New Perspectives

Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations

Contents

History, Nationalism and Democracy: Myth and Narrative in Viktor Orbán's 'Illiberal Hungary'

MICHAEL TOOMEY
University of Limerick, Ireland

Abstract: This article studies the relationship between nationalistic discourse and Hungary's 'illiberal turn' from the election of Viktor Orbán's Fidesz party in the 2010 Hungarian elections up until 2015. It begins by examining the arguments of authors such as Jeffrey Alexander, Quentin Skinner, and Tapio Juntunen in order to establish a theoretical framework for how political actors construct and manipulate historical myths for their own political purposes. It then goes on to examine how Orbán specifically uses and constructs narratives surrounding the Treaty of Trianon and Miklós Horthy, the interwar leader of Hungary. This article argues that in addition to allowing Orbán to build a defensive shield against criticism from international and domestic actors, these interpretations of Hungarian history restore to prominence the interwar-era 'populist-urbanist' cleavage, and allow Orbán to create an exclusionary image of Hungarian nationalism. Thus, this serves to legitimize Orbán and Fidesz, while denying opposition parties from both the right and the left the opportunity to stake claims to being true representatives of the Hungarian people.

Keywords: Fidesz, Hungary, nationalism, Trianon, Horthy, Orban

HISTORICAL AND NATIONALIST NARRATIVES IN POST-2010 HUNGARY

Since the victory of Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party in the 2010 Parliamentary elections, much academic attention has been focused on Hungary's 'illiberal turn' and its consequences for democracy in the country. The increasingly authoritarian tendencies there have been accompanied by a notable intensification of nationalistic sentiment on the part of Orbán and many of his fellow party members, and facilitated by politicized retellings of Hungary's past (particularly as they relate to the country's experiences during the interwar period and the years prior to the country's occupation by Nazi Germany in March 1944). This surge has manifested itself in a number of policy initiatives, but most visibly in the cases of the creation of the Hungarian Citizenship Law in 2011 (which extended the possibility of citizenship to any Hungarian-speaking descendant of Hungarian citizens who lived within the coun-

try's pre-1920 borders) and the construction of a controversial statue in Budapest's Szabadság Tér (Freedom Square) commemorating "all the victims" of the "German occupation" of Hungary during the Second World War (e.g. Euractiv, 2014).

In some ways, this may be seen as nothing new, as politicized historicist narratives and symbolic politics have long been associated with Hungarian politics. Throughout the 20th Century, periods of regime change in the country were marked by the creation of new political identities and historical 'truths' which were always in line with the respective new government's ideological perspective, a dynamic that continued following the country's transition to democracy in the early 1990s (Greskovits, 2012: 751). In this vein, for many years, Orbán and his party have at least partially relied upon their elaboration and dissemination of particular historical understandings and narratives as a political tool. An example of this could be witnessed in their construction of metaphorical associations between the 2006 anti-government protests that occurred in Budapest and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution (Oltay, 2013: 165). In addition, they adopted a 'victim discourse' in the late 2000s and early 2010s which sought to explain Hungarian history as being a series of (externally imposed) disasters. This then allowed for the framing of the introduction of a new constitution for the country in 2012 as part of a more comprehensive and conclusive reckoning with the legacy of Soviet communism than the one that had initially taken place after the democratization in the early 1990s (Kovács and Mindler-Steiner, 2015: 54; Oltay, 2013: 14).

Between 2010 and 2015, however, Hungary's historical politicization has tended to revolve around Miklós Horthy (Hungary's interwar – and wartime – leader) and the Treaty of Trianon, the peace settlement Hungary signed with the Allies following its defeat (as part of Austria-Hungary) in World War I. This is most visibly, but not only, represented in initiatives such as the aforementioned Citizenship Law and the Szabadság Tér statue, and it is part of a 'reconnection' on the part of Orbán with Hungary's pre-communist past (Rupnik, 2012: 135–136).[1] This approach recalls and reconstructs the country's 'urbanist-populist' cleavage, a crucial dynamic in the interwar years which separated the country into two camps: one, based in Budapest, which was composed of liberal, socialist, and Jewish elites, and the other, which was made up of the 'true' Hungarians of the countryside and the peasantry (Gerner, 2006: 101).

What is unique about this contemporary approach is its 'parachronistic' character: it retrospectively makes the assumption that the entire Hungarian 'nation' suffered (and continues to suffer) a collective cultural trauma as a result of the Trianon settlement, and it also involves a construction of Horthy as a 'predecessor' to Orbán in his status as a leader who sought to redress this trauma. This served several purposes for Orbán. It has allowed him to outflank political opponents (such as the Movement for a Better Hungary, also known as Jobbik) that were previously per-

ceived to be further to the right on the political spectrum (although perhaps this perception is no longer the case) (Schultheis, 2018; Toth, 2018). It delegitimizes any internal or external opposition to himself and his party's rule, since the opposition is then perceived as being treacherous to the Hungarian nation. Most importantly, it allows Orbán to construct an exclusivist understanding of the Hungarian nation, which renders him and his party the sole representatives of 'true' Hungarians, and his political opponents as treacherous usurpers. In exploring these issues, this article addresses the following research questions:

• *How are narratives and discourses surrounding the Treaty of Trianon and Miklos Horthy constructed in modern Hungary?*

• *How do these narratives and discourses inform and shape the political strategies and successes of Viktor Orbán and Fidesz?*

The article begins by establishing the analytical and methodological framework through which these questions are explored in it. This framework is substantially based on Jeffrey Alexander's (2004; 2012) theories surrounding the construction and elaboration of 'cultural traumas', but also integrates literature on the politics of history and the application of parachronistic and anachronistic viewpoints in the establishment of historical myths, narratives, metaphors, and analogies. Moving on from this, the article will then discuss the specificities and uniqueness of the roles played by the 'Horthy' and 'Trianon' discourses in contemporary Hungarian politics, the reasons for their particular prominence following the 2010 parliamentary elections, and their relationship with previous myths and narratives promulgated by Orbán. Finally, it will conclude by discussing the implications these particular constructions of history have for Hungary's 'illiberal turn', and how they function to facilitate Orbán's continued dominance over the country's political scene.

'TRAUMA', NARRATIVE, AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY AND HISTORICITY

One of the primary objectives of this paper is to unpack and explain the ways in which national 'traumas' can potentially contribute to the construction of politically useful myths and narratives. A trauma can be defined as being an occurrence whereby a social group believes that they have been the victim of a traumatic event which has left deep, significant impacts upon the collective psyche of the group, which last into perpetuity (Alexander, 2004: 1). According to Sztompka, for a cultural trauma to develop amongst a given society, it must necessarily have experienced a social change which contains four key characteristics: that the change occurred rapidly and suddenly, that it was substantive and had a broad scope affecting a swathe of members of the affected community, that it was caused exogenously and not (or at least not knowingly) by the community itself, and that it was experienced as being unexpected, unpleasant, repulsive, and/or shocking (Sztompka, 2000a: 452). Sz-

tompka describes a bottom-up process through which a societal or cultural trauma is elaborated and realized. According to this approach, cultural traumas...

> [...] appear only when people start to be aware of [their] common plight, perceive the similarity of their situation with that of others, [and] define it as shared. They start to talk about it, exchange observations and experiences, gossips and rumors, formulate diagnoses and myths, identify causes or villains, seek for conspiracies, decide to do something about it, envisage coping methods. They debate, even quarrel and fight among themselves about all this. Those debates reach the public arena, are taken by the media, expressed in literature, art, movies [...] (Sztompka, 2000b: 279–280).

The existence of a trauma within any society, however, is never an indisputable or self-evident historical or social fact, and a particular event cannot simply be assumed to be traumatic. According to Alexander, when one considers social systems, "[...] societies can experience massive disruptions that do not become traumatic [...] for traumas to emerge at the level of the collectivity, social crises must become cultural crises" (Alexander, 2012: 15). According to Alexander, collective cultural traumas are not connected directly to 'traumatic' events, as events in and of themselves are not necessarily traumatic: instead, they are socially constructed based on the perceptions of the affected society before, during, and/or after the event, and may indeed be entirely imagined (Alexander, 2004: 8). Additionally, he argues that these 'traumas' are constructed and given meaning by "carrier groups",[2] who articulate the nature and significance of national traumas in pursuit of their own ideals and material interests (Ibid.: 11–12).

In order for the idea that the community in question has been traumatized to be accepted by its constituent members, the carrier groups need to effectively engage in the construction of complex (and potentially divisive and polarizing) symbolic narratives and stories (Alexander, 2012: 17). As such, 'trauma' is as much a function of particular constructions of a society's history as it is a function of any particular material historical fact, and in contrast to Sztompka's understanding of how cultural traumas emerge, its realization may be elite-driven as much as it may be grassroots-driven. In this sense, the existence of a cultural trauma may just as easily reflect the perspectives, experiences, and priorities of the carrier or elite group in question, as it does the broader society from which the carrier group is drawn. As this process is inherently subject to interpretation, it thus becomes necessary to consider the mechanisms through which history may be constructed and historical narratives given meaning.

Even at their most banal level, the manner in which historical myths and narratives are constructed and interpreted, and the lessons, meanings, and understandings de-

rived from them, are crucial to the ways in which the politics of a given state or organization may be shaped. This is because these depictions not only shape the way in which the members of a given community may understand and perceive the present, but they can also subsequently shape the identities and inform the future behaviours of these actors and alter perceptions of what actions and relations are considered acceptable and unacceptable (Browning, 2002: 48). Bliesemann de Guevara agrees with this, arguing that "...myths are one of the structuring elements of broader discourses which construct political problems and legitimate policy solutions" (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2016: 19). She goes on to state that there are four major types of socio-political functions of historical myths: determining functions, meaning the use of myths to distort language and knowledge in the service of maintaining or imposing a given hierarchical order; enabling functions, meaning the coping strategies used by organizations for dealing with societal influences or dilemmas; naturalizing functions, which are the ways in which certain myths structure knowledge in such a way that the myth is 'naturalized', and that subsequently can allow for the crystallization of certain hierarchical structures; and constituting functions, meaning the construction of significance and meaning through narratives and paradigms which themselves drive the construction of what people consider 'knowledge' (ibid.: 32–36).

There is no one 'correct' or 'true' way for historical research to be carried out, and different modes of analysis serve various purposes and functions, with no necessary inherent hierarchy of appropriateness amongst them (Hobson and Lawson, 2008: 416–417). If this is the case, then it is also possible to state that there is no one necessary way in which to elaborate and explain the findings and stories. However, it is crucial to understand at the same time that historical research is often fraught with inaccuracies, flawed assumptions, and incorrect, anachronistic, or parachronistic readings of a given actor's intentions or objectives. Skinner, for instance, highlights the fact that historical and historicist research is filled with muddled logic and factual errors, and that attempts to overcome these problems by, for instance, divorcing events and pieces of literature from their specific social context can lead to anachronistic mistakes whereby historians apply their own expectations and values to those of the actors they are interpreting (Skinner, 1969: 4–5, 12). As such, he argues that "perennial problems" do not exist in philosophy (or elsewhere), and that "...there are only individual answers to individual questions... there is in consequence simply no hope of seeking the point of studying the history of ideas in the attempt to learn directly from the classic authors by focusing on their attempted answers to supposedly timeless questions" (ibid.: 50).

Joseph Femia, while broadly agreeing with Skinner's arguments surrounding the potential pitfalls of historical and historicist research, disagrees with his broader points about the temporal specificity of historical events. He argues that while historicism should aim to ensure that past events are not completely ripped away from

the social context in which they transpired, this does not mean that historical ideas need to be straitjacketed in the past, with no application or relevance to modern events (Femia, 1981: 126–127). He goes on to note that political ideas are crucially dependent on given historical and/or philosophical traditions for their genesis and development, and are rarely results of completely original thought (ibid.: 134). While this may indeed be the case, Skinner's arguments about the need to properly contextualize historical events and historical research still hold. As Tapio Juntunen points out, historical myths function through their replacement of historical narratives that may or may not be deeply contextual and specific to a specific period in time with overgeneralized universal meta-narratives (Juntunen, 2017: 62–63). Subsequently, this can result in observers seeing "the world as more unchanging than it is," and can lead to the lessons drawn from these overgeneralized narratives being applied to cases and events that are only superficially, or that are not at all, similar (ibid.). Specifically, this can lead to 'parachronistic' errors, which simplify the intricacies of past events and discard important elements of these events in order to shoehorn them into palatable frameworks that can easily serve the interests and perspectives of the present, regardless of whether or not they have anything in common with the current situation (ibid.: 71).

An analysis of the literature on this subject indicates that many of the authors seem focused on the issue of honest mistakes made in the process of applying historical metaphors or analogies to present-day problems. However, we must also be careful to note that the construction of some political ideas may indeed be knowingly based on inaccurate or even false readings of historical traditions. In such cases, these 'mistakes' may be intentionally made in the construction of politically favourable myths and narratives. Even where they are not being made intentionally, and where the elaborator of the flawed narrative may genuinely be seeking to render an 'honest' account of history, having a vested interest in a narrative being interpreted in a certain way can lead to errors being ignored or glossed over. Political concerns and imperatives often exist in tension with the examination and discussion of historical subjects (Lazaroms and Gioielli, 2012: 656). When we combine this with our previous discussion of the way in which cultural and social traumas are constructed through the elaboration of historical narratives (as opposed to existing as a matter of fact), it highlights the importance of understanding the manner through which these discussions and discourses are established, and of understanding the political imperatives informing their establishment.

CONSTRUCTING TRAUMA, TRAGEDY AND (A) SAVIOUR(S): THE TRIANON AND HORTHY DISCOURSES IN ORBÁN'S HUNGARY

At this point, this paper moves on to discussing the ways in which Fidesz (and their leader, Viktor Orbán) constructed and employed historical myths and narratives in

the period between 2010 and 2015, and the political purposes these myths and nar-ratives served. During this time, Fidesz's use of historical myths and analogies was primarily centred on events that occurred in the country during the interwar period, and specifically on the Treaty of Trianon and the subsequent rule of Miklós Horthy. It should not be a controversial statement to say that the Treaty of Trianon was one of the most important events, and Horthy (symbolically, at least) one of the most im-portant figures, in Hungarian history: the Trianon settlement led to the creation of the modern territorial borders of the Hungarian state, while Horthy was the head of state for almost the entirety of one of the most tumultuous periods in the country's history.

However, the broader significance of each arguably lay in what they symbolized. Trianon, for many Hungarians (both then and now), represented the humiliation of their nation, marked the definitive end of the Kingdom of Hungary, and created an enduring perception amongst nationalist circles that Hungary had been uniquely hard done by the post-WWI settlement, and by the foreign powers that imposed it (Traub, 2015). Meanwhile, although Horthy was Hungary's head of state from 1920 until 1944, he was not the only figure of power in the country; oftentimes, actors such as his Prime Ministers, István Bethlen, Gyula Gömbös, and Pál Teleki, would take more decisive roles in decision-making processes (Molnár, 2001: 287). How-ever, an intense propaganda campaign built around him during this time allowed for the construction of an image of him as the heroic military saviour of the nation, who would seek to bring about a restitution of the 'injustices' wrought upon the country at Trianon, and thus restore the nation's honour and glory. This interpreta-tion would eventually become dominant in the country from the early 1920s until 1940, and served an important role in legitimating the interwar regime (Romsics, 2009: 98−99; Turbucz, 2014: 11).

Official statements relating to a possible re-visitation of the Trianon settlement have been a common theme of Viktor Orbán's career, at least since his first rise to the Prime Minister's office in 1998. Throughout the period between the 1998 and 2006 elections, Orbán repeatedly irked neighbouring countries (while receiving ac-claim from nationalist groups amongst the Hungarian diaspora) for his advocacy of a 'cultural and social reunification' with ethnic Hungarian communities in neigh-bouring countries, and his references to Transylvania being "part of Hungary's living space in the Carpathian Basin" (The Economist, 2002; British Broadcasting Corpo-ration, 2000; The American Hungarian Federation, 2004). On the other hand, pos-itive references to Horthy are a relatively new development, and as late as 2013, Horthy was largely being publicly commemorated only by those on the extreme right of the country's political spectrum, and particularly by supporters of the Job-bik party.[3] Since then, however, Orbán's approach towards Horthy subtly became more positive. This was initially marked by his adoption of a non-committal and even

conciliatory attitude towards the erection of statues of Horthy in the towns of Kereki and Csokako in 2012, and the unveiling of a Horthy commemorative plaque in the city of Debrecen in the same year (Dempsey, 2012; Verseck, 2012; Schleifer, 2014). This was followed by his more active approach to the re-visitation of Horthy's legacy with the 2014 installation of the 'Memorial to the Victims of German Occupation' in Szabadság Tér in Budapest, and his even more favourable attitude toward the interwar Regent in the subsequent year.[4]

Trianon: Parachronistically Constructing a Collective Trauma

Following Hungary's defeat in World War I, the country's political establishment underwent a dramatic upheaval which subsequently led to the emergence of its first democratic political system under the premiership of Mihály Károlyi (Romsics, 1999: 90). This new government sought to allay the various ethnic divisions within the country which had been reinforced by the war through the creation of constitutional guarantees of political representation and autonomy and, in so doing, to at least somewhat protect the territorial integrity of the Hungarian state. The Károlyi administration's capacity to implement these reforms (along with other pressing social reforms) soon began to creak under the weight of an impending economic collapse, and the territorial demands of the neighbouring regimes in Serbia, Czechoslovakia and Romania (ibid.: 91–95). Indeed, according to Kontler, as early as January 1919, the democratic Hungary had already effectively lost control of some 50% of its pre-WWI territory and population (Kontler, 2002: 330).

The subsequent agreement of the Treaty of Trianon one year later saw these losses confirmed and even expanded. In total, almost three-quarters of the territory of pre-war Hungary and two-thirds of its population were ceded to the newly independent states of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and also to Romania. These territories, whilst predominantly populated by the respective majority ethnic groups of the states they were awarded to, also contained large Hungarian populations, who found themselves as minorities in the new states. This perceived loss of territory and population is widely thought to have contributed to the undermining of progressive and liberal democratic elements in the interwar Hungarian society, and a consequent growth in support for revanchist and radical populist platforms (on both the right and the left) in the following months and years (Kontler, 2002: 332; Ormos, 2007: 20, 23). This subsequently led to the emergence of a brief left-wing regime in the country led by Béla Kun, which fought a war against Czechoslovakia and Romania in order to recoup Hungary's territorial losses. The emergence of this Soviet republic in Central Europe alarmed the attendees of the Paris Peace Conference, who in turn provided support to the Romanian and Czechoslovak armies to turn back the Hungarian advance, and so consolidated the new borders (Romsics, 1999: 106).

In the ensuing years, the reasons for why Trianon occurred started to be of particular relevance to Hungarians, with the subsequent interpretation of the events being that they were not just a punishment for Hungary's defeat in WWI, but also a result of the emergence of Kun's short-lived socialist republic. Thus, during the interwar years, Jews, socialists, and liberal or progressive democratic politicians (who were all associated with the various governments during the period of the Trianon negotiations) often received blame for the excoriating terms of the treaty (Gerner, 2006: 98). Deriving from this, a cleavage emerged in Hungarian society between the so-called 'urbanists' and 'populists'. The 'urbanists' were considered to be made up of a cohort of liberal, socialist, and Jewish elites, primarily based in Budapest and other large population centres, while the 'populists' were composed of the 'true' Hungarians of the smaller towns and villages, and the rural countryside, and of the peasantry (ibid.: 101). In addition, the 'urbanists' were perceived as having a Western European identity, while the 'populists' (at least according to several key intellectuals and public figures associated with this group) had a more 'Magyar', Asiatic and Turanian identity or, at the very least, an identity that was neither fully 'western' nor 'eastern' (Esbenshade, 2014: 179–180).

It is certainly true that Hungarian society has been, and continues to be, deeply affected by Trianon. Both Kristian Gerner and Jan-Werner Mueller, for instance, have argued that the country has an abiding "obsession" with, and a sense of resentment resulting from, this period in its history (Gerner, 2006: 98; Mueller, 2011: 7). The terms of the Trianon settlement are commonly believed by Hungarian nationalists to be a unique injustice suffered by the nation.[5] However, the extent to which Trianon is a trauma 'carried' by the grassroots of Hungarian society is debated. Krisztián Ungváry argues that the legacy of Trianon remains crucial as it led to a situation whereby Hungarians who lived outside of the state's new borders were forcibly assimilated into the majority cultures of their new states, and that it is this, along with the subsequent inequality suffered by these Hungarians, that perpetuates the 'trauma' of Trianon; on the other hand, Éva Kovacs contests the idea that Hungarians are necessarily traumatized by the legacy of Trianon, arguing that the matter is no longer truly relevant to the lives of Hungarians, and that it exists purely in the country's cultural memory (Laczó, 2011). Likewise, Gabor Egry opposes Ungváry's position by arguing that Hungarians that found themselves living outside of Hungary's borders after 1920 were neither universally victimized by the authorities in their new countries nor universally accepted by nationals of the 'new' Hungary, and that the extent of the trauma of Trianon was thus unclear, even in the immediate aftermath of the settlement (Egry, 2012). Thus, while the sheer presence of a debate on the issue shows that Trianon retains an influence on Hungarian discourses surrounding nationality and democracy in the modern era, the degree to which the elaboration of the cultural trauma associated with it continues to be a bottom-up

process (in the manner described by Sztompka [2000b]) in the modern era is limited, and it is dependent upon the actions of elite 'carriers' for much of its development.

It is with this in mind, then, that the significance of Viktor Orbán and Fidesz as the carriers of the Trianon trauma becomes even greater. Throughout much of his political career, Orbán's messages have been based on the concept of a 'national unification' project which would seek to somehow redress the Trianon Treaty (Bozóki, 2011: 649). Upon returning to power in 2010, Orbán has been able to deliver tangible results in this regard through his introduction of legislation such as the previously-mentioned Citizenship Law, and the creation of a 'National Unity Day'[6] commemorating the country's perceived territorial losses in 1920. Throughout this time, he and his fellow party members have been at pains to stress the linkages between the law, the Unity Day and Trianon. For instance, the proponents of the bill that eventually led to the creation of the National Unity Day stated the following as justification for the legislation:

> The Treaty of Trianon signed on June 4, 1920 left an indelible, yet to this day unresolved mark on the consciousness of the peoples of Central Europe, for generations influencing directly or indirectly political and historical events in the region... while for some countries Trianon meant the realization of their aspiration to a national identity and as such was a progressive event, for Hungarians it was the greatest tragedy of the 20th century. The national remembrance and the interest of promoting a common future for the peoples of the Carpathian Basin vindicating European values, gives us the task of understanding and resolving the issues brought up by the decisions taken at Trianon. At the same time, it gives us the opportunity to prove that, despite a historic tragedy, the Hungarian nation, nurtured by her culture and language, is capable of national renewal and the solution of her historic tasks (Kövér and Semjén, 2010).

The introduction of the Citizenship Law and the creation of the National Unity Day serve an important purpose. They either imply the *existence* of a national trauma surrounding Trianon, or attempt to retroactively construct such a trauma (almost as if the argument was that if a 'solution' was found, then surely there must have been a problem that existed which necessitated this solution in the first place). Fidesz and Orbán thus act through these policies and discourses as clear examples of Alexander's (2012) 'carrier groups' for the elaboration and articulation of the Hungarian cultural 'trauma' surrounding Trianon.

This elaboration and articulation of trauma serves immediate political goals for them, as they lend credence to Fidesz's nationalistic credentials (without the implementation of which, the party's adoption of nationalistic discourse would seem hol-

low and lack credibility). In addition, it allows Fidesz (and Orbán specifically) to be presented as the 'saviours' of the Hungarian nation who are bringing restitution to the country for its losses suffered during the 20th Century, and as its defenders against any attempt to inflict a 'second Trianon' upon the populace. Indeed, references by Fidesz representatives and other right-wing figures to the need to defend Hungary against a recurrence of this 'disaster' began to emerge following the onset of the European migration crisis towards the end of 2015, and have increased in frequency in the ensuing years.[7] The Orbán regime has made repeated connections to this topic through issues relating to control of borders, self-determination and an unwillingness to bow to the demands of outsiders ('Brussels' and 'liberal' Western Europeans) in this regard.

The Orbán regime's construction and use of the trauma of Trianon has not been confined to the Citizenship Law and the National Unity Day. Following the annexation of Crimea by Russia in early 2014 and the outbreak of the separatist conflict in Eastern Ukraine, and coming immediately in the wake of his victory in the 2014 Hungarian parliamentary elections, Orbán gave a speech wherein he demanded that ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine be given autonomy, and that they be allowed to avail themselves of a dual citizenship (Gardner, 2014; Zalan, 2014). Elaborating on this point, he argued that "...the Hungarian issue has been unresolved since the Second World War", and stated that his government would henceforth be pursuing these concessions for Hungarians throughout the Carpathian Basin (a region that encompasses parts of Slovakia, Ukraine, Serbia, and Croatia, along with Hungary) (Zalan, 2014). These demands were swiftly rejected by the Ukrainian government, and did not receive much consideration from other governments in the region either. Given the curt treatment of these comments, and the lack of any subsequent escalation of actions by the Hungarian government, it is likely that these comments were not made with the intention of being taken fully seriously outside of Hungary. Instead, their intended audience was more likely a domestic one.[8] Comments such as these bolster the idea of a Hungarian cultural trauma, and of the urgent necessity of resolving this trauma, and contribute to the creation of an image amongst the Hungarian population of Viktor Orbán as a 'tragic' national saviour who is engaged in an earnest, but possibly futile, effort to redress the 'injustices' inflicted upon the nation at Trianon.

This approach is historically careless and presumptuous, as it asserts that revising or otherwise rectifying Trianon is an issue which is of pressing concern for Hungarian people in the 21st Century. It is parachronistic, as it uses a simplified understanding of Hungarian history, as past events are ripped from their context (the idea that the Hungarian 'nation' was necessarily 'traumatized' by the Trianon treaty) to serve the interests of present day actors and activities. However, it is also an effective and successful strategy, as it restores to modern day relevance the 'populist-ur-

banist' cleavage, and situates Fidesz firmly on the side of the populists. As such, any domestic opposition to their rule can be dismissed as being made up of the modern descendants of the feckless and corrupt urbanists, whose incompetence was responsible for the infliction of the trauma of Trianon on the pure, uncorrupt populists. Thus, when the party attacks particular civil society organizations as being agents of 'meddling foreigners' and tries to threaten their access to funding (Dunai and Koranyi, 2014; Novak, 2014), or when Orbán describes Brussels as "the new Moscow" and alleges that the EU is trying to colonize Hungary (Deutsche Welle, 2013), such statements carry greater weight amongst nationalistic circles in the country. Likewise, the manner in which the trauma is constructed allows for anyone who might seek to contest the Trianon narrative to be similarly dismissed as the allegedly self-interested urbanists, who are supposedly seeking to deny the suffering of the Hungarian people so as to deflect attention from their own culpability.

Orbán's role as the 'carrier' of the Trianon trauma is highlighted by the previously discussed debate over the trauma's existence and relevance in modern Hungary. However, it should not be taken to mean that because the Trianon trauma is largely an elite-driven one, the general population is a passive actor in this process. As Jacques Ranciere argues, "...every spectator is an actor in her story; every actor, every man of action, is the spectator of the same story" (Ranciere, 2009: 17). In this sense, then, while Orbán's narratives surrounding Trianon are misleading and partial, they are also successful precisely because a receptive audience actively chooses to accept them and internalize them. This then permits Orbán to shape and direct the modern day construction of the Trianon trauma in such a way that it allows him to extract the maximum possible value from it.

Horthy: Mythically Constructing a Tragic National Saviour

In contrast to Trianon, the popular legacy and memory of Miklos Horthy is even more contested. Following Béla Kun's brief interlude as the leader of Hungary, Horthy was installed as the Regent of Hungary (in effect, its Head of State) after a military coup had toppled Kun's regime.[9] This coup was supported by Britain and France, and was followed up in the country with a period known as the 'White Terror', when army units loyal to Horthy carried out a series of retributive attacks on the remaining Socialists, and on societal elements (including Jewish people and liberals) that were seen as having been loyal to Kun's regime (Ormos, 2007: 66–69). Horthy's domination of Hungary's political scene in the subsequent years leading up to 1944 was so complete that, in the words of Ignác Romsics, "...it is entirely fitting that it should be referred to as the Horthy era" (Romsics, 1999: 129).

Hungary subsequently lurched towards right-wing extremism and authoritarianism (albeit without becoming a totalitarian state) in the late 1920s and 1930s, sign-

ing alliances with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany in 1927 and 1939, respectively (Hoensch, 1996: 136–141; Romsics, 1999: 190–191). Horthy was also able to deliver some partial revisions to the Trianon settlement. These included a significant rearmament program, the achievement between 1938 and 1939 of significant territorial concessions from Czechoslovakia in the regions of Slovakia and Ruthenia, and the addition in 1940 and 1941 of lands that had previously been ceded to Romania and Yugoslavia (respectively), which set off a wave of national celebration and jubilation (ibid.: 199–201).

However, these developments would also eventually lead Hungary to disaster, as the country found itself on the losing side of yet another major international conflict. With the tide of war seemingly turning against the Axis powers in WWII, by 1943 Horthy had already started to send out peace overtures to the Allies. Having found out about this, Hitler ordered the occupation of Hungary in March 1944, and in October 1944 he appointed the leader of the extremist Arrow Cross Party (Ferenc Szálasi) in place of Horthy as the puppet ruler of the state. Szálasi then accelerated the campaign of extermination against the Hungarian Jewish population, which had already begun under Horthy's tenure[10] (Lendvai, 1999: 423–424). This sealed the fate of the country, as it was occupied by the Soviet Union in February 1945, which left it firmly in the hands of the Communists for the duration of the Cold War.

As a result, Horthy's legacy to Hungary could reasonably be argued to be one of defeat and occupation, without even mentioning his (at least partial) culpability for the fate of the Hungarian Jewish community. Regardless of this, after 2010 Fidesz and Orbán began a subtle, but noteworthy, rehabilitation of Horthy. This is most apparent in their wording of the preamble to the 2011 constitution, which at one point states:

> We date the restoration of our country's self-determination, lost on the nineteenth day of March 1944, from the second day of May 1990, when the first freely elected body of popular representation was formed. We shall consider this date to be the beginning of our country's new democracy and constitutional order. We hold that after the decades of the twentieth century which led to a state of moral decay, we have an abiding need for spiritual and intellectual renewal... Our Fundamental Law shall be the basis of our legal order, it shall be an alliance among Hungarians of the past, present and future. It is a living framework which expresses the nation's will and the form in which we want to live (Constitute Project, 2013).

According to this formulation, the periods of Nazi and Communist rule over Hungary are explicitly delegitimized and excised from the history of Hungary as a self-determining country (Bozoki, 2011: 659–660). By contrast, Horthy's period of rule

is dislocated from its connection to Hungary's experiences during WWII and the period of German occupation that largely resulted from his decisions. As such, Horthy's regency is normalized and included in the avowed period of the country's history of self-determination, which establishes a linkage between his regime and the rule of the Orbán government.[11] Subsequently to this, in 2014 Fidesz decided to erect another monument in Szabadság Tér (it is separate to the bust of Horthy which sits in the same square, and which is referenced in endnote ix) which sought to commemorate the "Victims of the German Occupation".[12] The monument depicts a giant eagle attacking a statue of the Angel Gabriel (used here as a symbol of Hungary, albeit a somewhat unusual and obscure one); the message of this is quite clear: Hungary and, virtually by extension, Horthy are reconstituted as victims of Germanic aggression, and the suffering of the country as a whole is equated with that of its Jewish population.

It is important to note that during his first period as Prime Minister between 1998 and 2002, Orbán had also taken steps to minimize the role of Horthy and his administration in the Holocaust, and to shy away from criticizing him (Dempsey, 2012; Verseck, 2012). For instance, the high-profile and internationally recognized[13] House of Terror Museum in Budapest, established by Fidesz in 2002, minimized Horthy's role in the atrocities suffered by the Hungarian population before and during WWII, whilst largely putting the blame on Szálasi's Arrow Cross party, and presented the crimes committed during the communist era as being equal to, if not greater than, the crimes committed during the Holocaust (Gerner, 2006: 102–104).

However, after 2010, Orbán's approach shifted from a mere minimization of Horthy's offences (which still implied some blame) towards a sanitization and a rehabilitation of Horthy. The Szabadság Tér statue cannot be decoupled from the sentiments expressed in the preamble to the constitution, as both contribute to the creation of a revisionist understanding of history. It constructs the Hungarian nation as not being truly responsible for the crimes committed on its soil during WWII, and thus allows Horthy to be conceived of as being an honourable and courageous nationalist leader who defied Hitler's demands and defended both Hungary and its Jewish population for as long as he could (Jenne, 2016: 11–12).

In the manner that Juntunen and Skinner both describe, and similarly to Fidesz and Orbán's discourses surrounding Trianon, this approach is parachronistic, ignoring the specificities of the context within which Horthy's regime is historically located so as to serve the interests of the present-day Hungarian government. Again, this is related to the government's efforts to recreate the 'populist-urbanist' cleavage for their 21st-century audience. During the interwar years, Horthy functioned as an 'antidote' to the urbanists,[14] having achieved some measure of restitution for the country following the chaos experienced during the immediate aftermath of the conclusion of WWI. During his period of regency, regime stability was restored, and

a partial restoration of the country's pre-WWI borders was achieved through his alliances with Hitler and Mussolini. Thus, from the perspective of Fidesz, Horthy serves as a useful analogy (or even a predecessor) for the travails and accomplishments of the current government.

Orbán is likewise presented as an 'antidote' to what they characterize as the weak and incompetent 'urbanist' administration of Ferenc Gyurscany[15] – and the Budapest liberal elite more widely - who is constantly striving for a solution to the 'Trianon' issue that will allow for the restoration of the Hungarian pride and honour. As was noted earlier, the suggested restoration of the territories previously controlled by the Kingdom of Hungary is geopolitically impossible, and has already been flatly rejected by those countries that would be affected by it. However, the ingenuity of Orbán's approaches lies precisely in the fact that 'Trianon' cannot ever be resolved; his intended audience is not external, but internal. As such, by engaging in a perpetual battle to restore the country's lost honour, he continues to reconstruct the Trianon trauma, while also consolidating his image as the tragic national saviour (in a similar manner to the way in which the previously mentioned interwar 'Horthy-cult' continued to be used to burnish and legitimate Horthy's position as the heroic military saviour striving to resolve Trianon).

CONCLUSION: THE USES OF 'TRIANON' AND 'HORTHY'

The analysis presented above showed that Viktor Orbán has sought to tap into various streams of Hungarian nationalist history through manipulating and historicizing understandings of the country's experience during the interwar years, and then using these interpretations as implicit and explicit analogies and as lessons for the contemporary actions of his government. Through these approaches, Trianon becomes constructed as an uncontestably traumatic event, one which has fundamentally and detrimentally affected the 'true', non-urbanist Hungarian nation as a whole, and which demands restitution (even one hundred years after the fact). Meanwhile, Horthy is reconstructed as a courageous defender of the true Hungarian nation and Hungarian national interests, who sought to provide this restitution and to restore stability to the country, but was tragically undone by the country's occupation by Germany in 1944. In this manner, he becomes the spiritual predecessor of Orbán, who likewise delivered Hungary from the abyss of the economic and political instability wrought on the country, and who has also struggled against overwhelming odds and foreign adversaries to achieve a sustainable solution to the Trianon trauma. Thus, Orbán's rule is afforded a façade of nobility as the actions of the mythic saviour of the nation, who is selflessly seeking to restore the Hungarian dignity and pride.

There are a number of purposes for the use of these discursive strategies. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, Fidesz and Orbán function as carriers for the development and elaboration of the cultural trauma associated with Trianon. This allows them to

cast themselves as the guardians of the broader Hungarian *nation's* interests (as opposed to merely being the leaders of the Hungarian state). As such, Fidesz and Orbán become analogous with Hungary itself – the 'true' Hungary, that is. Their more nationalistic policies (such as the Citizenship Law or the National Unity Day) become inherent, indisputable parts of the Hungarian culture and nationality. Using this construction, they can claim to have taken decisive steps towards healing the country's 'trauma' (which they themselves are largely responsible for elaborating). Additionally, this allows them to deflect any criticisms from international actors such as the EU or from the indigenous civil society of other aspects of their 'illiberal turn' by saying that these are attacks on Hungary itself (rather than just attacks on the country's government) by foreign powers and their domestic proxies (Jenne and Mudde, 2012: 153; Hodonyi and Trüpel, 2013; Saltman and Herman, 2013). As a result of this, opposition movements find themselves delegitimized and deprived of resources, while the regime's critics from the European Commission and the European Parliament find their critiques inadvertently fulfilling Fidesz's narratives, and thus reinforcing the party's grip on Hungarian society.

However, this is just one aspect of these narrative strategies, and it represents only one function of Fidesz and Orbán's approach. A much more important point to consider is who the intended audiences for these narratives are, and what the message that is being communicated is. In truth, these messages are likely not being created for the purposes of communicating Hungary to the outside world, and are not intended to majorly expand Fidesz's voting base or counteract left-wing criticism. Nor are they likely to be focused to any great extent on changing people's minds about the historical legacy of Horthy. Instead, these narratives are targeted more towards right-wing nationalists in the country, many of whom would already view Horthy as being a courageous and tragic figure. Thus, by seeking to reconstruct Horthy's interwar image as the virtuous military hero who sought to guide the nation through a particularly turbulent time in its history, Orbán legitimizes the admiration such people hold for Horthy. In so doing, this creates affinities between Orbán and the nationalist right in the country, and removes a potential obstacle to their absorption into his broader coalition of voters.

By seeking to rehabilitate the image of Horthy (at least from an official state government standpoint rather than from an academic standpoint) and to resolve the ongoing trauma associated with the Trianon treaty, Orbán firmly aligns himself with the 'populist' segment of Hungarian society. This then serves to create an image of the Hungarian nation that is exclusionary of both people on the left and political groupings on the right of the political spectrum. The 'true' Hungarians find their sole representation in Fidesz and Orbán. Meanwhile, the left-wing opposition parties and civil society activists become the modern incarnation of the urbanist cleavage, and are more easily castigated as being agents of the perversion of the general will

of the nation, who might prevent the resolution of the Trianon trauma if they could. On the other side, the Jobbik party (specifically) are equally excluded. By appropriating the legacy of Horthy for himself, Orbán is able to pre-empt Jobbik, and force them to either accept the mantle of being the heirs to Szálasi's Arrow Cross fascists or (as has transpired) move towards the political centre and away from the right. So while Orbán's spiritual predecessor is reconstructed as a brave and honorable leader and defender of the nation, Jobbik (unwillingly) either become the successors of a group that eventually betrayed Hungary and collaborated with its enemies, or, effectively, urbanists. This assists in the consolidation of Fidesz's electoral base, and prevents their support from being eroded by anyone from further to the right of them on the political spectrum.

Through this, it is possible to see how Fidesz and Orbán use partial and parachronistic approaches to Hungarian history as a discursive tool for legitimizing and consolidating their rule over Hungary. By constructing a 'cultural trauma' that has been suffered by the Hungarian people as a result of the Treaty of Trianon, they can subsequently claim credit for having attempted to resolve it through steps such as the Citizenship Law and the National Unity Day; this can be constantly recycled, as by its sheer nature Trianon can never realistically be fully resolved. As such, policies related to the redress of the trauma can be continually introduced and claimed domestically as steps towards the ultimate redemption of Hungary's national honour without ever truly removing the spectre of Trianon from Hungarian life. By reclaiming the legacy of Horthy, Orbán can ensure that he alone reaps the electoral rewards from these strategies whilst bolstering his image as the strong and determined leader tragically beset by domestic and foreign adversaries intent on thwarting him. Broadly speaking, then, the strategy revolves around resuscitating the 'populist-urbanist' cleavage of the interwar years in the 2010s, and ensuring that Fidesz, and only Fidesz, can lay claim to being the 'true' representatives of and heirs to the populist tradition. In this way, the approaches of Fidesz and Orbán outlined in this paper seem to have been broadly successful thus far, and have been an important part of Hungary's post-2010 'illiberal turn'.

ENDNOTES

[1] According to Rupnik, this reconnection is most notable in the way in which it reflects Horthy's own twin obsessions: his strident opposition to 'Bolshevism', and his irredentist desire to reverse the territorial losses resulting from the Treaty of Trianon (Rupnik, 2012: 135).

[2] According to Alexander, there is not necessarily any specific characteristic to these carrier groups, who may be "...prestigious religious leaders or groups whom the majority has designated as spiritual pariahs...[they may] be generational...national...[or] institutional..." (Alexander, 2004: 11).

[3] Indeed, at the unveiling of a monument to Horthy in Szabadság Tér in Budapest, Jobbik politicians had effusively praised Horthy's role in "...[rebuilding] the country after the deadly Bolshevik rampage fol-

lowing the First World War and the catastrophe of Trianon, which was the darkest time in the history of [the] country" (Jobbik, 2013).

[4] Indeed, in more recent months Orbán has gone on to adopt even more nakedly pro-Horthy stances, going so far as to describe him as being an "exceptional statesman" in a speech given in Budapest in 2017 (Balogh, 2017a). While this statement falls outside of the chronological focus of this paper, it is useful to note that Orbán's veneration of Horthy has not died down in the subsequent years, but instead, it has become ever more brazen.

[5] References to the unjustness of the terms of the Treaty of Trianon are frequently made at rallies by the Jobbik party, and the revanchist 'Greater Hungary' map is often adopted and displayed by members of nationalist and 'patriotic' groups. One example of this rhetoric appeared during an anti-EU protest in Budapest in 2012 when protestors chanted "Down with Trianon" (Jobbik, 2012).

[6] The idea for the creation of a national commemoration of Trianon was originally proposed by the Jobbik party, and was part of their platform during the 2010 elections. It was not until after the elections that Fidesz adopted this policy (Biro Nagy et al., 2013: 245–247).

[7] Although they lie somewhat outside the chronological scope of this article, it is important to highlight some specific cases here. As early as December 29th 2015, the *Budapest Beacon* reported that János Lázár, a senior figure in the Hungarian government, opposed the settlement of refugees in Hungary on the grounds that it could lead to Hungarians becoming a minority in their own land, which was a supposed precondition for the Trianon settlement (Novak, 2015); likewise, in a speech in March 2017 commemorating the 1848 revolution, Viktor Orbán thematically (albeit not explicitly) linked the government's opposition to the refugee quotas with its restoration of the 'unity' of the Hungarian nation (Orbán, 2017). In contrast, Balogh reports on the far more explicit linkages made by several pro-government historians and public figures between the refugee crisis and the potential for a 'new Trianon' (Balogh, 2017b).

[8] Although it lies outside of the scope of this article, it is interesting to note that similar tactics to those described here have previously been used by Orbán and Fidesz. A case in point would be the 2015 anti-refugee billboard campaign, in which billboards were erected throughout the country containing messages such as "If you come to Hungary, you should not take Hungarians' jobs"; the messages were written in Hungarian, a language very few refugees to the country spoke (Nolan, 2015).

[9] Horthy's appointment as Regent essentially meant that Hungary became an autocratic government with him as the leader. This was because Hungary, although legally a kingdom, did not have a king; when the rightful claimant to the throne, King Charles, attempted to ascend it in October 1921, Horthy (with the backing of the Allies) had him taken prisoner and exiled (Lendvai, 1999: 381).

[10] It is important to note that prior to the appointment of Szálasi, deportations of Hungarian Jews had already begun between April and July 1944, but then they were halted by Horthy in the face of an international outcry; however, these initial deportations did not include the Jewish population of Budapest. Following Szalasi's installation as ruler of the country, the deportations and massacres were restarted, and this time they included the Budapest Jews.

[11] Given that Horthy was an avowed conservative, and was supported throughout his tenure by right-wing and far-right political groupings, his regime could be more easily seen as a spiritual predecessor of Orbán's government than as a predecessor of Ferenc Gyurcsány's government (for instance).

[12] An inscription above the statue states in Hungarian: "The Memorial for the Victims of the German Occupation".

[13] Amongst its other distinctions, the House of Terror Museum is recognized as a member of the EU's Platform of European Memory and Conscience (Platform of European Memory and Conscience, 2018).

[14] According to Balogh (2011), Horthy was actually criticized in his time by intellectuals from the 'populist' camp, who were largely left-wing; however, she also notes that in the modern era, the heirs of the 'populist' mantle are predominantly right-wing, and that Fidesz are very much part of this group.

[15] Orbán's accession to the position of Prime Minister in the 2010 elections came in the wake of the culmination of eight years of rule by the Hungarian Socialist Party. These years were marked by economic turmoil, with the country experiencing ballooning budgetary deficits between 2002 and 2006, which were subsequently followed by one of the most severe recessions in the EU in 2008. In addition to this, massive, sustained street protests were experienced in several major cities in 2006 after the leaking of then Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány's 'Balaton speech' to the press, in which he admitted that the Socialist government had been lying to the Hungarian people about the troubles facing the country's economy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

• Alexander, Jeffrey C. (2004), 'Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma', in Jeffrey C. Alexander, Ron Eyerman, Bernard Giesen, Neil J. Smelser, and Piotr Sztompka (eds.) *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity*, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 1–30.

• Alexander, Jeffrey C. (2012), *Trauma: A Social Theory*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

• The American Hungarian Federation (2004), 'Former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán Visits Cleveland to Help Commemorate the 1956 Hungarian Revolution'. Available at http://www.americanhungarian-federation.org/news_orban.htm (accessed 11/09/2017).

• Balogh, Eva S. (2011), 'Today's "Right" and Its Antecedents'. Available at http://hungarianspectrum.org/2011/11/06/todays-right-and-its-antecedents/ (accessed 14/11/2017).

• Balogh, Eva S. (2017a), 'In Orbán's Opinion, Miklos Horthy Was an Exceptional Statesman'. Available at http://hungarianspectrum.org/2017/06/21/in-orbans-opinion-miklos-horthy-was-an-exceptional-statesman/ (accessed 15/9/2017).

• Balogh, Eva S. (2017b), 'A New Declaration of War: Justice for Hungary!'. Available at http://hungarianspectrum.org/2017/06/04/a-new-declaration-of-war-justice-for-hungary/ (accessed 09/10/2017).

• Bíró Nagy, András, Tamás Boros, and Zoltán Vasali (2013), 'More Radical Than the Radicals: The Jobbik Party in International Comparison', in Ralf Melzer and Sebastian Serafin (eds.) *Right-Wing Extremism in Europe: Country Analyses, Counter-Strategies and Labor-Market Oriented Exit Strategies*, Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, pp. 229–253.

• Bliesemann de Guevara, Berit (2016), 'Myth in International Politics: Ideological Delusion and Necessary Fiction', in Berit Bliesemann de Guevara (ed.) *Myth and Narrative in International Politics: Interpretive Approaches to the Study of IR*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

• Bozóki, András (2011), 'Occupy the State: The Orbán Regime in Hungary', *Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, 19(3): 649–663.

- British Broadcasting Corporation (2000), 'Bitter Hungarians Recall Trianon'. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/777320.stm (accessed 11/09/2017).
- Browning, Christopher S. (2002), 'Coming Home or Moving Home? "Westernizing" Narratives in Finnish Foreign Policy and the Reinterpretation of Past Identities', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 37(1): 47–72.
- Constitute Project (2013), 'Hungary's Constitution of 2011 with Amendments Through 2013'. Available at https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Hungary_2013.pdf?lang=en (accessed 14/10/2017).
- Dempsey, Judy (2012), 'Orban Has Gone Too Far'. Available at http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=48892 (accessed 26/04/2018).
- Deutsche Welle (2013), 'Moving Right in Hungary'. Available at http://www.dw.de/moving-right-in-hungary/a-16563266 (accessed 02/05/2018).
- Dunai, Marton and Balazs Koranyi (2014), 'Hungary Raids NGOs, Accuses Norway of Political Meddling'. Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-norway-funding-ngo/hungary-raids-ngos-accuses-norway-of-political-meddling-idUSKBN0ED1QW20140602?feedType=RSS (accessed 26/04/2018).
- The Economist (2002), 'Viktor Orban, an Assertive Hungarian', 28/02/2002. Available at http://www.economist.com/node/1011129 (accessed 11/09/2017).
- Egry, Gábor (2012), 'Towards a Social History of Trianon and Its Aftermath'. Available at http://www.imre-kertesz-kolleg.uni-jena.de/fileadmin/imre-kertesz-kolleg/Portal/Egry_Gabor_Towards_a_Social_History_of_Trianon_and_its_Aftermath.pdf (accessed 26/04/2018).
- Esbenshade, Richard S. (2014), 'Symbolic Geographies and the Politics of Hungarian Identity in the "Populist-Urbanist Debate", 1925–44', *Hungarian Cultural Studies*, Vol. 7: 177–197.
- Euractiv (2014), 'Controversial Monument Divides Hungarians, Angers Jewish Community'. Available at http://www.euractiv.com/sections/central-europe/controversial-monument-divides-hungarians-angers-jewish-community-303656 (accessed 26/04/2018).
- Femia, Joseph V. (1981), 'An Historicist Critique of "Revisionist" Methods for Studying the History of Ideas', *History and Theory*, 20(2): 113–134.
- Gardner, Andrew (2014), 'Orbán to Ukraine: Give Hungarians Autonomy'. Available at https://www.politico.eu/article/orban-to-ukraine-give-hungarians-autonomy/ (accessed 03/12/2017).
- Gerner, Kristian (2006), 'Between the Holocaust and Trianon: Historical Culture in Hungary', in Martin L. Davies and Claus-Christian W. Szejnmann (eds.) *How the Holocaust Looks Now: International Perspectives*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 97–106.
- Greskovits, George (2012), 'Re-presenting Moral Ambivalences: Narratives of Political Monologue Regarding András Hegedűs and Pál Teleki', *European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'histoire*, 19(5): 749–766.
- Hobson, John M. and George Lawson (2008), 'What Is History in International Relations?', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 37(2): 415–435.
- Hodonyi, Robert and Helga Trüpel (2013), 'Together Against Orban: Hungary's New Opposition'. Available at http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2013-03-22-hodonyi-en.html (accessed 26/04/2018).
- Hoensch, Jorg K. (1996), *A History of Modern Hungary, 1867–1994,* London: Longman Group.

• Jenne, Erin K. (2016), 'How Populist Governments Rewrite Sovereignty and Why'. Available at https://www.ceu.edu/sites/default/files/attachment/event/15587/erinjennepolberg-consec-2016.pdf (Accessed 23/10/2017).

• Jenne, Erin K. and Cas Mudde (2012), 'Hungary's Illiberal Turn: Can Outsiders Help?', *Journal of Democracy*, 23(3): 147–155.

• Jobbik (2012), 'Gabor Vona Re-elected as the President of the Jobbik Party'. Available at http://www.jobbik.com/gabor_vona_re-elected_president_jobbik_party (accessed 26/04/2018).

• Jobbik (2013), 'Horthy's Statue Was Unveiled in Budapest City Center'. Available at http://www.jobbik.com/horthys_statue_was_unveiled_budapest_city_center (accessed 26/04/2018).

• Juntunen, Tapio (2017), 'Helsinki Syndrome: The Parachronistic Renaissance of Finlandization in International Politics', *New Perspectives*, 25(1).

• Kontler, László (2002), *A History of Hungary: Millennium in Central Europe*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

• Kovács, Henriett and Ursula K. Mindler-Steiner (2015), 'Hungary and the Distortion of Holocaust History: The Hungarian Holocaust Memorial Year 2014', *Politics in Central Europe*, 11(2): 49–72.

• Kövér, László and Zsolt Semjén (2010), 'Of the Testimony to National Unity'. Available at http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/hungary/2082_Trianon_Law_060410_EN1.pdf (accessed 02/10/2017).

• Laczó, Ferenc (2011), 'The "Trianon" – Debate in the Hungarian Left-Liberal Weekly Élet és Irodalom'. Available at http://www.imre-kertesz-kolleg.uni-jena.de/index.php?id=414 (accessed 26/04/2018).

• Lazaroms, Ilse Josepha and Emily R. Gioielli (2012), 'The Politics of Contested Narratives: Biographical Approaches to Modern European History', *European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'histoire*, 19(5): 653–658.

• Lendvai, Paul (1999), *The Hungarians: 1,000 Years of Victory in Defeat*, London: Hurst and Company.

• Molnár, Miklós (2001), *A Concise History of Hungary*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Mueller, Jan-Werner (2011), 'The Hungarian Tragedy', *Dissent*, 58(2): 5–10.

• Nolan, Daniel (2015), 'Hungary Government Condemned over Anti-immigration Drive'. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/02/hungary-government-condemned-over-anti-immigration-drive (accessed 01/05/2018).

• Novak, Benjamin (2014), 'Janos Lazar Accuses Norway of Interfering in Hungary's Domestic Affairs'. Available at http://budapestbeacon.com/featured-articles/janos-lazar-accuses-norway-of-interfering-in-hungarys-domestic-affairs/ (accessed 26/04/2018).

• Novak, Benjamin (2015), 'Hungary Fears Immigration May Lead to Another Trianon'. Available at https://budapestbeacon.com/hungary-fears-immigration-may-lead-to-another-trianon/ (accessed 09/10/2017).

• Oltay, Edith (2013), *Fidesz and the Reinvention of the Hungarian Center-Right*, Budapest: Szazadveg Kiado.

• Orbán, Viktor (2017), 'Viktor Orbán's Speech on the Anniversary of the 1848 Revolution'. Available at http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/viktor-orban-s-speech-on-the-anniversary-of-the-1848-revolution (accessed 09/10/2017).

- Ormos, Mária (2007), *Hungary in the Age of the Two World Wars*, New Jersey: Atlantic Research and Publications ltd.
- Platform of European Memory and Conscience (2018), 'Members'. Available at https://www.memoryandconscience.eu/members2017/ (accessed 29/04/2017).
- Ranciere, Jacques (2009), *The Emancipated Spectator*, London: Verso Books.
- Romsics, Ignác (1999), *Hungary in the Twentieth Century*, Budapest: Corvina Books.
- Romsics, Ignác (2009), 'Changing Images of Miklós Horthy', in Anssi Halmesvirta (ed.) *Cultic Revelations: Studies in Modern Historical Cult Personalities and Phenomena*, University of Jyväskylä, pp. 93–115. Available at https://jyx.jyu.fi/dspace/bitstream/handle/123456789/23081/spectrum_hun_4.pdf? sequence=1 (accessed 01/05/2018).
- Rupnik, Jacques (2012), 'How Things Went Wrong', *Journal of Democracy*, 23(3): 132–137.
- Saltman, Erin Marie and Lisa Herman (2013), 'Hungary versus Europe'. Available at http://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=4436&title=Hungary-versus-Europe (accessed 14/11/2017).
- Schleifer, Yigal (2014), 'Hungary at the Turning Point: How Prime Minister Viktor Orban and His Populist-Right Party Is Slowly Destroying His Country's Democracy'. Available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/moment/2014/10/viktor_orban_s_authoritarian_rule_the_hungarian_prime_minister_is_destroying.html (accessed 18/09/2017).
- Schultheis, Emily (2018), 'How Hungary's Far-Right Extremists Became Warm and Fuzzy'. Available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/06/how-hungarys-far-right-extremists-became-warm-and-fuzzy/ (accessed 27/04/2018).
- Skinner, Quentin (1969), 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', *History and Theory*, 8(1): 3–53.
- Sztompka, Piotr (2000a), 'Cultural Trauma: The Other Face of Social Change', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 3(4): 449–466.
- Sztompka, Piotr (2000b), 'The Ambivalence of Social Change: Triumph or Trauma?', *Polish Sociological Review*, Vol. 131.
- Toth, Csaba Tibor (2018), 'Hungarian Far Right Pushes Moderate Image – and Wins'. Available at http://www.dw.com/en/hungarian-far-right-pushes-moderate-image-and-wins/a-18378981 (accessed 02/05/2018).
- Traub, James (2015), 'Hungary's 500-Year-Old Victim Complex'. Available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/28/hungarys-500-year-old-victim-complex-nazis-habsburgs/ (accessed 02/05/2018).
- Turbucz, David (2014), 'The Horthy-Cult, 1919-1944'. Available at http://eklektika.ektf.hu/dsr/access/6b3a1042-6616-427f-b633-3c324dda2440 (accessed 01/05/2018).
- Verseck, Keno (2012), '"Creeping Cult": Hungary Rehabilitates Far-Right Figures'. Available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/right-wing-extremists-cultivate-horthy-cult-in-hungary-a-836526.html (accessed on 02/05/2018).
- Zalan, Eszter (2014), 'Orban Upsets Neighbours by Call for Hungarian Minority Self-Rule'. Available at https://euobserver.com/foreign/124145 (accessed 03/12/2017).

Notes on Contributors

LAURENT BINET lives and works in France. His first novel, *HHhH*, was an international bestseller which won the prestigious Prix Goncourt du premier roman, among other prizes, and was first published in English in 2012. His second novel *The 7th Function of Language* was published in 2017. Both novels were translated into English by Sam Taylor and published by Harvill Secker, an imprint of Vintage, which is part of the Penguin Random House Group. A film adaptation of *HHhH – The Man with the Iron Heart* – directed by Cedric Jiminez was released in 2017. In 2012 he published *Rien ne se passe comme prévu (Nothing Goes as Planned)*, an account of the successful French presidential campaign of Francois Hollande, which he witnessed while embedded with Hollande's staff. He tweets @LaurentBinetH.
correspondence through: tallis@iir.cz

DR NICHOLAS DUNGEY is Professor of Political Philosophy in the Department of Political Science at California State University, Northridge and associate researcher at the IIR Prague. He has taught at the University of California in Davis and Santa Barbara and a recent book on Kafka and Foucault with Lexington Press. Previous works include 'Thomas Hobbes's Materialism, Language, and the Possibility of Politics (*The Review of Politics*, 2008); "The Ethics and Politics of Dwelling" (*Polity*, 2007); and, "(Re)Turning Derrida to Heidegger: Being-With-Others as Primordial Politics" (*Polity*, 2001). He runs and produces the popular political philosophy (video) podcasts 'Dungey State University'.
Correspondence email: nicholas.dungey@csun.edu

JASON ENIA is an Associate Professor of Political Science and the Director of the Center for the Study of Disasters & Emergency Management (CDEM) at Sam Houston State University. His research explores the political economies of both nuclear nonproliferation and natural disasters, focusing on the ways in which institutions incentivize behaviour.
Correspondence email: jason.enia@shsu.edu

JEFFREY FIELDS is an Associate Professor of the Practice of International Relations and the Director of the Dornsife Washington DC Program at the University of Southern California. His research focuses on international security, diplomacy, and U.S. foreign policy.
Correspondence email: jrfields@usc.edu

DIETER FLECK is a former Director of International Agreements & Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence of Germany; a Member of the Advisory Board of the Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL); a Rapporteur of the ILA Committee on

Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and Contemporary International Law; and an Honorary President of the International Society for Military Law and the Law of War.

Correspondence email: dieterfleck@t-online.de

OĽGA GYÁRFÁŠOVÁ is associate professor and senior researcher at the Institute of European Studies and International Relations, Comenius University in Bratislava. She studied sociology and holds a PhD in comparative political science. In her research she focuses on electoral studies, political culture, analyses of populism and right-wing extremism. She is the national coordinator of the European Election Studies (EES) and the Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems (CSES). Recently, she co-authored a chapter on the radical nationalist right in Slovakia (Gyárfášová and Mesežnikov, 2015) and published a paper on electoral behavior in European Parliament elections (with Karen Henderson in *East European Politics*).

Correspondence email: olga.gyarfasova@fses.uniba.sk

ANGELA KANE is the Vice President of the International Institute for Peace, Vienna, a Senior Fellow at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, and a former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Correspondence email: akane@vcdnp.org

ANASTASIA KAZTERIDIS graduated *magna cum laude* from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, where she studied International Politics with a concentration in Security Studies. Her primary areas of interest are international relations and national security, including nuclear security and conflict resolution.

correspondence through: matthew.kroenig@georgetown.edu

MATTHEW KROENIG is an Associate Professor at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council. Dr. Kroenig is the author or editor of six books, including the latest, *The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Oxford University Press, 2018). His dozens of articles have appeared in leading peer-reviewed academic journals, foreign policy journals, and major newspapers, including: *American Political Science Review*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, *International Organization*, *The Wall Street Journal*, and *The Washington Post*. He was a senior national security adviser on the 2016 Marco Rubio presidential campaign and a foreign policy adviser on the 2012 Mitt Romney campaign. He has served in several positions in the U.S. Department of Defense and the intelligence community, has testified before Congressional committees, and regularly consults with U.S. government entities.

Correspondence email: matthew.kroenig@georgetown.edu

RICHARD PRICE (Ph.D., Cornell) specializes in international relations. His research interests focus on the role of norms in world politics, particularly norms limiting warfare; constructivist international relations theory; normative international relations theory; the politics of international law, and ethics in world politics. His publications include the co-authored *Special Responsibilities: Global Problems and American Power* (Cambridge University Press, 2012), *Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2008), *The United Nations and Global Security* (with Mark Zacher, co-editor, 2004), *The Chemical Weapons Taboo* (Cornell University Press, 1997), and numerous articles in *International Organization*, *World Politics*, *International Security*, *European Journal of International Relations*, and the *Review of International Studies* among others. His teaching interests include courses on world politics, the politics of international law, ethics in world politics, and international relations theory.

Correspondence email: rprice@mail.ubc.ca

MICHAL SMETANA is a post-doctoral researcher at the Center for Security Policy and the Peace Research Center Prague at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University. He worked as one of the main organizers of the Prague Agenda conference between 2012 and 2016. He would like to express his gratitude to the editors of *New Perspectives* for publishing this special section and to all the friends and colleagues that contributed to the success of the Prague Agenda conferences in the last couple of years. Moreover, he would also like to acknowledge the funding by the Charles University Research Centre program UNCE/HUM/028 (Peace Research Center Prague/Faculty of Social Sciences) and by the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic in the context of the grant project VI20152019011.

Correspondence email: smetana@fsv.cuni.cz

SADIA TASLEEM is a lecturer at Quaid-i-Azam University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies in Islamabad, Pakistan. As a Robin Copeland Memorial Fellow for Nonproliferation from 2014 to 2015, she investigated the prospects of "Creating a Constituency for Unilateral Nuclear Arms Restraint in Pakistan." She regularly delivers lectures on issues relating to strategic stability and nuclear deterrence at the Pakistan Air Force and Pakistan Navy Headquarters in Islamabad as well as the Pakistan Naval War College, Lahore. She is an active participant in various Track II dialogues promoting strategic stability in South Asia. She is also a member of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

Correspondence email: sadia.tasleem@gmail.com

MICHAEL TOOMEY received his doctorate from Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey in 2015. He is currently employed as a Teaching Fellow at the Univer-

sity of Limerick, Ireland. His research interests include the normative power and foreign policy of the European Union, the role of external actors in democratization processes, democracy and democratization processes in Central Europe, and the science of pedagogy. He has previously held a faculty appointment at Wenzhou-Kean University in Wenzhou, China, and a teaching appointment at Rutgers University. He has also previously been a visiting scholar at the Institute of International Relations in Prague, and the Central European University in Budapest.

Correspondence email: michaeltoomey2005@gmail.com