

# **Almanach**

## **Aktuálne otázky svetovej ekonomiky a politiky**

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**Vedecký časopis  
Ročník XVIII.  
2/2023**



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**ALMANACH**  
**Actual Issues in World Economics and Politics**  
Scientific journal  
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# ALMANACH

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Vydavateľstvo EKONÓM, Ekonomická univerzita v Bratislave

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IČO 00 399 957

ISSN 1339-3502

## **Issues in 2023**

MARCH

SEPTEMBER

## **Obsah/Contents**

<b>Position of Women in the Ukrainian Armed Forces</b> <i>Postavenie žien v ukrajinských ozbrojených silách</i> Andrianna Baleha	<b>5</b>
<b>Afganský islamský emirát pod správou Talibanu –vnútorná obnova ako predpoklad návratu krajiny do medzinárodného spoločenstva</b> <i>The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan under the Government of the Taliban - Internal Reconstruction as a Prerequisite for the Country's Return to the International Community</i> Lubomír Čech	<b>16</b>
<b>Role of the Russian Federation in the Transnistrian Conflict</b> <i>Role Ruské federace ve válce v Podněstří</i> Ondřej Hynek – František Frolík – Peter Juza	<b>29</b>
<b>Severské štáty ako lídri v oblasti ochrany životného prostredia v Európe</b> <i>The Nordic Countries as Leader in the Field of Environmental Protection in Europe</i> Sabina Lacušová	<b>44</b>
<b>Meeting the Climate Goals During Armed Conflict. Analysis of the Russia-Ukraine war</b> <i>Spĺňanie klimatických cieľov počas ozbrojeného konfliktu. Analýza rusko-ukrajinskej vojny</i> Jakub Pernický	<b>61</b>

# **POSITION OF WOMEN IN THE UKRAINIAN ARMED FORCES**

## **POSTAVENIE ŽIEN V UKRAJINSKÝCH OZBROJENÝCH SILÁCH<sup>1</sup>**

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**Abstract:** The main research of the contribution is focused on the analysis of the position of women in the security sector of Ukraine from a qualitative and quantitative point of view. We will examine the course of this transformation from a historical point of view, from the formation of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in 1929, during the World War II, to the invasion of the Russian Federation in 2014 and the war attack in 2022. We have come to the conclusion that the process of feminization is underway in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which increases the quality of the given state structure and ensures equal rights and opportunities regardless of gender.

**Keywords:** Security system, Russia-Ukraine war, Female combatants, Ukraine

**JEL:** F51, F52

### **Introduction**

In the context of the war conflict, the issue of gender equality in Ukraine came to the fore not only in the opinion of society, but also in the political, legal, security, economic, social spheres, as well as in the media and scientific circles. The immediate presence of women on the front line for the protection and liberation of their country from the Russian occupation, transforms archaic social roles based on gender. Ukrainian society is not divided between women who are victims of war, refugees or exclusively civilians, and male combatants who perform their military duties. Currently, we see the process of militarization of the female part of Ukrainian society, their recognition as active and equal participants in the war conflict. The contribution of Ukrainian women as part of the armed forces is irreplaceable for the achievement of political and security goals.

The aim of this article is to point out the change in the position of women in the security sector of Ukraine, de jure and de facto, with the help of analysis. We will examine the course of this transformation from a historical point of view, from the formation of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in 1929, during the World War II, to the invasion of the Russian Federation in 2014 and the war attack in 2022. We will examine the issue from both a qualitative and quantitative point of view. Based on the information obtained, we will try to identify the benefit of feminization of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF).

### **1 The state of the solved problem at home and abroad**

In the article Ukrainian wartime policy and the construction of women's combatant status, Trisco Darden, J. (2023) explores the role of gender in designating individuals as civilians and as combatants in the military conflict in Ukraine. The author points to some discrimination towards men, since gender-political decisions have imposed the status of a combatant on men, while the status of a combatant for most women has become voluntary.

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<sup>1</sup> The article is processed within the project SLO10021GR3054 Women in foreign policy.

The historical side of the issue is dealt with by Kis, O. (2015) in the article National femininity used and contested: Women's participation in the nationalist underground in Western Ukraine during the 1940s-50s. She points to the marginalization and underestimation of the contribution of Ukrainian women to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and their role in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. The author casts doubt on the established view that women held only auxiliary and secondary positions in these organizations.

Berlinska, M., Martsenyuk, T., Kvit, A., and Grytsenko, G. (2016) conducted an empirical study-interview of 42 women who fought in the ATO and testified to the main problems pointed out by the respondents: women are actually not allowed to make decisions in the armed forces forces, many of them are not officially registered, and in fact, do not have the opportunity to receive adequate payment for their work and state benefits. The shortcomings were also noted at the household level: lack of specialized medical care for women, appropriate sizes of uniforms and shoes, unsatisfactory living conditions, which indicates that the infrastructure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is designed for the needs of men and excludes women with their specific needs from the army. However, a lot has changed since then, as many researchers point out.

Mosjondz, O. (2021) talks about the importance and implementation of the policy of gender equality in modern power structures of Ukraine. Increasing the gender competence of military professionals is one of the important directions of the development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the state's cooperation with international partners, since the number of women in these structures is constantly growing.

## **2 Woman as combatants according to international humanitarian law**

With the passage of time, the transformation of war conflicts takes place, which also implies the necessity of making changes to the laws and legal norms that regulate them. One of the most important issues of the given process is the regulation of the legal status of combatants and civilians, the accuracy of distinguishing one category from another. The emergence of new entities that participate in war conflicts, such as terrorist groups, representatives of private military and security companies, as well as the development of another alternative branch of warfare in cyberspace, speaks of the topicality of the given issue.

According to international humanitarian law, we can consider the following categories of persons as combatants:

- 1) "Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power."
- 2) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
- 3) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions: (a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) That of carrying arms openly; (d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
- 4) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to

form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.”<sup>2</sup>

According to Article 44 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted on 8 June 1977, “Any combatant, who falls into the power of an adverse Party shall be a prisoner of war.”<sup>3</sup>

In Section III (Treatment of persons in the power of party to the conflict) it is said that “Women whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related to the armed conflict shall be held in quarters separated from men’s quarters. They shall be under the immediate supervision of women.” Also “Women shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected in particular against rape, forced prostitution and any other form of indecent assault. The Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to avoid the pronouncement of the death penalty on pregnant women or mothers having dependent infants, for an offence related to the armed conflict. The death penalty for such offences shall not be executed on such women.”<sup>4</sup>

As we see in the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, the difference between the treatment of men and women only becomes annoying in the case of captivity. There is no gender difference in the definition of combatants.

The “exceptional” status of women has long been present in the Ukrainian Armed Forces and other military institutions. Ukrainian legislation significantly limited the participation of women in certain types of military assignments and the possibility of occupying certain job positions. This fact was in violation of international law, enshrined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 and established standards of other states. In addition, some of the then provisions of the Law of Ukraine on Military Conscription and Military Service violated the recommendations of the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces (CWINF). In order to change this discriminatory tendency and ensure gender equality in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in 2018 the Verkhovna Rada, the Ukrainian parliament, adopted Act No. 2523-VIII, which was signed by the then President Petro Poroshenko. In Art. 1 it is said that “Women perform military duty on an equal basis with men (with the exception of cases provided for by legislation on maternity and childhood protection, as well as the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex), which includes voluntary acceptance (under contract) and conscription, completing military service, serving in the military reserve, performing military duty in the reserve and observing the rules of military accounting.”<sup>5</sup>

Changes to the given law not only provide equal legal status for men and women in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but also the possibilities of its implementation. Nevertheless, women are provided with special protection during pregnancy, childbirth and breastfeeding, and the retirement age difference is also maintained, which is not considered discriminatory under the law.

In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the introduced changes to the gender state policy in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the UAF Scientific Research Center for Humanitarian Issues conducted a survey among members of the armed forces on gender issues in 2020. 1,802 soldiers took part in the survey, of which 1,360 were men, 411 were women and 31 were unspecified.

Based on the research, it was concluded that the staff considers itself to be sufficiently informed about gender issues. Around 64% of men and 60% of women agree that the principle

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<sup>2</sup> INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF RED CROSS (1949): Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention).

<sup>3</sup> INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF RED CROSS (1994): Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, p. 33.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 56.

<sup>5</sup> VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKRAINE (2018): Zakon Ukrayiny № 2523-VIII.

of equal rights and opportunities for women and men has been implemented in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. 63% of men and 66% of women agree that the introduced changes in OSU's gender policy are increasing women's opportunities. An interesting fact is that most of the soldiers interviewed said that the role of women in the armed forces of Ukraine has increased in recent years, both in daily activities and in the field of anti-terrorist operation (ATO) in the south-east of the country. The vast majority of respondents of both sexes pointed to the absence of cases of gender discrimination in the physical, emotional or economic sphere. Also, soldiers do not report cases of gender-based violence in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but around a quarter of women pointed out the presence of humiliation and insults by men. The respondents cited outdated traditions and the undervalued social role of women in Ukrainian society as the main reason for the persistence of certain forms of gender discrimination.<sup>6</sup>

The military attack of the Russian Federation on Ukraine in 2022 triggered significant transformational processes in society. According to First Lady Olena Zelenska, the war in Ukraine has a female form to a greater extent.<sup>7</sup> Women are not only victims of war, but represent a significant force of resistance. These processes are largely reflected in the position of women in Ukrainian society and subsequently also in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. According to Zelenska "For our women, military service is a voluntary choice, they honor our borders and fight on an equal footing with men."<sup>8</sup> Women in Ukraine demonstrate their leadership position in both the civilian and military spheres by their own actions.

### **3 The role of women in establishing the security of Ukraine - a historical digression**

The active position of women in Ukraine during the war conflict is not only a matter of the present. For many years, Ukrainian women participated in the creation of Ukrainian society, its identity, independence and freedom. Women played a significant role during the formation of protective military units and rebel groups to change political leaders and countering foreign invasions of Ukrainian territory.

From the beginning of the 1930s, a Ukrainian nationalist movement flourished in the western part of Ukraine, which fought against the Nazi occupiers and the Soviet regime. Young women aged 16-22 were actively involved in the given liberation movement, which was led by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The goal of the given organization was the establishment of the Ukrainian cathedral independent state, its preservation and development.

Ukrainian women were prepared both ideologically and practically for full participation in the subversive activities of the OUN. A large number of women, originally working in agriculture, gained the opportunity to acquire previously unavailable education in the fields of history, geography, medicine, journalism and publishing. In addition to the given general education knowledge, they had a solid foundation in nationalist ideology and the execution of espionage activities.

The mass involvement of girls and women in the nationalist underground movement overturned patriarchal ideas about their social role in society, status and contribution to the homeland. But it should be noted that despite this, women did not have influence and access to leading political and military positions and decisions.<sup>9</sup>

Another historical milestone in the transformation of the position of women in military conflict was the World War II. The participation of Soviet women in the regular army became

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<sup>6</sup> SCHEVCHUK, O. V. a kol. (2020): Stan realizaciji u Zbrojnych Sylach Ukrayiny hendernoji politiky derzhavy, p. 61.

<sup>7</sup> SCHEJKO, J. (2022): Zelenska: Zhinky zachyshchajut' Ukrayinu narivni z cholovikami.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> KIS, O. (2015): National femininity used and contested: Women's participation in the nationalist underground in Western Ukraine during the 1940s-50s., pp. 53-82.

a precedent. Around 800 thousand to 1 million women served in the Red Army and were in partisan units, and half of them used weapons and took direct part in hostilities. In 1943, women made up 8% of the Soviet army.<sup>10</sup> For comparison, in Germany and the United States of America, the number of women in the army was around 500,000.

Soviet women not only performed typical female tasks in air defense, radio communication or medical aid<sup>11</sup>, but also were snipers, military pilots, served in the navy or fought in partisan units. Thus, women were able to obtain military ranks on an equal footing with men. More than 150 thousand women were awarded combat orders and medals.<sup>12</sup>


About 127,000 women from Ukraine were part of the Red Army. And 27 of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.<sup>13</sup>

The examples of these women are of great importance for the transformation of Ukrainian society, awareness of one's identity and history. At the same time, they point to the long-term process of achieving gender equality not only in the security sphere, but also in other areas of social life.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in August 1991, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Act of Proclamation of Ukraine's Independence and Creation of an Independent Ukrainian State. 90.32% of the voters in the national referendum supported the given Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine.<sup>14</sup> After declaring independence, the government of Ukraine nationalized all Soviet military infrastructure facilities on its territory and subordinated all military formations stationed in Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada. Also in the same year (1991) the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine was created and the process of establishment began

“Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Republican Guard and the Supreme Guard unit Council, the Cabinet of Ministers and the National Bank of Ukraine.”<sup>15</sup> In 1991, the number of soldiers in the state reached around 900 thousand.<sup>16</sup> The next period we see a significant reduction in the number of soldiers in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This decrease is justified “optimization of their composition and number in accordance with the legally established indicators.”<sup>17</sup>

**Figure 1: Number of soldiers in the Armed Forces of Ukraine from 1991 to 2014**



Source: MINISTERSTVO OBORONY UKRAINY (2013): Vojenna istorija.

<sup>10</sup> SCHAJDE, K. (2015): Stalinski sokolici: radanski zhinki-lotchici u Chervonij armiji pid chas Druhoji Svitovoji vijni, p. 80.

<sup>11</sup> Women made up 40% of front-line doctors, paramedics, and health instructors.

<sup>12</sup> SIDKO, L. (2020): Zhinochi doli na vijni i pisla vijni.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> LITVIN, V. M. (2003): Akt proholoshenna nezalezhnosti Ukrayiny.

<sup>15</sup> VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKRAINE (1991): Postanova Verchovnoji Radi Ukrayiny Pro vijskovi formuvanna na Ukrajini № 1431-XII.

<sup>16</sup> LAZORKIN, V. (2011): Zbrojni Sylly Ukrayiny: 1991-2011.

<sup>17</sup> MINISTERSTVO OBORONY UKRAJINY (2012): Bila knyha – 2011. Zbrojni Sylly Ukrayiny, p. 26.

Unlike the total number of soldiers in the army, the dynamics of the development of the presence of women in the Armed Forces of Ukraine has a growing tendency. In 2006 in the Ukrainian army 19,186 women completed military service, including: officers – 1,145; warrant officers – 2,735 people; Sergeants and contract soldiers – 15,137 people; cadets – 169 people. The number of female employees of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (civil personnel) was 52,307.<sup>18</sup> In 2010, the Ukrainian army had about 50,000 women, including 1,500 officers and 14,500 sergeants and contract soldiers. In general, women in this year made up 13.5% of the number of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.<sup>19</sup> In 2013, the ratio of female and male military servicemen under contract was 27% and 73%, respectively.<sup>20</sup> Based on the available data, we can see the process of feminization of the Ukrainian army, but only in its initial stages.

#### **4 The status of women in the Armed Forces of Ukraine after the Russian invasion in 2014**

The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in February 2014, which grew into a military conflict in the east of Ukraine, pointed to significant shortcomings and destruction of the Ukrainian army. The units of the Armed Forces did not have a sufficient number of weapons and equipment, the personnel was poorly trained.<sup>21</sup> The number of personnel was also insufficient. However, the partial mobilization announced in March 2014 made it possible to increase the number of military personnel from 120,900 (as of the end of 2013) to 204,000 (as of the end of 2014).<sup>22</sup>

**Table 1: Tendency of the development of the position of women in the Ukrainian Armed Forces from 2014-2021**

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
The total number of military personnel	204 000	204 000	204 000	204 000	204 000	204 000	204 000	215 000
The total number of female military personnel	16 557	14 319	17 044	20 123	24 897	26 617	29 754	32 569
Share of women in UAF in %	8	7	8	10	12	13	15	15

Source: MARKEVYCH, K. (2022): Profesija viiskovoho v umovach zmin rynku praci v Ukrajini, p. 4.

As we can see in the table above, according to official data, the total number of soldiers in the Armed Forces of Ukraine from 2014 to 2020 did not change. In 2021, the number of the army was increased by 11 thousand soldiers. In contrast to the long-term constant tendency of the development of the total number of soldiers in the UAF, the share of women in the given military structure gradually increased.

The country's leadership strove to continue in a military policy that would aim to make service more attractive to women. In 2016 there was "revision of approaches to attracting women to military service and assigning them not only to staff, but also to command and combat positions (gunner, machine gunner, grenade launcher, positions in mortar crews and combat

<sup>18</sup> DUBCHAK, N. (2008): Zhinky u Zbrojnych Silach Ukrayiny: problemy gendernoji politiky, p. 188.

<sup>19</sup> KROTYKOV, V. P. – TOPALSKYJ, V. L. – MALUHA, V. M. (2011): Aktualni problemy gendernoji polityky u Zbrojnych Sylach Ukrayiny, p. 80.

<sup>20</sup> MINISTERSTVO OBORONY UKRAINY (2014): Bila knyha – 2013. Zbrojni Syly Ukrayiny, p. 26.

<sup>21</sup> MINISTERSTVO OBORONY UKRAINY (2013): Vojenna istorija.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

vehicle crews, unit commander, group commander, instructor.”<sup>23</sup> Even after this expansion, two-thirds of all military positions were closed to women.<sup>24</sup>

In 2018, the Ukrainian authorities adopted a law on ensuring equal rights and opportunities for both men and women during military service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations. As a result of this law, all military accounting specialties of private, non-commissioned and non-commissioned officers, including “combat” such as armored gunners, infantry commanders and snipers, became available for female servicemen.<sup>25</sup>

The feminization of the military sphere also takes place in the educational process. Gender aspects are taken into account in the system of training military personnel in the programs of educational disciplines of the humanitarian direction at the Military Institute of the Kyiv National University named after T.G. Shevchenko and the National Defense University of Ukraine named after Ivan Chernyakhovskyi. Starting in 2019, girls got the opportunity to enter military lyceums.<sup>26</sup> At Ivan Bohun Kyiv Military Lyceum, the number of female students increased from 5% in 2019 to 10% in 2022.<sup>27</sup>

Another important step towards ensuring gender equality in the military sphere of Ukraine was, for the first time in the history of the country, the participation of the combined women's unit in the celebrations of the 27th anniversary of Ukraine's independence in the military parade at the Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in Kyiv.<sup>28</sup>

In October 2021, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine adopted a regulation on the registration of women aged 18 to 60 in defined professions at the local military office. The goal of this registration was to create a suitable personalized record of women who have related military occupations. The listed professions included professions related to health education and related departments, such as dentistry, medicine, nursing, pharmacy, medical diagnosis and treatment technologies, physical rehabilitation, psychology and veterinary medicine. Science majors were also listed, including chemistry, biology, physics, geography, computer science, and bioengineering. Related specialties such as accounting and taxation, marketing, management, entrepreneurship, economics, finance, banking and insurance, publishing and printing, translation and food industry were also mentioned in the list.<sup>29</sup> In 2022, the list of specialties and/or professions related to the relevant military accounting specialties was supplemented. As in the case of the 2015 mobilization, the order on military registration in 2021 and 2022 did not require women to participate in hostilities and did not introduce a general conscription of women.<sup>30</sup> The given laws were adopted critically by the society, as a result the parliament agreed to amend legislation to make military registration for women voluntary, except for female medics.<sup>31</sup>

All the mentioned and other measures of the government led to an increase in the number of women in military service. In 2021 (table 1), the share of women in the total number of soldiers reached 15%. The Russian invasion on February 24, 2022 stimulated the entire Ukrainian society to defend its freedom and the country's independence. The number of women working in the Ukrainian Armed Forces has also grown significantly. As of March 1, 2023, the number of female servicemen in the UAF reached 42,898.<sup>32</sup> This is one of the highest indicators

<sup>23</sup> MINISTERSTVO OBORONY UKRAJINY (2017): Bila knyha – 2016. Zbrojni Sylly Ukrayiny, p. 57.

<sup>24</sup> DARDEN TRISKO, J. (2023): Ukrainian wartime policy and the construction of women's combatant status, p. 4.

<sup>25</sup> Nakaz Ministerstva oborony Ukrayiny № 627 vid 13.12.2018.

<sup>26</sup> MINISTERSTVO OBORONY UKRAJINY (2019): Bila knyha – 2018. Zbrojni Sylly Ukrayiny, p. 114.

<sup>27</sup> INTERFAX Ukrayina (2022): Podijji.

<sup>28</sup> MINISTERSTVO OBORONY UKRAJINY (2019): Bila knyha – 2018. Zbrojni Sylly Ukrayiny, p. 114.

<sup>29</sup> MINISTERSTVO OBORONY UKRAJINY (2021): Nakaz № 313 vid 11.10.2021.

<sup>30</sup> PRAVO UA (2021): Vijskovi oblik zhinok: koli i komu treba zjavitysa do vijskomatu.


<sup>31</sup> BBC NEWS UKRAJINA (2022): Rada zminyla poradok vijskovoho obliku dla zhinok. Dla koho vin obovjazkovij.

<sup>32</sup> UKRINFORM (2023): Kilkist zhinok-vijskovych u ZSU z 2014 roku zrosla u 2,5 raza.

of women in relation to the total number of troops, even among many armies of NATO countries.

An important change in the position of women in the Ukrainian Armed Forces also occurred from a qualitative point of view. The number of female officers has increased by 204% since 2014. In 2021, for the first time, a woman received the post of general. Tetyana Ostashchenko became the commander of the medical forces of the UAF.

**Figure 2: Number of female soldiers by rank in 2014 and 2020**



Source: MOSJONDZ, O. (2021): U nashomu vijsku sluzhit ponad 31 tysacha zhinok.

In the ranks of the Armed Forces, women are gun chiefs, platoon commanders, a lot of snipers and even deep-sea diving instructors. Oksana Grigoryeva, adviser on gender issues to the commander of the Ground Forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, notes that “many tank women are more nimble and smaller than men, and sometimes it is even more comfortable for them to be in a tank.“ According to her, in combat positions, women are often more psychologically stable than men and are more empathetic and sensitive when it comes to team relations and support of fellow soldiers.<sup>33</sup>

The wife of the President, Olena Zelenska, also noted the great role of Ukrainian women in resisting the Russian invasion: “They cannot be called passive victims, each of them has their own history of resistance. Most of our doctors are women. 50% of our entrepreneurs are women and they work to keep the economy going. More than a thousand women have already become commanders. Like history teacher Lyubov Plaksyuk - the first Ukrainian woman to head an artillery unit and now fighting in Donbas.”<sup>34</sup>

<sup>33</sup> KORBA, H. (2022): Ne ekzotyka, ale j ne norma. Jak zhinky zavojovujut svoje misce v ukrajinskij armiji.

<sup>34</sup> PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE (2022): Olena Zelenska delivered a speech at the international conference „Women in Conflicts“.

## Conclusion

The feminization of the security sector by the state has several reasons:

- 1) the involvement of a large part of a purposeful, motivated and competent society in the Armed Forces of Ukraine ensures an increase in the quality of the segment in particular;
- 2) the entry of brave, dedicated and qualified women into the armed forces not only solves the problem of shortage of personnel, but also increases the operational capabilities of the army;
- 3) the inclusion of women contributes to the destruction of the patriarchal logic of masculine defense, outdated approaches based on gender. To transform the existing system, you need to be inside this system.

In the Ukrainian Armed Forces, there are still many problems that female soldiers face in the army - from life, confined to men, to manifestations of sexism. But their role is becoming more and more visible, and Ukrainian society increasingly takes the idea of a woman in the army for granted.

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# **AFGANSKÝ ISLAMSKÝ EMIRÁT POD SPRÁVOU TALIBANU – VNÚTORNÁ OBNOVA AKO PREDPOKLAD NÁVRATU KRAJINY DO MEDZINÁRODNÉHO SPOLOČENSTVA<sup>1</sup>**

## **THE ISLAMIC EMIRATE OF AFGHANISTAN UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TALIBAN - INTERNAL RECONSTRUCTION AS A PREREQUISITE FOR THE COUNTRY'S RETURN TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY**

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**Abstrakt:** Historický vývoj Afganistanu vždy zásadným spôsobom ovplyvňovala otázka vztahu medzi ortodoxnými náboženskými postojmi a potrebou vypracovať a realizovať pragmatickú stratégiu sociálno-ekonomickeho rozvoja krajiny. Dva roky po návrate radikálneho islamského hnutia Taliban k moci sa Afganský islamský emirát nachádza v zložitej vnútorenej i medzinárodnej situácii. Vnútorné rozvrátenú krajinu, nachádzajúcu sa v medzinárodnej izolácii, čaká zložité obdobie postkonfliktnej obnovy a hľadania návratu k štandardnému spôsobu fungovania. Cieľom článku je poukázať na možnosti a limity obnovy a rekonštrukcie Afganského islamského emirátu s dôrazom na analýzu vnútorných aspektov tohto problému. Súčasne zdôrazňuje prepojenie požiadavky vnútornej stabilizácie a úsilia krajiny o návrat do štruktúr medzinárodného spoločenstva.

**Kľúčové slová:** Afganský islamský emirát, Taliban, sociálno-ekonomická stabilizácia

**JEL:** F5, A12, D04

**Abstract:** The historical development of Afghanistan has always been fundamentally influenced by the question of the relationship between orthodox religious attitudes and the need to develop and implement a pragmatic strategy for the country's socio-economic development. Two years after the return of the radical Islamic Taliban movement to power, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is in a difficult internal and international situation. The internally torn country, which is in international isolation, is facing a difficult period of post-conflict reconstruction and the search for a return to the standard way of functioning. The aim of the article is to point out the possibilities and limits of the restoration and reconstruction of the Afghan Islamic Emirate with an emphasis on analysing the internal aspects of this problem. At the same time, it emphasises the connection between the requirement for internal stabilisation and the country's efforts to return to the structures of the international community.

**Keywords:** Afghan Islamic Emirate, Taliban, Socio-Economic Stabilization

**JEL:** F5, A12, D04

### **Úvod**

Afganistan patrí k najchudobnejším krajinám nielen v Ázii, ale aj na celom svete. Problém Afganistanu je spojený s celým radom rôznorodých bezpečnostných a rozvojových problémov, ktoré sa dotýkajú samotného Afganistanu, aj jeho susedov. V medzinárodných indexoch sa Afganistan zaraďuje medzi najnebezpečnejšie krajiny na svete. V indexe Global

<sup>1</sup> Príspevok bol spracovaný v rámci projektu VEGA 1/0842/21: Vývoj kooperatívnej bezpečnosti a pozícia Slovenskej republiky.

Peace sa nachádza na poslednom mieste za Jemenom a Sýriou, čo je pokles o päť miest v porovnaní s rokom 2020 (údaj 2021). Okrem toho problém Afganistanu zahŕňa mnohé kultúrno-antropologické, historické, sociálno-ekonomicke, demografické, politické, náboženské, inštitucionálne, geostrategické a iné dimenzie, ktoré spolu úzko súvisia, ale majú nezávislú logiku a dynamiku vývoja.

Drvivá väčšina odborníkov komentujúcich dramatické udalosti v Afganistane v roku 2021 dnes doslova súperí v zostavovaní zoznamov početných výziev a hrozieb, ktoré z tejto krajiny vychádzajú alebo by potenciálne mohli vychádzať. Hovorí sa o:

- a) o nebezpečenstve medzinárodného terorizmu,
- b) o perspektívach niekoľkomiliónových tokov utečencov a vnútorné vysídlených osôb,
- c) o možnom náraste produkcie afganských drog,
- d) o problémoch cezhraničnej kriminality,
- e) o Afganistane ako „zlyhávajúcim štátom“,
- f) o humanitárnej katastrofe v niektorých provinciách alebo v národnom meradle,
- g) o negatívnych dôsledkoch zmeny moci v Afganistane pre Blízky východ, Strednú a južnú Áziu, ako aj pre medzinárodný systém všeobecne.

Bolužiať, väčšina identifikovaných výziev a hrozieb je príliš reálna na to, aby sme ich jednoducho ignorovali. Pri zohľadnení dôrazu na prevažne negatívne scenáre vývoja treba povedať, že volanie po obozretnosti je na mieste.<sup>2</sup>

Nemenej pozornosti si však zaslúžia aj alternatívne, optimistické scenáre vývoja udalostí v Afganistane a v jeho susedstve. V každej krízovej situácii je vždy užitočné identifikovať nielen riziká, ale aj príležitosti, diskutovať nielen o budúcich problémoch, ale aj o ich preferovaných riešeniach. História pozná veľa prípadov, keď národy, spoločnosti a štáty našli východisko z najťažších situácií a preukázali úžasné vynaliezavosť, vitalitu a presvedčivo vyvrátili pochmúrne proroctvá.

Hľadanie univerzálneho riešenie problémov Afganistanu je takmer nemožné. Môžeme hovoriť len o vyhliadkach na minimalizáciu nebezpečenstiev a hrozieb, ktorým je dnes vystavené obyvateľstvo samotného Afganistanu, susedné štáty a medzinárodné spoločenstvo ako celok.<sup>3</sup> Optimistické scenáre vývoja udalostí vychádzajú z predpokladu, že táto minimalizácia nebezpečenstiev a hrozieb, aj keď bude náročná, je v zásade možná ak interní a externí hráči na afganskej scéne zaujmú realistické postoje k rovnováhe toho, čo sa chce a čo je možné, zbavia sa nereálnych očakávaní a budú sa usilovať o rozumný kompromis medzi sebou. Akýkolvek takýto kompromis celkom iste nebude ideálnym riešením a každá jeho podoba bude zrejme kritizovaná. Napriek tomu bude lepší nedokonalý kompromis, než nová konfrontácia. Veriť, že hned po odchode medzinárodných koaličných síl z Afganistanu sa situácia v krajinе začne meniť k lepšiemu, by bolo vrcholom naivitu. Naopak, existujú dôvody pre zhoršenie ekonomických, sociálnych, politických a iných problémov krajiny. V každom prípade Afganistan čakajú ľažké časy, a to aj v situácii, že súčasná vláda a hlavní externí hráči majúci vplyv na situáciu v krajinе neurobia vážne chyby. Rôzna však môže byť dĺžka akútneho štadia krízy, ako aj následná trajektória vývoja krajinu.<sup>4</sup>

Afganistan musí vyriešiť viacero vnútorných problémov, ktorých riešenie je nevyhnutné nielen pre vnútornú stabilizáciu krajinu, ale aj pre jej návrat do štruktúr súčasného medzinárodného spoločenstva. Najlepším riešením by bola spoločná vízia pozitívnej budúcnosti Afganistanu, ktorá by sa stala významným motivačným faktorom pre rôzne politické sily v krajinе, ako aj pre medzinárodných partnerov. Je však spoločná vízia reálna?

<sup>2</sup> Afghanistan's Security Challenges under the Taliban (2022). [online].

<sup>3</sup> ČECH, I. (2015): Vozmožnosti i predely razvitija ekonomiki Afganistana posle 2014 goda. s. 85-95.

<sup>4</sup> LOMBARDI, C. B. – MARCH, A. F. (2022): Afghan Taliban Views on Legitimate Islamic Governance. Certainties, Ambiguities and Areas for Compromise. s. 7-14.

Rozdiely sú zatial' príliš veľké. Sme toho názoru, že skôr pôjde o pripravenosť formovať postupnými krokmi konštruktívne vzťahy. V prípade, že dôjde k vnútornému uzatváraniu sa krajiny, bude proces jej návratu do štruktúr medzinárodného spoločenstva komplikovaný. Na druhej strane určitý stupeň otvorenosti afganského režimu by zvýšil šancu pre postupné zmiernenie vnútropolitickej rigidity.

V tomto procese považujeme za dôležité, aby sa v blízkej budúcnosti hlavní účastníci prebiehajúceho procesu riešenia afganskej otázky vyhli nenapraviteľným chybám, ktoré by mohli viesť k obnoveniu občianskej vojny, k sociálno-ekonomickej kolapsu Afganistanu a k zachovaniu nebezpečného ohniska instability v centre Eurázie na dlhé obdobie.

Cieľom článku je poukázať na možnosti a limity obnovy a rekonštrukcie Afganského islamského emirátu po návrate Talibánu k moci. Dôraz kladie na vnútorné aspekty tohto problému, ktorý bude determinujúci aj pre zaradenie krajiny do štruktúr medzinárodného spoločenstva.

Metodologický prístup ku spracovaniu článku bol určovaný snahou o jeho obsahové naplnenie v súlade s cieľom a zvolenou štruktúrou. Vzhľadom na multidisciplinárny charakter skúmanej problematiky, sme sa rozhodli využiť ako metódu medzinárodnú politickú sociológiu.<sup>5</sup> Zahrnuje a spája možnosti analýzy a komparácie týkajúce sa zahraničnej politiky štátu, vnútornej politiky štátu, bezpečnosti, náboženských a sociálno-ekonomických interakcií ovplyvňujúcich riešenie afganskej problematiky. Situácia v Afganistane za ostatné roky prechádzala takou dynamikou zmien, že jej skúmanie vyžaduje interdisciplinárny prístup. To umožňuje práve medzinárodná politická sociológia, obsahujúca analýzy množstva autorov. Práve Didier Bigo predstavuje syntézu potrebnú pri hodnotení spracúvanej problematiky, pretože jeho prístup umožňuje využiť logickú postupnosť skúmania. V prvom rade určuje habitus miesta a času, ďalším krokom je charakteristika vonkajšieho a vnútorného prostredia štátu v súvislosti so zmenami vnútornej a zahraničnej politiky i bezpečnostné, ekonomické, demografické a náboženské faktory, ktoré sú určujúce pre tieto zmeny. Tento metodologický postup nám umožňuje vykonať záverečnú syntézu skúmania i náčrt možností, aké má Afganistan v budúcnosti z hľadiska vnútornej obnovy a svojho zaradenia do systému medzinárodných vzťahov.

## 1. Sociálno-ekonomická stabilizácia Afganistanu ako predpoklad riešenia jeho vnútorných problémov

Ako sme uviedli v úvode, Afganistan je jednou z najchudobnejších krajín nielen v Ázii, ale na celom svete. A to napriek tomu, že:

- krajina má priaznivú geografickú polohu na križovatke euroázijských obchodných ciest,
- disponuje veľkými zásobami nerastných surovín (med', zlato, ropa a plyn, urán, bauxit, zinok, uhlie, železná ruda, kovy vzácnych zemín),
- má pôdu vhodnú na poľnohospodársku činnosť.

Najmenej polovica obyvateľov Afganistanu žije v chudobe. Z hľadiska detskej úmrtnosti je krajina na prvom mieste na svete a z hľadiska priemernej dĺžky života (53 rokov) jedna z posledných. Populačný rast v Afganistane (2,33 %) je zároveň jeden z najvyšších na svete a počet obyvateľov krajiny sa blíži k 40 miliónom. Očakáva sa, že do konca storočia bude v Afganistane žiť asi 75 miliónov ľudí.<sup>6</sup>

Časovanou bombou pri riešení sociálno-ekonomickej krízy spoločnosti je problém vnútorne vysídlených osôb. Hovoríme o ľuďoch, ktorí sú zbavení trvalej práce, akýchkol'iek sociálnych záruk a často aj základného bývania. Procesy vnútorej migrácie pokračujú a počet vnútore vysídlených osôb narastá: celkový počet vnútore vysídlených osôb je 3,5 milióna

<sup>5</sup> BIGO, D. (2016): International Political Sociology: Transversal Lines.

<sup>6</sup> Population Pyramids of the World from 1950 to 2100. Afganistan (2023). Afghanistan 2100. [online].

ľudí, čo je takmer 1/10 z celkového počtu obyvateľov krajiny.<sup>7</sup> Títo ľudia sa sústredia najmä na okraji veľkých miest, čím vytvárajú dodatočnú záťaž pre mestskú infraštruktúru a predstavujú vhodnú cieľovú skupinu pre kriminálne a radikálne politické skupiny.

Krajina zostáva prakticky vylúčená z medzinárodnej del'by práce. Jej celkový „legálny“ export sotva presahuje 700 miliónov dolárov ročne.<sup>8</sup> Podľa rôznych odhadov sa potreby externého financovania pohybujú od 1 do 2 miliárd USD mesačne alebo 12 až 24 miliárd USD ročne. Afganistan zostáva jedným z hlavných príjemcov zahraničnej pomoci.<sup>9</sup> Za posledné dve desaťročia bol napríklad najväčším príjemcom technickej pomoci Európskej únie.<sup>10</sup> Významnú časť devízových príjmov v krajine tvoria aj príjmy z exportu drog (až 2 – 3 miliardy dolárov ročne)<sup>11</sup> a z transferov financií afganských diaspor zo zahraničia.

S touto realitou sa bude musieť vysporiadať každá vláda v Kábule a hlavnou úlohou každej vlády v Afganistane bude vypracovať a zrealizovať úspešný projekt sociálno-ekonomickej modernizácie krajiny. V priebehu minulého storočia sa tento problém snažili vyriešiť rôzne politické režimy, no doterajšie výsledky týchto pokusov boli sklamaním. Nedostatok viditeľného pokroku v zlepšovaní životných podmienok nevyhnutne povedie k poklesu popularity úradov, posilneniu opozičných síl a v konečnom dôsledku k ďalšej zmene politického režimu.

Úspešnosť sociálno-ekonomickej modernizácie krajiny sa bude odvíjať od viacerých vnútorných faktorov, ktoré súvisia s dominanciou hnutia Taliban v afganskej spoločnosti a s vyváženosťou náboženskej ideológie a politického pragmatizmu v stratégii a taktike tohto hnutia. Prevzatím kontroly nad Kábulom v auguste 2021 sa Taliban dostał svojím spôsobom do pasce, ktorú si sám pripravil. Na jednej strane sa vláda Talibanu snaží o medzinárodnú legitimitu, predovšetkým kvôli peniazom, ktoré krajina zúfalo potrebuje. Na druhej strane títo nasledovníci deobandského smeru islamu nechcú robiť vážne kompromisy vo svojej doktríne.

Viacero otázok týkajúcich sa charakteristik orgánov zriadených v Afganistane koncom leta a začiatkom jesene 2021 zostáva stále otvorených:

- Ako veľmi sa súčasný Taliban líši od Talibanu z konca minulého storočia?<sup>12</sup>
- Aká je rovnováha náboženskej ideológie a politického pragmatizmu v stratégii a taktike tohto hnutia?
- Ako veľmi je stabilná podpora Talibanu zo strany rôznych sociálnych, etnických a regionálnych skupín afganského obyvateľstva?
- Aké sú skutočné mobilizačné schopnosti súčasných sil stojacich proti Talibanu?

Získanie odpovedí na uvedené otázky do značnej miery ovplyvní budúce afganské smerovanie. Do akej miery prvé verejné vyhlásenia lídrov Talibanu odrážali skutočné plány a priority novej vlády v Afganistane už vieme po takmer dvoch rokoch posúdiť. Súčasná vládna garnitúra deklaruje svoje pranie nadviazať normálne vzťahy s medzinárodným spoločenstvom. Respektuje diplomatické misie, ktoré zostali v Kábule a ostatné diplomatické kontakty rieši cez kanceláriu v Dauhe. Delegácie Talibanu navštívili Moskvu a Ankaru a niekoľko zahraničných delegácií bolo v Kábule.<sup>13</sup> V ostatnom čase mimoriadne zvýšili kontakty s Afganistanom stredoázijské štáty, najmä Uzbekistan a Kazachstan.<sup>14</sup> Taliban je aktívny v komunikácii s OSN a v kontaktach so zahraničnými predstaviteľmi vyhlasuje, že z územia Afganistanu nehrozia

<sup>7</sup> Afghanistan: More than \$1bn pledged for Afghanistan (2021). [online].

<sup>8</sup> Štruktúra afganského exportu: 45 % tvoria koberce, 31 % sušené ovocie a 12 % liečivé rastliny (pozn. autora).

<sup>9</sup> V súvislosti s Afganistanom sa v tomto kontexte (nie vždy v pozitívnych konotáciách) hovorí o „syndróme natiahnutej ruky“ (pozn. autora)

<sup>10</sup> International Partnerships. Afghanistan. European Commission (2023). [online].

<sup>11</sup> ČECH, L. (2020): Afganský drogový priemysel ako limitujúci faktor postkonfliktnej obnovy krajiny. s. 7-11.

<sup>12</sup> AHMED, Z. Sh. (2021): Is There A ‘New’ Taliban in Afghanistan? [online].

<sup>13</sup> JUZA, P. (2020): Politické pohyby v Strednej Ázii. s. 5-6; JUZA, P. (2021): Stredoázijské súvislosti 2020 – 2021.

<sup>14</sup> JUZA, P. (2023): Kábul na biznis návšteve v Astane. [online].

žiadne hrozby pre iné štáty a tiež deklaruje svoj zámer bojať proti drogám. Nastoluje otázku uznávania, nadväzovania kontaktov a rozmrazovania aktív Afganistanu v cudzích krajinách, ako aj zrušenia medzinárodných sankcií proti Talibanu. Deklaratórnemu charakteru zahranično-politických vyhlásení však doposiaľ chýbajú aj konkrétnie praktické kroky, ktoré presvedčia zahraničie o ich úprimnosti.

## 2. Klúčové faktory vnútornej stabilizácie Afganistanu

Za klúčové faktory vnútornej stabilizácie Afganistanu považujeme:

- riešenie tribálneho/kmeňového faktora;<sup>15</sup>
- riešenie problému tzv. strategickej autonómie;
- riešenie premeny vojenského víťazstva na mocenskú politickú kontrolu;
- riešenie úspešnosti budovania islamského emirátu cestou hľadania celonárodnej občianskej identity a zaistenie reprezentatívnosti novej vlády;
- riešenie sporu Taliban verus ISIS – Chorasán a al-Káida;<sup>16</sup>
- riešenie hrozby sociálno-ekonomickej kolapsu krajiny;
- riešenie „drogovej závislosti“ krajiny.

*Riešenie tribálneho/kmeňového faktora.* Rozšírený afganský kmeňový systém a absencia výraznej národnej identity boli a zostávajú vážnou prekážkou sociálnej mobilizácie, bez ktorej je ľahké počítať s úspechom akéhokoľvek modernizačného projektu. Tento faktor do značnej miery ovplyvní schopnosť Talibanu upevniť štátnu moc v krajinе (mat' celé územie Afganistanu pod svojou politickou a vojenskou kontrolou, vrátane tých vzdialených provincií, ktoré sa tradične podriadovali Kábulu len nominálne). Táto úloha je ľahká najmä pre Paštúnov, ktorí sice tvrdia, že sú štátotvorným etnikom, no napriek tomu vždy odolávali akýmkoľvek zásahom vychádzajúcich z Kábulu. Rozšírený afganský kmeňový systém a absencia výraznej národnej identity boli a zostávajú vážnou prekážkou sociálnej mobilizácie, bez ktorej je ľahké počítať s úspechom akéhokoľvek modernizačného projektu.

*Riešenie problému tzv. strategickej autonómie.* Vojenské úspechy Talibanu v lete 2021 do určitej miery súviseli aj so „strategickou autonómiou“ jednotlivých skupín v rámci hnutia, čo im umožnilo konáť nezávisle od seba a samostatne sa rozhodovať v rýchlo sa meniaci situácii. Efektívna decentralizácia, ktorá nebránila koordinácii akcií jednotlivých skupín Talibanu, mimoriadne stížila starej vláde v Kábule a silám medzinárodnej koalície „konečný“ zásah proti Talibanu. V nových podmienkach sa však táto „strategická autonómia“ môže zmeniť z výhody na vážnu nevýhodu. Rýchle potlačenie jediného významného ohniska odporu v Pandžírskom údolí svedčí skôr o slabosti odporcov Talibanu ako o sile Talibanu samotného.<sup>17</sup>

*Premena vojenského víťazstva na mocenskú politickú kontrolu.* Premenit' vojenské víťazstvá na udržateľnú mocenskú politickú kontrolu nie je také jednoduché, o čom sa Taliban mohol presvedčiť aj po tom, čo sa prvýkrát dostal k moci v roku 1996. Rýchla územná expanzia Talibanu v lete 2021, ktorá prekvapila viacerých vojenských expertov, ešte nezarúcuje Talibanu, že zavedie účinnú administratívu dokonca aj v prevažne paštúnskych vidieckych oblastiach Afganistanu. Efektívna každodenná kontrola veľkých miest je ešte ľahšou úlohou.

*Riešenie úspešnosti budovania islamského emirátu cestou hľadania celonárodnej občianskej identity a zaistenie reprezentatívnosti novej vlády.* Po udalostiach revolučných dní a opäťovnom prevzatí moci vzniká potreba každodennej práce na vytvorení islamského emirátu

<sup>15</sup> CREWS, R. D. (2021): The Challenge of Taliban Ideology for International Politics: Religious Competition, Counterterrorism, and the Search for Legitimacy. s. 50-66.

<sup>16</sup> GIUSTOZZI, A. (2018): The Islamic State in Khorasan: Afghanistan, Pakistan and the New Central Asian Jihad. s. 30-45.

<sup>17</sup> GIUSTOZZI, A. (2021): The Lessons Not Learned: Afghanistan After the Fall of Panjshir. [online].

a tátó práca prináša veľa kontroverzností. To, ako sa ich podarí riešiť sa môže značne lísiť v závislosti od špecifík politickej taktiky, ktorú si nová vláda zvolí. Taliban získal krajinu v lepšom stave, ako pri prvom uchopení moci v Kábule v roku 1996, keď bola značná časť mestskej infraštruktúry úplne fyzicky zničená.<sup>18</sup> Je pravdepodobné, že otvorení a skrytí odporcovia režimu sa pokúsia vyvolať nepokoje a protesty, čím režim prinútia k novým represiam. Nie je vylúčená ani pomoc opozičným skupinám zo zahraničia. Nevyhnutným predpokladom naplnenia pozitívneho scenára treba považovať kooptáciu reprezentatívnych politických hnutí Tadžíkov, Uzbekov a ďalších veľkých etnických skupín,<sup>19</sup> ako aj šíitskej menšiny Hazárov<sup>20</sup> do mocenského systému.

Paštúni tvoria o niečo viac ako 40 % celkovej populácie Afganistanu, a preto akýkoľvek politický systém vybudovaný iba na etnickom paštúnskom nacionálizme bude nielen vnútorne nestabilný, ale v očiach afganskej väčšiny aj nie celkom legítimny. Paštúnska etnokracia nevyhnutne spôsobí skrytý alebo dokonca otvorený konflikt s Pakistanom, pretože bude priamo alebo nepriamo žiť paštúnsky separatizmus v tejto krajine. (Paštúni sú po Pandžábcach druhou najväčšou etnickou skupinou v Pakistane).

Z národného a etnického hľadiska je Afganistan do istej miery podobný susednému Iránu, kde etnickí Iránci (Peržania) tvoria približne polovicu obyvateľstva krajiny. Po revolúcii v roku 1979 sa v krajine vytvoril zložitý, ale svojím spôsobom efektívny systém zabezpečujúci zastúpenie etnických menších v politickej a ekonomickej moci. V tomto zmysle, so všetkými nepochybými rozdielmi medzi týmito dvoma krajinami, skúsenosti s budovaním štátu v Iránskej islamskej republike môžu byť užitočné pre moderný Afganistan.

Význam širokého politického zastúpenia pri moci v Afganistane možno ilustrovať na negatívnom príklade predchádzajúceho vedenia krajiny. Prezident Ašraf Ghani bol pred svojím útekom z Kábulu považovaný za legítimnu hlavu štátu, keďže v slobodných a demokratických voľbách v septembri 2019 získal väčšinu hlasov. Jeho víťazstvo však nebolo príliš presvedčivé: získal len 50,64 % hlasov, čím sa tesne vyhol druhému kolu hlasovania. Na voľbách sa zúčastnilo približne 1,8 milióna voličov, čo je mimoriadne nízke číslo na krajinu s 37,5 miliónmi ľudí.<sup>21</sup> V skutočnosti vo voľbách v roku 2019 podporil Ašrafa Ghaního menej ako milión Afgancov. Možno sa čudovať, že v lete 2021 afganská spoločnosť neprejavila žiadnu túžbu brániť svojho „legítimného“ vodcu proti uzurpátorom reprezentovaným Talibantom?

Zostavenie prvej vlády Afganistanu v septembri 2021 nepotvrdilo optimistické očakávania zahraničných odborníkov a politikov ohľadom reprezentatívnosti novej vlády. Napriek všeobecnému očakávaniu vládu neviedol umierený Abdulghaní Baradar, ale radikálnejší Mohammad Hasan Achunzáda (jeden zo zakladateľov modernej afganskej verzie „deobandizmu“ – militantného smeru v rámci islamského fundamentalizmu). Najviac alarmujúcim bolo vymenovanie Sirádžuddína Haqqáního (jedného z najradikálnejších bojovníkov Talibantu) za ministra vnútra novej vlády.

*Riešenie sporu Taliban versus ISIS – Chorasán<sup>22</sup> a al-Káida.<sup>23</sup>* Nemenej dôležitým predpokladom stabilizácie situácie je úspešnosť Talibantu pri potlačení alebo aspoň neutralizácii buniek jeho politických konkurentov – zástupcov ISIS (tzv. ISIS – Chorasán) a al- Káidy. V Afganistane sa nachádza asi 1 500 – 2 400 militantov ISIS – Chorasán, ktorí operujú najmä

<sup>18</sup> ZAMAREVA, N. (2021): Islamskij emirat Afganistan – kurs na legitimaciu vlasti. [online].

<sup>19</sup> LIEVEN, A. (2021): Who are the Islamic State in Afghanistan? [online].

<sup>20</sup> BALOCH, Sh. M. (2021): Hazara Shias flee Afghanistan fearing Taliban persecution. [online].

<sup>21</sup> SHALIZI, H. – SEDIQI, A. Q. (2019): Afghanistan's Ghani claims narrow win in preliminary presidential vote results. [online].

<sup>22</sup> LIEVEN, A. (2021): Who are the Islamic State in Afghanistan? [online].

<sup>23</sup> PHILP, C. (2021): Terrorist elite set free from Afghan Guantanamo Bay. [online].

v provinciách Nangarhár a Kunar na východe krajiny.<sup>24</sup> Činnosť skupiny dosiahla svoj vrchol v roku 2018, potom výrazne poklesla, a to aj v dôsledku častejších stretov s Talibonom. Napriek demonštračným a odstraňujúcim operáciám s cieľom vyvolať široký politický ohlas (príkladom toho boli výbuchy na kábulskom letisku počas evakuácie amerických jednotiek), sú aktivity týchto skupín obmedzené. Ich bezprostredným terčom zrejme nebudú cudzie štáty (jednoducho na to nemajú dosť síl), ale predstavitelia umierneného krídla vo vedení samotného Talibana.<sup>25</sup>

Taliban nemá dôvod konáť s ISIS – Chorasán „v rukavičkách“ aj preto, že nie je paštúnskou organizáciou. V jeho radoch pôsobia Pakistanci, ale aj Ujguri, Turci, Iránci, Indonézania, príslušníci štátov Strednej Ázie, Severného Kaukazu a dokonca aj západnej Európy. Vážnym zdrojom posilnenia ISIS – Chorasán v Afganistane boli veľké porážky, ktoré utrpel Islamský štát v Iraku a Sýrii.<sup>26</sup> Úspech Talibana v konfrontácii s ISIS – Chorasán nezávisí ani tak od účinnosti protiteroristických operácií, ale od schopnosti Talibana transformovať sa z prevažne paštúnskeho hnutia na afganské, keďže ISIS – Chorasán bude pravdepodobne mimoriadne aktívny pri nábore nových bojovníkov z neafganských etnických skupín.

V prípade al-Káidy je situácia oveľa komplikovanejšia. Vzájomnú konkurenciu často sprevádzala aktívna a komplexná spolupráca počas veľmi dlhého obdobia. Treba poznamenať, že niekoľko úspešných amerických operácií na elimináciu vodcov al-Káidy v Afganistane a v Pakistane uskutočnených za posledných 20 rokov nedokázalo úplne eliminovať hrozbu zo strany tejto teroristickej organizácie. Stratu základnej infraštruktúry v Afganistane, vybudovanej počas rokov prvej vlády Talibana (1996 – 2001), dokázala al-Káida čiastočne získať späť rozmiestnením širokej decentralizovanej siete buniek v celej južnej Ázii. Veľkú úlohu zohrala najmä pri vytváraní a rozvoji pakistanského Talibana (Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan – TTP) a tiež organizovania regionálnej teroristickej siete al-Káida na indickom subkontinente (AQIS – Al Qáïda in the Indian Subcontinent), ktorá je v súčasnosti prítomná takmer vo všetkých juhoázijských krajinách.<sup>27</sup>

Časť afganských ozbrojených skupín striedavo pôsobila pod zástavami al-Káidy a Talibana, pričom svoju príslušnosť menila v závislosti od vznikajúcej vojenskej situácie a politickej situácie. Zatiaľ nie je jasné, či je súčasný Taliban pripravený neutralizovať bunky al-Káidy v Afganistane, alebo naopak tieto bunky vezme pod svoju ochranu. V každom prípade, počas rokovaní s Američanmi v Dauhe v roku 2020 sa lídri hnutia napriek pretrvávajúcemu tlaku zo strany Spojených štátov dôsledne vyhýbali prípadným záväzkom zo strany ich budúcej vlády v tomto smere.<sup>28</sup>

Maximálne, čo lídri Talibana slúbili medzinárodnému spoločenstvu, bolo zabrániť využívaniu územia Afganistanu na plánovanie a vykonávanie teroristických činov či iných podvratných operácií proti susedným štátom. Čažko povedať, nakoľko to bude fungovať vo vzťahu k al-Káide. Medzi odborníkmi panujú obavy, že táto organizácia sa skôr či neskôr vráti k praktikám rozsiahlych teroristických činov na Západe a predovšetkým v USA.<sup>29</sup>

V ISIS – Chorasán dúfajú, že Taliban sa bude ľažko rozhodovať o konečnom výbere a ich odmietnutie al-Káidy nevyhnutne povedie k poklesu popularity Talibana, najmä medzi nepaštúnskymi etnickými skupinami. To by znamenalo vytvorenie ďalších príležitostí na podporu štruktúr Islamského štátu v krajinе.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>24</sup> XIN, L. – YUNYI, B. – WENWEN, W. (2021): China urges terrorist crackdown by Taliban, as Kabul deadly blasts exemplify US failure. [online].

<sup>25</sup> DOXSEE, C. – THOMPSON, J. (2021): Examining Extremism: Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). [online].

<sup>26</sup> KAZANCEV, A. (2021): Krízis v Afganistane: problemy bezopasnosti Rossiji i stran Central'noj Azii. [online]..

<sup>27</sup> SAYED, A. (2021): IntelBrief: The Past, Present, and Future of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. [online]..

<sup>28</sup> CURTIS, L. (2021): Taliban Ascendance in Afghanistan Risks Return of Global Terrorist Hub. [online].

<sup>29</sup> BARAKAT, M. (2021): CIA veteran: Al-Qaeda will rebuild within Afghanistan, seek to attack US again. [online]..

<sup>30</sup> DORSEY, J. M. (2021): AfPak takes on a new meaning with the rise of the Taliban. [online].

*Riešenie hrozby sociálno-ekonomického kolapsu krajiny.* Okrem riešenia otázok upevnenia politickej moci a vytlačenia konkurenčných fundamentalistických politických projektov z krajiny ide o ďalší problém, ktorý musí Taliban riešiť. Táto úloha vyžaduje udržať v krajine aspoň časť tej vrstvy technokratických manažérov, ktorá sa vytvorila počas dvoch desaťročí zahraničnej vojenskej prítomnosti v krajine. Týchto odhadom 50 – 100 tisíc ľudí za starého režimu pracovalo v mestskej správe, finančnom systéme, zdravotníctve a školstve, ale aj v súkromnom sektore a think-tankoch.

V záujme zachovania toho, čo by sme mohli nazvať „technickou inteligenciou“, bude musieť Taliban nielen ponúknúť atraktívne pracovné podmienky pre technokratov, ale aj nejakým spôsobom ustúpiť od najkonzervatívnejších interpretácií práva šari'a a to minimálne vo veľkých mestách a v Kábule. Netreba zabúdať, že Afganistan sa za posledných dvadsať rokov veľmi zmenil. Priemerný vek obyvateľov krajiny je menej ako 20 rokov, čo znamená, že takmer polovica Afgancov sa narodila po roku 2001 a pre túto vekovú skupinu je predchádzajúca vláda Talibanu a sovietska intervencia hlbokom minulosťou.

Za posledných 20 rokov sa v krajine výrazne rozšírila mestská populácia (27 % Afgancov dnes žije v mestách) a procesy spontánnej urbanizácie postupujú veľmi vysokým tempom. Zvýšila sa aj miera gramotnosti a v roku 2021 dosiahla 40 %. V oblasti emancipácie žien došlo k výraznému pokroku. Pred nastolením vlády súčasného Talibanu tvorili ženy najmenej jednu tretinu všetkých študentov v afganskom stredoškolskom a vysokoškolskom systéme a približne rovnakým podielom sa angažovali v štátnej administratíve.<sup>31</sup>

Všetky tieto dlhodobé sociálne zmeny nemožno ignorovať a je veľmi tăžké ich zvrátiť. V každom prípade nebude možné oživiť Afganistan na úroveň konca minulého storočia, aj keby si takú úlohu stanobil dnešný Taliban. Existuje názor, že Taliban bude musieť vo všeobecnosti umožniť paralelnú existenciu dvoch spôsobov života: liberálnejšieho pre veľké mestá a konzervatívnejšieho pre vidiecke oblasti. Na druhej strane sa niektorí odborníci domnievajú, že k zavedeniu prísnych noriem šaría a pravidiel správania skôr či neskôr dôjde. Tento proces bude podľa nich dost' zdĺhayvý, bude mať niekoľko po sebe nasledujúcich etáp, no nakoniec povedie k podobnej situácii ako na konci 90. rokov minulého storočia.<sup>32</sup>

Budúcnosť ukáže, aká bude prax, no už dnes je jasné, že rýchly a bezbolestný návrat Afganistanu do noriem tradičnej islamskej spoločnosti sa neočakáva. Pre novú vládu v krajine by mohla byť zaujímacia skúsenosť susedného Iránu, kde sa normy islamského tradicionalizmu zložito spájajú s mnohými charakteristikami modernej postindustriálnej spoločnosti 21. storočia.

*Riešenie „drogovej závislosti“ krajiny.* Nadviazanie konštruktívneho vzťahu medzi novým režimom v Kábule a medzinárodným spoločenstvom bude tăžké, ak Taliban nedosiahne viditeľný pokrok v boji proti obchodovaniu s drogami. Produkcia drog v Afganistane od roku 2001 neustále rástla a v polovici minulého desaťročia dosiahla takmer 700 ton heroínu a 7 tisíc ton ópia ročne. Vývoz opiatov z Afganistanu sa počas dvadsaťročnej prítomnosti zahraničných vojsk dramaticky zvýšil.

V roku 2019 dosiahol podiel krajiny na svetovom obchode s ópiom a heroínom podľa odhadov 80 %<sup>33</sup> (niektoré pramene udávajú viac ako 90 %). Celkový export drog v hodnotovom vyjadrení dnes niekoľkonásobne prevyšuje objem celého legálneho zahraničného obchodu Afganistanu. Celé regióny sú závislé od výroby a exportu drog. Žiadne alternatívne zamestnanie na vidieku nemôže a ani v dohľadnej dobe nezabezpečí porovnatelné

<sup>31</sup> VOGT, H. (2021): What an Afghan News Outlet's Early Encounters With the Taliban Tell Us About the Country's Future. [online].

<sup>32</sup> VOGT, H. (2021): What an Afghan News Outlet's Early Encounters With the Taliban Tell Us About the Country's Future. [online].

<sup>33</sup> Afghanistan opium survey 2019. Socio-economic survey report: Drives, causes and consequences of opium poppy cultivation. [online].

príjmy. Pestovanie jedného hektára ópiového maku prináša ročne v priemere 16-tisíc dolárov, čo je asi 10-krát viac, ako zisk z pestovanie obilní na rovnakej ploche. V niektorých oblastiach sa vytratili staré zručnosti ziskového „legálneho“ polnohospodárstva, a preto každá zmena profilu pestovaných plodín nevyhnutne povedie k poklesu príjmov a zniženiu životnej úrovne celých oblastí, kde sa pestujú makové kultúry.

Dnes sa v Afganistane využíva na polnohospodársku výrobu asi 1,6 milióna hektárov pôdy, pričom celkový potenciál pôdy vhodnej na intenzívne polnohospodárske využitie je asi 8 miliónov hektárov. V každom prípade boj proti obchodu s drogami nemožno považovať za odsúdený na neúspech, hoci odborníci pochybujú o pripravenosti Talibana zaradiť boj proti obchodu s drogami medzi svoje priority.<sup>34</sup>

## Záver

Historický vývoj Afganistanu vždy zásadným spôsobom ovplyvňovala otázka vzťahu medzi ortodoxnými náboženskými postojmi a potrebu vypracovať a realizovať pragmatickú stratégiu sociálno-ekonomickejho rozvoja krajiny. To posledné znamená záruky vlastníckych práv, nezávislé súdnictvo, transparentnosť rozhodnutí úradov, meritokraciu pri výbere personálu a otvorenosť krajiny voči zahraničným partnerom. Taliban v tomto smere inklinuje k tradičným ortodoxným postojom. V islamskom svete je ľahké nájsť príklady udržateľnej rovnováhy medzi náboženskými postojmi a ekonomickými imperatívmi. Dnes nevieme odpovedať na otázku, do akej miery bude táto historická úloha v kompetencii lídrov afganského Talibana.<sup>35</sup> Ak sa im to podarí vyriešiť, vytvoria veľmi dôležitý historický precedens, ktorý bude mať veľký význam ďaleko za hranicami samotného Afganistanu.

Stabilizácia situácie v krajinе závisí aj od schopnosti samotného Talibana uskutočniť hlbockú vnútornú transformáciu. Ak vezmememe do úvahy voľnú paralelu s prvými rokmi sovietskeho Ruska, potom Taliban musí nájsť silu prejsť od vojnovejho komunizmu k NEP. Je zrejmé, že nie každý v tomto heterogénnom hnutí bude pripravený na takúto transformáciu. Nemožno vylúčiť vnútorné rozkoly, boj jednotlivých skupín medzi sebou, vytváranie nestabilných koalícií a ich následný rozpad.

Afganistan má dobre zavedenú tradíciu rýchlo sa meniacich politických vzťahov v závislosti od meniacej sa situácie. Generáciu „revolucionárov“ musí nahradíť generácia „manažérov“ a táto zmena bude v každom prípade náročným a bolestivým procesom. Oficiálny predstaviteľ Islamského emirátu Afganistan Zabihullah Mudžáhid na prvej tlačovej konferencii po víťazstve v Kábule zdôraznil priority riešenia sociálno-ekonomickejch problémov krajiny, pripravenosť Talibana na dialóg s politickými oponentmi a rešpektovanie základných ľudských práv.<sup>36</sup> Následne vodcovia Talibana urobili viaceru vyhlásení, ktorých cieľom bolo demonštrovať umierenosť hnutia, napríklad o rodových otázkach.<sup>37</sup> Kábul však v skutočnosti ovládajú predstaviteľia najradikálnejšieho krídla Talibana (zoskupenie spomínaného Sirádžuddína Haqqaního), priamo napojeného na afganské odnože Al-Káidy. Podarí sa im dlhodobo udržať svoju moc v hlavnom meste, alebo ich dokážu umierené frakcie rýchlo vytlačiť? Odpovedať na túto otázku do značnej miery určuje vyhliadky na stabilizáciu politickej situácie v hlavnom meste, a tým aj v krajinе ako celku.

V prípade stabilizácie spoločensko-politickej situácie v krajinе a pozitívnej dynamiky ekonomickejho rozvoja je krajiná schopná dodať potrebnú integritu a celistvosť euroázijským

<sup>34</sup> BORDJUŽA, N. (2021): Eta situacija naprjamuju kasajetsja nas, a ne toľka SŠA i ich gosudarstv – satellitov. [online]; ČECH, L. (2020): Afganský drogový priemysel ako limitujúci faktor postkonfliktnej obnovy krajiny, s. 33-35.

<sup>35</sup> DORSEY, J. M. (2021): Taliban perpetuate Muslim world's failed governance paradigm. [online].

<sup>36</sup> Transcript of Taliban's first news conference in Kabul (2021). [online].

<sup>37</sup> Taliban says women can study in gender-segregated universities (2021). [online].

integračným projektom. Takýmito projektmi sú čínsky „Ekonomický pás hodvábnej cesty“ a ruské „Veľké eurázijské partnerstvo“ a ďalšie celokontinentálne štruktúry. Z geografického hľadiska zostáva Afganistan prirodzeným mostom medzi Strednou a južnou Áziou a na mape euroázijských integračných projektov je táto krajina veľkým prázdnym priestorom, kde rozsah skutočne širokej kontinentálnej spolupráce zostáva obmedzený.

Afganistan zostáva jednou z posledných veľkých surovinových a zdrojových základní v samom strede Eurázie, ktorá je takmer nevyužitá. O zmenu tohto stavu sa budú usilovať najmä jeho najbližší susedia. Rýchlo rastúce ázijské ekonomiky zaručujú dopyt po afganských surovinách a energetických zdrojoch na desaťročia dopredu. Dá sa predvídať aj realizácia rozsiahlych cezhraničných projektov, vrátane tých, ktoré využívajú významné vodné zdroje krajiny, ako aj potenciál obnoviteľných zdrojov energie. V budúcnosti sa Afganistan môže stať významným vývozcom určitých druhov poľnohospodárskych produktov do krajín južnej a východnej Ázie.

Afganistan môže dať nový impulz plánom na vytvorenie euroázijských dopravných koridorov tak pozdĺž osi východ – západ, ako aj pozdĺž osi sever – juh. Afganistan má osobitný význam pre realizáciu projektu čínsko-pakistanského hospodárskeho koridoru, ktorý je mimoriadne dôležitý pre budúcnosť Pakistanu (napr. ak sa situácia v Afganistane stabilizuje, Vachánsky výbežok môže obnoviť svoj bývalý význam ako prirozeného spojenia medzi Čínu a západnou Áziou).

Za predpokladu stabilizácie situácie v krajinе existuje predpoklad ukončenia dlhoročných diskusií okolo výstavby plynovodu TAPI, ktorý by mal viesť z plynových polí Turkmenška cez Afganistan, Pakistan a Indiu až k námorným terminálom v Indickom oceáne a mohol by sa stať dôležitým článkom v zjednotenom eurázijskom systéme prepravy plynu.

Afganistan nepochybne stojí na pomyselnej križovatke. Jeho súčasné vedenie rozhoduje o tom, ako si poradí s úskaliami svojej vnútornej obnovy, ako využije možnosti spájané s jeho návratom do štruktúr medzinárodných vzťahov.

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# **ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT**

## **ROLE RUSKÉ FEDERACE VE VÁLCE V PODNĚSTŘÍ**

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**Abstract:** The Transnistrian conflict is a protracted conflict between Moldova and the breakaway region of Transnistria. The role of the Russian Federation in the conflict has been a topic of significant debate and controversy. This paper provides an overview of the historical context of the conflict, followed by an analysis of the role of the Russian Federation in supporting Transnistria both militarily and politically. The paper examines the geopolitical and historical factors influencing Russian policy towards Transnistria. The paper argues that the Russian Federation's support for Transnistria has contributed to the protracted nature of the conflict and that a resolution will require a coordinated effort by all parties involved. The paper concludes by discussing how the Russian Federation wants to spread its influence not only in Transnistria but throughout Moldova as well.

**Keywords:** Transnistria, Russia, Moldova

**JEL:** F51

### **Introduction**

In the Black Sea region and directly on the borders with the European Union and NATO exists a geopolitical triangle consisting of the Russian Federation, Moldova, and the separatist and internationally unrecognised state of Transnistria. The triangle resulted from the civil war at the beginning of the 90s. Russia's involvement in its course determined that the Russian Federation stands at the imaginary apex of the triangle and has a hierarchically superior relationship to the other two states due to the so-called war in Transnistria from the beginning of the 1990s.<sup>1</sup> The Russian Federation's influence in Transnistria and Moldova has been preventing a deeper integration of Moldova into the world of pro-Western values for three decades.<sup>2</sup> Although we can find several pro-Western governments in Moldova during the last thirty years, Russian representatives have expressed more than once about the independence of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (further referred to as PMR) as a long-term goal and, overall, they significantly try to influence events in Moldova, which prevents pro-Western reforms.

The main goal of the presented article is to analyse the role and involvement of the Russian Federation in the conflict in Transnistria, including mapping Russia's historical footprint in the region. Even though we can find several frozen conflicts on the territory of the former USSR - some have been hiding, and fighting has been renewed in recent years -

<sup>1</sup> CRANDALL, M. (2012). Hierarchy in Moldova-Russia Relations: the Transnistrian effect, s. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.; MIKKO, M. (2009): Moldova: Lääne ja Ida Vahel, s. 52; COYLE, J. (2018): Russia's Border Wars and Frozen Conflicts, s. 157.

Transnistria is among the oldest.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, there are indications that especially younger generations have the slightest awareness of the conflict in Transnistria.<sup>4</sup> Considering the rise of Russian geopolitical ambitions recently, we thus want to raise awareness about the frozen conflict in Transnistria. As the successor of the USSR, Russia maintains it for its own geopolitical benefit, even concerning the ongoing conflict in Ukraine or the "de facto" support of the states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.<sup>5</sup> It is necessary to mention that it was on the territory of Abkhazia or South Ossetia that Russia maintained its peacekeeping troops; likewise, Russia has been doing so in Transnistria. In addition, it is increasingly speculated that Russia is trying to influence the political scene of neighbouring Moldova from Transnistria, which will also be the subject of analysis in the article.

Transnistria calls itself the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic, and despite numerous attempts to resolve the conflict, it has been frozen since the so-called Transnistrian War of 1992. Even so, it can be argued that this is a current European and Russian geopolitics topic. Increased tensions in the region can be observed since the launch of a special military operation, an invasion, by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in February 2022.

The paper is structured as follows. The first section consists of a brief analysis of Russian geopolitics with a specific zoom at Transnistria and why this territory is critical for Russia. The following section maps Russian historical engagement in the region since the 18<sup>th</sup> century through the prior Soviet era and Soviet era. This section bridges the paper into the subsequent section that analyses the war in Transnistria, so the reader is familiar with the conflict. Afterwards, the paper exposes the Russian involvement in the Transnistrian conflict. This fourth section contains three subsections in which we analyse different forms of support provided by Russians in the conflict. The fifth chapter provides the reader with a descriptive analysis of how the Russian Federation wants to pursue its influence over the whole of Moldova and not Transnistria only. The last chapter is the conclusion, where the knowledge gained, and the reflection on the further development of the conflict are summarised.

## 1 Russian Geopolitics

The geography and history of Russia have played a significant role in shaping its geopolitical ambitions. The country's vast size, strategic location between Europe and Asia, and access to key resources have made it a key player in regional and global politics. Throughout its history, Russia has pursued a strategy of expansionism, seeking to exert influence and control over neighbouring territories. This approach has continued to shape Russia's geopolitical outlook in the modern era.

One of the defining features of Russian geopolitics has been its pursuit of a "sphere of influence" in neighbouring regions. This concept refers to a geographic area over which a state has significant political, economic, and military influence. For Russia, this has traditionally included parts of Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus region.<sup>6</sup> These areas are considered critical to Russia's security and strategic interests, and Moscow has historically been willing to use force to maintain its influence in these regions.

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<sup>3</sup> CRANDALL, M. (2012): Hierarchy in Moldova-Russia Relations: the Transnistrian effect, p. 5; COYLE, J. (2018): Russia's Border Wars and Frozen Conflicts, p. 157.

<sup>4</sup> HYNEK, O. – FROLÍK, F. (2022): Transnistria. Students' knowledge of contemporary geopolitics, p. 113.

<sup>5</sup> ATLAND, K. (2020): Destined for deadlock? Russia, Ukraine, and the unfulfilled Minsk agreements, p. 129; GÖTZE, E. (2016). Neorealism and Russia's Ukraine policy, 1991-present, p. 304; LACHERT, J. (2019): Post-Soviet Frozen Conflicts: A Challenge for European Security, p. 3; COYLE, J. (2018): Russia's Border Wars and Frozen Conflicts, p. 184; FISCHER, S. (2016): Not frozen! The unresolved conflicts over Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh in light of the crisis over Ukraine, p. 8.

<sup>6</sup> HYNEK, O. (2020): Geopolitics of Central Asia: Between the Russian Bear and the Chinese Dragon, p. 75.

JUZA, P. (2016): Stredná Ázia a Čína – problémy politiky, bezpečnosti a možné geopolitické dosledky, p. 37.

Several factors have shaped Russia's pursuit of a sphere of influence. Firstly, the country's geography places it at the centre of several key regions, including Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This has made Russia a crossroads for trade and communication between different civilisations and cultures. Additionally, Russia has a long history of territorial expansion, dating back to the Tsarist era and continuing through the Soviet period.<sup>7</sup> This history has created a sense of national pride and identity that is closely tied to the country's territorial integrity and strategic interests.

Furthermore, Russia's pursuit of a sphere of influence is driven by its desire for security. The country has a long history of being invaded and threatened by foreign powers, and maintaining control over neighbouring territories is seen as critical to preventing future attacks. For example, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 was driven by a desire to maintain control over the Black Sea region and prevent Ukraine from moving closer to the West.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, Russia's involvement in Syria can be seen as an attempt to maintain its influence in the Middle East and counterbalance the United States' dominance in the region. Therefore, Transnistria is important because of its strategic location. The region lies at the brink of a sphere of influence between West and Moscow.

Moreover, Transnistria and Moldova are both crucial transit countries for gas pipelines and other transport routes. This makes Transnistria a potential gateway to the rest of Europe and provides it with significant economic influence. In addition, Transnistria is close to the Black Sea, a vital shipping route for Europe and Asia. The region's geopolitical importance is growing with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Although the Russians have not directly used the possibility to operate from the territory of Transnistria, this risk still exists. Ukrainian intelligence has come forward with the claim that the Russian Federation planned a "false flag" attack on Transnistria to justify conducting operations from Transnistria or its possible involvement in the conflict.<sup>9</sup> In the case of the occupation of entire southern Ukraine, the Russian Federation could create an imaginary corridor that would connect the Russian territory with Transnistria and thus border directly with the states of the European Union and NATO (Romania) on the southern flank as well. Russia's leverage over the region stems from its ethnic composition. Most of the population in Transnistria is Russian, and the region has strong cultural and historical ties to Russia. This led Russia to become involved in the conflict between Transnistria and Moldova, with Russia providing support to the separatist region.<sup>10</sup>

At the same time, Russia has also sought to expand its global influence and challenge the existing international order. This has been evident in Moscow's support for authoritarian regimes and opposition to Western-backed initiatives such as the expansion of NATO and the European Union. Russia has also sought to strengthen its alliances with other major powers, such as China, in order to counterbalance Western influence. The conflict has thus become a proxy for the wider geopolitical struggle between Russia and the West, further increasing Transnistria's importance. Nonetheless, Russia's pursuit of geopolitical power has been met with resistance and pushback from the international community, particularly the United States and its allies, specifically in Transnistria from the EU.<sup>11</sup>

Finally, Transnistria is important because of its status as a frozen conflict. The conflict between Transnistria and Moldova has been ongoing for more than 30 years and has resulted in the region being in a state of limbo. This created a situation where Transnistria is not fully

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<sup>7</sup> COYLE, J. (2018): Russia's Border Wars and Frozen Conflicts, p. 17.

<sup>8</sup> BEBLER, A. (2015): Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict, p. 38; ATLAND, K. (2020): Destined for deadlock? Russia, Ukraine, and the unfulfilled Minsk agreements, p. 131.

<sup>9</sup> AL JAZEERA (2022): Russia is preparing a pretext for invading Ukraine

<sup>10</sup> CRANDALL, M. (2012). Hierarchy in Moldova-Russia Relations: the Transnistrian effect, p. 5.

HYNEK, O. – FROLÍK, F. (2022): Transnistria. Students' knowledge of contemporary geopolitics, p. 100.

<sup>11</sup> BEYER, J. – WOLFF, S. (2016): Linkage and leverage effects on Moldova's Transnistria problem, p. 338.

recognised as an independent state but is also not under the control of Moldova. Inadequate resolution of the conflict has contributed to instability in the region and created opportunities for the involvement of outside powers. The frozen conflict also means broader geopolitical implications and competition for the sphere of influence between the European Union and the Russian Federation. Russian involvement in Transnistria had a significant impact on the conflict. The conflict has become a proxy for a broader geopolitical struggle between Russia and the West, and Russia's support for Transnistria is seen as part of its efforts to maintain influence in the region.<sup>12</sup> In addition, Russian support for Transnistria allowed the region to remain partially autonomous, contributing to the frozen nature of the conflict. However, Russian involvement in Transnistria has also brought problems. The conflict significantly disrupted Russia's relations with Moldova and the West. In addition, Russian support for Transnistria contributed to the lack of progress in the peace talks, leading to frustration on all sides.<sup>13</sup>

In conclusion, Russian geopolitics remains a significant factor in global politics. The country's pursuit of a sphere of influence in neighbouring regions and its efforts to challenge the existing international order has shaped its foreign policy and fueled tensions with the West. Understanding Russia's geopolitical ambitions and motivations is critical to developing effective strategies for managing conflicts and maintaining regional stability and beyond.

## 2 Russian Historical Footprint in the Region

During the 18th century, there were wars between Russia and the Ottoman Empire - the territory of Transnistria was annexed by Russia as early as 1791, the remaining area of today's Moldova up to the Prut River and the Black Sea was annexed by Russia in 1812. More significant changes occurred in April 1917, when the Moldavian demand for autonomy within Russia was raised. On December 2 of the same year, the autonomous Democratic Republic of Moldova was proclaimed. Subsequently, Russian troops invaded Moldova in January 1918, which forced local politicians to look for other solutions. They turned to the Romanian government for help, and on February 6, 1918, they declared the independent Moldavian Republic, with the addition that all ties with Russia were being severed. Russia responded by proclaiming the Bessarabian Soviet Socialist Republic, but Romanian troops pushed the Bolsheviks beyond the Dniester and Moldavian top officials requested annexation to Romania, which was officially achieved on December 10, 1918. The victorious powers also approved this act in the Treaty of Paris in October 1920; Russia (and subsequently the USSR) never recognised this treaty.<sup>14</sup>

Thus, Bessarabia became part of Romania on December 10, 1918, while Transnistria remained under the Russian administration even after the end of the First World War. After the creation of the USSR, the Soviet regime decided to revive the claims to the territory of Bessarabia, which it had lost in 1918.<sup>15</sup> A small Ukrainian territory was annexed to Transnistria, and the city of Balta became the capital of the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic established on October 12, 1924, within Ukraine. From a geographical point of view, this is an anomaly, when the historical name Moldova was used by the Russian administration in 1924 to name the entirely artificially created Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) on the part of the Ukrainian territory in order to demonstrate to the world

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<sup>12</sup> COYLE, J. (2018): Russia's Border Wars and Frozen Conflicts, p. 178; FISCHER, S. (2016): Not frozen! The unresolved conflicts over Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh in light of the crisis over Ukraine, p. 14.

<sup>13</sup> MIKKO, M. (2009): Moldova: Lääne ja Ida Vahel, p. 66.

<sup>14</sup> BAAR, V. (2002): Národy na prahu 21. století. Emancipace nebo nacionalismus?, p. 113.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

Russia's claims to the entire former Moldavian territory between the Prut and the Dniester.<sup>16</sup> Since the beginning of the MASSR, Moldovans constituted only a thirty per cent minority - 30.1% in the 1926 census, with a significant preponderance of Ukrainians - 48.5% and a minority position of Russians and Jews - 8.5% each. With the adjustment of borders and extensive industrialisation associated with the influx of ethnic Russians (and Russified members of other minorities from all over the USSR), a specific ethnolinguistic situation with a structure distantly reminiscent of Switzerland was gradually created.<sup>17</sup> It is October 12, 1924, that the inhabitants of the PMR understand as the beginning of their statehood. They claim that today's PMR follows on from the MASSR.<sup>18</sup> Opponents claim that only 16 years of MASSR's existence, moreover within different boundaries than the current PMR, certainly does not constitute a tradition of statehood.<sup>19</sup>

In June 1940, the USSR annexed Bessarabia under the threat of a military attack on Romania (as a result of the Ribbentrop - Molotov Pact). Stalin divided the territory into the newly created Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic with its centre in Chisinau (to which the former MASSR was attached) and Ukraine, which received territories, especially in the south, due to which the newly created MSSR did not reach as far as the Danube Delta and the Black Sea and thus became landlocked region. During the Second World War (in the summer of 1941), Bessarabia and Transnistria were occupied by Romania, which for a time became an ally of Nazi Germany. Transnistria has never been part of Romania or Moldova except for this occupation. One of the supporters' arguments of a separate PMR is the claim that Romania at that time respected the Dniester as a border, and therefore Transnistria, unlike the territory of Bessarabia, was not annexed to Romania but "only" occupied. In 1944, the region of Transnistria and Bessarabia was conquered by the USSR army, and the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was restored within the borders of 1940.<sup>20</sup>

During the subsequent Soviet era, the society of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) experienced increasing socio-economic differentiation. The territory of Transnistria was more industrialised and, in connection with that, there was extensive immigration, the result of which was a different population structure (in 1989, about 39% of Moldavians lived in Transnistria, but 54% of Slavs - Russians and Ukrainians) compared to the rest of the MSSR. It was also multi-ethnic, but with a significant majority of Moldovans – 64.5% and a smaller representation of Slavs – 26.8%.<sup>21</sup> Later, during the 1980s, nationalist tendencies began to manifest in the MSSR during the period of perestroika and glasnost. It is, therefore, not surprising that Moldova's distance from the USSR, language laws favoring Moldovan, and ideas of future integration with Romania meant that the inhabitants of Transnistria resisted the Slav predominance.<sup>22</sup> The conflict between Moldova and Transnistria escalated between 1989 and 1992. New language laws of August 1989 defined Moldavian written in the Latin script (actually Romanian) as the sole state language of the MSSR and Russian as the language of communication between nationalities with weaker guarantees vis-à-vis other languages. The inhabitants of Transnistria perceived these shifts as a threat to their social status and their very future in Moldova.<sup>23</sup>

Changes to the language laws were the responsibility of the People's Front of Moldova, which dominated the elections to the Supreme Soviet in June 1990. For the first time, several

<sup>16</sup> BAAROVÁ, B. – JAKUBEK, D. (2019): Podněstří – de facto stát s nejistou budoucností, p. 5.

<sup>17</sup> BAAROVÁ, B. – JAKUBEK, D. (2019): Podněstří – de facto stát s nejistou budoucností, p. 6.

<sup>18</sup> BAAR, V. (2002): Národy na prahu 21. století. Emancipace nebo nacionalismus?, p. 114.

<sup>19</sup> BAAROVÁ, B. – JAKUBEK, D. (2019): Podněstří – de facto stát s nejistou budoucností, p. 24.

<sup>20</sup> BAAR, V. (2002): Národy na prahu 21. století. Emancipace nebo nacionalismus?, p. 115; COYLE, J. (2018): Russia's Border Wars and Frozen Conflicts, p. 14.

<sup>21</sup> ROGSTAD, A. (2016): The next Crimea? Getting Russia's Transnistria policy right, p. 6.

<sup>22</sup> PIRNA, F. (2013): Linguistic Divisions and the Language Charter – The Case of Moldova, p. 7.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

subjects ran in those elections, and after their victory, the LFM declared Moldova a sovereign state within the USSR. There were also significant amendments to the constitution, from which the article talking about the leading role of the Communist Party was removed.<sup>24</sup> Another critical decision of the Supreme Soviet was the change of the Moldovan flag. During the protests of the 1980s against the Russian government, the Romanian tricolour appeared more and more often, and the MPs voted that the flag of Moldova would be very similar, only with the national coat of arms added in the middle. Differentiating the flag was a demand mainly for Moldovans who wanted independence and considered joining Romania possible only in the future.<sup>25</sup>

On September 2, 1990, Transnistria responded to Moldova's June declaration by declaring the Transnistrian Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. Moldova declared full independence on August 27, 1991. Transnistria even issued the PMSSR Declaration of Independence a day earlier, and the communist epithets were removed from the state's name a few weeks later - on November 5, 1991.<sup>26</sup> On December 1, 1991, the first referendum on the independence of the PMR took place. Voter turnout reached 78%, and the vast majority of voters - 97.7% voted for complete independence. At the same time, the Transnistrian militia established control over police stations and other strategic points east of the Dniester. The first president was Igor Smirnov, who, a few months later, had to face an armed conflict against Moldova – the so-called war in Transnistria.<sup>27</sup>

### 3 Transnistrian Conflict

The Transnistria War was a conflict that took place in Eastern Europe from 1990 to 1992 between the breakaway region of Transnistria and the Republic of Moldova. The war was characterised by ethnic tension, political instability, and the involvement of outside powers. This essay will examine the causes and consequences of the Transnistria War. The causes of the Transnistria War can be traced back to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, the region of Transnistria, which had a significant population of ethnic Russians, declared independence from Moldova. The Moldovan government, which was seeking to establish a pro-Western government, refused to recognise Transnistria's independence, and tensions between the two regions escalated. The conflict was exacerbated by Transnistria being transit country for natural resources as coal and natural gas deposits, which were necessary resources for the surrounding countries.<sup>28</sup>

Armed clashes broke out in the fall of 1991 and in March 1992, developed into a full-fledged war that continued until July of the same year. The war began in March 1992 when Moldovan forces attempted to retake the Transnistrian city of Dubăsari. The conflict quickly escalated, with both sides engaging in military operations, including shelling civilian areas. Police and armed forces were loyal to the Moldovan government and tried to regain control of the left bank but failed. Partly because the leadership of the PMR managed to mobilise mass population support and partly because of the interference of the Russian army deployed in this territory.<sup>29</sup> Russian support for Transnistria was particularly evident in the military sphere. The Soviet (since April 14, 1992, Russian) army stationed in and around Tiraspol supplied the

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<sup>24</sup> MIKKO, M. (2009): Moldova: Lääne ja Ida Vahel, p. 84.

<sup>25</sup> BAAR, V. (2002): Národy na prahu 21. století. Emancipace nebo nacionalismus?, p. 77.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> ROGSTAD, A. (2016): The next Crimea? Getting Russia's Transnistria policy right, p. 6.

<sup>28</sup> MIKKO, M. (2009): Moldova: Lääne ja Ida Vahel, p. 85; COYLE, J. (2018): Russia's Border Wars and Frozen Conflicts, p. 162.

<sup>29</sup> OSIPOV, A. – VASILEVICH, H. (2017): The phenomenon of Transnistria as a model of post- Soviet diversity policy, p. 8.

separatists with weapons, ammunition, expertise, and sometimes soldiers.<sup>30</sup> The support of the Russian army sent a clear message to Moldova: an attack on the PMR is equal to an attack on the Russian army.<sup>31</sup>

The consequences of the Transnistria War have been significant. Fighting between Moldavian and Transnistrian troops claimed hundreds of victims on both sides and was stopped only by the deployment of the 14th Russian Army.<sup>32</sup> Other figures claim that the clashes cost more than 1,000 lives, 10,000 injured and 100,000 displaced. The heaviest fighting took place in the city of Bendery, which Chisinau tried in vain to recapture, as it is located on the right bank of the Dniester. The situation was finally calmed down and preserved in July 1992, when a peace agreement was concluded. To date, it is guaranteed by tripartite peacekeeping forces, which are composed of units of Russia, Moldova and the PMR.<sup>33</sup> The war also contributed to the economic and political instability in the region, with both Transnistria and Moldova suffering from the effects of the conflict. The war also had wider implications for the region, with Russia becoming involved in the conflict and using it as a proxy for its own geopolitical interests.<sup>34</sup>

Today, the conflict between Transnistria and Moldova remains unresolved, with the breakaway region still not recognised as an independent state by the international community. The lack of resolution to the conflict has contributed to regional instability and created opportunities for outside powers to become involved. The conflict also highlights the challenges of managing ethnic tensions and creating stable political systems in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, the Transnistria War was a conflict that had significant consequences for the region and the wider international community. A combination of ethnic tension, political instability, and the presence of valuable resources in the region caused the conflict. The war displaced tens of thousands of people and contributed to economic and political instability in the region. The lack of resolution to the conflict has continued to create challenges for the region and underscores the importance of finding peaceful solutions to ethnic conflicts.

#### 4 Russian Involvement in Transnistrian Conflict

Russia has played a significant role in the conflict, providing support to Transnistria and using the conflict as a way to exert its influence in the region. This section will examine the Russian role in the Transnistrian conflict and its implications for the region.

Russia's involvement in the Transnistrian conflict can be traced back to its historical ties with the region. The majority of the population in Transnistria is Russian, and the region has strong cultural and historical ties to Russia. This has led Russia to become involved in the conflict between Transnistria and Moldova, with Russia supporting the breakaway region. Russia has provided economic and military assistance to Transnistria, including supplying weapons and funding to the region.

Russia's involvement in the Transnistrian conflict has broader geopolitical implications for the region. The conflict has become a proxy for the broader struggle between Russia and the West, with Russia seeking to assert its influence in the region and prevent Moldova from

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<sup>30</sup> FISCHER, S. (2016): Not frozen! The unresolved conflicts over Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh in light of the crisis over Ukraine, p. 23.

<sup>31</sup> JAKUBEK, D. (2018): . Podněství – krizová oblast Moldavská, p. 33.

<sup>32</sup> COYLE, J. (2018): Russia's Border Wars and Frozen Conflicts, p. 168.

ROGSTAD, A. (2016): The next Crimea? Getting Russia's Transnistria policy right, p. 6-7.

<sup>33</sup> COYLE, J. (2018): Russia's Border Wars and Frozen Conflicts, p. 169.

OSIPOV, A. – VASILEVICH, H. (2017): The phenomenon of Transnistria as a model of post- Soviet diversity policy, p. 8.

<sup>34</sup> CRANDALL, M. (2012): Hierarchy in Moldova-Russia Relations: the Transnistrian effect, p. 8; BEYER, J. – WOLFF, S. (2016): Linkage and leverage effects on Moldova's Transnistria problem, p. 336.

aligning with the West.<sup>35</sup> Russia's involvement in the conflict has also raised concerns among Moldova's neighbours, including Ukraine and Romania, who fear that Russia's actions in the region could destabilise the broader region.<sup>36</sup>

The Russian role in the Transnistrian conflict has also created challenges for the international community in resolving the conflict. Russia's support for Transnistria has made it difficult for the international community to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. The lack of resolution to the conflict has contributed to regional instability and created opportunities for outside powers to become involved.

Another central point in settlement of the conflict is the withdrawal of Russian troops and military equipment. Russia's failure to meet the deadline recorded in the Summary Document of the OSCE Istanbul Summit (1999) was seen as an attack on Moldova's neutral status. Russia pledged to withdraw its troops by the end of 2002, but the deadline was extended by a year.<sup>37</sup>

Despite the promises, at the end of 2015, 1,000-1,200 soldiers of the operational group of Russian forces - OGRF, remained in the PMR. According to the Russian position, a complete withdrawal should only occur after resolving the conflict – i.e. the question of the status of the PMR.<sup>38</sup>

In 2003, the Netherlands presided over the OSCE and participated in the creation of a document that envisioned the exchange of tripartite peacekeeping forces under the EU administration. The proposal was logically blocked by Russia, which feared disrupting the status quo and drawing Moldova into the sphere of influence of Euro-Atlantic structures. It reacted vigorously – the so-called Kozak plan.<sup>39</sup> The plan is named after Dmitry Kozak, a Russian politician with close ties to President Putin who served as deputy chief of staff at the time of its drafting. It was initially created at the request of Moldovan President Voronin for more active Russian mediation.<sup>40</sup> It consisted of creating an "asymmetric federation" in which the PMR would gain the right to veto laws deemed unacceptable.<sup>41</sup> Another aspect of the plan was the extension of the Russian military presence in Moldova, which was a requirement of the PMR leadership. Through the Kozak Plan, Russia came close to securing the pro-Russian PMR as an autonomous region within a unified Moldova that could act as a check on any westward advance by changing the political situation in Chisinau.

The pressure was exerted on Moldova by the EU, the USA and the OSCE not to sign the plan. Voronin and Smirnov (then president of the PMR) were to sign the memorandum together with Vladimir Putin on November 24, 2003. However, Voronin called off the ceremony a day before the intended signing, fearing protests from the political opposition and civil society, similar to those that had brought down the country a few days earlier president of Georgia. Pressure from Western states, which were particularly concerned about the clause on the extension of the Russian military presence, also played a role. For Moscow, the sudden withdrawal was a shock that worsened relations between Russia and Moldova for a long time. In the spring of 2005, In March 2006, Russia implemented a series of bans on the import of certain Moldovan products. The banned items included Moldovan meat, fruit, and vegetables.

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<sup>35</sup> CRANDALL, M. (2012): Hierarchy in Moldova-Russia Relations: the Transnistrian effect, p. 6.

<sup>36</sup> DEMBINSKA - M., MERAND, F. (2018): The role of international brokers in frozen conflicts: the case of Transnistria, p. 21; BEYER, J. – WOLFF, S. (2016): Linkage and leverage effects on Moldova's Transnistria problem, p. 337.

<sup>37</sup> COYLE, J. (2018): Russia's Border Wars and Frozen Conflicts, p. 178.

ROGSTAD, A. (2016): The next Crimea? Getting Russia's Transnistria policy right, p. 23.

<sup>38</sup> ROGSTAD, A. (2016): The next Crimea? Getting Russia's Transnistria policy right, p. 9.

<sup>39</sup> TROITSKYI, E. F. (2016): EU policy towards the Transnistrian conflict (1992-2015), p. 32.

<sup>40</sup> ROGSTAD, A. (2018): The next Crimea? Getting Russia's Transnistria policy right, p. 13.

<sup>41</sup> JAKUBEK, D. (2018): Podněstří – krizová oblast Moldavska, p. 34.

Additionally, Moldovan wine was also added to the list of restricted imports. The reasons given for these bans were reportedly related to health concerns.<sup>42</sup>

These measures had significant economic implications for Moldova, as Russia was a major trading partner for the country. The restrictions on food and wine imports disrupted trade flows and affected Moldova's export revenue, leading to economic challenges for the nation's agricultural and wine industries. Attempts to settle the conflict took place during the presidential term of Dmitry Medvedev (2008-12). Together with Angela Merkel, he concluded the "Meseberg Memorandum" in June 2010, which envisaged the establishment of an EU-Russia political and security committee in exchange for a solution to the conflict in the PMR. However, initial hopes were dashed as the two sides interpreted what commitments took place differently.

In the introductory part of the work, it was stated that one of the signs of de facto states is the presence of a patron state, whose role in the case of the PMR is played by Russia. During the analysis of the historical context, significant Russian influence was pointed out - the PMR acquired the territory under its administration as early as 1791 and, except for 1941-44, held it until the declaration of Independence in 1990. In the chapter on the structure of the conflict, the fact was mentioned that the ineffective Transnistrian economy survives mainly thanks to the subsidies of its patron, which was demonstrated by a concrete example - gas supplies for which the PMR does not pay and the non-payment of which created a potentially astronomical debt of \$7 billion.

#### **4.1 Security shelter through peacekeeping troops**

In response, Russia has provided significant support to Transnistria, including military troops. In 1992, Russia sent peacekeeping troops to the region under the auspices of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to help stabilise the situation. However, these troops have remained in the region ever since, and their presence has been a primary source of tension between Russia and Moldova. In July 1992, the presidents of Russia and Moldova agreed to a ceasefire and the installation of a tripartite peacekeeping force. In other words, the Russian troops were initially welcomed by both sides, but their continued presence in the region has since become a point of contention.

Over the years, there have been numerous attempts to resolve the conflict and withdraw Russian troops from Transnistria. In 1999, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) established the Joint Control Commission (JCC) to oversee the ceasefire in the region, but the JCC has been largely ineffective in resolving the conflict. Although the number of Russian troops on the territory of the PMR has decreased over the years, their continuous presence is a security guarantee for the region and, at the same time a constant subject of dispute with Chisinau and Western states. Russian military personnel were renamed the Operational Group of the Russian Forces (OGRF) in 1995 and fell from the original number of 9,600 (1992) before the so-called Istanbul Summit (1999) due to budget cuts and relative calm to 2,600-3,000. Another reason for the decrease was transferring part of the soldiers directly to the Transnistrian army. Less than a decade later (2008), the number of soldiers decreased to 1,500; in 2016, it encompassed 400 men.<sup>43</sup>

In 2005, Moldova and Ukraine signed an agreement to withdraw Russian troops from Transnistria, but the agreement was never implemented. In 2017, Moldova initiated discussions with Russia on withdrawing Russian troops from the region, but no agreement was reached.

At the same time, in July 2017, the Moldovan parliament adopted a statement on withdrawing Russian troops from the territory of the PMR. 61 out of 101 MPs voted for the document (it should be noted that pro-Western parties had a parliamentary majority at the time).

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<sup>42</sup> ROGSTAD, A. (2016): The next Crimea? Getting Russia's Transnistria policy right, p. 14.

<sup>43</sup> DEMBINSKA, M. – MERAND, F. (2018): The role of international brokers in frozen conflicts: the case of Transnistria, p. 28.

In August, Moldova even asked the UN to include the issue of the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from the PMR on the agenda of the 72nd session of the General Assembly, which will be reported in more detail in the sub-chapter concerning the UN's position on the conflict. The Moldovan government and presidents have repeatedly requested the withdrawal of Russian military forces and their replacement by an international civilian mission. However, Moldova has not withdrawn from the July 1992 ceasefire agreement, which provides for the deployment of tripartite peacekeeping forces in the buffer zone.<sup>44</sup> Moldova considers the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria to be an illegal occupation, while Russia has maintained that the troops are necessary to maintain stability and protect the rights of the ethnic Russian and Ukrainian minorities in the region.

Russian troops in Transnistria have been a major obstacle to resolving the conflict, and Moldova has repeatedly called for their withdrawal. However, Russia has maintained that the troops are necessary to maintain stability in the region and protect the rights of the ethnic Russian and Ukrainian minorities.

Notably, the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria has significantly impacted the conflict. Despite its lack of international recognition, Russia's military and economic support for Transnistria has allowed the breakaway region to remain economically viable. However, it has also fueled tensions between Russia and Moldova and between Moldova and Transnistria.

Overall, the role of Russian troops in the Transnistrian conflict remains a contentious issue, and the conflict is likely to persist until a solution is found that satisfies all parties involved.

## 4.2 Russian role in Transnistrian statehood establishment

Russia has also provided economic and political support to Transnistria, including supplying energy resources, providing Russian citizenship to many Transnistrian residents, and supporting the Transnistrian authorities in international forums.

The mentioned factories cannot be ignored because the relatively successful building of state structures cannot be attributed only to the actions of local actors. Russia is also responsible for creating and developing Transnistrian statehood. Security guarantees through military presence, diplomatic support, political advice and financial support have led the European Court of Human Rights to conclude that Russia exercises jurisdiction outside its territory and therefore shares responsibility for human rights violations on the territory of the PMR. Russia exerts a decisive influence on matters of strategic importance, leaving less important matters to local actors.

Russia has played a vital role in helping Transnistria establish its own political institutions. In 1990, Transnistria declared its independence from Moldova; in 1991, it held its first elections. Russia recognised the elections and the independence declaration and has since supported the development of Transnistria's political institutions, including its parliament, presidency, and judiciary.

Furthermore, Russia has supported Transnistria in establishing its own legal system. In 2001, Transnistria adopted its own constitution, which established a legal framework for the region's government and institutions. Russia has provided legal assistance to Transnistria in drafting the constitution and helped the region develop its legal system and judicial institutions.

Finally, Russia has supported Transnistria in its efforts to gain international recognition. Despite its lack of recognition by the international community, Transnistria has established diplomatic relations with several countries, including Russia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Russia has supported Transnistria in gaining recognition and has pushed for a peaceful resolution to the conflict between Moldova and Transnistria.

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<sup>44</sup> FISCHER, S. (2016): Not frozen! The unresolved conflicts over Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh in light of the crisis over Ukraine, p. 22.

In conclusion, Russia has played a significant role in helping Transnistria establish and develop its statehood. Its military, economic, and political support has allowed Transnistria to develop its own institutions, legal system, and economy and has helped the region maintain a degree of de facto statehood. While the conflict between Moldova and Transnistria remains unresolved, Russia's support will continue to be a key factor in shaping the region's future.

#### 4.3 Financial Aid

Without Russia's direct financial support, civil servants' salaries and old-age pensions would drop to 40-60% of their current levels. The PMR received several ad hoc subsidies from Russia in the past – for example, it financed the construction of 14 schools and hospitals in the PMR, and in 2015, it bought tens of thousands of Russian textbooks for Russian-language schools in the PMR. As for remittances coming from emigrants from Russia, they were estimated at 200 million dollars in 2014.<sup>45</sup> Although the share of Russian remittances in the total volume decreased, it still accounts for 71% (\$57.3 million). Remittances from Israel (\$4 million), the USA (\$3.1 million), Turkey (\$2.1 million) and Italy (\$2 million) follow closely behind. The strategic partnership with Russia is considered a pillar of foreign policy, and financial as well as material aid is appreciated. At the same time, representatives of the PMR claim that their own economy needs to be strengthened in order to reduce dependence on Russia.<sup>46</sup> Considering that Russia belongs to the countries with an average economic potential, all forms of its financial assistance to the PMR are not selfless. With this strategy, they are trying to draw not only the PMR but all of Moldova into their structures and thus prevent all the CIS states from successfully integrating towards Europe - to return Russia to the former borders of the USSR, at least in terms of influence, if not on the map. The leading representative of Russian geopolitics is Russian President Vladimir Putin. There are two other economic aspects to Russian ties. Russia is the largest foreign investor in Moldova (24% of foreign direct investment in 2013), also investing in Moldovan labour migrants in Russia. After signing the association agreement with the EU, Russia announced that it could repatriate 190,000 Moldovans allegedly working in Russia in violation of immigration rules. Such massive repatriation could devastate the Moldovan economy and social structure. In April 2014, the Russian Embassy in Chisinau increased this number even more (250,000-570,000 Moldovans). So far, these expulsions have not taken place, but their very mention causes fear in Moldova and points to vulnerability on the part of Russia.<sup>47</sup>

### 5 Discussion: Pursuing Russian Leverage Over All Moldova

Looking closely at Russia's policy in Moldova over time, we find that the goal is to influence Moldova as a whole, not just the PMR. Due to the attitudes of its residents, the PMR is a vital pressure region for Russia against the excessive pro-Western orientation of Ukraine and Moldova. In Moldova, we can see these ambitions mainly in the right-wing spectrum - see the 2014 elections, in which the pro-European right won the most seats. In the 2019 elections, the battle between pro-European and pro-Russian-minded parties ended in a stalemate, and the ongoing political crisis may culminate in early elections.<sup>48</sup>

In referendums, the PMR inhabitants have repeatedly expressed unequivocally favour independence or joining Russia. However, it is more than evident that, despite this long-term

<sup>45</sup> DEMBINSKA, M. – MERAND, F. (2018): The role of international brokers in frozen conflicts: the case of Transnistria, p. 25.

<sup>46</sup> BAAROVÁ, B. – JAKUBEK, D. (2019): Podněstří – de facto stát s nejistou budoucností, p. 14.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> BAAROVÁ, B. – JAKUBEK, D. (2019): Podněstří – de facto stát s nejistou budoucností, p. 17.

demand, nothing similar is planned.<sup>49</sup> On April 14, 2014, the Supreme Council of the PMR turned to Russian President Vladimir Putin to recognise its sovereignty, independence and subsequently, following the same scenario as in Crimea (a local referendum), allow it to join Russia. However, then Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov responded by saying that Russia would respect Moldova's sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the same time, he added that he hopes to preserve Moldovan neutrality and recognise the special status of the PMR. Russia has been calling for a "special status" of the PMR within Moldova for a long time - the ideal scenario would be the fulfilment of the so-called Kozak plan.<sup>50</sup>

Russia rejects the potential annexation of the PMR using cautious and diplomatic statements. What is the situation regarding the recognition of independence? After Russia recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, the leadership of the PMR hoped for similar treatment but did not receive it. Russia learned from the consequences of recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia – it increased anti-Russian attitudes in Georgia and caused conflicting reactions from allies in the EAEU. An increase in Russian willingness to recognise the PMR / join it is not likely, as it can be expected that Russia would lose influence over the rest of Moldova in such a case. The current status quo, on the other hand, suits Russia. He indicates that he agrees with the reintegration of the PMR with Moldova within the framework of federalisation (see the Kozak plan).

He assumes that through federal entities with a pro-Russian orientation, it would be able to turn the political course towards the east in the whole of Moldova. A pro-Russian-oriented Moldova would contribute to a more significant isolation of Ukraine from Europe and thus also to the realisation of another goal – to get Ukraine into sphere of Russian influence.<sup>51</sup> Efforts to influence all of Moldova and prevent it from moving westward were evident, for example, during the tension between Moldova's pro-European coalition government and the Russian leadership before adopting the EU-Moldova Association Agreement. At that time, Russia tried to prevent the agreement by means of threats or a ban on the import of Moldovan wine.<sup>52</sup> This is not the first time Russia has resorted to such measures. After the fiasco with Kozak's plan, Russian policy towards Moldova became more coercive. There was a unilateral suspension of the withdrawal of troops, bans on the import of Moldovan meat, fruit, vegetables and, subsequently, wine (allegedly for health reasons, the export of wine to Russia at that time generated about 200 million for Moldova dollars per year). In addition to export restrictions, Gazprom suspended gas supplies for two weeks in January 2006, and political and economic support for the PMR increased.<sup>53</sup>

Other efforts to prevent a pro-European trend include Russia's support for a referendum in Gagauzia in 2015, which the Moldovan government considered illegal.<sup>54</sup> With a turnout of 70%, 98.4% of voters voted for closer relations with the EAEU, while 97.2% rejected closer integration with the EU. At the same time, 98.9% of voters approved Gagauzia's right to hold another independence referendum if Moldova's sovereign status were to change. Although the vote is not legally binding and declared illegal by the district court in the capital of Gagauzia, it illustrates the attractiveness of the Russian offer - for example, the lifting of the embargo on agricultural imports only from the Gagauzia region.<sup>55</sup> Moreover, in the parliamentary (2014,

<sup>49</sup> ROGSTAD, A. (2016): The next Crimea? Getting Russia's Transnistria policy right, p. 28; BAAROVÁ, B. – JAKUBEK, D. (2019): Podněstří – de facto stát s nejistou budoucností, p. 7.

<sup>50</sup> BAAROVÁ, B. – JAKUBEK, D. (2019): Podněstří – de facto stát s nejistou budoucností, p. 21.

<sup>51</sup> BAAROVÁ, B. – JAKUBEK, D. (2019): Podněstří – de facto stát s nejistou budoucností, p. 23.

<sup>52</sup> FISCHER, S. (2016): Not frozen! The unresolved conflicts over Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh in light of the crisis over Ukraine, p. 15.

<sup>53</sup> ROGSTAD, A. (2016): The next Crimea? Getting Russia's Transnistria policy right, p. 14.

<sup>54</sup> DEMBINSKA, M. – MERAND, F. (2018): The role of international brokers in frozen conflicts: the case of Transnistria, p. 24.

<sup>55</sup> BEYER, J. – WOLFF, S. (2016): Linkage and leverage effects on Moldova's Transnistria problem, p. 343.

2019) and municipal (2015) elections, the pro-Russian opposition Socialist Party received significant help from the Russian media.<sup>56</sup>

The Russian political elite remains convinced that Moldova naturally belongs to the Eurasian integration projects (EAEU). Notably, Russia is concerned not only with the fate of Moldova but also with preventing the precedent of a successful (however incomplete - Moldova is not a full member) integration of the CIS states with the EU. Thus, Russia may use the PMR to prevent closer ties between Moldova and the EU and trigger a political crisis between the governments in Chisinau and Tiraspol.<sup>57</sup>

## Conclusion

The role of the Russian Federation in the Transnistrian conflict has been a significant factor in the protracted nature of the conflict. Russia has provided military and political support to the breakaway region of Transnistria, which has contributed to the region's de facto independence from Moldova. Geopolitical considerations and historical and cultural ties have shaped the Russian Federation's policy towards Transnistria.

In the past, the PMR hoped several times that Russia, like Abkhazia and South Ossetia, would recognise it and, at least partially, thereby improve its position in the international arena. However, the Russians did not do so because they suspected that they would lose their influence on the rest of Moldova, and it can be expected that they will not do so even in the coming years. Thus, the PMR still cannot rely on the recognition of any UN member state.<sup>58</sup> A more significant problem would arise regarding the distribution of the state debt between the old and the new state - how it would be divided and how the markets would believe in the PMR's ability to repay the divided part of the debt. The joining of the PMR to Russia is just an unrealistic scenario. The Russians would thereby lose influence over the rest of Moldova.<sup>59</sup> Even though the Moldovan public does not consider the conflict between the PMR and Moldova to be the country's most pressing problem, the vast majority of the population rejects the possibility of the Russian annexation of the PMR. Furthermore, it is also rejected by members of national minorities, who often show understanding and a certain degree of sympathy towards the PMR. They base their reservations on the possibility of permanent separation because it would weaken the status, demographic and political weight of all other minorities in Moldova.

The ongoing conflict in Transnistria is a complex issue that requires a coordinated effort by all parties involved to reach a peaceful resolution. While there have been some efforts to resolve the conflict, progress has been limited, and the international community must remain engaged in the process to encourage a lasting solution. Dialogue and diplomacy will be critical to resolving the conflict, and efforts must be made to ensure that all parties feel heard and included in the process. Ultimately, a sustainable solution to the Transnistrian conflict will require compromises from all sides, and the willingness to find common ground and work towards a shared future.

Nevertheless, Russia's goal remains to settle the conflict to such an extent that it can maintain sufficient influence in Moldovan politics to shape the country's geopolitical orientation or block any further step of Moldova towards the west by maintaining an unresolved conflict in the PMR. Therefore, Russia has so far tamed Transnistria's aspirations for

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<sup>56</sup> FISCHER, S. (2016): Not frozen! The unresolved conflicts over Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh in light of the crisis over Ukraine, p. 24.

<sup>57</sup> KONOCZUK, W. – RODKIEWIZC, W. (2012): Could Transnistria block Moldova's integration with the EU?, p. 3.

<sup>58</sup> DEMBINSKA, M. – MERAND, F. (2018): The role of international brokers in frozen conflicts: the case of Transnistria, p. 22.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

independence and emphasised the need for a settlement that respects Moldova's sovereignty and territorial indivisibility within its 1991 borders.

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# SEVERSKÉ ŠTÁTY AKO LÍDRI V OBLASTI OCHRANY ŽIVOTNÉHO PROSTREDIA V EURÓPE

## THE NORDIC COUNTRIES AS LEADER IN THE FIELD OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN EUROPE

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**Abstrakt:** V celosvetovom meradle existuje všeobecne zaužívané tvrdenie, na základe ktorého sú severské krajiny, konkrétnie Island, Nórsko, Švédsko, Dánsko a Fínsko považované za lídrov v oblasti ochrany životného prostredia v Európe. V našom skúmaní posudzujeme, či sa tieto krajiny skutočne vymykajú priemeru a zastávajú pozíciu popredných environmentálnych lídrov. Počas nášho skúmania využívame metódu pološtruktúrovaného rozhovoru. Prostredníctvom tejto metódy diskutujeme s odborníkmi z daných severských krajín na témy nami vytýčených environmentálnych problematík. Napriek kritickému pohľadu, ktorým sme hodnotili nárok severských krajín na status environmentálneho prvenstva, sme dospeli k záveru, že severské krajiny sú oprávnené využívať prívlastok environmentálneho líderstva. Pri výsledkoch nášho skúmania sa opierame predovšetkým o silnú angažovanosť tretieho sektora. Tretí sektor využíva svoj vplyv v prospech dosahovania stanovených cieľov a dodržiavania environmentálnych záväzkov v dôsledku čoho sa severské štáty odlišujú od ostatných krajín.

**Kľúčové slová:** Severské krajiny, environmentálne organizácie a inštitúcie, antropogénne znečisťovanie, znečisťovanie morí, holoruby.

**JEL:** Q53, Q54, Q57

**Abstract:** On a global scale, there is a generally accepted statement based on which the Nordic countries, specifically Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, are considered leaders in the field of environmental protection in Europe. In our research, we assess whether these countries stand out from the average and hold the position of leading environmental leaders. We used the semi-structured interview method. It means that we had discussions with experts from the given Nordic countries about the environmental issues we have outlined. Despite the critical view with which we evaluated the claim of the Nordic countries to the status of environmental priority, we concluded that the Nordic countries are entitled to use the attribute of environmental leadership. For the results of our research, we rely primarily on the involvement of the third sector. The third sector uses its influence in favour of achieving set goals and complying with environmental obligations. That is the reason why Nordic countries differ from other countries.

**Key words:** Nordic countries, environmental organizations and institutions, anthropogenic pollution, sea pollution, clear-cutting.

**JEL:** Q53, Q54, Q57

### Úvod

Ťarchou klimatických zmien sú zasiahnuté ekosystémy v každej časti sveta, pričom polárne oblasti čelia týmto výzvam v podstatne vyššej miere. Na základe posledného tohtoročného vyjadrenia panelu OSN, budú musieť štáty v najbližších rokoch vykonať kroky smerujúce k okamžitému zamedzeniu využívania fosílnych palív. Podľa predpokladov bude

v priebehu nasledujúcej dekády hraničná línia globálneho otepľovania prekročená.<sup>1</sup> Nejestvuje ani jedna krajina, na ktorú by klimatické zmeny nemali dopad, a pre ktorú by nepredstavovali hrozbu. Napríklad na Švédsko budú mať klimatické zmeny vplyv v podobe záplav z dôvodu zvýšenej hladiny morí. Približne 60 % populácie Fínska bude čeliť určitému klimatickému nebezpečenstvu a zasiahne 50 % poľnohospodárstva tejto krajiny.<sup>2</sup> Island trpí najmä otepľovaním a okysľovaním oceánu v jeho bezprostrednej blízkosti, pričom nemenej alarmujúcou je aj narastajúca tendencia topenia ľadovcov.<sup>3</sup> Dánsko bude musieť prehodnotiť svoje súčasné smerovanie poľnohospodárskej politiky, a to z dôvodu využívania veľkého množstva hnojív a pesticídov, ktoré znečisťujú vodné toky.<sup>4</sup> Nórsko, najsevernejšia krajina západnej Európy, bude ovplyvnená klimatickými zmenami najmä z dôvodu masívnej ľažby rupy a zemného plynu, ktoré stoja za tvorbou emisií.<sup>5</sup>

Povest' severských krajín ako samozvaných environmentálnych lídrov podopierajú prvenstvá v mnohých ukazovateľoch, z ktorých budeme pri našom skúmaní vychádzať. Nielenže sa z globálneho pohľadu vymykajú priemernej línií dosahovaných výsledkov, ale zároveň sa stávajú aj vzorom pre ostatné krajiny. Otázkou však zostáva či je používanie prílastku environmentálneho líderstva, pre krajiny nachádzajúce sa na severe Európy skutočne relevantná, alebo je ich vedúca pozícia zapríčinená iba zaostávajúcim statusom štátov s ktorými sú porovnávané. Naším hlavným cieľom je preskúmanie tohto bežne zaužívaného tvrdenia, podľa ktorého sú severské krajiny označované prílastkom environmentálneho líderstva. Pri hodnotení oprávnenosti ich prvenstva sa opierame najmä o vyjadrenia renomovaných odborníkov pochádzajúcich z daných severských krajín prostredníctvom metódy pološtruktúrovaného rozhovoru. Kritický pohľad na ich líderstvo sme poňali formou vytýčenia si určitej problematiky, ktorá je v danej severskej krajine badateľná, pričom spolupracujeme s odborníkmi z danej oblasti. Takisto sa zameriavame na identifikáciu potenciálnych možností nápravy, k tej ktorej vytýčenej problematike, v prípade ak je možná jej identifikácia.

V problematike islandského vývozu plastov nám The Blue Army poskytla súčinnosť. V otázke švédskeho lesného priemyslu sme mali možnosť kooperovať so Švédskou agentúrou na ochranu životného prostredia. Kooperáciu v problematike nadmerného rybolovu a nárustu emisií skleníkových plynov nám poskytla najstaršia nórská organizácia na ochranu životného prostredia a prírody *Naturvernforbundet*. Pri Fínsku sme spolupracovali s Fínskym inštitútom pre životné prostredie v problematike znečisťovania morí a eutrofizácie. V neposlednom rade v prípade Dánska sme mali možnosť diskutovať s najväčšou svetovou nezávislou environmentálnou organizáciou Greenpeace Nordic, s ktorou sme riešili pozíciu Dánska v rámci indexu zdravých oceánov.

## 1 Stručný ekonomický a environmentálny prehľad pozadia severských krajín

Podľa Otta von Bismarcka, často nazývaného „železný kancelár“<sup>6</sup> bola zemepisná poloha krajín jediným pretrvávajúcim prvkom medzinárodných vzťahov. Vychádzajúc z tejto premisy, už od vikingských čias severské krajiny predstavujú strategické rázcestie medzi Západom a Východom.<sup>7</sup> Skupina severských krajín, do ktorej zaradujeme Dánsko, Švédsko, Nórsko, Fínsko a Island nesie so sebou určité geografické špecifiká. Pre Dánsko je príznačná

<sup>1</sup> PLUMER, B. (2023): Climate Change is Speeding Toward Catastrophe. The Next Decade Is Crucial, UN.N. Panel Says.

<sup>2</sup> SERKEZ, Y. (2021): Every Country Has Its Own Climate Risks. What's yours?

<sup>3</sup> ICELANDIC MET OFFICE: Climate Report.

<sup>4</sup> SMITH, B. (2015): Denmark: Environmental Issues, Policies and Clean Technology.

<sup>5</sup> SMITH, B. (2015): Norway: Environmental Issues, Policies and Clean Technology.

<sup>6</sup> PLANETWISSEN: Otto von Bismarck.

<sup>7</sup> NORDIC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS (1997): *The Nordic Countries and the New Europe*, s. 12.

jedna z najnižších priemerných úrovni nadmorskej výšky vo svete. Spomedzi spomínaných krajín, najväčšou rozlohou a najväčším počtom obyvateľstva oplýva Švédsko. Krajina, ktorá sa hrdí ôsmym najdlhším pobrežím na svete je Nórsko. Napriek tomu, že sa v Nórsku nachádza najroziahlejšie jazero severských krajín, až o Fínsku hovoríme ako o krajine tisícich jazier. Pre Island sú príznačné jeho geologické podmienky v podobe gejzírov, sopiek a geotermálnej energie.<sup>8</sup>

Pre zvýšenie objektívneho hodnotenia uvádzame v tabuľke 1 všeobecný prehľad nami vybraných dát pre dotvorenie uceleného pohľadu na tieto krajiny.

**Tabuľka 1: Všeobecné ukazovatele monitorovania severských krajín**

Krajina	Švédsko	Nórsko	Dánsko	Fínsko	Island
Rozloha v (km <sup>2</sup> )	528 447	385 207	42 951	338 440	103 000
Pol'nohospodárska pôda (v tisícoch hektárov)	464	178	222	22	1,4
Populácia (v miliónoch)	10,3	5,3	5,9	5,5	366 425 (tisíc)
HDP na obyvateľa (v tisícoch USD)	59,32	89,2	64,6	55	68,3
Výdavky na ochranu život. prostredia (% HDP)	0,9	0,9	0,4	0,2	0,9
Hrubé výdavky na výskum a vývoj (% HDP)	3,3	2,2	3	2,8	2,4
Výdavky verejnej správy (% HDP)	52,1	58,2	53,6	57	50,6
Environmentálne dane (% HDP)	2	2	3,7	2,8	1,8
Emisie CO <sub>2</sub> na obyvateľa (t/obyvateľ)	3,2	6,7	8,6	6,5	5,2
Komunálny odpad na obyvateľa (v kg)	449	772	850	565	700
Obnoviteľné zdroje (%TPES)	40,8	51	39	37	90
Odbory vody (v miliónoch m <sup>3</sup> )	2 375	2 025	976,4	6 562	165

Prameň: Vlastné spracovanie podľa údajov WORLD BANK DATA, OECD a EUROSTAT.

Na severské štaty mnohokrát prihliadame ako na krajiny, ktorých spoločnou víziou je figurovať vo zvyšovaní environmentálneho povedomia. V tabuľke 2 sa nachádza umiestnenie severských štátov vo vybraných ukazovateľoch kvality života spolu s priečkami, ktoré obsadili v určitých environmentálnych ukazovateľoch.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> STATISTA (2023): Geography of the Nordics – Statistics & Facts.

<sup>9</sup> THE NORDICS: 10 Things you should know about Nordic sustainability.

**Tabuľka 2: Pozícia severských krajín vo vybraných ukazovateľoch kvality života a environmentálnych ukazovateľoch**

Ukazovateľ	Švédsko	Nórsko	Dánsko	Fínsko	Island
Index environmentálnej výkonnosti	8	9	1	7	17
Globálny index udržateľnosti	1	7	9	2	32
Ukazovatele udržateľného riadenia	1	3	5	2	21
Environmentálny, sociálny a index riadenia	2	4	1	-	3
Index trvalo udržateľného rozvoja	146	157	156	136	159
Globálny index zdravia (2019)	6	9	25	14	3
Správa o ľudskom rozvoji (2022)	26	17	4	14	1
Index globálneho mieru (2022)	7	1	10	11	5
Správa svetového šťastia (2021)	7	6	2	1	4
Globálny rodový rozdiel (2021)	5	3	28	2	1

Prameň: Vlastné spracovanie autora.

Napriek tomu, že vo väčšine ukazovateľov obsadili severské štáty príkladné popredné umiestnenie, netreba opomenúť fakt, že pri indexe trvalo udržateľného rozvoja, ktorý je inovovaným indexom ľudského rozvoja (HDI) a berie do úvahy emisie oxidu uhličitého a materiálnu stopu, pomerne zaostávajú.<sup>10</sup> To však nie je jediný ukazovateľ pri ktorom dokážeme vyvodiť takýto záver. Svedčí o tom aj umiestnenie Dánska, pri hodnotení ekologickej stopy, pretože sa nachádza v skupine krajín, ktorých obyvatelia žijú nad limity biofyzikálnych možností v dôsledku čoho trpia ekologickým deficitom.<sup>11</sup>

## 2 Problematika vývozu plastov Islandu

Od roku 1964 sme svedkami až dvadsaťnásobného navýšenia výroby plastov.<sup>12</sup> Na Islande existuje niekoľko spôsobov nakladania s plastovým obalom. Týmito spôsobmi sú skládkovanie, spaľovanie a recyklovanie.<sup>13</sup> Najvyužívanejšími spôsobmi likvidácie odpadu na Islande sú skládkovanie a spaľovanie, čo je vyvodené zo skutočnosti, že k samotnej recyklácii na tomto ostrove nedochádza.<sup>14</sup> Odpad, ktorý nekončí v spaľovacích zariadeniach alebo jeho životnosť nie je ukončená formou skládkovania, poväčšine svoje umiestnenie nájde v oceánoch, ktoré nielen znečistiuje, ale ohrozujie aj živočíchy žijúce v ňom.<sup>15</sup> Odstraňovanie odpadu na Islande sa stalo finančne náročnou záležitosťou prevažne preto, že existujú veľké diskrepancie medzi miestom produkcie odpadu, naproti miestam jeho likvidácie. Finančná záťaž je taktiež z jedným faktorov, ktoré stojia za absentujúcim počtom recykláčnych zariadení v tejto krajine, pričom zber, ktorý je už vytriedený sa odošle na svoje ďalšie spracovanie do zahraničia. Za nedostatočnou vybavenosťou krajiny v tomto smere stojí aj nízka zaľudnenosť a väčšie vzdielenosti medzi jednotlivými mestami, inými slovami jeho samotné geografické členenie. Paradoxom však je, že táto krajina bola prvou krajinou na svete, ktorá zaviedla dnes tak globálne využívaný systém zálohovania obalov z nápojov. Magistráty nesú zodpovednosť za odpadové hospodárstvo a v okolí hlavného mesta sa nachádzajú aj verejné recykláčné

<sup>10</sup> HICKEL, J. (2022): The sustainable development index: Measuring the ecological efficiency of human development in the anthropocene.

<sup>11</sup> GLOBAL FOOTPRINT NETWORK (2022): Open Data Platform.

<sup>12</sup> PLASTLAUS SEPTEMBER (2021): Do Icelanders use more plastic than other nations?

<sup>13</sup> MDPI (2022): Plastic Packaging Waste Management in Iceland: Challenges and Opportunities from a Life Cycle Assessment Perspective.

<sup>14</sup> MDPI (2022): Plastic Packaging Waste Management in Iceland: Challenges and Opportunities from a Life Cycle Assessment Perspective.

<sup>15</sup> PADI AWARE FOUNDATION (2018): The Blue Army of Iceland.

zariadenia slúžiace na recykláciu surovín akými sú plasty a papier, no do zberu je súce aj štatstvo. Za nedostatočnou recykláciou stojí pravdepodobne aj systém odvozu odpadu, pretože cena sa odvíja aj voľby spôsobu prepravy odpadu, pričom je na obyvateľoch, či si zvolia systém odvozu odpadu zberovou spoločnosťou, alebo ho individuálne na tieto miesta odvezú.

Podľa niektorých vyjadrení však Island v posledných rokoch dosahuje v systéme odpadového hospodárstva spomedzi severských štátov najväčší pokrok, čo môže byť spôsobené aj jeho vstupom v roku 1994 do Európskeho hospodárskeho priestoru, pretože ide o zákon platných pre Európsku úniu, a vzťahuje sa aj na odpadové hospodárstvo. Islandské orgány vykonali kroky smerujúce k systematickému obmedzeniu tvorby odpadu a jeho náležitému začleneniu do opakovaného využitia prostredníctvom recyklácie. Tento zámer podporili schválením zákona o recyklačných poplatkoch, ktorý udelil Islandskému recyklačnému fondu právomoc poskytovať ekonomicky výhodnejšie podmienky obyvateľom, ktorí sa rozhodnú pre opäťovné využitie a recykláciu v snahe znižovania objemu odpadu určeného na konečnú likvidáciu.<sup>16</sup> Poplatky za spracovanie odpadu, sú vyberané s cieľom prenesenia finančnej zodpovednosti za jeho následné spracovanie stranami produkujúcimi odpad. Islandský recyklačný fond je riadiacim subjektom, ktorý slúži na pridelovanie týchto poplatkov za spracovanie odpadu. Táto krajina bola tiež prvou v poradí, ktorá zaviedla svoj vlastný celoštátny systém recyklačných poplatkov pre jednorazové nádoby na nápoje, pričom vrátením nádob získajú spotrebiteľia spätné vrátenie poplatku.<sup>17</sup>

V súčasnosti je však zariadení slúžiacich na recykláciu odpadu v tejto krajine stále málo, vďaka čomu sa nahromadený odpad odosiela na proces recyklácie a ďalšieho spracovania do zahraničia.<sup>18</sup> To v praxi znamená, že životný cyklus plastového odpadu končí buď procesom skládkovania, alebo spaľovania, no na to aby bol tento odpad recyklovaný, musí byť prostredníctvom kontajnerovej lode transportovaný do zahraničia. Ak sa pozrieme na spríbuznené nordické krajinu, tak preprava z Islandu do Švédska sa vzdialenosťne vymeriava na 2 178 km, pričom napríklad na prepravu do Dánska je potrebné vzdialenosťne prekonat' 2 377 km.<sup>19</sup>

Recyklačnú otázku v kontexte vývozu odpadu do zahraničia by sme podporili obrázkom 1, na základe ktorého je badateľné, že medzi rokmi 2010 – 2019 podiel recyklovaného odpadu v zahraničí presiahol množstvo odpadu recyklovaného v tejto krajine.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> ÚRVINNSLISJÓÐUR: The purpose of operating the Icelandic Recycling Fund and collecting recycling fees.

<sup>17</sup> GOVERNMENT OF ICELAND. Waste treatment.

<sup>18</sup> KAZDOVA, T. (2019): Fotoreportáž: Ako triedia odpad na Islande?

<sup>19</sup> MDPI (2022): Plastic Packaging Waste Management in Iceland: Challenges and Opportunities from a Life Cycle Assessment Perspective.

<sup>20</sup> STATISTICS ICELAND (2021): 47 % of packaging waste to recycling.

**Obrázok 1: Množstvo recyklovaného odpadu z obalov medzi rokmi 2010 – 2019 na Islande**



Prameň: STATISTICS ICELAND (2021): 47% of packaging waste to recycling.

Pri riešení problematiky plastov sme mali možnosť kooperovať so zakladateľom mimovládnej organizácie, ktorá nesie názov The Blue Army. Táto spoločnosť, na čele ktorej stojí pán Tommi Knúts, odo dňa svojho vzniku, ktorý sa datuje do roku 1995, vyzbierala do roku 2022 viac ako 1 700 metrických ton odpadkov.<sup>21</sup> Jeho kritika týkajúca sa znečisťovania morí, najmä plastovými obalmi, bola smerovaná k novodobému negatívному trendu nazývanému *Greenwashing*, pretože prostredníctvom zavádzajúcej seba prezentácie sa spoločnosti často vykresľujú ako udržateľné.<sup>22</sup> Túto praktiku môžeme prepojiť aj so zberom plastového odpadu a jeho následným transferom do zahraničia, pretože ako pán Knúts poznamenal, praktika *Greenwashingu* je na Islande z veľkej časti rozšírená. Jedným z dôvodom je, že primárna snaha tejto krajiny tkvie v tom, že má za cieľ v očiach zahraničných partnerov a verejnosti figurovať ako environmentálny líder a z toho dôvodu častokrát finálne následky spôsobené danými činmi nezverejňovať.

### 3 Výruby lesov vo Švédsku

V procese dosahovania uhlíkovej neutrality zohrávajú lesy osobitnú úlohu. Táto pozícia sa osobitne posilňuje pri krajinách, ktorých prevažná plocha rozlohy je práve lesmi tvorená. Švédsko sa zaraďuje medzi krajiny, kde oblasť posiate lesnými plochami predstavuje viac ako polovicu, konkrétnie hovoríme o 70 % ploche.<sup>23</sup> Z celkového rozsahu tejto plochy sa vo Švédsku nachádza 83 % ihličnatých lesov, 12 % zmiešaných lesov a 5 % listnatých lesov. Formou celulózového dreva putuje 45 % vyťaženého dreva do celulózového priemyslu.

Existuje niekoľko spôsobov akými môže dôjsť k obnove vyrúbaného lesa. Zaraďuje sa medzi nich napríklad prirodzená obnova, výsev a výsadba nových sadeníc. Zo spomínaných metód, pri ktorých dochádza k najrýchlejšej obnove lesa sa považuje výsadba nových sadeníc. V tabuľke 3 uvádzame výsledky prieskumu týkajúceho sa opäťovnej výsadby stromov

<sup>21</sup> PADI AWARE FOUNDATION (2018): The Blue Army of Iceland.

<sup>22</sup> ROBINSON, D. (2022): What is Greenwashing?

<sup>23</sup> EURONEWS.GREEN (2023): Sweden is home to one of Europe's largest carbon sinks – but is it being cared for properly?

v oblastiach, kde dochádzalo k výrubu stromov medzi rokmi 2014 – 2017 Švédskej lesnej agentúrou.<sup>24</sup>

**Tabuľka 3: Metódy regenerácie lesnej plochy vo Švédsku medzi rokmi 2014 – 2017**

Regeneračná metóda	Celá oblasť Švédska	Götaland	Svealand	Severné Norrland	Južné Norrland
Výsadba	82	84	84	77	84
Prirodzená obnova (semenné stromy)	11	12	11	12	11
Sejba	4	0	2	9	3
Bez starostlivosti	3	4	3	2	2

Prameň: SWEDISH WOOD: The forest and sustainable forestry.

Výber metódy závisí aj od konkrétnej lesnej oblasti, pretože napríklad na juhu Švédska sa predpokladá dvojnásobne vyšší rast stromov ako v severnej časti tejto krajiny. Od začiatku tohto cyklu, na začiatku ktorého je fáza výsadby stromov, by mali byť plochy monitorované kvôli škodcom, požiarom a búrkam, pričom finálna fáza spočívajúca v t'ažbe, resp. vo výrube lesných plôch prebieha takmer vo všetkých oblastiach v rovnakom čase.<sup>25</sup>

Vo Švédsku prevažuje t'ažba prostredníctvom holorubov, o čom svedčí aj to, že iba pri 3 % lesného hospodárstva nie je využívaný tento spôsob t'ažby.<sup>26</sup> V tejto tematike sa nám podarilo nadviazať kontakt s *Naturvårdsverket*, štátnym orgánom, ktorým sme boli výslovne upozornený na diferenciu medzi odlesňovaním a holorubami, pretože pri holoruboch dochádza k výsadbe nových stromov, kdežto pri odlesňovaní ide o zmenu využitia pôdy.

Vlastníci plôch, na ktorých sa nachádzajú lesy majú relatívnu slobodu v rozhodovaní sa akým spôsobom budú tieto lesné plochy obhospodarovať. Táto sloboda rozhodovania sa znamená aj to, že vlastníci majú právo zvoliť si to, či budú lesy obhospodarovať udržateľným spôsobom formou ekologických metód obnovy lesov, alebo využijú metódu holorubov, ktorá až taká priaznivá voči životnému prostrediu nie je.<sup>27</sup> Napriek tomu je tento spôsob, ktorý sa mnogokrát považuje za synonymum odlesňovania<sup>28</sup> využívaný vo veľkej miere, najmä preto, že je to najefektívnejšia metóda na produkciu veľkého objemu dreva. Zvýšená produktivita stála za tým, že sa táto metóda stala najvyužívanejšou, aj keď v 50. rokoch 20. storočia čelila vlné kritiky.<sup>29</sup> V praxi môže viest' holorubná t'ažba k degradácii pôdy, avšak netreba opomenúť ani to, že v niektorých prípadoch je považovaná za priaznivú pre obnovu lesa, pretože dochádza k výrubu starých stromov, ktoré sú viac náchylné k určitým chorobám a zamedzujú prieniku slnečných lúčov na mladšie stromy. Avšak treba vytýčiť aj veľké množstvo negatív, ktoré so sebou holoruby prinášajú. Jedným z nich je ničenie prirodzených biotopov a biodiverzity, čím prispieva k samotnému ničeniu lesných biotopov. Taktiež dochádza k zhoršovaniu kvality vzduchu a spomaľovaniu vodných tokov, čo vedie k zvyšovaniu erózie pôdy. Do vodných tokov unikajú často aj živiny a holoruby vedú aj k sedimentácií týchto živín, nehovoriač o zvyšovaní teploty vody v pobrežných oblastiach. Azda najväčším negatívom je riziko odlesňovania, pretože miestam kde sú holoruby vykonané a nedôjde k ich následnej obnove hrozí okrem straty lesa, devastácií tejto pôdy aj dezertifikácia.<sup>30</sup> Hoci sa táto krajina orientuje

<sup>24</sup> SWEDISH WOOD. The forest and sustainable forestry.

<sup>25</sup> SWEDISH FOREST INDUSTRIES (2021): The cycle of forestry.

<sup>26</sup> HOFFNER, Erik. (2022): How unsustainable is Sweden's forestry? 'Very.' Q&A with Marcus Westberg and Staffan Widstrand.

<sup>27</sup> SWEDISH FOREST INDUSTRIES (2020): Why are Sweden's forests managed the way they are?

<sup>28</sup> EOS DATA ANALYTICS (2021): Clear-Cutting Pros & Cons and Its Effects on Forests.

<sup>29</sup> SWEDISH FOREST INDUSTRIES (2022): Why are there clearcuts in the Swedish forests?

<sup>30</sup> EOS DATA ANALYTICS (2021): Clear-Cutting Pros & Cons and Its Effects on Forests.

na zelenú politiku, jej lesnícky priemysel nie je v tomto ohľade natoľko v súlade s udržateľnosťou. Táto prax je tiež v rozpore so stratégou lesného hospodárstva Európskej únie, pretože do roku 2030 je vytýčený cieľ značného okresania využívania holorubnej metódy.<sup>31</sup>

Kvôli nadmernej tăžbe, a s ním spojeným výrubom stromov bol v roku 1903 prijatý aj zákon o lesnom hospodárstve, ktorého hlavný zámer spočíval v starostlivosti o vyrúbané územia formou výsadby nových sadeníc.<sup>32</sup> Zákon o lesnom hospodárstve spočíva sice v tvrdení, že les ako celok spadá pod národné bohatstvo a pri akejkoľvek činnosti spojenej s jeho obhospodarovaním by sa do úvahy malo bráť zachovávanie biodiverzity. Na druhú stranu ale zákon neopomína ani verejné záujmy, ktorých kontext nie je bližšie definovaný.<sup>33</sup> Zaujímavé je však to, že v snahe zabrániť úpadku švédskej lesov, ktorý bol v negatívnom slova zmysle poháňaný najmä poľnohospodárstvom, bytovou výstavbou, prípadne tăžbou dreva na palivo, alebo tăžbou dreveného uhlia sa stalo obligatórnym za každý jeden vyrúbaný strom zasadíť nový. Legislatívne obmedzeným sa stalo aj množstvo dreva na ktorého tăžbu sa nároky vzťahovali. Paradoxne má táto krajina početne viac a mohutnejšie stromy ako tomu bolo pred storočím, ale práve využívanou metódou holorubov a sadením monokultúrnych stromov došlo k situácii, kedy kvôli narušenej biodiverzite hrozí niektorým druhom vyhynutie. Inak tomu nie je ani v prípade d'atľa bielochrbtému.<sup>34</sup>

#### 4 Nadmerný rybolov v Nórsku

Rovnováha biologického systému mora je v súčasnom smerovaní spoločnosti ohrozená nadmerným rybolovom, na problematiku ktorého poukazujú predovšetkým vedci. Rovnováha morských ekosystémov a biodiverzita je narušená desaťročiami pretrvávajúcej tăžby, ktorá prebieha v moriach. K tomuto impulzu došlo najmä v snahe poskytovania neobmedzeného množstva rýb, ktoré sú predávané za prijateľné ceny. K narušeniu tejto rovnováhy prispievajú aj hospodárske politiky krajín, na základe ktorých sú poskytované aj dotácie a pôžičky komerčným rybárskym flotilám. Za týmto problémom stoja aj využívané praktiky, na čele ktorých sa nachádza metóda výlovu rýb prostredníctvom vlečných sietí. V roku 2006 bolo vykonané skúmanie, ktorého výsledky uviedol časopis *Science ponuro*. Podľa predpovede vedcov oceán, ktorý bol v doterajšom chápaní považovaný za nekonečnú zásobu morských živočíchov čeli existenčným hrozbám, pretože ak sa v súčasnom spôsobe lov u bude pokračovať aj nadálej, do roku 2048 hrozí kolaps tohto priemyslu.<sup>35</sup> Upriamujeme pozornosť na nástroj TAC (*total allowable catches*), ktorý sa využíva pri určení hranice maximálneho povoleného množstva rybolovu za vymedzený časový úsek pre každý jeden druh. Nástroj TAC je kritizovaný obzvlášť preto, že neberie do úvahy naliehavé odporúčania vedcov. Inými slovami do úzadia išlo až 78 % odporúčaní, ktoré vedci navrhovali, čo malo za následok nadmerné využívanie väčšiny lovísk.<sup>36</sup>

Situácia v Severnom mori je viac ako kritická, o čom svedčí aj štúdia, ktorá bola v roku 2009 vykonaná Európskou komisiou, na základe odhadov ktorej, sa úroveň nadmerného rybolovu v Severnom mori vyšplhala až na 88 %. Korene problematiky nadmerného rybolovu však siahajú niekoľko stoviek rokov pred vykonaním tejto štúdie a to najmä preto, že komerčný rybolov bol v praxi zavedený už omnoho skôr, než sa na túto skutočnosť začalo poukazovať.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>31</sup> EURONEWS.GREEN (2023): Sweden is home to one of Europe's largest carbon sinks – but is it being cared for properly?

<sup>32</sup> SWEDISH FOREST INDUSTRIES (2022): Swedish forestry through the ages.

<sup>33</sup> FAOLEX: The Swedish Forestry Act.

<sup>34</sup> WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (2018): Sweden's forests have doubled in size over the last 100 years.

<sup>35</sup> NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (2022): How overfishing threatens the world's oceans – and why it could end in catastrophe.

<sup>36</sup> OCEANA: Total Allowable Catches (TACs).

<sup>37</sup> LORENZ, A. (2020): Overfishing in the North sea.

Rybolov zohráva v nórskom hospodárstve nezastupiteľnú úlohu, o čom svedčí aj skutočnosť, že táto krajina bola v poradí prvou na svete, ktorá založila v roku 1946 samostatné ministerstvo rybolovu. Pre Nórsko je toto odvetvie klúčovým a očakáva sa, že veľký nárast v tomto odvetví ešte len príde, pretože strojárenské spoločnosti, ktoré sa donedávna orientovali len na ropný priemysel, začali vytvárať inovácie týkajúce sa chovu rýb a pomaly sa preorientovávajú na oceánsky dodávateľský priemysel. Netreba opomenúť, že zvýšená úroveň aktivity morského priemyslu má za následok pozitívne ekonomickej účinky, no vo všeobecnosti životné prostredie ovplyvňuje negatívne.<sup>38</sup>

V tematike nadmerného rybolovu sme sa obrátili na morského biológá Per-Erik Schulza z najstaršej nórskej organizácie na ochranu životného prostredia a prírody. Touto organizáciou je *Naturvernforbundet*. V tomto kontexte podľa slov morského biológá je jedným z najväčších problémov práve samotná kontrola rybolovu, pretože rybolov je mnohokrát vykonávaný zahraničnými flotilami. Touto problematikou je zasiahnutá aj oblasť *Skagerrak*, ktorá je považovaná za najdezelátnejšiu a to nielen z dôvodu nadmerného rybolovu, ale aj kvôli eutrofizácii a deštrukcii morských ekosystémov spôsobom výlovu rýb. Táto oblasť má vplyv aj na Švédsko a Dánsko pretože hovoríme o časti Severného mora, ktorá sa rozlieha medzi uvedenými krajinami. Za problematickou spomínamej oblasti stojí najmä prúdy, prostredníctvom ktorých znečisťujúce látky viažu usadeniny. Sedimenty, ktoré obsahujú tieto nečistoty vplývajú na zdravie morského dna a stojí práve za jeho každoročným niekol'ko milimetrovým nárastom.<sup>39</sup> V súvislosti s nezákonným, nenahláseným a neregulovaným rybolovom by podľa jeho slov zmeny mohli nastať v prípade, ak dôjde k zvýšeniu kontroly v týchto oblastiach a zároveň k zvýšeniu výskumných kapacít. Riešenie by mohlo byť na dosah, ak by došlo k uváženejšiemu prerozdeleniu morských plôch, čo by spočívalo vo vyčlenení 30 % z celkovej plochy oceánu, do ktorej by zásahy v akejkoľvek podobe neboli povolené. Zároveň však na zostávajúcich 70 % by mali byť vyvájané inovatívne a ekologicky priateľné metódy zberu rýb. Zvýšená pozornosť by sa mala venovať sledovaniu správania rybárskej komunity, nevynímajúc hrozby v podobe klimatických zmien a neistoty spojenej s vedením štatistik. Samotný cieľ by však mal tkvieť v snahe obnoviť zásoby rýb, pretože práve tieto zásoby sú z pohľadu dlhodobo udržateľného výnosu rozhodujúce.

## 5 Fínsko a problematika znečisťovania morí

V otázke znečisťovania morí a eutrofizácie sme oslovilili Fínsky inštitút pre životné prostredie, ktorý je považovaný za výskumný ústav spadajúci pod Fínske ministerstvo životného prostredia a Fínske ministerstvo poľnohospodárstva a lesného hospodárstva.<sup>40</sup> Konkrétnie sme túto problematiku konzultovali s pánom Jari Lyytimäkim, ktorý je v rámci tohto inštitútu odborníkom centra environmentálnej politiky.<sup>41</sup>

K znečisťovaniu Baltského mora, ktoré je jedným z najviac ohrozených eutrofizáciou<sup>42</sup> prispieva prostredníctvom nadmernej lodnej dopravy a vypúšťanej odpadovej vody predovšetkým činnosť človeka. K tomuto znečisťovaniu dopomáhajú aj umelé hnojivá využívané v poľnohospodárstve, pretože rastúca prosperita krajín, ktoré toto more obmývajú zintenzívňuje jeho využívanie.<sup>43</sup> Acidifikáciu oceánov zapríčinuje znížené pH morskej vody, čo je spôsobené rozkladom rastlín a rias v prípade, ak sa ich v oceáne nachádza nadbytok. Významnú úlohu v tomto procese eutrofizácie zohráva nadmerné množstvo oxidu uhličitého,

<sup>38</sup> JOHANSEN, U. a kol. (2019): The Norwegian seafood industry – Importance for the national economy.

<sup>39</sup> HELMHOLTZ-CENTRUM HEREON (2022): Industrial sedimentation in the North Sea.

<sup>40</sup> FINNISH ENVIRONMENTAL INSTITUTE (2023): Evidence-based knowledge to support sustainability transformation.

<sup>41</sup> FINNISH ENVIRONMENTAL INSTITUTE(2021): Our experts for environment.

<sup>42</sup> HELCOM (2018): Our Baltic Sea.


<sup>43</sup> THIS IS FINLAND: Concern for a precious sea.

ktorý je uvoľňovaný pri odumieraní rastlín, pretože ich časti sú vo finále trávené baktériami čo práve tento oxid uhličitý uvoľňuje.<sup>44</sup>

Fínsko má priaznivé poľnohospodárske podmienky, pričom k podpore tejto prosperity dopomáhajú aj tuhé mrazy, ktoré ničia škodcov a majú žičlivý vplyv na znižovanie chorôb rastlín. Ekologické poľnohospodárstvo zaberá 14,4 % plochy.<sup>45</sup> Taktiež práve kvôli zvyšujúcej sa industrializácii v roku 1974 vošiel do platnosti Helsinský dohovor, ktorého primárny cieľ spočíval v riešení environmentálnych výziev vyplývajúcich práve zo spomínamej ľudskej činnosti, čím dochádza k jeho aktualizácii v dôsledku meniacoho sa geopolitického rámca.<sup>46</sup>

Na druhej strane priaznivé klimatické podmienky tejto krajiny proces eutrofizácie v zimných mesiacoch zhoršujú, pričom výrazným prispievateľom eutrofizácie dna jazier sú prvky fosfor a dusík, pretože sú súčasťou poľnohospodárskych hnojív.<sup>47</sup> Postranne túto problematiku ovplyvňujú aj znečisťujúce látky, ktoré sa do vodných tokov dostanú prostredníctvom zvýšeného vysádzania stromov a následného obrábania pôdy. Fínsky stav pobrežných vôd by mohol byť charakterizovaný ako neuspokojivý, čo by sa dalo generalizovať aj na situáciu v Baltskom mori. Z tohto dôvodu boli vytýčené ciele v podobe zdravého oceána, ktorý sa mal splniť do roku 2020, no k jeho naplneniu v stanovenom termíne nedošlo a cieľ je prolongovaný do roku 2027. Spomínaná poľnohospodárska záťaž je výrazným faktorom zhoršujúcim stav eutrofizácie, ktorý podporujú aj štátne dotácie na produkciu rašeliny,<sup>48</sup> pričom prívody fosforu a dusíka začali v tejto oblasti narastať už obzvlášť medzi 50. až 80. rokmi 20. storočia.

**Obrázok 2: Zniženie prísunu živín do Baltského mora**



Prameň: STATE OF THE BALTIC SEA (2016): Eutrophication.

<sup>44</sup> NOAA (2023): What is eutrophication?

<sup>45</sup> MTK: Agriculture in Finland.

<sup>46</sup> HELCOM: The Helsinský Convention.

<sup>47</sup> MTK (2019): Naudanlianhan ympäristövaikutukset Suomessa ja globaalisti.

<sup>48</sup> PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE (2020): Finland: Report on the implementation of the 2030 agenda for sustainable development. Helsinki. s. 132-133.

Prostredníctvom nástroja *HELCOM HEAT* bolo vykonané hodnotenie stavu eutrofizácie, a to pomocou zohľadnenia kritérií akými sú úroveň živín, priame účinky a nepriame účinky, pri ktorých sa do úvahy berie indikátor kyslíkového dlhu. Napriek tomu, že k eutrofizácii dochádza, pozitívnym zistením je, že množstvo dusíka a fosforu obsiahnutého v povodiach Baltského mora sa znižuje.<sup>49</sup>

Inštitút sa snaží pomáhať prostredníctvom priamo miernených rád politikom, ktorí by mali pri svojom rozhodovaní bráť do úvahy environmentálny rámec veci. To, akým smerom sa plnenie cieľa uberie istotne ovplyvní aj vojna medzi Ruskou federáciou a Ukrajinou. Po vypuknutí vojny bola spolupráca medzi Fínskom a Ruskou federáciou pozastavená, čo znamená, že akékolvek snahy o hľadanie riešení na environmentálne problémy budú stagnovať. Faktom zostáva, že každá krajina, ktorá sa podieľa na znečisťovaní tohto mora by mala prevziať adekvátnu zodpovednosť za svoje konanie, a tým prispieť nielen k naplneniu vytýčeného cieľa, ale svojimi činmi zvyšovať aj ekologicky pridanú hodnotu.

## 6 Index zdravia oceánov z pozície Dánska

Od 80. rokov 20. storočia problematike eutrofizácie čeliť aj Dánsko. K zhoršeniu eutrofizácie formou zvýšeného znečistenia vnútrozemských, ale aj pobrežných vód Dánska došlo kvôli zvýšenej záťaži živinami. Toto obdobie predstavovalo bod zlomu, od ktorého sa tejto problematike začala pripisovať vyššia váha, čo v praxi znamenalo zvýšenie iniciatív o zavedenie akčných plánov, ktoré by prispeli k zamedzeniu vytvárania ďalšieho pobrežného ale aj vnútrozemského znečisťovania.

Index zdravia oceánov, v rámci ktorého sa Dánsko umiestnilo na 164. priečke z celkového počtu 220 je tiež jedným z faktorov, ktorý svedčí o medzerách krajiny vo sfére ochrany vód.<sup>50</sup> Tento index sme hodnotili s medzinárodnou neziskovou organizáciou *Greenpeace*, ktorá bola založená v roku 1971 a svoju činnosť sústredí najmä do environmentálnych sfér.<sup>51</sup> Pre presnosť, komunikovali sme menovite s jej regionálnou pobočkou *Greenpeace Nordic*.<sup>52</sup> Táto organizácia sa vyznačuje svojou nezávislosťou, pretože nedostáva finančné prostriedky od žiadnych skupín, štátnych aktérov, ani organizácií od čoho si môžeme odvodiť aj jej svojbytosť.<sup>53</sup> Hlavná moc tejto organizácie spočíva v mobilizácii verejnosti, ovplyvňovaní verejnej mienky a vyvájaní tlaku na konzumentov. Ďalšou formou vplyvu je napríklad aj lobovanie.<sup>54</sup>

Zdravie oceánu, podľa definície indexu zdravia oceánov, spočíva v jeho udržateľnosti, ktorá na jednej strane zachováva prirodzenú biodiverzitu oceánskeho ekosystému, no na strane druhej slúži tak tiež k uspokojeniu ľudských potrieb.<sup>55</sup> To, do akej miery sú jednotlivé krajiny úspešné určuje desať cieľov, na základe hodnotenia ktorých sa dotvára celkové skóre indexu zdravia oceánu.

Obrázok 3 znázorňuje sledovaných desať cieľov, medzi ktoré sa zaraďuje napríklad aj cieľ čistoty vody, alebo cieľ biodiverzity.

<sup>49</sup> STATE OF THE BALTIC SEA (2016): Eutrophication.

<sup>50</sup> OHI (2020): Denmark.

<sup>51</sup> MLADÍ ZA KLÍMU: Environmentálne organizácie, ktoré chránia našu prírodu.

<sup>52</sup> DBPEDIA: About Greenpeace.

<sup>53</sup> GREENPEACE (2023): Hvem er Greenpeace: Greenpeace er mennersker som dig.

<sup>54</sup> GREENPEACE: About Greenpeace.

<sup>55</sup> OHI: Goals.

**Obrázok 3: Desať cieľov indexu zdravia oceánov**



Prameň: LIFEWATCH BELGIUM: Ocean Health Index.

Pri posudzovaní indexu zdravia oceánov Dánsko so svojím dosiahnutým výsledkom 64 zaostáva za celosvetovým priemerným skóre, ktoré predstavuje hodnotu 69, čo v širšom kontexte znamená, že sa zo 220 sledovaných krajín umiestnilo v rebríčku na 164. mieste.<sup>56</sup> Pani Kristina Modviga Klement, ktorá zastrešuje kampaň Greenpeace pre poľnohospodárstvo a lesy nám vydala stanovisko, ktoré sa neprikláňa v prospech environmentálneho líderstva. Svoje tvrdenie podopiera faktickými údajmi opierajúcimi sa o výsledky skúmania indexu pri cieli udržateľného výlovu morských plodov, pretože z možných 100 bodov získala táto krajina počet bodov v hodnote 35.<sup>57</sup> Ďalším aspektom je to, že Dánsko neprihliada na ochranu vodných ekosystémov pri sledovaní svojich záujmov v oblasti turistiky a rekreácie, čo je tiež jeden z dôvodov prečo dosiahlo 23 bodov z celkového 100-bodového skóre.<sup>58</sup> Táto krajina má tiež medzery pri vynakladaní snahy na ochranu pobrežných biotopov. Ochrana by priaznivo ovplyvnilo aj kapacitu tejto krajiny v kontexte jej možností využitia potenciálu uchovávateľa uhlíka. S dosiahnutým skóre 62 sa síce nachádza za 50 % úspešnosťou, no stále nedochádza k maximalizácii potenciálu aký by mohol byť využitý.<sup>59</sup> Inak tomu nie je ani pri cieli týkajúcom sa kvality a počtu pracovných miest, ktoré sú v určitej sfére alebo sektore prepojené s morom, neopomínajúc výšku príjmov obyvateľstva.<sup>60</sup>

## Záver

Výsledky hodnotenia oprávnenosti využívania prílastku environmentálneho líderstva severskými krajinami by sme v prvom rade rozčlenili do dvoch rovín. Následne bližšie vyhodnotíme jednotlivé nami ustanovené problematiky, v rámci ktorých nám spolupráca s odborníkmi z daných oblastí pomohla pri zosnovaní celkového obrazu.

Do popredia by sme chceli vyzdvihnuť nepopierateľný fakt v podobe vedúcich pozícií, aké tieto krajinu zastávajú v rozličných indexoch, ukazovateľoch a hodnoteniach, pričom my sme poukázali iba na niektoré z nich. Ak sa zameriame na výsledky hodnotení, akceptovanie a zaužívanie náratívu environmentálneho líderstva verejnosťou tkvie práve v tomto faktore. Radi by sme však poukázali aj na druhú stranu mince, a súčasne, že napriek tomu, že v druhej väčšine ukazovateľov zastávajú vedúce pozície, nie je to pravidlom. Toto tvrdenie by sme podopreli indexom trvalo udržateľného rozvoja z tabuľky č. 2. V tejto rovine by sme vedúce postavenie severských krajín nechceli spochybňovať, avšak upozorňujeme na to, že treba bráť

<sup>56</sup> OHI (2022): Denmark.

<sup>57</sup> OHI: Goal: Food Provision.

<sup>58</sup> OHI: Goal: Tourism and recreation.

<sup>59</sup> OHI: Goal: Coastal Protection.

<sup>60</sup> OHI: Goal: Livelihoods and economies.

kriticky na vedomie, že celosvetová priemerná úroveň nedosahuje takú mieru akú by jej ho potenciál dovoľoval, a z tohto dôvodu vymanenie sa z tejto roviny nie je práve vzorovým meradlom.

Zásadný rozdiel sme vyzozorovali práve vo fungovaní a nastavení občianskej spoločnosti v týchto krajinách. Zastávame názor, že práve samotné naladenie spoločnosti ako celku výrazne odlišuje tieto krajinu od zvyšku sveta. Domnievame sa, že ich odlišný spôsob správania vychádza práve z vyšej miery ekologickej povedomia, na ktorých nesie zásluhu aj vyššia miera vzdelanostnej úrovne. Badáme príčinnú súvislosť medzi prístupom verejnosti, reakciou obyvateľstva a angažovanosťou environmentálnych organizácií a inštitúcií v hľadaní riešení na environmentálne problémy. Iniciatíva hľadania riešení zväčša vychádza práve z popudu verejnosti, čím sa výrazne odlišujú od ostatných krajín. Triumf týchto krajín sme identifikovali v miere ekologickej gramotnosti, ktorá sa následne kvôli občianskej iniciatíve odzrkadľuje v presadzovaní progresívnych politík.

Pri jednotlivých severských krajinách sme spolupracovali s odlišnou škálou environmentálnych organizácií, ktoré spájajú ekologický prvok. Pri Isande sme identifikovali problematiku nedostatočnej vybavenosti krajiny vo forme recyklačných zariadení, z dôvodu ktorého dochádza k transportu odpadu do Európy. Prepravou sa zvyšuje miera znečisťovania. Odporúčame prehodnotiť túto stratégiu a starostlivo zvážiť, či by pre túto krajinu nebolo vhodnejšie vynaložiť finančné prostriedky na zaobstaranie a zriadenie daných recyklačných zariadení, ktorých výstavba by pomohla zredukovať množstvo emisií, ktorých tvorba vychádza práve z ekologickej náročnej prepravy.

Vo Švédsku, krajine bohatej na lesné plochy, existuje zákon o lesnom hospodárstve z ktorého vychádza premisa, na základe ktorej sa výsadba nových sadeníc nahradzujúca množstvo vyrúbaných stromov považuje za dostačujúce riešenie. Pri hlbšom skúmaní tohto riešenia vyjde na zretel', že sice množstevne nedochádza k zmene počtu stromov, avšak holoruby spôsobujú poškodzovanie biotopov a narušujú prirodzenú rovnováhu lesného ekosystému, za podporou ktorej stoja práve staršie stromy. Za najvhodnejšiu alternatívu považujeme svedomitejšiu kontrolu lesných plôch, na ktorých k výrubom dochádzalo k tăžbe na vybraných miestach, vo vytýčených časových obdobiah a vo zvolenom počte stromov. To by malo za následok udržateľnejšie obhospodarovanie týchto plôch, menej závažné ekologicke následky a ľahšiu obnovu.

Nadmerný rybolov sa stal pálčivou tému súčasnej spoločnosti, pretože zvyšujúci sa počet obyvateľstva v určitých častiach sveta poháňaný rastúcim životným štandardom stojí za zvyšujúcim sa dopytom po konzumácií rýb a morských plodov. Myslíme si, že by sa do popredia mali dostávať nástroje, ktoré sledujú maximálne hranice povoleného množstva výlovu rýb za určité časové obdobie pre jednotlivé druhy. Napriek tomu, že dosiahnutie udržateľného rybolovu nie je v súčasnosti prioritou Nórska, by bolo vhodné zaviesť kontrolu výlovu rýb zahraničnými flotilami vo vodách tejto krajiny, čo by predstavoval prvý krok vpred k udržateľnosti.

V prípade Fínska sme sa zamerali na problematiku eutrofizácie, a s ním spojený cieľ dosiahnutia cieľa zdravých oceánov do roku 2027. Zastávame názor, že by malo dôjsť k regulácií a najmä aktualizácii súčasných zákonov, pretože opatrenia, ktoré sú momentálne v platnosti sa nejavia ako dostačujúce na to, aby k naplneniu vytýčeného cieľa mohlo dôjsť. Avšak ďalšia stránka celého tohto problému spočíva v tom, že v globále akékoľvek posuny bude tăžké vykonávať, pretože procesy zmien sú pomalé a dosiahnutie tohto cieľa v kontexte znížovania tlakov bude zdĺhavé. Taktiež tomu nepridáva ani skutočnosť, že v súčasnom smerovaní budú tendencie klimatických zmien iba silniť, čo bude mať za následok pôsobenie ďalších tlakov vedúcich k spomaľovaniu naplnenia vytýčeného cieľa.

Pri hodnotení indexu zdravia oceánov Dánsko nie je krajina, ktorá by mohla o sebe samozvane tvrdiť, že drží status environmentálneho lídra, pretože zaostáva za globálnym priemerným skóre. Náprava by bola možná v prípade, ak sa zamerajú na väčšiu ochranu morských biotopov spolu s udržateľnejším výlovom morských plodov, ako tomu je aj v prípade Nórska. Najväčší podiel viny nesú práve zodpovedné strany, ktoré svojou nedostatočnou angažovanosťou celý tento proces spomaľujú.

Po zhodnotení celkovej situácie v severských krajinách im podľa nášho názoru právom prináleží prívlastok environmentálneho vodcovstva s prevažujúcou zásluhou tretieho sektora, ktorý sa pričinuje svojím dohľadom a stimulmi na plnení stanovených záväzkov a cieľov. Predpokladáme, že skrytý potenciál, ktorý je zhmotnený v tejto neviditeľnej sile, bude mať v budúcnosti ešte väčšiu váhu. V prípade ak sa požiadavky a iniciatívy verejnosti stretnú so silnejšou podporou mocenských elít bude vedúce postavenie severských krajín usvedčujúcim a nepriestrelným demonštrovaním skutočnosti voči pochybám ich environmentálneho prvenstva. Avšak netreba opomenúť to, že k tomu aby celková spoločnosť v kontexte environmentálneho rámca mohla napredovať sa nemôže uspokojiť s doteraz nadobudnutými úspechmi. Práve toto nastavenie bude jej hnacou silou pri vlastnom zdokonalovaní, ktoré sa následne pretransformuje do skutočne podniknutých krokov a plnení záväzkov.

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# **MEETING THE CLIMATE GOALS DURING ARMED CONFLICT. ANALYSIS OF THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR<sup>1</sup>**

## **SPŁŇANIE KLIMATICKÝCH CIEĽOV POČAS OZBROJENÉHO KONFLIKTU. ANALÝZA RUSKO-UKRAJINSKEJ VOJNY**

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**Abstract:** Externalities influencing countries, such as wars tend to disrupt the regular economic and social processes. This paper analysis how a military conflict impacts the efforts of world actors in climate change and carbon neutrality. It focuses on armed conflict between Russian Federation and Ukraine, research the most recent available data and compare the emissions in given periods in order to provide and estimated impact of such events on climate efforts of countries directly and indirectly involved in conflict. Assumption, that crises directly lead to neglecting the climate goals and therefore an increase in GHG emissions is tested. Paper also analyzes the overall impact of war on GHG emissions, providing a overview of its severity. The results indicate that emissions on territory of countries directly involved in conflict tend to increase significantly, while change in emissions of external actors are insignificant. Results that would confirm or disprove the assumption of increased GHG emissions during crises are inconclusive and indicate a high subjectivity.

**Keywords:** climate change, war, Russia-Ukraine, GHG emissions, carbon neutrality

**JEL:** Q85, N44, F51

### **Introduction**

The 21<sup>st</sup> century is characterized by rapidly growing global activity in the prevention of climate change. Most countries are aware of the issue, participate in annual climate conferences and expressed their willingness to participate in prevention of such occurrence. At the same time, the level of cooperation and policy adaptation differs quite significantly among them. While some consider the threat of climate change critical, include it in the most serious issues for years to come and adopt more strict policies, others accept rather insufficient approach and does not show a true interest into solving the human caused issue. Nevertheless, with regard to climate change, we can in fact talk about a global effort with common goal. On the other hand, as many countries still do not consider the threat of climate change critical, their priorities focus on different matters, and when crisis (of any type) occurs, interest in solving this issue is pushed even further away, in some cases completely neglected. Reason, why externalities can disrupt the efforts could be rationally explained by observability, since the effects of climate change are currently only mildly observable, in comparison with other crisis such as pandemic, war, financial crisis and others, which directly influence all critical parts of social establishment. Current century was incidentally and unfortunately marked by all crisis mentioned above, while the most recent one in February 2022 led to the military conflict, in which permanent member country of United Nations Security Council is involved.

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<sup>1</sup> The paper was written within the project VEGA 1/0115/23: Application of Cooperative Models of Game Theory in Economy and International Relations.

This paper will analyze, how such event impacted the efforts in meeting the climate goals and define whether setbacks could be followed. It will focus on two key direct actors of the war as well as the external ones. Analyzing the most recent available greenhouse gasses (GHG) emissions statistics for given regions will allow us to estimate preliminary impact of the conflict and define the severity of war on climate change prevention. Relevance of statistics could be in question in some cases, as both countries are primarily focusing on military conflict, and might not provide the exact data. Preliminary data provided will reflect the result not only of organizations such as European union or International Energy Agency, but also of studies which provides us with calculated estimates. Key study, which help us examine the problematics further, was held by Initiative on GHG Accounting of War (2022), focuses on direct and active emissions caused by military conflict, specifically focusing on conflict on the territory of Ukraine. It involves several sources from given area, that are a significant contributors to GHGe and by available data gives a rough estimate of cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions caused by them. Based on these results, it is additionally possible to calculate a future expected emissions, that might arise as the war continues and as a result of reconstruction. RIVERA A et. al. (2022) focus in their study *Preliminary US Greenhouse Gas Emissions Estimates for 2022* are emissions in United States during the year, that war in Ukraine erupted. Based on this data, we may compare given year with previous development, and partially define the impact of war on emissions on territory of US. Additionally, we analyze a document provided by Roshydromet, an institution in Russian Federation providing information on a state of climate change on its territory, by which we may point to the potential deviation of the Russian Federation from the climate goals, which may indicate an impact of war on overall emissions.

Although Ukraine adjusted their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in 2021, the firstly presented one by Ukraine<sup>2</sup> and Russia<sup>3</sup> were from the beginning barely in accordance with Paris Agreement goal, which states that countries should limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels<sup>4</sup>, presented documents pointed out a small, but positive effort. This effort was and still is only implemented to a very limited extent to practice and governmental policies before and after the conflict erupted were not showing a serious interest.<sup>56</sup> Additionally, with ongoing military conflict, the already limited NDCs became almost symbolic for the time being.

In regard to that, it is important to note that such act is rational, and every global actor would naturally prioritize the elimination of the imminent threat at all costs to mildly observable long-term issue.

As European Union (EU) and United States (US) along with other countries influence the war without an actual intervention, the paper will also analyze GHG emissions of the two biggest external actors during the year after invasion and point out the potential deviation from the climate goals. Such deviation could be expected from two perspectives; firstly, the sanctions applied by EU and other countries did in fact affect the development of economy due to lack of primary commodities (of which Russia is a significant exporter) and other international trade barriers; secondly, the military and humanitarian aid provided to Ukraine needed to be substituted by new technology or resources within the countries of origin.

## 1 External actors and military industry

Although the ongoing physical conflict erupted between two countries, Ukraine and Russian Federation, other countries and organizations do participate in certain ways and have a

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<sup>2</sup> UNFCCC (2022): Updated Nationally Determined Contribution of Ukraine to the Paris Agreement.

<sup>3</sup> UNFCCC (2022): Nationally Determined Contribution of The Russian Federation.

<sup>4</sup> UNITED NATIONS (2015): Paris Agreement.


<sup>5</sup> CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER (2021): Ukraine.

<sup>6</sup> CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER (2022): Russian Federation.

share in development of situation. European union, United States and other countries mostly with democratic regimes but not limited to, expressed a strong support towards Ukraine<sup>7</sup>, while some stated their position as neutral and only few with an opinion that Russian Federation should not withdraw their soldiers from Ukraine territory.<sup>8</sup> EU countries, being the ones with the strictest policies in climate change prevention, were greatly challenged after the invasion of Ukraine. Decision between supporting a democratic country and potential energy crises had to be made, which eventually led to expected outcome of energy crisis. As previously stated, from any kind of crises we assume a slowdown in climate change ambitions. To determine, whether this assumption would be applicable in this case, we analyze the GHG emissions in Figure n. 1, which follows their development by quarters in EU-27.

**Figure 1: Air emissions accounts for greenhouse gases by origin - quarterly data (EU-27)**

Note: In thousand tonnes of Greenhouse gases ( $\text{CO}_2$ ,  $\text{N}_2\text{O}$  in  $\text{CO}_2$  equivalent,  $\text{CH}_4$  in  $\text{CO}_2$  equivalent, HFC in



By analyzing quarterly data observed in EU-27, the total amount of GHG emissions including households, we were able to observe a 5-year period development, since 2018 up to 2022. 2018 and 2019 were selected intentionally, in order to be able to clear a variable of pandemic, that influenced the GHG emissions quite significantly (see Fig. 1. 2020-Q2). In given period, the emissions peaked at the beginning of 2018-Q1, while rest of the quarterly development follows a gradual decline, which indicated the active efforts of EU-27 to fulfill its global determination of carbon neutrality.

To obtain an estimated impact of military conflict on GHG emissions, we focus on last four quarters of 2022 (in Fig. as 2022-Q1, Q3). At the beginning, in 2022-Q1, we follow a slight increase in comparison with previous year, which could still have the origin in recovery of

<sup>7</sup> IFW Kiel (2023): Ukraine Support Tracker.

<sup>8</sup> KYIVPOST (2023): Who are Russia's Allies? A List of Countries Supporting the Kremlin's Invasion of Ukraine.


economic activity after pandemic. Although the invasion begun in February (Q1), after which the consumption of primary commodities such as natural gas and oil reduced, we do not record an immediate and more significant decrease in GHG emission until 2022-Q4, when emissions reduced by -39,583 Mt GHGe (9,6 %), compared to 2021-Q4. This observation underlines a fact, that a significant reduction in natural gas consumption occurred in EU-27 after the invasion and energy crisis, when other means of energy production were prevalent in order to provide heating. Specifically speaking, the overall natural gas consumption within European Union states has dropped by 17,7 % in a period of August 2022 and March 2023 in comparison to the average gas consumption for the same months (August-March) between 2017 and 2022.<sup>910</sup>

Repeating pattern fluctuation in between the quarters that is present in Fig. 1, is caused by a seasonal effect, while the peak of emissions for each given year is recorded during Q1 (January-March) closely followed by Q4 (October-December), which represents winter and spring months. This is naturally caused by higher consumption of energy due to heating and other energy demanding activities that are characteristic for colder periods and does not indicate any irregularity potentially caused by military conflict. Fig. 1 also indicate that household activities are contributing the most to such pattern.

Analyzing individual sectors, data show that the biggest share in emissions for followed period comes from by Manufacturing; Electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply; and household activities, which are interestingly also keen to be sensitive to energy crises and primary commodities supply shortage. This is important in our specific case of military conflict on the territory of Ukraine, which led to a noticeable energy crisis in Europe.

Following Fig. 2 provides a cumulative yearly data of quarters, for GHG emissions in EU-27.

**Figure 2: Air emissions accounts for greenhouse gases – annual data (EU-27)**



<sup>9</sup> EUROSTAT (2023): EU gas consumption decreased by 17.7%.

<sup>10</sup> Note: European Union set a target for 15% reduction on natural gas supplied from Russian Federation for all member states for given period. Majority of EU countries reached the -15% target, with the exception of Ireland (-0.2%), Slovakia (-1.0%), Spain (-10.8%), Poland (-12.5%), Slovenia (-13.8%) and Belgium (-14.5%), which recorded smaller decreases, and Malta (smallest gas consumer among all EU members using gas), which saw a 12.7% increase between August 2022 and March 2023.


Note: In thousand tonnes of Greenhouse gases (CO<sub>2</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O in CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent, CH<sub>4</sub> in CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent, HFC in CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent, PFC in CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent, SF<sub>6</sub> in CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent, NF<sub>3</sub> in CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent) from all NACE activities plus household; \*2022 estimate based on quarterly data

Source: EUROSTAT; Own calculations

The analyzed data is extended by 2 years in comparison with Fig. 1 (2016 and 2017) for a clearer comparison and analysis of GHG decrease in given time span. As previously proven, we follow a steady and gradual decline of GHG emissions within EU-27 with exception of 2017 when emissions rose by 0,7 % compared to previous year mostly as a result of transport and manufacture emissions increase<sup>11</sup> and 2021 when emissions rose by more significant amount due to a recovery of global economies and backward correction of “artificial” GHG emission decrease in 2020, caused by limited social and economic activity due to pandemic. Interestingly, the cumulative emissions in 2022 returned to the declining trend even due to the crises caused by military conflict. At the level 7 % lower compared to previous year, emissions released made for the amount even below pandemic level. In total, there was 255 Mt of GHG emissions reduction between 2022 and 2021.

Assuming that the CO<sub>2</sub>e percentage share on total GHGe in EU-27 was on the same level in 2022 as in 2021, which was 81,6 % [2 942,017 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>e] we are able to provide an approximate of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions share on total 2022 GHGe which will be used in our following comparison. Realistic estimate would then be, that there was a drop of 210,226 Mt in CO<sub>2</sub>e within EU-27.

**Figure 3: Change in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by world region, 2021-2022**



Note: in million tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions; *international bunkers* equal for energy consumption of ships and aircrafts

Source: INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA)


As we look at the data provided by International Energy Agency, which defines a CO<sub>2</sub><sup>12</sup> emissions results for 2022, the decrease is present for the whole continent despite the fact, that

<sup>11</sup> EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY (2019): Small increase in EU’s total greenhouse gas emissions in 2017, with transport emissions up for the fourth consecutive year.

<sup>12</sup> Note: The data analyzed provides a result for only one of the GHG gases – CO<sub>2</sub>, not GHG as complex.

it was impacted by energy crises. Fig. 3 partially confirms the assumption of increasing emissions during military conflict, since it follows a decrease in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions on European continent only on level of 138 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>, while previous data provided by EU-27 stated a decrease of approximately 210,226 Mt CO<sub>2e</sub>. Assuming that the preliminary data of IEA is correct even with slight deviation, emissions in Europe region outside of EU-27 rose by approx. 72,226 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>. Additionally, this data does not directly involve an estimated emissions that are specifically resulting from war activity on territory of Ukraine, analyzed in following part of the paper. If these were to be included a larger gap could be expected in between the emissions of EU-27 and other countries on European continent.

**Figure 4: Change in US net GHG emissions compared to GDP growth**




Note: Percentage change relative to the previous year

Source: RIVERA, A. – KING, B. – LARSEN, J. – LARSEN, K (2023): Preliminary US Greenhouse Gas Emissions Estimates for 2022.

Fig. 4 shows a GHG emissions development in United States for years 2019-2022. The pattern caused by pandemic can be observed, as with previously examined EU-27 data, in which significant drop is visible in 2020 followed by a significant increase in 2021 as a result of recovery of economy after limiting the activity. The estimate for 2022 shows increase in overall emissions of 1,3 %. The data compares emissions with GDP growth in order to partially rationalize emissions, as some studies suggest an interdependence between the two in a way, that the economic growth leads to the increase of GHG emissions. This limited data proves this assumption for 2021 and 2022 but disproves it for 2019 and partially for 2020 as well. Although this type of increase is not in compliance with global efforts for carbon neutrality and NDCs of United States, it does not show a significant increase which could be attributed to the war. To examine specifically where the most emissions come from, we analyze data available in Fig. 5.

**Figure 5: Year-on-year change in net GHG emissions by major emitting sectors in US**



Note: In million metric tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub>e / percentage change in comparison with previous year

Source: RIVERA, A. – KING, B. – LARSEN, J. – LARSEN, K. (2023): Preliminary US Greenhouse Gas Emissions Estimates for 2022

Considering a fact, that United States are the biggest supporters of Ukraine with military as well as humanitarian aid<sup>13</sup>, increase in military manufacture, which would replace the donated technology could have been expected. However, following the estimated increase in industry sector, it proves to be rather low with 1,5 % compared to levels of 2021 and does not show any significant change that could indicate the influence of military conflict in Ukraine. Same pattern is followed with emissions released by production of electricity in Energy sector, where a slight decrease of 1 % is expected in comparison with previous year.

Limiting part of the data analyzed, is the insufficient implementation of military emissions in final results, as reporting of military emissions differs among countries. Therefore, if all real emissions from military sector would be taken into an account, overall emissions from industry sector might increase more. In order to precisely answer how much war in Ukraine impacted the military industry, the data specifically for military manufacture emissions for past decade would be required to make a comparison. At the same time, reports show that military spending in USA surges, resulting in increased arms, ammunition, and military vehicles production<sup>14</sup>. This demanding process cannot of course occur without a higher energy consumption and burning of fossil fuels, which lead to increase in GHG emissions.<sup>15</sup>

## 2 Emissions at the time of ongoing military confrontation

As the concern for environmentally friendly progression falls behind in times of imminent threat towards one's country, while military equipment usage soar, the increase in GHG emissions could rationally be expected. Although statistical data provided from countries directly involved in ongoing military conflict are limited and could be hardly considered precise, we are able to state a few predictions and estimates based on most recent available

<sup>13</sup> IFW Kiel (2023): Ukraine Support Tracker.

<sup>14</sup> BRITZKY, H. – LIEBERMANN, O. (2023): Ukraine is burning through ammunition faster than the US and NATO can produce it. Inside the Pentagon's plan to close the gap.


<sup>15</sup> LIPTON, E. – CROWLEY, M. – ISMAY, J. (2022): Military Spending Surges, Creating New Boom for Arms Makers.

sources. This chapter will analyze the two actors of observed military conflict, that are directly involved and territorially impacted, looking at the emissions and their development, in order to provide a conclusive result that will prove or disprove the expected GHG emission increase as a result of war.

Ukraine, as the largest country of European continent, plays an important role in the path to the carbon neutrality of Europe. For past 30 years, Ukraine total emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> were following a declining trend, when compared to 1990 levels of 776 Mt GHG (640,09 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>e), levels of 2019 were significantly lower at 221,29 Mt GHG (162,54 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>e).<sup>16</sup> Although these numbers are still not in compliance with Paris Agreement of 1,5C, the declining trend could be considered positive.

However, after implementing the preliminary predictions of CO<sub>2</sub>e originating from Russia-Ukraine war, the situation changes and emissions are expected to increase drastically for 2022 in Ukraine, adding to the overall global GHGe increase.<sup>17</sup>

**Figure 6: Overview of estimated war-caused GHG emissions by origin**



Source: INITIATIVE ON GHG ACCOUNTING OF WAR (2022): Climate Damage Caused by Russia's War in Ukraine

Study held by *Initiative on GHG accounting of war* estimate that almost 100 Mt of CO<sub>2</sub> was emitted into atmosphere as a result of war activities on Ukrainian territory, during the first 7 months of the war (Feb.-Sept. 2022).

It separates the biggest sources of active emissions into three categories; firstly, movement of refugees, which contribute with 1,4 % to the overall estimate or 1,397 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>e, and includes emissions caused by internal displacement, international refugees plus transports returning empty, refugees visiting and refugees returning (it is expected that by March 2023 about 65 % refugees returned home since the beginning of the war, although the available data

<sup>16</sup> CLIMATEWATCH: Historical GHG Emissions [Ukraine].

<sup>17</sup> INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA) (2023): CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions in 2022.

varies).<sup>18</sup> Secondly, the warfare itself, where the focus is on fuel consumption by Russian and Ukrainian army in the context of pre-invasive force accumulation, troops movement, military equipment movement and munition deliveries, air-force etc., and ammunition usage, where the biggest emissions come from artillery ammunition manufacture. Overall, warfare makes up 9,10 % of calculated emissions from given military conflict, which equals to 8,855 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>e. Lastly, fires directly resulting from fights, have the biggest share on active emissions. With 24,4 % share, it is expected that fires contributed with up to 23,764 Mt of CO<sub>2</sub> emitted into the atmosphere in the first 7 months of war.

Additionally, study works with future expected emission which will be the outcome of reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure. Estimate is, that 48,670 Mt of CO<sub>2</sub> (50 %) will be emitted during such reconstruction, while this number will most certainly increase, as the war continues. Specific case of Nord Stream pipelines leakage was included, which released estimated 14,6 Mt of CO<sub>2</sub>.

It is worth noting, that availability of precise calculation of actual GHGe in Ukraine is currently very unlikely, due to the constantly changing infrastructure state, while large amount is either destroyed, occupied (e.g., powerplants)<sup>19</sup> or non-functional.

Given the estimates, even considering that deviation could be significant in both ways, (meaning, that the emissions could be significantly higher, or the estimate could be exaggerated) it is clear, that Ukraine is required to part from the climate goals in order to protect the more actual needs and safety of citizens. Therefore, the increase in emissions is expected and inevitable.

By implementing analyzed data, warfare emissions might increase the overall CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in Ukraine by more than 50 % in comparison with 2019, resulting in highly compromised air quality in certain regions and huge deviation from climate goals. Although a slight reduction might occur from destroyed or non-functional industrial production, this is most likely substituted by less ecologically friendly alternatives, which are less effective and more carbon demanding.<sup>20</sup>

**Table 1: Summarization of estimated war-caused GHG emissions**

Sector	Emissions, thousands of tonnes CO <sub>2</sub> e	Emissions, %
<b>Movement of refugees</b>	<b>1,397</b>	<b>1,4</b>
<b>Warfare</b>	<b>8,855</b>	<b>9,1</b>
<b>Fires</b>	<b>23,764</b>	<b>24,4</b>
<b>Reconstruction of civilian infrastructure</b>	<b>48,670</b>	<b>50,0</b>
<b>Leakage (Nord Stream pipelines)</b>	<b>14,600</b>	<b>15,0</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>97,286</b>	<b>100,0</b>

Source: INITIATIVE ON GHG ACCOUNTING OF WAR (2022): Climate Damage Caused by Russia's War in Ukraine

Although the conflict is taking place mostly on territory of Ukraine, increased emissions could be expected in Russian Federation as well, resulting from military equipment transportation and increase in military manufacture. Available sources in fact support this assumption, however no reports have been made directly by Russian climate researchers on

<sup>18</sup> BINNUR DONMEZ, B. (2023): EU official says 11M Ukrainian refugees returned home from union's territory.


<sup>19</sup> EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE (EEAS) (2022): Ukraine-joint statement on the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

<sup>20</sup> RATCLIFFE, V. (2022): Ukraine Starts Coal-Fired Plants After Lost Nuclear Output

increased emissions as a result of war. Following figures points out to the development of emissions, as measured by arctic stations on the territory of Russia.

Figure 7 shows the emissions measured in three different locations (Russia) in comparison with Barrow Atmospheric Baseline Observatory (BRW) located in Alaska, since 2017.

**Figure 7: Annual development of CO<sub>2</sub> concentration in the atmosphere measured on territory of Russian Federation**




Note: ppm – parts per million (parts of carbon dioxide in one million parts of “air”)

Source: RUSSIAN FEDERAL SERVICE FOR HYDROMETEOROLOGY  
AND ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING (ROSHYDROMET)

Report from Roshydromet show, that the concentration of greenhouse gases in Russia in 2022 grew faster than in the previous year, reaching record level. In fact, the growth turned out to be significantly higher than the average growth rate over the previous 10 years. Biggest share on emissions were produced by energy sector, (77,9%) followed by industry sector (11,8%).<sup>21</sup> At the same time, the curve itself indicate rather constant trend of growth, which correlates with other international organizations claims. Supplemented by fig. 8, which analyses a monthly emission, data points to the slight increase in emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> for March 2022, which hypothetically might have a part in beginning of the war but can also be a result of other externalities.

<sup>21</sup> LENTA (2023): The growth of the concentration of harmful emissions in Russia broke last year's record.

**Figure 8: Monthly development of CO<sub>2</sub> concentration in the atmosphere measured on territory of Russian Federation**



Note: ppm – parts per million (parts of carbon dioxide in one million parts of “air”)

Source: RUSSIAN FEDERAL SERVICE FOR HYDROMETEOROLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING (ROSHYDROMET)

As other relevant cumulative data derived from manufacture processes focused on military sector is unavailable, only rough estimates can be made based on expectation and empirical evidence from previous events of such character, i.e., military conflicts, on emissions originating from military activity in Russia.

### 3 Role of military sector in global emissions reduction

Often neglected, probably mainly due to insufficient or completely lacking statistics on greenhouse gas emissions, is the military sector. Nevertheless, some studies which were able to obtain a limited data, were able to create a certain estimate, which points out the current and future share of military sector on global GHG emissions.

Emissions produced by military sector can have several origins, while the most commons are operational GHG emissions, also known as “stationary emissions”, which represents the energy consumed per active military personnel and operational GHG emissions released from mobile military activities (such as use of aircraft, marine vessels, land vehicles, and spacecraft). The other important origin is manufacture of military equipment and vehicles. One of the shortcomings of study analyzed in this paper is, that it does provide a very limited background for calculation of statistic on the expected CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from military manufacture, which most likely also significantly contribute to the final number of GHGs.

Conflict And Environment Observatory study estimate for operational military GHG emissions is approximately between 300 and 600 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e, which is percentage share of total global GHG emissions would be 0.6% and 1.2%. Secondly, the total estimate for the global military carbon footprint is approximately between 1,600 to 3,500 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e, which is between 3.3% and 7.0% of total global GHG emissions. Lower end of given estimate assumes that militaries are labor-intensive; consuming less energy, while high end of the estimate consider them energy-intensive; due to advanced military technology. Considering the fact, that military sectors in most countries are energy-intensive, the estimate for the military’s operational GHG

emissions would be 500 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e (representing 1.0% of global GHGs) and for total global carbon footprint 2,750 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e (representing 5.5% of the global GHGs).<sup>22</sup>

Important part of given estimate remains, that it is valid only for a state of peace. Meaning, that it includes a day to day, regular operation of world's militaries, not including a variable of ongoing military conflict. While it is very hard to precisely define and separate the emissions that are directly originating from military conflict from emissions of other origin (as the countries that are involved have in most cases very limited capability for measurements and reporting), rough estimates are available which we defined in previous chapter, based on limited statistics.

From technological point of view, military equipment was never meant to be environmentally friendly, based on a fact, that during its development and manufacture, efficiency was the key part considered. Naturally, during the time of war the utilization of such equipment increases drastically. When we observe the emissions of selected vehicles, the energy consumption efficiency is clear; for example military vehicle HUMVEE (armored truck) efficiency, is 6 miles per gallon (mpg) [3,8 liters of fuel per 9,7km driven], while F-35 (combat plane) efficiency is at the level of 0.6 mpg [3,8 liters of fuel per 0,9km traveled].<sup>23</sup> With comparison to conventional passenger vehicles, which could have the efficiency as good as 60 mpg [approx. 4 liters of fuel per 100 km], the difference in energy demand, makes military vehicles 10 or even 100 times more demanding. Hence, with increased usage of such vehicles during military conflict, the increase in emissions produced by military sector is inevitable.

If the estimates are even remotely accurate, the conducted studies clearly point to the fact, that recording and reporting GHG emissions from military sector needs to be improved immediately and globally. At estimated level of 2,750 MtCO<sub>2</sub> (5.5% of the global GHG total) the emissions are certainly not neglectable and needs a further and more precise analysis in order to be able to look for a future solution.

Clearly, significant increase in operational as well as manufacturing emissions could be expected from countries directly involved in a military conflict, as their demand for supplies, military personal and missions conducted increases as well. Side effect, with regard to emissions, of such conflicts could also be observed in form of destroyed forests and greenery, which sequester carbon dioxide, along with destroyed infrastructure which needs to be rebuilt in the future in a process, which is highly energy-intensive.

## **Discussion and Conclusion**

War in Ukraine most certainly impacted the global emissions of greenhouse gases. However, the impact of war on emissions differs among the regions while data analyzed indicate, that the largest emissions are recorded directly at the territory where fights are held, and in the countries directly involved in the conflict. This is due to two key observations; firstly, the ongoing fights produce significant emissions from many different sources such as transport of military equipment and personnel, fires caused by warfare, usage of military equipment, forced reallocation of citizens and, importantly, future reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure. Secondly, countries that are directly involved in conflict and are exposed to the threat are rationally using all capacities without a consideration of their climate impact in order to prevent the catastrophe and cope with the situation. With regard to that, we conclude that the war itself contributes without a doubt with significant amount of additional GHG emissions, that would not occur without it.

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<sup>22</sup> SCIENTISTS FOR GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY (SGR) AND THE CONFLICT AND ENVIRONMENT OBSERVATORY (CEOBS) (2022): Estimating the Military's Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions.

<sup>23</sup> PARKINSON S., (2020): The carbon boot-print of the military.

Proposed assumption, which generally expected that when countries are challenged with a crisis their climate efforts are pushed back and measures taken in order to prevent given crises do not consider the climate goals could not be confirmed and is inconclusive. On the contrary, analyzed data for European Union suggests, that the climate efforts were even more encouraged during given period and overall carbon emissions decreased. For United States the data also did not prove any significant increase of emissions, even though their economy was influenced by war as well. Limited data from Russian Federation doesn't directly proves significant increase, but record increase in emissions measured by stations may have a roots in preparations for a military intervention and its subsequent course. Additionally, the internal economy of Russia was significantly influenced in a negative way from various reasons (sanctions, war costs, diplomatic relations, international trade, and others) and economic crisis was present, which most likely led to deviation from already limited climate targets. For Ukraine, although the assumption did in fact fulfil, since estimated increase in emissions is to be at least 50%, it could not generalize the assumption as formulated.

Therefore, whether a crisis in fact leads to a reduced efforts in GHG emissions reduction is highly subjective and depended on its type and country influenced. If the country is capable of substituting its incapacitated infrastructure in the times of military conflict by technologically advanced infrastructure which is not significantly more demanding on carbon, then the crisis might not have a significant impact on overall emissions produced during such times.

Additionally, data indicate, that crisis in which states are forced to limit the manufacture and overall economic activity (whether it is a pandemic prevention lockdown or occupation) can temporarily and artificially decrease the GHG emissions, which in most cases are expected to bounce back to previous or even higher levels.

By that, we conclude that in case analyzed in this paper, which could be partially generalized, military conflict in global perspective does undermine the overall efforts in climate change prevention, as it creates unnecessary emissions in large amounts. At the same time, it does not significantly impact the external actors climate efforts, but in fact presents an obstacle for countries directly involved in fights from fulfilling their goals.

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# **Almanach** **Aktuálne otázky svetovej ekonomiky a politiky**

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ISSN 1339-3502