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Research Articles

The “Brotherly People” Metaphor and the Russian-Ukrainian Irredentist War: A Corpus-Based Study

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ABSTRACT

The article examines the “brotherly people” metaphor in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war and the concept of irredentism. Such kinship/family metaphors are closely associated with colonialism and expansionism. Using a corpus analysis of Russian sources on and Anglophone studies of irredentism published in the period of 1923–2022, this article reveals that these metaphors are an important aspect not only of the scientific conceptualization of irredentism but also of the ideological justification of irredentist wars in both Russian and world history. The comparative analysis of the usage of the “brotherly people” metaphor in the political, academic and non-academic corpora in the Russian language allowed us to capture its ideological content, which justifies the aggression of Russia against Ukraine. The study showed the full semantic range of the “brotherly people” metaphor in the large Russian corpora while connecting it to Russian irredentism: from assertions of cultural, historical and ethnic unity with, support for and assistance for the “brotherly people” to the delegitimization of Ukrainian statehood and the separate ethnic identity of the “brotherly people”, and the desire to “protect” them through annexations.

KEYWORDS	metaphor, brotherly people, irredentism, Russian-Ukrainian war, corpus linguistics, kinship/family metaphors, war, nationalism
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INTRODUCTION

In international relations, kinship/family metaphors are often used to establish and designate mutual obligations, historical ties, and ethnic and cultural affinities, and/or to articulate hierarchical, colonizing, expansionist policies. As Morten Andersen and Benjamin de Carvalho argue, *"kinship metaphors with paternalistic undertones have been used historically to legitimize colonial endeavours and racist international politics"* (ANDERSEN – DE CARVALHO 2018: 21). For example, in the 19th century the metaphor of the "family of nations" was popular among advanced Western countries: the "countries-fathers," the civilized countries, were presented as guarantors of paternal care, an instrument for re-educating the "countries-children", the undeveloped, "barbaric" colonized countries. In this discourse the "countries-fathers" are supposed to civilize the "countries-children", and the "countries-children" are obliged to obey, renouncing their right to sovereignty (IBID.: 34–38). Also, since the 17th century British and Americans saw themselves as representatives of the "countries-fathers" in relation to the "countries-children", e.g., the Native American tribes of North America. The Indians accepted the language of the family metaphor but understood family relationships differently compared to the British and Americans. The latter treated the family as a hierarchical, patriarchal unit with clear roles and obligations: to obey one and dominate another; the Creek Indian tribes viewed the family as an equal relationship between its members, who support and protect each other (HOUGH 1999: 65–66, 74). Ultimately, the different understandings of the family became one of the sources of the conflict between these nations.

Here is another connotation of this metaphor. After World War II, the relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia was imagined through the "brotherly people" metaphor. However, while Indonesia considered itself the latter's older brother, Malaysia tried its best to avoid playing the role of a younger brother. Indonesia dominated Malaysia's cultural and linguistic space, and wanted to influence its foreign policy, while Malaysia nurtured its nationalism. The relationship did not, however, follow a strictly antagonistic logic, since amid the danger of a Chinese invasion in the 1960s, the Malaysians promoted stronger ties with Indonesia (LIOW 2003: 26–30, 61, 260–275). The "brotherly people" metaphor was also employed in a positive way during the Civil War in Russia by Soviet authorities, while constructing

a sense of unity between different nations. As Joshua Sanborn argue, *"[f]raternity was a wonderfully useful concept, incorporating all the aspects of nation that state officials desired and reinforcing the popular slogan of equality without significantly lessening maneuvers of power and domination"* (SANBORN 2001: 105). However, despite this positive context, fraternity soon showed its hierarchical connotations: *"as Ukrainian nationalists (and Russian peasants) would soon grow tired of hearing, within any fraternal system there is room for older brothers and younger brothers, leaders and followers"* (SANBORN 2001: 105).

In some cases, kinship and family metaphors served as a rationale for a mobilization of nationalistic feelings and ideas, as well as for an aggressive country's annexation of the territory of a neighboring country inhabited by people who had some kind of affinity with it (LIOW 2003: 58). The practice of such a mobilization is signified by the notion of irredentism, which is defined as an annexation of territory based on the idea of ethnic and cultural affinity. Here are a few examples of this phenomenon: pan-Turkism, pan-Slavism and pan-Greek movements in the late 19th and early 20th century, the annexation of Czechoslovakia by Germany under the guise of protecting the Sudeten Germans in the late 1930s, the pan-Serbian policy of Slobodan Milošević in the 1990s, etc. In all of these cases, the goal was to reunite in one state the presumably unfairly severed parts of a large ethnos, and the corresponding family-kin metaphors were used.

Metaphors help one to imagine something unknown, some kind of practice or idea, through sensory, palpable, and more understandable images, practices and ideas. Metaphors also shape attitudes toward certain practices (KÖVECSES 2015: 2, 5, 20, 51–52). The family/kinship metaphor is the clearest and most palpable sensual image that helps one to conceive the relationships between countries through the relationships between family members. In today's world, Russia makes use of expansionist rhetoric and practices. In Russia, the ideas of the expansionist "Russian World" are represented through the use of the "brotherly people" metaphor and the imperative to "protect" the Russian-speaking population (KHALDAROVA 2021; A'BECKETT 2012).

This study aims to determine that the "brotherly people" metaphor is an ideological tool that can be used by the ruling elite to justify war, and also provides an opportunity to encourage the given country's population to participate in a war of aggression, considering that the Russian

aggression against Ukraine from 2014 on is studied as an example of irredentism (DIRIBA 2021; AMBROSIO 2016). Therefore, it is important to examine the meaning of the "brotherly people" metaphor and the practices of its use in Russian texts. In addition, we should inquire into the extent to which this metaphor is widespread in other irredentist conflicts. This paper is organized as follows. We proceed by first highlighting the relevance of the topic vis-a-vis the existing literature, and then describing the methodology of the corpus approach, data collection and operationalization. In the next section we present the results, and then we discuss them in the context of the existing literature.

LITERATURE REVIEW

From the metaphorical kinship of the Russian and Ukrainian nations to the Russian expansionism

Several studies have examined the "brotherly people" metaphor used in Russia in relation to Ukrainians. Irina Khaldarova reviewed Channel One's (a major state media outlet in the Russian Federation) coverage from 2012–2014 to show the evolution of the image of Ukrainians: from a "little brother" to the "Ukrainian-fascist-nationalist-enemy" nexus. Interestingly, initially the Euromaidan participants in 2014 were equated with fascist right-wing radicals, and then the pro-Ukrainian position was largely equated with the fascist position in general. At the same time, pro-Russian Ukrainians, namely, those in the Donbass, were regarded as oppressed Russian-speaking Ukrainians, and victims of genocide at the hands of the neofascist Kyiv government (KHALDAROVA 2021: 13–16). Summarizing her research, Khaldarova notes the following: *"prior to Euromaidan, Ukrainians were portrayed as a 'little brother', dependent on Russia's guidance and support, but with shared origins and values. This narrative, emphasizing Ukraine as a fraternal but subordinate partner, was part of Russia's response to the identity crisis that was caused by the fall of the Soviet Union and aimed at reinforcing Russia's position among neighbouring and post-Soviet countries. The transformation of this image began with the narrative of betrayal, wherein any political choice that did not favour Russia was interpreted as irrational or misguided"* (IBID.: 16).

Ludmilla A'Beckett conducted research of the use of "brotherly" metaphors in two of Russia's most popular newspapers – *Argumenty i Fakty* (Arguments and Facts [AiF]), and *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* (Comsomol Truth),

as well as the independent media channel *Echo of Moscow* during 2004–2010. A'Beckett notes that the "brotherly nations" metaphor *"often becomes a carrier of Russian expansionist efforts exemplified by trade wars, separatist activities, military operations and various forms of political pressure"* (A'BECKETT 2012: 172). The independent policy of the sovereign post-Soviet countries is considered a betrayal and a sign of ingratitude, but interference in their affairs by the Russians is called "brotherly care" (IBID.: 173, 181). Hence, brotherhood always implies a hierarchy – an older and a younger brother (IBID.: 178) – in which *"Russia plays a leading role while Ukraine, Belorussia, Bulgaria, and Georgia are immature 'little brothers'"* (IBID.: 190).

Briefly summarizing the works of these scholars, it can be noted that the "brotherly people" metaphor in Russia has the following meanings in relation to Ukraine: 1) the shared ethnic origins and values of Ukrainians and Russians, with an emphasis on the idea that the Ukrainian population cannot exist without the support of Russia; 2) delegitimizing the independent policies of sovereign post-Soviet countries; 3) Russia meddling with Ukraine's domestic politics, because in this case, brotherhood, for Russians, always implies a hierarchy and Ukraine's dependence on Russia; 4) representing pro-Russian Ukrainians as victims of the Kyiv regime who must be protected and thus implementing the practice of Russian expansionism against Ukraine as a whole.

It is worth pointing out that these authors, on the one hand, used limited samples of Russian sources, e.g., sources of the same type, and perhaps the scholars have not taken into account the additional meanings and connotations of the "brotherly people" metaphor. On the other hand, they did not consider the spread of the "brotherly people" metaphor on a global scale, and made no connection between it and the practice of irredentism.

Toward the Concept of Irredentism

David Siroky and Christopher Hale define this concept as follows: *"irredentism is a governmental decision that subtracts from one state and adds to another on the basis of shared ethnicity"* (SIROKY – HALE 2017: 117). In 2013 John Nagle could still argue that irredentism is a thing of the past, as few countries pursue a policy of national unification, but if they do, it is through peaceful means such as cross-border institutions. It is important to emphasize that Nagle defined irredentism as *"a sense of loss arising from the belief that*

territory has been wrongfully taken away from a nation in the past. The task of irredentist movements is to take action to expedite [the] rightful restoration of the lost land and people" (NAGLE 2013: 295). Furthermore, Nagle believed that the relationship between an ethnically similar population of a kin state and the so-called "mother country" (where the ethnos in question is the one which constitutes the state) is not devoid of ambivalence and asymmetry, and these features prevent the exercise of irredentism (IBID.: 219).

An aggressor country's annexation of another country's territory based on an ethnic affinity with it is not the norm in modern history, however, see (NAGLE 2013: 295). However, the situation has changed since 2014 (HENSEL – MACAULAY 2015). The Russian annexation of Crimea and parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine in 2014 was the first instance of its kind in Europe since the beginning of the twenty-first century. This event represents a renewal of the practice of irredentism (DIRIBA 2021; AMBROSIO 2016; KÖSE 2016). Russia threatens to set a precedent that would destabilize *"long-established norms against conquest which have been predominant in the international system in the 70 years since World War II"* (HENSEL ET AL. 2022); i.e., Russia could become an example for other potentially irredentist countries. Similar irredentist conflicts can arise between India and Pakistan, China and Taiwan, Israel and its Arab neighbors, Central Asian post-Soviet countries, and North and South Korea (WOODWELL 2005: 347).

Let's define the causes of irredentism, which could help us to identify the ideological meanings of irredentist metaphors:

1) irredentist policies are pursued by dictatorships and military juntas (NAGLE 2013: 296; WOODWELL 2005: 79); authoritarian countries initiate irredentist policies for purely internal reasons – e.g. to win the support of the people, or to compensate for the lack of economic privilege of the dominant ethnic majority through the idea of ethnic reunification (SIROKY – HALE 2017: 122–123, 125); this is precisely the state of affairs in Russia (IBID.: 124), and it also involves the threat of separatism within Russia, as the population of Central Asia and the Caucasus could secede (IBID.);

2) the ruling elite is seeking to gain the support of the majority by mobilizing nationalist sentiments and conducting an

annexation (NAGLE 2013: 293; SIROKY – HALE 2017: 120); a nationalist mobilization of the population and a desire to protect their co-ethnics (WOODWELL 2005: 79, 81); the ruling elite seeks to retain power through a war of aggression, especially if a kin state has an opposing political system (IBID.: 333; SIROKY – HALE 2017: 120); the ruling elite have fears about internal and external security (GANGULY 1996: 8, 9);

3) newly emerged states arising from a collapse of a multinational state, face the risk of an intervention from a strong mother country (NAGLE 2013: 293); irredentist states try to do so before the postcolonial ethnically kindred population in the kin state develops an identity of its own (HENSEL – MACAULAY 2015);

4) the ethnic minority in the kin state is represented as a victim (WOODWELL 2005: 79; HENSEL – MACAULAY 2015; GANGULY 1996: 8, 9);

5) the deterioration of international norms that support sovereignty and territorial integrity (WOODWELL 2005: 333);

6) the military readiness and the influence of the military on the internal politics of the mother country, while the kin state is in poor economic and political shape (WOODWELL 2005: 334, 337).

The irredentist ideology is already embedded in the first four causes of irredentism. If we consider that kinship and familial metaphors are used in justifications of irredentism, then the following reasons could provide a basis for identifying the meanings of these metaphors:

1) the idea of ethnic unity and reunification;

2) the desire to protect members of an ethnically kindred populace of a kindred country who are presented as victims of the current political regime there;

3) delegitimization of a kin state with a different political system;

4) a critique of the national identity and ideology of an ethnically kindred population in a kin state.

Based on the fact that the Russian-Ukrainian war is referred to as irredentist (DIRIBA 2021; AMBROSIO 2016), we compared the ideological meanings extracted from the causes of irredentism with the meanings of the "brotherly people" metaphor in Khaldarova (2021) and A'Beckett (2012) (SEE TABLE 1).

TABLE 1: COMPARING THE IDEOLOGICAL MEANINGS OF IRREDENTISM AND THE "BROTHERLY PEOPLE" METAPHOR

Ideological meanings of the "brotherly people" metaphor in Khaldarova and A'Beckett	Ideological meanings extracted from the causes of irredentism
the shared ethnic origins and values of Ukrainians and Russians, emphasizing that the Ukrainian population cannot exist without the support of Russia	the idea of ethnic unity and reunification
meddling with Ukraine's domestic politics, because brotherhood, for Russians, always implies a hierarchy and Ukraine's dependence on Russia	a critique of the national identity and ideology of an ethnically kindred population in a kin state
delegitimization of the independent policies of sovereign post-Soviet countries	delegitimization of a kin state with a different political system
representing pro-Russian Ukrainians as victims of the Kyiv regime who must be protected and thus implementing the practice of Russian expansionism against Ukraine as a whole	the desire to protect members of an ethnically kindred populace of a kindred country who are presented as victims of the current political regime there

According to Table 1, the comparison of the meanings of the "brotherly people" metaphor with the ideological meanings extracted from the causes of irredentism indicates that the meanings are semantically similar. Based on the semantic similarity of the meanings of the "brotherly people" metaphor and the ideological meanings of the causes of irredentism, as well as the understanding of Russia's war with Ukraine as irredentist in the scientific literature, we can assume that the "brotherly people" metaphor, as explored by Khaldarova (2021) and A'Beckett (2012), served as an ideological justification for the Russian irredentism in Ukraine. Contemporary science allows us to test this hypothesis with the help of corpus linguistics by examining a large number of texts.

Corpus Linguistics and Conceptual Analysis

Corpus linguistics is the linguistic discipline that allows for *"the complete and systematic investigation of linguistic phenomena on the basis of linguistic corpora using concordances, collocations, and frequency lists"* (STEFANOWITSCH 2020: 54). It is important to understand the terms used in this definition. The corpus is a collection of texts chosen for studying the state and diversity of a language; a corpus study reveals regularities and patterns, persistent word usages, and new semantic relationships. A concordance is a collection

of all the uses of a word form, each in its context; concordance helps one to quickly form an understanding of the contexts of a particular word, and to highlight its stable connections with other words. Collocation is the stable coexistence of two or more words at a short distance from each other in the text; collocations allow one to identify semantic relationships between words (idioms). A frequency list is a list of the most frequent words in the text (it is also possible to observe the distribution of words in the corpus to understand the representativeness of their frequency); the frequency list provides an opportunity to assess the main topics of the corpus (SINCLAIR 1991: 9, 32, 170, 30; BAKER 2006: 48–49). Clusters are also used in the context of corpus linguistics. They point out frequent word combinations (starting from 2 words). In addition, it is possible to use part-of-speech tagging for the corpus study, as well as lemmatization, which converts all words to their dictionary form – nominative case and singular.

Corpus linguistics is not only a quantitative discipline, since any results yielded by it need to be interpreted. Corpus linguistics helps one to test or refute hypotheses and intuitions, or to create other hypotheses to re-check them. Paul Baker has shown how corpus linguistics can be used to study discourses, i.e., the statements which produce their subject, practices, and structures that shape people's lives in society (hence there are political discourses, tourist discourses, advertising discourses, medical discourses, etc.). Thus, corpus linguistics can show how discourses are constructed in a language: what words, metaphors, etc. are used, what meanings they carry, what consequences they lead to, what kind of social subject they create, etc. (BAKER 2006: 3–4).

To understand this or that discourse, one should create a corpus or use an already created corpus, and then certain words and word combinations could be searched for using the specified tools. Corpus linguistics offers a way to limit empirically unverifiable intuitions and unwarranted superimpositions of interpretations by revealing objective characteristics of texts (BAKER 2006: 92). Corpus linguistics is also used for descriptive studies of concepts, their history, connotations of their meaning, their construction, etc. (ALFANO 2018; BETTI ET AL. 2019; BELLER – BENDER 2017: 13–15; WILLIAMS 2021).

The purpose of the study: to expand the meaning of the "brotherly people" metaphor through an analysis of Russian corpora and demonstrate that this metaphor, as used in Russia in relation to Ukraine, has irredentist meanings and was used to justify the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Objectives:

1. To determine the meanings of the "brotherly people" metaphor in relation to Ukraine in Russian society based on several corpora of Russian texts.
2. To identify to what extent this "brotherly people" metaphor is widespread in other cases of irredentism through a corpus analysis of irredentism studies.

METHODS

The meaning of the "brotherly people" metaphor in the Russian corpora

The first objective of the study was accomplished in two stages:

1. the creation of corpora of information about Ukraine and the Ukrainian people from texts published by Russians in Russia.
2. the analysis of the use of the "brotherly people" metaphor in these corpora.

These stages are described in the following.

The creation of the Russian corpora

During the course of the study, four corpora were created. These four corpora were named Corpus A, Corpus B, Corpus C, and Corpus D, respectively. Figure 1 provides information about the data sources used to create the corpora for the study.

FIGURE 1: DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA SOURCES WHICH WERE USED TO CREATE THE CORPORA

Corpus A	Corpus B	Corpus C	Corpus D
source: academic and popular science texts in Russian from Google Academy	source: a representative web-corpus of the Russian language at "Sketch Engine" – "Russian Web 2011 (ruTenTen11)"	source: a representative web-corpus of the Russian language on the Leeds University website	source: texts on the website of the President of the Russian Federation
the search period: 1991–2022	time frame – 2011	time frame – 1999–2014	time frame – 2000–2022 (till August)
size: 2.8 million words in total	size: 14.5 billion words in total	size: about 400 million words in total	size: 660,000 words in total

Corpus A was created manually from Russian academic texts (3.2 million words). These materials were downloaded via Google Academy website links on March 23, 2022. The search was made using the keywords "independent Ukraine people post-Soviet" ("nezavisimaya Ukraina narod postsovetskaya") to get sources related to independent Ukraine. The search period is "1991–2022". A total of 223 sources were used to create Corpus A (for a complete list of the sources, see Appendix 1). All the PDF and DJVU original files were converted to txt to create Corpus A, and were then merged into a single file. Reference lists have been removed in their entirety. Concordances with the word combination "Ukrainian people" were lemmatized (without additional cleaning).

Corpus B was created using the existing, representative corpus of the Russian language located on the website "Sketch Engine" – "Russian Web 2011 (ruTenTen11)" (Sketch Engine n.d.). The total number of words in this corpus is 14.5 billion. Corpus B was generated from the representative corpus with the word combination "Ukrainian people". The result was that the number of concordances was more than 11,000, but only 10,000 could be downloaded in the limited access mode (with a pre-established context size). The concordances were lemmatized (without additional cleaning).

Corpus C was created by using the existing, representative Russian language corpora located on the Leeds University website (Leeds University n.d.): these were the "Russian National Corpus" (50 million words, 2010), "Russian Newspapers" (70 million words, 2001–2004), the "Russian Internet Corpus" (sites, blogs) (160 million words), "Russian Livejournal" (blogs), and the "Russian Business Corpus" (Business Literature Corpus). The overall time range of the texts in these corpora is 1999–2014. Corpus

C was generated from the representative corpus of the modern Russian language with the word combination "Ukrainian people" (with the context of 25 words on the right and left). Concordances were lemmatized (without additional cleaning).

Corpus D was created manually by searching for the texts in Russian on the website of the President of the Russian Federation (Kremlin n.d.) which contained the word "bratskiy" (brotherly) and then examining them to identify its meaning and to which countries the word is applied most often. The fragments with the word "brotherly" being used in reference to countries and in relation to Putin's statements were then manually extracted from the whole corpus (660,000 words) by generating concordances. The corpus was lemmatized. The word "brotherly" was used for the search in Corpus D due to the specific research purposes and the impossibility of an effective word search based on the standard search technologies of Google and the website of the President of the Russian Federation.

All text files within the corpora were lemmatized by TagAnt (ANTHONY 2022B) and uploaded to AntConc software (ANTHONY 2022A).

The operationalization of Corpora A, B, C, and D

The second stage of the study was aimed at exploring the meaning of the "brotherly people" metaphor in the context of discussions of the Ukrainian people. For this purpose, two-word clusters (bigrams) were generated for corpora A, B, and C: any adjective on the left + the noun "narod" (people) on the right. For corpora B and C, additional two-word clusters were generated: any adjective on the left + "ukrainsk*" (Ukrainian) (repetitions or irrelevant statements were not taken into account). Part-of-speech tagging was applied to the corpora.

In Corpus D, clusters with the word "bratskiy" (brotherly) were generated to search for the word on the right (to identify what other countries the corresponding metaphor was applied to), and similarly, clusters with any adjective on the left + "narod" (people) on the right were also generated and used to perform searches. The clusters were generated in this corpus to identify which nations were considered as "brotherly", so that we could understand how frequently this word was used in relation

to Ukraine. This operation was performed only for Corpus D, since it contains the texts of the Russian president, who sets the foreign policy of his country in relation to the post-Soviet countries.

By generating clusters and reading concordances with the word "bratskiy" (brotherly) in all the corpora it was possible to learn more about the context of the use of this word, and to identify how the Ukrainian people are characterized from the point of view of the Russians in the context of the "brotherly people" metaphor. To structure this information, we created topics that reflect the meanings of the Ukrainian people from the point of view of the Russian population and Putin in the context of the "brotherly people" metaphor. Examples of concordances for the topics were added after our summary of them (with the number of concordances in brackets).

The study compared all four corpora against each other based on the percentage of concordances for each topic. The semantic focus in each corpus was identified based on the prevalence of two particular topics in the corpus, which corresponds to more than 50% of the concordances.

Identifying the prevalence of the "brotherly people" metaphor in other cases of irredentism

The second task of the study was addressed in two stages:

1. The creation of a corpus of academic works with the word form "irredent*" in the title.
2. Studying the use of the "brotherly people" metaphor in the corpus.

Below is a description of these steps.

The creation of Corpus E

We performed a search using Google Scholar, JStor, ProQuest Theses and Dissertations and archive.org for English-language texts with "irredent*" in their titles (this operation was carried out in the period of June 16–19, 2022). Searching for the word "irredent*" in the titles of the texts, on the

one hand, limited the number of downloaded works, but, on the other hand, provided more accurate and meaningful information about the concept we are interested in.

Thus, Corpus E was formed, consisting of 156 sources: 125 articles, 27 dissertations, and 4 books published between 1923 and 2022 (for a complete list of the sources, see Appendix 2). The size of the corpus was 3.8 million words. The corpus was then manually cleaned of reference lists, notes, tables of contents, acknowledgements, and abstracts. Then the final size of the corpus was 2.8 million words.

The operationalization of Corpus E

We posed questions to the corpus and used certain operations of corpus analysis to answer them. Our main question was this: "How frequently is the kinship-family 'brotherly people' metaphor used by irredentist states/organizations?" To answer this question, we searched for the word forms of "brother" and used the "collocation" tool for identifying words related to the word "brother", which refers to the ethnic dimension of relations between peoples.

Results

The "brotherly people" metaphor in Corpus A (the academic corpus)

In Corpus A, the adjective "bratskiy" (brotherly) occurs a total of 178 times. The adjective "bratskiy" (brotherly) in connection with the noun "narod" (people) occurs 65 times. The adjective "bratskiy" (brotherly) together with the adjective "ukrainskiy" (Ukrainian) occurs only 4 times. 52 relevant concordances were identified and sorted into 7 topics, which reflect the meanings of "brotherly" from the perspective of Russian researchers in the context of their understanding of the relations between Russia and Ukraine. The topics are ranked according to their frequency below (SEE TABLE 2).

TABLE 2: TOPICS WITH MEANINGS OF "BROTHERLY PEOPLE" IN RELATION TO UKRAINIANS IN CORPUS A

No	Topic	Number of concordances	% of the total number
1	Unbrotherly behavior of the brotherly people	16	30,77
2	Brotherly people – integration and unification with the Russian people	16	30,77
3	Support and assistance	7	13,46
4	The Soviet myth of the three brotherly peoples	4	7,69
5	Dimensions of unity among brotherly peoples	4	7,69
6	One People	3	5,77
7	Protection of the Russian-speaking population	2	3,85
Total		52	100

Let us summarize the concordances with the word "brotherly". Topic 1 focused upon several connotations. The ideal state of brotherhood can be imagined by thinking of the example of the union of Russia and Belarus. Ukraine must support its comprehensive integration and cooperation with the brotherly Russia. Furthermore, it is emphasized that the "brotherly" Ukraine has no reason not to maintain a close relationship with Russia because it is historically proven that Ukraine has achieved outstanding success in many sectors only in an alliance with Russia, and the reunification of the countries will contribute to the cultural communication between the brotherly peoples. Ukraine has great importance for Russia in the economic, political, cultural, military, and human dimensions. The latter has sought to restore the union of brotherly peoples, and to reintegrate the former "brotherly peoples" through the creation of the CIS, the CSTO, the Union State with Belarus, and the Eurasian Union. Russia, in fact, sees its historical role in accomplishing this, as it did something similar in 1654. Stepan Bandera's (the leader of the Ukrainian nationalists in the mid-20th century) apologists do not understand that without a brotherly union of the eastern Slavic peoples, the Ukrainian nation cannot exist.

"The prospect of Russian-Ukrainian integration will be of particular relevance, as it is a complex and ambiguous process, but its nature will largely determine the fate of the two brotherly peoples. In addition, the question of choosing the direction and form of the integration interaction between Russia and Ukraine will be of crucial importance for the entire post-Soviet space" (22).

"The USSR did not follow the path of building a nation-state. Instead of that during the last 23 years, Russian authorities have been making new attempts

to reintegrate the former 'brotherly people'. This goal led them to create the CIS, the union state of Russia and Belarus and, finally, the Eurasian Union" (51).

Topic 2 centered on the meaning of the non-brotherly behavior of Ukraine from the point of view of Russian scientists. In the context of the "brotherly people" metaphor, the existence of distinct, separate peoples and their respective states is not encouraged. Russians and Ukrainians are considered members of one "brotherly family," which the Ukrainian authorities are trying to destroy. Presumably, Ukrainian propaganda constructs a distinct identity for Ukraine, its own history that is separate from that of Russia, and also a unique nationality: Ukrainian. Ukrainian authorities sought to distance Ukraine from Russia, and as a result, the image of the latter turned from that of a "brotherly people" into that of an "aggressor state" and an "enemy." Nationalism is flourishing in Ukraine, which is the antithesis of the "brotherly people" idea. Scholars argue that the real reason for this state of affairs is European integration, which has divided the Ukrainian and Russian people. At the same time, Ukraine insidiously uses the metaphor of "brotherly people" so that Russia can pay for its European integration with cheap gas. Ukraine and Russia are two Russian states formed after 1991, but the obtaining of separate statehoods by the peoples of the former "brotherly family," will lead, in the best case, to economic ruin and, in the worst case, to war.

"The aim of the state and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is to defend the interests of the respective political elites, but they completely ignore the shared historical and cultural roots of the two brotherly peoples in favor of pseudo-liberal and nationalist aspirations" (6).

"The threat of almost total physical annihilation of Russian Ukraine and the creation of an enemy state in place of the former 'brotherly republic'".

"At the end of the 19th century, the Western Ukrainians were bombarded with powerful propaganda, which gave them the idea that the Ukrainians are a distinct nation, different from the brotherly Russian people, that the Russian Tsar, with cunning and deception, sought to colonize Ukraine, that the existence of an 'independent' Ukrainian state is possible only under the patronage of the Germans" (79).

Russian scholars use the "brotherly people" metaphor to indicate that Ukraine's shared history with and territorial proximity to Russia imply that Russia always supported and assisted and will continue to support Ukraine (Topic 3).

"Putin's annual press conference, referring to the signing of the agreement with Ukraine, stated: 'And if we really say that this is a brotherly people and a brotherly country, then we must act as a close relative and support the Ukrainian people in this difficult situation'" (49).

Curiously, the Soviet idea of "brotherly peoples" is considered ambiguous: on the one hand, it implies separate brotherly peoples (hence, "separatism"), and on the other, it entails their unity (integration, unification, unity) (Topic 4).

"The thesis of a brotherly Eastern Slavic nation of Ukrainians and Russians has been hammered into our minds, and already for most of our fellow citizens, the existence of two brotherly but different peoples has become an axiom" (100).

There is a firm understanding of the unity of the brotherly peoples in terms of their shared civilizational identity: they both share the Orthodox faith, a common history, and certain traditions (Topic 5).

"In the public opinion the two countries [Russia and Ukraine] are evolving in a process of centuries of shared history. They are greatly influenced by the historical and cultural traditions of the two brotherly peoples" (26).

Russian scholars also use the "brotherly people" metaphor to indicate the need to (re)integrate two territorially neighboring, ethnically and culturally related peoples into a union state, since they are essentially the same people (Topic 6).

"It is time to understand this: we are not just 'brotherly Slavic peoples'; we are one great Russian people. And our 'mova' ['language' in Ukrainian] is just a dialect of one Russian language" (90).

There are calls to defend the oppressed Russian-speaking population in Ukraine as a brotherly people (Topic 7).

"Unanimously vote to grant the President of the Russian Federation the right to use armed force to prevent rampant banditry and protect the Russian-speaking population in a brotherly country" (108).

Thus, this metaphor has concrete political implications, as it rules out the extra-Russian existence of the "brotherly people" and constitutes Russia's dominant role in maintaining the brotherly relations.

The "brotherly people" metaphor in Corpus B

In Corpus B, the adjective "bratskiy" (brotherly) in connection with the noun "narod" (people) occurs 32 times. The adjective "bratskiy" (brotherly) occurs very often in combination with the adjective "ukrainskiy" (Ukrainian), forming a stable and frequent collocation (110 concordances). In total, the adjective "brotherly" occurs 245 times. There are only 66 relevant concordances. All the occurrences are grouped into 4 topics in the context of understanding the relationship between Russia and Ukraine (SEE TABLE 3).

TABLE 3: TOPICS WITH MEANINGS OF "BROTHERLY PEOPLE" IN RELATION TO UKRAINIANS IN CORPUS B

No	Topic	Number of concordances	% of the total number
1	Dimensions of unity among brotherly peoples	27	40,9
2	Unbrotherly behavior of the brotherly people	25	37,8
3	Support and assistance	12	18,1
4	Acceptance of the Ukrainians' independent way of life	2	3
Total		52	66

Let us summarize the concordances with the word "brotherly". Topic 1 focused upon several connotations. Ukraine and Russia are regarded as "brotherly peoples" in terms of their shared history: they jointly fought in battles and underwent a reunification in the 17th century, which sealed forever the destinies of the two peoples. There are even occasional statements that Ukrainians and Russians are essentially one people. In this regard, Ukrainians have a spontaneous desire for unification with the brotherly Russian people and also resist NATO, though the political elite of Ukraine wants to align the country with it to profit from it, even at the expense of the values that unite Russians and Ukrainians. Russia is always ready to

extend a helping hand to Ukraine, develop good-neighborly relations with it, and fight against fascism on Ukrainian soil.

"The reunification of Ukraine and Russia marks a turning point in the life of the Ukrainian people; it determines their further historical development and forever joins together the fates of the brotherly Ukrainians and Russians" (50).

"[I] *share with the governor the joy of a positive attitude towards the fraternal Ukrainian people, who are essentially one people with us. There remains, of course, a slightly negative connotation of that unpleasant moment"* (35).

According to Topic 2, the nationalists are the main project of the Ukrainian ruling elite against Russia. They separate the destinies of the two brotherly peoples. The United States is an ally of the Ukrainian authorities, who have appointed their leaders (e.g., Viktor Yushchenko, Yulia Tymoshenko) to pursue anti-Russian policies that sow discord between Ukrainians and Russians. Thus, in Ukraine the Nazi is recognized as a hero (a reference to Bandera), and the Holodomor in 1932–1933 is considered a genocide. A different interpretation of World War II is being imposed, a persecution of Russian-language speakers is taking place, and an apartheid regime has arisen. At the same time, the cheapness of energy has allowed the Russophobic elite in Ukraine to remain in power and has given Ukrainian capitalists a fortune.

"Russia was outraged, but its outrage was very well concealed. When in front of the eyes of the brotherly Ukrainian people a Nazi is recognized as a hero, when the persecution of the language begins, and in essence an apartheid regime arises" (15).

"It is not Yushchenko's will that should be reflected, but the will of the Ukrainian people. Then we can congratulate Bush and his Condoleezza [Rice] – their plan to split the brotherly people has completely succeeded" (112).

"The problem lies not in the attitude towards the Russian language and the Russian nationality on the part of the brotherly Ukrainian people, but in the attitude of the Ukrainian government toward our country and the Russian people" (168).

According to Topic 3, Russia is always ready to lend a helping hand to Ukraine, develop good-neighborly relations with it, and fight fascism on Ukrainian soil.

"The Ukrainian people are mighty and invincible, for they have fought the enemy and will continue to do so in close friendship with the great brotherly Russian people, together with all the great Russian people. For a century, they have been providing brotherly assistance to their sister country, Ukraine" (155).

"In the 90's and early 2000's Russia provided the brotherly Ukrainian people with low gas prices, on which they earned a fortune" (22).

It is noteworthy that Russians, when discussing the Russian authorities, sometimes consider the declaration of brotherly relations with the Ukrainian people as a lie designed to cover up the imperialistic policy of the Russian state.

"So that the brotherhood – the allegedly friendly to policy toward Ukraine, the strategic partnership and the 'brotherly' relationships with the Ukrainian people – should be perceived as a false declaration, serving only as a cover for his imperial policy" (162).

At the same time, some Russians express sympathy and support for the Maidan, that is, for the Ukrainian people who decided to take their destiny into their own hands, as well as for the uprisings against the corrupt Kuchma regime and the massive election fraud in 2004.

"On the occasion of the Orange Revolution, I was really on the Maidan; I am proud that our brotherly Ukrainian people rebelled against the corrupt Kuchma regime and the mass falsification in the elections of 2004" (49).

Therefore, the "brotherly people" metaphor is used in the "Sketch Engine" corpus to denote shared historical roots, joint military actions, and mutual assistance, as well as to indicate the unbrotherly behavior of the Ukrainian authorities – namely an independent foreign policy, a non-Russian reading of history, and an anti-Russian ideology. On the other hand, in particular, there are several positive comments in this corpus about

the desire of the Ukrainian people to fight corruption. These statements recognize the autonomy and national dignity of Ukrainians.

The "brotherly people" metaphor in Corpus C

In Corpus C, the adjective "bratskiy" (brotherly) occurs infrequently in connection with the noun "narod" (people). Sixteen concordances of this sort were generated. However, the adjective "bratskiy" (brotherly) is often found in combination with the adjective "ukrainskiy" ("Ukrainian"), and thus this combination forms a stable and frequent collocation (20 concordances). In total, the adjective "brotherly" occurs 70 times. There are only 23 relevant concordances. All the occurrences are grouped into 5 topics in the context of understanding the relationship between Russia and Ukraine (SEE TABLE 4).

TABLE 4: TOPICS WITH MEANINGS OF "BROTHERLY PEOPLE" IN RELATION TO UKRAINIANS IN CORPUS C

No	Topic	Number of concordances	% of the total number
1	Dimensions of unity among brotherly peoples	7	30,4
2	Unbrotherly behavior of the brotherly people	6	26,09
3	Acceptance of the Ukrainians' independent way of life	5	21,7
4	Support and assistance	3	13,04
5	Brotherly people – integration, unification	2	8,7
Total		52	23

Let us summarize the concordances with the word "brotherly". According to Topic 1, Ukrainians and Russians are united by a shared history and spiritual heritage. There is no history of Ukraine that would be separate from that of the brotherly Russian people, but all three brotherly peoples (with Belarusians being the third) came from the same root, which is why most Ukrainians are in favor of restoring close brotherly relations with Russia.

"350 years [after the Pereiaslav Agreement between the Ukrainian Cossacks and the Russian Tzar] is a very important milestone in the interaction of the two brotherly peoples. 'We have created a lot together; we have lived through a lot,' he noted" (21).

"Friendship with Ukraine, which is close to us historically, culturally and spiritually, the preservation of a special relationship between the brotherly Russian and Ukrainian people, is strategically much more important for our country than the establishment of a fair gas price from January 1" (52).

Topic 2 is focused on the nationalistic anti-Russian policies of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, which lead to the degradation of the brotherly Ukrainian people. Ukraine's flirting with the West is painfully perceived in Russia, and Russians are ready to support the protests against the nationalist government of Ukraine.

"It is very difficult to restore law and order in the country after such crooks as Timoshenko and Yushchenko, provocateurs who conducted a nationalist anti-Russian policy and lead to the degradation of the brotherly Ukrainian people" (13).

"The special attitude of Russian people regarding Ukraine, the perception of the Ukrainian people and their culture as brotherly, inevitably causes a particularly painful reaction, a specific kind of jealousy, in relation to Ukraine 'flirting' with the West" (65).

At the same time, in Topic 3 there are words of support for Euromaidan as a symbol of civil resistance and the desire of Ukrainians to realize their long-held dream – to live by the Ukrainian law and not by shadow rules. Russia's inconsistent policy is criticized, namely the high price of gas for the Ukrainians as a brotherly nation. It is pointed out that Moscow must learn to forgive Ukraine for its otherness by allowing its brotherly people to think, act, and live differently. In one instance, we read about the fact of the inconsistency with the official doctrine about the brotherly Ukrainian people dreaming of a reunification with Russia.

"Moscow must learn to forgive Ukraine for its dissimilarity, as well as other countries. The same goes for Georgia. Accept the idea that a brotherly nation can think, act and live differently" (27).

"On March 12, activists from the Kirov cell of the 'Essence of the Time' held a series of solitary pickets in support of the brotherly people of Ukraine. They

talked about the utmost lawlessness that the current illegal Ukrainian authorities are responsible for" (35).

Topic 4 expresses the need for the two countries' closer economic integration. The texts illustrate their current cooperation, which included a discount on gas prices and Russia's willingness to provide a loan to Ukraine.

"It is important to maintain and enhance the good tradition of our good neighborliness and cooperation, to strengthen the mutually beneficial equal partnership between the two states. We heartily wish our compatriots, the entire brotherly Ukrainian people, success and prosperity" (1).

"The majority of Ukrainian people are categorically in favor of restoring close brotherly relations with Russia. The misfortune of Ukraine is that the 15 percent 'minority' suffer from Russophobia and impose their will on the 80 percent" (50).

Topic 5 articulates a desire for the revival of a union state with the Belarusian and Ukrainian peoples. It is emphasized that the majority of the Ukrainian people support the restoration of close brotherly relations with Russia.

"I am sure that with this great victory, and faith in the ideal of truth, goodness and justice, we will revive the union state. Brotherly Belarus is with us, the hardworking Ukrainian people are with us, and the whole great Soviet country is with us. The bright idea of socialism is with us" (58).

Thus, the "brotherly people" metaphor in Corpus C is represented by the ideas of unity and the impossibility of a separation of the Ukrainian people from the triune Russian people; it also implies economic assistance to the Ukrainian people, as well as, what is remarkable, sympathies for the democratic transformation in Ukraine, and, what is non-remarkable, dissatisfaction with the non-brotherly policies of the Ukrainian authorities. Less frequent are ideas about the reunification of the brotherly peoples.

The "brotherly people" metaphor in Corpus D

This corpus was used to check in relation to which countries and peoples the word "brotherly" was used most frequently. It was done to see whether the application of this word to Ukraine has any particular significance. There are 21 words that are frequently used in relation to the adjective "bratskiy" (brotherly).

The words that are frequently combined in clusters with the word "bratskiy" are "Ukraina" (Ukraine) ("ukrainskiy" [Ukrainian] [9 times], "Ukraina" [Ukraine] [5 times]), "Belorusiya" (Belarus) ("belorusskiy" [Belarusian] [8 times], "Belorussiya" [Belarus] [1 time]), "Azerbaydzhan" (Azerbaijan) ("azerbaydzhanskiy" [Azerbaijani] [4 times]), and "Kazakhstan" (Kazakhstan) ("kazakhstanskiy" [Kazakhstani] [2 times], "Kazakhstan" [Kazakhstan] [1 time]). The word "bratskiy" (brotherly) is also associated with Serbia (2 times), and Armenia and Yugoslavia – once time each.

There are 146 uses of the adjective "bratskiy" (brotherly) in total in Corpus D. The most frequently mentioned countries in connection with this word are the following (listed in order from the most to the least often mentioned): Ukraine – 41 mentions, Belarus – 27, Kazakhstan – 19, Armenia – 6, Azerbaijan – 5, Serbia – 4, Bulgaria – 3. As for the annexed territories, the corresponding figures for them are as follows: South Ossetia – 1, Abkhazia – 2, Crimea – 3, L/DPR – 3. Thus, Ukraine is the country or territory mentioned most frequently in connection with the adjective "bratskiy" (brotherly) in this corpus. All occurrences of the word "bratskiy" (brotherly) are grouped into 5 topics in the context of understanding the relationship between Russia and Ukraine (SEE TABLE 5).

TABLE 5: TOPICS WITH MEANINGS OF "BROTHERLY PEOPLE" IN RELATION TO UKRAINIANS IN CORPUS D

No	Topic	Number of concordances	% of the total number
1	Dimensions of unity with the brotherly Ukrainian people	30	61.2
2	Unbrotherly behavior of the brotherly Ukrainian people	9	18.3
3	One people	5	10.2
4	Annexation of Ukrainian territories	3	6.1
5	Support and assistance	2	4
Total		52	100

Let us summarize the concordances with the word "brotherly". Topic 1 focuses on describing the commonalities between the brotherly peoples of Russia and Ukraine in terms of their shared historical roots, joint battles, traditions, and values. Ukraine is understood through the unity of the two brotherly peoples because it is the closest country to Russia and its language is very similar to Russian. According to the Russian leader, the brotherly peoples have good-neighborly relations and actively cooperate and ensure each other's stability and security.

"I am confident that our common course to deepen [the] bilateral strategic partnership will receive further constructive development and allow us to bring the brotherly people of our country even closer [to us]. The people of Russia and Ukraine are firmly linked by shared spiritual and cultural roots" (23).

"Shared historical roots and centuries-old brotherly relations have always been a solid foundation for [the] close economic and cultural cooperation between our people. It is important that today the Russian-Ukrainian partnership has received…" (93).

"I have said many times that Ukrainian[s] and Russian[s] are brotherly people. [A]nd even more: I even believe that they are one people in fact, with its own peculiarity…" (84).

Topic 2 centered around Ukraine's unbrotherly attitude. Putin points to the deviation from the pro-Russian course of the Ukrainian authorities, the pursuit of irresponsible policies by the "comprador" Ukrainian political regime that has caused misfortune for Ukrainians, the unwillingness of Ukraine to integrate into the Eurasian Economic Community, and the presence of nationalist sentiments that betray the brotherhood between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples.

"What is happening in Ukraine – and [to] Ukrainians[;] even in today's tragic conditions, I want to say that this is a brotherly people. First, it emerged in the 19th century, Ukrainian nationalism…" (82).

"Speaking of which, the example of our neighbor, the brotherly country of Ukraine, clearly shows that irresponsible politicians cause a lot of trouble and losses" (91).

In connection with Topic 3, the Russian leader criticizes Ukrainian nationalists because Ukrainians and Russians are one nation.

"And we consider Ukraine, and the Ukrainian people really brotherly, if [...] not part of the one Russian people. There though Russian nationalists don't like it, and Ukrainian nationalists don't like it" (133).

In relation to Topic 4, Putin supports pro-Russian separatist movements, protecting Russian-speaking Ukrainians from the nationalist, irresponsible policies of the Ukrainian authorities. The Crimea peninsula, which was occupied by Russia in 2014, is also mentioned in connection with this. "Returning Crimea" to Russia is considered as a "restoring of historical justice" and "returning to one's native home." Putin asserts the need to support the LPR and the DPR, which resist the anti-Russian policies in Ukraine.

"Despite all the tragedy that we are witnessing now, especially in the southeast, the Ukrainian people will always be and remain the closest brotherly people to us. We are connected by ethnic, spiritual, religious, historical affinities" (133).

"Love for one's homeland is one of the most powerful [and] sublime feelings. It [was] fully manifested in the fraternal support of the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol when they firmly decided to return to their ancestral home" (140).

However, on the other hand, Putin claims that Russia supports Ukraine and its sovereignty (Topic 5).

"It is well known that Russia not only supported Ukraine and other brotherly republics of the former Soviet Union in their quest for sovereignty, but also contributed significantly to this process at the turn of the 1990s" (97).

Thus, the "brotherly people" metaphor is used in Putin's corpus mainly to denote shared historical roots, traditions, and values and the current cooperation between the countries, but also annexations of territories in case of resistance to the Russian idea of the unity of brotherly peoples and a lack of commitment to the pro-Russian policies in Ukraine.

SUMMARY OF CORPORA A–D

We created Table 6 for all the corpora to show the frequency of the topics in each corpus and to highlight the semantic focuses in them.

TABLE 6: THE FREQUENCY OF TOPICS IN CORPORA A–D

No	Topics	Concordances per topic (in %)			
		Corpus A	Corpus B	Corpus C	Corpus D
1	Dimensions of unity with the brotherly Ukrainian people	7.69	40.9	30.4	61.2
2	Unbrotherly behavior of the brotherly Ukrainian people	30.77	37.8	26.09	18.3
3	Support and assistance	13.46	18.1	13.04	4.0
4	Brotherly people – integration, unification	30.77	-	8.7	-
5	One people	5.77	-	-	10.2
6	Acceptance of the Ukrainians' independent way of life	-	3.0	21.7	-
7	The Soviet myth of the three brotherly peoples	7.69	-	-	-
8	Protection of the Russian-speaking population	3.85	-	-	-
9	Annexation of Ukrainian territories	-	-	-	6.1

According to Table 6, all 4 corpora contain mentions of topics 1, 2, and 3. Along with the positive semantics of the metaphor, there is a cluster of topics that delegitimize the statehood of Ukraine. It is important to pay attention to this combination, which indicates, as we assume, irredentist sentiments about Ukraine in Russia.

The "brotherly people" metaphor refers to the two countries' shared ethnic roots, history and traditions, as well as Russia's support for Ukraine and vice versa, but there is also a delegitimization of the Ukrainian authorities and the national and cultural identity of Ukrainians. Russians criticize the Ukrainian people for their non-brotherly behavior, their right to self-determination and independence, and their distinct history, language, culture, and foreign and domestic policies.

The semantic focus of Corpus A lies in the unbrotherly behavior of Ukrainians (30.77%), along with statements about the need for their integration and unification with the Russian people (30.77%). The semantic focus of Corpora B, C and D is the same and consists of emphasizing the unity of the brotherly peoples (B – 40.9%, C – 30.4%, D – 61.2%) and the non-brotherly behavior of the Ukrainian people (B – 37.8%, C – 26.9%, D – 18.3%). On this basis, we can conclude that the semantic focuses of

all the corpora are similar, which implies that the Ukrainian people, who are perceived as brotherly, pursue through their nationalist authorities a non-brotherly, anti-Russian policy, contradicting the historical, cultural, and ethnic ties and affinities between the two peoples.

An important feature of Corpora B and C is a new topic – the recognition of the right to independence of Ukrainians. This topic is most frequent in Corpus C (21.7%) and least common in Corpus B (3%). This can be explained by the fact that in Corpus C the time range of the texts is larger (1999–2014) than in Corpus B (only 2011). These results can also be considered as quite expected, given the partly non-state origins of the sources in the web corpora; i.e., they are free from state propaganda. According to Table 6, only Corpus A and D contain the topic "One People" (A – 5.77%, D – 10.2%) along with "expansionist" topics: Corpus A underlines the need to protect the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine (3.85%), and Corpus D directly justifies the annexation of territories with a Russian-speaking population (6.1%).

Operationalizing Corpus E

We pose the following question in regard to Corpus E: how often is the "brotherly people" metaphor used by irredentist states/organizations? Let us start by searching for the word "brother" and its forms. Here are the results: "brother" (277), "brotherhood" (37), "brotherly" (16), "brothers" (8), "brotherhoods" (1). The most frequent collocation for the word form "brother" is the word "ethnic" (45), which corresponds to the "brotherly people" metaphor.

A total of 301 concordances were generated for the words "brothers," "brother," and "brotherly", which were considered as relevant word forms. From our reading of the concordances, we can say that the word forms "brotherly," "brother," and "brothers" were used as metaphors that served as a common motif and justification for irredentist politics and ideology from the first half of the nineteenth century. A total of 35 cases of irredentist claims using the "brotherly people" metaphor (made by non-state entities and also with no political consequences) were found in the history of irredentism from 1860 to 2010 (for the table with all the cases, see Appendix 3). According to Markus Kornprobst, there were 108

irredentas in the period of 1848–2000 (2008), Appendix II. If we take only the cases mentioned by Kornprobst, then the "brotherly people" metaphor was used in 10 irredentas out of 108 in total. However, if one adds to this list the irredentas Georgia and Ukraine, then one comes up with 12 irredentas with the "brotherly people" metaphor out of 110 irredentas in total. However, it should be taken into account that there are no studies in Corpus E focused specifically on the analysis of irredentist metaphors. This is one of the limitations of the current study.

In some cases, this metaphor appears to refer to an ethnically oppressed nation wishing to create its own single nation state by seceding from an empire (e.g., Italy seceding from the Austrian Empire):

"Primarily, it [irredentism] *was used to describe independence political movements functioning in the 19th and 20th centuries in Italy. Their participants, Irredentists[,] demanded Trieste, Trident, Dalmatia, and Istria to be incorporated to Italy. In reality, the territories inhabited by Italian language people, called unredeemed brothers, were expected by them to be seceded from Switzerland and Austria-Hungary. In other words, Irredentists aimed at the integration of all the territories inhabited by Italian language ethnic groups in the one state, Italy,"* concordance 106; (NEDASHKOVSKAYA 2016).

There are also cases where the metaphor refers to the given empire's policy toward neighboring, ethnically close countries and territories (e.g., the Ottoman Empire and Greece):

"A characteristic expression of these sentiments was voiced by Halil Bey, <…> on assuming the presidency of the newly-elected Ottoman Chamber on 19 May 1914, he delivered an eloquently irredentist speech: 'I address myself, from this high pulpit, to my nation. <…> I ask our teachers, journalists, poets and all our intellectuals to remind continuously our present generation and the future ones, via their lessons, writings and moral influence, that beyond the frontiers there are brethren to be liberated and bits of the Fatherland to be redeemed'", concordance 146 (LANDAU 1995).

There are examples of new countries that emerged after the end of colonial rule and made territorial claims based on a single ethnicity being

divided into several newly formed countries (e.g., Somalia in relation to Ethiopia):

"The situation appears to have been exacerbated by leaders who built upon pan-Somali hypernationalism in order to achieve certain domestic goals such as uniting the clans. Such leaders were also convinced that the existence of their Somali brethren in the Ogaden was at stake. Thus the perceived security issue of the Ogadenis became a symbol for creating a Somali ethnic identity, which Somali leaders were skillful at manipulating," 216 (CARMENT 1993).

Interestingly, the "brotherly people" metaphor is used as one of the grounds for the conceptualization of irredentism, partially losing its metaphoricity, but denoting ethnically close groups:

"In limiting oneself to irredentism that focuses on peoples and particularly the notion of ethnic brethren (defined as ethnic irredentism), three problems result. At the most basic level, an exclusive focus on ethnic brethren inherently assumes and suggests that nations are given entities and are constituted by people who necessarily share a common lineage," 4 (MCMAHON 1998).

"Indeed, even before the emergence of nationalist ideologies, many states, or groups of states, attempted to justify expansionist policies by employing the argument of redeeming territory or liberating their brethren," 61 (YAGCIOGLU 1996).

The theoretical use of the "brotherly people" metaphor in the conceptualization of irredentism could be interpreted as indirect evidence of the prevalence of this metaphor as an ideological means of justifying irredentism. Thus, the "brotherly people" metaphor gave justification for the need for a violent territorial change, increasing the territory of one country at the expense of another by pointing to a similar ethnic composition.

CONCLUSION

The corpus approach in this study refined the analyses of the "brotherly people" metaphor by Khaldarova (2021) and A'Beckett (2012) and supplemented it with additional meanings based on a large number of texts from various Russian sources (web corpora of non-academic Russian texts, an academic corpus and a corpus of texts by Putin). In all 4 of the Russian

corpora, namely Corpora A, B, C and D, the "brotherly people" metaphor indicates a hierarchical, abusive, patriarchal relationship in which, despite the declared unity, the superiority of the Russian people/state is assumed, and it is thus assumed to have the supreme "familial" right to interfere in the domestic and foreign policy of a neighboring kin state, and use violence if the latter refuses to follow Russian-centric policies. We specified the meanings of the "brotherly people" metaphor in the academic corpus, the two web corpora, and the corpus with the texts of the Russian leader.

The two web corpora of non-academic Russian texts (Corpus B and Corpus C) mostly have statements echoing the language of the Russian authorities and scholars (Corpus A and Corpus D) by employing such topics as "dimensions of unity with the brotherly Ukrainian people", "unbrotherly behavior of the brotherly Ukrainian people", and "support and assistance". At the same time, ordinary Russians express support for the independent identity of Ukrainians in several fragments. This fact has not been revealed in the aforementioned studies of this metaphor. However, such support is insignificant due to the low number of such statements.

The Russian leader (Corpus D) overemphasizes brotherly ties, ethnic unity, and cultural affinities, paying attention to the spiritual factor in relations between peoples. At the same time, he speaks out about protecting the alleged victims of ethnically kindred populations and pursues the annexation of Ukrainian territories. It turns out that Putin uses the "brotherly people" metaphor to express the ethnonational idea and reinforces it with expansionist and irredentist policies.

Russian scholars (Corpus A) rather approach Ukraine in an economic context and believe that Ukraine cannot exist without Russia, but must integrate with it and that Ukraine's domestic and foreign policies must change for it to do so. That is, the subtext of the use of this metaphor in this corpus also has an irredentist, expansionist character, but with a predominance of economic and political measures, while this character is also to a lesser extent expressed in direct territorial claims and the desire to protect the "brotherly people".

The study of the "brotherly people" metaphor was placed in the context of foreign policy and international relations, namely the context

of irredentism. This allowed us to combine the two subjects of study: metaphors as a means of political communication, and irredentism as a socio-political phenomenon.

The use of kinship-family metaphors has been a fairly common ideological tool to justify irredentism over the last 150 years. A "brotherly people" metaphor helps to demonstrate the contingent nature of countries' borders and the possibility of changing borders between countries due to the ethnic affinity of peoples living in different countries. This metaphor is used as one of the foundations for the conceptualization of irredentism, partly losing its metaphoricity, but denoting ethnically close groups. The use of the "brotherly people" metaphor in the conceptualization of irredentism could be interpreted as indirect evidence of the prevalence of this metaphor as an ideological means of justifying irredentist policy.

The corpus approach allowed us to capture the full semantic range of the "brotherly people" metaphor in the large Russian corpora while connecting it to irredentism: from assertions of cultural, historical and ethnic unity, and support and assistance for the "brotherly people" to the delegitimization of the kin nation's statehood and the separate ethnic identity of the "brotherly people", and the desire to "protect" it through territorial expansion.

Consequently, the "brotherly people" metaphor in Russia's case serves as an ideological manifestation, a sensuous and concrete illustration of relations between peoples, embodies the particular political demands of one state towards another, and also suggests an expansionist practice based on ethnonationalism. From the point of view of the irredentist Russian state, the "brotherly people" metaphor forms a perfectly logical whole: an acknowledgment of the unity, kinship and affinity between peoples implies their unification and integration, but if the "brotherly people" do not recognize their fraternal responsibilities, then this metaphor leads to the delegitimization of an independent kin nation's statehood, an undermining of its sovereignty, and further to the stronger nation's desire to "protect" the allegedly oppressed population in the kin state through expansionism. This particular understanding of brotherhood does not imply equality, mutual obligations, or independence of the brotherly peoples. It is a framework of co-dependent, abusive relations, in which the

Russian people are considered the supreme steward and the ruler, and the Ukrainian people only have to meet the requirements of brotherhood imposed upon them.

The spread of the "brotherly people" metaphor in Russian society led to the politicization of the ethnic issue, as well as the affective mobilization of the Russian population around the idea of the reunification of the Russian people. The majority of the Russian population positively perceives the irredentism towards the Ukrainian people, as they view it through the prism of the idea of saving a brotherly people. The "brotherly people" metaphor and the waging of a hybrid, "cold" and then "hot", full-scale war of aggression are two elements on the surface of the same whole.

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NOTE

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Neoliberalism or Else: The Discursive Foundations of Neoliberal Populism in the Czech Republic

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the linkage of markets and democracy in the post-1989 Czech transition as a neoliberal populist discourse that delegitimized alternatives to the market as a return to authoritarianism. Using Laclau's concept of equivalential linkages, I analyze Václav Klaus' texts surrounding the voucher privatization program to determine how he formulated this linkage and communicated it to the public. Framing markets as natural, essential, and fundamentally Czech, Klaus constructed the people as a virtuous community of market individuals while othering those who opposed markets as communist holdouts and, elitists. Klaus further legitimized marketization through identification with international neoliberal projects and thinkers. Through his moralized and dichotomized discourse, Klaus communicated to the public that there could be no freedom without markets, nor markets without freedom: a circular formulation that continues to influence Central and Eastern European political economy.

KEYWORDS	neoliberalism, post-communism, Czech Republic, Václav Klaus, discourse, populism
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INTRODUCTION

Prior to 1989, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ) justified its rule by presenting it as a technocratic government in the service of the people, wherein faith in the scientific doctrine of Marxism-Leninism would ensure favorable outcomes (BUŠTÍKOVÁ – GUASTI 2019; KIM 2022). The dissidents of 1989, condemned by the KSČ as elitists, focused on overthrowing one-party rule in the name of human rights and democracy, seeking an order in which the people, not a technocratic elite, would be sovereign. Many citizens saw the events of 1989 as a "renewal" of socialism with a human face, the past attempt to democratize socialism that was crushed by the Warsaw Pact's 1968 invasion (KRAPFL 2013: 105–106). While two thirds of the people did not know what 'market economics' meant, according to an April 1990 survey (KOPEČEK 2010), neoliberalism became interlinked with democracy two years later, when Václav Klaus' Civic Democratic Party (ODS) won a parliamentary majority and a mandate to enact their vision of building a market system based on neoliberal principles in the Czech lands. Klaus justified his implementation of neoliberalism as a rational decision of a technocratic expert whose real world knowledge placed him above both communists and the humanistic dissidents (BUŠTÍKOVÁ – GUASTI 2019). How did Klaus, himself a neoliberal technocrat, justify another technocratic project by linking it to democracy and a desire for political change? How did the neoliberal reformers overpower the humanistic ideas for a Czechoslovak *perestroika* (KRAPFL 2019)?

This paper explains the discursive linkages between market economics and democracy as a form of neoliberal populism. Using the Laclauian concept of the equivalential linkage, I argue that Klaus' linkage of markets and democracy as inseparable concepts constitutes a discursive conjuncture (GUARDINO 2017) that artificially fused markets and democracy through a discourse of neoliberal populism. This article begins by placing the contribution in neoliberal populism literature. And examining Klaus' ideology, I argue that Klaus utilized the populist constructs of the people versus elite dichotomy, moralized politics, and anti-elitism to justify the neoliberal transition. I then analyze Klaus' writings and speeches in which he advanced the linked market-democratic ideology, identifying the equivalential linkages of markets and democracy. I conclude with a brief

discussion of the long-term effects of the related voucher privatization and the market-democratic linkage.

VÁCLAV KLAUS AND CZECH NEOLIBERAL POPULISM

The adoption of a neoliberal economic order in Czechoslovakia (after 1993 the Czech Republic) was never a guarantee. In November and December 1989, a broad public opinion survey asked Czechoslovaks about their preferred path for the future of their country. A majority favored socialism or some combination of socialism and markets (41 and 52 percent, respectively, and three percent favored a purely capitalist path) (LIPOLD 1999; KRAPFL 2019). In December 1989, only 22 percent of the Czechoslovak population supported complete privatization (SKALNIK LEFF 1997). Indeed as Krapfl relates, shortly after the collapse of KSČ control, *"workers throughout Czechoslovakia began democratizing state enterprises in accordance with their understandings of socialism and democracy"* (KRAPFL 2013: 218). Alternatives to neoliberalism and the KSČ called for workers' self-management and the democratization of the economy alongside a democratic political system and a rejection of the *"absurd accumulation of property and power in the hands of a narrow oligarchy"* that was present in economies elsewhere in the capitalist world (RAMEŠ 2020: 80). A group of Slovak economists called for *"the realization of a pluralist system in socialism, in confidence that the working class [would] remain at the forefront of the progressive movement"* (KRAPFL 2013: 106). Many attended the 1990 May Day marches carrying red flags (KRAPFL 2019). These are hardly the actions of a citizenry of Friedmanite neoliberals. In a survey of Czech public opinion 19 years after the revolution, *"a majority of the respondents (58%) felt that the main reasons for the Velvet Revolution were political change [sic], rather than economic considerations (10%)"* (LYONS – BERNARDYOVÁ 2011: 1731). The November protesters targeted bureaucracy, arbitrariness, and a sense of unfairness, not socialist economics (KRAPFL 2013). At the dawn of the 1990s, the dissidents who found themselves with a government and an economy to manage needed a workable and publicly acceptable set of policies with which to build their new state. Capitalizing on the public's frustration with the still-powerful KSČ *nomenklatura* (KRAPFL 2019), the then-finance minister Václav Klaus seized the opportunity to irreversibly transform Czech political economy in accordance with the neoliberalism that had at the dawn of the 1990s gained prominence across the Western world. In spite of support from the firm and factory cells of the Civic Forum (OF), leading

economists in the OF government began to see workers' self-management as an obstacle to the core goal of transferring enterprises to private hands. A subsequent law passed in April 1990 eliminated the last vestiges of self-management from the Czechoslovak economy (RAMEŠ 2020). Against this backdrop, the ascendant Klaus utilized a discourse of neoliberal populism to construct a discourse that cast the Czech people as a community of market individuals (GUARDINO 2018) struggling against corrupt and outside 'others' to build what was natural and correct, namely the market economy, to attain freedom. Portrayals of neoliberal behaviors such as investing, risk-taking, and entrepreneurship were portrayed by investment funds and state advertisers as natural and socially beneficial, and as an embrace of the country's future as a normal society (BABIČKA 2022).

Neoliberalism is a highly contested term with multiple competing definitions – from an economic theory explaining the development of capitalism since the 1970s (EAGLETON-PIERCE 2016) and a means for ordering sociological relations (COOPER 2020) to a *"catch-all for something negative"* (ROWLANDS – RAWOLLE 2013: 260) or a *"political swear word"* (HARTWICH 2011). For the purposes of this paper, I utilize a minimal definition of neoliberalism as envisioned by Friedrich Hayek (2001 [1944]) and Milton Friedman (1962), among others; a political economy based on the primacy of the market in the determination of value and the allocation of resources. For the efficient functioning of the market, the state machinery acts as a bulwark against political activity that risks disrupting the market logic. Biebricher (2015) demonstrates the utility of such a minimal definition through its lack of ambiguity and its acceptance of the flexibility of neoliberalism as a programmatic concept through its relationship to democratic governance.

The relationship of neoliberalism to democracy poses theoretical problems (BIEBRICHER 2015; SLOBODIAN 2018). This tension is best illustrated through neoliberalism's primacy of the market in ordering life and the fact that the role of the government in neoliberalism is to create the ideal conditions for the market to function. If need be, the government exists to protect the market from civic or political interference, whether well-intentioned or otherwise. This tension appeared in the early days of the Czech transition. Klaus, a deep and self-professed admirer of Friedman, took an orthodox view in line with Friedman's assertion that *"in order for men to advocate anything, they must in the first place be able to earn a living"* (FRIEDMAN

1962: 16; KLAUS 1997). This ran contrary to President and erstwhile dissident leader Václav Havel's belief that civic duty must precede the accumulation of material wealth to avoid the corrupting effects of the latter on the former, as he presented a dichotomous view of the fundamental basis of society: a choice between civil society or the market (PONTUSO 2002). Klaus, as this paper shows, constructed the two concepts as inseparable. This intertwining led to the "marketization of democracy," leading to the contradiction between the economic, social, and political inequality fostered by market conditions, and the democratic ideal of equality, and thereby frustrating the fulfillment of liberal democracy's promises (XING 2001: 75–76). It is this situation in Klaus' Czechia that this work aims to explain.

Was Klaus responsible for bringing neoliberalism to the Czech Republic? An oft-repeated idea is that neoliberalism came to the post-socialist countries from the West by means of the Western-led global financial organizations as an essential condition for building a democratic political system (E.G. ASLUND 1994, 1997; SACHS 1995). While these organizations certainly helped facilitate the process through their dispatching of technical advisors and provision of various incentive packages, this argument overlooks the role of the post-socialist reformers themselves. Capitalizing on the trade and reform policies of late socialism (PULA 2018), the *"neoliberal reform elites"* (BOHLE – GRESKOVITS 2012), themselves ideological adherents to neoliberalism, turned the region into a *"laboratory for economic knowledge,"* utilizing international expertise adapted to local conditions (BOCKMAN – EYAL 2002). The literature firmly places Klaus among these "neoliberal reform elites", first in his capacity as a prominent member of the Civic Forum, and then in his capacity as Finance Minister and, later, Prime Minister (E.G. BOHLE – GRESKOVITS 2012).

Klaus' role as a neoliberal thinker is broadly evident from his own writings and throughout the scholarly literature. Slobodian and Plehwe (2020: 8) highlight Klaus' Friedmanite formulation of free economics as the basis for political freedom (along with his populist credentials); Bockman and Eyal (2002: 338, 340, 343) refer to Klaus as one of the prominent neoliberal reformers and as a homegrown neoliberal who sought to remove political and bureaucratic blockages to economic reform. Eyal (2000: 74) relates Klaus as the leader of a group of monetarist economists who *"advocate[ed] an orthodox public finance approach."* Pula (2018: 111, 178) refers to Klaus as a *"radical*

neoliberal" whose locally engineered voucher privatization program sought to create a domestic market *"dominated by small investors."* While Klaus has been criticized as not being a true neoliberal for maintaining low unemployment levels, Eyal considers Klaus' approach, criticized as a departure from International Monetary Fund orthodoxy, as a monetarist technology (as opposed to a doctrine): *"relatively autonomous from both usage and abstraction, policy and theory [...] a technology for governing economic life"* (EYAL 2000: 76). The voucher privatization program illustrates the technological utility of Klaus' monetarist neoliberalism, as it facilitated the self-organized creation of a market without the need for top-down solutions (IBID.: 77). Spurring individual action required shifting popular thinking, a process which Babička (2022: 84) calls a pedagogic attempt to *"legitimize neoliberal reforms as a moral transformation"* from communist societal organization into a *"nation of free, market-oriented individuals."* This paper proceeds along the construction of Klaus' neoliberalism as both a legitimizing tool and a programmatic prescription.

Like neoliberalism, populism is a highly contested term (ROVIRA KALTWASSER 2019). I adopt a minimal definition of populism for the sake of this research, incorporating the conception of populism as an ideational concept. As a "thin ideology," populism divides society into two mutually-antagonistic groups (the pure people and the corrupt elite) and constructs politics as an expression of the general will (MUDDE 2004). The politician can then graft other "thick ideologies" onto the populist frame. In addition to this Manichean discourse (HAWKINS 2009; MUDDE – ROVIRA KALTWASSER 2017), this minimal definition of populism offers the flexibility to apply the concept to cases across historical or cultural contexts, while tying the case to a broader understanding of populism as a phenomenon (ROVIRA KALTWASSER 2019).

The moralization of politics adds significant tension to the dichotomy of the people and the elite, elevating the political struggle to a *"part of a cosmic struggle between good and evil"* in which *"there can be no fence sitters"* (HAWKINS 2009: 1043). This definition, adapted to neoliberal populism, constructs a *"moralized, emotionally laden construction"* of the people and a *"valorization"* of market relations between the people (GUARDINO 2018: 448). While the concept of the people is flexible, it usually focuses on sovereignty in opposition to an elite that is fundamentally different in character (MUDDE

– ROVIRA KALTWASSER 2017). The affinities between neoliberalism and populism, namely their attempts to mobilize individuals against a corrupt and wasteful elite to address economic problems, is a natural consequence of both concepts' approaches to state power, sources of political support and rejection, and the distribution of socioeconomic benefits (WEYLAND 1996). Both reject the role of intermediaries between the people and their government, e.g. civil society, preferring instead to perform politics and economics as direct connections between the people and their leader, and between individuals and the market (WEYLAND 1996).

The construction of the people in neoliberal populism presents an ideological inconsistency. Populism homogenizes the people, glossing over their differences in favor of constructing a unified, mobilized group. Neoliberalism rests on the individual's role as a market subject for whom the collective is an oppressive entity. Da Cruz Queiroz (2021) reconciles libertarian constructions of the collective people as oppressive with the role of the homogeneous people in neoliberal populism by arguing that neoliberalism cloaks the concept of the people in the neoliberal concept of the individual; i.e., the pure people are a community of market individuals simultaneously pursuing their rational economic goals (see below). That pursuit of rational economic goals is the commonality that binds these individuals together in a pure conception of an in-group. According to Guardino, *"neoliberal populism constructs a community through market individualism: Neoliberal-populist identity is defined by an imagined commitment to a rough-hewn, pragmatic, entrepreneurial, market-oriented identity"* (GUARDINO 2018: 452). Neoliberal populism can therefore override ties to a community that is not based in the market by obscuring *"values and concerns that might otherwise be understood as held in common by the significant majority"* (GUARDINO 2018: 458). In Czechia, this neoliberal conception of community arose in opposition to the revolutionary community based on a commitment to non-violence and the shared experience of November 1989 (KRAPFL 2013).

The neoliberal populist construction of the people casts them as a monolithic group based on individual interest. This seemingly contradictory composition of the people rests on the identity of the people as self-interested individuals. Da Cruz Queiroz argues that by invoking *us* and *we*, neoliberal populists are *"invoking the prerogatives of the entrepreneur against those who are characterized as being dependent on the state"*

(DA CRUZ QUEIROZ 2021: 241). In neoliberalism, the pure, individualized people come together as a community through market individualism. The individual in this community of market individualism is tyrannical in their *"commitment to unrestricted individual liberty"* (DA CRUZ QUEIROZ 2021: 241), and it is this commitment that enables the neoliberal populist leader to mobilize the people against the interests that the leader constructs as threatening to the people. The community, through market individualism, serves the role of the pure people in the populist dichotomy, signifying a set of ideals that bind the in-group together in opposition to the out-group.

In contrast to the people, the elite in populist discourses are out of touch with the general will of the people and are engaged in corruption at their expense. The elite is *"defined on the basis of power"* (MUDDE – ROVIRA KALTWASSER 2017: 12), and the composition of the elite can thus change. Populists, once in power, can use their new elite status to condemn "the other elite" (BUŠTÍKOVÁ – GUASTI 2019). Populists are inherently anti-elitist, and thus a claim connecting Klaus with populism would seem inherently incorrect, especially considering the technocratic elitism of neoliberalism and Klaus' belonging to the "neoliberal reform elite" (BOHLE – GRESKOVITS 2012). Either Klaus is a neoliberal elite or a populist but not both. I argue, however, that Klaus can be both because of the nature of the elite and the competing elite discourse. Because the definition of the term elite is based on power relations, populists in power, constituting a new elite, will condemn the previous elite for its elitism (GARLAND 2019). In spite of their being the elite themselves, the KSČ's drumbeat discourse denouncing dissidents as elitist and Klaus' own discourse of neoliberal populism raising his political capital over that of his opponent President Havel carry clear populist framing (BUŠTÍKOVÁ – GUASTI 2019; KRAPFL 2013). A shifting power dynamic places the populist in the rhetorical position of being able to criticize their opponents as elitist, despite exercising power themselves. Presenting himself as an opponent of both the elitist project of state socialism and the intellectual elitism of the dissident movement, Klaus managed to appear as one of the "good elite" (BUŠTÍKOVÁ – GUASTI 2019: 304): an enlightened technocrat advancing the interests of the people. Constructing a dichotomy of civil society against a free society and of the technical experts of the market against "incompetent communists" and "impractical dissidents" constituted a rekindling of the technocratic populism of the KSČ and enabled Klaus to discredit his political opponents (IBID.: 307, 309). This ability

of the populist politician to *"instrumentally appeal to followers, to maintain a direct relationship between the leader and the followers, and to exploit existing institutional weaknesses"* is present in Klaus' neoliberal populist rhetoric. A personalistic leader will utilize populist tactics to maintain support for *"painful, risky neoliberal reforms,"* often *"demonstrat[ing] their charisma [and] intensifying their bond to their mass base"* (WEYLAND 2001: 17). To maintain mass support, neoliberal populist leaders may be impelled to take a flexible approach to the application of neoliberal principles as a means of political convenience. In spite of Klaus' advocacy for a market-based organization of society, Klaus departed from his neoliberal ideology at times, retaining social security networks, public healthcare, and public universities without tuition fees and refusing to eliminate rent caps as a means of maintaining public support through the transition (BUŠTÍKOVÁ – GUASTI 2019). Whether Klaus could have removed social welfare systems is doubtful. Support for social welfare is deeply rooted among Czechs, with a tradition dating back to the interwar First Republic and continuing under the KSČ (VEČERNÍK 2008). Social protection is a form of the *"intrinsic 'classlessness'"* of Czech society, which, Večerník (2008: 498) contends, dates back to the 15th century Hussite movement and persisted through successive regime changes through habituation. Rabušic and Sirovátka (1999) similarly cite public opinion surveys that show a trend toward egalitarianism among Czechs throughout the transition period. Klaus, in confronting this entrenched social welfare, likely recognized that attempting to shift Czechia toward a Thatcherite model of welfare would prove detrimental to his market reform program. While his refusal to cut back social services arguably calls Klaus' credentials as an orthodox neoliberal into question, it demonstrates his flexibility in communicating and framing his policy to an electorate initially beset with a heavy skepticism for market economics.

There is some debate about the applicability of neoliberal populism to the Czech transition. Weyland (1999) offers two arguments to this effect: that populists in Central and Eastern Europe did not have an enemy against which to orient themselves, which is a factor necessary in populism, and that the strong parliamentary system in Czechia prevented the rise of a strong populist leader. Klaus' emergence as an *"unknown technocratic economist"* (SAXONBERG 1999: 392) and subsequent development into a charismatic leader capable of overshadowing his rival Havel through his ability to generate a strong emotional attachment of the people to him, challenges

this. His exceptional rhetorical skill in connecting with the people, and his *"peculiar sense of mission comprising belief both in the movement and in [himself] as the chosen instrument to lead the movement to its destination"* is reminiscent of Hugo Chavez as he sought to build a new era in Venezuelan politics by addressing the country's economic problems and the oligarchy he held responsible for them (SAXONBERG 1999: 393; MAINWARING 2012; OSTIGUY 2022). Klaus' neoliberalism, acquired and honed through his time at the Academy of Sciences and the State Bank, during which his duties involved the study of Western economics journals, armed him with a crystalized vision of the world he wanted to build, overpowering Havel's less succinct, more idealistic discourse (SAXONBERG 1999). Buštíková and Guasti (2019) identify the dissident faction led by Havel as the enemy against whom Klaus oriented his populist discourse. Through his efforts to demonstrate his technocratic project's superiority to the dissidents' humanistic political project, Klaus sought to delegitimize his opponents as unsuited to stabilize the uncertain situation in Czechia and prevent the return of the communists to power. While Klaus' monetarist technological approach (EYAL 2000) and ideas on the self-organization of society may seem opposed to populism's leader-organized mass movement, Klaus cast himself as a morally authoritative leader returning the people to the natural and correct order.

KEY CONCEPTS, METHODOLOGY, AND SOURCE SELECTION

Laclau's (2005) concept of equivalential linkages provides a framework for understanding the linkage of markets and democracy within Klaus' neoliberal populist discourse. The construction of a popular identity that goes into the formation of the homogeneous group relates to the internal split of the crystallization of the popular identity, i.e. the split between a particular demand and the wider universality. As Laclau states, *"For a short time after 1989, for instance, the word 'market' signified, in Eastern Europe, much more than a purely economic arrangement: it embraced through equivalential links, contents such as the end of bureaucratic rule, civil freedoms, [and] catching up with the West"* (LACLAU 2005: 95). Marketization therefore serves the dual purpose of a particular demand and an empty signifier in the sense of a wider universality. Marketization is the frame onto which its supporters could graft democracy, freedom, and other demands of the Velvet Revolution, thereby establishing an equivalency between the market and those additional values. Terms such as *freedom* or *catching up* appear

as an undifferentiated fullness, i.e. without conceptual content. Linking conceptually abstract, empty terms such as freedom or catching up to the West with a conceptually specific concept such as markets grounds the abstract terms in practical, actionable substance (thus, the equivalential link). Paraphrasing Laclau, referring to a set of social grievances, i.e. those referred to by the protesters of November 1989, and attributing the source to the socialist government (containing the structures of political and economic governance), constitutes the people as those harmed by the social grievances, and the elite as those causing the social grievances. The singular element (i.e. markets) facilitates the performative constitution of the equivalential chain, rather than the location of an abstract common feature (IBID.: 97). The discourse can utilize individual terms as representative of a greater, more complex meaning. Žižek (IN IBID.: 104) argues that the "quilting point" represents the point at which the unity of the discursive formation is achieved. As an example he mentions the phrase that "Coke" is America (but America is not the Coca-Cola Company), and through this phrase the construction of a soft drink as a crystalizing signifier for American identity is achieved. In this sense, *"the name becomes the ground of the thing"* (IBID.: 105). Markets and related terms take a similar, mutually-constitutive role in Klaus' neoliberal populist discourse, with the market representing Czechs, but not all Czechs fitting into the market (recall Guardino's community of market individuals as the definition of the people). Laclau's discussion of the role of the leader informs and justifies the focus on Klaus' discourse in particular. The leader is the individualized representative of the singularity binding the chain of signifiers. The leader thus becomes the symbolic unification of the movement *"inherent to the formation of a 'people'"* (IBID.: 100).

During his term as prime minister, Klaus advanced the cause of neoliberalism in Czechia through editorials, speeches at parliamentary and party events, and other essays and talks that were highly visible in the Czech public discourse of the time. Much of this material is compiled in two published volumes collecting Klaus' speeches to public and expert organizations, opinion pieces for leading newspapers, and written commentary. The first volume, *About the Face of Tomorrow* (*O tvář zítřka*) (1991), is geared toward describing Klaus' economic and political philosophy and his vision for reform. *Why I am a Conservative?* (*Proč jsem konzervativcem?*) (1992) is a similar volume that includes material on the mechanics of the economic

transformation. Additionally, Klaus' personal website, *Klaus.cz*, contains a wealth of material. I selected the texts for this study so as to capture a clear and widely available (for the Czech citizens of the time) outline of the justifications of the neoliberal political economy Klaus sought to build. I examine material from the period of 1989–1993, which covers Klaus' rise to power and the launch and running of the voucher privatization program. The period of voucher privatization represents a critical moment in Czech history because it was the impetus for implementing the transition away from the planned economy and toward the new economy of the post-1989 order. The concept of the critical moment is defined in Yuana et al. (2020: 157) as *"particular events"* that create new *"social realities through changing orders of discourse and the relationship between multiple actors in transition pathways"*. A contemporary journalist called Klaus' election to the premiership the *"second revolution [...] the real revolution"*, which would impel *"the definitive completion of systemic changes begun almost a year ago"* (KRAPFL 2013: 29). This paper is not intended to provide an intellectual history of Klaus' political-economic thought, as much of this is already covered elsewhere (E.G. KOPEČEK 2012). This work seeks to explore how Klaus communicated his vision to the electorate at a time when significant insecurity and instability were the dominant moods in Czech society. A "mild hysteria" over fears of a communist return to power provided an opportunity to Klaus to utilize his rhetorical skill to reassure the population that the capitalist economy would stabilize the situation and complete the transformation begun in 1989 (SAXONBERG 1999; KRAPFL 2013: 182, 184).

"MARKET ECONOMICS WITHOUT ANY ADJECTIVES": KLAUS' NEOLIBERAL POPULISM

In this section, I examine how Klaus constructed his neoliberal populist discourse to link markets and democracy by crystalizing particular demands representing a wider universality. I have organized Klaus' discourse into three categories based on the overarching themes he utilizes to effect the linkage: framing markets as natural law, making linkages with other neoliberal projects, and constructing the transition as an imperative. These serve to dichotomize the Czech people and moralize the transition to a neoliberal economy.

Natural Law Language

Natural law language in the Klaus discourse dichotomizes the Czech people by presenting their natural state as a community of market individuals. Through the notion of the heartland as defining the people by the absence of what is not wholesome (TAGGART 2000), the discourse constructs market economics as fundamentally healthy, morally good, and civilizationally correct in opposition to unnatural socialist and collectivist values. Klaus highlights this civilizational correctness and ties the market to long-standing civilizational values: *"The creed [of conservatism] is to preserve real and proven values, on which our civilization has long stood, and on which we want our civilization to continue standing"* (KLAUS 1992: 13). Those *"foundational stones"* on which conservatism stands are the values that are *"unorganized and unplanned in the thousands of years of the development of the person and humanity"* (KLAUS 1992: 14). While the neoliberal revolution and the conservative reaction seem mutually contradictory, Klaus saw neoliberalism not as a revolutionary idea, but as a return to the natural state of society before the interruption of the socialists' attempt to change human nature by changing property relations. The connection between Klaus' vision of human values and the behavior of market economics rests in their mutual organization by "unorganized and unplanned" forces. As a means of ordering economics, the market is therefore a natural and deeply engrained means. Klaus' conservatism extends to a time before socialism, and the naturalness of the return to capitalism appears as an antithesis to the unnaturalness of communism. Klaus describes communism as *"nothing but a giant experiment,"* in which Czechs and Slovaks *"abandoned [their] most treasured common values, created as the fruits of thousands of years of evolution, embodied in institutions, in lawful behavior, in the market order, in language, in morality, in the structure of settlement. We cancelled private ownership and paralyzed the function of money"* (KLAUS 1991: 17).

The market takes a place among the foundational concepts of belonging and identity. Socialism caused an abnormal interruption, an experiment that went wrong that necessitated a return to those traditional values that defined the Czechoslovak people. Therefore, the advent of Czech neoliberalism was at once conservative and revolutionary, securing the future by returning to a lost facet of the past. Market economics appear as a natural law in comparison to other scientific laws and the moral

thinkers who broke through the dominant canon in their realization: *"Just as Copernicus managed to break the dogma of the church and newly enlightened [his] age [with] the inconceivable movement of the planets, just as Newton clarified the secret physical laws hidden in the fall of an apple from a tree to the ground, so did Adam Smith ask perhaps the most difficult [question] – he showed the revelation of seemingly non-existing laws in individual human behavior, in human society, in economics"* (KLAUS 1991: 23).

Klaus frames Smith's dictum that *"we will never tell them about what we need, but rather the advantages that they can get from it"* as proof that *"society is never built on the best human properties, but rather on the properties of the strongest."* This survival of the fittest language feeds into Klaus' design for voucher privatization, in which the most market-savvy individuals would emerge as the new capitalist class that would be able and, according to natural laws, beholden to govern and drive the new market system, which in turn would govern the new Czech society (KLAUS 1991: 24). Such language is difficult to reconcile with the fact that Klaus' voucher privatization was itself a massive distribution of capital to the citizenry, which itself was at odds with the social Darwinist undertones of his rhetoric. According to his colleagues writing after the fact, Klaus' primary concern in the design of voucher privatization was not adherence to ideology, but rather the practical concern of gaining broad support among the population without the necessity to sell off national industries to foreign investors (TŘÍSKA ET AL. 2002: 126; ČTK 2019). While this language is contradictory, Klaus sought to use an artificial distribution of capital in the form of vouchers to effect a social Darwinist process of accumulation. Thus, a pro-market state was necessary to rebuild the natural laws of human behavior within the market.

The framing of market economics as a natural law of humanity further cements the construction of the community through market individualism. The community is built through the activities of the strongest and the most market-savvy, while still appealing to morality through the fairness and impartiality of market mechanisms. Like the appeal to morality, natural law language has a general effect of separating those who accept it from those who reject the market as a natural effect, thereby restricting the definition of the democratic polity. The dichotomization of the nation into pro- and anti-market forces occurs in the construction of marketization as a battle of on multiple fronts: *"For Czechoslovakia and*

Great Britain, market economics are not – as has been incorrectly argued – only an economic mechanism for ensuring a higher living standard and economic rationality. It is at the same time the foundation, and also necessary condition for the creation of a new moral system, which must replace the false morality of socialist society in the notions built up in their heads about the relationship between individuals and society. The battle for market economics in our country cannot be limited only to the realm of economic processes, but [must] cause deep changes in the thoughts and behavior of people and in the lifestyle of the whole society" (KLAUS 1992: 11).

In framing market economics as a black and white battle between the true morality of markets and the false morality of socialism, Klaus further embattles and cements the homogeneity of his market community. This statement is a strong call to action, utilizing terms such as *battle* to evoke high stakes and the need for drastic action, and the disparaging language about socialists with *false moralities [...] built up in their heads* creates a fighting mentality in the reader. The need to oppose the wrong forces by supporting the right forces becomes a clear and concise moral equation. That morality further situates the market as a key of the community through market individualism by casting acceptance of markets as a binary, i.e. right or wrong, choice. Only those who accept markets as natural can belong to the community. Again turning to a construction of natural law in constructing the in- and out-groups, Klaus warns against social engineers, who *"desire to change the world according to their conceptions"* (KLAUS 1992: 17). The implication is that the world naturally exists as a market-based system, and the alien out-group will attempt to make unnatural alterations to that base state. Thus, the world in its natural state exists under the neoliberal-conservative ideological paradigm (i.e. humans are naturally disposed to individualistic solutions and market-based behavior), and therefore the program of neoliberalism cannot be questioned because it is natural, and to oppose it is to oppose human nature. Similarly, in the "Ten Commandments of Systemic Reform", published at the height of privatization in 1993, Klaus acknowledges that his program for shock therapy will cause shocks, but that this is simply factually unavoidable. In calling for shock therapy, Klaus does not equivocate, using expansive and powerful phrases such as "dramatic action," *"merciless price and foreign trade liberalization,"* and the adjective "overwhelming" as he points reform in the ultimate direction of *"finding real and therefore responsible and*

rationally behaving owners [...] as a final blow to the ambitions of government bureaucrats to control the economy" (KLAUS 1993: 9). This rhetoric continues to advance the dichotomization of the pure people constituting the market community against the corrupt out-group. Terms such as "bureaucrats" evoke the connotation of non-productive and manipulating groups in direct opposition to the industrious, entrepreneurial people.

This naturalistic approach continues from the macro-civilizational level to the micro-level of the individual, identifying the qualities of those who constitute the community of market individuals. Klaus' discourse claims to elevate the individual, freeing them of unnatural constrictions from technocratic and ideological governance, which leads to the unleashing of their potential and the recognition of their natural right to freedom. According to Klaus, conservatism facilitates *"individualism and free individuals in the wisdom and competence of the person, which the state must serve and which must control it"* (KLAUS 1992: 16). Klaus reinforces the anti-state imagery by calling the state a Hobbesian leviathan, which he cautions against by claiming that it is a threat to individuals that is not recognized with the same urgency as socialism (KLAUS 1991). The people, through market individualism, attain their natural state in spite of the state by trusting the economic processes. Throughout this entire process, Klaus argued that economic reform must necessarily take precedence over policy reform and, echoing Friedman, that rational self-interest would produce the best result (KLAUS 1993).

Klaus does recognize that state action is necessary to establish the framework of the neoliberal system. *"Because we well recognize that democracy does not mean anarchy, and because it is also necessary to create mechanisms for uniting different perspectives, it is necessary to create a strong order, a rational system"* (KLAUS 1992: 49). That rules-based system is, evidently, embodied in a responsible and market oriented political party (namely Klaus' party ODS). In a speech to the first congress of ODS, Klaus defines the *"basic political entity [as] the citizen and for us, this means searching for new dimensions, new measurements of citizenship for the present age, [and] thus [for] citizens' courage and responsibility, citizens' fortitude. The citizen is, for us, the founding constitutive unit of our new democracy."* In effecting this reorientation, ODS could effect a reorientation of Czech society to *"normally functioning conditions"* (KLAUS 1992: 49), with Klaus here referencing the heartland imagery

of markets as natural, and the people as its natural constituents. By framing markets as a natural law, Klaus institutes the moralization of marketization as a "cosmic struggle" with civilizational consequences. Framing markets as coming from historically rooted qualities of the people carries an emotional element, i.e. suggesting that market behavior is in the soul of the people, and a departure from it is unthinkable. Constructing market economics as a natural law delineates the population into two camps: those who accept the natural law and those who do not. Those who reject the evident natural law are immediately discredited, as one who rejects gravity or proclaims that the Earth is flat.

Linking Language

The construction of the people as a community through market individualism relies on its legitimization through its linkage to exemplars both from Czech history and from the history of neoliberal societies abroad. Klaus strengthens the dichotomization by constructing a common heritage and a common threat, using both concepts to introduce borders between those in the community and those outside it. To strengthen the community's internal cohesion, Klaus makes frequent usage of the linkage between his neoliberal project and that of Margaret Thatcher: *"The revolution in Central and Eastern Europe really started in Great Britain with the victory of the Conservative Party in the elections of 1979 and the rise of Margaret Thatcher to the head of the British government"* (KLAUS 1992: 11). A pantheon of heroes from the United States including Barry Goldwater, the Founding Fathers, and the philosopher Frank Meyer serve to link Klaus' neoliberal thought and the Czech civilizational transition to a strong ideological anchor: a conservative tradition of market economics in a long-lasting and established capitalist democracy (KLAUS 1992). Klaus uses the established linkage to build coherence among the in-group, providing legitimacy and examples of success. In light of Hayek, Reagan, and Thatcher's explicitly revolutionary conception of neoliberalism, Klaus identifies neoliberalism as conservative in his attempt to legitimize his movement through its linkage with internationally-renowned examples. Linking language uses such examples of legitimacy to further deepen the dichotomy of the pure people and the corrupt elite. *"Both types of [conservative] thought [here referring to Hayekism and Friedmanite neoliberalism] have not only a common enemy – collectivism, socialism, Marxism, authoritarianism – but also common ideological roots and*

traditions from which they draw and to which they return" (IBID.: 16). This not only demonstrates Klaus' attempt to force ideological consistency into neoliberalism, but also his attempt to construct an image of an implied threat to it, namely collectivist ideologies peddled by *"unbelievably self-confident socialist (now leftist) intellectuals" that "destroy individualism [and] destroy the soul"* (KLAUS 1991: 16). The reference to moral and spiritual concepts deepens the sense of cosmic struggle (HAWKINS 2009) in defense of cherished ideas and the very base identity of the person. In creating this outside threat to the community, Klaus strengthens the integrity and legitimacy of his market community by providing a clear alternative to the forward march of progress in building the market economy.

Klaus uses linkages to the Thatcherist project in Britain to demonstrate commonalities between the foes of the Czech community of market individuals and that in Britain. Highlighting "left intelligentsia" as seeking to reverse Thatcherism by taking advantage of economic problems, Klaus argues that the economic crisis improved in only two years thanks to the continuation of Thatcher's neoliberal policies. The implication is that Czechs need to be patient and trust the processes of this *"unusually inspiring"* politician and the system for which she provides an example (KLAUS 1992: 12). There is an implied call to faith in the mechanism of the market that enables it to work itself out, and that it is both inappropriate and harmful for the state to intervene in the process, even with good intentions. Alongside Thatcher in his pantheon of neoliberalism, Klaus places U.S. Senator Barry Goldwater, from whom he borrows a stark quote: *"extremism in the defense of freedom is no vice"* (IBID.: 14). This quote has two effects. By referencing Senator Goldwater, a prominent American neoliberal, Klaus obtains moral legitimacy in the same way that his appeals to Thatcher confer it. This reference legitimizes the call to action for the extreme measures Klaus planned to implement, and by tying those extreme measures to freedom, a rallying cry of the Velvet Revolution, the moral imperative to implement a neoliberal program is established. This connection of the past struggles of other neoliberals with the current struggle of Czech reformers cements the place of the market community among its historical predecessors and enemies. It is thereby legitimized. Similarly, the connection focuses on the departure from the solidaristic values of Havel and the dissidents to the community of market individuals.

Linkages of the Czech character to neoliberalism serve to deepen and enrich the conceptualization of the community of market individuals versus the anti-market out-group: *"I believe in the wealth of our country, which is the wisdom, skill, competence for action, and adaptability of the fifteen million inhabitants of Czechoslovakia"* (KLAUS 1991: 16). The factors Klaus outlines are representative of an aptitude in market economics. In outlining these factors, Klaus links market economics to the Czechoslovak character, suggesting the capacity of Czechoslovaks to successfully and naturally engage in market economics. The government is presented as clearly detached from those 15 million inhabitants in a bid to strengthen the appeal of individual participation in the market community: *"I do not believe that some wise minister, ministry, government, party, or parliament can use its superior brain capacity – supported by computers of the highest parameters – to substitute for that which the impersonal market can [do]"* (IBID.: 16). Klaus constructs the market as rational, thereby assigning rationality to those who accept markets, and irrationality to the out-group. The reference to the wisdom and superior brain capacity of government authorities carries a sarcastic, scathing tone, suggesting the absurdity and irrationality of opposing market mechanisms. Similarly, it evinces the anti-elitist appeal of populism through its implication that the rationality of the market and those who put their faith in it is superior to the (ir)rationality of elites and intellectuals. While Klaus' indictment of government is intended primarily to push readers away from supporting the old system with which Klaus says they have become comfortable, this separation of the people from the government reinforces the key neoliberal values of individual initiative and self-reliance that eventually create a population habituated to an enfeebled government and a lack of social services. This duality of a pure people and a government ranging from sinister to incompetent enriches the Manichean populist framing: the "rough-hewn" market community is clearly present in Klaus' construction of Czechoslovaks' natural aptitude for market-based behavior.

To further link Czech identity to market economics and entrench the dualization of Czech society, Klaus' separation of communism from the Czech experience, first discussed as part of the natural law package, absolves the people from responsibility for its implementation, thereby purifying the market community. The Czech (Czechoslovak) people did not cause the break in the natural development of their civilization because

it is not in their nature to seek and support such ideals. Klaus is careful to specify that *"no 'us' could have committed such audacity, because we do not have this type of ambition"* (KLAUS 1991: 17). Socialism came to Czechoslovakia because of the *"support of left-oriented intellectuals,"* who are distinctly separate from the organic people and the market community (KLAUS 1992: 17). This framing of socialism as an outside project supported by a narrow clique inside the country serves to absolve the public of a sense of responsibility for their role in the *"forty-year experiment,"* delinking them from socialism and encouraging them to participate in the return to the normal, traditional values of market economics. Klaus believes in the *"healthy and fruitful pragmatism of the people and in the strength of the impersonal mechanism of the market"* and their ability to carry out that restoration, which, he believes, the market can perform far better than *"that undemocratically elected parliament"* (KLAUS 1991: 17). Klaus' market community must therefore put its faith in the superhuman perfection of the market in order to attain its birthright: its existence as a productive, entrepreneurial society.

Imperative Language

Klaus' imperative language presents the adoption of a neoliberal model as the only option open to the Czechoslovak people. By reinforcing the correctness of the system and coupling it to the lack of any other viable options, Klaus creates a unidirectional path for his audience. That path is irreversible and unchangeable because any reversal of or change to it would facilitate the return of the communists and an end to any hopes of further progress toward "rejoining" Europe. Echoing Friedman, Klaus entrenches the community of market individualism by highlighting the distinction between the roles of the government out-group and the in-group in proclaiming that the government's role is that it *"may, with its policies, incite and stimulate needed changes in behavior, or, on the other hand, protect, but in no case is it competent or appropriate for providing substitutes for missing decisions on the micro level [i.e. those of firms and individuals]"* (KLAUS 1992: 56). Government exists to provide a framework of laws to guide the relations of the micro-level. This further confirms Klaus' construction of the government as separate from the market community, and thus neoliberal relations of the government with the micro-level of individuals provide a barrier against this alien other and the natural organization of people as individuals and firms. From this definition of roles, Klaus indicates two

broad philosophical choices. The first choice is a world in which an ideal of perfection exists, and in which intellectuals may use the state to address and solve problems. Klaus calls this view *etatist*, while calling the second choice *truly democratic* because it recognizes imperfection and the undesirability of finding solutions at any cost. This second method, which rests on the solving of problems outside of the state, Klaus describes as *"realistically democratic [...] populist (in the good sense of the word) [...] [and] searching for a way to prevent anyone having too much power over decision-making [...] the second view wants real freedom, which cannot be threatened or misused by an unlimitedly powerful dictator, bureaucracy, or thieves [...] The second type dominated in revolutionary America"* (KLAUS 1991: 29).

The implication is that neoliberalism by nature protects individual freedom as an impersonal, natural force, and Klaus repeatedly links this concept to the model's evident success in the West by invoking the United States. On the basis of this framing of a civilizational choice, Klaus proposes a *"new social contract"* for the transition and post-transition period based on the principle that *"those who can must with all of their strength attempt to participate in the creation of a market economy, take its fruits and risks, and learn how to win and lose"* (KLAUS 1991: 34). Klaus thus makes his philosophical alignment clear: that stratification of people into winners and losers is natural and healthy, and that broad solutions present unacceptable dangers to freedom. Those willing to accept this dichotomization fit into the market community. Those who do not, become part of the outside group, those opposed to the market community through their adherence to alien, un-Czech influences.

The process of privatization is presented as necessary despite the immediate pain it may cause. In responding to "A Letter from an Unsatisfied Farmer," Klaus justifies an unnamed farmer's worries about the loss of subsidies and the opening of the Czech agricultural sector to foreign competition as part of a necessary, if painful, process of joining the community of market individuals. *"Economic reform must – besides other things – ensure the applicability of the same rules for everyone because the market introduces an institution which does not accept exceptions, which, without error, reveals performance and non-performance, and which unfeelingly punishes everyone who cannot or does not want to provide such performances and services for which there is a demand"* (KLAUS 1992: 76).

This stark portrayal of the operations of the market as a rational, unfeeling, efficient and ultimately moral mechanism sets out further conditionality for belonging to the in-group. Belonging to this community requires total submission and total faith in the process working correctly. To further develop the divide between the in- and out-group, Klaus appeals to public outrage over the special privileges of the *"red aristocracy"* (KRAPFL 2019: 84) and the broad desire for a fair system. Deepening the conditionality of joining the community of market individuals, Klaus admits to the market's shortcomings, but frames it as the only possibility: *"We know that [the market] brings infinitely better results than any alternative system"* (KLAUS 1991: 61). Accepting that there will be pain, Klaus defends voucher privatization as his tool of choice for effecting the transition to neoliberal capitalism: *"voucher privatization suggested the fastest, most transparent, and most just form of the transfer of state property to private hands, and with it the fastest way of ending the power of ministry bureaucrats over Czechoslovak economics"* (KLAUS 1992: 67). To his critics, Klaus offered little more consideration than that he gave to the farmer in his quickness to dismiss criticism of the transition. In addressing the fracturing of the Civic Forum following the Velvet Revolution, Klaus argued, *"let us leave the eternally unsatisfied, who will criticize everything, always and everywhere, let us for this reason leave those who measure their dissatisfaction against the slow or insufficient redress of past wrongs and crimes"* (KLAUS 1991: 29). The market community is thus exclusive of those who criticize it, and its adherents must accept market logic in order to belong to this new community. The eternally unsatisfied out-group is not worth the trouble of debate and discussion. To those individuals, Klaus presents a choice: *"If we want a better living standard, we must allow it to be for those who deserve it with sufficient motivation. Otherwise, we will never make it to Europe"* (KLAUS 1992: 22). In linking the adoption of a neoliberal economic model with the "return to Europe," Klaus makes this precondition of achieving an ideational goal inescapable with the adoption of a material one.

Klaus connects these two goals, a rapid voucher privatization and the necessity of alleviating the people's suffering: *"Fast privatization is an integral part of economic reforms. Attempts to halt and loosen the process of privatization can lead to the stopping of reforms as such. Privatization is also the best and most pleasant solution to the problems of the old structure which pervade the business sphere and state organs, and which have made us all suffer"*

(KLAUS 1992: 50). Failure to act has dire consequences: *"Market economics without any adjectives"*, i.e. market economics in their pure form, are necessary for the Czechoslovak people to embrace a complete stamping out of the communist system, and prevent its return *"under a new banner (but with the same ideals)"* (KLAUS 1991: 21). Indeed, in spite of his later political concessions, Klaus argued that the maintenance of *"a network of social protection…would mean the liquidation of the foundations of market economics"* (IBID.: 22). This threat of the lurking communists was nothing new in the post-November discourse, having been inherited from the Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence's portrayal of the communists as *"devils[…] [responsible] for all problems that Czechoslovakia faced"* (KRAPFL 2013: 25). Klaus' adaptation of the communist threat to the market community crystalized the in- and out-group, and deviation from the neoliberal plan threatened to release the once-deposed specter of communism to destroy the new democracy.

CONCLUSION

This paper has analyzed Václav Klaus' discourse of market transformation through a neoliberal populist lens, identifying the artificial linkages of markets and democracy. Throughout the discourse, Klaus relied predominantly on the construction of the in-group as a community of market individuals whose faith in natural market mechanisms crystalized their boundaries and defined their fundamental Czech identity. Through appeals to natural law, markets became a piece of the heartland, which borders the community and others its opponents. Through Klaus' casting of Czech society into two opposing camps and moralizing the question of economic development, the battle to build a market economy became a cosmic struggle, complete with heroes and villains, a bright future and an idealized past under the threat of dark and sinister forces. In an atmosphere in which a transition to a neoliberal market economy was neither a guarantee nor the unified plan of an organized revolutionary movement, a powerfully worded and ideologically coherent discourse became a political force. In the absence of viable competing programs for the country's economic future, Klaus framed alternatives to neoliberalization as a regression toward authoritarianism and an abandonment of the democratic gains of 1989. Klaus' neoliberal populist discourse legitimized markets as necessary for the achievement of democracy by compartmentalizing the people into a community of market individuals and their opponents. In doing this, Klaus broke up the revolutionary community of

"transcendent solidarity" (KRAPFL 2013: 111) and supplanted it with a neoliberal community of market individuals. An analysis of a discourse of neoliberal populism in the transition of Central and Eastern Europe demonstrates the method of connecting capitalism and democracy that continues to affect the political and economic life of the region by stunting the spectrum of politically acceptable political economy policies (CHELCEA – DRUȚĂ 2016).

The legacy of voucher privatization continues to influence Czech politics. Voucher privatization succeeded in the divestiture of state property and the creation of a domestic capitalist class capable of running private businesses in a market economy, albeit only until the arrival of foreign investors (PULA 2018). The role of the entrepreneur as a builder of the country received another place in the Czech historical mythology, alongside the successful global firms of the interwar First Republic. The former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš frequently draws on images of interwar and privatization entrepreneurs to illustrate the creative potential and entrepreneurial spirit of the Czech people, although he eschews much of Klaus' moralizing language. A darker side to voucher privatization's legacy remains with the enduring perception that many of the corrupt individuals involved in it escaped punishment, or worse, that their corruption was tolerated (ČESKÁ TELEVIZE 2016). In 2019, the Chamber of Deputies issued a statement calling the privatization a process with *"a great amount of excesses, errors, and theft, which caused the Czech Republic and its citizens damages to property in the order of hundreds of billions of crowns"* (KOHOUT 2019). Klaus, however, calls criticism of the voucher privatization program *"politically motivated"* (TŘÍSKA ET AL. 2002: 93).

The experience of voucher privatization proves the truth of Klaus' contention that *"the fundamental transformation of the whole society in a historically short period is a feasible task"* (KLAUS 1996B). By linking the market with democracy through neoliberal populism, Klaus presented an emotionally charged paradigm for the public in which the only alternative to the market was a return to communism. Making a formulation in which the market appeared as a component of Czech identity, Klaus dichotomized society to make acceptance of his economic program a means of belonging in the post-1989 order. In doing so, Klaus transformed a revolution based on the dignity of the individual into one that established a political economy that reduces individuals to the utility of their economic performance.

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Forum

Climate Impacts of the Ukraine War

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ABSTRACT	The war in Ukraine has had a profound effect on climate politics and policies around the world. It has caused widespread economic crises and undermined global climate targets. It has also, however, had the potential to speed up energy transition in the mostly developed countries of the Global North. This article discusses these challenges and introduces a special section of this issue of the *Czech Journal of International Relations*, in which several leading scholars share their views on the climate impacts of the war on and beyond the EU.

KEYWORDS	European Union, climate, Ukraine, war, energy, transition
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INTRODUCTION

The war in Ukraine has had a tremendous impact on world politics. It has caused severe economic crises and spurred high inflation, exacerbated existing conflicts, propelled hundreds of thousands of people to leave homes and reconfigured the existing world order, leading some authors to argue that a new Cold War is upon us (KOTKIN 2022). Among the most severe consequences of the war were those in the fields of energy and environmental/climate politics. The Russian grip on oil and gas markets, combined with the market volatility in the face of the war, has led to dramatic increases of resource prices, which hit the European Union (EU) the hardest, but also had significant climate and energy repercussions beyond Europe.

The security implications of the war for Europe are clear. It is generally assumed that the war has destabilized the architecture of European security in military and territorial terms (VOGLER 2023). But the impacts of the war were not bound only to hard security concerns of European states. There are severe climate implications of the war, which have clearly linked hard security concerns to climate concerns. The war economy in Russia and Ukraine but also in the allied countries, has produced a huge amount of carbon emissions (BBC 2022), and has undermined the willingness of many countries to strengthen their climate pledges, as was apparent in the failure of the 2022 UN Conference of Parties in Sharm el-Sheikh. The rise in gas prices and the resulting energy wars have also prompted some countries to discuss reopening/reusing other energy resources such as coal that have slowly been withering in the developed countries' energy mixes.

Europe was particularly hit by the spike in prices. In many of the EU countries, rising energy prices led to inflation – somewhere as high as 25 percent – and the prices of regular commodities and goods have basically doubled over 2022 and 2023. This has in many ways resulted from the growing reliance of several countries (most notably Germany) on Russian gas, which was seen as a means of transition towards renewables. Within one year, the EU has made great strides to detach itself from Russian gas and oil, diminishing the share of Russian oil from 27 percent to below 10 percent by the end of 2022, and that of gas from 31 to 18 percent (EUROSTAT 2023). But the EU was not the only entity hit by the crisis. Inflation and rising prices coupled with the EU's sudden thirst for liquified natural gas (LNG)

that was previously routed to Asia, have had a negative economic effect on most countries around the world. For some developing countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia, the new energy reality meant that they were unable to secure sufficient resources, and experienced several serious blackouts (STORROW – SCHONHARDT 2023).

The global energy supply has indeed been damaged by the war. And yet the reactions of particular countries have been greatly varied. Whereas several developed countries, including many within the EU, have advocated using the opportunity to expand on clean energy sources and decouple from fossil fuels, others were unable to do so and had to resort to burning more coal. The division once again primarily rested on the access to capital – those that were able to afford higher prices were able to diversify, while those that weren't did not. But there were other reasons too, stemming from the perception and securitization of the Russian threat to the relationship with China.

The Forum presented in this issue of the *Czech Journal of International Relations* focuses on the climate impacts of the Ukraine war. It presents six articles that deal with specific questions within the general theme. The first two pieces, written by John Vogler of Keele University and Jon Birger Skjærseth of the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, analyse the immediate impacts of the war and the challenges it brought to the European Union's security and energy strategy. Vogler introduces the forum with several general considerations regarding the impact of the war on the EU's domestic and foreign policy. He shows that whereas before the war, EU conceptions of climate and energy security had begun to converge in a "virtuous synergy" that supported the EU's climate leadership, the war has profoundly altered the immediacy and location of the perceived threat, leading to a dramatic reorientation of energy and security policies. Skjærseth in many ways confirms these claims, and goes one step further to argue that the war has strengthened rather than weakened the 'Fit for 55' package, accelerated the EUs energy transition and created conditions that can strengthen the EU's international climate leadership.

Oleskandra Kovalevska of Metropolitan University Prague and Mats Braun of the Institute of International Relations Prague build on these claims, but focus on the impacts of the war on the EU's narratives rather

than policies. They argue that the war has merged the EU's foundational peace and climate leader narratives to illustrate the EU as the peaceful green leader in contrast to the brutal aggression of the authoritarian and climate-hurting Russian regime. This has further legitimized the EU's transition to renewables via the Fit-for-55 package. Miriam Prys-Hansen of Giga Hamburg and Simon Kaack of Lund University look inmore detail at the energy impacts of the war. They focus on the EU's thirst for sustainable resources beyond oil and gas, which was clearly exacerbated by the war. Hydrogen has emerged as a resource with a significant potential to allow the EU to reach its climate targets. Prys-Hansen and Kaack focus on India as one of the EU's main hydrogen trading partners and show its growing importance for the old continent, albeit with significant hurdles.

Ulv Hanssen of Soka University and Florentine Koppenborg of Technical University Munich continue in analysing the influence of the war beyond the EU. They look into the impacts of the war on Japan to show an example of a particular regional dynamic. Japan has securitized the war to advance the country's ongoing security transition, which significantly influenced the wording of the late 2022 new security strategy. At the same time, however, it has been much slower in translating the outcomes of the war to stronger climate pledges and pushing towards renewables. The reason, as Hanssen and Koppenborg argue, lies in Japan's reluctance to be dependent on China, which controls a significant majority of the renewables technology and infrastructure markets. And lastly, Chad Briggs of the Asian Institute of Management and Miriam Matejova of Masaryk University Brno analyse the Russian hybrid warfare strategies that were exacerbated by the war. Briggs and Matejova argue that Russia has been increasingly attacking the climate regime as a means of hybrid warfare by undermining trust in democratic institutions, scientific data, and the resilience of Western societies.

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EU Climate and Energy Security after 24 February 2022

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ABSTRACT	Before 2022, EU conceptions of climate and energy security had begun to converge in a 'virtuous synergy' that supported the Union's continuing attempts at international climate policy leadership. This paper argues that the more orthodox military security problem posed by Russia's invasion of Ukraine coupled with extreme weather events in the same period has profoundly altered both the immediacy and the location of the perceived threats. The Union's responses have been dramatic in terms of a re-orientation of established energy and security policies. Ending the dependence upon Russian gas provides the chance to accelerate the achievement of the European Green Deal and 'Fit for 55' but also involves an immediate quest for alternative gas supplies. The unresolved question is whether the Union can use this opportunity to enhance rather than dissipate its climate security and policy leadership.

KEYWORDS	European Union, energy, security, climate, leadership
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INTRODUCTION

There is general agreement that the invasion of Ukraine has de-stabilised the architecture of European security in military and territorial terms but also in the way in which the EU has suddenly engaged in an unprecedented 'energy war' with Russia. The implications are likely to be far-reaching. Because energy-related emissions increase the greenhouse effect such implications will involve climate policy. This yields a complex security problem for the Union which may analysed using three inter-related definitions of security. Energy security – *"access to secure, adequate, reliable and affordable energy supplies"* (BORDOFF ET AL. 2009: 214) – is evidently connected to orthodox conceptions of 'national security', the protection of borders and interests, if necessary, by armed force. In the case of a partly supranational entity like the Union it would be more appropriate to speak of 'hard security'. Prevailing ideas of climate security have been closely linked to these types of security. Environmental change is associated with various conflicts and assaults upon the integrity of states. Such analysis, most prominently expounded by Thomas Homer-Dixon (1999), has framed the Union's discourse on the security implications of climate change, as it did for most other discussions of the topic within NATO and elsewhere. This maintains an orthodox view of political and territorial security. An alternative, less orthodox, but potentially significant definition places the climate and global ecosystem itself, as opposed to the state, as the referent object, in which security is *"...understood as the maintenance of stable climate conditions as a pre-requisite of all human enterprises"* (TROMBETTA 2008: 595).

Ten years ago it appeared that, in official discourse at least, ideas of climate and energy security had begun to converge in a potentially virtuous 'synergy' (VOGLER 2013). Previously they had been both conceptually and institutionally separate. On the one hand, ever since the days of the initial Coal and Steel Community, the Union had vital economic concerns with developing and diversifying its energy supplies while perfecting its fragmented internal market. On the other, environmental policies, emerging rapidly since the 1980s, were often at odds with the apparent requirements of energy security. The relationship came into sharp focus as the Union asserted itself as a leader in international climate policy in the implementation of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Rightly or wrongly, the UNFCCC and its Protocol targeted the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions and the

EU responded with an ambitious programme based upon its Emissions Trading Scheme.

For many member states dependent upon coal or imported gas, the Union's atmospheric policies imperilled their energy security, leading to continuing battles within the Council as the Commission and 'progressive' member states struggled to elaborate new reduction targets to sustain the Union's leading role in climate diplomacy. Many saw the necessity to resolve the contradictions between energy and climate policy. As Energy Commissioner Piebalgs (2009) presciently argued, they were necessarily *"two sides of the same coin"*. In advance of the 2015 Paris Agreement the EU set new emissions targets and the process of re-orienting the Union's approach to energy and climate policy continued with the Commission's ambitious European Green Deal (EGD) of 2019 and the 'Fit for 55' proposals of 2021. They attempted to provide the detailed underpinning of the pledge (NDC), made before UNFCCC COP 26, to reduce EU carbon emissions by 55% against a 1990 baseline. Major parts of these proposals remained controversial and un-agreed within the Union's legislative procedure. At COP 26 in Glasgow in November 2021 internal divisions were evident. While most member states were supportive of the proposals, other states, namely the coal and gas dependent Central European states, for whom a green transition would be costly, disagreed. These included Poland and the Czech Republic, whose leaders were openly critical of the proposals in the plenary session. One EU prime minister, referring to the EGD, described it as *"...not a deal but an ideology"* involving EU climate policies that were *"dangerous and improper"*:

"Instead of negotiating long-term (gas) contracts with Russia, European politicians are busy blocking the transit capacity of the Nord Stream 2 and Opal pipelines citing worries that the EU will become dependent on Russia. Ladies and Gentlemen, this might seem like news to you, but we are already dependent on Russian natural gas and will be for at least another 20 or 30 years" (EU OBSERVER 2021).

The security situation, in all its dimensions, was soon to be transformed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Perceptions of threat predicate discussions of security. The argument advanced here is that although some of the critical threats to the EU have been emerging for some time, there have been sudden changes prompted by, but going well beyond, the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The essential point is that whereas climate and security problems were formerly regarded as being largely external and distanced from the Union they were now transformed in their location and immediacy.

The EU was sheltered from immediate 'hard' security threats during much of the Cold War and its aftermath but the Russian pressure on Ukraine since 2014 and, most strikingly, the events that unfolded since the 24th of February 2023 presented a shocking and immediate threat at the eastern borders of the Union. Energy policy, under the original Steel and Coal Community, provided a means of ensuring that a Franco-German conflict would become 'materially impossible' and the early years of the European Economic Community (EEC) were characterised by an abundance of fossil fuels. Subsequently there was vulnerability to the 'oil price shocks' of the 1970s and an enlarged Union, dependent upon supplies of Russian gas and oil, struggled with supply interruptions, via Ukraine, in 2006 and 2009. Yet even these events and the crisis of 2014 involving the Russian seizure of Crimea did not entail a fundamental re-think. Germany, having discontinued its nuclear generation and closed its coal mines, continued to enjoy and extend, through the controversial Nordstream pipelines, a mutually beneficial level of dependence upon Russian gas. While Germany relied on Russian supplies for around 30% of its energy needs, other states, locked into Soviet era pipelines, were even more dependent, with the corresponding figures for Lithuania, Slovakia and Hungary being 96.1%, 57.3% and 54.2%, respectively (EUROSTAT 2022). In 2021 more than 40% of the EU's overall gas consumption came from Russia, amounting to around 155 billion cubic meters of gas (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2022: FN. 1). The February 2022 invasion of Ukraine served, quite suddenly, to shift the very foundations of EU energy supply as an immediate strategic threat to the Union's eastern flank rendered the continuation of established relations unthinkable and conjoined a hard security and an energy supply crisis.

Perceptions of the climate change problem were also shifting. Europe (defined as a WMO region rather than as the EU) has warmed at twice the global average rate over the last 30 years, which is more than the rate for

any other WMO region, and with a marked acceleration in the last decade (WMO 2022: 9). There had been extreme weather events before in Europe, for example the 2003 deadly heatwave in France, but until relatively recently their relationship to climate change was still controversial. However, public opinion surveys began to indicate real concern about this issue with 47% of citizens citing climate change as the *"biggest challenge to their lives"* (EIB 2019/20). By 2021 the extent of climate-change-related extreme weather events and the consequent damage (mainly through storms and flooding but also involving droughts and wildfires) in Europe could not be ignored. Apocalyptic events such as Storm Christoph in July 2021 struck at the heart of the EU. In that storm, in Germany at least 189 people died, *"130 km of motorways were closed and 600 km of railway tracks were damaged"*, entailing *"immense economic losses"*. The overall economic damage in Europe was estimated at $50 billion with 510,000 people directly affected (WMO 2022: 25). Such outcomes may appear less than catastrophic when set against the devastation of Pakistan in the subsequent year, but they seemed both shocking and unprecedented for wealthy and 'developed' Europeans. These significant alterations in the location and level of threats have already had significant impact upon EU security policies.

HARD SECURITY

The most dramatic shift in the EU's security policy occurred when three days after the Russian invasion, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell announced the direct EU financing of lethal aid to the Ukrainian army. In his words *"a taboo has fallen"* as for the first time in its history the EU would be providing lethal equipment to a third country. Military assistance, both lethal and non-lethal, has been provided through the recent (2021), and now somewhat inappropriately named, European Peace Facility (EPF). The EPF is an 'off budget funding mechanism' originally designed to provide assistance for 'crisis management' and peace support operations. By the end of January 2023 it had disbursed some 3.6 billion Euros (MILLS 2023: 50). When placed alongside the military assistance provided by most member states this is a substantial sum, but its real significance is in the sharp change in the character of the EU as an international actor that it seemed to represent. A foundational characteristic of the European Community (EC) was that it was in itself a 'peace project' following the functionalist ideas that had been introduced by

David Mitrany during the Second World War (MITRANY 1976). The EC briefly but unsuccessfully engaged in an attempt to create a European Defence Community during the early 1950s. After 1954 the specifically European dimension of defence policy was the province of the Western European Union and it was NATO that provided the essential US security guarantee defence against the Soviet Union. When the European Union did attempt to develop its own 'European Defence Identity' around the turn of the 21st century, the result was the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which has operated in an intergovernmental and voluntary manner alongside the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Beset by arguments about 'strategic autonomy' and its relationship to NATO, it performed a range of civil and military functions in support of UN peacekeeping operations. Its operations were mainly carried out in Africa but also in the Balkans with an emphasis upon dealing with what were essentially indirect threats and contributing to good global, multilateral citizenship. As Jolyon Howarth notes, none of these *"activities subsumed under 'crisis management intervention', whether military or civilian, has anything to do with European defence per se"* (HOWORTH 2023: 313). Only time will tell as to the importance of recent changes on the long and uncertain road to EU strategic autonomy or 'open strategic autonomy,' as some members would insist. The appearance of a direct military threat to the East did concentrate minds and persuade member states that had previously been unable to agree on the basics of a hard security role for the Union beyond the CSDP. The expansion of the EPF was one result but it still bears some of the hallmarks of the CSDP, which it was originally designed to support, including the provision of opt outs from lethal aid funding for neutral member states. Most immediately, however, an unmissable lesson from the events of 2022 is that the Union remains dependent for its vital defence upon the United States and a re-invigorated NATO.

ENERGY SECURITY

Security of energy supply is an objective of the Union where competence is shared with Member States. While the Commission shall ensure the functioning of the energy market and promote energy efficiency and interconnection *"[s]uch measures shall not affect a Member State's right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different*

energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply…" (TFEU: ART. 194). Neither is energy subject to the Union's trade rules. The implication has been a divergence of policy approaches. On the one hand, the Commission has sought to obtain energy security by perfecting the functioning of the internal energy market and extending its provisions to a wider regulatory space in the EU's neighbourhood (the Energy Community) and even at one point attempting to enrol Russia in the Energy Charter Treaty. On the other, Member States have pursued their national energy interests by seeking out alternative sources of supply and building, often competitive, pipeline networks. Although diversification of supply is an EU energy security objective, European-wide policies of liberalisation, privatisation and interdependence were often challenged by energy geopolitics.

Nordstream 1, officially inaugurated by Chancellor Merkel and Russian President Medvedev (along with the then Dutch and French prime ministers) in 2011, and Nordstream 2 contained elements of both approaches. The long-term vision of successive German governments was for the engagement of Russia in a peaceful and mutually beneficial partnership, albeit the resulting partnership was one that caused problems with EU competition rules on separation of ownership and transmission (in the case of Nordstream 2). Opponents of these pipelines saw that they were essentially designed to avoid dependence on the transit of gas through Ukraine and the associated and ongoing disputes between Gazprom and the Ukrainian authorities that had been at the heart of the 2006 and 2008 supply crises. Nordstream 2 commenced construction in May 2018, but in the changed political circumstances following the Russian seizure of Crimea in 2014, the project was already coming under heavy attack from the United States and other allies. The Trump administration imposed extraterritorial sanctions on Nordstream 2 contractors on the grounds that the pipeline undermined Europe's energy security and would lead to a new vulnerability to Russian blackmail. In the light of what was soon to occur, the furious reaction of Germany, France, Austria and the Commission to this presumed assault on Europe's internal commercial affairs and energy independence, has a certain irony. This is especially so in the light of some accusations that the underhand motive of the US was to sell its own LNG to Germany and the EU. Two days before the Russian assault on Ukraine, German Chancellor Scholz moved to terminate Nordstream 2, citing the Russian claims to Donetsk and Lukhansk. The pipeline itself, although

completed, never carried any gas. Both Nordstreams were seriously, perhaps fatally, damaged by mysterious explosions in September 2022.

The immediate response by the Commission to Russia's invasion was to outline an emergency change of course for the Union in its RePowerEU proposals (SEE SKJÆRSETH 2023). Alongside a complex of immediate internal measures to tackle the problem of high energy prices and to ensure adequate gas storage for the coming winter, a two thirds reduction in gas imports from Russia by the end of the year was proclaimed with a phasing out of dependence upon all Russian hydrocarbons by 2030. This was to be achieved by *"[d]iversifying gas supplies via higher LNG imports and pipeline imports from non-Russian suppliers and higher levels of biomethane and hydrogen"* (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2022: 6). The gas supplies from Russia diminished drastically. This appears to be as much a consequence of the destruction of Nordstream 1 and the Russian retaliation against the sanctions, including demands for payment in roubles, as a consequence of EU action. By the end of November 2022 Russian gas imports had fallen from 42% in January to around 10% of the EU total with the slack being taken up by correspondingly large increases in imports of LNG, primarily from the US but also from Qatar and Nigeria (EUROPEAN COUNCIL 2023). The situation in the 'energy war' with Russia was complicated because the very high prices meant that Russian revenues did not fall even though only one pipeline to the West (amazingly enough, through Ukraine) was still operational (FINANCIAL TIMES 2022). Gas prices peaked during August, and then fell back to more normal levels while at the same time EU Member States managed to negotiate a common price cap. In December 2022 an EU embargo on Russian oil and a global price cap were finally implemented. While the energy security map was thus transformed away from Russian imports and towards diversified alternative supplies, the other pillar of the Commission's approach was to push for a full and enhanced implementation of its 'Fit for 55' proposals, which was announced on the basis of the European Green Deal of the preceding year and largely achieved by Spring 2023. Their fundamental objective had been to fulfil an EU climate pledge (the Nationally Determined Contribution) for 2030, and thus respond to one definition of climate security.

CLIMATE SECURITY

As a concept 'climate security' has been particularly troublesome. Diverse and politically loaded 'referent objects' entail multiple meanings. There can be national, international, human and ecological climate security discourses (MCDONALD 2013). EU policies embrace all of them along with rhetorical moves that are sometimes employed to 'securitise' particular projects such as a satellite observation system (VOGLER 2002). An important and defining early statement on climate security was made by High Representative Javier Solana in 2008 (COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 2008). In it, climate change was framed within an externally oriented hard security concept as a 'threat multiplier'. This has remained the predominant Union definition oriented towards distanced international security threats (REMLING – BARNHOORN 2021; YOUNGS 2021). Thus, a recent European Council conclusion approved the *"increased climate sensitivity of EU actions on conflict prevention and sustainable security"* while endorsing *"the relevance of climate change for CSDP missions and operations"* (EUROPEAN COUNCIL 2019). Elsewhere, in the Directorate General for International Partnerships for example, there is a more human security-based approach. The shared underlying understanding, according to documentary and interview research, is that *"[i]nsecurity is seen to be travelling to the EU via – often not further specified – threats to international stability or unregulated migration flows to Europe. Climate change is therefore framed as a source of instability in the Global South..."* (REMLING – BARNHOORN 2020: 8). It may be added that this chimes well with the Union's self-image in international climate politics as an actor especially attuned to the problems of the developing world. There is some evidence of a growing concern with more localised 'ecological' security, but an indicator of the relatively low priority given to the climate threat within Europe may be seen in the under-development of adaptation strategy in terms of *"legally binding targets and specific measures"* (EEB 2021).

The important question is whether the rapid alterations in the nature of threat and perception of local risks can lead to an integrated security concept that fully embraces the evident connection between hard security, reduction in gas and oil dependence, their replacement by renewables and a renewed emphasis on domestic adaptation and resilience. An overarching EU strategy has clearly been lacking in this respect (STANG – DIMSDALE 2017). There is now at least a rhetorical recognition of the gravity

of the problem. The EU external energy policy paper, for example, begins with the acknowledgement of an existential threat (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2022B). The European Green Deal and 'Fit for 55' preceded the invasion and are still wending their way through the legislative process. They involve ETS extensions, an energy tax directive to encourage sustainable fuels, and aviation and maritime emissions reform plus the highly controversial carbon border adjustment measures. An agreed new 'climate law' responds to the requirements of the Paris Agreement and IPCC reports, which perhaps provide an operational definition of climate security, and entail being on a path towards staying within the 1.5°C (at best) and 2°C thresholds by 2030 and achieving net zero emissions by 2050.

The Commission's response to the invasion of Ukraine was to 'double down' on these measures and push for more rapid achievement in the introduction of renewables and energy efficiency under RePowerEU and, to an extent, provide an alignment of climate, energy and hard security policy in removing dependence on Russian gas. This has already, as of the beginning of 2023, been substantially achieved (SKJAERSETH 2023). The problem is, of course, that in order to achieve this, highly polluting coal mines have been reopened in Germany and elsewhere and there has been a scramble to acquire new 'diversified' supplies of LNG from the US, the Middle East and Africa. There is a danger that the opening of new gas installations and overseas contracts will lock EU energy policy into a path that will miss vital climate targets. At the moment this does not appear to be happening as it was reported in late 2022 that EU carbon emissions had actually fallen (HARVEY 2022). Nonetheless, the road to de-carbonisation is far from easy and internal disagreements over policies such as the 'taxonomy' that describes whether nuclear energy or gas can be regarded as a sustainable investment under the EGD, are continuing. Yet the distance already travelled and the speed at which hard security imperatives have overcome obstacles to the abandonment of Russian hydrocarbons would have been unthinkable before 24 February 2022.

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The War in Ukraine and EU Climate Leadership

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ABSTRACT	Prior to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022, EU deliberations on the 'Fit-for-55' climate/energy package embedded in the European Green Deal were already well underway. The energy transition had also begun to gain traction towards more renewables, energy saving and emissions reduction. The invasion caused an energy-political earthquake that threatened to split the EU, slowing down or weakening these ongoing processes. This study finds that the invasion 1) strengthened rather than weakened the 'Fit for 55' package; 2) accelerated rather than slowed the ongoing energy transition; and 3) may have strengthened the EU's potential for climate leadership-by-example. However, the further consequences are highly uncertain as the EU shifts from crisis response to long-term governance of climate and energy policy implementation.

KEYWORDS	European Union, climate, leadership, Ukraine war, Fit for 55, Paris Agreement
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INTRODUCTION

Since the 1990s, the EU has aimed to play a leadership-by-example role in international climate cooperation, with increasingly ambitious targets and policy instruments. From 2009, this has involved packages of policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, improving energy efficiency and increasing the production of renewable energy to replace fossil fuels and promote net-zero industries. By 2020, helped by the lockdowns due to COVID-19, the EU had met its 20-20-20 targets by a good margin: GHG emissions were 31% lower than in 1990, energy consumption had been reduced by 20% and the share of renewable energy consumption had increased to 21% (EEA 2021).

In 2021, the European Commission proposed a comprehensive new climate/energy policy package for achieving the objective of a 55% net emissions reduction by 2030 (compared to 1990). This target also served as the EU's updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement. The 'Fit-for-55' package formed part of the European Green Deal (EGD) on wider sustainability, with industrial and societal ambitions of serving as a steppingstone towards the net-zero by 2050 target included in the EU Climate Law. When Russia – the largest energy supplier to the EU – invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, EU policymaking on the 14 legislative acts included in the 'Fit-for-55' package was underway but had not yet led to any results. In addition to causing deep suffering and destruction in Ukraine, the Russia invasion unleashed an energy-political earthquake that threatened to divide the EU, as it could possibly place energy security and affordability before sustainability concerns.

Externally, EU division could also further harm the Union's capacity to speak with 'one voice' in international climate cooperation. Internal political tensions among the member-states had represented a real risk of EU division during the 2015 Paris Conference. Poland, which had initially threatened to torpedo the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21), changed its stance, which was conditional on an outcome that would allow for a continuation of coal as a key energy source (ANDRESEN ET AL. 2016). In the end, the EU managed to maintain considerable political unity throughout the Paris Conference, helping to build a 'high-ambition' coalition. However,

EU-internal divisions were also evident at COP 26 in Glasgow in November 2021 – three months before the Russian invasion (VOGLER 2023).

Drawing on public reports, research papers and media articles, this paper explores the consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine for deliberations on key 'Fit-for-55' files, COP 27 in Sharm-El-Sheikh and the European energy transition. If the EU were to lose its climate/energy policy momentum, its potential for external climate leadership might be significantly reduced. EU climate leadership has received significant scholarly attention, but with only a limited focus on the exogenous conditions for change (SEE, E.G., SCHREURS – TIBERGHIEN 2007; PARKER – KARLSSON 2010; DUPONT – OBERTHÜR 2015; TORNEY 2015; WURZEL ET AL. 2017). Drawing on the literatures on leadership and exogenous shocks and crises, this paper explores changes in the EU climate policy, energy transition and leadership aspirations.

LEADERSHIP AND EXOGENOUS SHOCKS

Leadership in international cooperation can be defined as an asymmetrical relationship of influence, where one actor guides or directs the behaviour of others towards a certain goal over a certain time-period (UNDERDAL 1991: 140). In international climate policy, the EU stands as an identifiable and purposive actor with the necessary capabilities to act as a leader (VOGLER 2017). Also its component parts – the EU institutions, member-states and societal actors – may play a leadership role (WURZEL ET AL. 2017; SKJÆRSETH 2017).

Much of the literature on leadership has been concerned with categorizing different types and styles of leadership (E.G. YOUNG 1991; UNDERDAL 1991; BARNES 2010; WURZEL ET AL. 2017). In addition to leadership by example, whereby actors can show the way for others, the EU may exercise other types of leadership. For one thing, it can act as an entrepreneurial leader by using its resources to formulate and frame new policy ideas, mobilize support, and craft consensus. Entrepreneurial leadership entails identifying the appropriate means, and guiding others toward a common goal. This requires diplomatic, negotiation and bargaining skills – and such skills were enhanced since 2011 through the diplomatic service of the EU: the European External Action Service (BIEDENKOPF – PETRI 2021). Second, the EU may act as an intellectual or cognitive leader by shaping and influencing the interests and preferences needed for changing the status quo through ideas. Policies can

be accelerated by intellectual leadership particularly in issue-areas where scientists and technical experts play a central role, as with climate policy (DREGER 2014). Third, structural leadership requires some type of power or force based on material resources, such as economic or military strength. The world's largest internal market – the Single European Market – gives the EU economic power to restrict access to or tax products that fail to meet minimum climate or other environmental standards, as exemplified by the recently adopted Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM, see below). These types of leadership are not mutually exclusive: indeed, they may prove particularly effective in combination. However, they all require sufficient internal and external unity.

Theories of exogenous shocks build largely on the insight that established institutions and policies are inherently hard to change (POWELL – DIMAGGIO 1991; SKOCPOL – PIERSON 2002). Path dependency, and its self-reinforcing mechanisms like increasing returns and policy feedback, are expected to cause a bias towards reproduction and stability (NORTH 1990; PIERSON 2004). Changing an institutionalized cooperation is difficult, especially when collective norms, behavioural regularities and convergent expectations have evolved over time. However, exogenous shocks can be potentially powerful disrupters of such stability, providing moments of openness through 'critical junctures' and windows of opportunity for rapid policy innovation – which may lead to major changes in the status quo (CAPOCCIA 2015; RIXEN ET AL. 2016). 'Critical junctures' can be understood as situations of uncertainty in which decisions of pivotal actors are decisive for selecting one path of institutional development over other possible paths. However, the direction of change is essentially an empirical question. EU decision-making powers are dispersed among the 27 member-states and the EU institutions: the resultant wide range of pivotal actors may lead to 'joint decision traps' (SCHARPF 1988), or push EU agreements toward the lowest common denominator (SKJÆRSETH ET AL. 2016). This often results in lengthy and difficult negotiations, complex compromises, and sub-optimal policy solutions (WURZEL ET AL. 2017).

Lower ambition may ensue if the external shocks that establish collective EU norms for dealing with climate change through, e.g., effort-sharing lead to fewer behavioural regularities through greater flexibility, in turn resulting in more divergent expectations toward alternative long-term

low-carbon pathways. This could lead to a 'push-back correction' – the dismantling and erosion of previous policies (BURNS ET AL. 2020). Conversely, higher ambitions may result if the shock induces reinforcement of norms for effort sharing, more behavioural regularities through less flexibility, and more convergent expectations concerning alternative low-carbon pathways for 2030 and beyond. The shock may also pass more swiftly than expected, with limited effect on political dynamics – thus reinforcing the status quo.

EU CLIMATE POLICY, ENERGY TRANSITION AND LEADERSHIP

In December 2019, the European Commission launched the EGD as a green-growth strategy, emphasizing innovation, new 'green' jobs, and sustainable transformation (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2019). The EGD aims for no net emissions of GHGs, economic growth decoupled from resource use, and a socially 'just' transition geographically and individually, all of which are to be achieved by 2050 (SKJÆRSETH 2021). It also aims to strengthen the EU's ambitions to be a global climate leader. It is specifically noted in the EGD roadmap that the *"EU [is] to continue to lead the international climate and biodiversity negotiations, further strengthening the international policy framework"* (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2019, ANNEX 4).

In autumn 2021, when the EU deliberations on the climate/energy part of the EGD – the 'Fit-for-55' package – started, Russian gas supplies to Europe were falling, as Gazprom did not fill up gas storages as expected.[1] Russia was the largest energy supplier to the EU, accounting for 36% of its natural gas, 45% of its coal and 25% of its oil imports (EUROSTAT 2022A). After the invasion, gas prices increased more than ten times compared to 2020 (as of August 2022), contributing to a crunch in the EU electricity markets. The stepwise reduction of Russian gas exports in 2022 and the sharp increase in energy prices for households and businesses caused economic and social problems that threaten to divide the EU (BORRELL 2023). This might also spill over to the 'Fit for 55' deliberations, which would result in elevating energy security concerns while pulling sustainability down the EU agenda.

Two weeks after the invasion, the Versailles Declaration by the 27 EU leaders demanded that Russia withdraw from Ukraine. To sever the EU dependence on Russian fossil fuels, the Declaration called for diversifying

energy supplies away from Russia, increasing gas storage, speeding up renewables and improving energy efficiency. In May 2022, these priorities culminated with the REPowerEU Plan for making the EU independent of Russian fossil fuels. The aims are to save energy, produce more renewable energy, and diversify EU energy supplies, including through massive imports of hydrogen. The previous goal of 10 million tons of annual hydrogen production within the EU is to be complemented by the goal of 10 million tons of annual hydrogen imports to be achieved by 2030 in order to meet the EU's climate target (SKJÆRSETH ET AL. 2023).

The Commission proposed strengthening several short- and medium-term measures on energy efficiency and renewable energy compared to its initial 'Fit-for-55' proposals. The renewable energy consumption target would be increased from 40% to 45%. This would also include new legislation for more rapid granting of permits for solar and wind power in dedicated 'go-to areas' with low environmental risk (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2022). The European Parliament supported the 45% target, whereas a majority of the member states in the Council wanted to retain the 40% target. In March 2023, the European Parliament and the Council reached a compromise on a provisional agreement on the Renewable Energy Directive (RED): the EU's binding renewable energy target for 2030 would be raised to a minimum of 42.5%, but with the aim of (voluntarily) reaching 45% by the same year. The Directive also included easier and faster permissions procedures.

For energy savings, new ambitions for the EU-wide energy efficiency target were proposed, as it was raised from 9% to 13% by 2030. As for the RED, the Council refused to support the Commission's REPower plan proposal, while the European Parliament pushed for a 14.5% energy efficiency target (ENDS 2023). A provisional agreement was reached: to reduce final energy consumption by 11.7% by 2030, compared to projections made in 2020. Although these outcomes are less ambitions than those proposed in REPowerEU, they are more ambitious than those initially proposed by the Commission in 2021.

As to climate policy, in October 2022, the Council and the European Parliament agreed on a provisional deal involving stricter performance standards for new cars and vans with the aim to move towards

zero-emission mobility. The co-legislators agreed to a 55% emissions reduction target for new cars and a 50% target for new vans to be reached by 2030 compared to 2021 levels. The target is a 100% CO_2 reduction for both new cars and vans by 2035. In November 2022, a provisional deal was reached on the Effort Sharing Regulation covering 60% of EU GHG emissions from road transport, agriculture, waste, buildings and small industries. The new target is a 40% reduction by 2030 compared to 2005 for these sectors, differentiated by new binding targets for each member-state in line with the Commission's 2021 proposal. The Council preferred more flexibility to transfer emissions among the member-states, and the European Parliament preferred less, but they agreed on a compromise close to the Commission's initial proposal (E&K 2023A). A provisional agreement was also reached on the land use, land-use change and forestry regulation (LULUCF). The objective is 310 Mt CO_2 equivalent of net removals by 2030 from 2026 in the use of soils, trees, plants, biomass and timber, which both emit and absorb CO_2 from the atmosphere. This target is in line with the Commission's 2021 proposal.

In December 2022, the Council and the European Parliament reached a deal on the EU ETS. The revised Directive will reduce emissions from power production, energy-intensive industry and aviation by 62% by 2030 compared to 2005 – up from 61% in the Commission's 2021 proposal.[2] The deal also establishes an EU ETS 2 for direct emissions from buildings and road transport. To protect needy households challenged by the energy crisis, the ETS 2 would enter into force one year later (2027) than initially proposed by the Commission (ICAP 2022). It can be further postponed to 2028 if energy prices are exceptionally high (more than 106€/MWh for gas and oil). Revenues going to the ETS 2 will flow into the Social Climate Fund – which is also a part of the December deal.

Shipping will be included in the new ETS Directive, and free allowances accorded to EU companies will be gradually phased out between 2026 and 2034. Also in December 2022, a political agreement was reached on the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) to compensate for the phasing-out of the free allowances, and prevent 'carbon leakage,' whereby energy-intensive industries relocate production to countries with more lenient climate policies. The CBAM will apply to imports to the EU of cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilizers, electricity and hydrogen.

Building on earlier initiatives for a wider CBAM and responding to higher hydrogen ambitions in the REPowerEU plan, the European Parliament proposed that hydrogen be included, thus widening the scope of the CBAM compared to the Commission's initial proposal (HYDROGEN EUROPE 2023). Importers of these goods will be required to buy certificates – based on the weekly average price of EU ETS allowances – corresponding to the GHG content of the goods imported to the EU. A carbon price paid in the country of origin will be deducted from the CBAM credits.

Amid the negotiations on the 'Fit-for-55' files, COP 27 in Sharm-El-Sheikh was convened in November 2022. This COP, expected to be one of 'implementation', was complicated by the prolonged impacts of COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine, with rising energy and food prices (ENB 2022). On the one hand, critical observers indicate that that the EU was largely inward-focused and reactive at COP 27 – which could be expected, given the ongoing 'Fit-for55' deliberations (IDOS 2022). On the other hand, the REPowerEU plan, and agreements already reached and expected shortly after the COP, led the Commission Executive Vice President for the European Green Deal, Frans Timmermans, to announce an increase in the EU NDC from a 55% to an 57% reduction by 2030 compared to 1990. This announcement indicated that the EU would strengthen its leadership-by-example ambitions, but this would subsequently need to be formalized and adopted by the member-states.

There have been few signs thus far that the energy shock caused by the Russian invasion has slowed or weakened EU climate/energy policy-making. Several of the 'Fit-for-55' files proposed by the Commission before 24 February 2022 have been strengthened or widened in scope after the invasion, and there have been no major changes in the overall structure or principles underlying the policy package. On the other hand, the postponement of the ETS 2 also shows that the energy crisis may weaken or delay specific parts or elements of the Commission's proposals – but this instrument has been controversial since its inception. As of April 2023, most of the 'Fit-for-55' files had been finally adopted, including the revision of the EU ETS Directive, the regulations establishing the Social Climate Fund and the CBAM, the Effort Sharing and LULUCF Regulations and the file regarding CO_2 emissions from cars and vans.[3]

Whereas these results may strengthen the EU's aspirations to leadership by example, the 'Fit-for-55' package embedded in the EGD may also strengthen the EU's entrepreneurial leadership potential by taking a comprehensive cross-sectoral approach to climate, nature and environmental challenges linked to 'green' growth and a 'just' transition. Moreover, the carbon border tax mechanism is based on the EU's structural economic capabilities. The aim is to tax products imported from countries with more lenient climate policies, which may provide incentives for other major trading partners and emitters to step up their climate ambitions. However, the CBAM is expected to encounter substantial opposition from countries with industries dependent on fossil fuels, such as the USA and China (OVERLAND – SABYRBEKOV 2022). Moreover, Russia and Ukraine were candidates for CBAM influence before the war, which is now unrealistic.

The EU's credibility in terms of leading by example also depends on what happens on the ground. As the energy sector is responsible for some 75% of EU GHG emissions, energy policies and developments are pivotal for reducing GHG emissions. At this early stage after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we may attempt to indicate some energy-transition developments. In line with the REPowerEU plan, the EU has been largely successful in diversifying its fossil-fuels supplies and filling gas storage sites for the 2022/2023 winter (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 2023). Following the Save Energy plan linked to REPowerEU, and further facilitated by a mild winter and high gas prices, energy saving led to a 20% reduction in gas consumption in August–November 2022 compared to the same months in 2021 (EUROSTAT 2022B). Moreover, in the third quarter of 2022, electricity consumption decreased by 2% compared to the same period in 2021 (COMMISSION 2022B). Initially, however, demand for coal increased, as coal was intended to compensate for the reduced gas consumption and (partly) replace gas as a backup power source (EURACTIVE 2023).

Renewable energy is a key element in the EU's energy transition with the aim to reduce GHG emissions and dependence on energy import. In 2021, the share of renewables showed a minor drop. Preliminary data for 2022 show that renewable energy production in the third quarter of 2022 rose by 1% (in TWh) compared to 2021. The increase in solar, wind and biomass energy was nearly matched by a decrease in hydropower generation

due to low water reservoirs (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 2023), although this reduction is likely to be temporary.

In the third quarter of 2022, EU GHG emissions increased by 2% compared with the same period in 2021. This increase is mainly related to the growth in GDP after the sharp decline in activity due to COVID-19. GHG emissions decreased by 4% in the same period compared with the pre-pandemic third quarter of 2019 (EUROSTAT 2023). Both coal consumption and CO_2 emissions have apparently decreased since September 2022 (CRE 2023). According to the think-tank Ember, coal production decreased by 27 TWh and gas by 38 TWh from October 2022 to March 2023, saving 40 million tons of CO_2 (E&K 2023B).

Preliminary data on the energy transition shortly after the invasion of Ukraine are mixed, and some developments are not necessarily related to the war, but observations do not indicate that the energy transition has been put on hold – quite the contrary. That being said, the longer-term consequences of the Russian invasion for the EU's energy transition remain highly uncertain.

CONCLUSIONS

This study has explored the consequences of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine for EU climate/energy policy, the energy transition and the EU's leadership potential. Drawing on insights from the literatures on leadership and exogenous shocks, it has explored the consequences for the deliberations on key 'Fit-for-55' files, COP 27 in Sharm-El-Sheikh and the European energy transition. The main observation on EU policy-making is that the invasion has strengthened rather than weakened the 'Fit for 55' package ambitions. However, there have been no major changes in the overall structure or principles underlying the package compared to the Commission's proposals before the invasion. Second, at COP 27, the European Commission signalled higher NDC ambitions, indicating that the EU may strengthen its ambitions to leadership by example. Third, the invasion has not dealt a blow to the ongoing European energy transition on the ground – indeed, quite the contrary – due partly to a surprisingly high level of energy savings. These observations indicate that the policy outcomes and behaviour thus far lie somewhere between the status quo

and the somewhat higher ambitions compared to the situation prior to the invasion. This may in turn be explained by the resilience of the EU institutions, the unified response to the invasion among the member-states and multi-level reinforcement dynamics (SCHREURS – TIBERGHIEN 2007). However, the greater focus on the energy transition, as exemplified by the more rapid permissions procedures for renewables, may exacerbate the potential conflicts over land use, nature and biodiversity.

The EU will have to shift from crisis response to long-term governance of energy diversification, gas and electricity markets, grid interconnection, renewables, energy efficiency and energy poverty. These energy policies must be linked to EU climate policies – not only in policymaking, but also in implementation among the member-states and societal actors. Further, climate and energy policies need to be aligned to the EU's industry strategy, which has been increasingly linked to the energy transition through the net-zero industry and raw materials initiatives. Success here may enhance the EU's ability to lead internationally by example towards 2030 and beyond.

ENDNOTES

1 Although not a breach of contract, this action was widely seen as a move by Russia aimed at achieving changes in the terms for the gas trade.

2 To accomplish this, the *linear reduction factor* will be increased from 2.2% to 4.3% from 2024 to 2027, and to 4.4% from 2028 to 2030.

3 After pressure from Germany, the European Commission will make a proposal for CO_2-neutral e-fuels which allow for combustion engines after 2035.

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The EU's Green Peace Narrative and Russia: Russia's War in Ukraine in the EU's Climate Narrative

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ABSTRACT

The article looks at how Russia's war in Ukraine enters the EU's climate narrative. The European Union has over time developed a narrative of itself as the global green leader. This narrative has increasingly served as a complementary one to the EU's foundational peace narrative. For the peace narrative, the EU's own violent past served as 'the other', whereas for the green leader narrative other world powers less willing to participate in climate action, including the US, China and Russia, have served as 'the others'. The current war merges the two narratives and posits the EU as the peaceful green leader in contrast to the brutal aggression of the authoritarian Russian oil and gas economy. The war discourse, moreover, facilitates the concrete work with the EU's Fit for 55 climate mitigation agenda, and during the second half of 2022, several important milestones were reached in this respect.

KEYWORDS	European Union, Ukraine, Russia, climate policy, narrative analysis
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INTRODUCTION

The European Union's status as a global green leader has long been integral to its strategic priorities. The European Green Deal (EGD) is a recent flagship initiative of the European Commission (EC) under the leadership of Ursula von der Leyen, who became President in December 2019. Some analyses have gone as far as suggesting that the EGD is a new defining *"building block to the European economic model"* (BONGARDT – TORRES 2022). A crucial feature of the EGD is the roadmap to make the EU carbon-neutral by 2050. Within this strategy, the 'Fit for 55' legislative package is a crucial first step aiming at reducing EU greenhouse gas emissions by 55 percent by 2030. The package was proposed by the Commission in 2021 in the middle of the Covid pandemic, and when the different proposals entered the legislative procedure the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine began.

There is now beginning a literature on how the previous significant crisis in the EU, the Covid pandemic, influenced the EU's approach to climate mitigation. Some parts of the initial analyses have been optimistic, and considered the pandemic and lockdowns an opportunity for economic transition, whereas others suggested that the crisis and its negative consequences on the economy would lead to a prioritization of economic investment and a decreasing willingness to impose a stringent climate mitigation policy (SEE, E.G., BÄCKSTRAND 2022). At the same time, official EU discourse tended to describe climate policy as key to the recovery from the crisis – an economic opportunity in line with the ecological modernization thesis (HAJER 1997) more recently repackaged under the label 'circular economy' (LEIPOLD 2021). The crucial point of this discourse is that economic growth and sustainable development are combinable. With the EGD and the Fit for 55 legislations, the EU continues along a path of reforms based on utilizing market-based instruments. For one thing, the EU's Emissions Trading System (ETS) has been described as the flagship of EU climate policy.

The EU's climate policy has both an internal and an external dimension. Internally, the policy aimed to enhance solidarity by introducing the social and climate fund to support the citizens and businesses most badly affected by the extension of the ETS. In addition, the ETS already included the modernization fund established primarily to support the less affluent

member-states in their transition to a climate-neutral economy. Externally, there were always several foreign policy components related to the EU's climate policy. The target of climate neutrality by 2050 and the 55 percent reduction target to be achieved by 2030 made the EU the leader among major economies in climate mitigation (VON HOMEYER – OBERTHUR – DUPONT 2022). Historically, the EU's greenhouse gas reduction commitments to the outside world came before the existence of any internal climate policy (SEE, E.G., OBERTHÜR – DUPONT 2021). The EGD and the attempts to reduce the EU's dependence on the import of fossil fuels were also always viewed as foreign policy in relation to oil/gas exporting countries, in particular Russia. Frans Timmermans explicitly warned about potential negative reactions to EU climate policy, in particular, those of Russia already before the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine began (TIMMERMANS 2021). Additionally, other countries are affected in this context, such as those along crucial oil shipping routes (LEONARD ET AL. 2021).

As the impact of the Covid pandemic on the EU's climate policy only begins to emerge, it is even more premature to draw definitive conclusions about the impact of Russia's war in Ukraine. Some early research has suggested that it weakens the East-West conflict within the EU over EU climate policy (VON HOMEYER – OBERTHUR – DUPONT 2022), whereas other studies have indicated a new division line between those states that consider coal as a (temporary) solution to achieving energy security and those which do not and instead focus on renewables, energy efficiency and/or nuclear energy (MIŠÍK – NOSKO 2023). Nevertheless, during the first year of the war in Ukraine, the EU managed to adopt some crucial legislation of the Fit for 55 package. In particular, the Czech Council of the EU Presidency managed to broker an agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission on an extension of the ETS to nearly all sectors of the economy, including buildings and transport (FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND CLIMATE ACTION 2022). There were also some setbacks, in particular the reversal of the agreement to ban combustion engines by 2035 (COKELAERE 2023). A more notable change has occurred in the official 'green Europe' narrative; Russia and the war in Ukraine now occupy a sizable role in it.

Indeed, a significant transformation has emerged within the content of the official 'green Europe' narrative. This narrative, traditionally

centred around environmentally friendly practices, sustainability, and the collective action of European nations to address climate change, has experienced a shift in focus to Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine. The role of the war is not just peripheral, but substantial, thus warranting a detailed examination. This shift signifies a geopolitical angle, an addition that has nuanced the existing narrative. It brings into the conversation the implications of the war on energy security, regional stability, and the overall objectives of the 'green Europe' narrative.

This narrative change is what this article aims to decipher. In the following, we first briefly introduce how we understand the role of narratives in the development of European integration and for the EU as an actor in international politics. Thereafter, we provide an examination of the discourse among EU representatives about climate mitigation in the context of Russia's war in Ukraine. In the final discussion, we seek to answer the question of how the war is integrated into the EU discourse on climate mitigation and how the narrative can facilitate domestic legitimation as well as the external role of the EU as a green normative power. We argue that as an internal outcome, while identifying Russia as anti-green and as an aggressor in its green narrative, the EU is actually defining itself as the opposite, a process that can be conceptualized as *othering* in the context of collective identity building. Thus, Russia's war in Ukraine allows the EU to merge its foundational narratives of being a peace project and a climate leader. Externally, the transition to climate neutrality, which is argued for by the EU as a normative power in the international arena, is not a win-win situation for everyone, particularly not for exporters of fossil fuel.

THE EU'S FOUNDATIONAL NARRATIVES

Narratives are stories people tell to make sense of their reality. For an evolving political entity such as the EU, narratives are crucial for the domestic process of legitimation but also for its external normative power. In times of crises and increased politicization of the European integration project, narratives are increasingly important, but crises can disrupt narratives that people have utilized to make sense of the world around them.

The foundational narrative of the EU serves as the bedrock upon which the union is built and operates, embodying the principles, aspirations,

and collective identity that bind the member states together. At its core, the EU's foundational narrative is based on the ideals of peace, unity, and prosperity. It was born out of the ashes of World War II, where a desire for lasting peace led nations to bind themselves together in an unprecedented political and economic structure. The narrative encompasses the commitment to prevent the recurrence of the devastating wars that ravaged the continent through cooperation and shared decision-making. Another crucial component of this narrative is the pursuit of prosperity. The EU seeks to create an integrated and thriving economic space where trade barriers are minimized, and economic opportunities are maximized. This commitment is reflected in the establishment of the single market and the shared currency, the Euro. Finally, democracy, human rights, and rule of law form the pillars of the EU's foundational narrative. These principles are said to guide the union's internal policies and its relationships with the outside world, serving as a beacon for countries aspiring to join the EU and acting as a yardstick for the union's actions on the global stage. In essence, the foundational narrative of the EU is a complex tapestry woven from threads of shared history, collective aspirations, and firmly held principles. It serves as both a guide for action and a mirror reflecting the union's identity.

The former Commissioner Olli Rehn claimed in 2005 that the EU was *"a postmodern entity: a community of states that have agreed to pool their sovereignties and obey common laws in order to increase their impact in the world [in contrast to] the mindset of spheres of influence currently prevailing in Russia"* (REHN 2005). However, already at that time, critical academic voices warned that in relation to Russia, the risk was that the EU would *"learn from Russia and embrace precisely what it is lauded for having overcome: traditional (realist) geopolitics"* (KLINKE 2012: 930).

Della Sala (2023) suggests that the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine undermines the EU's foundational myth based on achieving peace through interdependence. While facing a concrete military threat the peace narrative, which was confirmed through the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012, is not a credible story for the future anymore. However, already prior to the latest stage of Russia's war in Ukraine, research suggested that the initial peace narrative of reconciliation and postwar reconstruction

was gradually replaced by new stories such as the Green Europe narrative (MANNERS – MURRAY 2016).

We suggest here that while the Russian war undermines the EU's traditional story of facilitating peace through interaction, it simultaneously strengthens the EU's green narrative. The EU's climate policy has been internally contested, which has hampered both the EU's work on climate change policy and its potential global leadership role in this regard, which is referred to as the EU's 'green normative power' (VAN DER HEJDEN 2010). The contestation does not disappear as a consequence of the war, but from this perspective, it generates an increased urgency for coherence. Moreover, even if Della Sala (2023) might be correct in suggesting that the war undermines the EU's traditional view of itself as creating stability in the neighbourhood through interaction, it renders the traditional narrative increased relevance by showing how fragile peace is. Waever (2005) suggested that the EU's other was the continent's own brutal past, but with the war on the Union's border, the 'other' is no longer an abstract interpretation of the past. The following analysis illuminates how the war enables a merger of Green Europe and the peace narrative.

THE GREEN EUROPE NARRATIVE IN TIMES OF WAR

The tensions between the EU and Russia regarding climate policy, let alone the geopolitical tensions between them, began well before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Despite their mutual interdependence in their energy relations, concerns were voiced regarding the reliability of Russian energy companies and contrasting environmental policies (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 2013). The EU has been criticizing Russia for its lack of ambition, as well as the inconsistencies in its approach to climate change mitigation (GROSS 2021). However, even up until the start of the invasion, there were expressions of hope for a cooperation between the EU and Russia, at least on climate issues. Russia and the EU organized a joint climate conference in 2020[1]; speaking at the World Economic Forum in 2021, von der Leyen described climate change as the defining challenge of our time and urged the EU's partners, including Russia, to jointly work on solutions to it together with the EU (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM 2021). However, just a few days before the invasion, von der Leyen commented on Russia's troop build-up at Ukraine's borders at the Munich Security Conference, promising that

the EU would not rely on a partner that initiated a war on the European continent (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2022A).

After the invasion, discussions on the domestic energy crisis caused by rising gas and oil prices brought Russia's war in Ukraine into the EU's climate narrative. In a press release published less than two weeks after the invasion, the EC declared the necessity to significantly speed up the commitment to move to renewable energy sources *"in light of Russia's invasion of Ukraine"* (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2022B). In the press release, von der Leyen and Frans Timmermans underscored the urgency of accelerating the EU's clean energy transition by stressing not only that renewable energy is "cheap" and "clean", and has the potential to create new jobs at home, but also that the EU can no longer rely on Russia as an unreliable energy supplier *"who explicitly threatens us."*

Since then, the EU has consistently included Russia's war in Ukraine in its climate narrative, expanding the focus from energy policy to a more general climate neutrality strategy in line with the EGD. In this narrative, the EU is presented as a peaceful and green world leader, while Russia is portrayed as an aggressive and anti-green (fossil fuel-dependent) actor who disrupts the regional order. For example, at the World Economic Forum in 2023, von der Leyen highlighted the progress made by the EU in replacing its "dangerous dependency" on Russian fossil fuels with a "net-zero transformation," describing it as an unprecedented shift in industrial, economic and geopolitical realms (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2023A). In a statement on energy from September 2022, von der Leyen once again called Russia an "unreliable supplier" which manipulates the market, and which the EU cannot work with (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2022C). Describing the steps the EU has taken to free itself from Russia's "grip," von der Leyen called the investment in renewables the most crucial one as they are cheap and will make Europe independent, stating that *"the renewables are really our energy insurance for the future."*

During the European Parliament Plenary on December 15th 2022, von der Leyen began her speech by detailing the devastating consequences of recent Russian missile attacks on Ukrainian cities, emphasizing that *"this is what we [Europeans] are all standing up against"* (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2023B). Reconfirming that the EU is peaceful (in its support of peace in Ukraine)

and green (in its progress in line with the EGD and move away from fossil fuels), von der Leyen maintained that *"Putin assumed that our support for Ukraine would not last. Today, one year after the war began, he has already lost the energy war he started [against the EU]. [...] Putin's attempt to blackmail Europe using energy has been an abject failure."*

This line of argumentation suggests that the EU's foundational narrative is being reshaped, with a clear distinction being made between the 'green' EU and the 'anti-green' other, Russia. As noted by Laurence Tubiana, the CEO of the European Climate Foundation, during COP's discussion on the "Impact of Russia's War against Ukraine on European Climate Policies", this is not just about an energy crisis or climate policies; it is about *"reinventing Europe"* because the energy transition is not only a technical issue but also a political and social issue (INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 2022). This regional integration-facilitating reinvention has started when von der Leyen's Commission presented the EGD with the promise to 'green' Europe – to centre the EU's activities around climate neutrality targets. But the post-war Europe has both accelerated the green transition to make the Union lead the *"clean tech revolution"* (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2023C) and demonstrated that it is a peace promoter, especially since the refugee crises in the last decade did not show the EU in a good light in that regard.

CONCLUDING DISCUSSION – THE EU, CLIMATE AND RUSSIA

For several decades and even more so in the last few years, the EU is believed to hold leadership in global climate governance. An essential aspect of being a leader is being more ambitious than other entities. However, recently, some scholars have called for a 'grand climate strategy' of the EU (OBERTHÜR – DUPONT 2021) to harmonize the normative and diplomatic aspects of this leadership. The EU's normative leadership has been linked to setting an example but also convincing others to make changes due to the size and relevance of the EU's single market. Increasingly, however, the EU leadership in the field cannot ignore that the transition to climate neutrality is not a win-win situation for everyone, especially in the short term; exporters of fossil fuel lose not only income but also influence over the EU and, more generally, power in the international system.

The disappearing EU market for oil and gas affects not only Russia but also other major exporters such as Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and countries in the Middle East and Africa (LEONARD ET AL. 2021). For Russia, the war in Ukraine is likely to mean that the EU market will soon disappear completely, especially considering that market analysts had already predicted a fall in Russian GDP growth as a consequence of climate mitigation measures elsewhere (MAKAROV ET AL. 2020). If the EU's normative leadership is successful, this will mean a gradual decrease of other markets. For Russian 'state capitalism,' the fossil fuel revenues will be difficult to compensate for (KINOSSIAN – MORAGN 2022). Moreover, Putin's popularity and power have been linked to the rising oil prices during the early period of his leadership, which was combined with the process of nationalization (DRESSEN 2014).

For the EU, the war can potentially facilitate internal coherence. The Czech Republic, a country often described as being reluctant at best when it comes to EU climate policies (SEE, E.G., BRAUN 2019), held the EU Council presidency during the second half of 2022. Despite the country's opposition criticizing the Green Deal for contributing to increased energy prices, the government moderated its critique in this regard and stressed the need for a transfer to a carbon-neutral energy mix that would make the country more independent. However, the increased prices in Czechia, as in other countries of the EU, also led to an increase in coal use.

In this analysis, we have proposed that the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has catalyzed a unique convergence within the EU's foundational narratives. This convergence is between the EU as a peace project – historically dedicated to preventing conflict through integration – and the EU as a climate leader committed to environmental sustainability and spearheading global green initiatives. As such, a pertinent question arises: is the EU's response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine a reflection of a broader trend towards the EU behaving as a more traditional power in the sphere of international relations?

The EU began imposing sanctions on Russia over the Ukraine situation as early as 2014, and in 2023, another round of sanctions was enacted. These actions indicate an increasing willingness to use economic power to influence international affairs, a characteristic more typical of traditional state actors. Moreover, the EU's decision to supply arms to Ukraine,

particularly since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion, marks a novel and significant step in its external policy.

However, these actions, suggesting a shift towards the EU acting as a conventional power, do not necessarily undermine its foundational narrative of being a peace project. In fact, they could be seen as a reaffirmation of this narrative. By standing up against aggression, the EU is demonstrating its commitment to maintaining peace and stability within its borders and its neighbouring regions. It is signalling that it is prepared to take necessary measures to safeguard its values and principles.

When we bring into the mix the narrative of the EU as a global climate leader, the situation becomes even more nuanced. The EU's actions can be interpreted not only as an attempt to maintain peace but also as an effort to safeguard its green initiatives. This combination of peacekeeping and environmental stewardship has given rise to what might be termed as the 'green peace' narrative. This narrative, if sustained, could foster domestic legitimacy and earn external recognition, enhancing the EU's standing as a unique and influential actor on the global stage.

ENDNOTES

1 See the conference agenda here: <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/first-eu-russia-climate-conference-dialogue-climate-policy-and-next-steps-en>.

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India, the Inevitable? How the War in Ukraine Shapes EU-India Energy Relations

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ABSTRACT

In the wake of global energy shortages that were triggered or intensified by the Russian war in Ukraine, the search for reliable and sustainable resources is intensifying. Consequently, both new energy partnerships and the expansion of existing agreements are pushed by EU member states. In this article, we examine these trends with a particular eye on green hydrogen and its role in the cooperation between India and the EU. Not only in this context is this 'fuel of the considered' a climate hope and an economic miracle cure and therefore it increasingly takes on a central role in the apparently growing overtures of the EU to its partners in the Indo-Pacific in general, and India in particular, especially in, but not limited to, the field of energy. With India's growing geopolitical stature and confidence, which is most visible in its focus on strategic autonomy and neutrality in regard to the war in Ukraine, as well as its – at times – increasingly divergent political values in comparison to some of its European partners, the content and scope of the currently underdeveloped partnership continues to be in question.

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ENERGY SECURITY IN UNCERTAIN TIMES

Energy security is a central goal of all governments; and for most countries, but especially those in the Global South, a stable and affordable energy supply is one of the most important yet volatile factors (if not the single most important one) for economic development. Yet, the pursuit of energy security at all costs is often seen to stand in conflict with the pursuit of good environmental and climate policies. The little progress made in the past three decades in negotiations on the global climate regime, for instance, is seriously threatened by new pressures resulting from a sequence of certain events and disasters, including the COVID-19 pandemic and, above all, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine.

One prominent example in this regard is Germany's attempt at *Energiewende* (energy transformation), which was hit at a sensitive point: the so-called transitional energy sources, which are mainly made up of Russian natural gas. With the economic sanctions on Russia and the resulting end of supplies of natural gas, the resulting emergency purchases of Germany and other members of the European Union (EU) on the global spot market to secure national energy supplies contributed to turning the regional crisis into a global (energy) crisis. Countries such as Bangladesh have experienced blackouts at regular intervals due to the lack of affordable energy, while many others are suffering under high energy prices (ISLAM – JANJUA 2022) and their spill over into food production – for example, Egypt, which faced skyrocketing food inflation rates of up to 31% in November 2022 (IFPRI 2022).

Furthermore, the emergency fossil fuel purchases, especially by European nations as self-proclaimed leaders in the area of climate change (EUROPEAN COUNCIL 2023), were accompanied by considerable political reputational costs in the Global South. Yet, the crisis also offered other (unintended) effects for some, including the two Asian great powers, India and China. While Russia was hit by Western sanctions, India persistently abstained from all related votes at the UN General Assembly to condemn the Russian invasion, while China voted against Russia's suspension from the UN Human Rights Council (UN 2022A) and abstained from the non-recognition vote regarding Russia's proclaimed annexations (UN 2022B) as well as from a call to withdraw from Ukrainian territory on the eve of the start

of second year of the invasion (UN 2023). With their refusals to outspokenly blame Russia, both states created the basis for the continued and significantly increased imports of Russian gas and oil (MURTAUGH – CHAKRABORTY 2022) to them at extremely discounted prices.

The shortage of Russian gas supplies to the EU since the outbreak of the war has in turn made the EU more determined not to become directly dependent again on only one supplier of its key energy resources, particularly with China in mind, as it currently dominates the market for key inputs for batteries, solar panels, and other components that are necessary for a shift to renewable energies. The resulting diversification of trade relations focuses on reinforcing ties with established partners, including Canada, but also on strengthening ties to partners in Asia and Latin America. India has become a focal point in this regard, both as a partner of the EU in general, and specifically as a participant in Germany's drive for several newly concluded economic and (renewable) energy cooperation agreements (DELLATTE 2022).

This feeds into India's self-perception as a leader in the field of solar power, among others, but also into its overall strengthened position in the global order and its growing confidence on the world stage. One might say that India has become an inevitable (energy) partner. In addition to its many domestic projects, India's leadership ambition is expressed in the creation and maintenance of international forums such as the International Solar Alliance (ISA). In this context, both sides like to cultivate a rhetoric of "natural partners" who come together as the world's largest democracies. However, this requires an increased willingness on the part of the EU to look the other way on issues of rule of law and human rights. For instance, there has been little to no public criticism so far of the Indian practice of buying Russian discount oil, which has been referred to as *"not our business"* by the German Ambassador in New Delhi (NDTV 2023). At the domestic level, India has been declared an electoral authority in V-Dem's Liberal Democracy Index, ranked 97 out of 197 countries in terms of their levels of liberal democracy, and branded as *"one of the worst autocratizers in the last 10 years"* (V-DEM INSTITUTE 2023). Concerning press freedom in India, Reporters Without Borders ranked the country in the 150th place in this regard out of 180 states in 2022 (RSF 2023A), compared to its being in the 131st place in 2012 (RSF 2023B). More recently, the shrinking of spaces for civil society in

India has become globally visible in the growing number of think tanks and NGOs, including Oxfam India and the Centre for Policy Research, which have lost their Foreign Contribution Regulation Act licence (HINDUSTAN TIMES 2022). Two other examples of this shrinking of civil society spaces are the tax raids on the BBC offices in Delhi shortly after their broadcast of a critical documentary on PM Modi (CNN 2023), and the increasingly sharp rhetoric against 'outsiders' that allegedly try to influence Indian domestic affairs – for instance, by the foreign minister (INDIA TODAY 2023). It appears that against the backdrop of this growing self-confidence of India and the European need to find partners, any critique of India by the EU may be rather muted.

The key reason for what could be described as a strategic "tolerance" or "pragmatism" in this case is certainly the Russian war in Ukraine and its repercussions for the EU as a whole as well as its individual member states. The seemingly stable European peace order has been shattered by some states' clear deviation from some of its core principles, including the violent attempt to change borders. In addition, and to the surprise of many, the war has been regarded as mostly a "European" problem rather than a global one in many parts of the world. This not only had serious repercussion for Europe's self-image as a normative power with global reach, but also very concrete consequences for its trade relationships, as it strives to become less dependent on potential norm violators; and this specifically includes China with its looming threat to Taiwan, in addition to Russia. A renewed focus was given to so-called "value partners", especially when it comes to ensuring the EU's energy security. Germany, for example, has just concluded an energy partnership and a hydrogen alliance with Canada. Yet, this push to diversify has also led to a certain level of "strategic pragmatism" when it comes to human rights and other high-held norms and values. An example of this is the energy supply agreement with Azerbaijan, particularly after it recently went to war with Armenia, a country that has partner status with the EU, over Nagorno-Karabakh, and this war is flaring up on a regular basis. As said above, democratic backsliding is also on the advance in India, yet it is a highly desirable partner for the EU in many areas of concern, as it expands its weight, for instance, in the field of renewable energy but also in that of (green) hydrogen,[1] a field in which the Modi government wants to become a global leader. Yet, while the Ukraine war has given new impetus to these dynamics, many foundations for an expanding energy and specifically a hydrogen partnership between

the EU and its member states on the one side and India on the other, were already laid before 24 February 2022.

EXPANSION OF ENERGY AND HYDROGEN PARTNERSHIPS BEFORE FEBRUARY 2022

Hydrogen, especially green hydrogen, is an example of contemporary developments at the intersection of conflict, climate change and energy security; it is considered both a climate hope and an economic miracle cure. Even before the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the EU had expanded its hydrogen relations with partners in the Indo-Pacific but also other regions. Green hydrogen has great (but also so far largely unfulfilled) promise in this regard. These international partnerships on hydrogen often involve industrialized nations in the Global North and emerging or developing countries in the Global South. While industrialized nations secure their own energy supply in this way, in theory, actors in the Global South may benefit from investments in sustainable development in their economies but also in expanding their own energy supply. Yet, this model has also come under scrutiny for setting up new dependencies, specifically if local benefits, especially in terms of energy supply, are not secured. Such cooperation efforts and agreements, besides those with India, are primarily those that the EU has with Namibia, Brazil, Egypt, and Morocco (LINDNER 2022); and in the absence of a broader governance framework for hydrogen relations (VAN DE GRAAF ET AL. 2020) this is something that needs to be carefully considered.

Overall, however, the race for global hydrogen sources and associated markets is booming across the globe, and new agreements are negotiated in multiple bilateral or multilateral partnerships. In addition to joint research projects, these agreements also include, for instance, concrete trade intentions between the countries involved as well as related national development strategies that place hydrogen at the centre of their own future national economies. Globally oriented hydrogen strategies exist, for example, in the EU, the US, Canada, and the UK, but also in India and China.

The EU, for example, has developed its strategy on hydrogen in 2020 as one way of substantiating the European Green Deal. It envisions the creation of a European hydrogen economy, including an expansion in

research and innovation, and scaling up production and infrastructure. Twenty action points were listed, of which all had been implemented by the first quarter of 2022. Furthermore, the overarching economic strategy is flanked by publicity measures such as the European Hydrogen Week 2022 or the Clean Hydrogen Partnership Awards 2022. To link industrial interests and involve relevant stakeholders, the European Clean Hydrogen Alliance was created in July 2020 to form a bridge between industry representatives, public authorities, civil society, and other relevant groups for the large-scale deployment of clean hydrogen technologies by 2030 (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2022A).

India, for its part, launched its National Hydrogen Mission in August 2021 as the primary framework for managing national demands and achieving its self-set climate targets. The mission aims to standardize and bundle national hydrogen activities and bring science and industry closer together. Potential areas of green hydrogen use for India include fertilizer, steel, and petrochemicals as well as transport and industry schemes (MNRE 2022). At the same time, the mission aims to develop India as a global hub for the whole value chain of hydrogen and fuel cells technology, which could contribute not only to reaching the BJP government's target of Indian energy independence by 2047 (IBID.), but also to India complying with its overarching climate targets (including reaching net-zero by 2070) and simultaneously assuming a position of leadership in a market that global competitors are also striving to lead.

ENERGY PARTNERSHIPS IN TIMES OF WAR

While emergency purchases and conservation efforts characterized the European energy winter of 2022–2023, and widespread blackouts have been avoided, EU member states will likely have to manage their energy demand without any Russian gas supplies at all for the foreseeable future. In its Energy Outlook 2022, the IEA assumes that the Russian war of aggression will drive up investments in and the subsequent shift towards renewable energy sources from $1.3 trillion in 2022 to more than $2 trillion annually by 2030 (IEA 2022). Considering the increased efforts to promote national and global hydrogen economies, it thus can be assumed that bi- or minilateral hydrogen-related alliances will increase both in number and in quality. On the part of the EU, in the REPowerEU plan, published

in May 2022, the Commission proposed to establish a global European hydrogen facility and import-oriented green hydrogen that, in their duality, are intended to ensure a level playing field between EU production and third-country imports (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2022B).

India has become a partner at the forefront of these endeavours, and this has led to an increased diplomatic and political courtship that expanded and diversified an – in theory – strategic partnership that has existed since 2004 (MEA 2021). One of the most notable expressions of these aims is the resumption of negotiations on a free trade agreement with India in June 2022, as these negotiations had previously been stalled (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2022D). And while previous EU-India collaborations in the energy sector focused on offshore wind energy, solar roof tops and solar parks, integration of renewable energy and storage, smart grids, biofuels and energy efficiency in buildings, in September 2022, Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson travelled to Delhi for deepening the EU-India cooperation in the area of hydrogen, among others, guided by the EU-India Green Hydrogen Forum. The combination of diplomatic attention that India receives from the EU and the corresponding provision of financial resources for projects is in fact currently unparalleled on this scale. These expanding relations between the EU and India are cushioned by a rhetoric that emphasizes mutual appreciation and cooperation. At the same time, both sides are pursuing ambitious and potentially competitive goals, with the EU, for example, aiming for a boost of the hydrogen share in its energy mix to 14 percent of its final energy demand by 2050 (POLITICO 2022).

As per usual, however, the policy directives of the EU Commission at least partially overlap or even conflict with interests of individual member states, which could play into the hands of external partners such as India or China. One example is the German foundation H2Global, which was set up by the Federal Government with a mandate to increase investment in hydrogen for the German market. The foundation is explicitly focussed on non-EU countries and Germany aims to support this mechanism with more than €4 billion (KURMAYER 2022). Germany thus considers India a key partner for its own sustainable energy transition, but also for containing the carbon-emitting economic growth of emerging economies. To substantiate their partnership, extensive German-Indian governmental consultations were held in May 2022 and have subsequently been deepened

by concretized projects on renewable energies and energy efficiency as well as climate-resilient urban development, climate-friendly mobility, and the sustainable management of natural resources (BMZ 2022). These initiatives significantly expand existing bilateral formats, including the Indo-German Environment Forum, the Indo-German Energy Forum, and the Indo-German Green Hydrogen Task Force, among others. In addition to the cooperation on PV solutions, a hydrogen economy between them should be developed jointly (THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 2022A). So far, however, the Indo-German projects have primarily served as technical implementation projects, without any global political glamour. The ISA, on the other hand, was heavily promoted by France and India in international forums, and this promotion included personal statements by President Macron and PM Modi. Competitive and partnership entanglements in the energy sector therefore exist not only between global political players themselves, but also within the EU and third parties such as India.

It has become clear that India can significantly benefit from this new level of attention and support, yet it also has sufficient leverage to insist on its strategic autonomy when it comes to its positioning on the war in Ukraine and warding off critique of its domestic politics, for instance.

CONCLUSION: THE EU-INDIAN PARTNERSHIP ON SHAKY GROUNDS?

Overall, India serves the EU and its member states not only as an important and emerging trading partner, but also as an anchor in the newly solidified understanding of the Indo-Pacific as a strategically important region. Alongside the ASEAN states, India is seen as a bulwark against the all-encompassing dominance of the People's Republic of China, even though all three actors stand for conflicting and partly overlapping interests. India's vital role as an EU value partner for the maintenance of the rules-based order is repeatedly stressed in strategically goal-oriented documents such as the German Indo-Pacific Guidelines (THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 2022B) and the related progress reports or the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2021).

India is also a key partner with infrastructural development potential, for instance within the framework of the EU's Global Gateway Strategy,

and is in a primary position for investments, which should also include the hydrogen sector (DELEGATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO INDIA AND BHUTAN 2022). This has been primarily manifested in the India-EU Connectivity Partnership, launched in late 2022, which mainly intends to expand, diversify, and renew the EU-Indian trade relations, and serves to build a global narrative which is, above all, in competition with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (PANDA 2022). Much rhetoric in the EU reinforces this value partnership by using the standard trope of the EU and India as the two largest democracies in the world that together can strive for human rights and environmental safeguarding, along with trade, security, and research cooperation. If we compare this to the situation of Brazil under the right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro, who was mostly shunned by European partners (Bolsonaro was the only Brazilian President without a single bilateral visit to Europe – with the exception of a short visit to Hungary in 2022) (STUENKEL 2022), the EU's very different approach to India is noticeable in times in which autocratization tendencies in India persist and are growing. India has witnessed an increase in civil society and political restrictions under the Modi government. Moreover, India's stance on the war in Ukraine has caused, at least initially, substantial irritation in the EU. Yet, this potential for conflict has since been actively played down, presumably as a consequence of the even more difficult relations with China and the fear of alienating a still democratic state that has assumed a significant role on the geopolitical stage.

The deepened European-Indian hydrogen cooperation can therefore be interpreted as the dawn of a new, shared and positive energy future imaginary. It is – at this point – indeed an imaginary, as India still heavily relies on domestic and imported coal for its expanding energy needs, and the EU has dealt with the sudden breakdown of Russian gas supplies by developing new fossil-fuel based partnerships elsewhere in the world. Examples include the construction of new LNG terminals at the German coastline and the conclusion of long-term supply agreements with states such as Qatar (THE GUARDIAN 2022).

By courting India, the EU clearly tries to pursue a comprehensive approach that aims to combine the issues of energy security, global climate protection and increasing geopolitical relevance with calculated strategic partnerships, especially with states of the Global South. More importantly, however, this new attention to India is driven by avoiding new

dependencies on China at all costs. This puts the metaphorical ball distinctly in India's court, and gives it considerable leeway despite its setbacks to democracy, despite its profiting from cheap Russian oil and despite its increasingly questionable human rights record. An all-encompassing value match is therefore not to be expected from the new EU-India partnership. Rather, it is changing geopolitical realities that make India an inevitable port of call for the EU.

ENDNOTES

1 Hydrogen exists in several 'colour' variants, which represent the respective degrees of sustainability in its production. A grey colour, the currently predominant variant, means that it is created from natural gas or methane, using steam methane reformation without carbon capturing; blue hydrogen also stems from gas but the resulting emissions are captured and stored. Green hydrogen is produced exclusively from renewable energies.

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More Weapons than Windmills: Japan's Military and Energy Policy Response to Russia's Attack on Ukraine

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ABSTRACT	Russia's attack on Ukraine was a shock to both the international security architecture and global energy markets. This article examines Japan's response to these shocks. It finds that the Ukraine War spurred dramatic policy changes in Japan's defense policy, but only moderate ones in its energy policy. The war has so far had a particularly weak impact on Japan's green transition despite the potential renewable energy has for Japanese energy security. We argue that the main reason for the discrepancy between Japan's responses in the defense field and energy field is found in its increasingly strong tendency to securitize "the China threat". Strengthening Japan's defense policy as a response to Russia's aggression is seen by Japanese policymakers as compatible with counterbalancing China. However, a full-blown transition to renewable energy is not, due to the Japanese fear of becoming further trade-dependent on China, which dominates renewable energy markets.

KEYWORDS	Japan, crisis, Ukraine war, energy, military, defense, securitization
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INTRODUCTION

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a shock to the system – both the international security architecture and energy markets. As the biggest military conflict in Europe since the end of World War 2, it has brought NATO members closer together in a marked shift from when French President Emmanuel Macron decried the "death of NATO" in 2019 (THE ECONOMIST 2019). The security concerns are not limited to Europe, but also reverberate in Asia. Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio (2023) has repeatedly stressed that *"Ukraine may be the East Asia of tomorrow".* In the field of traditional military security, Japan's response culminated in the dramatic decision to double Japan's defense spending by 2027 and acquire enemy base strike capabilities (TATSUMI 2023).

Given that Russia is one of the largest producers and exporters of oil and gas, its actions in Ukraine also sent shockwaves through international energy markets with *"potentially serious implications for international energy security"* (IEA 2022A). In the wake of the attack, oil and gas prices skyrocketed, which is a challenge in particular for energy import-dependent countries like Japan. In the years before the Russian attack, Japan relied on Russia for approximately seven percent of its total fossil fuel imports (METI 2022). Globally, the energy crisis *"has sparked unprecedented momentum for renewables"* as concerns about energy security led many countries to strengthen their renewable energy policy to increase the share of domestically produced electricity (IEA 2022B).

The Ukraine War has thus posed a major challenge for Japan in the defense field and the energy field. However, as we will show, Japan's responses to the war have been starkly different in the two fields. In the defense field, we have seen language and action of such a dramatic nature that it should be labeled as a case of securitization. In the energy field, however, there has been little change, especially when it came to the green transition. Since Russia's actions have been framed as both a military and an energy threat, it is pertinent to ask why securitization has only taken place in Japan's defense policy and not in its energy policy. We argue that this discrepancy can be explained by "the China factor". The securitization in the defense field complements Japan's strategy to counter the rise of China – an increasingly important Japanese objective – while securitization in

the energy field does not. This is because policymakers in Tokyo fear that a mass-scale transition to renewable energy could increase Japan's trade dependence on China, which dominates many of the renewable energy markets. We conclude by presenting some policy recommendations and point out that Japanese concerns about a possible increase in trade-dependence on China are somewhat overblown in the case of renewable energy.

SECURITIZATION

Shock events, such as wars, accidents or economic crises, challenge the credibility of existing institutions and policies. By spotlighting deficiencies in existing structures, they create a window of opportunity for change (CAPOCCIA – KELEMEN 2007). It is not given, however, that a shock event translates into a fundamental policy change during critical junctures. Radical change depends on key actors' perception of the crisis at hand and their ability to mobilize support for new ideas. In times of crises, policymakers often resort to a tactic known as "securitization" – the framing of a problem as so urgent that extraordinary policy measures must be taken. Hence, a successful securitization transforms a window of opportunity into a radical reorientation of policy.

The originators of securitization theory, the so-called Copenhagen School, argue that securitization consists of the following steps. First, since security issues are often not self-evident, a securitizing actor must perform a speech act in which s/he frames a certain object as an existential threat that requires an imminent response. Typically, the speech act will be along the lines of *"If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way)"* (BUZAN – WÆVER – DE WILDE 1998: 24). As Ralf Emmers (2016: 172) notes, in contrast to realism's focus on the material nature of the threat, the constructivist securitization approach focuses on how an issue is *"made to be perceived as a threat"*. According to this view, threats do not objectively manifest themselves, but must, in a sense, be spoken into being. The speech act is therefore intended to convince a relevant audience of a threat that necessitates extraordinary measures. In democracies the relevant audience is typically the voters, who provide policymakers with political mandates to act. Second, if the speech act is accepted by the relevant audience, the securitizing actor implements extraordinary measures *"outside the normal*

bounds of political procedure" (BUZAN – WÆVER – DE WILDE 1998: 24). Such extraordinary measures differ in accordance with the nature of the threat, but they are typically considered rather extreme responses that would not be possible under normal circumstances.

In the following, we demonstrate that although Russia's actions were framed as both a military and an energy threat by Japan, the corresponding Japanese securitization only took place in the defense field while the response in the energy field has been far more restrained.

JAPAN'S DEFENSE POLICY RESPONSE TO THE UKRAINE WAR

Japan has undertaken a radical reform of its defense policies in the wake of the Ukraine War. The lack of popular opposition to these radical measures suggests that we are dealing with a successful case of securitization. It is important to note that the process of defense securitization in Japan had been underway for several years in response to the heightened threat perceptions vis-à-vis China (HAGSTRÖM – HANSSEN 2016). However, Russia's invasion of Ukraine greatly intensified Japan's defense securitization. Japan's National Security Strategy (NSS), released in December 2022, made 15 references to "Russia" as compared to only one in the previous NSS released in 2013. The document describes Russia's attack on Ukraine as an event that *"shakes the very foundation of the international order"*. Russia's attack on Ukraine is not primarily framed as a direct threat to Japan's security, but rather as an indirect one in the sense that Russia's aggression erodes the rule of law and might induce a similar aggression by China in Japan's vicinity. This fear is evident in the document's argument that *"[t]he possibility cannot be precluded that a similar serious situation may arise in the future in the Indo-Pacific region, especially in East Asia"*. It concludes that the breakdown of the rule of law coupled with the aggressive behavior by Japan's neighbors, ensures that *"Japan's security environment is as severe and complex as it has ever been since the end of World War II"* (CABINET SECRETARIAT 2022).

The securitization in the defense field has not been limited to speech acts by the defense establishment. Importantly, it has also been accompanied by some rather extraordinary measures in Japan's actual defense policy. Most notably, in November 2022, the Kishida Fumio government decided to double Japan's defense spending by 2027. This decision breaks

Japan's long-standing policy of limiting the defense budget to one percent of the GDP. By raising defense spending to two percent of the GDP, Kishida is overturning a key principle in Japan's defense policy and will likely propel Japan to third place on the list of military spenders. The increased budget will naturally enable the acquisition of new weapons systems. The most controversial of these is the planned acquisition of cruise missiles that would give Japan the ability to launch counterstrikes against bases on enemy territory. This is a breach, although not the first, of Japan's post-war policy of not possessing so-called offensive weapons, i.e. weapons with power projection abilities. According to one expert, these changes represent *"the biggest turning point in the history of the country's security and defence policy after World War II"* (TSURUOKA 2023).

This means that in the defense field, Russia's war in Ukraine has greatly intensified an already ongoing securitization effort. This securitization has manifested itself in both dramatic speech acts and extraordinary measures – the hallmarks of securitization.

JAPAN'S ENERGY POLICY BEFORE THE UKRAINE WAR

Such securitization has been largely absent in the energy field. Japan is notoriously resource-poor, making it highly dependent on energy imports to cover its industrial and household needs. The oil crises in the 1970s badly hurt Japan's economy and initiated a pursuit of energy security that continues to this day. Nuclear energy has long been promoted as the ideal energy source to meet the country's needs (METI 2010), but all of its nuclear power plants were shut down after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster, and the country's energy self-sufficiency rate plummeted to an all-time low of 6.3 percent in 2014 (METI 2022). Nuclear reactor restarts were severely slowed down by the increase in technical safety costs and social acceptance costs that resulted from the nuclear safety reforms after 2011 (KOPPENBORG 2021). This presents a major obstacle to Japan's nuclear power-reliant energy security strategy. The share of nuclear power has hovered between four and seven percent in the past few years, trailing far behind the share of 20–22 percent which the government seeks to achieve by 2030. The gap resulting from the sluggish nuclear reactor restarts has been filled with additional fossil fuel imports.

Due to an increase in renewable energy production and the restarts of some nuclear power plants, Japan's energy self-sufficiency rate rose to 12.1 percent in 2019, but this is still one of the lowest energy self-sufficiency rates among the major economies. Taking a closer look at Japan's electricity generation in 2019, oil, coal and gas accounted for a combined share of 76 percent of all electricity generated in the country. The introduction of a feed-in tariff for renewable energy in 2012 spurred substantial growth in the installed capacity of renewable energy. Consequently, renewables accounted for 18 percent of all electricity generation in 2019 (METI 2022). In 2020, the then Yoshihide Suga government announced the goal of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 and subsequently raised the renewable target share for 2030 to 36–38 percent in the 2021 Strategic Energy Plan.

Despite the perennial pursuit of energy security, Japan's energy mix still makes it highly dependent on fossil fuel imports. This situation is exacerbated by the sluggish nuclear reactor restarts, which have worsened Japan's energy import dependence conundrum.

JAPAN'S ENERGY POLICY RESPONSE TO THE UKRAINE WAR

Before the invasion of Ukraine, Russia accounted for 3.6 percent of Japan's oil imports, 8.8 percent of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports, and 11 percent of its coal imports (METI 2022). Under pressure from Europe and the US, Japan has taken some steps to decouple from the Russian energy market. In April 2022, Japan declared its intention to gradually phase down its imports of Russian coal and oil, and in December, Japan joined the G7 nations in implementing a price cap on Russian crude oil. By the end of 2022, Japan had reduced its Russian oil and coal imports by 56 and 41 percent, respectively, compared to the prior year. However, Japan's LNG imports from Russia actually increased by four percent in 2022 (EURACTIV 2023). Furthermore, Japan decided to maintain its Russian oil and gas imports from the Sakhalin projects, in which Japanese companies have placed considerable investments. Unlike the United States and many European countries, it has largely refrained from using the Ukraine War as an opportunity to lessen its energy import-dependence and hasten its transition to domestically produced renewable energy.

Even though Japan was not as reliant on Russian fossil fuels as some of the European countries, it has still suffered massively from the global increase in oil and gas prices. This impact has been exacerbated by the historically weak yen. In July 2022, Prime Minister Kishida underscored the challenge to Japan's energy security posed by Russia's invasion of Ukraine: *"We are currently facing an extremely tense situation, with the risk of the first energy crisis since the oil shock in 1973"* (KISHIDA 2022). While such language comes close to a securitization speech act, Japan has been slow to follow it up with commensurate action.

The Green Transformation (GX) Roadmap, adopted as official government policy on February 10, 2023, essentially has three objectives: first, to provide a plan for Japan to achieve its Paris Agreement goal of reducing emissions by 46 percent by 2030 (compared to 2013 levels) and reaching carbon neutrality by 2050; second, to alleviate the current energy crisis; third, to create a strong link between industrial and energy policy so that the green transformation can stimulate economic growth.

Concretely, the roadmap places particular emphasis on nuclear power. To revive Japan's ailing nuclear power program, the roadmap proposes a) an extension of the lifespan of existing nuclear power plants and b) the construction of next-generation nuclear power plants. The former is achieved by discounting years in shutdown from the number of allowed operating years. This effectively enables the plants' operation beyond the designated upper limit of 60 years. Kishida has also pushed hard for the construction of "next-generation nuclear power plants" as part of his energy strategy, even though this next-generation technology is not yet market-ready and will thus not have any immediate impact on the current energy situation. The push for operation extensions and new nuclear power plants marks a shift from the ambiguity on this matter exhibited by Kishida's predecessors (KOPPENBORG 2023). Kishida's willingness to tamper with nuclear regulations has, however, raised questions about the government's commitment to nuclear safety, including unusually blunt criticisms from one of the Nuclear Regulation Authority's scientists (NHK 2023).

In addition to the renewed focus on nuclear power, the GX roadmap aspires to accelerate the introduction of renewable energy. Since renewable energy presents a safe way to achieve the twin goals of lessening

energy import-dependence and reducing CO_2 emissions, any full-blown securitization of Japan's energy policy would have to include a push toward a green transition. The roadmap does indeed contain the objective of *"making renewable energy the main power source"*. While this sounds promising, concretely, the roadmap does little more than rehashing the 2021 Strategic Energy Plan's target of a 36–38 percent renewable energy share by 2030. Since that plan's envisioned energy mix also contains a 41 percent fossil fuel share, it is clear that the roadmap, despite its promises, will not make renewable energy Japan's "main power source", but rather seeks to make renewable energy a supplement to the real main power source, which continues to be fossil fuel.

Hence, the biggest problem with the roadmap's environmental vision is that it further locks in Japan's reliance on fossil fuels. The roadmap heavily promotes hydrogen and ammonia as well as carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology as a way of reducing CO_2 emissions from fossil fuel power plants. However, these technologies only have a limited CO_2 reduction potential and will likely serve as a justification for the construction of more fossil fuel power plants, including highly polluting coal plants. This lock-in effect is also why the plan has been heavily criticized by virtually every major environmental organization in Japan (SEE JAPAN BEYOND COAL 2023 FOR A SUMMARY).

Overall, the newest roadmap is largely old wine in new bottles. Japan thus failed to use the shock of the Ukraine War as an opportunity for securitizing its energy policy so that it would lead to a massive, society-wide transition to renewable energy and away from fossil fuel. Perhaps with the exception of a renewed focus on nuclear power, including a government attempt to water down nuclear safety standards, Japan's energy response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been devoid of extraordinary measures. This is unfortunate because it is estimated that the results will fall seven to 12 percent short of the nuclear power targets for 2030 (KOPPENBORG 2023). This will reinforce the future reliance on imported fossil fuels and thus demonstrates why a wholehearted transition to renewable energy is the best option to alleviate both Japan's perennial energy-dependence problem and its CO_2 emission challenge.

THE CHINA FACTOR

As we have seen, the Japanese securitization in wake of the Ukraine War has been significant in the defense field, but not in the energy field. The reason for this discrepancy, we argue, is found in Japan's growing concerns about the Chinese hegemony in East Asia. While for many years after the end of the Cold War, Japan had high hopes for a peaceful coexistence with China, the increasing tensions in the bilateral relationship since approximately 2010 have turned such hopes into concerns about a possible economic or even a military conflict. In the early 2000s, then Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō (2001–2006) stressed repeatedly that China's rise was not a "threat" but an "opportunity" for business and cooperation (HANSSEN 2021 [2020]: 165–166). This stands in stark contrast to how China is framed by the Japanese Government today. The 2022 National Security Strategy, for example, describes China's actions as *"a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community, and present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan and the peace and stability of the international community"* (CABINET SECRETARIAT 2022: 9).

This increased threat perception has, as already mentioned, spurred Japanese securitization moves in the defense sphere. Controversial moves such as allowing collective self-defense and the acquisition of offensive weaponry such as F-35 fighter jets and small aircraft carriers, were undertaken primarily to counter the perceived China threat. North Korea's development of nuclear weapons has of course also contributed to these securitization moves. But as Hagström and Turesson (2009) point out, it could be credibly argued that the North Korea threat has functioned as a "perfect excuse" for military securitization moves that are in reality aimed at China, which is seen as the far greater threat, but is also more difficult to explicitly label as such given its economic, political and military clout. In other words, the main driver of Japan's military securitization is the rising threat perception vis-à-vis China.

Russian aggression lends itself to Japanese defense securitization because, just like in the case of North Korea, Russia's aggressive conduct can justify military measures by Japan that fit neatly into its grand strategy of countering the China threat. That is to say, the defense measures against Russia complement Japan's securitization of China. Regardless of whether

Japanese policymakers actually feel that Russia is a direct threat to Japan or not, if Russia's dramatic attack on Ukraine can help justify a doubling of defense spending in the eyes of the public, policymakers see this as an opportunity to bolster Japan's defense securitization of China. In fact, in the wake of the outbreak of the Ukraine War, we have seen attempts by the Kishida government to link the threats from Russia and China. This is especially clear in the 2022 National Security Strategy, which both frames Russia's *"strategic coordination with China"* as a *"strong security concern"*, and warns that *"a similar serious situation [as the Ukraine War] may arise in the future in the Indo-Pacific region, especially in East Asia"* (CABINET SECRETARIAT 2022: 10, 2), which is a thinly veiled reference to a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. This framing allows policymakers to respond to the shock of Russia's aggression against Ukraine by taking countermeasures against China since the two threats are deemed as closely linked. In that sense, Russia too has become a "perfect excuse" for Japanese policymakers to securitize the China threat. It is this complementarity between the Russia threat and the China threat that has enabled such a rapid securitization in Japan's defense field since Russia's attack on Ukraine.

This complementarity is absent in the energy sphere, however. A seemingly ideal solution to Japan's energy-dependence on foreign countries in general and Russia in particular, would be a mass-scale transition to renewable energy and away from fossil fuels. However, the fear in Japan is that a renewable transition would increase Japan's trade-dependence on China and make Japan's energy policy vulnerable to the whims of the Chinese Communist Party, which is an outcome that is highly incompatible with a strategy of counterbalancing China. This is the main reason, we argue, that external shocks such as the Ukraine War have had only a limited potential to spur an energy securitization of the renewable variant in Japan.

A mass-scale transition to renewable energy could happen through imports of manufactured equipment from foreign countries or through the development of a world-leading renewable energy industry on the domestic level. But both these approaches are likely to increase Japan's trade-dependence on China, which is something recent Japanese leaders have tried desperately to avoid.

First, importing ready-made renewable energy modules from abroad, would make it difficult to avoid China because China dominates many of the renewable energy markets and can often offer the cheapest prices. For example, when it comes to solar panels, a market Japan dominated in the 1990s, China today holds a 74 percent global market share in this industry (HATTORI – CHEN 2021). China is also by far the biggest market for wind turbines with almost 40 percent of their global onshore installations (GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL 2021: 50). A cost-effective strategy based on importing ready-made renewable energy modules and hardware would therefore almost inevitably lead to increased imports from China, which controls the key markets. However, as Cabinet Office Vice Minister Wada Yoshiaki recently warned, *"if[...] we import components from China, that is not really a secure way to generate power"* (NORDIC INNOVATION HOUSE TOKYO 2022: 27:23–27:35).

Second, Japan could alternatively try to build up a world-leading domestic renewable energy industry, but this too is difficult to do without increasing Japan's trade-dependence on China. The reason is that this would require access to massive quantities of resources for the production of solar cells, windmills, batteries, etc. Since Japan is notoriously resource-poor, most of these resources would have to come from foreign suppliers. This option raises concerns that a wider transition to renewable energy would further increase Japan's reliance on Chinese imports (METI OFFICIAL 2023). Avoiding Chinese suppliers is, of course, possible, but only if Japan is willing to forego the often cheaper prices of Chinese resources. For example, when it comes to blue and green hydrogen, Song et al. (2021) have demonstrated that China could provide Japan with both quantities and prices that more than match Japan's specified targets for 2030 and 2050. China is also the world's largest producer and exporter of steel and rare earth minerals, both of which are essential for production of renewable energy hardware. This means that avoiding Chinese resources would entail a far higher price tag on a Japanese plan to reinvigorate the domestic renewable energy industry.

Both an increase of hardware imports and an increase of resource imports would almost necessarily lead to increased trade-dependence on China. It is therefore easy to understand why Japanese policymakers, who are becoming increasingly hawkish on China, have not expressed the same enthusiasm for renewable energy securitization as they have for defense

securitization in the wake of the Ukraine War. The latter securitization effort is compatible with the major objective of preventing Chinese hegemony in East Asia, and the former is not.

CONCLUSION

Russia's invasion of Ukraine was perceived as creating formidable military and energy challenges for Japan. The war constituted a window of opportunity for policy change in both the defense and energy field, but securitization was only carried out in the former. The defense field has seen both dramatic speech acts and the implementation of extraordinary measures that would have been difficult to carry out before the war. The energy field, on the other hand, has seen few strong speech acts and even fewer measures that can be characterized as extraordinary. Japan's energy response has mainly consisted of rehashing existing renewable energy targets while seeking to increase nuclear power generation and locking in fossil fuel utilization for decades to come through the allure of techno-fixes such as ammonia and CCS.

In this paper we have argued that the discrepancy between these responses can primarily be explained by the China factor. While the securitization in the defense field complements Japan's strategy to constrain China's growing power in East Asia, energy securitization of the renewable variant does not.

The reason is that China dominates many of the markets that Japan would have to tap into if it were to get serious about a green transition. Hence, any large-scale shift to renewable energy will evoke concerns about Chinese supply chains. When it comes to both renewable energy hardware and the resources needed to create such hardware, China can often offer the cheapest prices. While many components can be bought from non-Chinese suppliers, some degree of dependence on cheap Chinese suppliers is probably unavoidable as long as the profit-seeking business side is expected to drive the green transition. This presents Japan with a green transition dilemma: either buy Chinese and increase Japan's trade-dependence on China, or forego the Chinese market and buy expensively elsewhere. For policymakers and industrialists in Japan, neither option is particularly

attractive. The unfortunate consequence is that Japan resists phasing out fossil fuels and fails to play up to its potential in the green transition.

We would, however, argue that the fear of becoming vulnerable to Chinese export stops is somewhat exaggerated when it comes to renewable energy. Unlike fossil fuel imports, which permanently need to continue when the product is spent, hardware and resources for renewable energy can be used for a long time once they have been imported. Even if Japan were to import the majority of the necessary hardware and resources from China, once they would be in place, they would work regardless of China's export policies. A renewable energy supplier cannot hold other countries politically hostage in the same way a fossil fuel supplier can.

For several reasons, the China factor should not be allowed to perpetually serve as a Japanese excuse to postpone the green transition. First, Japan is the world's fifth largest greenhouse gas emitter and its current energy transition plans to retain a 41 percent share of fossil fuels in its electricity supply by 2030 are incompatible with its goal of cutting emissions by 46 percent by the same year. Second, it is risky for the government to bet on nuclear power in a situation where increased technical safety costs and social acceptance costs have complicated nuclear plant restarts (KOPPENBORG 2021). Failed restarts would result in a scenario where Japan would need to produce more than the planned 41 percent of its electricity from fossil fuels. This would continue to exacerbate Japan's energy import conundrum. It would also put Japan at odds with commitments made under the Paris Agreement and, more recently, at the G7 Energy and Climate Ministers Meeting, where Japan committed to a *"fully or predominantly decarbonized power sector by 2023"* (MOE 2023).

Thus, to meet the dual challenge of decarbonizing energy generation and increasing energy security, the Japanese Government should increase its support for the domestic renewable energy industry. Japan's technological and manufacturing strengths should be mobilized for the production of competitive renewable energy hardware that can be installed across the Japanese landmass and at sea. With an almost 30,000 km long coastline, Japan has a huge untapped potential for offshore wind power. According to the International Energy Agency, the maximum power potential of Japan's offshore wind is more than 9000 TWh of energy per year, which

constitutes approximately nine times its current electricity demand (IEA 2019: 70). A lack of shallow waters complicates the implementation of this idea, however, as deep waters typically require more technologically unproven floating turbines, so it will be difficult for Japan to reach its full potential in this respect. But even a fraction of Japan's full wind power potential would go a long way to turn the green transition into reality. Japan should immediately begin utilizing its vast and largely untapped potential for offshore wind power generation.

Although the shock of the Ukraine War failed to speed up the green transition in Japan, it is not too late for the country to embark on a more ambitious path toward carbon neutrality. This would require a long-term strategy to reinvigorate the country's renewable energy industry and a firm resolve to once and for all phase out fossil fuel. We are hopeful that the winds of change will also reach Japan's shores.

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Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine and its Impact on Climate Politics

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ABSTRACT

The Russian invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 represented not only attempts to erase Ukrainian sovereignty but were also linked to a larger campaign by the Kremlin to undermine trust in democratic institutions, scientific data, and the resilience of Western societies. This form of hybrid warfare has long taken a particular focus on energy systems, both in attempts to maintain Russian oil and gas exports, and to target energy infrastructure in invaded states like Ukraine. This article briefly traces the origins of the Russian government's "assault on truth," revealing how the information battlespace has affected global climate politics. The disruption of climate politics has long been a goal of the Kremlin and its allies. We argue that the ongoing energy crisis must be approached carefully, with particular attention to countering anti-science and anti-climate efforts.

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INTRODUCTION

The 2022 escalation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine sparked a series of cascading impacts that overturned many people's assumptions about war and peace in Europe, with energy insecurity and price spikes being some of the most visible consequences for those outside of Ukraine. International sanctions against the Russian Federation have used its reliance on revenues from energy exports to the West as a form of punishment. As a result, energy prices skyrocketed and worries about gas shortages spread across Europe. Many analysts viewed this energy security disruption as an unintended consequence of the Russian aggression, as something to be weathered while actions are taken to reduce reliance on Russian oil and gas supplies (FLANAGAN ET AL. 2022). Yet, it is important to understand that energy insecurity is not simply a consequence of the war in Ukraine. The targeting of energy and climate security, most often through covert and unconventional means, has been central to Russian foreign policy objectives for decades. If the international community is to respond effectively to the Kremlin's actions, we must understand the larger context within which the Russian invasion represents an end game for climate security, not merely a bump in the road.

For decades prior to the war, the Kremlin had been actively working to undermine climate and energy politics in the West. From attempts to maintain its dominance in the global oil and gas market to targeting energy infrastructure in invaded states like Ukraine, the Russian government has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use energy as a tool for political gain. Through a combination of state-sponsored propaganda, information operations, cyber-attacks, and covert operations, the Kremlin has sought to sow discord and confusion in Western energy markets, all the while working to maintain its own exports and influence (BLANK 2016).

Partly these actions were motivated by financial gains. Oil and gas exports accounted for 68 percent of Russia's total export revenue in 2013, the year before its illegal annexation of Crimea (EIA 2014). Even as successive sanctions have hit the Kremlin and its related companies, this reliance remained an existential vulnerability for Russian national security. Yet maintaining market access to the West was only part of the larger set of objectives for Vladimir Putin and the Russian government. As others have

pointed out, Russia's broader foreign policy objectives include undermining Western institutions, trust, and concepts of objectivity upon which actions could be taken against Moscow, either as a form of active defense, or as a reflection of Putin's visions of Moscow's role in Eurasia (BUGAJSKI 2009: 9–13; GALEOTTI 2019; HILL – STENT 2022; KOFMAN – ROJANSKY 2015). This is not a new phenomenon (certainly not for those familiar with earlier Soviet information and censorship policies), but such efforts not only continued after the fall of the Soviet Union, but became more covert, distributed, and effectively asymmetrical (RATSIBORYNSKA 2018).

As we discuss below, such "hybrid" tactics target and exploit vulnerabilities and undermine society's resilience. Resilience targeting involves, among other things, undermining trust in democratic institutions, scientific research and the idea of objectivity as well as breaking down the reliability of key institutions such as healthcare and energy systems (DANYK – BRIGGS 2023). While not the original target of hybrid warfare, climate change has been made into a cultural touchstone and a long-term way to disrupt societies. The invasion of Ukraine reveals these vulnerabilities in terms of reliance on fossil fuels (e.g., German imports from Russia), institutionalized distrust in energy transitions, and anti-science attacks that both allow continued Russian exports and impose costs on the West.

HYBRID WARFARE, ENERGY, AND CLIMATE SECURITY: THE RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE

While its exact meaning is subject to continuing academic discussion, hybrid warfare usually employs a wide spectrum of military and non-military tools and actions in pursuit of strategic objectives, somewhat akin to Chinese doctrines of "unrestricted warfare" (E.G., COMMIN – FILIOL 2015). Many hybrid warfare tactics are not new; for example, both Americans and the Soviets have used them during the Cold War. At the time, the Kremlin considered itself already at war with the West and free to take whatever actions could help reach its objectives, short of sparking Western military responses. In recent years, the repertoire of hybrid warfare tactics has expanded in scope with new cyber and information technologies. As with most unconventional warfare, a state or other political actor can resort to hybrid tactics as part of a broader effort to destabilize governments, sow uncertainty and mistrust among allies, and hinder military operations, all

while denying involvement in such activities (LANOSZKA 2016). A lack of clear attribution is thus an important component of hybrid strategies, as it allows for sidestepping assumptions that one must have proof of deliberate action before a response is warranted.

Some scholars and analysts believe that the concept of hybrid warfare is not unique, others criticize it for being too broad, and yet others believe that hybrid warfare is only about tactics and not strategic objectives (SEE FRIDMAN 2017; WIGELL 2019). The objectives and tactics we discuss below perhaps fit best under the label of 'hybrid interference' proposed by Wigell (2019). In this understanding, hybrid interference is a 'wedge strategy' that relies on a number of *"state-controlled, non-kinetic means that are concealed in order to provide the divider with official deniability and manipulate targeted actors without elevating their threat perceptions"* (WIGELL 2019: 256). The targets are often liberal democracies as liberal democratic values are perceived as exploitable vulnerabilities. Hybrid interference relies on covert means to exploit specific vulnerabilities, including cyber operations, disinformation, political corruption, and the use of economic inducements.

Hybrid and unconventional warfare (UW)[1] strategies have been central to Russian foreign policy, intertwined with Russia's military doctrine of *maskirovka* that relies on the use of various tools for deception, including concealment, imitation, denial, and disinformation (BARTKOWSKI 2015). The Russian view of security differs from Western understandings – at the core of this view is not a mere protection from potential threats but their removal from the world (HILL 2022). From the Russian perspective, hybrid warfare is about Western efforts to destabilize Russia and other adversaries – for example, through disinformation and subversive politics (KORYBKO 2015). The Russian *gibridnaya voyna* is a broader concept than Western hybrid warfare; it reaches beyond military activities and into political, economic, and social public spheres (FRIDMAN 2017). For this reason, it is difficult to clearly delineate an assertive Russian foreign-policy behaviour, different types of influence operations, and hybrid warfare.

US analysts, for example, tend to frame Russian cyber and information operations in terms of election interference, partly due to the high-profile nature of the 2016 presidential election. This is also a reflection of US social sciences that often favour rational actor approaches to politics and

rational choice influences centered on campaigns and elections. The RAND Corporation concept of "virtual societal warfare," while valuable, reflects this limitation in only examining how exposure to disinformation might change election or direct policy preferences (MAZARR ET AL. 2019). The Russian view of information and cognitive warfare is far more expansive, as it aims not only to shape elections and policy in accordance with Russia's long-term goals, but, at a deeper level, to shape perceptions of the world and limit what options one thinks are possible (CUNNINGHAM 2020). This concept, known as reflexive control in Soviet and Russian military doctrine, works to narrow the field of view on critical issues, so that an adversary acts in a way desired by Moscow, leaving the opponent to think it was their own choice (JAITNER – KANTOLA 2016).

Russian views of energy security, too, differ from Western understandings. In Western countries, energy security has different meanings, depending on the country's or group's point of view. The UN Sustainable Development Goals, for example, define energy security as a combination of concerns like access to resources, and affordability and sustainability of resource use (WU – WU 2015). The multiple dimensions of energy security, however, often lead to disagreements and widely divergent policy responses to energy insecurity – like it was in the case of the 2022 energy crisis. Climate change as a security risk is a much newer concept which also suffers from sharp disagreements over how the term should be defined and what policy responses are suitable. Some see climate change as a harbinger of violent conflict, some focus on forced migration across borders, and others on ecological or human security risks (KOUBI 2019; MCMICHAEL – BARNETT – MCMICHAEL 2012).

In Russia, energy and climate security tend to be more narrowly defined and more highly prioritized in the context of national security. While the Kremlin considers how energy trades and deals influence foreign policy, its main priority has often been to maximize export markets for Russian fossil fuels. As a country with larger fuel reserves than domestic consumption, for Moscow, access to resources has not meant ensuring access to those fuels but securing export markets. With the oil and gas company profits linked to Vladimir Putin's own finances, such considerations took on significance in recent decades (E.G., HARDING 2007). Without oil and gas exports, both Putin and the Russian government would lose

crucial sources of revenue. From this perspective, global climate politics has served as a threat to Russian state security. If Russia's export markets turned to renewable energy sources and concepts of net-zero emissions, the state's budget revenues could quickly dwindle, with no alternative Asian markets that would provide for easy energy transportation being established.[2]

Undermining climate discussions and negotiations has become an effective tactic to keep some countries, particularly in Central and Western Europe, dependent on fossil fuels as alternatives would seem too risky. The Western actions against the Russian Federation after 2014 heightened fears in Moscow that its energy security was at risk in an existential sense. Without access to Western technology and capital from companies like Exxon-Mobil, the Kremlin-associated companies like Rosneft, Lukoil, and Gazprom could not access increasingly difficult oil and gas fields, particularly offshore and Arctic deposits (MADDOW 2019: 337–338). With many of the easier-to-access fields depleted and with the already substantial pipeline loss due to permafrost melt and disrepair, the Kremlin had to establish an alternate reality to increasingly strident warnings against climate change risks.

RUSSIAN ANTI-CLIMATE STRATEGIES

The Russian government's approach to climate change partly mirrors its authoritarian politics. A common strategy since the Soviet times has been undercutting concepts of objective reality in the Soviet/Russian space, tightly controlling environmental sciences, and generally viewing such experts as de facto dissidents (WEINER 1999). Such policies continued and even accelerated under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, with Kremlin actions extending far beyond Russian borders (POMERANTSEV 2015). As we elaborate below, these actions have implications for sustainable responses to climate change both in general and within the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine. The Russian anti-climate actions take two main forms: fossil fuel reliance and resilience targeting. They work symbiotically, have been strengthened by the use of cyber technologies, and overlap with political ends desired by other, non-Russian actors.

Fossil fuel reliance

Fossil fuel reliance refers to a set of activities, from bribery and corruption to overt military action, designed to keep Russian export markets tied to the expectation of continued oil and gas from the Russian Federation (BLANK – KIM 2016). Gas and oil were long exported from the Soviet Union to the West as an alternative to what was framed as unreliable sources in the Middle East, leveraging Western European experiences from the OPEC oil crisis of the 1970s (BALMACEDA 2007). By 2021, the European Union was annually importing 155 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Russia, or around 45% of its total imports (KARDAS 2023). Due to the nature of pipeline infrastructure and politics, some countries were more reliant on Russian sources than others, with Germany and Italy being the largest consumers.

Establishing such pipeline conduits and long-term reliance works to the advantage of Moscow, as pipelines are expensive and time-consuming to build, rerouting oil and gas is not easy, and alternative import pathways often suffer from capacity restrictions. In 2022, for example, European countries could not simply replace their gas imports from Russia by those from another exporter like Norway, as existing pipelines from Norway only allowed around a 10% increase in gas flow before reaching capacity (ZHOU ET AL. 2023). This situation arose due to Moscow's foreign policy strong-arm tactics, promotion of internal corruption, bribery and co-option of key political leaders, and periodic threats (such as the shutting off gas supplies to Central Europe in the winter of 2006) (ORENSTEIN 2019: 67).

The Kremlin well understood that a coherent European energy security policy could be undermined by a divide-and-conquer policy of bilateral deals, economic incentives backed up by geopolitical threats, and blocking of alternative pipelines from regions like the Caspian and the Middle East/North Africa (GENS 2019). For example, the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline sparked disunity among European states, and between Germany and the USA, which viewed the project as a dangerous increase in dependence on Russian supplies (E.G., DE JONG – DE GRAAF – HAESEBROUCK 2020). The new infrastructure was to bypass traditional Ukrainian routes and deliver gas directly from Russian territory to Germany even though the existing pipelines were sufficient to carry gas from Russia to Central and Western Europe. From the Russian perspective, the military actions

against Ukraine in 2014 (and later in 2022) made such a project desirable as it allowed the bypassing of Ukrainian territory and the related transit payments. The European disunity surrounding the project was in part a product of Russian foreign policy. The development of Nord Stream 2 also contributed to further disagreements on European climate policy (E.G., WENDLER 2021). At the same time, Europe's energy dependence plays large in the growing call for energy transitions away from fossil fuels. Such efforts, however, have been targeted through the second strategy used by the Kremlin and its allies: resilience targeting.

Resilience targeting

Resilience targeting refers to actions that deliberately reduce or undercut the resilience of communities or systems, intending to make them more vulnerable to outside shocks, or unable to reconstitute societies following a conflict (BRIGGS 2020; LE MASSON ET AL. 2019). The Kremlin's hybrid warfare playbook uses resilience targeting across a wide spectrum of activities, many of which intersect with climate policies or climate-related risks. Although these activities may be vastly different, they serve the same strategic objectives in the context of resilience targeting.

The first category concerns attacks on physical infrastructure, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine highlighting some of the most severe examples. Beginning in October 2022, Russian military forces greatly increased their precision standoff targeting of energy infrastructure in Ukraine, often with the use of cruise missiles or drones. Within several months, Ukraine's energy minister reported that half the energy infrastructure in the country had been damaged or destroyed, from electrical substations to physical damage of nuclear power stations (RAMSARAN 2023). While attacks on energy infrastructure are nothing new in warfare, the scale and pattern of the Russian attacks indicate that this targeting is not related to the military activity in the east of Ukraine so much as it is intended to wear down the resilience of the Ukrainian people, and significantly increase the costs associated with reconstruction.

Destruction of energy systems presents opportunities for a greater attention to green energy transitions in Europe and, in particular, Ukraine, but it is here that the second (and perhaps less obvious) form of resilience

targeting makes this task more difficult to achieve. In the context of climate and energy security, undermining climate science and harassing scientists amplifies uncertainty and distrust among the public, which complicates the enactment of effective policy measures. Attacks on the fundamentals behind understanding climate change have been occurring for decades, and these attacks have been carried out in conjunction with other key actors around the world. For example, recent court cases in the USA have shown deliberate obfuscation and funding of climate denial institutes by fossil fuel companies going back to the 1970s (E.G., HIGHAM – KERRY 2022). But since at least the 2000s, Russian foreign policy has deliberately and systematically attacked climate scientists, activists, and negotiations around concepts of sustainability, even while officially issuing lukewarm domestic climate mitigation targets (KOCHTCHEEVA 2022). As noted earlier, these foreign actions are partly motivated by the hope to maintain fossil fuel export markets, but the psychological and policy impacts go far beyond the sale of natural gas to Western Europe.

The attacks on climate science follow specific patterns, with the attackers looking to undermine trust in scientists and media, and constrain discussions of climate politics in ways that do not allow alternative narratives to take root. In information spaces, this means that only certain dominant narratives are allowed, and other, dissenting voices are attacked and drowned out. Social media users are harassed, Twitter feeds are flooded, and media discussions are filled with "authoritative" denials (SEE ORESKES – CONWAY 2011; BRIGGS 2020). In the Russian context, the intention is to direct policy alternatives into narrowly defined, pro-Kremlin choices.

The 2009 "Climategate" email scandal[3] is instructive in this regard, as it not only set a precedent for information attacks on climate science and politics, but it was also often repeated in the following years (E.G., GARDU – GEHAMN – KARUNAKARAN 2014). Russian actors have been blamed for Climategate, but their involvement was never decisively proven (HUDSON 2009; MANN 2022: 36–42). The attack had two major components which illustrate how coordinated actions could undermine climate resilience in the long term. First, specific attacks were carried out on scientists associated with climate research. This included not only hacking into their email accounts but also constructing narratives around their intentions and actions. Typically, the most senior scientists were avoided, with the attackers instead targeting

mid-level researchers and professors who were not accustomed to attacks and had few to no political protections. Known as "cyber aggression," such targeting is well identified in the cyber warfare literature (DUGGAN 2015); in those cases, the targets lack protection, can be slow to react, and are maligned through the second ingredient in the coordinated attacks – media packaging.

When the emails were released in 2009, the exposure was rolled out in a coordinated fashion among media sites friendly to fossil fuel interests and the Kremlin, in particular, groups like WikiLeaks. Rather than wait for others to sift through thousands of emails and complex scientific data, these data bundlers amplified the malign intents ascribed to the targeted scientists, including through easy-to-digest and easy-to-replicate narratives that could be easily spread through the Internet. These frames had been cultivated for some time by various actors, and in the USA they drew upon anchors of skepticism of science and scientists (BOWE ET AL. 2014). The attacks drew upon long-standing conspiracy theories, many of them anti-Semitic, to anchor the scientists' "evil intentions" and fit the narratives into larger contexts for those who were already receptive. Broad brushstroke illustrations of scientists manipulating data for easy money to extend the political control of "global elites," fit the exercise into a historical and nefarious plot, since the actual emails showed little more than typical academic discussions over how to handle data uncertainties (BRICKER 2013).

The 2009 Climategate events set out a pattern for attacks on climate science and beliefs in the urgency of the transition to renewable energy sources, including questioning of anthropogenic climate change by Putin and other world leaders (TYNKKYNEN – TYNKKYNEN 2018), harassment of climate scientists (e.g., frequent open records requests, uncertainty amplification) (BIDDLE – KIDD – LEUSCHNER 2017), promotion of analyses that claim that Western Europe cannot survive without Russian oil and gas (RBC 2022), corruption of key government officials (GRASSO 2017), and cyber-attacks and threats against energy infrastructure (COOPER 2023). At the same time the Russian government engaged with United Nations negotiations and promised greenhouse gas reductions (though without any mechanisms for achieving such promises), giving Moscow plausible deniability against allegations that they were ever against policies for sustainable energy transitions (BROWN ET AL. 2023).

As the Kremlin benefits from status quo policies of fossil fuel use, all that needs to be accomplished is to amplify uncertainty over climate science, energy alternatives, and sustainability. The resulting policy delay and paralysis (e.g., "let's wait for more information," "let's stick with what we know for energy sources") works to the advantage of Moscow and its allies. This approach also fits with what Consentino (2020) refers to as "Surkovian politics" – rather than creating a well-rounded propaganda narrative, the Kremlin pushes for a bewildering array of conflicting narratives, some of them partly real, some based on conspiracies, but in total difficult to fact-check against a firehouse of disinformation (E.G., BORT 2022; HUNT 2021; PAUL – MATTHEWS 2016). This type of tactics aims for *"not necessarily military success but rather a process of constant disorientation and destabilization that could be exploited for geopolitical ends"* (CONSENTINO 2020: 47).

Of course, both Climategate and similar attacks on science were not solely or even directly attributable to the Russian government. They fit into a decades-long pattern of climate denial, obfuscation, and amplification of uncertainty, involving a number of oil-exporting countries, oil companies, and members of Western governments (ORESKES – CONWAY 2011). What is crucial is that the Russian government was aligning its disinformation campaigns with both foreign policy and military actions, and it is this combination of disinformation and active measures around climate and energy that has distinguished the Kremlin roles in the current geopolitical energy landscape. Disinformation goes hand in hand with energy market coercion and manipulation (COLLINS 2017), even if Moscow's latest attempts might end up backfiring and instead accelerate green transitions.

CONCLUSION

The 2022 invasion of Ukraine has shed light not only on Western energy vulnerabilities but also on the long-standing Russian hybrid warfare tactics in climate politics. In this article we discussed two anti-climate strategies pursued by the Kremlin for decades prior to the war: building reliance on fossil fuels (for example, through pipeline politics) and reducing climate resilience mainly through attacks on climate scientists and activists that involved discrediting or silencing dissenting voices. We argued that the energy and climate insecurity are intertwined and that such insecurity

is not simply a consequence of the war in Ukraine. However, the war will likely have implications for sustainable responses to climate change.

The groundwork for the response to an invasion of Ukraine was laid long ago. By dividing dependent states, Moscow hoped to prevent the kind of coordinated sanctions by Brussels and Washington, DC in the year following February 2022. If enough states received exemptions, and if Asian countries like India, China, and the Philippines increased their imports from Russia, the Paris Agreement commitments would still be left by the wayside. The war has provided impetus for countries to abandon fossil fuel dependence and accelerate the renewable energy transition, but the Kremlin bets on the long game. Long-term investments in political polarization, resilience targeting, and conspiracies to undermine support for Ukraine may ultimately fracture the Western support and resolve, and the larger global condemnation of the invasion may be tempered by whatever energy deals the Kremlin can broker abroad.

If the war is used as an excuse to increase oil and gas drilling (NEW YORK TIMES 2022), if concerns over supply chain disruptions justify investments in traditional energy production, and if questions over the veracity of climate science lessen the need for a concrete response, then the Kremlin's strategies will have borne fruit. Disruption of climate politics was not a military aim of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but energy politics and impacts on global environmental politics cannot be removed from the context of the events since 2014. If the Russian Federation persists in its war against Ukraine, it will become increasingly difficult for the Western response to maintain its coordinated and biting sanctions, especially as the USA enters a contentious 2024 election season. The war presents Europe and the world with an opportunity to make a clean break from legacy energy infrastructure and dependence, but this can only be achieved with clear leadership and resolve, while addressing both sanctions and the hybrid attacks on climate politics, science, and trust between states.

ENDNOTES

1 This term refers to the use of other than conventional war strategies, including guerilla fighting and subversion.

2 This is mainly due to insufficient infrastructure like the lack of suitable gas pipeline connections and high costs of oil transport for Russian firms. See, for example, Trickett (2022).

3 In 2009, as the world leaders were preparing for a new round of climate negotiations in Copenhagen, outside groups hacked email servers at the Climatic Research Unit at the University of East Anglia in the UK, and at Pennsylvania State University in the USA. Thousands of emails and files of research on climate change were copied and uploaded on the Internet, spurring a conspiracy theory among climate denialists. Climate change, as they believed, was a scientific conspiracy where data had been manipulated and critics silenced.

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Book Review

Weber, Isabella M.: How China Escaped Shock Therapy: The Market Reform Debate

1ST EDITION, LONDON AND NEW YORK: ROUTLEDGE, 2021, 342 PAGES, 978-1-138-59219-3

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Before the People's Republic of China's fascinating economic growth became a common topic, China was one of the poorest countries in the world, having been severely disrupted by the failed *Great Leap Forward* campaign (1958–1962) and the subsequent political chaos of Mao Zedong's *Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution* (1966–1976). This is not a miracle but an evidently successful upturn from the bottom of poverty to modern prosperity, and it is explained at length in this extraordinary monograph by Isabella Weber, whose deep insight into the global political economy as well as the Chinese modern statecraft synthetizes the fields of global economic economy and history.

Weber disrupts stereotypical expectations of the supremacy of ideology over practice in China while avoiding the Western disregard for the traditional intellectual legacy of the Chinese civilization. In the same manner, she shows China's historical openness to global economic expertise, which includes a major connection to Central and East Europe (CEE). Of course, her book mainly contributes to the scholarship on the history of China's economic expertise and contemporary economic model of state capitalism. However, it also sheds more light on the still surprising transnational history of how CEE (post)socialist experts co-shaped the variegated rise of neoliberal globalization both at home (KOPEČEK 2019) and globally (MARK ET AL. 2019).

Let's start with addressing the history of Chinese economic expertise. Weber uses a case study of the Chinese economic reform process in the 1970s and 1980s as a contribution to the never-ending discussion between market (neo)liberals and their Keynesian opponents. Her way of doing this is a *long-durée* perspective which allows the readers to understand the very socio-historical roots of the Chinese approach to this West-centered global debate; that is, she puts it in the centuries-long context of a dynastic era theory. This reveals a dynamic interaction between the state bureaucracy measures and the spontaneity of regional politics and market forces as a never-ending tension. The second context Weber applies is a more immediate 20th-century context. Weber explains the economic and political collapse of the Chinese Republic in the aftermath of World War II, and then critiques the Soviet-based Maoist model of economic management.

The main focus of the book and the center of Chinese economic development is the politics of inflation as a key to understanding the debate on the appropriate path to market reform in the 1970s and 1980s. Only the abovementioned contexts allow one to understand why and how the post-war communist government faced the imperative of creating a functioning market with state-controlled prices. In connection with this, Weber takes us on a historical hair-raising journey of a Chinese modern historical catastrophe in which inflation plays the main role. The inflation destroyed the Kuomintang political system in the late 1940s and thus paved the way to the communist takeover. Since the onset of the reform process in the 1970s, the Communists targeted inflation as part of avoiding the risk of repeating the previous state economic collapse.

The reconstruction of the post-war economy based on a tight price regulation and the state-led creation of a market was thus a temporary success for the People's Republic of China (PRC). The first three chapters trace the long origins of this post-war state interventionism by pointing to parallels between it and the early tradition of Chinese political economy during the *Warring States* period (770-476 B.C.). This period is when the main schools of Chinese social theory originated. Weber then refers to the Chinese tradition of dynastic economic policies and their state price regulation interventions, looking at how they regulated basic commodities, monopolies, and taxation in times of crop failure and a shortage of strategic supplies. Behind this process, the Song dynasty (960–1279) philosopher, politician, and reformer Wang Anshi (1021–1086) was a key figure who helped inspire a state intervention into the market and social stabilization (pp. 34–35). This was a kind of "Keynesianism" in a historically, culturally and geographically very distant context.

While the post-World War II regime succeeded in reining in the inflation, its state bureaucratic system failed, however, in delivering on the regime's main promise, which was to lift the mass of the Chinese population from poverty. Even the USA and the UK had to resort to price controls and state intervention in the market supply during World War II, which partially persisted during their gradual return to a full market economy. In China, the inflationary catastrophe in the late 1940s was eventually averted, the goods supply was restored, the new currency, the Renminbi (Yuan), was introduced and stabilized, and the new tax system provided

the state with income. The Communist Party rule was thus partially legitimized, but at a high cost: the majority of the 800 million rural population remained stuck at a low standard of living in a system oriented towards industrialization and urbanization. The state control became recognized as a burden that had to be counteracted. Twenty years of communist revolutionary reforms did not lift the PRC from the position of one of the poorest countries in the world.

What was done about this and how it was done is the topic of chapters 4–7. This is also where the CEE experts enter the story as an intellectual force of inspiration for the Chinese academics and liberal-minded party leaders. After Mao's death in 1976, in accordance with the Chinese tradition, there was a demand for heretical debates on market-oriented liberal theories against state interventionism as tools of averting the threats of inflation and political crisis. The post-Maoist rise of the pragmatic party faction was also connected with a desire for a new economic science and paradigm. This movement, during its origins, was led by the younger generation of the party leadership, which increasingly engaged with neoliberalism, the new international vogue at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s.

At that time, in the communist states of the world, including China, the new ideas at the "origins" of the then expected market-oriented reform correlated with the establishment of new economic "think-tanks", such as the *Financial Research Institute* in Budapest (Fabry 2018) or the *Forecasting Institute* in Prague (SOMMER 2015). In China, such a think-tank was the *Chinese Academy of Social Sciences* (CASS), which was established in 1977 and became the center of the economic reform and the internationalizing of the domestic discussion. In this transnational translation of global neoliberalism, World Bank experts, reform economists who were emigrants from CEE, and also some prominent Western economists served as intermediaries. Their ideas resonated with the new generation's push for market restoration and price liberalization.

The prominent figures among these experts included the West German ordoliberals Armin Gutowski and Wolfram Engels, and the Central European former émigré or dissident economists Włodzimierz Brus, Ota Šik, Péter Kende, Juliusz Strumiński, and János Kornai. These foreign experts became lecturers and consultants in the CASS, participating in

conferences where the scenarios of price reform and introducing a free market were discussed. This was a diverse group advocating for scenarios ranging from a radical *big bang* or *shock therapy* through a rapid abandoning of the price control to a more structured and gradual reform process, namely one that would entail the state dividing commodity price categories into groups by their relevance in domestic supply chains.

Ota Šik was one of the prominent advisors whose footprint on price reform resonated with the Chinese academic circles (pp. 131–135). Being formerly one of the intellectual leaders of the economic reform during the supressed Czechoslovak liberalization in the 1960s, he argued, together with Brus, that liberal economic reforms would fail if they were not paralleled by a corresponding political change. Even though both theorists still supported the model of socialism with a partially liberalized economy, any challenge to the Communist Party was a taboo in China. Šik immediately lost political support after his interview for West German media, where the Czechoslovak emigrant mentioned that a liberal economy without abandoning the party dictatorship was impossible and pointed out that liberal changes to the economy would inevitably *"undermine their [the Communist Party's] position"* (p. 137).

Although he was then no longer invited to give lectures, Šik's contribution to the theoretical debate remained relevant. His prophetic vision of the political consequences of economic liberalization came true in the whole Eastern Bloc, including the Soviet Union. Unlike most CEE dissidents, who found a market transition incompatible with preserving socialism, Šik proposed a reform concept which would replace state planning with market mechanisms without dismantling the socialist system. His market socialism would rely on state-owned enterprises in the key industries, while the other sectors would be privatized in order to produce competitive markets. The state's role in this system would be to protect fair competition by supressing monopolies. The key reform step would be the change to the price system. This would happen through a classification of commodities into three groups according to input-output calculation and their relevance for economic stability. Consumer goods prices would be left floating, while energy, basic food and short supply goods would remain under state regulation. In this sense, Šik stood against the shock therapy ideologues such as Milton Friedman, who also lectured at the CASS.

Experimental gradualism eventually prevailed among the Chinese reformers (pp. 135–146). Although World Bank consultants and many CEE dissident theorists influenced the Chinese domestic interest in price reform, their advice on either shock therapy or a planned gradual liberalization gave way to a more cautious strategy. In this sense, the *long durée* Chinese approach partially trumped the international advice, although both remained in constant interaction with each other. Weber explains the experimental gradualism through the metaphor of "tower rebuilding" (p. 179). The international advice would suggest destroying the tower and building a new and better one, and in extreme shock-therapy cases, this would be done regardless of the pains of the destruction. Meanwhile, the Chinese approach of price stabilization and economic reform focused on experimentally removing parts of the tower one by one while carefully watching the building's statics and rather preventing it from collapsing.

As Weber's analysis traces the first market reforms (Chapter 6), it shows that while the market reform paradigm achieved general acceptance, the scenarios leading to this objective nevertheless remained disputed. Such reforms predictably started as experiments at the regional level (typically in the countryside – they were not nationwide) with the backing of some reform-minded party leaders. For example, the rural reform was implemented through a system of farm households contracting land, which introduced a dual price regime and a quantitative quota. Farmers were free to choose the sort of planting, while the mandatory production was up to the state quota for state set prices, and the selling of above-quota crops was set for free and higher market prices. This dual system soon achieved a sufficient food supply, a sufficient price stability, and rising living standards while still assuring the state's regulative role. Following this, the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee adopted the program *Decision on Reform of the Structure*, which integrated the market strategy with the dual-track price system. Encouraged by the rapid success of the rural reforms and the partial progress in light industries, the government pushed for a speeding up of the market reforms through a "big bang".

Amidst the opinion split in the Communist Party and academic circles, Deng Xiaoping1 gave a strong personal endorsement to the speeding up of the reform. He voiced it in the *People's Daily* as *"Long-term pain is worse than short-term pain"* (p. 250). This meant rejecting the so far still

running dual-price system, and instead, taking the risk of an immediate large scale price liberalization. As a result, the inflation peaked at 25 percent, the highest number for it since the 1940s. A buying panic, a run on banks, and rising local unrests followed, upon which the shock therapy was immediately cancelled in 1988. The temporary economic chaos and massive corruption turned into a serious political crisis. The June 4th, 1989 Tiananmen massacre is reflected upon in the author's summary of information gained from her interviews. As she exposes the "imported" shock therapy as its *economic* cause, she debunks the Western liberal narrative wherein the Tiananmen massacre had to do solely with the *political* protest against the Party.

Sure, *How China Escaped Shock Therapy* neglects some aspects of the political context such as the rising tensions in the Tibet Autonomous Region and the split on media freedom within the Communist Party (DITTMER 1990). However, the book's final review of the late 1980s Chinese economic structural and fiscal landscape provides great insight into China's internal debate between liberals and conservatives on economic affairs (pp. 225–258). Western literature has so far hardly captured so specifically the Chinese clash of conservatism and modernism and their difficult search for a political consensus, wherein elements of an unusually open exchange of views are mixed with strict authoritarianism. What is more, the paradox of the 1988 top-down attempt at a drastic reform and its swift reversal teaches us one other lesson. Combined with the 1989 ousting of the Party First Secretary Zhao Ziyang, who was accused of something he did not commit himself, the story of the market reform is an instructive story for understanding the peculiarity of contemporary China's political milieu.

The book complements many fields. As the rising profile of Isabela Weber as a highly influential economic expert on fighting today's inflation shows, the book is very topical. The only question is how much her study of the Chinese fight against inflation informs her own intellectual interventions into the West's contemporary debate. First, the abundant Chinese resources used in the monograph are accompanied by a final list and biographies of about forty key Chinese reform economists who were introduced in the book. The double-digit GDP growth since the 1990s has overshadowed the disputes over accelerating reforms in the late 1980s. Weber's account corrects this, and thus reminds the reader that

the political economy discussions on China's or CEE's economic model in a global perspective must take the individual social forces and ideas involved, and not just the institutions, into account (NÖLKE ET AL. 2015). Second, the book completes the very transnational history of (post)socialist transitions. It is an account that confirms CEE's experience (MYANT – DRAHOKOUPIL 2011). In both CEE and Central Asia, the shock therapy backfired and led to unnecessary and painful transition crises. Those countries such as Poland (KING – SZNAJDER 2006), which just like China learned this lesson early on and gradually switched to a more state-led and gradualist alternative, are the most successful transition cases in the end.

ENDNOTES

1 At that time, Deng Xiaoping no longer held any official top state executive position; nevertheless, he continued to maintain his position in the Party and state hierarchy as the "Paramount Leader", which meant that he stood above the level of the Party's first secretary and the prime minister. Formally, he was a member of the Politburo until 1987, the Chairman of the Advisory Committee until November 1989 and, more importantly, the Chairman of the Central Military Commission until November 1989.

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