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CONTENT

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE IRAQ WAR - LESSON LEARNED?

Kristína Bolemanová[1]

ABSTRACT

In his first address to the United Nations in September 2017, the American President Donald Trump blamed North Korea and Iran for developing missiles and nuclear weapons program, suppressing human rights and sponsoring terrorism. He also called Iran a "rogue state" what relived the memories from 2003, when President Bush used similar term of "axis of evil" to describe the regime of Saddam Hussein. Soon after, the US intervened to Iraq to launch a war against terrorism and the Hussein´s undemocratic regime. This article seeks to analyse what impact had the Iraq war on the stability and security of the country and its region. The war in Iraq also teaches us a lesson of how dangerous and counterproductive it can be, when a world superpower labels other country as a "rogue state" and decides to fight alleged threats by using military power. If the US President fulfils his promise of "destroying North Korea" if under threat and launching action against its government, it could result in a very similar situation as in Iraq. A creation of another failed state would not only bring more instability but also open new military threats for the US as well as the world economy.

Key words: Iraq, rogue states, leadership, Iran, North Korea, threats, weapons of mass destruction

Introduction

On 19 September 2017, President **Donald Trump** addressed for the first time the United Nations General Assembly gathering leaders from around the world. In his speech, he blamed North Korea and Iran for developing missiles and nuclear weapons program, suppressing human rights and sponsoring terrorism. President **Trump** also accused Iran government of "*masking a corrupt dictatorship behind a false guise of a democracy by turning a wealthy country with a rich history and culture into an economically depleted rogue state whose exports are violence, bloodshed and chaos*" (Trump, 2017). Moreover, he also vowed to "totally destroy" North Korea - which he called a ´band of criminals´ if it threatened the United States or its allies. In addition, he stated that the United States is ready to take further action, because the policies

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of Iran and North Korea are against the interest of the entire world and therefore America would be prepared to act alone if needed.[2]

Calling Iran a "rogue nation" relived the memories from 15 years ago, when another president of the United States President **Bush** stood in front of the same audience in the United Nations and warned of the "axis of evil" before launching a war in Iraq on the false premise of Iran possessing weapons of mass destruction (Segell, 2005). This war had disastrous consequences on the stability of the country and plunged the region into chaos and further conflicts that are ongoing still nowadays. Moreover, it has also eliminated its leader **Saddam Hussein** and produced a country with no leadership. If the US President fulfils his promises in the case of threat to the US or the world security, what would happen with North Korea and Iran? What measures would America undertake against their dictators **Mr Kim** and **Mr Khamenei**? Have not the developments in Iraq after the Iraq war proved that a military action and the elimination of a well-established dictator in such country bring no stability and security for the region and the world economy as such? What can we learn from the example of the war in Iraq?

1 Definition of a rogue state

The term rogue state was introduced to describe states that are considered dangerous for the world´s peace. This term has mostly been used by American foreign policy makers to describe an "outlaw nation" ruled by a dictator or authoritarian government that severely restricts human rights, supports terrorism or engages in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

"As we work for peace, we must also meet threats to our nation's security — including increased dangers from outlaw nations and terrorism."[3]

In the US politics, the term was first used in 1985 by the US President **Reagan** who stated, *"we are not going to tolerate ... attacks from outlaw states"* (Joyner, 1988, p.29-42), but the Clinton administration elaborated on this concept further (Rees, 2011). The US National Security Advisor **Anthony Lake** described five regimes as "rogue states": North Korea, Cuba, Iraq, Iran and Libya accusing them of the suppression of human rights, promotion of radical ideologies and usage of coercive techniques in their politics (Litwak, 2000). The American administration perceived itself as a guardian of world order responsible for neutralizing and transforming these regimes into stable and democratic regimes that would protect or restore the world peace (Reinolds, 2012).

"We are here to discuss the emerging threats to America's security as we reach a new century. How do we respond to the threat of terrorists around the

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[2] President Donald Trump speech at the UN General Assembly, 19 September 2017, New York

[3] Bill Clinton, "State of the Union Address", January 19, 1999

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world, turning from bullets and bombs to even more insidious and potent weapons? What if they and the rogue states that sponsor them try to attack the critical computer systems that drive our society? What if they seek to use chemical, biological, even nuclear weapons? The United States must deal with these emerging threats now, so that the instruments of prevention develop at least as rapidly as the instruments of disruption.”[4]

Despite the fact that the **Clinton** administration was a leader in using the term of rogue states, the US Department officially stopped using it in 2000 after realisation that calling these states ´rogue´ can be counterproductive. However, this term was subsequently replaced by the term "Axis of Evil" or "states of concern" by the **Bush** administration after the attacks of September 11 - a concept covering Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.[5] Many critics accused the US from using the concept of rogue states and the Axis of Evil as a justification for their imperialistic efforts and propaganda or against the states that openly criticized the US (Freedland, 2006). However, the concept of rogue state has not gained wider acceptance.

2 US response to perceived threats - War in Iraq

In response to perceived threat from rogue states regimes, the US undertook steps to punish and isolate them by economic sanctions or even a military deployment. In Iraq, the US used the air power to fight against undemocratic regime of **Saddam Hussein**. The US deployed UN economic sanctions against Iraq or political sanctions seeking to undermine political stability such as the Iraq Liberation Act that was approved by the Congress in 1998 funding the Iraqi opposition groups and opponents. Moreover, the US also stirred up international action by pushing forward adoption of international agreements and treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Wassenaar Arrangement[6]).

However, the US had difficulties to persuade other countries to support the US policies of ostracism and punishment of Iraqi government for the alleged possession of the weapons of mass destruction and political ambitions to become a military superpower in the Gulf region. The US sought to protect its national interests in the region, in particular, the free flow of oil from oil-rich states such as Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Therefore, the main aim of the US administration was to maintain the US hegemony in the Gulf and ensure that there is a balance of power (Paul, 2004).

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[4] National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, "On Keeping America Secure For the 21st Century", January 22, 1999
[5] President Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address, 29 January 2002.
[6] Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies was agreed in 1995 by 28 governments and established in July 1996.

The US officials accused **Hussein** not only from repressive dictatorship but also from supporting al-Qaeda. However, the evidence of collaboration with al-Qaeda has never been revealed.

The Iraq war started in 2003 by the invasion of the United States-led coalition to overthrow the government of **Saddam Hussein**. The invasion led to the collapse of **Saddam Hussein** Ba´athist government and subsequently sentenced him to death by hanging in 2006. Despite the fact that the US forces defeated the Iraqi forces, the conflict continued for more than a decade due to insurgencies against occupying forces and the post-invasion Iraqi government.

In the aftermath of the invasion, Iraq held multi-party elections in 2005 with a victory of **Nouri al-Maliki** who became Prime Minister and remained in office until 2014. His government enacted policies alienating the country's Sunni minority and worsening sectarian tensions.

To securitize the situation in Iraq the US increased the troop deployment in 2007. Despite of that, the situation has not improved and the fights continued. President Obama reconsidered the US military intervention in Iraq by formally withdrawing all combat troops from Iraq in 2011 (Holsti, 2011). Following the withdrawal of the troops, the insurgency continued and Iraq suffered from political instability reinforced by the increased violence and armed conflicts inside Iraq and the formation of a terrorist group the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) that seized control in Northern Iraq declaring a worldwide Islamic caliphate in 2014 (Ackerman, 2014). Moreover, the conflict and violence between Shias and Sunnis continued taking place. The violent insurgent troops got support from al-Qaeda in Iraq as well as Iran (Bengio, 1998).

The Iraq war caused thousands of civilian as well as military deaths, most of them being a result of insurgency and civil conflict. Moreover, the instability in the country forced thousands of people to leave their homes and become internally/externally displaced persons.

In May 2018, Iraq will held new parliamentary elections. It is expected that two major camps will compete with each other: former Prime Minister **Nouri al-Maliki** against current Prime Minister **Haider al-Abadi** (Zaid, 2017). It is hard to predict yet who will be the winner and if his victory will finally bring stability and peace to Iraq and its citizens.

3 Saddam Hussein and his political leadership

Although the Ba´th Party was a single-party regime, its leader **Saddam Hussein** was strong enough to take personal control of the decisions and chose his own personnel (Garton, 1998). Once the party gained the power, it managed to eliminate its opposition and rule its population by repression, violence and surveillance. After the First Gulf War **Saddam Hussein** was still convinced that he won the war against Iran despite enormous human and material losses (Sassoon, 2012).

According to sociologist **Max Weber**, there are three ideal types of legitimate authority whose capacity to rule is based on traditional, legal-rational and charismatic grounds.

- Traditional authority rests on *"an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them."* (Weber, 1994)
- Legal-rational authority relies on the set of impersonal principles and represents *"a rule by virtue of legality, by virtue of belief in the validity of legal statute and the appropriate juridical competence founded on rationally devised rules."* (Weber, 1994)
- Charismatic authority refers to a creation of a personality cult - *"the entirely personal devotion to, and personal trust in revelations, heroism, or other qualities of leadership in an individual."* (Weber, 1994)

Weber perceives state as *"a relationship of rule by human beings over human beings, which rests on the legitimate use of violence"* (Weber, 1994). This means that for a state to remain in existence, those who are ruled have to surrender to the leadership of the ruler whoever it may be at any given time. If political leadership is absent, it results in stagnation and ineffectiveness of the political regime. The absence of the leadership gives subsequently rise to a reinforced bureaucracy where the activity of political leaders is replaced by the activity of the officials (Weber, 1994).

The political leadership of **Hussein** can be characterized by Weber´s definition of a charismatic authority. **Hussein** built a regime that used propaganda, repression and other methods to create an idealized and worshipful image of himself in order to build his cult of personality.

It is difficult to predict what would happen with the regime and with Hussein leadership if the US would not intervene into Iraq. Nevertheless, it is quite probable that Saddam Hussein would retain the regime due to an effective control of power. Moreover, at the time of the US intervention, the Iraq´s economy was improving and there was no other political or military leader threatening the status of Hussein as a leader of the party.

Conclusions

The Iraq war together with sectarian cleansing had disastrous consequences causing deaths of thousands of civilians and forcing three million people to flee their homes. Despite the fact that the US troops defeated the regime of Saddam Hussein, it has not helped to fight corruption and stop repression and atrocities. Moreover, after the US troops left, the creation of Al-Qaeda, and the self- declaration of a caliphate by ISIS brought new instability in the region and caused even more atrocities. The only precondition for peace is to fight these militant terrorist groups and ensure stabilization of the country. It

would be beneficial if Iraq could find a new political leader that would be able to unite its population, restore peace and security. In addition, societal recovery would be of utmost importance to deal with the hundreds of thousands internally displaced persons as well as citizens that had to leave the country and might want to come back in the future.

Iraq war provides us with a lesson of what happens when a world superpower seeks to fight alleged threats by using armed actions against other governments by bypassing or ignoring the United Nations. It also shows that labelling countries as "rogue states" might not be coherent and objective. The set of criteria for the determination of rogue states that pursue policies such as terrorism, development and deployment of the weapons of mass destruction and challenge international agreements might be relative and it could be possible to name more countries with roguish behaviors than those labelled by the US and the president Bush or Trump (Blum, 2006).

In conclusion, the US and its new President Donald Trump should take precautions when labelling other countries as "rogue regimes". It has proved difficult to establish stability and democracy in Iraq and the similar situation could happen in North Korea or Iran if the US decides to intervene. Moreover, creation of another failed state could only bring more instability and open new military threats for the US as well as the world economy.

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LEGISTATION AND MANAGEMENT OF CYBER SECURITY IN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Ján Brezula[1]

ABSTRACT

Cyber security is apprehended as the subsystem of the national security and the cyber space such as new operational domain. Cyber security represents a critical part of any governments' security strategy and is becoming one of the most important challenges nowadays. Therefore, it is essential for all states at national level to adopt an obligatory legal regulation on the protection of national cyber space, which would ensure an adequate level of protection of critical infrastructure and essential security areas of state functioning. The article deals with the main aspects of cyber security at national level in the realm of basic legislative definitions and regulations.

Key words: *cyber security, cyber threat, cyber space, cyber attack, critical infrastructure*

Introduction

Cyber security is currently one of the crucial elements of national and international security environment. Cyber security is complex of organizational, political, legal, technical and educational measures aimed at securing of the protected and resistant cyber space in the state of the Slovak Republic.

The development trends in society have been influenced by the exponential increase in the use of information and communication technologies. Modern information and communication technologies have significantly broadened opportunities and streamlined ways of interacting geographically distant subjects from different areas of society and economy. The growing number of information and communication users causes increasing public and private dependence on these technologies, which makes them more vulnerable (Marchevka, 2015).

Cyber security helps identify, assess and solve threats in the cyber space, reduce cyber risks and eliminate the impact of cyber attacks that are made through cyber crime or cyber terrorism. Cyber security is one of the most important challenges of nowadays, and its main purpose is the protection of the environment to the realization of human rights information.

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1 Definition of cyber space

The term cyber space was originally used to indicate the environment in which the digital recorded information is transmitted and processed. Currently, it identifies the information and communication infrastructure of an organization, state, or global information and communication infrastructure (Olejár, 2015). Cybernetic space is defined as a virtual space without borders, comprised of globally interconnected networks of hardware, software and data. (Koncepcia kybernetickej bezpečnosti Slovenskej republiky na roky 2015 – 2020, 2015).

The Internet is without doubt the world's most famous cyber space nowadays, which is currently presented and used everywhere in the world, including countries with authoritarian regimes such as North Korea, Cuba, Iran, or China. The Internet is the most known cyber space, but not the only one. In the context of an organization, cyberspace is any set of one or more interconnected local area networks (LAN). Networks that interconnect these local networks are then referred to as the wide area network (WAN). Examples of cyber space that are not connected to the Internet include military computer networks, technology networks, police data networks, and etc.

2 Cyber threats and its specifics

Cyber threats are characterized by several specifics. The first is that it involves a huge number of people, and they are much more immediate compared to traditional military threats. The unavailability of Internet banking, the Internet, e-mail, or telecommunication network failure are perceived by people much more personal and sensitive than armed conflicts in Europe and the world.

Another specific feature of cyber threats is the fact that cyber attacks do not require organized groups of people, or even demanding material security, and most of them require only a computer with Internet connectivity and the ability of the attacker to perform the attack. The nature of cyberspace allows him to deploy his offensive capabilities in several minutes practically everywhere, without the need for physical access to the victim or the presence of armed groups or units. Cyber attacks therefore have a higher potential for threatening our everyday lives as threats that are more serious, but their occurrence is less common and is limited more geographically. A common Internet user is able to defend him from attacks, but his degree of protection depends on his computer capabilities and willingness to respect the rules of using modern technologies. Very often it is also possible that he does not know the basics of information security and does not observe simple rules and measures to reduce the possibilities of its occurrence.

The problem of cyber security is the fact that cyber threats are currently extremely sophisticated and therefore it is difficult to predict and ultimately

determine who the real offender is. It is even harder to prove it. Common Internet users many times do not even know that their computers have been attacked and abused by hackers. Most of their cyber attacks hackers perform in places other than those where they are real.

The emergence of a security threat can cause not only a conscious attack, but also a system bug, which is another specific feature of cyber security. Vulnerability in the system may arise unintentionally, e.g. during the development of commonly used software, or in the case of insufficient security, and this vulnerability can be used by potential attackers. At present, the existence of systems and software with no workable vulnerabilities is practically unattainable. One way to eliminate it is to have a sufficient security audit in the process of software, application, or operating system development. It is also necessary to keep the software up to date and not to use its outdated version. As we know, this is not just a financial issue (changing the operating system or moving to a higher version requires additional financial costs), but some special applications are only developed for a particular version of the operating system or hardware.

In terms of importance, critical infrastructure is one of the most endangered areas for cyber threats. Critical infrastructure is represented by the objects of special importance and other important objects, information and communication means, equipment for production and supply of water, electricity, oil and natural gas and other parts of state property, which are necessary for the management of crisis situations, the guarantee of the minimum economy operation and state administration, as well as its external and internal security, which must be specially protected.

All components of critical infrastructure are dependent on information and communication infrastructure (Trebula, 2017), and the combination of computers and communication systems represents a basic infrastructure for the economy and industry and is also a major component of the security environment.

3 Cyber threats vs. cyber risks

Cyber security is a system whose main task is to provide the state with a secure, protected and open cyber space and the security of the electronic, information, communication and control systems, which are located in that space.

The role of cyber security is to protect cyber systems from cyber threats. A cyber threat is a threat that exploits the existence of cyberspace (Refsdal – Solhaug – Stolen, 2015). Cyber threats can be intentional (Malicious) or unintentional (non-Malicious). Intentional threats include, for example, attacks against Denial of Service (DoS) to overcome communication and information systems. Unintentional threats may arise, for example, from a hard disk failure

due to its wear or a bug in the program code (restart of the computer system because of an untreated situation in the computer system control components).

Similarly, methods and techniques that are used to manage and evaluate cyber risks are specific. One of the specifics of cyber space is its potential reach. It means that the threat developer can be found anywhere in the world and yet has enough potential to attack and deeply hit the analyzed cyber system. Similarly, the bulk may also be the fact that a large part of cyber threats are created with the intention of harming them. The attackers who are the originators of these threats often have their motives and intentions unclean. On the other hand, we also encounter unintentional threats every day.

Cyber risk can be defined as the risk of a cyber threat (Refsdal – Solhaug – Stolen, 2015). It can then be inferred from the definition that cyber risk does not include all the risks to which the cybernetic system may be exposed. For example, a room fire with servers is not a cyber risk (fire is usually not a cyber threat) while unavailability of data placed on servers due to deliberate overloading of the data network already the risk is.

4 Concept of cyber security in Slovakia

The central state administration for cyber security in Slovakia was designated by the National Security Authority on the basis of *"the Cyber Security Concept of the Slovak Republic for the years 2015-2020"*. Within its competencies it is primarily responsible for:
- coordination, monitoring, control and evaluation of national cyber security tasks;
- preparation of the Cyber Security Report in the Slovak Republic and its submission to the Cyber Security Committee of the Slovak Security Council;
- designing and submitting a procedure for a cyber attack in the context of the crisis management of the Slovak Republic;
- continuous monitoring of the national cyber space and analysis of potential and current threats;
- is a national contact point for the European Union and NATO members in the field of cyber security.

The framework structure of cyber security management in the Slovak Republic is shown in Picture 1.

Picture 1 Framework Structure of Cyber Security Management

CERT – Community Emergency Response Team
CSIRT – Computer Security Incident Response Team

Source: Koncepcia kybernetickej bezpečnosti Slovenskej republiky na roky 2015 – 2020

In connection with the designation of the National Security Authority, it has been operating the specialized "*Computer Security Incident Response Team*" (SK-CSIRT) as the Central State Office for cyber security since 1st January 2016. The team provides services related in particular to the management of security incidents, the elimination of their consequences and the subsequent restoration of the operation of information systems in cooperation with the owners and operators of these systems. One of the activities of this team is also participation in international exercises. One of these exercises was also the largest international exercise "*Locked Shield 2017*", which took place in April 2017 in Estonian Tallinn and was attended by more than 800 participants

from 25 countries around the world. The exercise Locked Shield is a simulation of so called "*red teams*" to systems and networks called "*blue teams*" composed of experts who protect the IT world every day. The Slovak Republic has its participation in this international exercise every year. The Cyber Security Concept of the Slovak Republic for the years 2015-2020 is the basic and starting document for the development of legislation, standards, methodological guidelines, rules, security policies and other tools needed to ensure cyber security within the Slovak Republic.

Since the creation of the Cyber Security Concept of the Slovak Republic for the years 2015-2020, work has continued on the creation of a legislative framework for cyber security and "*the Cyber Security Law*" was approved by the government in November 2017. His preparation was complicated, because not only the experts from the state administration, but also the academic community or non-governmental experts and analysts who contributed to its contents participated in its real form. The central authority for standards, operations, cyber security, and incident prevention will become the National Security Authority, as proposed by the law.

According to this law, the National Security Authority has the status of CSIRT that is superior to other teams with the same focus already operating in the territory of the Slovak Republic (Návrh zákona o kybernetickej bezpečnosti, 2017). The CSIRT will be responsible for dealing with cyber security incidents and implementing reactive and preventive services.

Preventive services will focus in particular on preventing cyber security incidents by building awareness, training, and working with other CSIRTs.

Reactive services will be designed to solve cyber security incidents and their analysis, to support the response for cyber security incidents and their coordination and measures to prevent further cyber security incidents from continuing, spreading and recurring.

In addition to the strengthened status of the National Security Authority, the law also introduces the term of "*Cyber threat status*" that occurs when there is a significant reduction in the level of cyber security, immediate threat or risk of cyber security threats. The National Security Authority declares Cyber threat status to be at most 10 consecutive days with the possibility of repeatedly extending it for a maximum of 30 consecutive days.

The law further specifies to the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic to carry out to the extent necessary the state administration in the field of cyber security, in particular:
- after initiation of war or state of war;
- at the time of crisis, if a cyber security incident threatens the state defense system and the ability to provide state defense;
- when the cyber security incident information indicates that a cyber security incident may be cyber terrorism or can be used as a means of terrorist attack, and the measures taken did not lead to its removal.

The law provides a good basis for further legislative efforts in the area of cyber security. It clearly divides competences and defines rights and obligations in legal practice and introduces the terminology used by the European Union, facilitating international co-operation, including the involvement of private companies in the process of its preparation and its final design.

In 2004, the Slovak Republic became a full member of NATO. The role of this organization is to protect the freedom and security of its members by political and military means, building on the shared values of democracy and human rights, while preserving the full sovereignty and independence of all member states (Školník – Belan, 2015). Article 5 of this treaty says that an attack on one of its members will be perceived as an attack on all members. Hence, the Slovak Republic, as a full member of the NATO, must be prepared to respond appropriately to all possible threats, not excluding cyber threats such as cyber terrorism, cyber warfare and cyber espionage.

Conclusion

The enormous implementation of information and communication technologies brings many benefits that lead to the development of information society, acceleration of communication and the development of services. On the other hand, the dependence of the society and its functioning on these technologies brings with it many threats in the form of cyber attacks, which are more and more sophisticated and complicated (Šahin, 2017). It is therefore essential that states at national level adopt binding legal regulation on the protection of the national cyber space, which would ensure an adequate level of protection of the critical infrastructure and the basic security areas of state functioning. The article analyses the Cyber Security Concept of the Slovak Republic for the years 2015-2020, which is the initial document for the forthcoming legislative change in the field of cyber security - the Cyber Security Law. The aim of the law is to create unified legislative conditions to ensure adequate protection of the cyber space of the state from potential threats whose existence could cause irreparable damage to the Slovak Republic. By adopting this new law, the Slovak Republic will integrate among other European countries that have had their own the cyber security laws in effect for a long time.

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9.

US IMMIGRATION POLICY TOWARD NON-IMMIGRANTS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: A NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUE

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ABSTRACT
On September 11, 2001, nineteen foreign citizens from the Middle East conducted the largest terrorist attack on American soil. All of them entered the country as non-immigrants. Suddenly, highlighting problems associated with immigration became acceptable and as a result, an adequate immigration policy reform seemed to be imminent. The policy changes that have been made in regard to non-immigrants from the Middle East after September 11 attack were supposed to improve the United States national security and keep America safe. This paper examines the new immigration policies and discusses their effectiveness. As the same time, it looks back on the American history at a time when the United States immigration policies were governed by national security.

Key words: *Middle East, terrorist attack, immigration, national security, immigration policies.*

Introduction

On September 11, 2001, the terrorist attack brought down two of the largest buildings in the world, killing several thousands of people. The terrorists involved were foreign nationals, coming from the Middle East. Before they engaged in terrorism, they all had been enjoying the status of non-immigrants. After September 11, immigration policy became very vital to national security and as a result, immigration reform seemed to be inevitable. The nation realized that if the country were to reduce the chance of another attack, it needed to pay more attention to how the terrorists entered and remained in the United States of America. Thus, similar to the past when the national security has been endangered, the nature of the new immigration policies shifted from economy-based to security-oriented.

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Economic opportunity, political liberty and religious tolerance made USA so desirable that people were willing to leave behind their homes, their families and the little possession they had. Early immigrants had a huge impact on this country and literally shaped every aspect of it. **John Bodnar** in his book *The Transplanted: History of Immigrants in Urban America* states: *"In essence neither immigration nor capitalism as it emerged in the United States would have been possible without each other."* He further continues: *"American population growth led to expand markets which made possible the exploitation of economies of large-scale production"* (Bodnar, 1987).

Immigration was crucial to the entire industrial transformation, and it remains to be equally crucial today. The American economy has relied for many years on the presence of immigrants in various branches of the economy, and it continues to do so.

It is almost a given that immigration throughout the years has been primarily connected with labor. Contrary to popular belief, a shift from an economy-based to security-oriented immigration policy is not a novelty in the United States. In order to demonstrate this, evidence will be presented showing that immigration has long been seen as a security issue. This study will further examine how, aside from national well being, there still remains the issue of close correlation between immigration policy and national security. Recent debates over immigration take a significantly different turn and similar to the past, immigration matters are those of national security.

1 Purpose of the research

The terrorists involved in September 11, 2001 attacks were non-immigrants, coming from the Middle East. Various government agencies were blamed for their inadequate preparedness, among them also, or especially, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service. Thus, a prevalent notion is that the threat comes from the people from abroad; mainly form the Middle East, Therefore, the first line of defense appears to be an adequate immigration policy that would keep the potential terrorists entering the country and carrying out any possible attacks. In order to achieve this, every aspect of the INS and its non-immigration policies should have been thoroughly examined for one simple reason: prior to September 11, these policies failed to protect the American public. Thus, the in-depth research of the different aspects of the immigration system before and after September 11 should be carefully dissected.

The purpose of this research is to determine, examine and evaluate if and how the US immigration policy, a national security issue, changed and/or improved toward the non-immigrants from the Middle East in the aftermath of the September 11th attack. This research examines the new immigration policies focused explicitly on non-immigrants from the Middle East and discusses their effectiveness and efficiency. The reason behind the focus on the Middle East is

that the terrorists involved in the September 11 attacks were originally Middle Easterners, enjoying visas designed for non-immigrants. Also, this research looks back on the American history at a time when the immigration policies suddenly became eminent to the national security.

2 Key variables

The terms *"immigrant"* and *"non-immigrant"* are many times used interchangeably. However, this research focuses at what referrers to as "non-immigrant" which is a term is referring to all aliens who, after a strictly defined stay in the US, return to their home country. Needless to say, while debating immigration, more often than not the *"non-immigrants"* find themselves in the same category as the "immigrants." There are many different categories of non-immigrant visas: so many, in fact, that the system seems very complicated and sometimes unclear. The INS defined non-immigrant as *"an alien who seeks temporary entry to the United States for a specific purpose"*. The alien must have a permanent residence abroad and qualify for the non-immigrant classification sought. The non-immigrant classification included: foreign government officials, visitors for business and pleasure, aliens in transit through the United States, treaty traders and investors, students, international representatives, temporary workers and trainees, representatives of foreign information media, exchange visitors, fiancé of US citizens, intracompany transferees, NATO officials, religious workers, and some others. Most non-immigrants can be accompanying or joined by spouse and unmarried minor (or dependent) children" (INS). In his book, Vernon Briggs states that the *"non-immigrant classification is a residual grouping. It collectively embraces all other persons who seek to enter the United States for a temporary period of time, not for permanent residence"* (Briggs, 2003).

Another important term is *"alien."* The official definition described alien as *"Any person not a citizen or national of the United States of America"* (INS). All foreign-born citizens, regardless of their immigration statues are included in this rather broad category. The term *"alien"* includes not only non-immigrants but also immigrants and/or illegal immigrants. In this research the term "alien" is used while researching the US immigration policy as the national security issue in the past: all "aliens" were obliged to comply with the Alien Registration Act regardless of their desired immigration status, and all of them were subject of the internment as well.

To define a geographical term *"Middle East"* is a sizeable task. **Fawaz A. Gerges** writes in his article" *"Despite the extensive use of the term by a host of scholars, periodicals and media, no standard boundary delimitation exists by which a "Middle East" region can be precisely located geographically."* The author also warns that the problem of definition is not only academic, but also ideological and political. *"Equating the Middle East with a particular entity (the*

pan-Arab region) or an Islamic community (the Muslim umma) carries political implications. It implies rejection of an entire academic discourse, which takes the "Middle East" for granted. Some Arab terrorists, for example, dismiss the concept of the "Middle East" as a product of Western Colonialism and imperialism and substitute for it concept of an Arab regional subsystem, which in their view represents more truly the interactions and relationships in the area" (Gerges, 1991).

According to another author, **Joseph G. Rahme**, the "Middle East" is ethnocentric, specifically a Eurocentric term that was first coined in 1902 by a well-known American naval strategist **Alfred Thayer Mahan**. He goes on to saying: *"The term 'Middle East' implies that it is 'East' of an entity that considers itself the center, that is Europe, and that which is the 'Middle East' is defined in relation to it"* (Rahme, 1999). Furthermore, not only the encyclopedias are not consistent in defining the term, but also at an institutional level (specifically within the United Nations), there is no uniform definition of the *"Middle East."* Therefore, for the purpose of this discussion, the "Middle East" is defined as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Syria, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and Mauritania. The focus of this paper on the Middle East is due to the fact that all of the terrorists involved in September 11 attacks originated from the countries defined as such.

National security described the measures taken by a state to ensure its survival and security. Measures include the maintenance of armed forces, civil defense and emergency preparedness, attempts to create resilience and redundancy in national infrastructure, superior intelligence services and protection of sensitive information. Because the primary weapons of the terrorists are not tanks, ships, or even commercial airlines but rather the terrorist themselves, the state's ability to detect them and keep them out of the country seems to be the most effective way to ensure national security and combat terrorism.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service was a government agency that dealt specifically with immigration issues. There were three aspects of the INS, which were the visa issuing abroad, the guidance of the border and ports of entry, and interior law enforcement. This paper focuses only on the two of the three aspects of the INS: visa issuing and guidance of the ports of entry.

3 Immigration policy as a national security in the US history

The advent of World War II served as a pretext for a sudden shift in the administrative responsibility for the nations' immigration policy and it has had lasting consequences. Immigration policy prior to 1933 was assigned to the UD Department of Labor. The two immigration functions, administering the

immigration laws and supervising the naturalization of aliens, were performed by two separate bureaus within the Department of Labor. On June 10, 1933, **President** Roosevelt decided to combine these two bureaus into a single agency known until 2002 as the Immigration and Naturalization Service. By late 1930, however, things rapidly changed. The prospect of US involvement in a war in Europe raised concerns that immigration might be a way for enemy and subversive elements to enter the country. Hence, a fateful short-term decision with long-term consequences was initiated. On May 20, 1940, **President Roosevelt** recommended to Congress that the INS be shifted from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice as part of the President's Reorganization Plan No. V (Briggs, 2003). On June 14, 1940, Congress approved the transfer. In his message to Congress, **President Roosevelt** stated: *"In normal times much can be said for the retention of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization in the Department of Labor where it has long resided…. Today, however, the nation is confronted with matters relating to aliens in our midst. It is more than necessary to exercise, for National safety, certain measures and controls over aliens, which are not demanded in normal days"*.

In subsequently published background papers, the specific rationale was explained as follows: *"The INS was originally placed within the Department of Labor because if the historical reason that it was, formerly, mostly concerned with problems pertinent to American labor. In recent years, however, there has arisen a dangerous threat from abroad on the form of the fifth column and other activities, it seemed expedient, therefore, to transfer the INS to the Department of Justice in order to cope with this danger, as a matter of national defense"* (Briggs, 2003).

After the war ended, however, there was no effort made to return the INS to the Department of Labor or shift it anywhere else. In order to know better about potential subversive activities on the part of aliens against the US armed forces, the Alien Registration Act, also known as the Smith Act, was passed and signed into law on June 28, 1940 (Johnson, 1958). It was passed as a war measure. The various government agencies, such as the INS, FBI, the Secret Service and the Office of Strategic Services were all interested in knowing the whereabouts and affiliations of aliens in the United States; nevertheless, at that period of time there was not any central registry of aliens in existence. On its web site, the INS stated that *"the significance of one passage of the Alien Registration Act of 1940 should be seen in this context of a feeling vulnerability, suspicion and fear probably not experienced since the early days of the Republic"*. The Alien Registration Act had three main sections.

The first part was dealing with subversive activities and sabotage. It actually forbade any person interfering with the loyalty of the US military or naval forces, advocating the overthrow of the US government by force and violence, or distributing printed matter advocating such overthrow.

The second part was concerned with deportation of aliens and the third part required the fingerprinting and registration of aliens. All aliens who were applying for visas overseas had to be fingerprinted at the US consulates. Moreover, it also required all aliens fourteens years and older who *"are now and hereafter in the United State…"* to register and fingerprinted within thirty days. Virtually all the aliens had to be registered, something that had never been done in the past. As a matter of fact, one of the main controversies of this Act was the idea of fingerprinting aliens. There was much opposition against it and what was especially troubling was the question of whether or not to treat "small" group of people differently from the majority or should fingerprinting be required for all citizens. The issue, however, was resolved and eventually only the aliens had to be registered, fingerprinted and required to submit their biographical data. Registrations were made at post offices throughout the United State and needless to say, this act established a definitive identifier for each alien, the so-called "A" number, which is widely used even today. Although many people see this Act as an inevitable pre-war measure, some critics argue: *„The main objective of the act was to undermine the American Communist Party and other left-wing political groups in the United States."* The problem seems to be the fact that the law required all alien residents to file a comprehensive statement of their personal and occupational status. According to some, this Act was the basis of later prosecutions of members of the Communist and Socialist Workers parties.

After Japanese military forces attacked Pearl Harbor, the United States declared war on Japan. **President F.D. Roosevelt** issued Proclamation Number 2525, in which he restricted travel and other movements of Japanese aliens and authorized detention of all suspicious aliens. Later on, these precautions were expanded to German and Italian aliens as well. Consequently, in 1942, **President Roosevelt** issued Executive Order Number 9066, in which he authorized the establishment of defense zones within the United States. Most of the states of California, Oregon and Washington officially constituted what was called the Pacific Defense Zone. The military commanders had power to exclude suspicious aliens from these zones or, at least, to restrict their movement. Fear of the Japanese invading and taking over the United States caused removing many people from their homes and placing them into the barbed-wire enclosed Relocation Centers for Internment. According to the National Public Radio's reporter **Greg Allen**, the Roosevelt administration made a mistake by its indiscriminant way it forced into camps not only aliens, but also about 70,000 American citizens. Thus, the boundary between citizens and aliens were not honored.

At the same time, however, **Mr. Claudius O. Johnson** from State College of Washington in his article *The Status of Freedom of Expression Under The Smith Act* states: *"The government's policy toward enemy aliens has been moderate and just."* He is arguing: *"Enemy aliens were placed by executive*

orders under more rigorous restraints and more constant surveillance, not, however, unreasonable or unduly onerous…enemy aliens dangerous to the public security are interned…this is a quarantine proceeding, not a criminal action." The author, however, conveniently omits detained US citizens, among them also many innocent children.

4 Immigration as a national security issue immediately after September 11, 2001

In the wake of the terrorist attack, immigration was suddenly center on the political agenda. Before September 11, the predominant assumption was that aliens, both legal and illegal, seek entry to the United States for economic gain. Other reasons to immigrate included family reunification and protection from persecution. Considering these ideas together, it is clear that the overriding assumption was that immigrants arrive in this country with good intentions. The terrorist attacks prompted policy-makers to seriously question this assumption. At a minimum, the attacks forced them and the public to acknowledge that some aliens wish to harm the United States and its citizens. Broadly speaking, the attacks shifted, once again, the focus of immigration policy from economic considerations to national security issues. In the pats, it was almost a given that immigration policies mostly followed national economic trends. Therefore, the agency (INS) focused almost exclusively on the law enforcement, which basically included the attempts to locate and consequently deport illegal aliens. Following the attack, it was recognized that borders and immigration policies do matter because they are the foundations on which national security itself rests.

Nevertheless, not every politician thinks the same. *"Immigrants are not the problem,"* said **Sen. Kennedy** in November of 2001. *"Terrorists are the problem."* The Atlanta Journal and Constitution states: *"The figures suggest that a decision by the INS to focus on national security has translated into less scrutiny for human smugglers, documents forgers, illegal immigrants and foreign nationals who commit crimes that should trigger deportation"* (Bixler, 2003). In other words, the critics say that instead of the immigrants, the INS is watching the terrorists, **Mr. Ibish** of the American-Arab Discrimination Committee warns: *"Confusing immigration law enforcement and national security is subject to potential abuse. It's irrational to have a policy that tries to do both"* (Iqbal, 2003).

The best evidence that immigration after September 11 was viewed first and foremost as a security issue, is the fact that the agency was transferred into the US Department of Homeland Security. This act represented *"the largest reorganization of the federal government since the establishment of the US Department of Defense in 1947"* (Briggs, 1993). The INS itself had been split into two separate bureaus: dealing with enforcement function and the other with services to legal immigrants and non-immigrants. Although due to the

rearrangements that had been done the INS had allegedly much better connection and information flow with the other agencies. On the other hand, INS is now a small part of one big agency that because of the bureaucracy involved does not necessarily have to react as swiftly as the smaller sized one.

5 Changes in immigration policy after September 11 attack in regard to the aliens from the Middle East

Unlike popular belief that the INS operates only domestically, the visa processing, the very first step that people need to take in order to get to the US, starts abroad. The American consulates and embassies around the words have the ultimate power and responsibility to decide who can and who cannot obtain a visa and, consequently, who can and who cannot enter the country. Three months before September 11 attacks, the Visa Express Program was introduced for all non-immigrants from Saudi Arabia. This program was designed to help qualified applicants in Saudi Arabia to *"obtain visas quickly and easily"* (Pound, 2001). Until just recently, the US consulates in Riyadh and Jeddah widely and "successfully" used this type of program. It allowed *"residents of Saudi Arabia, including non-Saudi citizens, to apply for non-immigrant visas at private travel agencies"* (Mowbray, 2002). All that was required from the applicant was to forward the application with a photo to the travel agent, who was responsible for submitting it to the nearest consulate.

No interview, no personal contact whatsoever was required. Many critics of this program say that precisely because of no personal contact, the consular officers were unable to determine if the applicant and the person who appeared on the application was the one and the same person. There are some voices, however, that say the consular officers are so overwhelmed that they can spend only about two to three minutes to interview the applicant. Therefore, *"even when someone is interviewed by a consular officer, it isn't likely to do any good"*. The truth remains, however, that Saudi Arabia was the only country with a benefit of the Visa Express Program. Everywhere else in this world, except the Visa Waiver countries, the applicants have to appear for a private interview in order to prove they are eligible to obtain a visa. According to the Section 214 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act*: „Every alien shall be presumed to be an immigrant until he establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer at the time of application for a visa, and the immigration officers, at the time of application for admission, that he is entitled to non-immigrant status"* (INS).

In other words, the applicant for a non-immigrant visa has to establish that he/she has a residence to which he/she is likely to return, that he/she is employed (or otherwise economically independent), able to finance the desirable trip, preferably with a clean criminal record. There is presumption that once an applicant has a family, good paying job or some kind of property, it is more likely that he/she will not settle in the US. Generally speaking, young, single

unemployed males with prior criminal records should never obtain visa because they are presumed to be "immigrants" or "intended immigrants" (people likely to stay in the US and never return back to their home countries). In order to turn the applicant down, the employees of the consular or embassy look for some evidence that would indicate that the applicant for non-immigrant visa does not have very strong ties to his/her country. Together with the application, the applicant is required to submit his/her photo and to undergo an interview with a US consular. Three of the hijackers obtained their visas through the Visa Express program and fifteen of them were Saudi nationals. The reasons behind the establishment of the Visa Express Program are still unclear and it must be said that this issue has not been publicly addressed very often. On one hand, there are voices that this program represents only one of the many friendly gestures toward the Saudi Arabian government: after all, the US immigration policy is a part of the US foreign policy. On the other hand, the very presumption and requirement that predominantly economically independent and financially stable applicants should be awarded with non-immigrant visas gives Saudi Arabia advantage before most of the other countries in the world.

Saudi Arabia is one of the world's wealthiest countries; nevertheless, there is an argument that the country's wealth is in the hands of a few and that Saudi Arabia has besides the millionaires also people who are less financially independent. The first thirty days after the September 11 attacks, the US consulate in Jeddah reportedly *"interviewed only two of one hundred and four applicants, rejecting none."* Only after the public outcry, on Wednesday, July 24, 2002, the World Tribune announced: *"The administration…ends a longtime practice in which Saudi Arabia applicants could apply for visas through travel agencies. Officials said the US embassy in Riyadh will now process all visa applications and interview everybody from ages 12 to 70…"*

The second goal of the INS is to guard the US borders and the ports of entry so everyone without valid permission is denied entry. The nation's ports of entry are the places where people travelling by land, sea, or air enter the United States. In the past, this part of the INS was almost entirely focused on decreasing the ability of the Hispanic people to infiltrate the US borders. Immigration officers and immigration inspectors are supposed to secure the entry points as best as they can. Until just recently, the main tool used for identifying undesirable immigrants was the so-called "watch list." This watch list system was based on names, dates of birth, country and passport numbers rather than a biometric identifier (photo or fingerprint). Upon arrival, the names of persons who applied for a visa and entry were checked against the list.

Due to time constraints, limited personnel and sometimes computer problems, people were not checked against this list (neither were those who came from the Visa Waiver country). In order to reduce the possibility of allowing someone undesirable into the country, the Special Registration was introduced to "let the government keep track of non- immigrants that come to

the US every year." The problem is, however, that the Special Registration requirements apply only to those non-immigrants who are coming from the "targeted" countries (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria) (INS).

The special procedures include fingerprinting, taking photographs, questioning and reporting periodically to the INS during the stay. While proponents of the tighter immigration policy applaud these precautions, some critics say that *"blanket measures like roundups and arrests and special registration requirements from individuals from Arab and Muslim nations have done little to improve national security"* (Bourge, 2003). Moreover, these measures tend to alienate an already disturbed population from the Middle East. Even **S. Camarota**, director of research at the Center for Immigration Studies and avid supporter of strictly enforced immigration policies admits: *"...in the long run targeting of particular groups of immigrants is not only constitutionally problematic, but also unfair"*. On the other hand, **Mark Krikorian**, another member of the Center for Immigration Studies states: *"The public recognizes that the radical Islam has finally reached our shores and that muscular immigration reforms must be part of our response"* (Camarota, 2002). According to many opponents, these "muscular reforms" do not seem to work: *"Should we really be surprised that not a single terrorist has gone into the federal immigration office to present himself for interrogation?"* asks **Robert Suro**, director of the Pew Hispanic Center (Bourge, 2003). Some people go even further by saying that *"even if you have fingerprinted every Saudi in the United States and one then commits a suicide bombing, these measures mean nothing"* (Kerwin, 2003). There is also awareness that due to the exclusive focus on these "targeted" countries, the terrorists might re-group and come from some other countries such as India, China or Russia.

No matter how many people disagree with focusing on Muslim-specific immigration policies, the truth remains that the American immigration history is full of exclusionary policies toward "non-desirable" aliens. On March 11, 2003, National Public Radio in its morning talk show contemplated the possibility of history repeating itself. **John Tateishi** is a member of the Japanese American Citizens League and one of those who were forced into internment camps, articulated that some *"Arab-Americans may have to relive his family experience"*. Especially in case of being at war with Iraq and using the internment camps as a lawful wartime measure, *"legal scholars like Muller and Cole say there is another question: "Do they make sense?""* (Edwards, 2004). Both pf these scholars argue that most of the Iraqis fled Saddam Hussein's regime, thus the are more likely than anyone else to support war that would take him out of his power. Nevertheless, Iraqis are one of the groups that were

required to undergo Special Registration with the INS, and the governmental officials have interviewed many of them.

Conclusion

September 11 was first and foremost a failure of law enforcement, intelligence and immigration procedures. It also spurred much of the media to report about immigration and national security more vehemently. Whether the immigration changes that have been made immediately in the aftermath of the September 11 attack were beneficial to national security was the subject of a fierce, ongoing debate. On one side are those favoring as open a system as possible, who claims the border need not be closed and law enforcement and intelligence agencies have the tools to fight terrorism if they would do just their jobs well? On the other side are those who insist that American citizens have a right to protection from the foreign nationals and that limitation on immigration, including a more selective approach to certain regions (Middle East) is the only way to ensure it? If nothing else, the ongoing debates have brought to our attention the region of the Middle East.

The number of Middle Eastern immigrants in the United States of America had grown nearly eightfold from 1970 to 2000 and was extended to double again by 2010. While the overall size of the foreign-born population has tripled since 1970 and now stands at 31 million, the number of immigrants from the Middle East has grown more than twice as fast: from fewer than 200,000 in 1970 to nearly 1.5 million in 2000. However, the numbers get smaller: in 2000, 431,405 non-immigrants from the Middle East visited this country whereas in 2002 only 25,821 non-immigrants came to the US (INS). The country with the largest decline was Saudi Arabia. Whether a lesser number of non-immigrants translate into safer America is questionable.

It is also worth noting that both, immigrants and non-immigrants from the Middle East are one of the most highly educated groups in America, with almost half of them holding a bachelor's degree, compared with 28 percent of natives, which means that their average income is higher as well. To date, the way Middle Easterners have navigated life in the United States reflects the group's relatively small size. A modestly small sized group has to accommodate itself to American society because it slacks the critical mass necessary to change status quo. However, down the road the settlement of one million new Middle Easterners could result in possible changes. Some conservatives already have suggested halting altogether immigration from this part of the world.

Solving the many problems with the US immigration system is not easy. There have been various plans to even more recognize the INS, but money and institutional changes are not enough on their own. The best way to give the INS the breathing room it deserves and needs is to take it seriously and learn from the many mistakes that have been made in the past. Immigration control can

make America safe but only if it is pursued consistently, forcefully and justly. Even though the INS must reinforce its shields against those seeking to cross the border and to do the US harm, it must preserve the openness to the rest of the world. If the reforms are going to be meaningful, they must apply to everyone. It is absolutely imperative for a successful policy not scapegoat certain individuals while exercising preferential treatment toward the others, while more vigorous background checks make sense, efforts to exclude or discriminate against certain countries or regions should be resisted.

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IMPACT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY

Martin Grešš[1]

ABSTRACT

The aim of the article is to analyze the impacts of economic sanctions imposed on the economy of the Russian federation in 2014 on its economy from macroeconomic point of view with identification of some of the impacts on the economy of the European Union. The article comes to a conclusion, that the imposed economic sanctions by the EU and the countersanctions by Russia had negative effects on both economic areas. We study the impacts of economic sanctions imposed on Russian economy from macroeconomic point of view, thus we focus on basic macroeconomic indicators of the Russian economy – gross domestic product per capita, growth of gross domestic product per capita, inflation rate, unemployment rate, natural resources rent and international trade. We use the data from the World Bank's online database – World Development Indicators

Key words: *economic sanctions, Russian Federation, European Union, trade*

Introduction

In the last century, relations among the countries became more complex and countries, especially their national economies, became significantly interdependent on each other. Economic interdependence between Russia and the European Union can be observed in trade flows between these two economic areas. Russia is one of the main trading partners of the European Union. There was a high and continually increasing volume of trade between these two economic areas in years preceding the sanctions. In 2013, Russia was, with share of 7.7% on total exports of the EU, the fourth largest trading partner of the EU after the USA, Switzerland and China. From the perspective of the Russian economy, the EU share on total exports of Russia was 42.4%, making the EU the most important trading partner (INTA, 2017, p. 6). Even though there was a positive development in the mutual trade between these two economic areas, one year before the sanctions were imposed and entered into force, mutual trade relations significantly declined because of the economic downturn in Russia. In the previous years, the exports increased significantly and continually; however, in 2013 exports stagnated. According to INTA (2017), the EU exports to Russia declined by almost 21% annually between 2013 and 2016, while between 2009 and 2012 they were increasing by 20% annually.

Concerning the economic sanctions in general, they may be seen as an important instrument (double-edged) of foreign policy and international

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diplomacy with long lasting effects even though they are implemented only for a limited period of time (Klinova and Sidorova, 2016). Economic sanctions are also often removed much more slowly than they are implemented. **Van Bergeijk** (1989) argues in a similar manner and notes that economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy became more controversial. He notes that generally sanctions are believed ineffective because of the impossibility to create necessary political unity for a forceful embargo and even if established, embargoes and trade warfare are easy to circumvent. According to **Yang** et al. (2009), sanctions in general may take many forms like withholding of the diplomatic recognition, boycotting cultural and sports events and sequestering of property of citizens of targeted country. On the other hand, they argue that the form of sanctions that usually attracts the most attention and may have the most visible effects are the economic sanctions including the various restrictions on international trade, financial flows and the movement of people. Economic sanctions and their impact on particular economy may be analyzed at two levels. The first level is microeconomic level where impacts of the economic sanctions is focused on two main economic subjects – households and companies. Concerning companies, one can analyze the impacts on certain sectors of the economy – primary, secondary, or tertiary. Primary sector includes agricultural production and mining of natural resources. Secondary sector includes different types of industries producing in the economy. Tertiary sector includes services. The second level of economic sanctions' analysis include the macroeconomic level. Impacts of economic sanctions are studied at the national level focusing on basic macroeconomic indicators including the gross domestic product and its growth (overall as well as per capita), inflation rate, unemployment rate and external economic balance (using the balance of payment or, more specifically, trade balance of the national economy together with inflows and outflows of foreign investment).

Another level of the study includes the objectives that are to be achieved by the sanctions. One can identify two types of objectives to be achieved by the imposition of economic sanctions. On one hand these are explicit (or declared) objectives, on the other hand there may by some implicit (or tacit) objectives. Without being differentiated between explicit or implicit objectives, **Aalto** and **Forsberg** note that objective may vary including achieving a policy change, regime change, weakening of the adversary, communicating to the domestic audiences and third parties (Aalto and Forsberg, p. 223).

Aalto and **Forsberg** (2015) note that researchers used to agree that international economic sanctions are rarely effective, even though this view of imposing of international economic sanctions and their impact changed in the 1980s when **Hufbauer** et al. (1985) published a comprehensive study on the impact of economic sanctions and found out that imposition of international economic sanctions was quite successful in one third of all analyzed cases. According to **Aalto** and **Forsberg** (2015, p. 223), emphasis also shifted from

general economic sanctions to sanctions directly targeted at the interests of the leaders rather than at the interests of wider population within a particular economy impacted by the sanctions. **Klinova** and **Sidorova** (2016) argue that economic sanctions are most effective in case when both, imposing and targeted economies, are traditional trading partners.

Economic sanctions of the EU as well as Russian countersanctions were implemented in 2014. The political conflict between Russia and western countries started due to conflict in East Ukraine and continued with Russian annexation of the Crimea. This conflict paved the way for economic sanctions by the EU, the USA and other countries against Russia. We note that all the restrictive measures were taken and implemented gradually. In March 2014, the first measures were taken including travel restrictions and freezing of the assets for selected Russian individuals as well as an import ban on goods originating in Crimea or Sevastopol. In July 2014, a complex package of targeted economic sanctions was adopted by the EU Member states. The package included:

- Measures to restrict Russia's access to EU capital markets,
- Embargo on the imports and exports of arms and related material from or to Russia,
- Prohibition of exports of dual use goods and technology for military use in Russia,
- Prohibition of exports of products that are destined for deep water oil exploration and production, arctic oil exploration or production and shale oil projects in Russia.

According to INTA (2017), there was a significant difference between the USA and the EU concerning the export contracts with the Russian trade partners. While the USA imposed sanctions on all the contracts alike (new contracts and old contracts), the EU decision made by the EU Council targeted only new contracts. Old (existing) contracts were therefore exempted and the economic sanctions concerned only new contracts closed after the decision. Since their imposition, the sanctions were extended several times with latest decisions made in 2017. In June 2017, decision was made for the economic sanctions to be in force until January 31st, 2018. However, in December 2017, the period was prolonged until July 31st, 2018. There is a possibility to cancel the economic sanctions before the last period ends in case the Minsk agreements are accepted and implemented by signatory parties.

After the implementation of restrictive measures taken against Russia, Russia imposed countermeasures in August 2014. It prohibited imports of certain agri-food products from the countries that imposed the economic sanctions (these included the USA, the EU, Canada, Australia and Norway). Later, the import ban was extended to other countries as well (Albania, Montenegro, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Ukraine). Import ban on agri-food included the following products:

- Beef and pork of all kinds,
- Poultry and poultry products,
- Smoked foodstuffs and sausages,
- Milk and milk products including raw milk and all foodstuffs containing milk,
- Fish,
- Vegetables and fruits.

Comparing the economic sanctions of both sides, the EU and Russia, we note that the EU sanctions include only a small group of products with minor share in total EU exports to Russia. On the other hand, Russian import ban include more substantial products with the impact on both sides:
- For the EU, the Russian market is the second most important market destination for agri-food products from the EU
- For Russia, the EU is the largest supplier of agri-food products to Russian market.

The aim of the article is to analyze the impacts of economic sanctions imposed on the economy of the Russian federation in 2014 on its economy from macroeconomic point of view with identification of some of the impacts on the economy of the EU.

Literature review

The works of **van Bergeijk** (1989, 1995) compose an important part of the academic literature on the economic sanctions. **Van Bergeijk** (1989) focus on the theoretical foundations of the economic sanctions analyzing two basic premises from the economic science. The first is that boycott and embargo deprive the targeted economy of some of the gains from trade and lower its welfare. The second is the idea that the disutility caused by imposed sanctions on the targeted economy influences its behavior (van Bergeijk, 1989, p. 385). Van Bergeijk (1995) analyzes factors that will lead to the increase in the use of economic sanctions, namely the end of the Cold War, strategic trade policy considerations, the greening of trade issues, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technology, scale economies in the implementation of sanctions and the process of globalization (van Bergeijk, 1995, p. 445).

Kim (2009) empirically analyzes the determinants of the success of economic sanctions. **Kim** bases the research mainly on the works of **Hufbauer** et al. (1985) and relate it with three categories: time, type and hegemonic decline model. Based on these three categories, **Kim** proposes three arguments related to the determinants of effectiveness of economic sanctions. Firstly, regarding the time and type categories, **Kim** argues with other researchers, that sanction duration and financial type do not have much impact on the success of

economic sanctions and considers as important the finding of relative ineffectiveness of sanctions imposed as a result of the human rights abuses in the target country.

Klinova and **Sidorova** (2016) focus on the exchange of the economic sanctions between the EU and Russia and on the impacts of these exchanges on their mutual economic relations. They note that economic sanctions in combination with other (military-political) measures can be significantly effective in terms of destabilizing the political system of governance in targeted country. On the other hand, if the economic sanctions are not reinforced by other measures, they rarely lead to the destabilization (Klinova and Sidorova, 2016, p. 219). They also focus on the cost of economic sanctions for the economy of the country that imposes the sanctions. They note that the costs are almost never calculated in advance because of the difficulty to assess the values of the sanctions and minimal damage to the major economies imposing sanctions (usually not exceeding 1% of gross national product). Also, the size of the economy imposing the sanctions is usually much larger than the size of the targeted economy. In case of the economic sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU member countries, it is the ten-fold difference – Russia's share of the world GDP is 2.8%, while the share of the EU is 23% (Klinova and Sidorova, 2016, p. 220). **Klinova** and **Sidorova** also examine the potential consequences of the economic sanctions. They believe that the strongest negative impact on the Russian economy will be in the sectors with the most crucial cooperation with foreign partners, namely financial, high-tech and other strategic sectors. They conclude, similarly to **Aalto** and **Forsberg** (2015), that the embargo on the exports of high technologies needed for the exploration of Arctic shelf, will lead to limited revenues of state budget in the long term.

Aalto and **Forsberg** (2015) try to examine the structure and possible restructuring of the Russia's geo-economy under the economic sanctions imposed by the EU, the USA and other western countries since spring of 2014 (when the first round of the sanctions was delivered). They focus also on restrictions on economic cooperation in the areas of trade, energy technology, access to credit, trade in arms, travel bans and assets freezing. Their main research question stands as how the economic sanctions affect the geo-economy of Russia and they conclude that the overall capacity of Russia to realize its interests has been significantly impaired in three geo-economics areas. Concerning the resource geographic dimension, the sanctions will, according to **Aalto** and **Forsberg**, slow down the progress and development in Arctic, offshore, and other related project in the oil sector. They argue that without sanctions, all the planned project in the oil industry (supported by the trade inflows of products, know-how and technologies used in this industry) would form the spearhead of modernization in the oil industry while supporting the oil production levels until 2030s (Aalto and Forsberg, 2015, p. 233).

Davis (2016) argues that economic warfare (including specific economic sanctions) is intended primarily to influence the power balances (economic, technology, military) to the advantage of those who conduct the economic warfare. According to **Davis** (2016, p. 170), the punitive measures may lead to decline or complete abolition in mutual trade in commodities and finance. Concerning the mutual trade, countries may impose refusal of export licenses, denial of the most-favored nation status or even the embargo. In finance, there is possibility of assets freezing, restrictions on lending and expropriation of property. Comparing **Davis** economic warfare with imposed economic sanctions, we note that both punitive measure areas were deployed. In the first step (spring 2014), the punitive finance measures were taken and, in the summer of 2014, the punitive measures in mutual trade in the form of a complex package were introduced. After the summer complex package was introduced from the side of western countries, Russia introduced, in August 2017), countermeasures also in mutual trade in commodities (import ban on certain agri-food products). So far **Davis** and the introduction of the measures and countermeasures are in line. However, we may see a difference between **Davis's** definition of economic warfare (to influence the power balance to the advantage of those conducting the economic warfare) and economic areas imposing the economic sanctions. Especially Russia as a significant importer of agri-food products with the EU being its largest supplier is not in the line with the economic warfare definition proposed by **Davis**. Russia did not comply with the definition, because the countermeasures it imposed did not bring any significant advantage to the Russian economy (especially modernization and increase in the self-sufficiency of the agricultural sector of the Russian economy). **Davis** also note (2016, p. 185) that two main features of economic sanctions against Russia undermined their effectiveness. The first was participation and the second was outsourcing. As **Davis** puts it (2016, p. 185), economic sanctions had the support of countries with collective GDP of 42.5 trillion USD. However, seven major industrial countries (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, South Korea, Turkey) with a collective GDP of 31.5 trillion USD did not participate on the imposition of the economic sanctions against Russian economy. The second was the outsourcing or transferring of high-technology production from developed economies (those who imposed the economic sanctions) to lower income economies which significantly facilitated trade diversion and covert acquisitions of high technologies by Russia.

Yang et al. (2009, p. 1223) show that the economic sanctions are expected to have an economic impact on both, the sender country (country that imposes the economic sanctions) and the target country. They note that when the US economic sanctions are imposed, target countries switch their trade from the US to other countries which they refer to as the third-country effects of the economic sanctions (Yang et al., 2009, p. 1223). **Yang** et al. argue that the economic sanctions imposed unilaterally by a single country or by a small group

of countries against particular countries are rather ineffective and lead to benefiting the third parties. According to them, in order to generate the successful outcome of the imposed economic sanctions (real impact on the economy of the targeted country), multilateral cooperation among countries imposing the economic sanctions is a necessary or sufficient condition. **Yang** et al. (2009) developed a gravity model to investigate the effects of the US sanctions on the EU trade with sanction targeted countries. They conclude that the impact of the US economic sanctions on the EU trade differs across the countries. On average, multilateral sanctions including both the US and the EU, have a negative impact on the EU trade (Yang et al., 2009, p. 1241).

Neuenkirch and **Neumeier** (2015) empirically assess GDP growth of economic sanctions targeted economies. They assess how multilateral economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations and unilateral economic sanctions imposed by the US affect the targeted economy's real GDP growth. They also take into account that the reasons for the economic sanctions imposition (engagement in interstate conflicts, autocratic tendencies and political repression) may affect an economic development in the targeted country. Their results are corresponding to the findings of **Yang** et al. (2009). **Neuenkirch** and **Neumeier** (2015, p. 122) conclude that the effects from the economic sanctions imposed at the multilateral level (the economic sanctions imposed by the UN) have a significant influence on the economic growth of the targeted country. On average, the imposition of UN sanctions decreases the target country annual real per capita GDP growth rate by more than 2%. Significant is also the period when the detrimental influence impacts the targeted economy. Based on their models, the dynamics of the economic sanctions decreases over time and becomes insignificant after 10 years with the aggregate drop in targeted economy's GDP per capita of 25.5% (Neuenkirch and Neumeier, 2015, p. 122). In case of different categories of economic sanctions imposed by the UN, comprehensive packages of the economic sanctions (like embargo on nearly all economic activity between the UN member states and the targeted country) have the strongest influence triggering a reduction of real GDP per capita growth by more than 5%. Based on their research, **Neuenkirch** and **Neumeier** (2015) note that the negative effects of unilateral economic sanctions imposed by the US are much smaller and shorter in duration than the multilateral economic sanctions imposed by the UN. The imposition of the US economic sanctions decreases the target country's GDP per capita growth by 0.75-1%. This detrimental impact on growth remains seven years and accounts for a total decrease in GDP per capita of 13.4%. They also found that the adverse effect of the US economic sanctions varies across targeted countries with a stronger negative influence on targeted countries that are geographically closer to the US.

Results and discussion

We study the impacts of economic sanctions imposed on Russian economy from macroeconomic point of view, thus we focus on basic macroeconomic indicators of the Russian economy – gross domestic product per capita, growth of gross domestic product per capita, inflation rate, unemployment rate, natural resources rent and international trade. We use the data from the World Bank's online database – World Development Indicators (available at https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators).

Table 1 - Macroeconomic performance of Russian economy, 2016

GDP growth (%)	-0.2
GDP per capita	11 099.2
Inflation, GDP deflator (%)	3.6
Total unemployment (% of total labor force)	5.6
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP)	10.3
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	25.7
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	20.6

Source: World Development Indicators.
Note: Data for unemployment and total natural resources rent for 2015

The basic economic performance of the Russian economy with latest available data is presented in Table 1. GDP growth is annual percentage growth rate of the GDP at market prices. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator shows the rate of price change in the economy. The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency. Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil, natural gas, coal, mineral and forest rents. Exports and imports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to / received from the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services.

Figure 1 - GDP growth, annual, %

Source: World Development Indicators.

Figure 1 shows the development of GDP growth in the years 2010-2016. In 2009, the Russian economy declined by 7.8% because of the global financial crisis and the decline in the demand of its trading partners. However, the economy surged in 2010 and 2011 with the growth of 4.5% and 5.3% respectively. Even though there was a slight decline in the GDP growth in 2012 and 2013, Russian economy still experienced the growth period. The growth, however, halted in 2014 (0.7%) and did not get to previous levels also in 2015-2016 when the economy experienced the decline in the GDP (-2.8% and -0.2% respectively). There are several underlying factors of the decline in the development of GDP. The first factor is the oil prices which sharply fell in 2014 and in 2015. The average price of Ural crude in 2014 of 97.6 USD/b fell by 47.5% to the average of 51.2 USD/b in 2015 with December 2015 average price reaching to 36 USD/b. The second factor is the economic sanctions imposed on the Russian economy and leading to change in trade flows between Russia and the EU economies. GDP per capita developed similarly to the growth of GDP. After the crisis, GDP per capita increased in the period 2010-2013 from 10 675 USD to 11 615 USD. However, since 2014 until 2016 there was ongoing decline in the GDP per capita reaching the level of 11 099 USD in 2016. Concerning inflation, the development was rather ambiguous. In 2010 and 2011, the deflator was rather high at 14.2% and 23.7% respectively. Since 2012 the deflator declined significantly averaging at 6.7% annually. However, the economic growth in this period was negligible (Russian economy experienced even the decline). The inflation leveled at 3.6% in 2016, which was the lowest level since 2009 (when the inflation was 2%). This low level of inflation might have been caused by poor economic development in terms of GDP and GDP growth leading to decline in the prices. However, the levels of inflation in 2014 and 2015 (7.5% and 8.2%) were caused mainly by rising of food prices which can be directly related to the impacts of Russian countersanctions introduced in August 2014 (import bans on certain agri-food products). Concerning the unemployment rate, it was continuously declining between 2011-2015 (from

16.2% to 10.3%). However, we did not have available relevant data for 2016 to compare the development in this macroeconomic indicator. We assume, with the development of inflation and growth of GDP, that the unemployment in the Russian economy increased due to companies going bankrupt. One of the factors impacting the development of the GDP and its growth was also significant depreciation of ruble in 2015 by 77% from 45 RUB/1 EUR to 80 RUB/1 EUR.

Figure 2 - Total natural resources rents (% of GDP)

Source: World Development Indicators.

Russian state budget revenues depend significantly on the natural resources rent coming from oil and natural gas. Figure 2 shows the share of total natural resources rent on Russian GDP. While in 2008 the share was 18%, it dropped significantly in following years. There was a decline caused by the global crisis and slow down in the demand for natural resources in 2009 and 2010. Despite the recovery in 2011 when the share reached 16%, the decline continued in all the following years reaching 10.3% share in 2015 which was the lowest share of total natural resources rents on the GDP since 1998. We may associate this decline partly to prohibition of exports of products that are destined for deep water oil exploration and production, arctic oil exploration or production and shale oil projects in Russia. The low oil prices also impacted the Russian state budget. The deficit between 2014-2016 increased from -0.5% GDP in 2014 to -3.4% GDP in 2016.

Concerning the developments in the international trade, figure 3 depicts the share of Russian exports and imports on the GDP. While the share of imports was stable since 2011 at 20%, the share of exports witnessed more turbulent development with the decline from 29% in 2010 to 25.7% in 2016 which may be associated to the decline in the revenues coming from the natural resources rents, especially from oil and natural gas and slump in their prices.

Figure 3 - Exports and imports of goods and services (% of GDP)

Source: World Development Indicators.

Conclusion

We conclude and note, based on our analysis, the decline in mutual trade relations between the EU and Russia. Concerning the EU and the impacts on its common market, we can conclude that:

- Exports from the EU to Russia significantly declined in 2014-2016,
- Trade flows were redirected to other countries,
- There are economic impacts of export losses.

Export losses were calculated at 11% of total EU exports or the value of 34.7 billion USD (INTA, 2017). Because of the imposed sanctions by the EU as well as countersanctions imposed by Russia, there was a trade redirection to third countries. Trade outflows from the EU were redirected mainly to the US, China, Switzerland and Japan. For the trade in agri-food products, the trade was redirected to Belarus, Serbia and Macedonia in order to cut the losses from the Russian import ban and to get the EU agri-food products to Russian market indirectly. INTA (2017) calculated the economic impacts from the export losses to be 0.2% from total value added and employment resulting in the loss of 11.6 billion EUR and loss of 400 thousand jobs in 2015.

Concerning the Russia, the impacts of imposed economic sanctions are hard to assess because of overall downturn of the Russian economy caused by the economic crisis in 2008-2009 as well as by negative oil price shock in 2014. Decline in the price of oil came in the same period when the economic sanctions entered into force with oil prices being a significant source of government revenues in Russia. Based on our analysis, we conclude the following impacts on the Russian economy:

- Import of agri-food products from the members of the Eurasian Economic Union (increased by 13% in 2014-206),
- Decline in the investments in energy sector (resulting in the revenue losses for state budget),
- Potential economic impact of economic sanctions may reach 8-10% GDP,

- GDP growth in 2014-2016 was negative, albeit slowly recovering in 2016,
- GDP per capita fell to 11 099 USD in 2016,
- Inflation increased in 2014-2015 due to higher prices of food products which may be associated with the import ban on agri-food products decreasing the overall supply in two ways: firstly, the decline of the EU supply and secondly insufficient substitution of the EU supply with domestic production,
- Total natural resources rents dropped significantly resulting partly in low oil prices and partly in prohibition of exports of products that are destined for deep water oil exploration and production, arctic oil exploration or production and shale oil projects in Russia.

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ROAD TRAFFIC SAFETY WITH REGARD TO DEMOGRAPHIC DELELOPMENT IN SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Tatiana Hajdúková[1]

ABSTRACT

Road traffic safety is one of the basic conditions for working society. Need for movement is consequent to the need to carry out work duties as well as fulfilling individual needs. Ability to overcome large distances is more or less taken for granted nowadays. For a few years, population ageing has been the most dominating development trend in terms of population structure in majority of the countries of the European Union. Regressive structure of population can be observed in form of increased number of owners of driving license, number of registered motor vehicles, overall road usage and traffic congestion, frequent occurrence of traffic jams, frequent road accidents and arise of other undesired road traffic issues. Safety and traffic flow are greatly influenced by behaviour of road traffic participants, hence the knowledge of age structure of population and the most common causes of traffic accidents with regard to age structure of population are of great importance for planning future development and taking precautionary steps. The goal of this article is to point out changes in road traffic accident frequency over the last five years with regard to demographic progress of population. In order to achieve this, multidimensional statistical methods are applied on the database of road accidents provided by the Police headquarters of the Slovak Republic.

Key words: Safety, Road traffic accident, Training, Licensing, pedestrian, Elderly road users, experience, injury

Introduction

In Slovakia, and most of the countries in Europe in like manner, older adults represent the fastest growing segment of the population. This behaviour is directly affected by the increase in number of elderly road users. This implies that the traffic situation and traffic safety of elderly people is changing as well. Accompanying factor of ageing is decline in some of the normative age-related changes in vision, hearing, cognition, and psychomotor speed that provide critical information for these and other driving decisions (Fisk, AD et al., 2009). Many older road users wish to continue using road communications for personal needs such as maintaining their independence, carrying out daily tasks on their own and many other activities that require using road communications. Hence, this article aims to find alternative solutions that contribute to road safety. In order to achieve safety of elderly citizens while also addressing their need for mobility, we need to employ elaborate and proactive planning. Other means of

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road transport, such as walking or cycling are often omitted, as they are not a viable choice for the majority of elderly people. In most of the developed countries, the proportion of people holding driving licences in any given age had always been on the rise when compared to previous generations, and the increase had been greater for women than for men, indicating that their behaviour patterns were becoming more similar (Madrej *at al*, 2013). The purpose of this study is to provide a clear view on the current road safety situation with regard to causes and consequences, partitioned by age of the traffic participants held responsible for the traffic accidents. This view allows us to focus on one target group of road users. The study describes and provides an overview and analysis of various countermeasures relevant in context of the road traffic safety in Slovakia in the years 2014-2017.

1 Road Traffic

The Need for safety and security is one of the basic need in life of every person. We desire safety in every life situation, including safety while being a road traffic participant. There are multiple reasons why road traffic is the most common means of transport, that is being put to for the purpose of transport of people as well as transport of products on a daily basis. Mobility is a fundamental prerequisite for quality of life. Everyday mobility is not only required to carry out work duties, but is also essential to fulfil basic human needs such as getting groceries and other goods, going to a doctor, attending various social activities, both family activities or group activities. Road communications have been well established so well by now, that in any city they connect any two arbitrary houses, which is relevant mostly for food, material and technical supplies, dangerous situations with need of immediate medical care, or to provide mobility to otherwise immobile citizens. In denser areas and cities, there is a possibility to use public transport, which is both more ecological, money-saving, and is publicly available to people without the opportunity to use their own vehicle. A comprehensive analysis of the global transport demand trend over the next forty years was presented by the JTRC/ITF in May 2011 in Leipzig (OECD/ITF, 2011). There is a wide range of factors falling under several disciplines which all affect the potential road safety.

1.1 Road Traffic Participant

Road traffic participant is any person that physically participates in road traffic, so besides drivers there are also car passengers, cyclists, pedestrians, road users riding mopeds, motorcyclists and users of public transport. Regardless of the role in the traffic situation, laws concerning road traffic apply to every person the same, every person is required to follow traffic code, be disciplined, respect traffic signs, follow orders of policemen etc. The need to be

disciplined, concentrated and aware of the situation on the road is further amplified by the fact that there is a large number of road users at once. A traffic accident is considered an undesirable event, and is a side-effect of road traffic that has negative impact on road safety and traffic flow.

1.2 Road traffic accident

As described by law concerning road traffic in Slovakia, a traffic accident occurred if one of the following apply:

One or more road users are injured or killed.

A road is damaged or traffic communication is damaged in other way.

There is a leak of dangerous substances.

Damage done on one of the vehicles is over EUR 3,990.

Common characteristic of all cases mentioned above is that a specific variable was in danger[2], and so a state-controlled investigation is carried out.

During investigation, the following attributes are always determined:

Cause of the traffic accident

Person(people) held responsible for the traffic accident

Consequences of the traffic accident

2 Development of the number of road traffic users and the traffic accident frequency in Slovakia

Figure 1 illustrates development of three following variables:

population of the Slovak Republic

number of all driving licence owners[3]

number of all road traffic accidents

Measured in the Slovak Republic in the past 20 years. The curve on the top represents the population of Slovakia. This variable has not changed by any significant amount, and has been fluctuated around 5.5 million for several years. Stable population is maintained not because of the population reproduction, but

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[2] Either health of people involved, damage to public property, or damage caused above some threshold.

[3] Driving licence is issued by the authority of the Slovak Police Force. Owner of a driving licence is authorised to drive a specific type of motor vehicle. The most common driving licence is group B, which is enough for typical needs. A person under 18 can drive motor vehicle if they have driving licence group B, but only when accompanied by an adult, who is sitting is sitting beside them, and has been owner of a driving licence group B for at least 10 years, and who must be registered by the authority of the Police force of the Slovak Republic on request of the legal guardian of the child.

mostly because of population ageing, in the same way that can be observed in most of the European Union.

Figure 1 Development of the population, the population aged 60 or more and the number of driving licences in the Slovak republic in 1996-2016

Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic[4] and Police Headquarter

The dashed line represents development of the number of traffic accidents. A visible decrease in the 2009 is a consequence of legislative changes based on the Law no. 8/2009 Z.z. concerning road traffic[5]. Since the 2011, the number of traffic accidents is stable, slightly below 10 000.

The ascending curve in the middle of the graph represents the number of people who own a driving license[6]. Coefficient scale is displayed on the Y axis, on the right side. Following this curve, we can observe that the number of driving licence owners has been linearly increasing over the last 20 years, with an annual increase over 60 000 new drivers per year. However, increased number of driving license owners has not affected traffic accident count, which was already established in the previous section.

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[4] Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic is central body of state administration of the Slovak Republic for the branch of statistics.

[5] Came into force on February 1st, 2009. Based on this law, there are so-called little traffic accidents, where health of traffic participants was not affected and total damage done on property is no more than 3990 euro which are not classified as real traffic accidents.

[6] Source of this is data provided by Police Headquarters of the Slovak Republic

2.1 Road Traffic Participants with regard to Demographic Changes

In the following years, Europe will be facing a massive change in the age distribution of its population. Currently, elderly people make up significant part of the population, mostly due to decline in birth rates and prolonging lifespan.

Furthermore, we differentiates between young elderly, ranging from 65 to 74, and older elderly, ranging from 75 higher (OECD, 2012, CONSOL, 2013a, Shinar, 2007). This differentiation is designed to capture difference between younger and older elderly, because mobility decreases rapidly around the age of 75 (CONSOL, 2013a, Kubitzki & Janitzek, 2009). This phenomenon can also be observed in the traffic accidents data statistics provided by the Police Headquarters of the Slovak Republic. To capture this phenomenon, this article uses both the two aforementioned classes to describe elderly people who use road communications.

2.2 Development of the population and drivers of motor vehicles in the Slovak Republic

In order to capture these changes, Figure 2 contains view of development of the three following variables over long period of time. Firstly, the number of citizens aged above 60, secondly, the number of people who own a driving license and lastly, the number of registered motor vehicles, in the past 20 years in Slovakia.

Figure 2 development of the population aged above 60, the number of people who own a driving license and the number of registered motor vehicles in the Slovak Republic in 1996-2016

$$y = 61248x + 2E{+}06$$
$$R^2 = 0{,}9907$$

$$y = -6{,}4709x^3 + 1262{,}1x^2 - 13733x + 452238$$
$$R^2 = 0{,}9968$$

— persons with driving licences — – motor vehicle
— · persons in age 60-69 ········· Lineárna (persons with driving licences)
········· Polynomická (persons in age 60-69)

Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic and Police Headquarter

The bottommost curve represents development of the number of registered motor vehicles. Since 1996, it has increased from 1.72 million to 2.95 million, so it has almost doubled over the time. Moreover, this increase has not been steady past during these 20 years, in years 1996-2006 it has increased only by 100 000, while in the last 10 years it has increased by more than one million. From a research on road traffic, it can be concluded that eventually, at some point in the future, the number of vehicles, as well as volume of the traffic itself will hit an upper limit, that is referred to as saturation limit. Moreover, the study suggests that the influencing factors are quality and price of public transport, as well as demographic and planning trends, which are, however, only taken into account indirectly, in form of "external trends" (Goodwin, P., 2013).

The topmost curve represents the increasing number of licensed drivers, which is complemented by linear regressive line and prognosis for the next 3 years.

The middle curve represents accurate ageing of population of Slovakia, it follows development of the number of seniors aged 60-69 in the Slovak Republic in the past 20 years[7]. The age interval is based on the fact that seniors in this age interval constitute the majority of all seniors that are actively part of the road traffic. For this curve, there is also complementary axis displayed on the right. Shape of the curve is best described by a third degree polynomial function. Prognosis of development of senior population aged 60-69 for the next

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[7] Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic

few years predicts steeper ascension in comparison to development of the number of licensed drivers. Comparison of the two upper curves indicates that the number of senior drivers had started increasing more that 10 years ago and has been steep during that time, while the number of licensed drivers has been linearly increasing over the last 20 years.

While the proportion of elderly people is expected to increase with an average of 10% in the EU-28 by 2050, Slovakia will experience a higher rise (11-15%) in the proportion of elderly people (Polders, E. at all,2015). As such by 2030 a quarter of all drivers will be older than 65 (DaCoTa, 2012)

3 Methodology

Researchers have been utilising increasingly more real-life data to study various aspects of driver injuries resulting from traffic accidents. This study aims to put together recommendations to increase road safety by identifying causes of traffic accidents with regard to age of people responsible for the traffic accident and age of people that were part of the traffic accident. We have come up with 2 basic questions, and they are "who caused the traffic accident" and "why". Therefore, the purpose of this study is to identify the most dominant differences in causes of road traffic accidents across all age groups (from children to elderly above 75 year old). Source data consists of traffic accidents over the last 4 years in Slovakia, which altogether comprises of more that 41 000 traffic accidents, all provided by the ISDN[8] system of the Police Headquarters of the Slovak Republic. Before processing, we have preprocessed the accidents by the number of licensed drivers or by the population in the corresponding age group. Researched traffic accidents had 22 distinctive causes in total, and we have eliminated those which are independent of age of the person responsible, unsafe lane changes, unsafe avoiding other objects, stopping vehicle on a road, dangerous behaviour on a railroad crossing to name a few. Accidents with the causes we eliminated occur with more or less the same frequency regardless of age of the traffic accident participants. In the next step, we eliminated causes, which correlated with the most common cause, violating driver duties. Correlated causes are for instance reckless driving, dangerous lane switching and overtaking, improper turns, not maintaining safe distance, improper driving on crossroads and other, less frequent causes.

For the purpose of this analysis, statistical and multidimensional methods were used, for instance Chi-square, correlation, Z-score and K-mean cluster.

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[8] ISDN – Informačný systém dopravných nehôd - system that works as a database of all recorded traffic accidents in the Slovak Republic

3.1 Causes of traffic accidents with regard to age of the person held responsible

6 distinctive causes made it to the final analysis, which can be seen in the table 1. To balance occurrences of observed causes, we have used standardised Z-score.

Table 1 Causes by different groups participating in traffic accidents.

Person responsible	Cause
Car driver	**violating driver duties** – driver must pay full attention to the road and traffic situation.
	speeding – driver must not drive faster than the allowed speed limit, which is set by traffic regulations, traffic signs or traffic facilities.
	incorrect road entering – When entering road, driver must give way to all vehicles that are already on the road. If driver does not have good view of the road, they are required to get help from other competent person.
Participant of a traffic	**violating duties of a traffic participant** – driver is required to follow traffic rules and behave with discipline.
Pedestrian	**violating pedestrian regulations** – pedestrians should use primarily sidewalks for movement. They are allowed to use roadsides only if necessary. Pedestrians are required to follow rules when crossing a road, as well as other rules that apply to them.
Cyclist	**violating cyclist regulations** – cyclist is must use primarily cyclist roads and ride on the right side of the road. Outside of urban areas, they are required to protect their head with a properly fixed helmet etc.

Taking into account input variables and the number of age groups, creating 5 different clusters, each describing one age group, proved to be the most effective setup.

Figure 4 Final K-means Cluster Centres, causes of traffic accidents 2014-2017 in SR

Final Cluster Centers

3.2 Results

Results from the K-mean Cluster are sorted in descending order from left to right by seriousness of the fault of the person responsible, and all causes have equal significance.

Children aged 15-17 frequently cause traffic accidents in role of traffic participants, pedestrians, cyclists. They also participate as drivers, with most frequent causes being speeding and incorrect road entering. Legislative of the Slovak Republic allows drivers to drive on their own only motorcycles with engine displacement no more than 50 cm^3 in case of a combustion engine, or engine output no more than 4kW in case of an electrical engine. Young drivers are are allowed to drive cars only when accompanied by an experienced adult. In spite of that, they frequently commit speeding. However, most frequent causes of traffic accidents, such as violating driver duties and other correlated causes, are rarely present in this group. Moreover, teenagers aged 17 are present not only as drivers, but also as pedestrians and cyclists.

Violating driver duties and similar mistakes are frequent among drivers aged 18-24. Behaviours of groups of young adults aged 18-20 and 21-24 are very similar, so they are placed together into the second cluster. They make common mistakes that are combination of lack of experience and not following road traffic regulations in form of reckless driving and not giving way when entering a road. Compared to underage drivers from the first cluster, we can observe that the frequency of causing traffic accidents as traffic participants, cyclists and pedestrians declines. Drivers from the first and second clusters are the least experienced drivers among all drivers from all groups.

The third cluster represents seniors aged 70 and higher. They act more disciplined as traffic participants, pedestrians and cyclists. However, gained experience is not enough to cover for age-related cognitive and sensory decline, and limited perception of other road users and traffic situation. Furthermore, their physical condition and ability to react properly and on time in urban areas rapidly declines as they age.

Road users aged 25-69 are among the most disciplined drivers. As a result, numerous traffic situations and unexpected events are imbedded in their memory and became a key component of the skill and experience 'package' of the older road user (GOAL, 2013). They were put into the fourth and fifth clusters, since their participation in traffic accidents was almost always below the average regardless of the cause. There was a minor difference in age group 50-64, with higher participation in traffic accidents as cyclists.

Conclusion

In this article we have used real-life data, on which we have applied K-means clustering, where differences between representatives from each cluster who were held responsible for the traffic accident were identified. These clusters are discussed and evaluated in accordance to their robustness and potential use on road safety campaigning. Besides obviously being a safety measure, prevention should be also a motivating factor for other people to become responsible for oneself and for each other. With prevention in mind, the key groups we should focus on are teenagers aged 17 and young drivers aged 24 or less. This is mostly due to their reckless driving, speeding and not giving way to other drivers. Lack of experience among these drivers gives way to frequent consequences on health of other road traffic participants in form of severe injuries and even death, a common occurrence is death of a passenger beside the young driver. Taking into account current demographic changes, percentage of occurrences of this group is declining, which means that this results are likely to be maintained, if not improved. Majority of people responsible for traffic accidents are drivers of motor vehicles, and in lesser extent pedestrians and cyclists. Results of analysis of the causes of traffic accidents point out the need to pay additional attention to seniors aged above 70, who are still actively part of

road traffic. Increasing proportion of elderly road users in traffic will bring a significant increase in the number of elderly road users who are at risk of being involved in road accidents. Negative consequences on their health arise most frequently during walking or cycling on the road. Finally, an older road user themselves might be keeping up with the world and be informed about their individual safety risks. Good prevention is to inform older road users about increased age-related risks and about the importance of using protection devices. Older road users themselves should be aware of the potential problems and risk of accidents associated with ageing. Prevention and systematic education of road traffic users prove to be more efficient from point of the money and time spent than repression. Furthermore, prevention and systematic education are the only possibility of preventing severe consequences on lives and health of road traffic participants.

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Zákon č. 8/2009 Z.z. o cestnej premávke

CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN HEALTHCARE IN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Karol Janas[1]

ABSTRACT

Crisis management in the Slovak Republic is a very important part of the civil protection of the population. In the Slovak Republic, the crisis management resolution system is managed centrally and hierarchically. Medical support plays a crucial role in the preparation or addressing crisis situations. Medical support consists of a set of medical, hygienic and anti-epidemiological measures to ensure the health care of the population, armed forces, armed security forces and other components. In case of crisis situations, crisis planning is also very important. The Crisis Plan is a set of organized information and on how to implement economic mobilization measures intended for economic mobilization entities. Crisis planning in the health sector also creates necessary reserves. These reserves - consisting of medicinal products and medical devices - are set up for the needs of health care provision during crisis situations. They are created by a health sector.

Key words: Crisis situations, Crisis management, Crisis plan, Prevention of healthcare crisis situations.

Introduction

Crisis management is an important part of the civil protection of the population in the Slovak Republic. The Crisis Management System in the Slovak Republic is managed centrally and hierarchically (Kútik, 2006). Decision making bodies such as the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of the Interior have disposal to all key management competencies. Healthcare Crisis management covers its special position relevant to the crisis management in general. Organizational, material, technical, personnel, medical, hygienic and anti-epidemiological measures in healthcare are designed to provide health care to citizens, armed forces, security armed forces to be ready and prepared to deal with and solve the crisis situations. Crisis management in healthcare itself includes activities of relevant institutions, situation analysis, evaluation of security risks and threats. The possible risks are evaluated at all levels from the government of the Slovak Republic to the lowest state administration bodies such as district offices (Janas – Bušša, 2012). Also, local self-governments established in cities and municipalities have their important position involving the crisis management in the Slovak Republic (Kútik – Králik, 2015, p. 230).

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Crisis Management in Healthcare

Crisis situations occur when the balance of social, natural and technological processes are disrupted. As a result of crisis situations, lives of individuals, the environment, the economy, the spiritual and material values of the region or the state are endangered. Crisis situation may lead to institutional public administration disfunctions. Emergency announcements and other managerial tools are implemented to cope with crisis (*Overview on selected concepts of crisis management in health sector*, 2004, p. 10). The state of emergency is the legal status declared by the competent public administration authority in the threatened territory to resolve the crisis situation. It is proclaimed when generally applicable management practices, tools and other mechanisms fail and the situation requires the application of crisis management principles and at the same time, permits temporary limitation of fundamental rights and freedoms. These might include outbreak of war, war status, a state of emergency and an event of exceptional emergencies. At peace time it is mainly the emergency situation and the state of emergency in particular. The state of emergency is declared as a result of disasters and natural hazards, calamity, cataclysm, industrial accidents or other accidents when the life and health of people, the environment and property are affected or damaged or are under instant threat. It is proclaimed by the government and applies to that specific territory only. It is possible to manage, restrict or adapt the activities of state and local authorities, economic operations and social organizations for inevitable period of time and for necessary action range. Declaration of Emergency allows fundamental rights and freedom restrictions, imposes and clarifies duties applicable even for armed forces. Emergency state is pronounced at the affected or directly threatened territories if the life and health of people, the environment and property are endangered, threatened or even damaged, as a result of massive violent and unlawful conduct. This happens if the scope of events and consequences, threats or disrupts violate the state security n such an extend that cannot be avoided by the activities of empowered authorities, since the effective use of legal means is impeded. The State of Emergency is announced by the President on a proposal of the Government and applies only to that specific territory. It is possible to manage, restrict or adapt the activities of state and local authorities, economic operations and social organizations for inevitable period of time and for necessary action range. A State of Emergency declaration allows restrictions of fundamental rights and freedoms, imposes and clarifies duties even for the armed forces (Klement – Mezencev – Maďarová – Rovný, 2007, p. 338-356). Special cases and exceptional emergencies rank to other emergencies when the crises management needs to come on duty. An exeptional emergency event is a situation when people´s life, health or property, the environment, the state economy as well as actions of public authorities are limited or spattialy determined during specific time (Janas, 2012, p. 43-49). That kind of situation is

triggered by exceptional emergency events or negative consequences that require crisis management operations. An exceptional emergency event is a serious, unpredictable and limited incident caused by disasters and natural hazards, technical or technological accidents, operational disorders or deliberate actions of people that causes breach of stability in the systems, ongoing events and activities resulting in health and life threats of individuals, goods, possessions, culture heritage or the environment. Special state of emergency is declared by competent state administrators or self-government authorities for limited period of time required for handling the consequences of the emergency situation. During the emergency, it is possible to restrict the fundamental rights and freedoms for inevitable period of time and for necessary action range as well as to impose obligations on citizens in affected or directly threatened areas (Klement – Mezencev – Maďarová – Rovný, 2007, p. 336). It is also possible to announce and order evacuation of the citizens (Janas – Bušša, 2015, p. 13-17).

It is important to guarantee and provide health care during preparation period as well as while handling the crisis. Prevention of healthcare crisis situations is one of the most important parts regarding the crisis management in healthcare (Klement – Mezencev – Maďarová – Rovný, 2007, p. 333). Therefore the planning, organization, implementation and inspection activities and recovery funding arrangements also apply and are included in those tasks that the crisis management is dealing with. The fact that not only military, but also civilian formations face the threats, is taken into consideration during the planning phase in healthcare crisis management. (Kazanský, 2015) Establishing the way of notification, the content of the notification documentation and the conditions for notification after the outbreak of war, declaration of the state of war, state of emergency, special emergency cases or execptional emergency events on the territory of the Slovak Republic is considered to be one of the main purposes of the planning (*Action plan issued by the Ministry of Health of the Slovak Republic regulating the way of health service notification about the termination of the war, state of war declaration, emergency state, or the exceptional emergencies on the territory of SR,* 2013, 1 : 1.). At the same time, it establishes the healthcare operation system needed for notification and information transfers after the declaration of special conditions or emergency situations, as well as the responsibility for their preparation and use (*Action plan issued by the Ministry of Health of the Slovak Republic regulating the way of health service notification about the termination of the war, state of war declaration, emergency state, or the exceptional emergencies on the territory of SR,* 2013, 1 : 2.). The crisis action plan itself is a set of information and ways of implementing economic mobilization measures by economic mobilization entities (Janas – Bušša, 2013, p. 15-19). It is made up by health, hygiene and antiepidemiological measures to provide health care for citizens, armed forces, armed security forces and other formations. In the scope of crisis planning period, supplies necessary for recovery maintanance are generated too. Public

health care and treatment provided during critical situations and crisis is set up by the health service department. Health service institutions provide medicine and medical aid devices mainly (*Overview on selected concepts of crisis management in health sector,* 2004, p. 16-31). However, emergency supplies can be used in emergency situations too (Janas, 2014, p. 8-13). Emergency supply is a system of measures that ensure minimum doses of food and drinking water distributed temporarily after the emergency is announced. Regarding emergency supplies, additional basic material and technical supplies such as electricity, heat and basic health care are provided to those affected by an exceptional emergency event within the limits of existing survival conditions. Other material reserves e. g. raw materials, products and real estates owned by the state and by natural and legal persons administered by the state are also used as a temporary solution during the recovery phase. Emergency stock can also be used during crisis while providing humanitarian aid. Emergency stocks include reserves of state material reserves. National material reserves are created, supplemented and imposed on the territory of the Slovak Republic to be ready to recover from crisis. These are material reserves, mobilization reserves and emergency stocks managed by the state. Within the State Material Reserves, there is only one commodity provided for the health sector to support affected communities and it is dried milk, the nutrition for children under one year old (*Overview on selected concepts of crisis management in health sector,* 2004, p. 7-25).

Apart from emergency stock reserves, there are other options that have significant impact on keeping health security during crisis management process. To mention at least one, civilian emergency supply holds a special position. Civil emergency planning is a complex system of security tools, forces and resources essential for coping with non-military crisis events and also for civilian support provided to the armed forces and military operations. Moreover, it ensures keeping the internal order, protection of citizens, the economic conditions and the consistent functioning of the state administration and territorial self-governmental institutions through public authorities as well as reinforce the recovery after potential disruption. The planning assures the preparation and coordination of measures taken by public authorities to ensure keeping order inside the state, sustain the safety of inhabitants, steady state economy and stable state administration during the crisis situation. Furthermore, support recovery efforts to the citizens during the crisis situation is inevitable. It is also important to give financial support to public authorities so that being able to implement and accomplish all necessary measures and make recovery funding arrangements. Financing is provided during preparatory period for coordination and implenting measures taken by public authorities to secure the internal order of the state, the protection of citizens, the state economic conditions and proper functioning of the state administration during the crisis situation (*Overview on selected concepts of crisis management in health sector,* 2004, p. 4).

Crisis management in healthcare deals with specific situations that are necessary for providing health care and treatment to inhabitants during the crisis. Therefore, the planning of extended facilities, the number of beds in hospitals in particular is an important part of the crisis planning in health care. Expanded bed fund is the total number of bed capacities of medical facilities providing salvage and rescue service during emergency situations. The situation may require setting priorities regarding the bed fund considering hospital residential treatment. It means a medical bed for internal or surgical operations is allocated according to certain principles. The specifications are carried out as a result of calculations related to procurement doses of medicine and medical aid devices for each bed capacity being provided from mobilization reserves. These are only used as a temporary solution during crisis. They are composed of selected basic raw materials, equipment and materials, machinery, products, tools, documentation and real estates built up according to the requirements of the system of economic mobilization (Janas, 2013, p. 35-50). They are owned and administered by the state. The Ministry of Health issued the Table of Mobilization Reserves according to profiles and standards for enlarging medical bed fund in the healthcare sector. It sets standards for the quantity and range of medicine and medical aid devices utilization during economic mobilization within crisis situations (*Overview on selected concepts of crisis management in health sector,* 2004, p. 16-25).

In addition, information assessment is essential to assure the flow of communication between all bodies involved in coping with crisis and emergencies. If a collective accident happens and there is a direct risk and threat to lives or health of individuals or to public health, relevant mutual communication is controlled within the health sector. This communication system consists of information submitters, conditions for triggering mutual communication, content of information and reporting, the way of mutual communication, the flow of information and the tenability of mutual communication system. There is the accident classification chart used for communication in case of a collective accident. It specifies the events and sets the priorities according to the level and extension of emergency. The grades are marked ALFA, BRAVO, CHARLIE and DELTA. The level ALFA means that there are from 3 to 50 injured people, out of them at least 3 to 20 are seriously injured or under serious threat on health or life. BRAVO applies when the number of wounded or affected is from 51 to 100, out of them at least 20 to 50 are seriously injured. When the number of threats is over 100, from 101 to 1000 and at least 50-300 of them are at serious risk of health or life, the CHARLIE degree is applied. DELTA is the highest degree applicable when there are over 1001 injured people, out of them at least 300 or more are under serious threat to health and life. The events are also ranked by priorities. The lowest level priority is an event causing distress with a relatively low number of people hit and injured. In such a case, the emergency intervention is coordinated by the

Integrated Rescue System Coordination Center in cooperation with the basic components of the Integrated Rescue System. If the number of injured and the amount of affected people is increased or it is necessary to declare exceptional emergencies, the situation is marked as high priority. In accordance to extent of the emergent the operation is coordinated by the Mayor of the municipality, the head of the district office or the head of the district office at the headquarters of the region via the coordination center of the integrated rescue system and the basic components of the integrated rescue system. The decisive jurisdiction belongs to the Regional Health Emergency Service that decides on the number of ambulances sent by the emergency health service institution and coordinates the providers of institutional treatment. In the case of high and critical priority event that has the character of an exceptional emergency, the classification at local and regional level that includes several districts may be declared as an emergency or exceptional emergency event. In this case, the operation is coordinated by the head of the district office seated at the headquarters of the region in cooperation with all units of the integrated rescue system, legal and individual persons on the territory. They follow the applicable crisis plans and mass wounded in-patient plans. High and critical priorities rank to the highest priorities of emergency. They have the character of an exceptional emergency event and affect several districts. The number of injured and affected people is very high and critical. In such a case, the emergency operation is coordinated by the Government of the Slovak Republic through the competent authorities of the state crisis management. If all available forces and means of the Integrated Rescue System are not enough to cope with the situation, it is possible to ask for cross-border cooperation and humanitarian assistance, aid from the European Union, NATO, UN or other international organizations (*Methodological guideline setting up a system of mutual communication in dealing with the consequences of mass accident in health sector,* 2012, add 1.).

At present, the Slovak Republic faces crisis situations especially when it comes to outbreaks of epidemics. In a case of epidemic, it is possible to declare an exceptional epidemiological emergency condition. An epidemiological emergency condition is the occurrence of communicable diseases or suspicion on such diseases and includes unexpectedly high number of deaths caused by infections at specific time and place (Avdičová, 2009, p. 35). Influenza is one of the most serious diseases that affect about 10% of the population every year. If pandemic, raises up to 40-50% (Sirági – Klement – Mezencev – Maďarová – Kissová – Struhársky – Trenkler – Kohútová – Nováková – Hupková – Trupl, 2009, p. 124). The pandemic epidemic influenza may be responsible for health and economic burden of the population or jeopardize the economy and public life. In order to eliminate these threats, there are necessary actions and set of tasks adopted in the Slovak Republic and designated to state administration authorities, self-governmental bodies and specialized experts. Their job is to protect public health as well as to define the tasks for legal persons, natural

persons and also natural persons who are authorized to do business (*Detailed Action Plan in case of Influenza Pandemic outbreak in Slovakia,* 2012, p. 3). The Government of the Slovak Republic establishes a Pandemic Commission to overcome epidemics. It is a multi-departmental coordinating, consulting, controlling and advisory body that proposes to adopt and control measures. The aim is to maintain the course of the economy and to reduce the health and economic burden of the population and fight the pandemic. There is an operation center within the Pandemic Commission and it acts as an operational and coordinating body of the Ministry of Health of the Slovak Republic. The Operational Center ensures synergy between pandemic centers and centers of central government authorities, between pandemic centers established at crisis headquarters and monitors the procedures of pandemic risk reduction in the country. Pandemic Centers accomplish the tasks within their sphere of competence. In this context, the Independent Regional Healthcare Department of Crisis Management is essential for coordinating the actions of institutional healthcare providers designated and appointed by the Ministry of Health to manage the economic mobilization. The independent department also coordinates the measures in the healthcare sector in the regional crisis management authority centers in the particular county (*Detailed Action Plan in case of Influenza Pandemic outbreak in Slovakia,* 2012, p. 3-4).

In addition to the Ministry of Health, the Pandemic Commission of the Government in the Slovak Republic and the Independent Regional Healthcare Department of Crisis Management, there are some more bodies dealing with pandemic conditions, such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of the Slovak Republic, the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic, the Ministry of Transport, Construction and Regional Development, the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic, the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sports of the Slovak Republic, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Relations of the Slovak Republic, the District Office seated at the headquarters of the Region, the Higher Territorial Unit and the District Office. The operations of all central administrative bodies are coordinated by the Governmental Pandemic Commission of the Slovak Republic. They follow the laws and regulations, generally binding laws, recommendations of the World Health Organization and applications of the European Union. The Minister of Healthcare of the Slovak Republic becomes the appointed Chairman of the Pandemic Commission of the Government of the Slovak Republic. The following individuals are all members of the Pandemic Commission: the Minister of the Interior of the Slovak Republic, the Minister of Defense of the Slovak Republic, the Minister of Transport, Construction and Regional Development of the Slovak Republic, the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development of the Slovak Republic, the Minister of Finance of the Slovak Republic, the Minister of Education, Science, Research and Sports of the

Slovak Republic, the Minister of Labor, Social Affairs and Family Development of the Slovak Republic, the Chairman of the State Material Reserves Administration, the President of the Self-governing Region of the Slovak Republic, the Chairman of the Self-governing Region of Banská Bystrica, the Chairman of the Self-governing region of Košice, the Chairman of Autonomous Region in Nitra, the Chairman of Autonomous region in Prešov, the Chairman of Žilina self-governing region, the Chief Hygienist of the Slovak Republic, the General Manager of the Public Health Insurance Company, PLC, the Chief Veterinary Officer - Central Director of the State Veterinary and Food Administration of the Slovak Republic, the Head of the Department of Crisis Management and Civil Protection of the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic, the Head of the Infectious Clinic and Geographic Medicine of the Faculty Hospital with Polyclinic in Bratislava, the Head of the Clinic for Infectious Diseases of the Medical Faculty of the UPJŠ in Košice, the Senior Expert for Epidemiology of the Ministry of Health of the Slovak Republic, the Chairman of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and the Employee Representative. Other experts may be appointed "ad hoc" by the chairman of Pandemic Commission to become the members of it. The membership of this institution is serious, Ministers can be replaced only by the State Secretaries, Chairmen of the Self-governing regions can exclusively be replaced by Vice-chairmen. The Prime Minister and other Members of the Government have the right to take part in the negotiations of the Commission (*Detailed Action Plan in case of Influenza Pandemic outbreak in Slovakia,* 2012, p. 4-6).

Conclusion

Independently managed crisis departments in regions are very importantly involved in the system of crisis management in healthcare in the Slovak Republic. There is a collection of documents related to the independent department of crisis management in regions essential for healthcare, such as the Documentation relevant to notification of the economic mobilization in the region about the declaration of crisis situation, Documentation and reports on subjects of the economic mobilization in the region, Management and planning documentation, Documentation on preparatory phase and training of employees and entities involved in economic mobilization, Documentation of controlling process, Documentation on finance regarding the economic mobilization, Documentation of the management of economic mobilization assets, Documentation on creation of mobilization reserves, Documentation on declaration of deteriorated epidemiological situation and pandemic if applicable, relevant legislation (*Lists, contents and examples of selected documents regarding economic mobilization,* 2011, p. 6). The regional crisis management has to make a document for their subordinates to inform about the economic mobilization, they are obligated to draw up a "Plan for carrying out

announcements about emergency or exceptional emergencies on the territory of the SR realized by entities dealing with healthcare economy mobilization in the region." Action plan issued by the Ministry of Health of the Slovak Republic regulating the way of health service notification about the termination of the war, state of war declaration, emergency state, or the exceptional emergency event on the territory of the Slovak Republic is provided and updated by the Department of Crisis Management of the Ministry of Health. Under the authority of the Minister, the Ministry also carries out periodic inspections and assessment checkouts. Their goal is to identify the flow of information and connection quality, avoid possible assessment inadequacies and prepare proposals for their elimination. (*Action plan issued by the Ministry of Health of the Slovak Republic regulating the way of health service notification about the termination of the war, state of war declaration, emergency state, or exceptionalemergencies on the territory of SR,* 2013, vol. 6, 7).

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THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TOWARDS THE WAR IN SYRIA

Łukasz Jureńczyk[1]

ABSTRACT
*The aim of the article is to discuss and assess the attitude of the People's Republic of China towards the war in Syria. The main thesis of the article is the statement that China did not want the powers to join the war in Syria. It was afraid that this could lead to an escalation of the conflict, and thus negatively affect the interests of China and its partners in the region. While for a few decades, China has been using the veto in the UN Security Council very sparingly, in the case of the war in Syria it has done it several times. This was despite the fact that Syria does not have a significant importance for China in terms of economic relations. Despite using the veto, China did not commit itself to resolving the conflict in Syria. Anyway, by taking the back seat, China achieved what was most important to it. There was no conflict spreading to the region, and **Bashar al-Assad**, supported by China, remained in power.*

***Key words:** Peoples Republic of China, war in Syria, United Nations Security Council, United States of America.*

Introduction

The Middle East is important for the People's Republic of China, mainly for commercial reasons. In the political and military dimension, however, this region is not a priority. This is evidenced by the lack of direct references to the Middle East in the latest white paper on China's Military Strategy of 2015. In the same document there are a number of references to the most important strategic areas for China, including mainly the East China Sea basin and the South China Sea basin (Chinese Ministry of National Defense, 2015). According to **Hoo Tiang Boon** in recent years "the calibration in China's Middle East policy has been more a matter of degree than type: it has deepened its engagement economically and to a degree militarily, but has mostly not shifted from its broader policy position of not intervening in Middle Eastern affairs. The Chinese remain convinced that this approach serves their interests best in the Middle East and though there has been more visible diplomacy there, the overarching strategy remains a largely minimalist one" (Boon, 2017, p. 11).

Chinese authorities, like the leaders of most countries in the world, were surprised by the revolutions of the Arab Spring. These unrests led to the overthrow of dictatorial regimes in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen. Beijing attempted to retain a neutral stance on the uprisings while continuing to seek

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improved relations in the region. Arab Spring also resulted in widespread of violence in Syria between the government of **Bashar al-Assad** and many rebel groups that have sought to end his dictatorial rule (Lanteigne, 2016, p. 200). In this case, too, China has retained abstinence and opposed excessive interference in the conflicts of other powers, including mainly the United States.

1 Motives of the attitude of the People's Republic of China towards the war in Syria

President **Hu Jintao** proclaimed the need to create a peaceful and harmonious world. In this world, states were to jointly strive for development and common prosperity. This narrative was well received by the president of Syria **Bashar al-Assad** (Nordin, 2016, p. 151). **Assad** visited Beijing in 2004, four years after he took the highest office in the country after his father **Hafez al-Assad**. During the visit he met with Chinese president **Hu Jintao**. The Syrian president described China as a close friend of Syria and invited Chinese companies to invest in his country. A year later, in 2005 r., China National Petroleum Corporation partnered in a USD 576 million investment of PetroCanada in Syria (Wenran, Zweig, Siqin, 2016, p. 114). China's investment in Syria, however, did not reach a more serious scale, and with the outbreak of the civil war, trade between countries began to diminish. In 2016, China imported from Syria products for only USD 3,26 million, mainly vegetables, and exported products for USD 915,26 million, mainly various types of industrial goods (Trade Map, 2016). At that time, Syria was of no significance for China as a supplier of oil. It was different with other countries located in the Middle East, like Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iran, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, from which in 2015 came respectively 16%, 10%, 9%, 9%, 4% and 3% of the total Chinese imports of oil (Wu, Zhang, 2017, p. 5). This does not mean, however, that Syria can't become an important economic partner for China in the future. Syria has significant deposits of oil, which is crucial from the point of view of China's economic development. Chinese oil companies can expand their investment activities even on unstable states such as Syria. They are able to do it with the financial support from state-owned banks (Zhao, 2017, p. 149). However, this would have to be preceded by closer political cooperation, especially if it would be beneficial to China from the point of view of global rivalry with the United States.

In previous decades, economic cooperation between China and Syria was not impressive. In addition, controversy aroused by China's sale of weapons to Syria, including missile systems. In 1979-2016, China sold to Syria armaments worth USD 81 million, which accounted for only about 0.2% of the value of the Middle East Chinese arms market. This can't be compared with the main Middle Eastern recipients of Chinese military equipment, i.e. Iraq (USD 4.295 million), Iran (USD 4.255 million) and Egypt (USD 2.812 million) (SIPRI). International

tensions have triggered the transfer to Syria of surface-to-surface missiles DF-15 (M-9 for export), which are capable of delivering a warhead, also nuclear, of 50-350 kilotons for 600 kilometers. For the first time the rocket was tested in June 1988, and already two months earlier Beijing signed a preliminary agreement with Damascus for its sale. However, the United States and Israel exerted effective pressure on China to withdraw from the transfer of missiles to Syria (Shichor, 2002, p. 319-321). It was similar to the attempt to sell to Syria surface-to-surface missiles DF-11 (M-11 for export), which are capable of delivering a 800 kilograms warhead for 300 kilometers. In early 1992, Beijing eventually gave up selling them to Syria as well as to Pakistan, which was in line with Washington's and Tel Aviv's expectations (Ross, 2009, p. 250). An international controversy has also aroused by alleged provision of Syria by China the technology that was intended to enable to improve the accuracy of the surface-to-surface SCUD missiles (Shichor, 2002, p. 322).

Even greater international discussions aroused by the speculation that China supported the Syrian atomic program. This was to be confirmed by the agreement of November 1991 on the sale of 30KW research reactor by China to Syria. This transaction was also stopped because of US-Israeli protest (Shichor, 2002, p. 322-323). In 2007, Israel carried out Operation Orchard, under which it destroyed the nuclear facility in Syria. Because it was built with partial support from North Korea, suspicions were directed not only towards Pyongyang, but also towards its protector - Beijing. Back then, China was keen on creating the image of a state that was seeking to seal the regime of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. For this reason, Beijing has clearly opposed the practice of North Korea's support of nuclear programs in other countries (Lanteigne, 2016, p. 168).

After the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, the Chinese authorities were clearly concerned and closely watched the development of the conflict. In February 2012, there was a significant change in the representation of China in Syria. Deputy Foreign Minister **Zhai Jun** was appointed special envoy to Syria. Former ambassador to Iraq and Syria, **Li Huaxin**, was sent instead as special envoy to the Arab League. Another important change took place in March 2016 when former ambassador to Iran, **Xie Xiaoyan**, was appointed as special envoy to Syria. These changes were meant to show that China was very interested in the situation in Syria and was keen to maintain friendly relations with the government of **Bashar al-Assad**. Cooperation between states was not limited only to political and economic, but also developed, to some extent, in the military area. A member of China's Central Military Commission, Rear Admiral **Guan Youfei**, said in 2016 that the People's Liberation Army would be willing to continue exchanges and cooperation with the Syrian military, including providing training (Zhou, 2017).

China presented its position on Syria in the forum of a number of international organizations, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

(SCO). At the SCO summit in Beijing on 6-7 June 2012, China explicitly opposed the use of force in Syria. Instead, it called for talks with the Syrian authorities. SCO members issued a joint statement on this matter in line with Beijing's position. It is worth mentioning that a similar statement was issued on how to solve the nuclear crisis in Iran. This meant that China was opposed to starting any war in the Middle East (Kizekova, 2016, p. 142). China feared that consent to carry out international military intervention in Syria could lead to an escalation of the war in the region. This, in turn, could have far-reaching consequences for China's partners throughout Asia as well as for China itself (Shichor, 2017, p. 122).

From the perspective of Beijing, the war in Syria gained a new dimension when the terrorist organization - the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) - appeared on its political and military scene. According to the Chinese state media, in 2014 from 20,000 foreign fighters fighting in the ranks of ISIL in Syria and Iraq, 300 were to come from the PRC. Most of them were to be Islamist Uyghurs, coming from the northwestern province of Xinjiang. The Chinese authorities feared that these fighters, after gaining combat experience and receiving ideological and military support, would try to return to China to carry out attacks there. According to the Chinese state media, these fears have been confirmed because some of the members of the East Turkestan faction who were trained in Syria organized terrorist attacs in Xinijang (Zhou, 2017). For years, the Uyghurs fighting for independence have been accused by Beijing of collaborating with Islamic extremists from various parts of Asia. Despite this, China has not decided to participate in military operations against ISIL. Beijing feared that its military interference in the Middle East affairs could lead to intensification of attacks by jihadist groups on Chinese objects in the region and in China itself (Kam, 2017, p.194).

2 The attitude of the People's Republic of China in the Security Council

Since taking up permanent membership of the UN Security Council to the present time, i.e. between 1971 and 2017, Beijing used the veto very sparingly, putting it only 11 times. For the first 40 years China used it only five times (1972, 1997, 1999, 2007 and 2008), none of which concerned the Middle East affairs. In turn, between 2011 and 2017, it used it six times, i.e. in 2011, twice in 2012, in 2014, 2016, and in 2017. All of these six vetoes concerned Syria and were used together with the Russian Federation (UNO Library). It is worth noting that in recent years China has supported, for example, a series of resolutions imposing economic sanctions on a much closer economic partner in the Middle East - Iran, for the implementation of the nuclear program (Shichor, 2017, p. 118). What is even more significant, China has also agreed on several economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council for the same reason on their only ally - North Korea (Jaewoo p. 238-239).

Beijing together with Moscow opposed the Security Council resolutions, which were intended to condemn the regime of **Bashar Al-Assad** for crimes against civilians using both conventional and unconventional weapons. China wanted to block the possibility of conducting international military intervention in Syria. This concerned both UN actions and actions of the coalition of the willing under the US leadership (Shichor, 2017, p. 122). China traditionally opposes interfering, especially in a military manner, in internal conflicts. In addition, it did not want to escalate the war in Syria, and to increase the political and military influence of the United States in that country. For the first time China supported Russia's veto on October 2011 against the motion for a resolution on Syria notified by France, Germany, Portugal and the United Kingdom (S/ 2011/612). These countries wanted to call on the Syrian government to end the use of force against civilians and to introduce freedom of speech, peaceful demonstrations and other public rights in the country. According to Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China to the UN, **Lia Baodong**, resolution undermined the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states and did not contribute to the unloading of unrest in Syria. Anyway, he expressed his concerns with the developments in Syria and called on all parties there to avoid further bloodshed by political dialog (United Nations, 2011).

On February 2012 China vetoed resolution (S/2012/77) which would have called for the president of Syria, **Bashar al-Assad**, to step down as part of a potential peace deal between the Syrian government and rebels seeking regime change. Beijing, like Moscow, was strongly criticized by Washington and London who proposed the resolution. Both Beijing and Moscow expressed concerns that the resolution would have violated Syrian sovereignty. They called to the international society for negotiations with the **Assad** government. China also agreed to conduct the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), to which it contributed its own staff. The purpose of the mission was to observe the parties' compliance with the ceasefire. In July 2012, however, China opposed the resolution (S/2012/538) that would have extended the mandate of the UNSMIS and which would have threatened sanctions on Syria if demands to end the spiralling violence were not met. **Lia Baodong** described the draft as „counterproductive, as it had uneven content that put pressure on only one party, which would only derail the issue from the track of political settlement and undermine regional peace and stability" (United Nations, 2012).

In the meantime, the Chinese communist authorities have condemned cases of military attacks in Syria, including the use of force against civilians by Syria's government security forces. Above all, however, they criticized strongly ISIL, which carried out a military offensive both in Syria and neighboring Iraq. However, the Chinese authorities have not decided to join the international coalition under the US leadership undertaking a military offensive against Islamic State. Beijing made such a decision, although Washington definitely

tried to include China to the international anti-terrorist coalition (Sutter, 2015, p. 193). In May 2014, China vetoed a resolution on Syria prepared by French diplomacy (S/2014/348). Its entry into force was, however, particularly unlikely, since it assumed the transfer of the case of the war in Syria to the International Criminal Court, which neither China nor Russia recognized (Lanteigne, 2016, p. 88-89).

In September 2015 Russia launched its first air strikes in rebel-controlled areas of Syria. According to Moscow, the attacks were carried out against ISIL fighters. The West, however, believed that Russia was primarily attacking Syrian rebels, also these trained by Americans, fighting against both government and ISIL. Despite these accusations, representatives of Beijing praised the effectiveness of the "counter-terrorism" Russian offensive in Syria. This was quite significant in relation to China's distance from military operations against ISIL carried out by an international coalition under the US leadership. In December 2016, China vetoed another resolution (S/2016/1026), this time proposed by Egypt, New Zealand and Spain. Among others it called for the cessation of all attacks on Aleppo for seven days. This was to enable the transfer of international humanitarian aid to the inhabitants of the city destroyed by the war. In February 2017, China vetoed altogether with Russia, for the sixth and so far the last time, the resolution on Syria. (S/2017/172). They have blocked sanctions against the Syrian regime for using chemical weapons against rebels and civilians (Zhou, 2017). Except blocking Security Council resolutions Beijing did not generally engage in seeking ways to resolve the conflict in Syria. It can be said that it behaved in line with the *wu wei* policy, leaving it to behave in a completely natural, uncontrived way. Beijing thus gave way to Moscow and Washington, which tried to solve the problem, but each in its own way (Shichor, 2017, p. 110). Russia militarily involved in supporting the regime of **Bashar Al-Assad**. The United States, on the other hand, supported the rebels fighting against ISIL and Syrian government. China, in turn, decided to keep away from the bloody war. Chinese political leaders argued that the fate of the Syrian government should depend on Syrians, and therefore opposed the interference of the great powers, mainly the United States (Zhou, 2017).

Communist authorities remained insensitive even to protests from the League of Arab States and Turkey, against the actions of government forces of **Bashar al-Assad**. The situation was different when voting on Security Council Resolution on March 2011 authorizing NATO's military action against the government forces of **Muammar Gaddafi** in Libya (S/RES/1973). China abstained but not opposed for that resolution. After the vote, the Chinese representative explained the position of Beijing. He pointed out that the main motive of not opposing the resolution was the attitude of the 22 states of the Arab League (Harnisch, 2016, p. 42). China, however, agreed only to the establishment in Libya no flight zone to prevent **Gaddafi** from using his Air Force against civilians. Beijing did not accept the fact that on the basis of this

resolution, NATO decided to overthrow the dictator. For this reason, it was more skeptical about the possibility of applying even limited sanctions on the regime of **Bashar al-Assad** in Syria.

Conclusion

China has important interests located in the Middle East, primarily in the commercial area. It buys a lot of oil in this part of the world and sells weapons and other industrial goods. Nevertheless, Beijing is not much involved in the problems of the Middle East. Its role is marginal in matters of local conflicts, including wars in Iraq, Yemen, Libya or Palestine. The situation in Syria was similar, but here Beijing took a more resolute stance, refusing to condemn the regime of **Bashar al-Assad**. For some reasons this was similar to the situation in 2002 when China protested against the United States invading Iraq ruled by Saddam Hussein. At that time, however, Beijing did not have to formally submit a veto. In both situations, China has limited itself to protests, resigning from introducing more decisive political and especially military actions. China cares for the least possible interference by the powers in the region's affairs, which primarily concerns military operations. Beijing did not interfere militarily, even when the Islamic State posed a serious threat to its regional partners, as well as to China's security (Pauly, 2016, p. 215).

The issue of the involvement of the People's Republic of China in Middle Eastern affairs should be seen through the prism of Sino-American relations. For China, bilateral relations with the United States are crucial and at the same time quite specific. They are based mainly on US demands on the PRC. These include, among others, observing human rights, balancing the principles of economic cooperation, curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or limiting demographic growth and emission of toxic gases into the atmosphere. In recent years, Washington has also tried to influence Beijing to make it more prominently involved in solving world security problems, including North Korea's and Iran's nuclear programs, or the war in Syria (Roberts, 2015, p. 71.). However, China is reluctant to yield to the hegemon. Beijing doesn't want to engage more seriously in the Middle East region, which it see not so much as the zone of influence of Americans, but the region destabilized by them. On the one hand, China doesn't want the United States to increase military presence in the region, but on the other, isn't interested in sending there its own military forces. Beijing is afraid that such involvement could negatively affect the security of China.

According to **Marc Lanteigne** "Although China has occasionally sided with Russia to create a coalition countering some US policies, such as over the civil conflict in Syria since 2011, China has shied away from building alliances meant specifically to balance US power (Lanteigne, 2016, p. 142). China is not yet ready to cast more serious challenges to the United States in the military

dimension, especially outside the closest neighborhood. Under **Xi Jinping**, while there are policy differences with Washington over strategic issues, the disputes have largely remained on the diplomatic level. While both the United States and Russia declared themselves victorious in the war against ISIL, China could not do so because of the lack of military commitment to resolve the conflict. On the other hand, China, taking the back seat, achieved what was most important to it. There was no conflict spreading to the region, and **Bashar Al-Assad**, supported by Beijing, remained in power. In an interview with Russia's Sputnik news agency in March 2016 **Assad** said he welcomed companies from Russia, China and Iran to take part in reconstruction of the country. The reason for the invitation of these three states was their support for Syrian government during the civil war. Towards China **Assad** was especially grateful for vetoing Security Council resolutions directed against his regime. He also confirmed that China was directly involved in many industrial projects in Syria, including the participation of Chinese experts (Zhou, 2017). If **Assad** remains in power after the end of the war in Syria, China will have an opportunity to increase significantly its economic expansion in the country.

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EXTREME RIGHT-WING AND RADICAL LEFT-WING POLITICAL THOUGHT AND MOVEMENTS AS A CHALLENGE FOR RESEARCH ON THE SECURITY OF MODERN STATES

Paweł Malendowicz[1]

ABSTRACT

The paper tackles the problem of political thought described as radical. The author explains the idea of radical criticism of the state and political relationships, analyzing cases of extreme right and radical left political movements. He also explains that radicalism means the particular strand of political thought which positions itself beyond the field of agreement (compromise) between other currents in political thought. The impossibility of compromise is due to literality and maximalism of interpreted core values of a given strand of political thought. The author also believes radicalism is not a synonym for extremism, which he justifies presenting diverging semantic fields of those terms. Research was carried out based on programs of political parties and social movements defined as radical.

Keywords: Radicalism, Extremism, Extreme Right, Radical Left, Nationalism, Anarchism, Communism

Introduction

"Radicalism" – from the Latin *radix* – means a return to the roots, i.e. to the sources of notions applied in the language of politics, but whose meaning was distorted, or which are not interpreted literally by the mainstream parties. Radical criticism is a feature of parties and movements which are not well-known to the public. It is also characteristic of parties and movements treated by the political and educational system of a state, as well as by the media and the dominant parties, as marginal. It may also be typical of parties in the final phase of their struggle for power, where radicalism may be a factor decisive of victory and seizure of power. It is characteristic of extreme right, especially of parties evoking the values of nationalism. It is also typical of parties and movements of extreme left – communist and anarchist. One of its features is questioning of common models of political thinking and methods of formulation of negative and positive goals by dominant political parties.

Thus, radical criticism touches different spheres of social life – those which are a result of an agreement (compromise) between social groups representing various interests. In the opinion of radicals, those groups, acting in the name of those interests, distort the meaning of notions such as democracy. It

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is the kind of criticism that does not belong within the field of agreement (compromise) or does not meet the requirements and conditions of such because of its maximalist understanding of core values. These are: freedom for anarchism, nation for nationalism, equality and community for communism. Those terms are absolutized, and their interpretation leaves no room for compromise. Radical criticism is also criticism that, from the perspective of maximalist and principled interpretation of values perceives the distortion and vagueness of rules created as a result of compromise, on which modern politics is based. The aim of this article is an attempt at answering the following questions: what is criticized by radical political parties and social movements? Do arguments raised in their enunciations refer to rectification of reality we live in, reforms and perfunctory changes, or do they refer to its very essence, demanding a total, revolutionary change? Are radical parties and movements extremist? Can radical movements and parties be a threat for the security of democratic states? What is their power and importance in modern states and societies? Which roles do they play in the society?

In order to answer those questions, the method consisting in an analysis of texts written by extreme right parties was used, in particular nationalist movements, as well as texts of communist and anarchist movements. Extreme right parties whose texts were analyzed are the following: French National Front (*Front National*), The National Democratic Party of Germany (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*), Spanish National Democracy (*Democracia Nacional*), The National Rebirth of Poland (*Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski*), The British National Party. Also documents prepared by The International Third Position – an international movement bringing together extreme right parties. Among analyzed communist texts were enunciations of international organizations, such as The Committee for a Workers' International, The International Socialist Tendency and The Initiative of Communist and Workers' Parties. The source used for study of anarchist thought were documents of The International of Anarchist Federations and other local anarchist groups published in books by the author, entitled *The anarchist thought in Europe at the beginning of the 21st century. The collection of documents and other source material* (Malendowicz, 2011).

Criticism of democracy

Nationalists condemned democracy invoking the fact that, according to them, in modern democratic political systems, the nation does not exercise the actual sovereignty. For the French National Front, democracy was a sacred and fundamental value – in its literal and maximalist meaning. Whereas in France, as stated by the National Front, there is a deficit of democracy. Public welfare is ignored for the sake of particular profit. According to French nationalists, electoral procedures in their country are undemocratic, many governmental

competences are transferred to independent agencies or local governments which are very often guided by patronage; referenda are seldom held or their results ignored, politicians deceive the public, failing to fulfill their election pledges, and, feeling independent of the will of the nation, disregard the public interest – they do not perceive politics as a service to the nation (Front National, 2012). The program of The National Democratic Party of Germany stipulates that democracy serves lobbies and political parties, not the nation (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, lack of the date of publication). The National Democracy from Spain condemned the Enlightenment interpretation of terms related to democracy, such as freedom, sovereignty, and human rights. Their original meaning was the autonomy of an individual versus the public. Democracy, however, should be based on a community of the people, not on an abstract notion of individuals (Democracia Nacional, lack of the date of publication). The National Rebirth of Poland referred to their country as the "demo-liberal bureaucratic state" that enslaved the Polish people. Polish nationalists claimed sovereignty of the nation instead of its independence of other internal and external centers of authority (Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski, lack of the date of publication). For their part, The International Third Position pronounced itself in favor of decentralization and implementation of an "ideal of authority of the public". A document entitled *10 Point Declaration* wrote: „This programme of political decentralization we call Popular Rule. In its essence, it is a system of self-government by the people which starts at the level of the lowest socially viable unit, and extends through a series of organically linked structures to the national level. It is the direct participation of the entire adult population in the decision-making process – local, regional and national – and draws its strength from the fact that the entire people express their wishes and have these acted upon by duly appointed delegates. However, the people themselves must act within the Moral Order if their wishes are to be valid; that is to say, the people do not make the 'truth' by voting, rather their political actions must conform to Objective Truth" (International Third Position, lack of the date of publication).

In the name of an idea of absolute freedom, any form of statehood was criticized by anarchists. Democracy was described by them as another name for totalitarianism, and parliamentarianism was called an undemocratic democracy, creating merely an impression of legality of the system. They claimed that the democratic system legitimizes the rule of an organized minority, being in fact nothing more than a fictitious democracy. Democracy was described as an illusion, since political freedom deprived of economic equality was seen by the anarchists as a scam. For them, democracy is a limitation of human freedom no less than other political systems. It was, however, regarded as "the lesser evil", as in the democratic system, anarchists were allowed to establish their own organizations – whether officially or unofficially (Malendowicz, 2013, pg. 325-335).

Criticism of capitalism and globalization

Communists from a Trotskyist organization The Committee for a Workers' International likened modern democracies to capitalism. Their criticism of democracy and capitalism was in line with Marx's economic determinism. According to them, democracy should be a system in which everyone has equal access to tangible goods, and power is not vested with the richest or possessing means of production or governing financial institutions, but to workers (in accordance with the majority rule). On its website, The Committee for a Workers' International wrote: "Capitalism is based on the control of a super-rich elite – big businesses and corporations – over the wealth of society. Their reckless management of the economy, in the pursuit of maximum profit at any cost is the source of the major problems of mankind today, such as crisis, unemployment, poverty, hunger, war and environmental destruction. On the basis of a socialist society, where the economy is planned democratically, with the resources of the planet under the control of the majority, we could begin to solve these fundamental problems" (Committee for a Workers' International, lack of the date of publication).

Radical parties and movements are also critical of globalization. Extreme right considers globalization as equal to neo-liberalism, leading to abolition of states and nations. Globalization was considered by extreme right parties as running counter to the principle of primacy of nation in international relationships and as a factor destroying nations through policy of multiculturalism. They also likened globalization to global capitalism, regarded as anti-national. E.g. The National Democratic Party of Germany claimed that globalized capitalism does not respect political, social and cultural ties and lives its own social life in capital markets. Workplaces are exported to countries with low labor costs, meanwhile importing foreign cheap labor, which is the reason for social injustice. Globalization means world dictatorship of big capital leading to cultural equalization of nations, their political incapacitation, their economic abuse and ethnic destruction (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, lack of the date of publication).

Anarchists criticized globalization, identifying it with the new world order in which global elites restrict the freedom of the people. Those elites were said to be composed of politicians, transnational corporations and international financial institutions. Some anarchists even claimed that modern countries are "guard companies" of big corporations, protecting them from aspirations of societies for freedom. The capitalist system has been judged by anarchists as continuously restricting freedom of the people by limiting their access to goods and forcing them to choose the way of life that is in line with needs of capitalism, and not natural needs of human beings.

For their part, the Trotskyists from The International Socialist Tendency, in a document entitled *The Declaration of the European Anticapitalist Left*

Conference analyzed causes, course, and results of the global economic crisis commenced in 2008: "It is evidently not a 'normal' cyclical recession but a systemic crisis on a comparable scale to and with the same disruptive potential as the Great Depression of the 1930s. Like that earlier crisis, the present one is protracted and goes through different stages – credit crunch, financial crash, global slump, and now a 'recovery' marked by mass unemployment, intensified competition among the leading capitalist powers, and the sovereign debt crisis. (…) In Europe these policies are now being forced through by the bourgeois right, which is now in government almost everywhere" (*Declaration of the European Anticapitalist Left Conference*, 2011).

Nationalists from The International Third Position went even further criticizing global economy. According to them, the cause of degradation of modern nations is not only capitalism itself as a system of production of goods and trading of those goods based on private property and free competition, but also primacy of materialism over the spiritual aspect of human existence. In a document entitled *10 Point Declaration,* they wrote: "No rational person could seriously deny that Money, the love of it and the scramble for it, dominates the modern world in a degree hitherto unknown in the history of Mankind. Increasingly, the very right to existence of individuals, families, communities, regions, nations and cultures is determined by an alleged 'economic viability', as though Money was the sole standard of importance in all the crucial questions of Life" (International Third Position, lack of the date of publication).

Criticism of the European Union

The European Union is supposed to be suffering from all of the abovementioned pathologies. However, the extreme right studied the Union mainly in terms of its undemocratic nature. The French National Front recognized that European institutions show a deficit of democracy. They referred mainly to the European Commission, which is unelected but influential. The European Parliament was described as an institution serving as a façade for undemocratic processes taking place in the EU. Moreover, it cannot perform its function as a representation of the nation, because according to nationalists, a "European nation" as such does not exist. Therefore, there is no common, shared will of having representatives in the Parliament, as concluded by the French nationalists. The National Front also opposed to transfer of rights from the level of state to the EU, as it meant loss of France's sovereignty. The European Union was described by French nationalists as the "Trojan horse of ultraliberal globalization", an institution enslaved by debt and Euro currency (Front National, 2012). The National Democratic Party of Germany claimed that the European Union authorities are not democratically legitimized. It called the EU a "Union of technocrats and corporations", juxtaposed with a "Europe of Nations" – free, forward-looking, socially just, protecting national identity

(Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, lack of the date of publication). The Spanish National Democracy suggested creation of a single geopolitical block, liberating Europe from under the American influence and cultural colonization (Democracia Nacional, lack of the date of publication). The National Rebirth of Poland wanted a "ban on groups, organizations, parties, information and propaganda centers engaged in political prostitution for the benefit of foreign countries and structures of power existing beyond the borders of the State – it applies, in the first place, to those who seek liquidation of the Polish State and its absorption by the European Union". It demanded an "immediate breakdown of all measures of 'integration' with the European Union leading to liquidation of the Polish State" (Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski, lack of the date of publication).

Communists from The Initiative of Communist and Workers' Parties in the document entitled *Founding Declaration* wrote: "We consider that the EU is capital's choice. It promotes measures in favour of the monopolies, the concentration and centralization of capital; it is strengthening its characteristics as an imperialist economic, political and military bloc opposed to the interests of the working class, the popular strata; it intensifies armaments, authoritarianism, state repression, limiting sovereign rights. It is our assessment that the European Union is the European imperialist centre, supports the aggressive plans against the peoples, and is aligned with the USA and NATO" (Communist and Workers' Parties, lack of the date of publication). Anarchists, in their critical discourse about the European Union, were guided by principles adopted in 1968 by The International Anarchist Federation. One of those principles was that the organization fights for: "The abolition of all forms of authority whether economic, political, social, religious, cultural or sexual" (International of Anarchist Federations, lack of the date of publication). To them, the European Union was a "super-state". They thought that citizens are unable to influence EU authorities and decisions made by them. They treated European integration as an element of globalization, identifying it with capitalism and neo-liberalism that restricted the freedom of individuals and groups

Criticism of migration

Migration was one of the most important problems tackled in programming documents of extreme right parties and the communist and anarchist movements after 2010. Communists and anarchists blamed capitalist governments for mass immigrations to Europe, as those governments waged wars outside of Europe, forcing workers from poor, ruined countries to emigrate. They believed that the process was supported by big transnational corporations for which immigrants constituted a source of cheap labor.

In their programs, extreme right parties focus the most on the problem of migration. The National Democratic Party of Germany called migration a "mass

murder" of the German nation. According to that party, mass migration might threaten the existence of the people of Germany. Therefore, the party called for a "Germany for the Germans!" (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, lack of the date of publication). The same conclusions were drawn by nationalists from The British National Party, who, in a document entitled *Parliamentary Elections Manifesto 2015. Securing our British future*, wrote: "Mass Immigration is the greatest threat to our precious and unique British identity. The pressure on housing and on public services such as schools, hospitals, transport networks, welfare and social security is far too great. Britain's full and it's time to shut the door! (…) The BNP is implacably opposed to the Labour/Tory regimes' Mass Immigration policy which, if left unchecked, will see Britain and most of Europe colonised by Islam within a few decades. The BNP recognizes that Islam, by its very nature, is incompatible with modern secular Western democracy. The BNP will protect our identity and heritage because it is the cornerstone of our culture and freedom" (British National Party, 2015).

Radical criticism – demanding recovery or destruction of political governance?

Extreme right and radical left parties and movements question the dominant principles of political governance, both in terms of internal policies of their states and international political relationships. Arguments raised in political programs and statements of leaders of those movements refer to defects of democracy, wrong direction of European integration, lack of control of society over globalization, capitalism entailing social polarization related to material situation of each individual, or migration caused by poverty, war and totalitarian political regimes. Critical discourse held by extreme right and radical left parties evoke arguments leading to a conclusion that defects of the modern political governance may be eliminated, i.e. rectified. A reform of democratic systems of European countries would then be possible, allowing "the people" to take over power. New directions of European integration could be established, taking into account the will of nations, ethnic groups, regional and local communities, instead of projects of political, financial and business elites. It would be possible to socialize globalization processes that would be independent of global society, but would be socialized and considerate of aspirations of large social groups. Changes to capitalist economy could be made, not only social, but also considering intangible aspects of functioning of modern societies – their spontaneous civic activism, free education, ideological pluralism. It would be finally possible to stop mass migration – if only major players in international political and economic relationships came to an agreement without letting particular interests and private aspirations for power guide them instead of public welfare.

However, the conclusion drawn from arguments raised in the radical criticism by extreme right and left, i.e. that defects of modern political governance can be eliminated through rectification, is a false conclusion. Radical criticism used by "far-right" and "far-left" parties and movements is thus called because it concerns principles and foundations of modern political governance, not that which was build upon those foundations. To repair the foundations of a building, one must first pull its walls down. It is impossible to repair the democracy, the European Union, globalization and capitalism, because in order to do that, compromise is necessary. And it is impossible to reach that compromise if values such as nation, freedom, or community, are treated as absolute, as a foundation of a new building. According to political radicals, they should be the ones to become the new foundation of the building instead of private profit and individual interest simply masked by democracy. Nevertheless, are far-right and far-left radicals extremists? Radicalism and extremism are not the same – their semantic fields differ significantly. Radicalism refers to political thought, concepts, ideology, doctrines and programs, whereas extremism refers to practice – to modalities, methods and forms of activity that are not commonly accepted and cause prejudice to individuals and societies. Radical criticism used by extreme right parties and radical left movements does not have to be implemented in an extremist manner. The notion of "extremism" brings to mind negative associations. It is used by politicians to discredit their adversaries in their struggle for support and power. Accusations of extremism are also made against far right and far left by the media and mainstream politicians. Those allegations may be justified, but sometimes, the term is improperly used.

The far-right extremism is known from European history of the 20th century, from the time when the Nazis in Germany and the fascists in Italy fought for power, and after they obtained it. After World War II, far-right extremists continued to commit acts of terror, and carry out clandestine and illegal operations. However, their activity was usually efficiently combated or neutralized by law enforcement authorities of democratic countries – courts, police, and intelligence agencies. Questions concerning a recent increase in support for extreme right parties are posed by many scholars (e.g. Hainsworth, 2008). Today's waves of political extremism result i.a. from opening of borders between the European Union member states and Muslim immigration to Europe from countries troubled by wars, poor and undemocratic, unemployment in Europe, condition of local economies and political and legal systems, as well as educational systems for children and youth. Meanwhile, attacks of migrants and acts of violence directed against them reported by the media have become one of the many topics in the press, on TV and Internet information services – and more importantly, just another fact of life to which European societies became accustomed, although they should not have.

Extremism of the far left also took its toll on the 20th century history, when Russian Bolsheviks took over power, followed by communists in other countries. However, it was the leftist extremism of the 1960s and 1970s that went down in history. Extremist organizations such as The Red Army Fraction (Faction) (*Rote Armee Fraktion*), known as The Baader-Meinhof Group, operating in West Germany, and The Red Brigades (*Brigate Rosse*), operating in Italy, were etched in the memory of people who lived at that time. The activity of those organizations was marked by kidnappings, bombings, and assassinations (Aust, 1987). Nowadays, leftist extremism is a marginal form of political activity.

The deepest mark in the history from more than a hundred years ago was left by anarchist extremism. Anarchists were responsible for the death of thousands of people, including those they blamed for oppressiveness of the state: monarchs, officials, policemen. In 1881, **Ignacy Hryniewiecki** killed the Tsar **Alexander II** of Russia; in 1894, **Santo Caserio** murdered the President of France, **Marie François Sadi Carot**t; in 1898, **Luigi Lucheni** killed the Austrian Empress **Elisabeth**; in 1900, **Gaetano Bresci** assassinated **Umberto I,** the King of Italy, and in 1901, **Leon Czolgosz** shot the President of the USA **William McKinley** who died a few days later (Tuchman, 1996). Today, anarchists do not use terrorism to pursue their goals. In Western and Eastern Europe acts of anarchist terror are rare.

Strength and importance of radical left and extreme right movements and parties

Donatella Della Porta and **Mario Diani** suggested a method of measuring the strength of social movements using three criteria. They are the following: logic of numbers, damage and bearing witness. The first logic pertains to the number of actions taken and the number of members of a party, movement, or protest. The second refers to the damage caused by the movement, attracting the attention of the media which then publicize problems and goals of the social movement. The third logic is related to the degree of commitment and participation in the social movement (Porta, Diani, 2006).

Analyzing the strength of far-right parties in Europe in accordance with the logic of numbers, it can be observed that the number of members of those parties, their supporters and voters, as well as social support vary from state to state. Major parties that count in the struggle for power are: in France (*The National Front – Front National*), Greece (*Golden Dawn – Χρυσή Αυγή*), Latvia (*The National Alliance "All For Latvia!" – "For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK" – Nacionālā apvienība „Visu Latvijai!” – „Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK”*), Denmark (*The Danish People's Party – Dansk Folkeparti*), Hungary (*Jobbik - the Movement for a Better Hungary – Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom*), Slovakia (*The People's Party - Our Slovakia –*

Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko), Russia (*Motherland – Партия „Родина”*). In some of those countries extreme right parties are strongly supported by the public and remain in the core of party systems.

Support for communist (except France, Greece and several other states) and anarchist movements is not as strong. Communist parties and organizations exist across Europe, but they are organizationally divided, and the political thought of communism itself is composed of many strands. Trotskyists are the most active in the movement, referring to the legacy of thought and writings by Lev Trotsky (1879-1940). Major international Trotskyist ogranizations are e.g.: The Committee for a Workers' International, The International Socialist Tendency, The Coordinating Committee for the Refoundation of the Fourth International, The Internationalist Communist Union, The United Secretariat of the Fourth International, The League for the Fourth International, The Fourth International, The International Workers League – Fourth International, The League for the Fifth International.

Anarchists also participate in many organizations, and anarchism is divided into many factions. At the beginning of the 21st century, anarchists created groups that constituted local federations. Those federations were the most active in France, United Kingdom, Ireland, Russia, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy, Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic. On the international level, anarchists were united in The International of Anarchist Federations and The International Workers' Association.

Both communist parties in European countries (except several states) and their international organizations were few in number and were not major nor influential elements of party and political systems of the continent. Anarchists, as an independent movement, was not numerous either – constituted a margin of political activity. Although those movements do not have many members, it does not mean that they cannot cause material damage in the social system, effectively threatening public order. Communists, however, do not copy methods used by leftist terrorism of the second half of the 20th century. Methods applied by modern anarchists are also no longer based on methods used by anarchists more than 100 years ago. An exception to that rule was the activity of an Italian organization called The Informal Anarchist Federation (*Federazione Anarchica Informale*), founded in 2003. At the beginning of the 21st century it was responsible for bombings and attempted attacks on European institutions (Agence Presse Associative, 2005). Material damages were caused by anarchists and communists during protests and riots started by anti-globalists. Anarchists and communists are a part of the anti-globalization (alter-globalization) movement.

The logic of damage might have also decided on the strength of the extreme right, not of nationalist parties, but of entities and groups supporting those parties. Extreme right ideologies may be an inspiration for attacks, acts of terrorism, battery, or even racially motivated murders. As concerns the logic of

bearing witness, it can be concluded that both among parties and movements of extreme right and radical left, there are individuals capable of sacrifice motivated by their faith in nationalist, communist or anarchist ideas. They do not act in the name of profit or personal benefit. They are unusually active, sacrificing their private and professional life in the name of ideals they believe in and perceive as an axiom of their actions.

Conclusions

Radical criticism professed by far-right parties and far-left movements may be analyzed as constructive or destructive for democratic political systems of modern countries. As an "unrealized criticism" of far-right and far-left parties, it is constructive – if it is treated seriously by dominant political parties and elites, its arguments influence reforms of degenerating political systems. In Western societies, dominated by values of consumerism and materialism, it is a reminder of values perceived as evident, taken for granted, and therefore never reflected on and forgotten. Those values are freedom and democracy; the latter, especially, as democracy is not static – it is a process. Democracy must be constantly, continuously democratized. Ruling elites of democratic countries should therefore take into account warnings and stipulations presented in programs of radical parties and movements. They should consider the voice of minorities that do not agree to be politically marginalized. The point is not to implement their "maximum" programs, but to take into account their criticism on a minimum level, as ignoring them may lead to a situation in which they stop being a margin and become a political force capable of making revolutionary changes that may prove destructive to many human freedoms, democracy, European integration, and capitalism.

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"ISLAM OR RUSSIA?": THE CZECH PRESIDENT MILOŠ ZEMAN'S PERCEPTION OF SECURITY THREATS[*]

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ABSTRACT
The goal of this paper is to analyze Czech President Miloš Zeman's strategy in using the phenomenon of „security" in the first four years of his term of office. Methodologically speaking, the text is established as a CAQDA dataset created by all of Zeman's speeches, interviews, statements, etc., which were processed using MAXQDA11+ software. This paper shows that the dominant treatment of the phenomenon of corruption by the president is primarily linked to the creation of vision of Islam and immigration as absolutely the biggest threat for contemporary Europe.

Key words: *Miloš Zeman, Security, Discourse, Islam, Russia, Immigration, Czech president, Threat.*

Introduction

For more than twenty years, **Miloš Zeman** has without doubt been one of the most prominent figures in Czech politics. In the first half of the 1990s, he became chairman of the Social Democratic Party, which he built up from a party with minimal preferences to one of the strongest political actors in the country and a party that repeatedly won elections at end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s. Thanks to these successes, **Miloš Zeman** also became the head of the Czech Government from 1998 to 2002. After his failed candidacy for the presidential seat in 2003, when even members of his own party voted against him in an indirect election, he left the party and also Czech politics in general After direct presidential elections were instated, **Zeman** began to profile himself as a non-partisan candidate advocating the interests of the people. After a very negatively-toned campaign, which managed to polarize the Czech public (cf. Červinková – Kulhavá, 2013), he became the third president of the independent Czech Republic in the second round of the historically first direct election in 2013. Equipped with a strong legitimacy stemming from the nation-wide

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popular vote, **Zeman** began to serve his function in office in a way that further polarized Czech society. He actively intervened in political processes in a manner that did not correspond to a parliamentary regime or constitutionally determined powers, thus destabilizing the Czech political scene. Also, immediately after his election, he became highly active in the media, and granted interviews to daily tabloid newspapers, disinformation websites, or in his own television program. Throughout the course of his whole political career, **Miloš Zeman** has been known for generating strong statements often made on a personal level. He has handed out various labels to his political opponents, which have often been border-line or blatantly vulgar. This has led a large portion of the Czech public to accept **Zeman** and left the remainder to spurn him.

The term security is used frequently in political and political-science discourse and represents one of the most important categories of rhetorical and practical politics (Lupták, 2017) and its research. This is logical given the fact that one of the basic functions of the state is to ensure the security (however the term is defined) of its citizens and structures. For this reason, it seems relevant to look at the context in which this concept is dealt with and how it is handled by the Czech executive branch. It should be mentioned in the introduction that we intend to follow the topic of security in its conventional sense, not in a broad sense (Ušiak – Nečas, 2011).

The aim of the text is to provide an interpretation of the ways in which Czech President **Miloš Zeman** constructs the content of the phenomenon of "security" and how the content that is created in this manner figures into the framework of his rhetorical and actual political strategies. I will focus on several particular mutually interlinked topics – primarily what, in **Zeman's** mind, are the causes and consequences of security (or danger), how threats should be further combatted, and the intentions **Miloš Zeman** has when mentioning security (or danger).

In regard to the fact that the president can be considered without doubt to be a moral authority or a *"moral entrepreneur"* (Cohen, 2011), the labels that he creates and introduces into dominant political and social discourse (in the sense of the imagination of how things should be – Chiapello – Fairclough, 2002, p. 195) are a highly relevant topic of research. The Czech President (as an institution and a specific individual) has long held a high position in terms of public approval ratings carried out by the Public Opinion Research Centre under the Czech Academy of Sciences. For this reason, it can be assumed that the messages of the president are seen by a large portion of Czech society as *"truth"* or *"objective reality",* which is further mediated and amplified by the media (Altheide, 2002; Žúborová – Borárosová, 2016). This issue, or more exactly both of its elements (the president and security), show both a high social/political and academic relevance. The analysis of presidential speeches has a strong tradition in political science (see Meernik – Ault, 2013 or Gregor –

Macková, 2015), which stems from the symbolic importance of the function on which certain expectations are based (Scacco – Coe, 2017). Through his speeches, the president creates certain narratives – in this sense, presidential speeches are understood as an integral part of the public sphere, which is also linked to the construction of the shape of democracy in a given country (Reisigl, 2008). This text's contribution lies in the interpretation of original and heretofore unanalyzed data (see below) and in the contextualization of the phenomenon of security from **Miloš Zeman's** point of view, which opens a new and original window in the research terrain.

1 Data and methodology

Methodologically speaking, this paper has been conceived as a CAQDA dataset, which is made up of complete interviews, statements, speeches, and other expressions made by **Miloš Zeman** in the first four years (March 2013 – March 2017) of his first presidential election period. All documents were taken from the official website of the President of the Republic (http://www.zemanmilos.cz/cz/). The total extent of the dataset is 675 539 words. The dataset was processed using MAXQDA11+ software while using the extended lexical search method. The search subject included words that are linked to the phenomenon of corruption, specifically: security/danger, endangerment/endanger, threat, risk. Found occurrences were subjected to manual refining. During this refining process, occurrences of terms that 1) were not linked to the topic of security (e.g. "securing [in the sense of providing conditions for] the course of the event") and that 2) were not linked to the conventional concept of security but fell into the wider concept of it (e.g. "ensuring the security of miners") were deleted (Buzan – de Wilde – Waever, 2005). After refining, we identified a total of 292 codes, i.e. the results of the key word search, which were then divided into several subcategories that followed the logic of the research intention.

This dealt primarily with operationalizing the term security (a total of 10 occurrences) and then determining the sources and causes of the state of "danger" – in this category, there were uses of terms that imply a potential risk, threat, etc. (a total of 121 codes). The third coding category is made up of statements that relate to actors ensuring security and is more or less the opposite of the previous category (a total of 25 codes). The fourth category naturally works off the previous one and is devoted to the specific methods and practices via which security is to be ensured (a total of 77 codes). The final category is linked to the use of terms in the sense of delegitimizing labels. These are statements that **Miloš Zeman** uses to attack various actors and primarily his symbolic adversaries by pointing out various aspects of security (a total of 59 codes).

2 Operationalization of terms

We will begin with how **Miloš Zeman** perceives the essence of security. In his view, security is a crucial matter: *"The national interest of every state has three parts. First, there is security, second there is economic growth, and third there is social stability or – if you like – social compromise."* In order to ensure security, however, it is important to realize the possible existence of threats and risks: *"We assume that we live in a society that is endangered by almost nothing and that is a great mistake."* That is why it is necessary to continually point out possible risks (Foucault, 1983): *"Apprehension is different than fear. Apprehension from a danger is sensible." "A person who has warned of a real danger is more likely to draw attention and stand the test than a person who has closed his eyes to this danger. So, history will have to be the judge of whether the refugee crisis was a realistic danger to Europe or not."* It is evident in this quote that, in the context of contemporary Europe, **Miloš Zeman** sees Islam and the so-called migration crisis (see below) as fundamental dangers. At the same time, the last quote above also shows that two coding categories overlap in one statement, which is a wholly common phenomenon in inductive coding. Firstly, **Zeman** operationalized the essence of security ("it is necessary to point out dangers") and at the same time communicated the source of the danger ("the refugee crisis") while also offering a method to solve it (to be watchful and point out possible danger). There were a number of these overlaps in the corpus, but overlapping of the "source of danger" and "method for solution" categories was most common – in addition to risk factors, **Zeman** thus very often and simultaneously provides his vision of how the given problem should be solved. A second common overlap can be found between the "source of danger" and the use of "delegitimizing labels" – it is evident that **Zeman** uses the topic as a discursive practice via which he attempts to damage selected actors whom he semantically links to the source of danger or the inability to prevent it. The following statement is an example: *"I see the danger […] of dividing society primarily in the risk of labeling. That is to say that every person who is afraid of this wave of migration, primarily from Islamic countries, can be labeled a xenophobe, racist, or even a fascist."* In **Zeman's** view, people who criticize the opponents of migration thus present a threat. In this statement, he also delegitimizes them (as in reality these are often the people who stand against **Zeman**).

3 The source of danger

If we read the individual codes relating to **Zeman's** understanding of what the source of danger is, we find one central theme that is linked to Islam, Islamism, jihad, migration, terrorism, etc. This topic clearly dominated in **Zeman's** speeches. In the beginning of his presidential mandate, it was possible

on several occasions to find other topics – e.g. Russia as a security threat in light of the conflict in Ukraine (e.g. "*We see the situation in Ukraine and what threats exist there, that is, a certain reinstallation of Russian power that had been somewhat forgotten.*"). Over the course of time, however, he began to relativize the issue of Russia and finally ceased to talk about Russia as a source of danger altogether ("*I refuse the opinion that there is danger in the East.*"); he did, however, begin to emphasize the threat of migration and Islamic terrorism ("*I have long contended that these attributes are endangered by Islam, primarily by its radical branch, which has several times declared its intent to conquer Europe and subject it to its own culture.*"), which he explicitly placed above the "Russian problem": "*Decades ago I had already realized that individual nation states are exposed to external danger. At that time, I saw Russian imperialism as the primary danger. Well, it turned out that the real enemy wasn't forming to the east, but to the south in the form of the Islamic State and its branches such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, or the Muslim Brotherhood. In the meantime, the number of these organizations has grown considerably. Sometimes they fight amongst themselves, because – as Charles Darwin wrote – the greatest aggression is of an internal nature. On the other hand, they are willing to unite in the interest of creating one Islamic State, a caliphate.*"

Zeman contextualizes Islam/migration as a source of danger on several levels. Firstly, it is a potential source of terrorism: "*The danger has come closer to our borders and, by the way, it is naïve to assume that there is no connection between the wave of migration and terrorism, because that would mean assuming that this wave of migration does not include potential jihadists, the number of which we naturally cannot estimate precisely, but some of them [...] have taken part in the Paris attacks mentioned previously.*" In terms of migrants, **Zeman** repeatedly mentions their illegal behavior: "*The term refugee evokes various associations within us, but in reality these are people who have continually broken the law by not applying for asylum in the first safe country.*" According to **Zeman**, empathy with refugees itself is a problem. The president does not see these individuals as real refugees, but as invasive armies: "*Through his indecisiveness and a number of other seemingly conciliatory and seemingly humanitarian gestures, which in my opinion do not appreciate the true danger, because, contrary to him, I see the migration crisis as an organized invasion.*" **Zeman** sees manifestations of Islam as such as a source of danger: "*I have made the objection – and this is linked to religion – that Islamic migration is dangerous because it is not possible to assimilate it into European culture.*" "*[…] it's not possible to carry on a discussion with the Islamic State; it's not possible to debate with those who, like a social cancer, want to destroy existing civilizations. If we are going to close our eyes in our discussions and say that they're all peaceful and they want to cooperate, then it will be too dangerous. Because anti-civilizations are destroyed with weapons and not dialogues.*

If we were to quantify a result from the 121 codes found in which **Zeman** discusses the source of danger, 92 (i.e. more than three quarters) deal with Islamic terrorism. Mention of other types of danger (primarily Russia) have appeared only in roughly the first year of his mandate; over the course of four years, **Zeman** mentioned other sources of danger sporadically and only in single-digit occurrences. Thus **Zeman's** concept of the sources of danger has been evidently monothematic in past years.

4 Source of security

In addition to factors that represent sources of danger, **Miloš Zeman** also thematizes the opposite pole or, in other words, he builds semantic constructions of what can be labeled a source of security. The first is the army, both the national army and one that is built on a higher level: "*In terms of security, I am convinced that security elements in the European Union should be strengthened with the long-term prospect of a European Army.*" The Army of the Czech Republic should actively take part in the fight against terror side by side with the armies of other states. The second source of security is made up of multinational organizations: "*The fact that the Czech Republic is a member of both groups, that is, the European Union and NATO, gives us the guarantee of security.*" In the context of the so-called migration crisis, other bodies, armed and unarmed, can represent a source of security: "*I believe that, if various cautionary prophecies are fulfilled – and no one wants them to be fulfilled – the army, police, and even the fire and rescue teams will have their hands full in dealing with the dangerous wave of migration.*"

5 Method for a solution

We can fluently link **Zeman's concept** of the ways in which security should be achieved to recognizing security threats and determining the actors that should provide security. The methods for dealing with the issue logically stem from the way **Zeman** understands security. In other words, these methods are fixed on the question of Islam. The first is the active use of the army including foreign missions: "[…] *I can say with full certainty that our soldiers are fighting in Afghanistan for our security.*" Engagement abroad, however, is not meant to be the unilateral actions of individual states; the whole international community should be taking part in the fight against terror: "*I would like to emphasize something that is rarely emphasized: Firstly, the attacks against the Islamic State cannot be a unilateral action – they must be an action under the aegis of the UN Security Council.*" The West should cooperate in this regard with Russia: "*Not long ago I exchanged letters with **President Putin** concerning the preparation of an anti-terrorist resolution in the UN Security Council because I will be visiting the General Assembly again.*"

A coordinated approach on the part of states is necessary on European soil, primarily in securing the EU's external borders ("*So far, the European Union has shown zero ability to protect its external borders.*") and in enforcing the so-called Dublin Regulation, which according to **Zeman** has been repeatedly violated, heightening the risk for the Czech Republic: "*My opinion is quite simple and based on valid international agreements, according to which refugees should apply for asylum in the first safe country that they enter and that is definitely not the Czech Republic. Each refugee in this respect is violating international law and committing a criminal act. As a sovereign state, we have the right to send the army and police to the borders and prevent these people – who are 90% young men, with an iPhone in one pocket and Euros or dollars in the other – from entering into the interior and having to be detained in detainment facilities. If we want to protect our culture, if we want to protect our customs, if we don't want to take the crosses down from our walls if we have them there at all, and to ban pork and other such things, then we should find the courage to protect the sovereign state that is the Czech Republic.*"

In addition to closing borders, **Zeman** claims it is necessary to deport some people who have come to Europe: "*Should security forces or the whole EU strongly react to this by closing its borders or possibly deporting these people back to their original countries? Everyone should live in their original country. It's one thing to travel and meet new cultures and another to live in your own country and work in its favor. I think these people should live in their own countries, practice their own religion, and not try to disrupt normal life in countries where there is a different culture.*"

The method of ensuring security is also rooted in the direct engagement of citizens who own weapons. In this respect, the president (similarly to, for instance, former Ministry of the Interior **Milan Chovanec**) has criticized the EU's plan to limit the possibility to possess certain types of weapons: "*You know, this would be a somewhat one-sided armament in a situation where the risk of terror attacks is growing. Of course if terrorists didn't exist and there were only crazy murderers firing sometimes legally and sometimes illegally held weapons, then the situation would be different; in that case I wouldn't mind restricting the possession of firearms. But, there's a new situation here – the police can't watch all the clubs, whether that's in Paris or elsewhere, and so the principle of self-defense applies.*" Thus, a method of dealing with the security problem in **Zeman's** view is that each person should face the problem, even if that means doing so with a gun in their hand.

6 The delegitimizing label

The last coding category is linked to the use of the security phenomenon in order to hand out negative labels (usually to **Zeman's** political adversaries or symbolic enemies). This use of the term security is the only one in which we

find a number of examples of security (or danger) not being related to the issue of Islam. **Zeman** on many occasions has mentioned the topic of security in connection with his chancellor **Vratislav Mynář**, who was not awarded a security clearance by the National Security Authority (which can be understood as a possible threat to security when an individual without a security clearance works at such a high position). **Zeman's** only reaction, however, was the repeated delegitimization of the National Security Authority, which "[…] *works quite miserably*." **Zeman** then used this topic pragmatically to delegitimize another one of his adversaries: "*If I remember correctly, for example, Mr. Schwarzenberg, President Havel's first chancellor, also lacked a security clearance.*" In 2013, **Karel Schwarzenberg** ran against **Zeman** in high-tension presidential elections and was at the same time chairman of the TOP09 party, which was **Zeman's** primary critic on the floor of the parliament.

The next category is linked to the EU and its relationship with Russia, which convenes with the abovementioned statement **Zeman** made in regard to Russia. **Zeman** began to actively criticize the EU for its sanctions against Putin's regime, which he sees as futile and counterproductive. Another example of the delegitimization of the EU can be found in the following statement: "*I see a large risk of terrorist attacks in Europe and the Czech Republic, but I think this chatter about various cybernetic attacks is just a fad.*" By saying this, **Zeman** is trying to defend Russian, which is seen in Europe as the source of hacking attacks on European states. **Zeman** depreciates the problem and draws attention away from it toward the issue of Islam and migration.

Additional efforts to delegitimize the EU are linked to the issue of the so-called migration crisis. For example, **Zeman** has repeatedly said about EU quotas for the division of refugees that: "*Europe is forcing us to accept so-called refugee quotas and the Czech government is quite justifiably objecting, saying that accepting tens of thousands of, for example, Syrian refugees could present the risk that, along with them, some jihadists may come with them and the relatively calm Czech Muslim community would begin to radicalize.*" The issue of migration is also linked to the effort to delegitimize a number of other actors connected to this topic (for instance journalists, who have long been one of **Zeman**'s favorite targets): "*I think the world will realize the danger of radical Islam the moment these attacks cease to take place outside Europe and the USA and start to affect people who create public opinion, which in this case are journalists.*" By saying this, **Zeman** is not just delegitimizing journalists, who in his eyes do not sufficiently refer the threats linked to Islam, but all members of society who are not are succumbing to a shared moral panic (cf. Cohen, 2011). "*I think that it's naturally convenient for those who want to endanger Europe just as they've done in the past with intolerant fanaticism if Europe is unarmed and I hold the opinion that, as we have for example experienced Nazi expansion, the Nazis' biggest allies were the pacifists.*" All delegitimized targets are linked

together by the fact that they fall into **Zeman's** idea of what society or politics should be like.

Conclusion

It is obvious from the text that **Miloš Zeman's** "topic number one" in regard to security is Islam and also the migration, Islamism, terrorism, jihad, etc. that is linked to it. However, it should be said that **Zeman** does not differentiate much between these terms in his speeches and creates an implicit link (or in some cases an "equal sign") between them. Although in the beginning of his presidential function he labeled Russia a security problem on several occasions, he later reframed this point of view, relativizing the issue of Russia (in connection with events in Ukraine) and ultimately denying it completely. It may be added that **Zeman** reached the peak of this approach in October 2017 when he *de facto* acknowledged Russian annexation of Crimea in a speech on the floor of the Council of Europe. After **Zeman** ceased to thematize Russia as a source of danger, Islam as a whole remained in his view of security issues for the Czech Republic and Europe as the only threat worth mentioning (any mention of other sources of danger were wholly incidental and inexplicit in **Zeman's** speeches – e.g. the statement that a source of danger "might be propaganda").

The way in which **Zeman** refers to Islam as a threat targets the very roots of this faith, which is understood as something wholly incompatible with Europe and its culture. Thus it is not only radical Islam and the terrorism connected to it that is a problem and a security issue; it is also Islam as such. This concept of the endangerment of security is then linked to suggested methods to remedy the situation, which in the majority of cases are aimed at the fight against Islamic organizations or preventing immigrants from stepping onto European (and thus Czech) soil.

In the context of social science as a critical science, it can be stated that **Zeman** often uses a method of argumentation and rhetoric in regard to security that can be labeled – to say the least – controversial and problematic ("young men with iPhones hiding behind small children"). In **Zeman's** case, however, these intentionally strong statements aimed at splitting society are nothing new. Although **Zeman** repeatedly criticizes his opponents for dividing Czech society by handing out labels (such as "fascist", "racist", …), he does the same himself in relation to the term security – he hands out labels to his opponents that mark actors responsible for causing a potentially dangerous situation, intentionally dividing society. By emphasizing Islam as a threat, **Zeman** provides campaign support for the political formations that support him and are in some cases seen as extremist parties.

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THE CONCEPT OF CBRN DEFENCE AND EVALUATION OF ITS IMPACT ON INNER MILITARY RULES AND INSTRUMENTS VALID IN THE CAF
PART 1 – GENERAL ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS INTO THE CAF LEGISLATURE

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ABSTRACT

In a paper there is an analysis of possible impacts of realization of a concept of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence which is under preparation. These impacts are considered in relation to a scope of military regulations and duty instruments valid in the Czech Armed Forces. Quantification of the impact of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence concept is performed based on evaluation in the form of the assignment of the mark in a scale from one to five separately in categories of military rules and duty instruments. The approach to contents of activities realized within a framework of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence and chemical support is reassessed in current time.

Key words: Chemical Corps, Czech Armed Forces, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence, chemical support, military regulation, military instrument

Introduction

In the year of 1999 was rounded off the political representation´s endeavour to finish an effort of long political negotiations which culminated in a festival acceptance of the Czech Republic (CR) into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (hereinafter NATO, Alliance) structures. New history of operational and combat employment of the Czech Armed Forces (CAF) units, formations and brigades began to be written. In many cases it was connected with the principal reinterpretation of an operational art understanding from "east" to the "west" one. Just now we know that this process was difficult not only for all armed forces but also for the CAF Chemical Corps (CCs). It is also necessary to mention that in the meantime the CR jointed the European Union´s (EU) structures. This fact, however, has practically no impact on the CR integration into the NATO structures and did not influence started procedures at all. It was only necessary to accept the EU military obligations that have been

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for the CAF CCs clearly specified in the form of purposely formatted task forces realized in the form of "NATO Response Forces" and "Battle Groups".

1 Current state of application of military regulation dealt with problems of CBRN Defence and Chemical support

The CAF CCs lead with its management has to approach to the problem of questions solution connected with the CR membership in NATO. It was entirely understandable that immediate acceptance of all legislation changes in both alliances was not possible and principally unreal. However, it necessary to appreciate the effort of in touch organs and institutions of the CAF CCs concerning implementation and establishment on some Alliance documents which were unconditionally necessary for unification of partial procedures within Alliance operations conducted under the NATO and EU flag and in the framework of the CR Integrated Rescue System. Despite expended effort, however, some questions concerning implementation of all armed Chemical Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence framework represented with allied publication AJP-3.14 stay live. This publication was established on an operational level with the help of military publication released in the 2nd issue Pub 36-00-01 (Centre of Doctrines, 2017) and tactical level with Pub-36-01-02 (Centre of Doctrines, 2012). However, it was not completely elaborated in CBRN Defence problems in a more detailed way.

Military regulation for an operational level of command Vševosjk-2-1 (Ministry of Defence, 2016) replacing the version from 2009 which elaborated CBRN Defence problems in the CAF is partially conformable with AJP-3.14. We consider as serious to mention that consequential military publication Pub-36-16-02 is fully elaborated in in compliance with NATO publications. It does not come out directly from the publication AJP-3.14. It specifies basic principles of CBRN Defence which are defined with the CBRN Defence Doctrine for the operational level AJP-3.8 (NATO Publishing Agency, 2015). The whole this area is into Pub-36-12-02 implemented with employment of publications coming out from AJP-3.8. Simple parts have been used as follow:
- The 1st part which is a content of the military publication Pub-36-16-02 and solves general CBRN Defence measurements in operations and into the CAF environment it was introduced with military regulation Vševojsk-2-1 (implementation of ATP-3.8.1, Volume 1);
- The 2nd part which solves professional skills which has been established into the CAF environment with Vševojsk-2-14 (Ministry of Defence, 2012) (implementation of ATP-3.8.1, Volume 2);
- The 3rd part which provides more detailed information about area of education, training, planning exercises and evaluation of control protocols.

Into the CAF CCs this part is established with the military regulation Chem-3-1 implemented of ATP-3.8.1, Volume 3 (Ministry of Defence, 2011).

It is obvious from this survey that a link on professional skills is done only with the military regulation Vševojsk-2-14. On the military publication Vševojsk-2-6 (Ministry of Defence, 2008) which specifies a CAF CCs professional scope in the framework of tasks fulfilment of the chemical support (CS) in operations is not linked there.

2 Analyses of inner military regulations and military instruments valid in the CAF

2.1 The survey of inner military regulations and military instruments in accordance with their marks

A fulfilment of the complex analysis of the state of valid inner military regulations and military instruments in the CAF was performed with the aim to point to those ones which have a direct impact on consolidation of CBRN Defence and CS measurements into one conjunctive framework of the CBRN Defence. Each year Ministry of Defence releases a Bulletin (Ministry of Defence, 2017) in which is communicated information related to valid inner military regulations and military instruments valid to the 1st of March of the particular year. The list of inner military regulations and military instruments elaborated in accordance with registration marks has been published in the bulletin. This list has been used for quantification of impacts of the newly formed CBRN Defence concept and it is elaborated in the form of a table with respecting legend under the Table 1. The marks of both regulations and instruments are introduced bilingually due to the fact that only Czech equivalents exist.

Table 1 The survey of inner military regulations and military instruments in accordance with registration marks and quantification of the impact on the CBRN Defence concept

Regulations and instruments in accordance with registration mark	Number	General impact on the CBRN Defence concept	Note
Chem	33	4	Only for those which are not technical descriptions of established military vehicles and materials (VTM) **(will be solved in the further text)**
NN	11	5	Only within that which is designated for CCs **(not solved in further)**
Oper	13	3	Only within those which

Regulations and instruments in accordance with registration mark	Number	General impact on the CBRN Defence concept	Note
			release in the CCs gesture**(not solved in further)**
Spoj	61	2	Only in terminology
Škol	11	2	Only in terminology
Všeob-P	6	1	*1 restricted* Only within operational regulations
Všeob-Ř	1	5	
Vševojsk	66	5	
Zdrav	17	2	Only within those that deal with devices and equipment**(not solved in further)**
Altogether	219	-	-

The legend for specification of the general impact on the CBRN Defence concept:
1-minimal, *2*-occasional, *3*-more occasional, *4*-distinct, *5*-fundamental

2.1 The survey of inner military regulations and military instruments marked "chem" and "NN"

The impact of realization of consolidated CBRN Defence and CS measurements into the CBRN Defence concept is possible to assume only within those military regulations and military instruments with marking "chem" and "NN" which have the crucial impact into operational practice (Table 2). The registration marks of both regulations and instruments are introduced bilingually due to the fact that only Czech equivalents exist (Authors´ collective, 2002). It is valid for all tables below.

Table 2 The survey of inner military regulations and military instruments marked "chem" and "NN" and quantification of the impact on the CBRN Defence concept

Registration mark	Name	Year of release	General impact on the CBRN Defence concept
Chem-1-4	Monitorování radiační, chemické a biologické situace silami Armády České republiky CBRN Situation Monitoring by the CAF Manpower	2009	4
Chem-1-5	Monitorování radiační situace v míru silami a prostředky Armády České republiky CBRN Situation Monitoring by the CAF Manpower and Equipment in Peace	2015	2
Chem-1-6	Činnost jednotek radiačního a chemického průzkumu CBRN Reconnaissance Units Activity	2009	5
Chem-2-2	Prostředky individuální ochrany a jejich používání Individual Protective Equipment and its Employment	2014	1
Chem-2-4	Hodnocení chemické techniky a materiálu	1983	0

Registration mark	Name	Year of release	General impact on the CBRN Defence concept
	Chemical Equipment and Material Assessment		
Chem-3-1	Časové normy pro hodnocení bojové přípravy jednotek chemického vojska Standards for CCs Units Combat Preparation	2011	3
Chem-7-6	Programy velitelské přípravy velitelů čet a rot chemického vojska The CCs Platoons and Companies Commanders´ Preparation of Commanders Programs	1989	4
Chem-21-2	Filtrační a ventilační zařízení FVZ-100 Filter Unit FVZ-100	1990	1
Chem-21-3	Kolektivní filtry a předfiltry Collective Filters and Pre-filters	1980	1
Chem-21-5	Ochranná maska M-10 Protective Mask M-10	1971	0
Chem-21-6	Filtrační a ventilační zařízení FVZ-150 Filter UnitFVZ-150	1983	1
Chem-22-2	Přístroj pro indikaci radioaktivních a otravných látek GO-27 Device for Radioactive and Chemical Warfare Agents Indication GO-27	1984	0
Chem-22-3	Vojskové dozimetrické přístroje Ground Forces Radiac Sets	1985	0
Chem-22-5	Automatický signalizátor otravných látek GSP-11 Automatic Chemical Agents Alarm GSP-11	1973	0
Chem-22-6	Chemický průkazník CHP-71 Gas Detector CHP-71	1974	0[1]
Chem-22-9	Souprava pro radiační a chemický průzkum SRCHP-75 The Set for CBRN Detection and Reporting SRCHP-75	1978	0
Chem-22-10	Automatický signalizátor otravných látek GSA-12 Automatic Chemical Agents AlarmGSP-12	1987	0
Chem-22-11	Přístroj pro vyhodnocování diagnostických dozimetrů VDD-80 a diagnostický dozimetr DD-80 Device for Diagnostic Dosimeters VDD-80 Assessment and Diagnostic Dosimeter DD-80	1988	0
Chem-23-1	Vojskové odmořovací soupravy Ground Forces Decontamination Sets	1984	0
Chem-28-6	Ošetřování speciální chemické techniky Special Chemical Devices Technical Service	1973	1
Chem-28-7	Zařízení pro speciální očistu bojové techniky LINKA-82 Equipment for Combat Equipment Decontamination LINKA-82	1986	2
Chem-28-10	Obrněný průzkumný transportér BRDM-2 rch Wheeled Armoured Carrier BRDM-2rch	1978	2
Chem-28-11	Chemický průzkumný automobil UAZ-469 CH Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle UAZ-469 CH	1976	2
Chem-28-12	Automobilová laboratoř AL-1 Mobile Laboratory AL-1	1987	1
Chem-29-2	Souprava na opravu prostředků protichemické ochrany jednotlivce SOPJ-71 Set for Damage Repairs of Individual´s Individual Protective Equipment SOPJ-71	1973	0
Chem-29-3	Dílna chemického zbrojíře DCHZ-72 Chemical Armourer Repair Shop DCHZ-72	1975	0
Chem-29-4	Pojízdná chemická dílna PCHD-72 Mobile Chemical Repair Shop PCHD-72	1975	0
Chem-51-1	Vojenský anglicko-český a česko-anglický chemický slovník Military English-Czech and Czech-English Chemical Dictionary	2002	5

Registration mark	Name	Year of release	General impact on the CBRN Defence concept
Chem-51-2	Metodika výcviku obsluh zařízení pro speciální očistu bojové techniky Methodology of Equipment for Combat Equipment Decontamination Preparation	1990	3 [2]
Chem-51-3	Vzdušný radiační průzkum Air Nuclear Reconnaissance	1992	4
Chem-51-4	Meteorologické zabezpečení monitorování radiační a chemické situace CBRN Situation Monitoring Meteorological Support	2003	5
Chem-51-5	Vyhodnocování radiační, chemické a biologické situace, předávání zpráv a zajištění varování v operacích NATO CBRN Situation Assessment and Warning Providing within NATO Operations	2011	3
Chem-51-7	Vyhodnocování přímých účinků jaderných zbraní Nuclear Weapons Direct Affects Assessment	2009	3
Chem-51-8	Vyhodnocování chemické situace Chemical Situation Assessment	1993	3
NN 30 0101	Chemické vojsko. Názvoslovná norma Chemical Corps. Terminological Norm	2009	5

The legend for specification of the general impact on the CBRN Defence concept:
0-zero,*1*-minimal, *2*-occasional, *3*-more occasional, *4*-distinct, *5*-fundamental

Notes:

[1]   in 2018 it will be replaced with the military regulation Chem-22-6 with supposed validation from the 1st of December 2018 and with the change of the name.

[2]   necessary to elaborate into CBRN Defence methodologies, respectively in methodologies which would be elaborated in the CBRN Defence concept.

2.3 The survey of inner military regulations and military instruments marked "oper"

Problems of military regulations marked „oper" is very complicated. From the 2009 year the publisher releases these publications only in the form of related STANAG establishment with a minimal comment of the real content which de facto does not make a statement about real filling of the military regulation. For example from the original text of military regulation Oper-1-3 comes out only the link on a STANAG original version which is not enough for complete understanding presented (linked) information. The survey of selected military regulations marked "oper" which could have the impact on the CBRN Defence concept is introduced in table 2.

Table 3 The survey of inner military regulations and military instruments marked "oper" and quantification of the impact on the CBRN Defence concept

Registration mark	Name	Year of release	General impact on the CBRN Defence concept
Oper-1-2	Velení a řízení spojeneckých pozemních sil Allied Land Forces Command and Control	2011	2
Oper-1-3	Ochrana sil v pozemních operacích NATO Force Protection in NATO Land Forces Operations	2011	2
Oper-1-4	Taktické stabilizační činnosti a úkoly Tactical Stabilized Activitiesand Tasks	2012	2
Oper-1-5	Nasazení sil a prostředků rezortu Ministerstva obrany do zahraničních operací Deployment of Manpower and Equipment of the Ministry of Defence into Foreign Operations	2014	3
Oper-1-6	Školení a výcvik do mírových operací Education and Training into Peace Operations	2014	3
Oper-1-8	Spojenecké pozemní operace Allied Land Operations	2013	3
Oper-51-3	Plánování a řízení přípravy generálů, důstojníků, praporčíků a občanských zaměstnanců Generálního štábu Armády České republiky a operačních velitelství Planning and Management of Generals, Officers, Warrant Officers and the General Staff and Operational Commands Civilian Employees´ Preparation	2001	4
Oper-51-5	Zjišťování a vyhodnocování pozemní radiační situace Determination and Assessment of Land Radiation Situation	1990	2

The legend for specification of the general impact on the CBRN Defence concept:
0-zero,*1*-minimal, *2*-occasional, *3*-more occasional, *4*-distinct, *5*-fundamental

2.4 The survey of inner military regulations and military instruments deal with military terminology and its translation and specific applications

The practical impact on the CBRN Defence concept creation should have its effect into military instruments with marks "chem", "spoj" and "škol. Typical for all below mentioned publications is their relationship to the military terminology used within training and education in military schools and training facilities (table 4). In case of these publications it is possible to establish the terminology connected with the CBRN Defence subsequently in the form of changes which would be performed by simple gestors at the time when the final concept of the CBRN Defence will be completely elaborated and terms will be verified in the NATO environment.

Table 4 The survey of inner military regulations and military instruments marked "chem", "spoj" and "škol" and quantification of the impact on the CBRN Defence concept

Registration mark	Name	Year of release	General impact on the CBRN Defence concept
Chem-51-1	Vojenský anglicko-český a česko-anglický chemický slovník Military English-Czech and Czech-English Chemical Dictionary	2002	5
Spoj-51-50	Vojenský česko-ruský spojovací slovník Military Czech-Russian Signal Dictionary	1981	3
Spoj-51-51	Vojenský rusko-český spojovací slovník Military Russian-Czech Signal Dictionary	1981	3
Spoj-51-52	Vojenský česko-německý spojovací slovník Military Czech-German Signal Dictionary	1992	3
Spoj-51-53	Vojenský německo-český spojovací slovník Military German-Czech Signal Dictionary	1992	3
Spoj-51-54	Vojenský anglicko-český spojovací slovník Military English-Czech Signal Dictionary	1995	3
Spoj-51-55	Vojenský česko-anglický spojovací slovník Military Czech-English Signal Dictionary	1994	3
Spoj-51-56	Malý vojenský česko-anglicko-německo-ruský spojovací slovník Small Military Czech-English-German-Russian Signal Dictionary	1995	3
Škol-51-1	Vojenský rusko-český slovník Military Russian-Czech dictionary	1957	3
Škol-51-9	Vojenský rusko-česko-slovenský slovník raketové a kosmické terminologie Military Russian-Czech-Slovak Dictionary of rocket and cosmic terminology	1975	3
Škol-51-21	Vojenský česko-ruský slovník Military Czech-Russian dictionary	1959	3
Škol-51-22	Vojenský německo-český slovník Military German-Czech Dictionary	1959	3
Škol-51-23	Vojenský anglicko-český takticko-technický slovník Military English-Czech Tactical and Technical Dictionary	1960	3
Škol-51-26	Česko-slovenský vojenský slovník Czech-Slovak military Dictionary	1976	3
Škol-51-29	Malý česko-anglický vojenský technický slovník Small Czech-English Military Technical Dictionary	1964	3
Škol-51-30	Vojenský česko-německý slovník Military Czech-German Dictionary	1964	3
Škol-51-35	Španělsko-český a česko-španělský vojenský technický slovník Spanish-Czech and Czech-Spanish military Technical Dictionary	1966	2
Škol-51-36	Vojenský francouzsko-český slovník Military French-Czech Dictionary	1968	2
Škol-51-37	Česko-francouzský slovník Czech-French Dictionary	1967	2
Všeob-Ř-1	Polní řád pozemních sil Armády České republiky The Czech Armed Forces Field Service Regulations	1997	5[1)
Všeob-P-6	Příprava a vedení obranné operace Preparation and management of defensive operations	1996	3

The legend for specification of the general impact on the CBRN Defence concept:
0-zero, *1*-minimal, *2*-occasional, *3*-more occasional, *4*-distinct, *5*-fundamental

2.5 The survey of inner military regulations and military instruments deal with combined arms approaches of battle conduct

Entirely principal impact of the new CBRN Defence Concept will be into military publications and military instruments marked with the registration mark „všeob-P", všeob-Ř", „vševojsk" and „zprav". The survey of these types of publications in introduced in table 5.

Table 5 The survey of inner military regulations and military instruments marked "všeob-P", "všeob-Ř" and "zprav" and quantification of the impact on the CBRN Defence concept

Registration mark	Name	Year of release	General impact on the CBRN Defence concept
Všeob-Ř-1	Polní řád pozemních sil Armády České republiky The Czech Armed Forces Field Service Regulations	1997	5[1)]
Všeob-P-6	Příprava a vedení obranné operace Preparation and management of defensive operations	1996	3
Vševojsk-1-1	Povinnosti funkcionářů útvarů a jednotek pozemního vojska Československé armády Obligations of formations and units functionaries of Land Forces of Czechoslovak Army	1993	4
Vševojsk-1-2	Bojový předpis pozemních sil Armády České republiky. Část 1. Mechanizovaná brigáda Combat Regulation of the Czech Armed Forces. Part 1. Mechanized Brigade	1997	5
Vševojsk-1-3	Bojový předpis pozemních sil Armády České republiky. Část 2. Mechanizovaný prapor Combat Regulation of the Czech Armed Forces. Part 2. Mechanized Battalion	1997	5
Vševojsk-1-4	Bojový předpis pozemních sil Armády České republiky. Část 3. Mechanizovaná, tanková, minometná a protitanková rota Combat Regulation of the Czech Armed Forces. Part 3. Mechanized, Tank, Mortar and Anti-tank Company	1997	5
Vševojsk-1-5	Bojový předpis pozemních sil Armády České republiky. Část 4. Mechanizovaná, tanková, minometná a protitanková četa, družstvo, osádka, obsluha Combat Regulation of the Czech Armed Forces. Part 4. Mechanized, Tank, Mortar and Anti-tank Platoon, squad, Crew, Service	1997	5
Vševojsk-2-1	Ochrana vojsk proti zbraním hromadného ničení CBRN Defence	2016	5
Vševojsk-2-6	Chemické zabezpečení v Armádě České republiky The Czech Armed Forces Chemical Support	2008	5
Vševojsk-2-7	Ochrana proti zápalným zbraním Protection Against Fire Weapons	1991	2
Vševojsk-2-8	Ochrana proti účinkům neutronových zbraní Protection Against Neutron Bombs Effects	1989	2
Vševojsk-2-9	Bezpečnostní opatření při výcviku Safety regulations within training	2011	1
Vševojsk-2-10	Výcvik jednotlivců a jednotek s radioaktivními a toxickými látkami Individual and Units´ Training with Radioactive and Toxic Substances	2013	3

Registration mark	Name	Year of release	General impact on the CBRN Defence concept
Vševojsk-2-11	Dekontaminace v Armádě České republiky Decontamination within the Czech Armed Forces	2016	2
Vševojsk-2-14	Bojové použití chemického vojska Combat Employment of the Chemical Corps	2012	5
Vševojsk-51-6	Metodika výcviku v předmětu "Ochrana proti zbraním hromadného ničení". Díl 2 Methodology of Training in the subject of „CBRN Defence". Part 2	1981	5
Vševojsk-51-6/1	Metodika výcviku v předmětu ochrana proti zbraním hromadného ničení. Díl 1 Methodology of Training in the subject of „CBRN Defence". Part 1	1989	5
Vševojsk-51-11	Použití dýmu malými jednotkami Employment of Smoke With Small Units	1973	2
Vševojsk-52-2/1	Zkratky, značky a zkratková slova používané v Československé lidové armádě (1. část) Abbreviations, Marks and Acronyms used in the Czechoslovak Army (1st part)	1988	3
Vševojsk-52-2/2	Zkratky, značky a zkratková slova používané v Československé lidové armádě (2. část) Abbreviations, Marks and Acronyms used in the Czechoslovak Army (2nd part)	1988	3
Zprav-51-10	Úkoly zdravotnické služby v ochraně proti jaderným a chemickým zbraním Medical Service tasks in CBRN Defence	1969	3

The legend for specification of the general impact on the CBRN Defence concept:
0-zero,*1*-minimal, *2*-occasional, *3*-more occasional, *4*-distinct, *5*-fundamental

Note:

[1] in 2004 was officially published the proposal of this military regulation. Its validity was neither confirmed nor disproved.

Conclusion

Present practice life of the CAF CCs specialists´ deployment in military operations points to the slightly survived approach to current CBRN Defence and CCs understanding within the CAF. At the time when rather relatively long time NATO publications of the STANAG, ATP, AAP are implemented no reason for refusing their acceptance does not exist. It is evident that indicated specification of impacts into inner military regulations and instruments will be further discussed not only at the CAF CCs level but also on the level of other chiefs of branches and services. Partial movement in the CBRN Defence concept perception has been recently realized in the form of the change of the military regulation Věevojsk-2-1 which partially applies regulations of NATO standards in the CBRN Defence area into the military practice life.

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THE CONCEPT OF CBRN DEFENCE AND EVALUATION OF ITS IMPACT ON INNER MILITARY RULES AND INSTRUMENTS VALID IN THE CAF PART 2 – PARTICULAR SPECIFICATIONS OF IMPACTS INTO THE CAF LEGISLATURE

Pavel Otřísal[1] - Radim Zahradníček[2]

ABSTRACT
Part 2 builds on the theoretical provisions on the concept of combined Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence measurements and Chemical support listed in Part 1. In this part a detailed analysis of possible impacts of this concept on the scope of key military regulations and service publications valid in the Czech Armed Forces is made. There are suggestions for possible changes that should accompany the implementation of the prepared concept

Key words*: Chemical Corps, Czech Armed Forces, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence, chemical support, military regulation, military instrument*

Introduction

The newly prepared and established concept of the CBRN Defence will have a particular impact into a great number of military regulations. Within military regulations listed in table 5 (part 1) would be suitable to perform changes coming out from newly prepared concept of the CBRN Defence immediately after its acceptation and elaboration into the particular form o the military regulation. In table 1 there are summarized parts of single publications for which changes performance will be inescapable.

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1 Summarization of single publication and changes performance

Table 1: Specification of publications´ parts for which principle changes will be necessary to conduct.

Všeob-P-6 Preparation and management of defensive operations				
Head/chapter	1/29	Head/chapter	2/72, 73	*Note:* - Document is necessary to completely revise.
Head/chapter	2/108	Head/chapter	4/175	

Všeob-Ř-1 The Czech Armed Forces Field Service Regulations				
Head/chapter	1/5	Head/chapter	2/71	*Note:* - Document is necessary to completely revise.
Head/chapter	4/4	Head/chapter	5/1	
Head/chapter	5/3	Head/chapter	6/1	
Head/chapter	6/3	Head/chapter	7/1	

Vševojsk-1-1 Obligations of formations and units functionaries of Land Forces of Czechoslovak Army				
Head/chapter	2/19	Head/chapter	-	*Note:* - Document should be completely re-elaborated.

Vševojsk-1-2 Combat Regulation of the Czech Armed Forces. Part 1. Mechanized Brigade				
Head/chapter	1/1	Head/chapter	1/4	*Notes:* - Regulation comes out from Všeob-Ř-1; - document is necessary to completely revise.
Head/chapter	3/4	Head/chapter	Annex 1	

Vševojsk-1-3 Combat Regulation of the Czech Armed Forces. Part 2. Mechanized Battalion				
Head/chapter	1/1	Head/chapter	3/4	*Notes:* - Regulation comes out from Všeob-Ř-1; - document is necessary to completely revise.
Head/chapter	Annex 1	Head/chapter	-	

Vševojsk-1-4 Combat Regulation of the Czech Armed Forces. Part 3. Mechanized, Tank, Mortar and Anti-tank Company				
Head/chapter	2/4	Head/chapter	3/	*Notes:* - Regulation comes out from
Head/chapter	3/7	Head/chapter	-	

				Všeob-Ř-1; - Regulation comes out from Ř-1;Vševojsk-1-3; - document is necessary to completely revise.

Vševojsk-1-5
Combat Regulation of the Czech Armed Forces. Part 4. Mechanized, Tank, Mortar and Anti-tank Platoon, squad, Crew, Service

Head/chapter	3/4	Head/chapter	3/7	*Notes:*
Head/chapter	Annex 11 (1-8)	Head/chapter	-	- Regulation comes out from Všeob-Ř-1; - Regulation comes out from Ř-1;Vševojsk-1-4; - document is necessary to completely revise.

Vševojsk-2-1
CBRN Defence

Notes:
- regulation was amended in 2016;
- regulation further respects provisions of military regulations deal with the CAF tactics and combat employment (mainly, Všeob-Ř-1, Vševojsk-1-2, Vševojsk-1-3, Vševojsk-1-4, Vševojsk-1-5);
- within elaborating this regulation it was managed to interconnect terminology, CBRN Defence measurements understood in NATO;
- in case of ambiguities with newly established terminology to use cooperation with the 314th CBRN Warning and Reporting Centre.

Vševojsk-2-6
The Czech Armed Forces Chemical Support

Notes:
- comes out from Všeob-Ř-1, Vševojsk-1-2, Vševosjk-1-3 regulations;
- to elaborate with combination with Vševojsk-2-1;
- do not cancel only in case when the framework of changes of the CBRN Defence project will not be accepted. Cancel only after respecting all arms military regulations modification from the reason that professionalism of the CAF CCs could be totally destroyed.

Vševojsk-2-8
Protection Against Neutron Bombs Effects

Notes:
- regulation links to Všeob-Ř-1;
- it is not unambiguously specified who is responsible for the work with this regulation. In other words, it is not evident in the framework of which measurements tasks of forecast and assessment of neutrons´weapons effects are fulfilled;

- regulation links to the canceled Oper-51-4; - confirm terminology in accordance with current terminology norm NN 30 0101, however only in cases when it is not linked to cancelled Allied norm AAP-21. If the term is connected with the link on this norm it is neccessary to adjust it with Allied publications and terminology coming out from AAP-6. in case of ambiguities with newly established terminology to use cooperation with the 314th CBRN Warning and Reporting Centre.				

Vševojsk-2-10
Individual and Units´ Training with Radioactive and Toxic Substances

Head/chapter	1/1	Head/chapter	-	*Notes:* - regulation is not necessary to change. Established purpose reflects the framework of the CBRN Defence; - there is unclear determination of terms "toxic compound" and "TIM".

Vševojsk-2-11
Decontamination within the Czech Armed Forces

Notes:
- regulation was completely and complexly re-elaborated in 2016;
- regulation connects active and passive decontamination, immediate, partial and thorough one;
- regulation in basically compatible with current Allied understanding decontamination problems;
- regulation created the framework for transfer into the problems of CBRN Defence despite it works eith terminology typical for CCs.

Vševojsk-2-14
Combat Employment of the Chemical Corps

Notes:
- regulation points to the Vševob-Ř-1, Vševojsk-1-2, Vševojsk-1-3, Vševojsk-1-4 regulations;
- regulation introduces STANAG 2522 (ATP-3.8.1 – CBRN Defence on Operations in NATO Operations);
- Head 1, article 2 – to omit the term "chemical support". This measurements touches the whole military regulation;
- links on Vševojsk-2-6 would have to be removed or re-transferred into new written regulation elaborated CHBR Defence concept or at least into Vševojsk-2-1;
- in parts in which principles of combat employment of the CAF CCs are solved changes are not necessary. They are elaborated in the way, that do not

content any link on the superior framework of fulfilled measurements, thus it does not mention the term of CCs and thus the form of fulfilled measurements even in the framework on the new CBRN Defence concept in all types of military operations is accepted;
- rather problematic can be application of (NATO) Network Enabled Capabilities which is in the framework of the CCs realized in the framework of Automatic Systems of Command and Control. This system is basically built on the CS measurements mainly in those applications which belong to purely into the CAF CCs specialists´ gesture.

Vševojsk-51-6
Methodology of Training in the subject of „CBRN Defence". Part 2

Notes:
- this regulation does not content a preamble thus parts in which it would refer on current (all arms) framework represented with military regulations „všeob-Ř", or „vševojsk";
- simple methodologies are elaborated purely for all arms and arms skills. Even hear it is valid that CBRN Defence problems is valid for the CAF CCs with that that id must be demanded even in the framework of the CAF CCs;
- in case of introducing of unique the CBRN Defence concept methodologies should have been completed in relation of provisions mentioned in Chem-51-2 "Methodology of Equipment for Combat Equipment Decontamination Preparation" (1990)

Vševojsk-51-6/1
Methodology of Training in the subject of „CBRN Defence". Part 1

Notes:
- regulation links to cancelled regulations;
- updating has been done, however it was not linked on updating related publication of Vševojsk-51-6 " Methodology of Training in the subject of „CBRN Defence". Part 2" (1981);
- introduced methodologies are usable for basic training and it is not basically necessary to update it in temr of the CBRN Defence concept.

Vševojsk-51-11
Employment of Smoke With Small Units

Note:
- regulation is not necessary to change.

Vševojsk-52-2/1
Abbreviations, Marks and Acronyms used in the Czechoslovak Army (1ˢᵗ part)

Note:
- regulation must be subjected detailed revisions whose aim will be identification and omitting particular terms included their abbreviations.

Vševojsk-52-2/2
Abbreviations, Marks and Acronyms used in the Czechoslovak Army (2nd part)
Note:
- regulation must be subjected detailed revisions whose aim will be identification and omitting particular terms included their abbreviations.
Zdrav-51-10
Medical Service tasks in CBRN Defence
Note:
- military regulation is from 1969;
- it is probable that published approaches are obsolete or they are not in accordance with NATO doctrines;
- it will be necessary to perform mutual correlation with military regulation Vševojsk-2-1 and Chem-51-7.
Pub-36-00-01
Force Protection
Notes:
- publication has been released in 2017;
- publication comes out from AJP-3-14 "Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection";
- the aim is to inform wide military public with problems of force protection to keeping their sustainability and to provide the uniform approach to this problems solution;
- publication introduces basements (resources) for CBRN Defence, it describes the process of Force Protection, the tasks of command and control with Force Protection and principles of the Force protection planning.;
- publication contents categorization of dangers and threats within current operations conducting;
- publication categorizes special measurements of the CBRN Defence in accordance with cancelled military regulation Vševojsk-2-1;
- CBRN Defence further divides into 5 areas which are mutually connected and support the Force Protection principles which are, however, in conformable with current Allied perception of the CBRN Defence presented in the military regulation Vševojsk-2-1.
Pub-36-16-01
Doctrine CBRN Defence on operation NATO for tactical command level
Notes:
- publication was released in 2011, however it is problematic to find up if it was distributed into the CAF;
- publication id elaborated in accordance with publication NATO ATP-3.8.1, volume 1;
- publication applies into the practice life the NATO Comprehensive Procurement Guideline (CPG);

- publication works with an idea that main threats for NATO in the period of next 10 to 15 years will be partly terrorism with fatal consequences which explodes to the worldwide range and Weapons of Mass destruction spreading;   - publication the CBRN Defence understands as a complex of five basic areas which are completely in accordance with NATO published in Vševojsk-2-1.
Pub-36-16-02   **Principles of CBRN Defence on operations NATO on the tactical command level**
Notes: - publication was released in 2012;   - publication is ordered into the category of military doctrines. Military doctrines are one of resources of military knowledge and experiences, they summarize and explain procedures, principles and ways of arms deployment in single kinds of military operations and non-military jeopardy. They have informative character, they do not content provisions of legal and inner regulations which in their content respect;   - publication is elaborated in accordance with NATO publication Allied Tactical Publication ATP-3.8.1, Volume 1;   - publication applies into the practice life the NATO Comprehensive Procurement Guideline (CPG);   - publication works with an idea that main threats for NATO in the period of next 10 to 15 years will be partly terrorism with fatal consequences which explodes to the worldwide range and partly Weapons of Mass destruction spreading;   - publication the CBRN Defence understands as a complex of five basic areas which are completely in accordance with NATO published in Vševojsk-2-1.

Conclusion

Performed analysis can be used as the basis for study and performance of particular changes of impacts of new CBRN Defence concept into inner military regulations and instruments in the CAF which have to be done in case when this concept will be accepted and finalized into an implementation phase.

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POWER OF THE STATE – KEY PRINCIPLES

Alicja Paluch[1] - Henryk Spustek[2]

ABSTRACT

Many years of research on the essence of the power of the state as one of the main determinants for shaping international relations allowed to formulate various concepts of modelling this phenomenon. The following article presents methodology of building the model of the power of the state. Existing and known from the literature models for determining power of the state have been discussed. Their advantages and disadvantages have been pointed out. Existing research, especially in the field of modelling the power of the state, indicates the popularity of developing models that are a conglomerate of various sectors of the state's functioning. On the other hand, there is a definite lack of power-building analysis, taking into account each sector individually in the form of sub-models. Therefore, in many analyses it is advisable to thoroughly investigate the catalogue of indicators of individual sectors and determine their hierarchy of importance.

***Key word*s:** Power of the State, Power-Building Factors, Modelling, Principles

Introduction

Reference books identify a diversity of typologies of power-building components of the state, which are recognized qualitatively, quantitatively as well as structurally. Among the most commonly applied one can distinguish area of the state, population, GDP in total and per capita, gas and oil production, electricity production, export volume, advancement of technological development, society's morale, quality of nation, quality of governance and diplomacy, organizational and decision-making abilities, will to implement national strategies. It is easy to notice that the collection of the above mentioned power-building components is created by both quantitative (hard) and qualitative (soft) components. The variety of proposed indicators used to determine the power of political units makes it necessary to select and categorize them. Most often, the systematization of the components of power is carried out within specified sectors (thematic blocks), i.e. political, economic, demographic, geographical, social and military ones. This approach is justified by the nature of power which is a multi-dimensional value, consisting of both material and non-material components (Lach, Skrzyp, 2007). The advantage of this approach is the ability to conduct an in-depth analysis within the individual categories of power-building determinants. However, the issue that poses many difficulties in

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researching the power of the state is applying an appropriate methodology that *would be acceptable by different scientific communities and would provide reliable research results* (Klin, 2011) (i.e. it would exclude the subjectivism of the selection of independent variables, visible in existing attempts to quantify the power of the state).

Construction of the model of the power of the state must be preceded by both statistical analysis made in terms of the selection of model variables as well as the choice of a specified mathematical form of the descriptive model. Both actions are crucial for the quality of the constructed model, and consequently, its reliability. This means that the model should satisfy the condition of verifiability. However, the reality is different. A common practice is to "impose" form of the model without justification where the proposed formula comes from. Then, reasonable doubts arise in relation to the reliability of the results achieved and the correctness of the analyses carried out. In addition, one should remember that the process of analysing reality under research is often disturbed which has an indirect influence on the final result (model of the system under research) – Figure 1. The model itself, which is a powerful cognitive tool and, above all, an effective means to solve the most complicated issues, can have any kind of thought structure at a sufficient level of abstraction (Habr, Veprek, 1976).

Figure 1. System analysis of the reality under research

Source: Own study

1 Evaluation the power of the state

Authors of this article attempted to assess the power of the state by determining a subset of independent descriptive variables strongly correlated with the power of the state within individual sectors. The most important sectors include military, economic and social ones, while the political sector acts as a binder and is an inter-sector link. Political factors have a wide impact on all other factors situated in other sectors – Figure 2.

Figure 2. Research area of the power of the state

Source: Own study

Therefore, a separate descriptive sub-model should be developed for each of the sectors listed above. A number of sub-models is not fixed, because over time and development of science and technology, new political views and theories appear and, consequently, new factors that should be taken into account when constructing the model of the power of the state (Gatnar, 2008). This has been symbolically shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Model of the power of the state

Source: Own study

It is required to select the correct set of explanatory variables for the construction of each sub-model (Gruszczyński, Mierzejewski, 1998). Explanatory variables should be selected in such a way so that Pearson's correlation coefficient is as small as possible (Łapińska-Sobczak, 1998). Therefore, during the analysis of variables, methods of elimination of variables for descriptive models known from econometrics should be used. These methods enable quantitative capture of significant relationships between variables and the selection of appropriate variables for the descriptive model. The structure of the formally correct model allows to carry out a number of analyses, including comparative ones. Due to the fact that the power is described as a relative category, a qualitative comparative analysis of the powers of selected countries is carried out. The reliability of the obtained results of the comparative analysis depends on the quality of the constructed model. In addition, an important research aspect is the ability to conduct simulation experiments, which result in the development of forecasts in the field of power. The process of building the power of the state is shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Stages of building model of the power of the state

Source: Own study

2 Models of the power of the state – advantages & disadvantages

Studies conducted so far in this area demonstrate various methods for determining the power of the state. Among them, formal and operational models gained the greatest popularity. They allow the quantification of accepted variables due to the availability of data and the existence of the function for their transformation. As pointed out by **Mirosław Sułek**: *these data may be statistical data – raw or processed or data based on experts' assessment* (Sułek, 2006*)*. In addition to the above, there are also ideological (heuristic) models *which present only in a more methodically disciplined way of reasoning the number and type of explanatory variables required, but they are not suitable for specific measurements, either because of the inability to formulate the type of connections (functions) or because of the lack of available data or substantial non-measurability of the proposed variables* (Sułek, 2006). The analysis of existing models clearly indicates their broad cognitive value, especially noticeable on the utilitarian ground of the issue under research. However, they are also subject to numerous errors, which often undermines the reliability of the results achieved. For the exemplification of the above, selected models of the power of political units have been presented.

The model of power developed by **R.S.Cline** takes the form:

$$P_p = (C + E + M) \cdot (S + W), \qquad (1)$$

where: P_p indicates the power (strength) of the political unit, C – critical mass (population and territory), E – economic potential, M – military potential, S – unit strategy, W – will to implement the strategy concerned (Cline, 1977). Disadvantage of the adopted indicators is the difficulty to demonstrate them in a measurable form, which unambiguously prevents their quantification. On the other hand, one should appreciate the inclusion of the so-called soft factors by the author as components of the power of the state, because currently the inability to build the power of the state with exclusion of non-material factors is pointed out. In turn, **Mirosław Sułek** proposes a model solution that only takes into account empirically verifiable data. His model takes the following form:

$$P = (mD)^{\propto} L^{\beta} p^{\gamma}, \qquad (2)$$

where: P indicates a synthetic power indicator, D – Gross Domestic Product, m – share of military expenditures in GDP, mD – military expenditures (W), L – population, p – area, while α, β and γ – the so-called power exponents (respectively: 0,666; 0,222; 0,111) (Sułek, 2003). In the above model, a priori and debatable assumptions in the form of power exponents raise doubts.

Virmani's model takes the following form:

$$PPP = (PKB)^{1,5} L^{-0,5} \qquad (3)$$

where: PPP indicates potential power of the state, PKB – Gross Domestic Product by purchasing power parity, L – population. It seems a mistake to place the population in the denominator, which in fact diminishes the power of the

political unit under research, i.e. there is underestimation of the power of such countries as China or India (Mikulski, Sułek, 2003). Another example of the operational model is the model by **W. Fucks** (Fucks, 1965), which is included in the formula:

$$M = \frac{M_s + M_e}{2} \qquad (4)$$

whereas : $\quad M_e = L^{1/3}E, \qquad M_s = L^{1/3}S, \qquad (5)$

where: M indicates a synthetic power indicator, M_E partial indicator based on population and energy production, M_S partial indicator based on population and steel production, L population, E energy production, S steel production. The advantage of the above structure is the adoption of measurable indicators whose relevant data are widely available. However, a significant drawback of this model is the fact that it definitely does not comply with modern conditions due to the inclusion of steel production as power-building factor. A certain apriorism can also be observed in accepted power exponents. Nevertheless, an important look at the measurement of the power of the state is the model by **F.C. German** (German, 1960) who takes into account five power-building factors in his compilation adopted in the form:

$$G = N(L + P + I + M), \qquad (6)$$

where: G indicates the power of the state, N nuclear potential, L teritory, P population, I industrial potential, M military potential. Although simple in its structure, this model is not possible for operationalization. What is more, one of the factors determining the power is nuclear potential, which as a result excluded many countries from the ranking of powers in the international area.

Conclusion

Studying the power of the state is an important aspect of analyses aimed at evaluating not only the relations between the powers of political units in the international area, but also the conditions and level of external and internal security of each country. Increasingly undertaken research work in the area of this issue determines its importance and constant demand, its scientifically confirmed quantification. Attempts to determine the power of the state relate both to the military and non-military sphere, i.e. the process of analysis deals with both "hard" factors and "soft" factors of the power, although the latter have not yet been sufficiently researched. In connection with the above, this process takes advantage of various research methods, among which, according to the authors, the potential of statistical methods referred to as multi-dimensional comparative analysis has not yet been used. This may be due to the labour-intensive nature of applying this method or the necessity to select very detailed data. Nevertheless, it is a very precise tool that enables the systematization and measurement of many power-building determinants.

Existing research, especially in the field of modelling the power of the state, indicates the popularity of developing models that are a conglomerate of various sectors of the state's functioning. On the other hand, there is a definite lack of power-building analysis, taking into account each sector individually in the form of sub-models. Therefore, in many analyses it is advisable to thoroughly investigate the catalogue of indicators of individual sectors and determine their hierarchy of importance.

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CZECH MINISTRY OF DEFENCE STRATEGIC LEVEL DOCUMENTS - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT[*]

Josef Procházka[1] - Antonín Novotný[2]

ABSTRACT

*This paper provides comparative analysis and qualitative assessment of the Czech Ministry of Defence (MoD) selected strategic level documents adopted by the Czech Government since 2001. It outlines set of criteria and matrix for measurement to place these documents into boundaries of hierarchy and typology of mission, vision, strategy, conception and plan. Critical findings:(1) the MoD developed defence strategic level documents rather frequently; (2) main impetus for that effort provided NATO integration, slushing resources and gradual deterioration of security environment; (3) the MoD strategic culture works with different hierarchy and typology of strategic level documents than theory of strategic defence management – namely it applies so called **conception**; (4) the MoD **strategies** are rather reactive, short-term looking, communicating general statements and principles, outlining strategic level objectives (ENDS), in most distances not providing sufficient and stable resourcing, not delegating responsibilities and not setting biding implementation framework; (5) the MoD **conceptions** outline usually the combination of WAYS and MEANS to implement strategies.*

Key words: *mission, vision, strategy, conception, plan, defence policy, defence policy adaptation,*

Introduction

The Czech Republic´s defence is based (1) on the responsible approach of the Government, and the other public administration authorities, to ensure the proper functioning of national defence system; (2) on the development of the requisite defence capabilities within the framework of NATO´s collective defence;(3) and on involvement of Czech citizens in defence activities in the event of a serious threat to the state (MoD. Defence strategy of the Czech Republic, 2017). For achievement of these objectives, system and processes of strategic defence management (SDM) are put in place. The SDM main goal is to adapt countries' defence system to the challenges of ever evolving strategic

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environment and to maintain its relevance for fulfilment of defence policy objectives and safeguard of national security interests. As main instruments of SDM serve strategic level documents (SLD) enabling top-down defence policy objectives formulation (strategy) and their decomposition to actionable measures outlined usually in more specific conceptions and plans. Thus, the SLD embrace objectives (ENDS) programs, projects and initiatives (WAYS) and balance identified goals and measures with ever existing resource and time constrains (MEANS).

By NATO membership in 1999 and the European Union accession in 2004, the Czech Republic joined the group of countries sharing the same values, freedom, peace and security. From this point of view, it is natural that the Czech Republic, as a member state of both these organizations, cannot be excluded from any activities and fulfilment of the commitments it has made.

Since 1989, the defence policy of the Czech Republic had to deal with three major challenges:

- defence policy has been trying to address adequately the pattern of change in country´s security environment and unprecedented internal political, economic and social transformation;
- defence policy implementation for most of the time has been facing significant underfinancing resulting in defence sector insufficient performance and deteriorating of armed forces capabilities;
- the way the defence provision and use of armed forces as an instrument of defence policy has also been evolving. Namely, the role of armed forces has been changing from purely territorial defence force in early '90s, to the collective defence contributor, expeditionary warfare firefighter in the framework of international crisis management and know-how provider of collaborative security.

All these three challenges were addressed by the MoD by a significant number of SLD with different names, purpose, structure and content. The objective of this contribution is two folded. First, the authors offer top-down hierarchy and typology of SLD. Their ambition is to institutionalise best practice in MoD SDM. This proposal reflects both theory and traditional perceptions and prospective in the MoD strategic culture. Second objective is to assess and compare in qualitative terms the purpose, structure and content of several SLD adopted within the process of SDM of the Czech Republic since 2001 and place them in to the boundaries of earlier defined and further specified typology (Procházka, Chalupová, 2017). Additionally, authors 'ambition is to enhance the effectiveness of SDM in the Czech Republic. They aim at reducing the overall number of SLD documents and creating the most suitable structure of SLD

while enabling both vertical and horizontal delineation of defence policy objectives to ensure their proper implementation.[3]

1 Strategic Level Documents Typology

In theory, SLD embrace usually *mission, vision, strategy* and *plans* (Petrova, 2017*)*. However, in the Czech Republic MoD strategic culture exists, one additional instrument called *conception*. Conception plays very traditional and important role in MoD. Even organisational structure of public services and salaries of public servants are influenced by so called conceptual responsibility. Thus, with SDM rests the responsibility for the long-term conceptual development of the respective system. In our case it is the country´s defence system comprising the MoD organisation, the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic and other government bodies involved in defence provision. This conceptual character of duty and higher level of responsibility related to the long-term development of this system is appreciated by more motivating salary grade as well. However, in some extend this disconnect between management theory a practise complicates SDM (e.g. terminology) and undermines its overall effectiveness. This rather unfortunate situation increases the number of adopted SLD. It, furthermore, creates unnecessary ambiguity in their typology (purpose, structure and content). Finally, this situation diminishes the ability of the MoD to implement SLD successfully (unclear responsibility, insufficient coordination and harmonisation, missing unity of effort).

Mission is usually understood as a document or high-level statement defining reason for existence of any given organisation and its value for customer. In public sector, mission is usually outlined in respective law. The Czech Republic Armed Forces mission is to prepare for its defence and defend it against external attack (Act No. 219/1999, on the Armed forces of the Czech Republic).

Vision communicates the most generic and desired end state of any given organisation in distance future (up to 20 years). It usually serves as an organization's road map, indicating both that the organization wants to become and guiding transformational initiatives by setting a defined direction for the organization's long-term development. Vision statements undergo minimal revisions during the life of an organization, unlike operational goals which may be updated from year-to-year. Vision statements can range in length from short sentences to multiple pages. Vision statements are also formally written and referenced in company documents rather than, for example, general principles informally articulated by senior management. Vision is an aspirational

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[3] The Czech Republic´s Ministry of Defence adopted more twenty strategic level documents which were supposed to adapt country´s defence system and capability of its Armed Forces to the challenges of evolving strategic environment, evolving national interests and budgetary constraints.

description of what an organization would like to achieve or accomplish in long-term future. It is intended to serve as a clear guide for choosing current and future courses of action (Lipton, 1996, p. 83)

Strategy stands for a document which communicates the way (Ways) the high-level objectives (Ends) are supposed to be fulfilled and outlines programs, projects and initiatives including resources (Means). However, strategies can be also form without being formulated: they can emerge through efforts of informal learning rather than having to be created through a process of formal planning. (Mintzberg, 2009, p. 162)

Conception or concept is usually used to express an abstract idea or a mental symbol. **Concepts** are the fundamental building blocks of our thoughts and beliefs. In military sense concept refers to force employment or to advocation of the need for new capability or technology. In the Czech strategic management culture, however, conception stands for a SLD addressing problems of the organization or its functional areas (Personnel, Communication and Information Systems, etc.). It usually outlines objectives, measures and tasks; allocates resources and identify risks and mitigation measures for its implementation. In this regard, conception, elaborates specific objectives (ends), and ways and means. It has very similar purpose as the traditional understanding of strategy.

Plan is typically any diagram or list of steps with timing and resources, used to achieve an objective. It is commonly understood as a temporal set of intended actions through which one expects to achieve a goal. There is short-, mid- and long-term plans. However, within SDM, there are usually used so called strategic plans embracing specific objectives, measures and tasks including resources in mid-and long-term outlook.

This typology underscores the purpose of different sort of SLD and serves as base line for the assessment of the Czech Republic SLD.

2 Assessments of the Czech Republic Strategic Level Documents

This paper analysis following SLD: (1) Military Strategy of the Czech Republic (2002, 2008); (2) Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic (2012, 2017); (3) The Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030 (2015); (4) and Concept of the Czech Armed Forces Development 2025 (2015).

The comparison analysis of SLD is based on a set of criteria selected after structured discussion with the experts of Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies University of Defence in Brno.

In order to identify set of criteria following structured approach to SLD analysis was chosen:

- strategic context (challenges and opportunities);
- expected outcomes (objectives, initiatives, political-military ambitions);
- principles for development and application of military power;

- available resources;
- implementation and evaluation framework.

Criteria:
1. Level of Responsiveness:
   - Reactive - short-term in focus, reflecting on rather present developments than future trends)
   - Proactive - long-term in focus, assessing future trends and anticipating their implications
2. Level of Elaboration:
   - Generic - general objectives and principles, conceptual ideas
   - Specific - well defined set of specific objectives and initiatives to meet them
3. Level of Complexity:
   - Complex - embracing all instruments of national power and overall functions and structure of defence system
   - Partial - focusing on one or several elements of national power e.g. the armed forces as the main tool of defence policy implementation
4. Level of Operationalisation:[4]
   - Resources (financial, material, personnel)
   - Implementation framework (responsibility, validity, feedback mechanisms, timeline).

The outcome of comparative analysis is based on qualitative assessment and expert judgement. It takes in consideration strategic management theory and best practice for strategy formulation (Galatík, Krásný, Zetocha, 2008). Relevant benchmark provides Russian National Security Strategy (2015) and National Defense Strategy of the United States of Amerika (2018) as highly elaborated strategies. Both documents outline clear and strategic level objectives with the ambition to shape future security environment. They reflect comprehensive approach to security and defence provision and provide clear guidance for successful implementation. Additionally, both strategies helped authors to define criteria for qualitative assessment of chosen the Czech Republic SLD.

In following step selected SLD will be assessed through the qualitative criteria mentioned above.

Military Strategy of the Czech Republic (2002). It is threat driven strategy (war on terror). It is reactive, short-term in focus strategy reflecting on rather present developments than future trends. It provides vision and strategic objectives (crisis response operations) and principles for defence provision and

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[4] Level of Operationalisation means that there are preconditions for successful implementation of document and stipulated objectives.

capability development (expeditionary warfare). It includes also conceptual ideas (full-professional armed forces). It set guidance mainly for the development of military instruments of national power. It outlines clear framework for resource allocation (2,2 % of GDP). Implementation framework is week.

Military Strategy of the Czech Republic (2008). Strategy is resource driven, reactive and short-term in focus (Afghanistan), reflecting present developments than future trends. It underscores importance of fulfilment of international commitments and fair burden sharing. It embraces strategic objectives and principles (expeditionary warfare). It deals with military instrument of power and minimizes activities not supporting international deployments. Resources and implementation framework is missing.

Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic (2012). Strategy proactively assesses future trends and their long-term implications. It is threat aware (instability in Middle East and Africa) and resource driven strategy (economic recession and cuts in defence budget). It provides general vision and conceptual framework (reiterate collective defence obligations). It contains quantitative and qualitative criteria for the CZAF development in form of well communicated political military ambitions. It applies holistic approach to defence provision and balance responsibilities of all instruments of national power and overall functions and structure of defence system (state, armed force and citizen). Strategy outlines measures to ensure efficiency rather than clear guidance for resources allocation. It contains basic implementation framework (responsibility, validity, feedback mechanisms, timeline).

Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic (2017). It is threat based and reactive strategy addressing developments in the past (recent changes in security environment, hybrid warfare and impact of long-term underfinancing of defence). It provides general vision in combination with set of strategic level objectives (back to the roots - balanced forces and article 3 of Washington treaty, resilience of all society, and security of supply). It deals in some extent with defence provision in holistic manner by embracing all instruments of national power and overall functions and structure of defence system. It outlines allocation of financial resources to defence in a long-term outlook and ambition to mitigate the relics of defence underfinancing in the past (undermanned structures, obsolete equipment and altered infrastructure). It provides basic implementation framework.

The Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030 (2015). It provides framework for fulfilling the political and military ambitions of the Czech Republic. It serves as a guideline for defence planning, particularly in developing five-year medium-term plan. Based on an analysis of trends in the strategic environment, it outlines the basic direction for military capabilities development and provides guidance for the Conception of the Czech Armed Forces Development 2025, and other conceptual documents. Document stems

from the legal system and the strategic policy documents of the Czech Republic and considers the principles of NATO and EU security policies and military documents. It outlines rather strategic level objectives and vision for the development of armed forces. It doesn't address the defence system in its entirety. However, it outlines basic principles for capability development and stipulates resources. Implementation framework is missing.

Conception of the Czech Armed Forces Development 2025 (2015). The aim of it is to define the frame and means of the capability development which are indispensable for fulfilment of tasks and commitments of the Czech Armed Forces in the horizon of 2025. The philosophy of this document - is completed on the basis of Act No. 219/1999 Coll., on the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic. It takes into consideration national security interests, principles of collective defence and prediction of the development of security environment and evaluates current status of capabilities and defines frame and means of the key capability development. It also provides basis for strategic planning, forms frame for concepts development of lower grades and addresses peace time structure. It formulates rather specific objectives both in mid- and long-term perspective (milestones 2020 and 2025). It is reactive; however, it stipulates also proactive measures. It outlines resources and provides solid implementation framework. It addresses mostly the armed forces development.

Strategic level documents are important tool of strategic management. Nevertheless, their impact should not be overestimated. The Government of the CZR adopted many strategies – allegedly there are 120 still in-power strategies – that are neither monitored nor implemented (Novotný, 2016). More important is the ability of the Government institutions to translate vision in to action, alocated adequate resources to manageable programs and spent money in effective, efficient and transparent way. As an example can be The White Paper on Defence (2011). The aim of this document, published in 2011, lies in the analysis of the overall state of the Ministry of Defence, the Czech Republic's Armed Forces and the designation of conceptual principles and specific goals for their stable development. In the document from department of the French defence ministry, *Europe's Strategic Cacophony* is the Czech Republic categorized as the Strategist. The Czech White Paper on Defence undertakes a detailed assessment of the wider strategic context, formulates national strategic objectives, and tailors the roles and missions of the armed forces accordingly. It goes on to address capability development, industrial policy, defence markets, budget projections, human resources, and force planning in systematic fashion. (France, Witney, 2013). But this is no longer true in a few years, and this document is no longer up to date.

Figure1: European security strategies by comprehensiveness and currency.

Source: France, Witney, 2013, p. 8.

The summary of the Czech SLD qualitative assessment is depicted in figure 2. Positioning of each SLD in matrix and allocation of size and colour of the circle is the outcome of qualitative assessment of each SLD through criteria defined. In order to validate authors´ assessment and enhance correctness additional six subject matter experts (SME) from the CSMSS (each SME assesses only one of six analysed SLD) were tasked to put each document in the matrix and choose the most adequate size and colour of the circle demonstrating the respective SLD. Accordingly, corrections were made when these two assessments (authors and SMEs) did not corelate.

Figure 2: Qualitative Assessments of the Czech SLD.

Notes:
Horizontal Axis
Generic – strategic level objectives, conceptualization, general commitments to resource allocation, missing implementation framework
Specific – two specific tasks or measures, transparent resources and sound implementation framework
Vertical Axis
Preemptive – long-term focus beyond horizon, shaping environment
Reactive – short-term focus reflecting presence or development in past
Level of Complexity – Diameter of Circle

Diameter of circle represents lower level of complexity; focus on military instruments of national power

Diameter of circle represents higher level of complexity, guidance to all instruments of national power

Quality of End state definition - Color of Circle
Green Color - means well defined end state (US, RS, S2, S6)
Amber Color - means rather generic definition of end state (S1, S3, S4, S5)
Red Color - means too generic definition of end state
Source: Authors

Conclusions

Common security cannot be identified with the absence of a military conflict, but current security is a much wider phenomenon. It covers much more aspects including purely civilian, non-military or until recently, completely outside the security perceptions. When building modern armed forces, much more emphasis is put on their interoperability, flexibility, professional performance and technical superiority. The security and defence of the state is ensured by the creation and implementation of the security policy, which is given by the internal security, economic, foreign and defence policy. The objectives of the state's defence policy are to create a political mandate for the use of the armed forces and to define the tasks for their further development and construction as an integral part of the state's security system. As the main instrument serves SLD elaborated in the framework of SDM.

The comparison of SLD and their typology indicates that there is a discontent between theory of SDM and practice within the Czech Republic MoD. Namely, there is some level of ambiguity regarding strategy and conception. It impacts both quality of SDM and capability development.

Strategies 2008 and 2012 are resource driven. They seek balance between constrained resource and objectives. Strategies 2002 and 2017 outline financial resources to defence in order to meet the NATO recommended benchmark (2% of GDP) and provide predictability of defence budgets to defence planners. Willingness to allocate more resources for defence is driven by responsible political attitude to fair burden sharing of collective defence within NATO and by rapidly deteriorating security environment (in 2002 it is the response to "war on terror" and 2017 it is the reaction to reversionistic Russia). SLD proves different level of elaboration, responsiveness, complexity and operationalization. In this regard the most advanced SLD are strategies 2012 and 2017 that set guidance to all critical elements of defence system. Most of SLD offer only insufficient implementation framework including responsibility, evaluation criteria and timeliness. That fact correlates with the questionable success of implementation of SLD and their translation in to enhanced functioning of defence system, effective and efficient capability delivery and adequate posture and readiness of the armed forces. Improvement of the SLD requires more political commitments to turn them in real SDM tool and enhanced expertise of all stakeholders involved in their elaboration.

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NATO INSTITUTIONS IN THE TERRITORY OF POLAND

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ABSTRACT:

Facing challenges and threats of the contemporary world, effective execution of foreign policy and security policy in particular, by respective state entities, makes countries develop international cooperation. Membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is supposed to serve the purpose of strengthening the sense of stability and also enabling its members to participate in a dynamic process of shaping the international security architecture. No doubt, for the Republic of Poland, that joined NATO in March 1999, the membership turned out to be a breakthrough. Structural reforms, army modernization, changes to the training system, doctrines and regulations – these are only a few of post-accession effects. The increase of the feeling of security is a result of intensive political and military cooperation of Poland within NATO. Surveys carried out by the Centre for Public Opinion Research (CBOS) show that Polish society considers the Alliance to be the key, next to the state authorities, guarantor of the feeling of security in Poland (Evaluation of State Security…2014). Active participation in execution of the Alliance policy, participation in military operations (the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan), placing NATO command structures in Poland (in Bydgoszcz), Rapid Reaction Forces (in Bydgoszcz), Multinational Corps Northeast (MCN NE in Szczecin), NATO Counterintelligence Centre of Excellence (NATO CI COE in Kraków) and many other international institutions is a sign of strong ties between Poland and NATO, and especially with the United States.

Key words: NATO, Poland, Cooperation, Institutions, Geopolitics

Assuming the role of an active ally, Poland gradually increased its engagement into NATO works. Intensive deepening of transatlantic ties included, next to active involvement in allied missions and operations, participation and organization of military exercises of different level, engagement in the process of increasing the Alliance's capacity to the collective defense (reform of the NATO Response Force – VJTF), establishing NATO institutions in the territory of the Republic of Poland. Within NATO the re-shaping was implemented as a result of gradual evolution of perception of international environment. Transformation of the Alliance's structures and forces caused by new circumstances, led to changes that resulted in strengthening of the position of Poland within the regularly modified structure of transatlantic security. What matters is that the change to the current way of treating security of the old and new NATO member states, resulting, among other things, in uneven distribution of the Alliance's infrastructure, was driven by events in Crimea. Surprisingly, destabilization in the eastern flank significantly strengthened the role and importance of Poland in the structural

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dimension, the effect of which is location of NATO infrastructure elements in Poland. The belief that a highly intensive conflict may occur in Europe returned and it resulted in moving the stress from a crisis response operation to a basic mission, executed within the collective defense of member states, especially within the context of threats coming from Russia[2].

Polish authorities attach great importance to the membership in NATO and thus allied cooperation within the Alliance and permanent deepening of ties with the United States, that dominate the Alliance, are the pillars of Poland's security. This international alliance is developing within institutional engagement of NATO in the territory of Poland. Geopolitical location of our country is of strategic significance for NATO. Being an important state of the region of Central-Eastern Europe, and at the same time a NATO border state, directly neighboring with Russia, we became an active Alliance member who is still building its position within this organization. What also matters for consolidation of Poland's hold is activity of institutions within NATO structure or related to them. Next to other factors, they may strengthen the negotiation mandate and increase Poland's military and political capabilities within the allied commitments. So, the purpose of my lecture is to present a summary and characteristics of NATO institutions located in Poland.

The Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC NE) in Szczecin was the first NATO institution in the territory of Poland. It was established in1999 by three countries, i.e. Denmark, Germany and Poland. Its establishment was an expression of deep engagement of each party into strengthening security in the Baltic Sea region through development of transnational structures (Jureńczyk, 2016).

The Multinational Corps is an important element of NATO collective defense and its importance is still growing. Key decisions regarding the Szczecin unit were taken during the NATO Summit in Wales (4-5 September 2014). Then, due to Russia's politics towards Ukraine, NATO re-oriented its position which was a reaction to the annexation of Crimea. Russia's support to military activities in the territories of eastern Ukraine made the Alliance take intensive, short- and mid-term actions to strengthen the NATO eastern flank (reassurance)[3]. Besides, the changes that occurred in the security environment-initiated works aiming at creating a new strategy. Russian Federation's aggressive policy required a thorough adaptation of the Alliance to the new reality, especially during execution of tasks related to the collective defense.

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[2] Russian attack on Georgia in 2008 was definitely an alert regarding probability of an outbreak of an international armed conflict in Europe. This is when first operational plans in case of Russia's aggression against Poland and Baltic States were created. (Jureńczyk, 2016)

[3] During his speech at the GLOBSEC conference in 2014 NATO SecGen Anders Fogh Rassmusen assured about application of allied means – strengthening air defense, intensification of land exercises, launching AWACS over Poland and Romania, strengthening the Air Policing over the Baltic Sea. (Rasmussen, 2016).

Decisions of the Newport Summit started one of the biggest transformations of the Multinational Corps. Key provisions of the Wales Summit in particular included: establishing command headquarters in the eastern flank, permanent presence of armed forces (in the states that joined NATO after 1999), strengthening NATO Response Force, the "Spearhead", deployment of equipment warehouses to support forces and especially raising the status of the Szczecin unit to the level of a High Combat Readiness unit.

Decisions taken in Newport gave Poland responsibility for security in this part of the Alliance, and at the same time it became one of the key defense elements in the eastern flank. A memorandum of agreement was signed in Brussels on 5 February 2015 and pursuant to it the MNC NE became the NATO only unit responsible for permanent monitoring of the situation at the NATO north-east perimeters during peace time. As a result, in 2015 and 2016 activities related to functioning of the Corps were significantly intensified and the process of strengthening the structures of the unit with new member states started[4]. Still in 2015 the Corps accomplished its most important task that had been set after the Wales Summit, i.e. it reached full readiness to command various formations of the Alliance, including among others: the, so called, NATO Spearhead or the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), NATO Response Force (NRF), and also NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) from Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (Sokołowski, 2016).

For the Corps, that assumed the role of a command headquarters for operational activities in this area of the Alliance, the strategic strengthening of the eastern flank meant that its role within the allied headquarters structure became even more significant. Another summit in July 2016 in Poland announced continuation of the reform of the allied security system, among other things, through intensification of activities aiming at strengthening the eastern flank. To achieve it, NATO multinational battalion combat groups arrived in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Following the decisions of the Warsaw Summit, there are around 3.5 thousand NATO troops deployed in Poland and the Baltic States within the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) (Warsaw NATO Summit Communique, 2016). They form combat groups of the size of a battalion (approx. 1000 troops) and they rotate every 6-9 months. (Grupy bojowe w Polsce… 2017)

Pursuant to the decisions taken, the following NATO forces are located in the territory of Poland:

1) Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) – the American contribution to strengthen the region, the so called European Reassurance Initiative

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[4] By the end of 2016 MNC NE in Szczecin consisted of 21 nations, including: Poland, Denmark and Germany as Founding Nations and respectively: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia (2004), Czech Republic and Slovakia (2005), USA (2006), Romania (2008), Slovenia (2009), Croatia (2012), Hungary (2013), Sweden (2014), Albania, France, Spain, Holland, Turkey, Great Britain (2015) and Greece (2016).

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(ERI) – approx. 4,000 troops plus hardware. US troops have been deployed mainly in the western part of Poland – in Żagań, Świętoszów, Skwierzyna and Bolesławiec, but also in the Orzysz training area, i.e. in the eastern part of Poland.

The command over the combat groups is coordinated by the Multinational Division North-East in Elbląg using structures of the 16th Elbląg Pomeranian Mechanized Division. The division coordinates all the four battalion combat groups sent by NATO states, mainly by the US, Canada, Great Britain, Romania and Germany.

2) 10th Combat Air Brigade – American brigade task group deployed in May 2017 in Powidz, Poland.

Finally, implementation of tasks the MNC NE was assigned during the last two NATO Summits, in Newport (2014) and in Warsaw (2016), with significant participation of the USA, resulted in creating a considerable military infrastructure in Central Europe. For Poland initiatives like permanent presence of US troops, transfer of heavy equipment, organization of military exercise and maneuvers or additional money allocated by the Pentagon to hasten construction of the anti-missile installation in Redzikowo (Keller, 2016). Not only was that an expression of a deep engagement of the US Administration into security of this part of Europe, but at the same time it enhanced the level of interoperability, i.e. the ability of forces to cooperate with other allied forces. But first of all, it strengthened the level of security of the Republic of Poland and belief of significance of Poland within the NATO Command Structure.

In November 2002, during a NATO Summit, it was decided that a reform of the military NATO structure was necessary (Górka-Winter, 2002). It was decided, within the adopted Prague Agenda, that a new command concept should be created.

Two strategic commands were established that closely cooperate:

1) Operational – Allied Command Operation (ACO)

2) Functional – Allied Command Transformation (ACT) (Zarychta, 2013; NATO During Transformation, 2018).

Transformation has been one of the Alliance's priorities since the Prague Summit. ACT focuses on mobilizing armed forces of the respective Alliance and partner nations to transform and to increase their level of interoperability. Creating the ACT opened a new chapter – the NATO transformation. Three new institutions that operate within ACT training network were established: the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) in Lisbon, Portugal (2002), the Joint Warfare Centre in Stavanger (JWC), Norway (2003) and the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland (2004).

JFTC was officially opened in June 2004. The Bydgoszcz training centre is Alliance's first institution located in Central-Eastern Europe. It is a pioneering

NATO multinational centre that operates in a country that joined the Organization in 1999.

Pursuant to the agreement, the Centre, having received the status of an allied headquarters has been subject to NATO common funding. JFTC focuses on training division, brigade and battalion staffs and presents doctrines, technologies or operational concepts that take into account Alliance's latest experience to officers from various nations.

In the following years JFTC supported numerous training for NATO Response Forces (NRF) and organized many conferences and seminars. OMLT training was the first one organized for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, especially for their leadership. Only in 2012 6880 participants attended training events organized by JFTC.

The institution systematically adjusted to the new requirements – the end of the ISAF combat mission in 2014, launching the Resolute Support in 2015 or intensification of the NATO – Georgia military exercises (since autumn 2016). Decisions taken during the latest NATO summits indicate that the role of training is growing and thus the interest in JFTC as a venue for meetings within the Alliance command structure is growing as well.

Location of JFTC in the territory of Poland may prove that the country's attainment in NATO was recognized. For Poland it is of prestigious significance – it created an occasion to create new forms of cooperation with other countries and access to the latest training methods. And Bydgoszcz has become an international centre for armed forces training and development of warfare tactics. The Bydgoszcz Joint Force Training Centre is one of only two training centres of Allied Forces in the world - the other one is in Stavanger, Norway. What is more, Bydgoszcz is the only city in Poland where four NATO institutions are located:

1) the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC),
2) 3rd NATO Signal Battalion,
3) NATO Military Police Centre of Excellence (MP COE)
4) NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU).

3rd NATO Signal Battalion located in Bydgoszcz is another element of NATO structures in Poland. Location of this entity in Poland aims at increasing NATO capabilities within the area of mobile communication. 3rd NSB main tasks include supporting the communication system for joint defense activities. This unit is a support element for both NATO missions as well as exercises and training organized by the Headquarters (Porozumienie w sprawie…, 2015). The Signal Battalion located in Poland is one of the three battalions that form NATO Command Structure. The Battalion consists of the command, the support company and 6 Mobile Communications Modules. The command, the support element and a mobile communications module are located in Bydgoszcz. The

remaining 5 modules are located in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, Hungary and in Turkey. The Forward Support Point East - FSPE[5] provides logistic support for 3rd NSB. Location of 3rd NSB in the territory of Poland gives Polish soldiers, who serve there, access to the latest CIS technologies and creates conditions for educating communications, IT, logistics and planning specialists.

During the Prague NATO Summit in 2002 it was decided to create NATO Centres of Excellence (COE) in order to develop new capabilities of the Alliance. COEs support the Alliance transformation processes. They enjoy the status of an independent International Military Organization that fulfills tasks assigned by HQ SACT. That means that organizationally, every centre[6] is independent from a Framework Nation and NATO due to the fact that it is not a part of the command chain of the Framework Nation or the organization. Its mission is to support the Alliance in the development of interoperability standards and capabilities of NATO Military Police, concept evaluation and testing through experimenting and cooperation in doctrine development as well as supporting processes of lessons learned analyses from NATO operations. The Centre also prepares reports on military police activities, in accordance with the Alliance strategic guidance[7]. The Bydgoszcz centre has been training officers aspiring to service in NATO military police units for four years. In 2017 the entity received the Quality Assurance Unconditional Accreditation valid from 24 January 2016 till 24 January 2023 and as a result the Bydgoszcz centre joined (as the first and the only one located in Poland) the narrow circle of certified international institutions that offer educational and training capacities that meet NATO standards (Certyfikat NATO dla…2017; Morzycka, 2017).

During the Wales NATO Summit in September 2014 Alliance leaders decided to strengthen the collective defense. To achieve that, they approved the Readiness Action Plan (RAP). A two-year program is a complex resources package created to react to changed security conditions in the eastern and south borders of the Alliance. It also assumed that the current NATO Response Force (NRF) would be replaced with the so called "spearhead", or the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and the Initial Follow-On Forces Group (IFFG). The VJTF are expected to be ready to operate just a few days after they

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[5] Grounds to the draft of the law on ratification of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) regarding the basing, legal status and provision of support to the 3rd NATO Signal Battalion, a subordinate element of the NATO Communication and Information Systems Group (NCISG), located in the Republic of Poland, signed in SHAPE on 17 September 2014, Sejm of the Republic of Poland, no 3169 dated 6 February 2015

[6] The unit became a part of the network of 21 NATO centres of excellence in Europe and the USA

[7] NATO MP COE will enhance NATO MP capabilities, will support interoperability and provide expertise in the area of Military Police in accordance with the strategic concept of the Alliance (Memorandum of Understanding…2014).

receive orders to deploy. This is why NFIUs are created that will deal with rapid redeployment of NATO forces into endangered areas. These forces should count up to 5,000 troops able to react rapidly – even in 48 hours – in case of a potential threat. The Noble Jump executed in June 2015 in the Polish training fields of Żagań and Świętoszów was the first test or the spearhead. The decision regarding location of NFIU was taken by the North Atlantic Council after a military evaluation was carried out and host nations were invited. The NFIU was located in Bydgoszcz, Poland, in September 2015 and became fully operational before the Warsaw NATO Summit in 2016. NFIUs are located in Sofia, Bulgaria, Tallin, Estonia, Riga, Latvia, Vilnius, Lithuania, Bydgoszcz, Poland, Bucharest, Romania, Szekesfehervar, Hungary and Bratislava, Slovakia. The Spearhead Force is their core and its leading elements will be fully operational within 48 hours (NATO Force Integration…, 2018).

The Counter Intelligence Centre of Excellence (CICOE) is the latest institution that was established in the territory of the Republic of Poland. It was established in Kraków, pursuant to the Memorandum from Norfolk in 2015. It was created on the initiative of Poland and Slovakia. The main task of this entity is to increase the Alliance counterintelligence capabilities to prevent activities of enemy intelligence services. The detailed CICOE tasks, however, are secret. The CICOE also executes tasks set by ACT and nations that co-create the Centre. It is one of the 24 NATO centres of excellence specializing in different areas. Poland is engaged in works of 13 NATO Centres of Excellence.

No doubt announced NATO investments in Poland maybe one of the important consequences of strengthening the NATO eastern flank. The 2018 budget of the NATO Investment Program for Poland is three times as big as last year's (231.5 mln $ vs 69.4 mln $). As it was announced, construction and IT companies and also suppliers of communication systems (or their elements) will benefit the most from NATO investments in Poland. NATO entities in Bydgoszcz: 3rdNSB, JFTC and NFIU will obtain new infrastructure (Lentowicz, Kozubal, 2017). Location of NATO forces and infrastructure elements is definitely a sign of the position and role that Poland occupies in the integrated NATO command structure. Those elements demonstrate a strong alliance, deter enemies and guarantee real support as specified in Article 5. Now Polish authorities seek increasing presence of Euro Atlantic military structures in Poland, using, among others, Alliance command system development plans that assume one of them will be created in Europe in order to improve its logistic capabilities. As general Petr Pavel, NATO Military Committee Chairman, announced the decision regarding the location of new centres will be of political nature (NATO: Lokalizacja nowych centrów… 2018).

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INSECURE WESTERN BALKANS WEAK STATES[*]

Vesna Stanković Pejnović[1]

ABSTRACT

The Western Balkans case could be an important point in the newly designed security architecture. At this point the Western Balkans demonstrate only a geopolitical gap, somewhere between the West and the East, the North and the South, the past and the future and both NATO, US and EU policies are stuck in the 90s and do not follow any roadmap designed along the axes of the contemporary reality. Further enlargements themselves will not increase the level of security and, as it has been proven by the enlargements in the late 90s and early 2000s, will not necessarily strengthen the organizations.
The Western Balkans have always been Europe's closest neighborhood, thus the employment of the EU security strategy was its first priority. The aim of this paper is to highlight the need of a proactive and multisectoral strategy of inclusion of the Western Balkan countries into the European security system based on positive assumptions. The EU must re-evaluate its security policy toward the Western Balkans with soft power and diplomatic mechanism in two ways. The first is the need to identify the grounds for the political disagreement among EU member states toward the overall policy in the Balkans. The second is to create fundamental bases for an effective implementation of an EU security policy which will finally solve the security dilemma in the Western Balkans. Relevantly weak Western Balkan states are potential brilliant players of specific security roles in the European security complex and may be used as suppliers of particular goods and services which will contribute to the shape of the European security.

***Key words**: Western Balkans, Europe, majorities, weak states.*

Introduction

Political instability keeps growing in the Western Balkans. European Union and its member states must engage intensively to ensure the political space for avoiding more serious crisis in the Western Balkans. Mounting political instability in the Western Balkans has the potential to spark new crises on the EU's immediate borders. Political tensions are particularly high in Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. The region's crises are rooted in a prevalent winner-takes-all party politics and flaws inherent in the political settlements forged to end the Yugoslav wars.

The EU should concentrate on local sources of instability, which often are linked to ruling parties' refusal to give up power despite losing elections. In the Rome Declaration, European agreed to work towards four goals: a safe and

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secure Europe, a prosperous and sustainable Europe, a social Europe, and a stronger Europe on the global scene. The partners in the Western Balkans play important roles in achieving all of these goals, through their strong European perspective, their commitment to EU values and principles as shown through alignment with Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the positive benefits accruing in the integration process.

The aim of this article is to show that the challenges confronting the Western Balkans are the same challenges the EU faces. In our time EU shows its own incapability to deal with the complex Balkan security and political issues due to a biased policy based upon double standards and regardless Balkans specific geopolitics and weakness of the state. Because of global security EU must find path to confront against transnational organised crime, the management of migration flows, ensuring energy security or the security of all citizens.

1 Balkans continuing instability

The Balkans are a part of the ongoing geopolitical contest, but local sensitivities are much stronger drivers of events and risks in the region than geopolitics: the EU therefore should concentrate on local sources of instability, which often are linked to ruling parties' refusal to give up power despite losing elections. Regional states have endured on-and-off political tensions since the 1990s, so far without sliding back into secessionist wars. Post-conflict situations are often characterized by weak states, states that need to consolidate and to rebuild their state functions. Fragile states focus on the weaknesses of developing states (Kaplan, 2008). Although the Western Balkans has made progress on its way towards the EU in recent years, it is still faced with a number of issues that can undermine security and stability, slow down the economic progress and overshadow the European perspective of the region (Stanković Pejnović, 2014, s.650). While individual West Balkans countries and the whole region are known for their complex security, the aggravation of such security through the continuing instability of certain Western Balkan countries is closely correlated with the insecure and complex regional security environment and this serves to remind that both security and development are prerequisites for irreversible transition, political reforms and economic development (Stern - Öjendal, 2010).

Academic debates reveals how notions of „security" emerge from disparate ontologies, refer to many different empirical realities and processes, and evoke much contestation over meaning (Uvin, 2008, Chandler, 2007); the power of definition over „security" also implies power to define not only the relevant field of interest, but also the material content of practices, the distribution of resources, and subsequent policy responses (Chandler, 2007). As the security of each state interacts with the security of others, security is strongly

interdependent within the region (Buzan - Wæver, 2003), pointing to the regional dimension's importance in understanding the security in the wider region. The state remains the key actor in international relations and a subject of security analysis (Mearsheimer, 2003).

For Buzan security is not only survival but also includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of coexistence. As the concept became more multifaceted and complex, he offered a broader framework of security that is more holistic and based on levels (individual, state and international) and sectors (political, military, economic, societal and environmental) (Buzan, 1991). Today „security" as a political value has no independent meaning and may be related to individual or societal value systems (Brauch, 2011, p.63). Following the end of the Cold War, the processes of globalisation and the gradual transition necessitated a reconceptualisation of security. The rise of violence by non-state actors, against states as well as other non-state actors has shifted the focus from state on state warfare carried out by dissident groups and individuals operating both within and across borders (Stanković - Pejnović, 2016, p.421).

The Balkan core is characterised by a transitional nature. Transition as the interval between the dissolution of an old regime and installation of a new one (Kopecky - Mudde, 2000) is conceptualised as the transformation towards a pluralist democracy and a market economy. In a political sense, this means a transition from authoritarian rule to a fully pluralist, parliamentary democratic system. In some Balkans countries, democratisation in the early stages often encouraged elites feeling under threat to utilise ethnic nationalism and keep their states institutionally weak and manipulative (Snyder, 2000).

The appearance of new West Balkan countries coincided with the emergence of a new political class, lacking experience to steer and enact the necessary reforms, develop state structures, manage the consequences of the conflict and ensure democratic development (Skočajič - Grizold, 2017, p.249). West Balkan remain a neuralgic spot of regional and European security also due to the synergetic effects and interactions of various elements within these processes in individual countries with the potential to destabilise not only their national situation but also impact regional security, the neighbourhood and all of Europe. Sometimes the symbiotic and often destructive dynamics of these elements within and among the West Balkan countries call for more effective strategic and regional approaches. The underlying core of the complex security in the Balkans region within the broader European and global context thus results from the mutual impact of the individual components that make up this complexity and could trigger a downward spiral of developments with a potentially destabilising effect on regional and international security. Compliance with the EU conditions as internal norms is considered a major achievement of the transition process and a step towards further development.

The main challenges in the EU's approach to the Balkans and its achievements clearly show contrasts between the stated goals and their implementation. In this stage EU enlargement fatigue meets the West Balkans 'accession fatigue', as reflected in the erosion of popular support for EU accession. Balkans requires a reinvigoration of enlargement instead of copying the strategy applied in CEE.

2 Western Balkan security capabilities

The integration of the Western Balkan countries with the European security system or security complex is a ongoing process constantly progressing in numerous sectors and advanced enough not be stopped or reversed easily (Buzan, - Waever, 2003). In order to avoid the *"Balkanism"* narrative on the region perceived as a natural source of security threats.

What positive components can be or should be seen as the crucial Western Balkan security capabilities and how can they contribute to the creation and development of the European security in the 21. century? In this area it is very important to keep in mind strong interdependence and correlation between geopolitics and capabilities that should constitute a fundament for development of European security policies. EU should develop a specific strategic culture based geopolitics and capabilities together with historical experiences and common values system. Only coherent and common strategic and geopolitical thinking in Europe, with the Western Balkans included, will contribute to the increase of the level of European security. Both the EU and NATO obviously lack a clear vision of the role of the Western Balkan region in Europe and particularly in its security system. The ongoing integration together with the absence of strategic thinking create a danger of destabilization of the whole European security complex. Most European analysts who take into consideration the relation between the security issues and the questions of the Western Balkans focus on the threats coming from the Balkan Peninsula and hardly ever make even a slight attempt to indicate the possible contribution the countries can have on the European security system (Orzechowska, 2017, p.146).

Elements of transition – stabilization – integration dynamics, although strongly correlated, are not based on causality and do not proceed simply one after another, especially when such an extremely differentiated case like the Western Balkans is considered. The Western Balkan countries are the only European countries which have experienced wars and armed conflict on their territory in the post Cold War era. They are the only European countries that have conducted wars and armed conflicts of the nature of new wars (Kaldor, 1999). They are the only European countries which have experienced wars and armed conflict in the post Cold War era as sides and not as a third party. Small and unconsolidated Balkan countries will never play a strategic role in the

security system, their armed forces are small, underinvested and have old type equipment at their disposal; however, they need to play a role, should not be left just as members and the role should be possibly well defined. Their membership, although important *per se* from a geopolitical point of view, may contribute much further to the stability of the whole European complex and of the region itself.

A historical analysis and a strategic review of the security sectors leads to a conclusion that the Balkan expertise, experience and understanding of the substance may play a crucial, or at least significant, role in several fields of security activities, including: special forces and special operations, demining, explosive ordnance disposal, rapid reaction, military police, IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) disposal, surface to air/air to surface support, as well as issues related to the functioning of private military companies, private security companies and mercenaries. This is also the strategic understanding of the new wars' dynamics that is strongly underestimated as a part of the Western Balkans expertise. (Orzechowska, 2017, p.149).

The geopolitics of the Balkans change constantly as the global power distribution evolves, and particularly as the concept of Europe and the West grows together with the subsequent EU and NATO enlargements. Given the strategic location of the region at the crossroads of political influences and cultural identities the region can neither be pushed out of European security space nor left as a laboratory where both the threats and counteractions are tested. The Balkan countries constitute the closest and most obvious source of knowledge on new type wars, peacekeeping, reconstruction, and long-term peace - and state-building (Orzechowska, 2017, p.151). EU policy makers became convinced that Europe must unite in its security sector in order to play a major role in the international community. But cooperation in the security sector among EU member states was obstructed from the beginning and domestic politics dominated EU security policy (Sedivy – Zaborowski, 2004, p.187). Some scholars have suggested that the global forces of neo-liberalism produced a tendency toward ethnic fragmentation in Yugoslavia (Schierup, 1999, p.15). *"Neo-liberal economics situated Yugoslavia in a new periphery, in which local elites had to compete with each other for limited resources"* (Bellamy, 1999, p. 861). The process of dissolution of Yugoslavia could be seen as a direct result of a modern capitalism and its rigid market expansion and globalization (Bellamy, 1999, p.785). Following its own global interests, the EU did not follow the address its strategic security objectives which emphasizes *"building security in our neighborhood"* (Bishop, 2005, p.17).

The The destiny of the Western Balkans was always created by outside political factors never taking into account the will and diversity of the Western Balkans population. It is an unavoidable destiny of the Western Balkans to depend on the policy of Great Powers. The policy of ignorance and forced bilateral solutions will not solve a century long dispute. The EU's powerful civil

society mechanisms could transform a negative Balkan energy into a positive and constructive force for rebuilding mutual trust and cooperation among various Balkan ethnic communities (Ivanoski, 2013, p.34).

3 Security and week state

The weakness of the state in terms of low levels of socio-political cohesion may be further exacerbated by the lack of essential capabilities at the hands of many political leaders that are deemed essential in order to overcome this structural weakness and build strong states. Consequently, the weak states are presenting a serious security threat not only to national security but also regional and international security as well. So, issue of weak statehood is at the core of most of today's relevant security problems (Sarper - Ağır, 2014, p.70).

Traditional security conception focuses on the security threats that originates from abroad in terms of other states capabilities and theirs revisionist aspirations. In the post-Cold War era, all the conflicts that took place in the region were intra-state ones. Therefore, a perspective that looks inside of the state should be introduced in order to understand the reasons underlying the intra-state conflicts. In contemporary Western Balkans, several countries face the internal security threats rather than external ones. For the moment wars were over in the Balkans region, but insecurities caused by weak states constitute an important concern for stability of the region. Therefore, it is argued that insecurity predicament in the Western Balkans region is best explained and confronted in terms of the „weak state" (Krastev, 1999). Conversely, weak state phenomenon is one of the structural problems plaguing the Western Balkans; it reflects inadequate institutional performance but also certain legitimacy deficits. States in the region are weak for a number of reasons, which boil down to the overarching issues of legitimacy and efficiency.

A weak state is defined not merely as one with inefficient institutions but one that is unable or unwilling to enforce rules or to implement consistent policies. For instance, the structures of weak states can encourage the threat of criminal activities, due to the ease with which criminal organizations are able to penetrate the state and its institutions (Stojarova, 2007, p.92). Despite appearing strong with regard to the monopoly of the use of force, it is in fact rather weak when it comes to provision of public services and its political and administrative systems. In this context, the infiltration by criminal organizations into state structures threatens democracy, democratic institutions and public confidence (Migdal, 1988).The weakness of the state in terms of low levels of socio-political cohesion may be further exacerbated by the lack of essential capabilities at the hands of many political leaders that are deemed essential in order to overcome this structural weakness and build strong states. Consequently, the weak states are presenting a serious security threat not only to

national security but also regional and international security as well. So, issue of weak statehood is at the core of most of today‟s relevant security problems.

During the 1980's and 1990's, a new type or organized violence has developed, especially in Africa and Eastern Europe, which is one aspect of the current globalized era. This is a violence decribes as „new war.‟ The term „new‟ is distinguish to these wars from prevailing perceptions of war drawn from an earlier era (Kaldor, 1999, p.3). New wars involve a blurring of the distinctions between war (usually defined as violence between states or organized political groups for political motives), organized crime (violence undertaken by privately organized groups for private purposes, usually financial gain), and large scale violations of human rights (violence undertaken by states or politically organized groups against individuals) (Kaldor, 1999, p.2). From this understanding of „new war‟ we can see that cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing, terrorism, and what many have previously described as low intensity conflict would be included in this definition. The idea is that no longer is war primarily state-to-state actors, but transnational actors that act outside of states. New wars are globalized conflicts in a number of ways, although they may be localised in terms of geographical location, their dependence on transnational networks for finance, support, mobilisation and *thus "the distinction between internal and external, between aggression (attacks within the country) and repression (attacks from inside the country) or even between local and global are difficult to sustain"* (Kaldor, 1999, p.3). Kaldor suggests that 'new wars' are globalized conflicts in a number of ways, although they may be localised in terms of geographical location, their dependence on transnational networks for finance, support, mobilisation and thus *"the distinction between internal and external, between aggression (attacks within the country) and repression (attacks from inside the country) or even between local and global are difficult to sustain. After the end of the Cold War, weak states have become a common concern in post-conflict situations such as in the former Yugoslavia. And weak states constitute the major source of political, economic, social and cultural insecurity. Therefore, it is argued that human insecurity in the region is best explained and confronted in terms of the „weak state"* (Krastev, 1999. p.19). In this context, European Security Strategy acknowledges the phenomenon of weak state as the cause of insecurities (European Council, 2003, p.7).

Conclusion

In all Western Balkans countries it seems clear that the state has failed to offer security and development. Weak states have lack of institutional capacities and socio-political cohesion and they suffer from deficits in legitimacy, capacity, provision of public goods and inclusiveness. This state can cause some important security threats such as terorism, transnational organized crime, refugee flows, mass migration and regional instability. These actors are in many

instances not just a local affair, but they act across borders and may destabilize entire regions. Connected to this, the term *"new war"* refers to armed conflicts conducted in the context of very weak states. Especially, it is the post-conflict era in which a variety of non-state actors can activate illegal activities and criminality by using power vacuum.

The EU must re-evaluate its security policy toward the Western Balkans. This process of evaluation is important for two reasons. The first is the need to identify the grounds for the political disagreement among EU member states toward the overall policy in the Balkans. The second is to create fundamental bases for an effective implementation of an EU security policy which will finally solve the security dilemma in the Western Balkans. With its soft power and diplomatic mechanisms, EU security policy is the key to reducing rising nationalism in the Balkans. Seeking unified understanding and unified actions toward the Western Balkan must be the EU priority. EU policymakers must synchronize and coordinate all governmental and NGO activities among the EU member states in order to achieve unity of effort over security issues in the Western Balkans. Relevantly weak Western Balkan states are potential brilliant players of specific security roles in the European security complex and may be used as suppliers of particular goods and services which will both strongly contribute to the shape of the European security and to the national security systems of the states (Orzechowska, 2017, p.147).

A cycle of security issues in the Western Balkans builds security concerns in the region that require a unified EU understanding and effort. Otherwise, the EU will show its own incapability to deal with the complex Balkan security and political issues due to a biased policy based upon double standards. The EU must promote stability and reconstruction in the Western Balkans based on the common values of understanding and mutual trust among EU member states.

By focusing on its enlargement policy, EU has the capacity to accommodate the entire Western Balkan region at once into its organizational structure. That policy would give equal economic opportunities to various ethnic groups and establish the fundamental basis for a solution of the century long disputes based on different political, religious, and cultural values. The EU security policy is focused on political and economic actions rather than military initiative, which would help to restore confidence and mutual trust and understanding between various nations. It is an inevitable fact that Western Balkan states need assistance for building and maintaining new democratic societies. Because democratization is a slow and methodical process, it can generate weak and uncertain leaders before it generates stable organizations and it cannot be accomplished over night (Kaplan, 2001). The 21. century will require a global order, which will need to be acceptable not only to states but also to the vast majority of the world's people. But the world still needs statesmen to apply authority. There is a type of national leader, who is head and shoulders above the rest – those „supermen" who strike out on their own, are

tough but humane, defer to the past while trying to build the future, are not scared of using force but ultimately want to achieve a lasting equilibrium between states (Stanković -Pejnović, 2017, p.129). This kind of leader is not possible in week state in the Balkans.

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ACTIVITIES OF THE UN IN UKRAINE

Ivana Šostáková[1] - Ľubomír Klačko[2]

ABSTRACT

This article deals with proposal of realization peacekeeping mission of United Nations in Ukraine. Also analyses two different statements of the Russia federation and the Ukraine republic. It describes possible motivation of Russia in this proposal. In the following article are mentioned chronologically proposals for peaceful operations and opinions, statements of all representatives and interested in politicians. Proposals to engage peacekeeping in conflict resolution has been in place since the autumn 2014. Another attempt came in 2016, due to expected elections in the both districts under separatist's command. Concluding we will focus on a possible future prediction.

Key words: United nation organizations, conflict, separatists, Minsk treaties, Ukraine, Russia

Introduction

At the end of the year 2013 **Viktor Yanukovych** did not signed the Association Agreement with the European Union which had caused riots, conflicts between supporters of the pro-European country and the supporters of **President Yanukovych**. Step by step escalation of tension turned this conflict into the armed one between regular Ukraine army together with voluntary military troops against pro Russia separatists all happening at eastern part of Ukraine. Pro Russia separatists consequently announced creation of two independent republics – People´s republic of Donecks (established 7th of April 2014) and People´s republic of Luhansk (established 27th of April 2014). Since the outbreak of the conflict, several efforts have been made to end the armed conflict and search for diplomatic options to solve the situation. Both Minsk Agreements has not been effective. Because either party has not respected Agreements and both sides are accusing each other of their non-compliance.

Proposals to engage peacekeeping in conflict resolution has been in place since the autumn 2014. Another attempt came in 2016, due to expected elections in the both districts under separatists command. Elections are one of the Minsk conditions. But one discrepancy came up regarding organizing the elections. Ukraine requires at first military equipment take off and over taking command of the separatist districts. On the other side Russia together with separatists

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require immediately elections plus amnesty for all separatists. Russia came up with attempt how to involve peaceful troops during the UN general assembly where Russia over-run Ukraine attempt. Proposal was denied because of representatives was not being able to answer questions about troops competencies. Both sides Ukraine and Russia try to make space for diplomatic possibilities and accuse each other of not doing enough and erasing the peaceful tries to solve the conflict.

Differences among Russia and Ukraine proposals stand on the Russian role in the problem. Russia sees itself as a mediator in the conflict, but Ukraine thinks different and marks Russia as an aggressor. According to UN principles, aggressor could not participate on the peaceful mission. If these differing views persist, the chance of effective conflict resolution is complicated (Mykhailyshyn, 2017).

In the following articles are mentioned chronologically proposals for peaceful operations and opinions, statements of all representatives and interested in politicians. Concluding we will focus on a possible future predictions.

Proposal

During a press conference following the BRICS Summit on 05 September 2017, Russian President **Vladimir Putin** responded to the question of one of the journalists, saying he is considering possibility of solving the conflict in Ukraine involving the UN peacekeeping mission (Press conference...2017). It is quite surprising statement because similar proposal announced by Viktor **Poroschenko** president of Ukraine at the UN Security Council meeting was blocked by Russia side. Subsequently Russian proposal was announced at the UN Security Council meeting but was not approved because Ukraine came up with new version in progress (Členy Sb OON, 2017).

Ukraine finds these points as a key one:
- Mission should take place at the borders between the Russia federation and the Republic of Ukraine.
- No mission members with Russia citizenship.
- Mandate should consist of cooperation while peaceful democratic processes, demilitarization of the region and stop occupying it.
- Mission´s deadlines (set up conditions mandatory for the aim of the mission).

The very first Russian proposal was about armed protection for OSCE mission operating in this region and facing a lot of attacks and repeating troubles and life threatening moments. After the phone call with the chancellor of the Germany, the statements got wider by these point, mission should not only operateat borders and be accepted at the territories where OSCE takes place, it should be to the border Russia – Ukraine (Putin obsudil s merkel,..2017). German´s Ministry of foreign affairs reacted by the statement that this should by

the first step to melting the sanctions against Russia down. **Kurt Volker** a special representative of the USA ministry of foreign affairs for Ukraine during the conference taking place on Yalta, announced that mentioned mission should deepen the split of the territory of Ukraine. But he also mentioned that if this mission takes control over the border and heavy weapons it could be a way how to fulfil the Minsk treaties. On October is planned meeting between **Mr. Volker** and **Mr. Vladislav Surkov**, advisor to **Vladimir Putin** (Komu vygodna misia..., 2017). This meeting is supposed to solve crucial questions regarding peaceful mission: (Meetings of representatives are supposed to solve crucial questions regarding a peaceful mission)

- Mandate of the mission (connect to OSCE mission);
- Status of the mission (permission for some kind of weapons);
- Status of the Doneck people republic and Luhansk people republic representatives (Russia wants to join them to discussions, but Ukraine sees them as a terrorists);
- Mission endurance – 6months up to 1 year;
- Mission costs (approximately 1bilion USD);
- Number of the mission members (possible direct participation of Russia).

Conclusion

Since its first meeting with representatives of the Russian Federation and the US, we can say that, despite many critics, the **Volker-Surkov** dialogue is the only alternative to the Minsk Agreements. At their meetings, it is not currently an immediate solution to the situation, but rather a consolidation of the process and the convergence of the position. While real decision-making is not expected before the presidential election in the Russian Federation. Significantly, the next meeting of the two representatives is set for the month of March 2018. According to some diplomats, the final decision is postponed even after the 2018 FIFA World Cup. In this development, it is remarkable to note the position of Ukraine. It is not the initiator of the processes, but rather the piece that rejects all the proposals a priori, no matter who they come from (Diplomat nazval...,2018). The year 2019 will be key to Ukraine in three areas - presidential elections, parliamentary elections, and in 2019 they have to repay part of their $ 4.6 billion debt to international creditors (Ukrajinu ždut.., 2017). The Russian Federation, with its leaders, will be more than careful to watch Ukraine face these challenges. The problem is that if the Ukrainian leaders have just before the elections will address the issue of Donbas. Donbas voter's are going to mix the division of seats in the parliament. Ukrainian officials are not interested to open this Pandora's box. And in this context, we would also mention the existence of several possible reasons why the Russian Federation's attitude towards the UN peacekeeping mission changed.

1. Refinement of sanctions (against which are in favour Germany and France);
2. Some form of legalization of the status of representatives of the People's Republic of Donetsk and People's Republic of Luhansk there would be delegating some part of the direct responsibility of the Russian Federation to these officials;
3. The financial burden on the Russian Federation (in the long run, it is an unsustainable situation; for the Russian Federation, it is better to shift the issue to Ukraine);
4. Federalization and election in 2019 may be key reasons. Donetsk and Luhansk area represent 15% of the total population of Ukraine. As a long-term strategy of the Russian Federation appears federalization with the autonomy of Donetsk and Luhansk to ensure the participation of their population in the elections. In these areas, according to election polls, the Opposition Bloc is leading, which is Pro-Russia. Moreover, according to a poll conducted in 2017, up to 60% of Donbas's population is considered themselves as Ukrainians[3].In this way, they would try to achieve the fragmentation of the Ukrainian Parliament and the complication of the enforcement of the law that could be considered unacceptable by the Russian side (Vseukrajinske..., 2001).

As there was no a priori rejection of the mission by any of the parties concerned, there is great potential for negotiations on the implementation of the mission. In addition to the **Volker-Surkov** Dialogue, unofficial negotiations are also taking place in the background with the representatives of the People's Republic of Donetsk and the People's Republic of Luhansk. The stabilization of the situation in Ukraine is also important for the Slovak Republic as the immediate eastern neighbour. Slovakia is one of the long-term promoters of Ukraine's direction to European structures, as well as mechanisms such as the Eastern Partnership. Adherence to and implementation of Minsk Agreements is a prerequisite for further convergence of Ukraine and the European Union.

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[3]There is a long-standing phenomenon in this area: citizens claim to be Ukrainians, but they consider Russian as their mother tongue. This phenomenon gave the impression that there are more citizens living in this area who claim to have a Russian nationality than it actually was. According to the 2001 Census, in the Donetsk region, 56.9% of the Ukrainian nationality and only 20.4% of the Russian nationality, but 74.9% of the people marks Russian language as their mother tongue.In the Luhansk area, it was similar to 58% of the Ukrainian nationality, 22.5% of the Russian nationality, but 68.8% of the population speaks Russian as their mother tongue.

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POSSIBILITIES OF QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM UTILIZATION IN THE EDUCATIONAL PROCESS

Břetislav Štěpánek[1]

ABSTRACT

Qualitative shaping of pupil's personality is an integral part of the development of social relations, and therefore it is very important to keep in mind that the educational system is the interaction between schools, families and other institutions, which are characterized by their effect on the pupil. It is not enough to work just educationally at schools, it is needed to try to influence positively also the parental public and public opinion. To quality progress of the educational process at schools, it is necessary to strengthen the authority of faculty and schools by state bodies, because public understates the role of education in society.

Key words: pupil's personality, social relations, school, family, educational process

Introduction

Substantial changes in human behavior do not arise automatically, but these are the result of long purposeful and organized educational work. The problem very discussed at present is the question of moral education. Objective moral education must be to develop moral regulation of individual behavior for each pupil. The moral regulation of behavior represents the highest level of self-control, which is that every individual assumes responsibility for his behavior of free choice and on a purely voluntary basis, for his motives to the society and for the immediate aftermath there from.

Moral education is closely connected with aesthetic and physical education, as both contribute to obtain positive character traits, consolidate will and unify collective. It's work, which is of great benefit to the pupils and creates positive properties such as toughness, discipline or the ability to overcome obstacles. Interpersonal relationships are formed, also cooperation and sense of collective. Students have an opportunity to feel responsibility not only to ourselves, but to their classmates, who are involved in the process. They can enjoy the joy of a job well done and it's not negligible. As an example can be named experiences from collective training activities such as training and education within the branch of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence and many others (Otřísal, 2016, 2017).

All that knowledge is to be in mind when deciding how to raise the quality level of moral education. As suitable instrument is offering here to

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implement a quality management system, attention must be focused on strengthening the positive character of pupils and consolidating of class collectives. Students must learn to perform assigned duties responsibly and actively engage in extracurricular activities and trying to be within their capabilities a benefit for all society.

1 The role of the school in shaping moral and character qualities

It should be noted which role the school plays in shaping moral and character qualities in the whole process of education. Education is seen as a specific type of human activities, focused single-mindedly on building physical and mental characteristics, above all of generations in recruiting and that, consistent with the objectives and tasks, which requires the society on some level of historical development (Bezděk, 2012b). The school has the task of preparing children to live and work, and in the context of their future profession and active civil life with good level of moral and character qualities. Mission of schools in this issue is mainly to form the pupils and create a positive relationship to the world and to work and its results, to human being, to the collective, to his own country, to the duties and activities, to beauty and art and last, but not least to the physical culture and health (Janiš, 2011). These specific issues have to be emphasize within the military pupils´ education that is focused on specific areas of their duty concerning military service for example in the CBRN contaminated area (Kučík, 2007; Florus 2014; Bednář 2017).

If educative formation of students is to achieve this objective, the process must form a comprehensive framework (Bezděk, 2012a). The creation of appropriate conditions for the predetermined educational objectives is the base. It means to have such teachers in the staff who are able get over standards to students of right conduct and behaviour, to become enthusiastic them about work, art and sports activities in the school and outside of school.

The role of management is essential. The role of the director is the qualitative characters in the faculty with adequate authority. The role of the principal is to identify these quality characteristics in the pedagogical staff with adequate authority. The precise nature of tasks shall be transparent with the results of the work of the feedback at breeder boot process which, of course, is very problematic. The process of education is long-termed, the result comes later. However, there is a need to monitor and evaluate at least partial tasks or these, which can be evaluated. It´s a nonsense to set a target and not to follow the way the man is going. Teachers and students need to know how far they went in the right direction or if lost (Urbanovská, 2006).

What features should have a good supervisor? He must be personal, not to be in conflicts between his words and actions in school and beyond. He must to the student show, what and why. The great supervisor must follow his target systematically and consistently. His nature should not be authoritative, and he

should be able to descent to students and to empathize with their situation. His main mission in educational advice should consist in the provision of technical assistance in the development of personality and of structure - educational problems (e. g. of a socially undesirable phenomenon or risk behaviour). However, this does not apply only in respect of teacher and pupil, similar situation can be found in the relationship between a teacher and a principal. The principal acts educational to the teachers and these to the students. Good educational results may be just in these schools where there is a conformity between her management and at the same time among its individual members each other.

It is very important to realize that not only educate students, but at the same time to shape the right opinion of the world and social development. Goal is to have every child for its real status and tasks in society without tendency to hide behind collective. This is not an easy target. The basic condition for success in structure - training, good organization of pupils in classes and the school, which leads to well-disciplined behavior, habits of good work, the interpersonal relations between teachers and pupils and among pupils each other (Grecmanová, 2006).

Class master is an irreplaceable role in the educational process, he has two main tasks. He is the immediate and the main organizer of pupil´s collective and acts as the coordinator of all educational work in its class. The basic condition of the success of class master are, broad knowledge of each pupil, his interests, skills, family circumstances and living conditions. However, each member of the staff takes part both in his personal views and position, and exploit possibilities of educational operating in individual subjects, that offers to the teacher the subject matter. Education broadly developed personality is a long-term and complex process, whose success depends on many factors. School is just one of them.

The educational operating of school is currently affected by various external factors at the same time. The most important of them are mass media that it is significant influence in the development of children, and of their relations and the morality formation. This effect is with still increasing trends and not always with a positive impact on a student. Another dominant role in the education of the children plays the family. Today are the situations which may occur, that in some families, their relationship to moral values will be at variance with school education. Some families do not form a reliable background for the children, and are for them negative examples in the educational activity. Last, but not least, it is necessary to bear in mind that children are also influenced by people-to-people relations and interpersonal links in various social groups and collectives, which may have the certain educational problems, which include lying, petty theft, truancy, running away from home, substance abuse, bullying, vandalism and others. Not only the parent or school are sufficient for their solution, but is very much needed and

desirable cooperation both appointed by invited experts. The educational adviser has there an irreplaceable role to coordinate the activities of school, of family and other institutions (Vacek, 2012).

The school must give students to excel and assert oneself, even if not all are by far. If children feel the lack of this, they are either passive, or they are trying to attract attention to yourself at any price and from there are just close the negative phenomena and risk behaviour, that are nowadays so much bothering our society (Grecmanová, 2002).

1.1 The use of quality management structure in education

However, the child's moral development is not only qualified by objective conditions and subject to the system of education itself, but also of the child, his own moral activity and interest focus (Andrejsková, 2009).

This knowledge is the basis for considering the use of quality management structure - in education. The objectives of education must be followed, to remember objective and subjective factors affecting educational process, also different perception of the older school age children. The appropriate use of negative features of this age category may be useful. Many teachers don't work with these negatives, but if they use that activity in the right direction, it leads to the activity and independence. This is primarily an individual way of thinking, in questions of politics, the social and cultural questions, strong emotional experience, sense of honour and justice. We need to keep in mind that students are particularly critical of the adults, they hate differences between words and actions. They want to act like an adult and for this reason they can be stored by many tasks, that previously were forced to carry out teachers (Vacek, 2012).

Quality management system can be absolutely or relatively understood. The concept of quality management is for management of relative importance, understands that the quality of either compliance with predefined specifications, or as permanent improvement and transformation of the organization. Quality control methods have their origin in the sphere of industrial production, where these detect and remove of defective products. In the same way as quality management techniques are resulting to the products, not only great, but even better then are the needs and expectations of potential customers. These methods were later adapted for services, including services - in educational structure. The use of quality management is a strategic decision - of an educational structure. His contribution is the mapping of processes, their efficiency, the introduction of measures to remedy and prevent systemic deficiencies and problems, better organization of work, and overall increase the satisfaction of all stakeholders (Otřísal, 2011).

Conclusions

The introduction of quality management system should be first a strategic decision of the educational organisation. The proposal and implementation of quality management system depends on its needs, objectives and products, but also to its organisational structure and realized processes. Okay benefits of the introduction of the quality control system is to be found in the specific educational organisation, processes, and in the event of problems to establish and to take corrective measures and prevention of systemic deficiencies or problems. On the basis the comprehensive analysis of the existing processes may be defined their effectiveness and then implement systems management processes. Another equally important aspect is documentation of interaction, in education and security processes. The introduction of quality control system should lead to more pragmatic work organization methods, streamlining management and document management and at last increase satisfaction of pupils and staff. The introduction of quality management system must be in the interest of educational organization.

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CONFLICT IN UKRAINE – LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE AND POSSIBLE WAYS OF RECONCILIATION

Matúš Štulajter[1]

ABSTRACT

Vladimir Putin requested the Council of the Russian Federation to authorize the use of an armed force, due to unsatisfactory security situation in Ukraine. He also claimed that the Russian citizens of Crimea (Autonomous Republic of Crimea) are endangered. He obtained that authorization at the same day and Russian forces began to deploy their forces in Ukraine, which caused one of the most precarious disputes of this decade. Was this conduct in accordance with an international law, especially under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter? Could we subsume this act as self-defense or any other legal way of use of force? Is there a legal way to resolve the dispute according to the means of international dispute settlement?

Key words: Ukraine, dispute, reconciliation, use of force, negotiation

Introduction

If we would like to know whether reconciliation in Ukraine is possible if at all, then we should start by defining who are the responsible parties and the time frame when it all began. Answer to the first question greatly depends on one's worldview. Ukraine and Russia have two absolutely opposite explanations of Crimean issue and the war in Donbas. Ukraine sees Crimean crisis to be a land grab by Russia and still treats it as a de jure Ukrainian territory. Russia, according to Ukrainian officials, is also responsible for supplying weaponry and personnel to the separatists in the Eastern Ukraine. Therefore Kyiv treats Russian Federation as an enemy and as an opposing force. Russia, in turn, portrays the Crimean events of the spring of 2014 as a protection of Russian-speaking populace of the peninsula from the new "fascist" government. The new political regime is also blamed for the unrest in the Eastern Ukraine as a result to unjust policies, according to Russian media and statesmen. In this regard, Russia treats the conflict as an internal problem of Ukraine with separatist in the East and legally denies any military presence in the region while maintaining a strong political support to the new Republics.Both views are extremes and require a direct evidence to support them, Russia cannot support its claims of persecution of Russian-speaking minority in mostly bilingual Ukraine. At the same time Ukraine is unable to present hard evidence of the involvement of its Eastern

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neighbor. Most of the proof that Kyiv has is treated as indirect by the international community and is subject to its willingness to act against nuclear-capable state as was in case with Crimea.

1 Legality of use of force and possible ways of reconciliation

As for the time, there are at least two points that we can refer to. One if rather far fetched and should be placed sometime around the end of Orange Revolution events in the winter of 2004 with annual gas disputes of 2006-2010 between Ukraine and Russia. This particular period is characterized by formation of several major actors that play large part in current crisis: strong pro-Russian lobby in Verhovna Rada (Parliament), gradual closure of Ukraine-related public organization and the unification of most media providers in Russia under governmental control. (The Day newspaper, 2017) The last fact is crucial to understanding the level of social tensions currently present in both societies because of the coverage Russian media outlets have over former Soviet republics, where Russian language is on par with national if not surpassing it (e.g. Belarus). This fact was used extensively during the events that were dubbed as Revolution of Dignity of 2013-2014 in Ukraine, which leads us to the second timeframe of the conflict.

The export blockade of Ukraine by Russia started on 14 of August 2013, just mere months before the signing of Ukraine-EU Association Agreement and the Revolution of Dignity (The Economist, 2017). Prior to this event, Russian Federation began an unprecedented inspection of Ukrainian goods going to Russia in violation of CIS policies. This occurrence can be reasonably treated as a first attempt to forcibly stir Ukraine into Customs Union and resulted in success as the DCFTA signing failed and the protests added in participants. Starting from this point we can speculate on the break in the traditionally friendly relations between the two nations.

The strictly pro-government stance of some local and Russian media just helped the conflict to grow by portraying protesters as pawns of the West. Such representation gradually alienated some part of the Ukrainian audience who were customary consumers of Russian news about Ukraine, especially after the bloody events of 20th of February 2014 (The Guardian, 2017). The further division came with the inception of "green men" in Crimea just days after president Yanukovich was ousted.

The media extremities of the media discourse were raised to the new heights then developing the story of the "fascist junta" that is going to repress Russian-speakers, an unimaginable event to most of the Ukrainians. Further events of Crimean occupation and eventually of pro-Russian unrest in the East, have caused even deeper wounds in Ukrainian-Russian relations. Several sociological services in both Ukraine and Russia noted a steep decline in the relations between both countries. For example, the combined positive attitude

towards Ukraine from the perspective of Russian citizens fell from 66% in January 2014 to 24% the year later (Levada Center, 2017). In case of Ukraine the attitude fell a little less dramatically with 78% positive answers in February 2014 and 36,5% in December 2014 *(graph 1, combined sociological release of Kyiv Institute of Sociology [KIIS] with Levada Center, only in Ukrainian though, there is, however an older version).* (KMIC, 2017).

It is important to understand that the complexity of the crisis from the viewpoint of international law is great and there is no concrete solution in regard to reconciliation process. Even though two Minsk agreements have been signed, situation can be defined as a frozen conflict at best, however there is enough evidence of violations of the peace agreement. Yet, in order to categorize the notion of reconciliation it is necessary to deal with the terminology international dispute settlement law and legality of use of force within this conflict. Disputes of highest order can arise between states, international organizations or a combination of thereof and can be resolved either peacefully or by the use of force. Since in rational terms every player wants to maximize his profits and minimize his losses, it is obvious that the peaceful scenario remains the most desired outcome. Article 33 of UN charter states that techniques used for peaceful settlement of international disputes are: "(…) negotiations, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice." We will discuss each of those techniques and establish whether they are effective or not in resolving Ukrainian crisis.

So far the practice of negotiations has been the first-hand way of reconciliation attempt globally and it has been de jure the most successful in Ukrainian case. The representatives of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany signed not just one, but two Minsk agreements up to date. Since the sides have been able to reach a certain compromise then it is possible to elaborate, that there are certain points of mutual interest, like the end of the armed conflict. However, there are at least two immediate problems that arise and may influence the outcome in the long run.

First of all it is the mentioned question of credibility of the "republics" as they are unrecognized not only by Ukraine, but also by Russia, that has officially represented them and taken the role of the mediator in the negotiations. Therefore, the binding factor of international law is non-existent as one of the counterparts of the *negotiations* has no international relations and interdependence whatsoever, meaning that the failure to comply with the negotiated terms will not result in any kind counterbalance as it happened after "Minsk I". The exact opposite is expected of Ukraine as a world-recognized state bound by membership in various international organizations it faces full responsibility in the event of breaking the agreement.

Secondly, it is the logical issue of observing the implementation. As OSCE (part of the regional agencies practice) became an institution chosen for

this mission, certain interrelated problems started to arise. These include the responsibility for not allowing OSCE representatives to certain areas of the conflict zone during the pull-out all heavy weaponry and the implementation of further normalization via demilitarization and democratic elections.

Next in line of possible ways to reconcile is *inquiry*, by which we understand questioning and interrogation by the third party. The impossibility of such measure is quite evident, since there is little hope that both sides will agree on such a third party and if so, how the accountability will be achieved. Similar problems arise also in *mediation, judicial settlement and arbitration techniques* as not all of the involved parties are clearly defined by international law.

There is however some hope in *conciliation* approach, which to some extent was used in Minsk talks. A third non-biased authority with no political power may be able to develop a roadmap for reconciliation. But the problem is still the same – enforcing the implementation of such agreement as in the event of "Minsk I".

All in all, the definition of reconciling parties depends on ones perception of the situation. "Minsk II" agreement establishes quasi-legal framework of returning Eastern "republics" under Ukrainian control with full implementation still being under the question. Effectiveness of international law in this case is based on the desire of the overseeing participants to enforce the execution of the agreement, highlighting the consequences in the event of non-compliance. But what is more interesting in this particular situation is that it is also a precedent for disproportionate responsibility for Ukraine and can be, arguably, explained by the unwillingness of European counterparts to involve themselves in an open economic and event armed conflict with Russia. The whole idea of *reconciliation* as part of the conflict in Ukraine cannot be clearly defined. Currently there is no evidence that there will be a violent or aggressive reunification of the society with the return of runaway "republics" and that such term as "reconciliation" will have a right to be used.

Article 51 of the Charter sets forth one the recognized exceptions to the prohibition of the use force. Thus is state allowed to use armed force as the response to an armed attack. The controversy is whether an armed attack occurred against territorial integrity of Russia. No Ukrainian troops has been deployed on Russian territory, but Russian officials claim, that Russian military personnel and Russian citizens on the Crimea were threatened. Is it accordance with international law, when a state refers to the concept of self-defense in order to protect its citizens outside its territory?

The UN Resolution of General Assembly 3314 on the Definition of Aggression states that armed attack does not has to be exclusively linked to the territory of the attacked State. It mentions an "extra-territorial armed attack" by the forces of a State on land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleet of another State". This provision only speaks of the various types of forces of another State – i.e. the attacked State – that have to be concerned. As the acts mentioned in

Art. 1 (a) and (b) UNGA Res. 3314 clearly require to occur 'against the territory of another State', Art, (1) (d) e contrario applies also extra-territorially. On the other hand, Russia as the State willing to invoke the right of self-defense bears the burden of proof here as it was stated in the Oil Platform Case to show that Ukrainian acts against Russian military personnel are that intensive to constitute an "armed attack". However Ukrainian officials didn´t warn Russian military personnel in Crimea to remain in the territories where were allowed to operate, there is no clear evidence that the Russian fleet based in Crimea had been violently attacked before Vladimir Putin was authorized to deploy force in Ukraine. An armed attack against Russian military personnel in Crimea did not occur and cannot be invoked in order to justify the Russian resort to armed force. (Aust, 2010)

Russia seems to be highly concerned about the safety of its citizens in Crimea. It not a part of ius cogens, but it´s disputed among States and academics whether there exists a right to invoke the concept of an armed attack regarding the protection of nationals residing extra-territorially. Sir Humphrey Waldock in his well-known 1952 General Course at The Hague on 'The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law' (81 RdC 1952, 455) has an opinion that States had a right to use force to protect their citizens abroad under three conditions: 'There must be (1) an imminent threat of injury to nationals, (2) a failure or an inability on the part of the territorial sovereign to protect them and (3) measures of protection strictly confined to the object of protecting them against injury'. (Noortman, 2005)

The existence of such a right since the security of the attacked state is not threatened when its citizens are attacked outside its borders and because such a right would have the potential of 'blurring contours of the right of self-defense (Brownlie. 2012. p. 754) Dinstein, however, shares the view that nationals abroad may form the object of an armed attack in the sense of Article 51 of the Charter, 'if the attack against [such] nationals is mounted primarily because of their link of nationality [to the attacked state]' (Dinstein. 2001. p 218) and refers to an impressive amount of State practice supporting his view (Ibid at 257 et seq.) ranging from the Israeli liberation of hostages in Uganda in 1976 to the American Invasion in Panama 1989 and the Russian invasion in Georgia in 2008. Only the last case will be discussed here, as it seems most relevant for the current situation. Gray argues that in the events surrounding the Russian intervention in Georgia to protect its nationals. Western States did not oppose this doctrine as a matter of principle' but ' challenged Russia's motives and the proportionality of the Action' (Dinstein. 2001).

Although there are divergent views between Western and Russian media on what is currently happening to Russian nationals in Crimea there seem to be no reports that would clearly establish that Russian nationals in Crimea or other parts of the Ukraine have been threatened. The Russian federation only generally asserts 'a real threat to the lives and health of Russian citizens' but

fails to establish in concreto how Russian citizens are endangered by the governmental transition that has occurred in the Ukraine on 23. February 2014. Therefore, in our opinion, the Russian authorization of force cannot be justified by the concept of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. Even when one does not concur with this conclusion, Russian actions would have to comply with the requirements of necessity and proportionality in order to be lawful under Article 51 of the Charter. One fails to understand, how actions like the surrounding of Ukrainian military bases in Crimea, should contribute protecting Russian nationals, given that there are no claims that they have been threatened by Ukrainian forces.

We think that one might simply deny the validity of Mr. Yanukovich's consent for the lack of effective control of the situation in the Ukraine. Effective authority would seem to be of primordial importance in determining who is entitled to validly speak out an invitation (Shaw- 2008). This line of argumentation even holds true if one considers, and this is not my personal interpretation of the events, that Mr. Yanukovich has been overthrown by an illegal Coup d'État. (Shaw. 2008) In times of turmoil and upheaval with competing claims for legitimacy, effective control would seem the sole factor that can be determined and verified objectively. Predictability is crucial for the legality of an intervention upon invitation as ' no uncertainty should be allowed to exist regarding the actual presentation of such a request by a duly constituted Government' (GAOR, op. cit.). Support to an overthrown legitimate government could solely be given multilaterally by the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the Charter (Shaw. 2008).

Conclusion

This is the main reason why this example of use of armed force in Crimea cannot be considered as legal under international law. It is also incorrect to subsume this act to the concept of Humanitarian Intervention, or Responsibility to protect, while these concepts are still considered as illegal according to the ius cogens international law. In addition Russia didn´t ever used this concept before. However, even if one accepts the validity of this doctrine under international law, a humanitarian intervention would not be applicable here. The only situation where this is (hypothetically under theory of customary international law) applicable is when civil population is under threat of crimes against humanity, war crimes or genocide is another state empowered to act. There is also no evidence that Russian population in Ukrainian territory was under threat of subject of any illegal conduct. It only supports the theory of ethnification of this dispute by Russian officials. It will be difficult to resolve this precarious dispute. From the Ukrainian standpoint, the reconciliation should happen not with "the East" but with Russia in the future. At this point in time such even is

impossible to imagine, as there is no framework to facilitate such practice. The rapprochement of the two nations not is possible as long as Crimea remains under Russian control, as long as it supports separatists in the East and as long as it denies it. Therefore this possibility is reserved for brighter future.

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THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN SECURITY IN KOSOVO DURING THE BRUSSELS DIALOGUE: POLITICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS

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ABSTRACT
The article traces the implications of the Brussels talks between Belgrade and Pristina and the pending establishment of the Community of Serbian Municipalities in Kosovo for human security in Serb-populated areas of Kosovo. Human security is analysed both in terms of implications of key documents of Belgrade-Pristina negotiations and in the context of actual problems related to human security in Kosovo. Theoretical conclusions on the evolution of human security in Kosovo in the current stage of Brussels talks are drawn.

Key words: *Kosovo Serbs, human security, political security, community security, Brussels Dialogue, Community of Serbian Municipalities in Kosovo*

Introduction

The concept of human security switches the analytical focus from defence of the state from external threats to protecting people and includes multiple dimensions of importance for individual well-being: personal security (protection from physical threats, crime, individual and institutionalized violence), economic security (income, employment opportunities and purchasing power), health security, education, freedom of thought, conscience and religion (manifesting group identity in public sphere), etc. (UNDP, 2017; UN Human Security Unit, 2009). Although not explicitly mentioned, human security has been increasingly employed as a legitimizing motive in military interventions all over the world.

The Kosovo war was a prominent precedent of invoking human security-related motives (although the term was not explicitly used) as a legitimization for a military intervention. Since the internationalization of the Kosovo conflict, human security motives were employed by all actors (the NATO, international missions in Kosovo, Serbia and various factions within the Kosovo Albanian political community), each pursuing its own policies (Tamminen, 2008, pg. 15; Beha, Visoka, 2010, pg. 100). Protection of civilian population was extensively invoked as the main legitimizing motive behind the NATO-led air strikes campaign (dubbed 'humanitarian intervention') and the subsequent instalment of international military and civilian missions KFOR, UNMIK and EULEX. A nearly two-decade-long period that has passed since the end of the 1999 war

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allows us to assess the progress achieved in terms of human security in Kosovo, as well as commitment of the main actors in the status-related conflict to human security in the current stage.

1 Human Security Situation in Kosovo since the Beginning of the Brussels Negotiations

Throughout the post-war period, civil population (in non-Albanian-populated areas in particular) has remained extremely vulnerable to poor prospects in all human security-related dimensions, including physical security and "freedom from fear" (a term used within the UN framework: UN Human Security Unit, 2009), economic and political security. The life in Kosovo Serb-populated areas is still characterized by low-intensity tensions with sporadic waves of ethnic violence. Continuing attacks on civilian population, its property and objects of the Serbian Orthodox Church persist. From October 2016 till October 2017, over 80 attacks on civilians and their property all over Serb-populated areas in Kosovo happened, including physical assaults and injuries, mass protests and harassment of returnees in rural localities, gunshots fired at civilians, damaging property of civilians, churches and cemeteries, thefts and obstruction to public celebration of religious feasts (Kancelarija za KiM, 2016; Kancelarija za KiM, 2017). Although the efficiency of the Kosovo Police in bringing perpetrators to justice slightly increased compared to previous years, a wave of arrests perceived to be arbitrary and pressure upon Serbs working in local self-government institutions were perceived to be a politically motivated latent pressure upon the local Serbian population, which was interpreted by the official Belgrade as the need for negotiations on human and civil rights of Serbs in Kosovo.

This data shows that, almost 19 years after the war, a sustainable solution to human security in Kosovo has not been found, and the city of Kosovska Mitrovica still remains one of the most dangerous spots in Europe with regard to potential ethnic escalation. In the wake of the deterioration of security situation in North Mitrovica, construction works on the bridge and pedestrian area were suspended on 20 April 2017, which also implied the suspension of the implementation of the agreement regarding the main bridge of Kosovska Mitrovica. As a result of the agreement reached by the mayor of North Mitrovica and Kosovo's authorities on 7 July 2017, concrete barricades were placed in the middle of the bridge in order to protect the construction area from extremist drivers, and the EULEX, KFOR and Kosovo Police patrols were strengthened. Security situation and technical agreements regarding construction works in the area of the main bridge of Kosovska Mitrovica is still a matter of considerable discord between the three negotiating parts, with the European External Action Service urging Belgrade to implement it commitments with regard to justice and freedom of movement in the centre of the Serbian part of

Kosovska Mitrovica city. The assassination of **Oliver Ivanović**, one of the most prominent Kosovo Serb political representatives, in Kosovska Mitrovica on 16 January 2018, came as a manifestation of a high degree of political insecurity.

The security situation is further aggravated by youth radicalization trend and the return of Islamic extremists from Iraq and Syria to Kosovo. Out of 335 combatants of Kosovo Albanian origin, ca. 60 perished in the Middle East, and ca. 120 returned (UNDP, 2017, pg. 20). Although such returnees are placed under observation of security forces, the said phenomenon increases the risk of terrorist attacks, against the background of widespread networks of organized crime and corruption.

2 Political and Community Security of Kosovo Serbs

In the context of ethnic violence in Kosovo, the notion of community security (UNDP, 2009) is relevant for analysing the situation of minority groups. An inalienable part of the concept of human security is empowerment of local communities to participate in decision-making process with regard to managing issues related to their security. Still, for nearly two decades, the status-related conflict over Kosovo has not left much space for individual or community contribution to decision-making. Instead, human security-related issues have been managed in a top-down manner, by international missions, supranational, state and parastatal actors. It is noteworthy that the implementation of the concept of human security remains state-centred, rather than delegated to local community as an immediate recipient of security. Institutions of various power centres involved into conflict over status thus retain power to condition modalities of human security provision.

In post-war Kosovo, political security is a key notion for understanding possibilities of minority political participation, freedom of identity and collective memory manifestation in public space. A prerequisite for ensuring security is state capacity, but, as interpretations of legitimacy differ depending on political stances of the main actor involved into status-related conflict, human security is the first to suffer under the conditions of contested statehood.

It is notable that the commitment to ensure security of Kosovo Serbian population was at the core of the existence of the network of the institutions of local self-government, as well as health care, educational institutions, post offices, etc. that had been run by the Republic of Serbia before the agreement with Pristina was reached in 2013 to integrate the local Serbian population into Kosovo's institutions. This comprehensive network of institutions run by Serbia had been presented as the only way to ensure the survival and sustainable presence of the Serbian population in Kosovo. Given several waves of Serb exodus from Kosovo and systematic inability of Kosovo's institutions and international missions to create conditions for human security in Serb-populated

areas, the Serbia-run institutions were viewed by Kosovo Serb mass consciousness as a prerequisite for the continuation of Serb presence in Kosovo.

In turn, Kosovo's institutions consistently viewed all kinds of institutions functioning on the ground through the lens of Kosovo's state-building (see, e.g., Ministry for Dialogue, 2017; Constitutional Court of Kosovo, 2015). Claiming monopoly over security and public services provision, they blamed security failures on competing institutions run by Serbia on the same territory. Accordingly, access to territory was claimed by them as a precondition for ensuring security. In the logic of Kosovo's state-building pursued by Pristina, integration into the Pristina-based institutional framework has been seen as a key indicator upon which whole security-related discourse is based. Pristina has been systematically insisting on its request to withdraw or dismantle the Serbia-run institutions in Kosovo as a precondition for introducing human security to Serb-populated areas.

The period of Belgrade-Pristina negotiations has brought about a qualitative shift in Belgrade's Kosovo policies – acceptance of Kosovo Serbs' integration into the Pristina-based institutional framework. Still, empowerment of Kosovo Serbian population to manage its security-related issues in the period 2012-2018 has been limited. Serbian deputies in Kosovo's parliament encountered difficulties in promoting their agenda due to lack of political will on the part of Kosovo Albanian parties, and were forced to freeze their participation in the parliament for several times during the said period.

Within the framework of the Brussels talks, human security was contingent on the establishment of the Community of Serbian Municipalities in Kosovo (CSM), which is not established up to this writing due to lack of political will on the part of Kosovo's institutions and resulting decision of Kosovo's Constitutional Court.

The Belgrade-Pristina dialogue was frozen in early 2017, as Pristina withdrew from it due to the arrest of **Ramush Haradinaj** accused of war crimes by Serbia. After the release of **Haradinaj**, the talks were not resumed, and no new agreements have been reached since then. The intensity of the dialogue thus reached its lowest point from the very inception of the talks in 2013. Rare Serbian-Albanian meetings on top political level and bilateral meetings with EU representatives on the technical level aimed at overcoming current problems rather than dealing with normalization of relations. Moreover, the dynamics of talks were heavily affected by waves of political legitimacy crises in Pristina that effectively set back every attempt of European mediators to bring it back to the negotiation table.

Justice was virtually the only sphere where progress in Belgrade-Pristina dialogue has been reached during 2017. In the wake of the Agreement with the EU representatives reached in Belgrade on 22 August 2017 and the top political meeting in Brussels on 31 August 2017, Pristina's consent to the implementation of court decisions passed by the courts of the Republic of Serbia prior to the

integration period was intended to contribute to improving protection of the Serbian population in Kosovo. Still, Belgrade deplored Pristina's reluctance to implement the latter's commitments with regard to the establishment of the Community of Serbian Municipalities (CSM), cadastre, police integration, recognition of university diploma, civil protection, delimitation of North and South Mitrovica, etc.

Human rights and freedoms of the Serbian population in Kosovo, along with issues of private, public and corporate property, are still pending to become objects of negotiations, as Pristina's withdrawal from the dialogue made it impossible for the EU mediators to put forward these issues. The EU mediator did not challenge Pristina's proneness to treat issues under negotiation selectively, as subject to Kosovo's legislation.

Notably, Pristina acted very autonomously in the spheres of freedom of movement and integrated border management. Intensified control measures on integrated borders, introduced by Pristina unilaterally, complicated the implementation of the Agreement on the Freedom of Movement.

Political security of Kosovo Serbs was also endangered by a narrative blaming Serbia and the local Serb politicians participating in Kosovo's legislative and executive institutions for Kosovo's internal political problems. For instance, electoral campaign during Kosovo's 2017 parliamentary elections was marked by topics that were perceived in Kosovo Serbian public opinion as hostile to the security of Kosovo Serb population. For instance, the Democratic Party of Kosovo promoted the transformation of Kosovo Security Force into Kosovo's Army regardless of the Serbs' stance, whereas the Self-Determination (Vetëvendosje) movement called for abandoning the dialogue with Belgrade and talking directly to Kosovo Serbian political representatives instead. As the Serbian List became an inalienable part of the ruling coalition in Pristina, the issue of the establishment of Kosovo's Army was gradually pushed to foreign policy area.

3 Community of Serbian Municipalities in the Light of Human Security

The establishment of the CSM is the key commitment stipulated by the First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations (Brussels Agreement) between Belgrade and Pristina, signed by the two Prime Ministers in Brussels on 19 April 2013 (First Agreement, 2013). Along with the General Principles signed on 25 August 2015 (Association/Community, 2015), it stipulated the modalities of founding the CSM, its structure and powers, as well as the implementation schedule.

The CSM was intended to exercise competences in the areas of "economic development, education, health, urban and rural planning" (First Agreement, art. 4), corresponding to key areas of human security. It is notable that the CSM is perceived by the official Serbian part to the negotiations as the key precondition

for human security in Kosovo (Kancelarija za KiM, 2017). In this view, the failure to establish the CSM, along with persisting continuous insecurity, undermined the legitimacy of the negotiations from the point of view of human security.

The decision of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo of 23 December 2015 countered the General Principles on the Establishment of the CSM, signed on 25 August 2015 in Brussels (Constitutional Court, 2015). Consequently, the creation of the ASM Governing Team was not completed. Moreover, Pristina conditioned the implementation of these agreements by other issues that are not part of any agreement. Namely, it has been consistently conditioning the establishment of the CSM by the abolishment of the "parallel" institutions (Ministry for Dialogue 2017), complying with Kosovo's laws and numerous current political issues. Simultaneously, having frozen its participation in the dialogue, Pristina did not complete the integration into the Kosovo Police Force of all employees of the Ministry of Interior of Serbia that had previously operated in North Kosovo (the commitment stipulated by art. 7 of the First Agreement), including administrative employees to be integrated in registry offices in Serb-majority municipalities in North Kosovo, firefighters, policemen and employees of Food and Accommodation Office of Serbia's Ministry of Interior.

With regard to the freedom of movement, the prohibition of entry to Kosovo to bus operators not in possession of license issued by Kosovo's Ministry of Infrastructure was introduced by Pristina on 7 September 2017, and subsequently lifted, as reciprocity measures for Kosovo Albanian bus operators were announced by Belgrade. By the same token, Kosovo's driving licenses are only issued to persons that officially renounce the driving license issued by Serbia.

Insisting that all organizations stipulated by the Agreements (except the Tripartite Implementation Group) act according to Kosovo's legislation, Pristina and the EU mediators claimed that the Agreement on Cadastre should be implemented according to the Law on Kosovo Property Comparison and Verification Agency. In turn, Belgrade protested that property rights of citizens of Serbia and of the Serbian Orthodox Church be decided within organizations where Serbs are not represented, as it would legalize the plunder of Kosovo Serb property. The Serbian part also refused to deliver cadastre documentation to the EU Special Representative in Pristina, as long as a tripartite agreement is not reached. Likewise, Serbs living in North Mitrovica cannot obtain their personal documents in North Mitrovica Civil Registry due to Pristina's refusal to share registers containing data on North Mitrovica inhabitants within the framework of implementation of the Agreement on Registers, which is seen by the Serbian negotiating party as a sign of disrespect toward Serbs that have lost their property.

Likewise, in the sphere of education, the Agreement on Mutual Recognition of University Diploma does not function due to Pristina's reluctance to recognize diploma issued by the University of Pristina temporarily settled in Kosovska Mitrovica. This view is shared by the EU that recognizes Pristina's exclusive authority and monopoly of Kosovo laws over universities all over Kosovo. Compromise proposed by the EU did not target the said university, as it suggested Belgrade recognize diploma issued by Kosovo's educational institutions and Pristina recognize Serbian diplomas issued outside Kosovo.

As the CSM remained the only commitment stipulated by the First Agreement whose implementation has not begun, Belgrade has been using every opportunity to insist on the need to establish the CSM as the precondition for the protection and overall wellbeing of Kosovo Serbs. In its view, a series of human security-related issues are contingent on the establishment of the CSM, including property rights, economic development, education, urban and rural planning, etc. By the same token, operation of Serbia's national communications service providers and founding Serbian trading and electricity supply enterprises were seen by Belgrade as a precondition of improving the quality of life for the Kosovo Serbian population by means of enhancing their economic security. The state of art of the CSM issue, as the main object of discord between Belgrade and Pristina, implied extremely unfavourable conditions for enhancing human security.

Conclusion

The Belgrade-Pristina dialogue has not yet led to an application of a sustainable solution to human insecurity in Kosovo. Instead, issues related to human security continue to be instrumentalised by various institutional actors engaged in conflict over Kosovo and its status.

The key conceptual misunderstanding lies in opposed goals of negotiating parties. Pristina sees the dialogue through the lens of state-building and refuses to participate in any talks that fall outside this logic. After having signed the Brussels Agreement, Pristina relied on its legislative and institutional tools that helped it avoid implementing it fully. Instead, Pristina prioritised other ways of Serb political participation in Kosovo. Belgrade, in turn, views the CSM as an optimal framework for enhancing political, economic, cultural and other dimensions of human security of Kosovo Serbs and for building communication with the Kosovo Albanian community and Kosovo's institutions. Extremely limited efficiency of channels of political participation available to Kosovo Serbs implies a considerable degree of community insecurity. Official human security policies in Kosovo remain state-centred and structured along ethnic lines. The institutions engaged in mutual conflict over status determine security policies in a top-down manner, which implies that the progress in terms of

community enablement, compared to previous periods (Kostovicova 2008: 631; Dulic 2008: 17-18), has been extremely slow.

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SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO CONFRONTING TERRORISM[*]

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism today represents one of the most serious security threats to the entire human society. We thus face the task of choosing the best form of confronting terrorism. Today, most terrorist attacks are based on a religious principle, not a separatist one, which has gradually disappeared from Europe. We have been witnessing mass attacks against civilian populations or critical infrastructure. The aim of our contribution is to define the key approaches in the fight against terrorism. As a scientific method, we will use a systemic approach that should include not only the fight against the spread of terrorist groups and terrorist attacks, but also the fight against the causes that could lead to the elimination of terrorist attacks. It is important to avoid mistaking the idea that the issue of terrorism affects only the developing countries, as many terrorist attacks are conducted in developed countries by their citizens. Perhaps the most importantly, it has to be noticed that the problem of terrorism is faced in particular by young men in vulnerable societies and situations.

***Key words:** terrorism, confronting terrorism, security, society, states, international organization*

Introduction

Terrorist acts became the synonym of violent act of foreign minority for the laic part of society. The laic part of society also thinks that it is necessary to eradicate or significantly reduce acts of terrorism. Terrorism is one of the most serious security threats. None of the countries or societies is immune against it. Today we face the task of choosing the best form of the fight against terrorism. The extreme form of protecting society would be the total state which in reality is the only efficient way to cope with the consequences of terrorism. Already today we may see some modifications like Patriot Act in United States that became an inspiration for other countries in effort to deal with the consequences of terrorism. But all of the changes of the law will sooner or later limit freedom or privacy of the society. On the other hand, there is the idea of fighting terrorism by conciliating societies, nations, and civilizations. The concept that

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would allow such a reconciliation is still to be developed. Such a concept would principally be much more effective because it fights against the roots of terrorism. The question that resonates among many nations is: "Why should we conform? Why not they?" Now we face the classical sociological problem of cohabitation of different cultures. It is necessary to realize what do "we" stand for.

In the last decade, terrorism underwent fundamental transformation. It does not manifest itself through sporadic attacks on states elites. In Europe there is a long tradition of terrorism bind with ethno-separatist projects of some groups trying to achieve higher autonomy or even independence. Today the terrorism is mostly based on religious grounds. Separatist terrorism almost vanished in the region of Europe. Today's attacks are directed mainly towards civil society or critical infrastructure. Terrorism can no more be eradicated by the effort of a single country. The systematic solution based on cooperation of several countries or even the coordination of international organizations is needed.

The aim of this article is to define the key approaches in fight against terrorism. The scientific method used in this article is system approach. It is based not only on the fight against the outcomes of expansion of terrorist groups and terrorist attacks led by them but the fight against the causes of terrorism that could lead into total elimination of potential causes of the emergence of terrorism.

The main sources for our article are: **P. M. Cronin, T. D. Hoyt, P. R. Pilar, L. Clutterbuck** and **M. A. Sheehan**. We expand the research by critical analysis and comparison with the current situation mainly in the region of Europe.

1 Fight against terrorism from the systemic point of view

Terrorist attacks happen in all of the regions of the world on almost daily basis. Either developed or developing countries are exception. Two decades ago terrorist incidents were of local importance. They had no or very limited effect on geopolitical situation. As the time passed methods and means of terrorism developed. Efficiency as well as the power of the terrorist attacks grew. The number of victims and harm caused by terrorism has grown. The most significant change came after 1990 when the bipolarity collapsed and the Cold War was at its end. The key point of development of current terrorism were 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York.

Neither Europe is immune against rising number of terrorist attacks. Increasing number of terrorist attacks causes increasing efforts of individual states and international organizations to develop such a counter-terrorist strategy that will result in the complete elimination of potential attacks. The process is difficult considering the motivation behind the terrorist attacks. There are

mainly two types of aims. The first is to cause a fear among society. The second one is usually hidden. It is aimed at excluding chosen part of society from normal life in order to easily radicalize and manipulate it. Taking both of the aims under consideration it becomes very difficult for referent objects to develop a mechanism to stop potential terrorist attacks. Today most of the counter-terrorist initiatives aim at fighting against the effects of terrorism. This form of fight against the terrorism after 9/11 opened space for the use of military power bind with political targets. However, the military power cannot be used as in the symmetrical warfare. It must be utilized with the close connection to other policy instruments (initiatives) against terrorism (Hoyt, 2004). This approach had two main shortcomings that finally materialized. Critics mostly feared the effects of rising number of terrorist attacks. The legality of military operations against countries accused of supporting terrorists is also questionable. A lot of authors and analysts agreed on systemic approach of fight against terrorism. It consists of several aspects. It is not only the fight against effects of terrorism but as well against the causes of the emergence of terrorist groups. Considering this approach, we can define three main approaches: military power, diplomacy, foreign aid, engagement and support of police, and finally the engagement of intelligence agencies.

2 Chosen approaches for the fight against terrorism

Modern military disposes of different capabilities that might be used for the fight against terrorism. Modern military technology limits the footprint that would be otherwise left by traditional military operation. Even though, the use of military force is difficult and controversial. The use of military force might be categorized into two fields: (Hoyt, 2004) first of all it causes civil casualties; secondly there is a tendency of rising number of terrorist attacks in countries that took part in counter-terrorist operations. Second effect causes unpredictable outcomes in the international politics.

The use of military force against terrorism might motivate further sympathizers and enemy states to support terrorism. Some critics consider such a form of military operations to be against the law. The question is where and when is it suitable to use conventional military force: (Hoyt, 2004, pp 179-180)

1. operations against terroristic regimes like ISIL;
2. enemy regimes that allow terrorists to operate and train on their territory;
3. against enemy states that evidently cooperate with terrorist organizations.

The main problem that unfolds around terrorist organizations is their relative invisibility. Only few chosen individuals are well informed about the attacks. In case of lonely wolves no one except them knows about the operation. They behave like normal citizens to the last moment. There seems to be no

connection with previous attacks and no connection with terrorist organizations as well. Virtually anyone might be the terrorist. Not even the intelligence service might be well informed. There is high chance they would not be able to gather relevant information.

The core of their activities should be based on gathering of relevant information about persons, groups, links connected with terrorist activities. There is a question whether intelligence services and agencies are able to gather such information. Their activities might be divided in few points: (Pilar, 2004, pp. 137-138)

1. gathering of information and evidence from attacks that already happened;
2. trying to uncover the perpetrator before terrorist attack takes place, it is a most desirable way, the person might be expelled from the country or taken into custody, nevertheless this activity is very limited;
3. the aim should as well be the subversion of terrorist cells that might have additional information about other cells, there is a high possibility that one cell uses similar practices as some of the others, revealing the patterns of their modus operandi seems to be the most important.

For more effectivity of intelligence services two things are very important: resources and exchange of intelligence information. The intelligence might be boosted by rising the number of analysts. That means more money. The exchange of information between intelligence agencies but also between international organizations needs to be improved as well. The key point is effectivity of exchange of intelligence as well as other information. (Pilar, 2004) The work of intelligence agencies is under permanent critique. It needs the support of society. In order to be successful intelligence agencies have to pursuit multiple aims. It is undesirable to prioritize only certain kind of operations.

An important feature in the fight against the terrorism is police. More precisely the enforcement of law. Terrorism itself cannot be eradicated only be means of military power because it is not an entity in the true sense. Most of the liberal-democratic strategies of the fight against the terrorism is based on judiciary system. By this we mean traditional conviction of perpetrators. It is based on the protection of citizens and the rule of law.

One of the approaches is the holistic approach that is based on: (Clutterbuck, 2004, pp. 156-157)

1. specification of crimes related to terrorism and cooperation of security agencies by application of these specifications;
2. legislation focused on specific crimes that are committed by terrorists what allows to identify them in advance, it is necessary

that legislation focuses also on the financial flows of terrorists or on new ways of recruitment of members;

3. today, many states proceed in process of prevention/detection, investigation and management of effects of the terrorism;
4. the last important feature is personal and community responsibility of society in process of revealing crimes connected to terrorism.

Today, many of the international organizations that deal with the fight against terrorism got extraordinary competences in case of investigation. It is necessary to stress that terrorism cannot be comprehended only as a crime. That would be too narrow as a definition. Not only because the borders between crime and terrorism are blurring but also because terrorism uses the means of ordinary crime for its benefits. The role of law enforcement is one of the most important in case of counter-terrorism.

When fighting terrorism, it is important that not only the state forces cooperate. Also, the cooperation between states is desirable. Effective counter-terrorist alliance is an inevitable part of a wider strategy. Only the prevention can effectively protect against terrorist attacks. The effective global strategy should be able to marginalise the power of terrorist organizations and prevent them from undertaking attacks with catastrophic effects. Some of the authors (Sheehan, 2004) consider diplomacy as one of the means of counter-terrorism. They consider it also to be the basis for complex and long-term strategy of discrediting and stopping global terrorist groups from functioning (it might as well get rid of these groups).

Taking the decentralisation and geographical dispersity of terrorist groups under consideration, it is not easy at all to eliminate them that is why most of the terrorist attacks are mostly not on a huge scale. Particular cells and organizations try to keep their operations secret or use other cells to cover up the whole organization. Diplomacy and its contribution to the counter-terrorism should be based on cooperation of intelligence services, exchange of information, cooperation of police forces and military units. The aim of diplomacy should be the support for creation of: (Sheehan, 2004, pp. 112-113)

1. inter-state and international counter-terrorist laws;
2. rise of the findings for training, equipment and other programs in the fight against terrorism;
3. programs which cover the coordination of cooperation between particular states with the aim to create effective apparatus which would help in the process of arresting terrorists or obstructing their functioning;
4. coercive means as sanctions and military power.

One of the key factors to stress is the ever creating and unifying international law that is aimed against terrorism.

The last of the approaches is foreign aid that should be aimed effectively. It is obvious that states cannot help everywhere and without the limits. The hypothesis about the nexus between failed states and terrorism seems not to be universally right. (Kosárová, 2016) To focus only on Muslim countries tends to be ineffective. There are many Arabic (Muslim) countries that are against the terrorism. The islands of security in the developing world have to be created should the foreign aid be successful. Foreign aid must support long-term development goals. These goals have to be effective and sustainable to support for example industry and future political changes that would cause economic growth and stability of the country.

The aim of the foreign aid should be the support of: (Cronin, 2004, pp. 253-255)

1. such incentives that would bring about economic changes under the responsibility of the recipient and thus would also rise the support of citizens;
2. human capital and their abilities, education and health service;
3. development of woman rights and reduction of freedom deficit (political as well as economic).

It is necessary not to live in a prelude that the problematics of terrorism regards only the developing countries. Many of the attacks are carried out in developed countries by local citizens. It is important to stress that the problem of terrorism is most sound for the young males in risk societies and situations (we do not mean only developing countries but also developed countries where men are excluded from the society from different reasons and thus vulnerable for manipulation). It is as well important to know that financial aid against terrorism is a long-term aim and must be the inherent part of other approaches.

Conclusion

Summarization of this analysis allowed us to set possibilities which might lead to effective fight against terrorism. Not only against the effects of terrorism but against causes as well. The aim was not to make comprehensive analysis of all the means and methods available in the fight against terrorism. The aim was to set the most used counter-terrorism means. These led us to a complex definition of the concept of terrorism.

Overall, such a comprehensive method should comprise all currently existing means in all of the sectors. Strategies should take mainly three requirements under consideration:

1. complementarity with the regional and global strategy (NATO, EU, OSCE, UN)
2. definition of competences, allocation of resources and human resources on the territory of the state in case of extraordinary situations including the creation of new organs and institutions,

3. creation of ways of elimination of organized crime including terrorism on all of the levels. (Lasicová, 2011)

In the end it is necessary to add that all of the tools must lead to creation of institutions in state or on the state territory. These institutions should be able to keep order and law. Other responsibilities include economic opportunities and creating the framework within which the security would be guaranteed. Without security there is no space for human security, education and health insurance. What is the aim of the complex strategy if it does not eradicate terrorism directly? It is important to know that different programmes must undermine the support for terrorism and enhance the partnership between the states that are willing to fight terrorism. Today it is not enough to conquer the state that is supporting terrorism or arrest the people that might commit terrorist attacks in the country. In such a state, it is necessary to create the environment that would lead to rejection of participation in terrorist organizations or acts of terrorism.

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THREATS TO SOCIAL SECURITY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF POLAND AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Monika Zawartka[1]

ABSTRACT

The security of every country is a very important element of the state's policy and functioning. The state should ensure security for its citizens in many areas of life. The creation of structures that ensure continuous protection and protection of citizens should be a priority for any government. Every citizen is subject to legal protection and is equal before the law. This applies to both internal and international security. Therefore, governments and non-governmental institutions should constantly examine and undertake activities aimed at strengthening security, both within the borders of the state and the entire European Union.

Key words: Security, Poland, European Union, Threats, Social Security

Introduction

The area of national security of Poland, which acquires a key significance in the 21st century, is social security, understood as protection of the existential basis of human life, providing opportunities to meet individual needs and fulfilling life aspirations by creating conditions for work and study, health protection and pension guarantees.

Social security therefore covers all legal, organizational and educational activities carried out by government entities (national and supranational), non-governmental entities and citizens themselves, which aim at providing a certain standard of living for individuals, families, social groups and preventing their marginalization and social exclusion. It is related to providing help to people who are temporarily or permanently unable to work, found themselves by their own lack of need in difficult life situations. Another situation affecting the deterioration of living conditions may be external factors such as floods or fires. It should be noted, however, that social assistance and support can not lead to helplessness and passive citizenship, that is, the expectation that the state will solve all their problems for citizens.

Social threats

In the modern world there are various, often referred to as 'unconventional' threats that really threaten societies. They go into the nation itself and its biological and existential foundations of existence, and thus also

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constitute a real threat to the security of the state. In literature, these threats have been called social threats. And in their area, social and psychosocial threats can be distinguished. It should be remembered that they significantly affect, on the one hand, the quality and standard of social life, and thus the level of civilization development of a given state, but also of international communities. Globalization brings not only the free flow of goods and services, but also all kinds of threats to which AIDS, drug abuse, trafficking in human beings and organs belong. A worrying phenomenon is the deepening decline of family values as the basic social unit. Consequently, this entails a low level of natural increase which, combined with other social hazards, can contribute to a significant extent to the destruction of modern society, including the interruption of national life including.

Low natural growth is one of the consequences of the crisis of the traditional family, which until now was a guarantee of stability, security and sustained state growth. The family performs many important functions, satisfying its psychological, emotional and social needs for its members and thus society. Thus, the state should show a significant concern for the family, because it is in its interest to ensure moral security and the natural process of generational exchange being a condition for survival and development, i.e. creating national security. (Zieliński, 2009, s. 25) Demographers, however, predict that low rates of natural increase will contribute to the gradual decline of the population of Poland and in 2050 there will be around 27.3 million citizens. The consequence of this process will be not only the reduction in the number of inhabitants of Poland, but also the aging of the society we are currently experiencing. Demographic processes will result, on the one hand, in the demographic decline and professional difficulties of teachers at all levels of education. Subsequently, the lack of young cadres in the labor market, after a significant increase in the number of people entitled to retirement benefits. It may cause a collapse of the pension system, and the forecasts indicate that in fifty years only one person can work for one pensioner.

Therefore, preventing and preventing demographic catastrophe should be one of the strategic missions of the state. This means that it should include a complex of undertakings in the social, economic, educational and cultural spheres.

Unemployment, poverty, homelessness, addictions are social threats that cause dysfunctionality of entire social groups functioning on the margins of social life. Threatened communities not only can not cope with the rights and obligations resulting from being a citizen of the Republic of Poland, but, above all, they do not perform family functions, including basic parenting and socialization duties in relation to their children. And in this way, the phenomena of dysfunctions, problems and finally the pathology of families are expanding. The fact that social threats in Poland is growing is evidenced by Poles' fears connected with losing their job and deteriorating living conditions and

deteriorating the health situation. Crime is also such a threat, and the fact that young people remain without permanent occupation. Also worrying is the growing number of people for whom social benefits are the only income used to meet the current needs of all family members. (Jakubczak, Marczak, 2006, s. 54)

Analyzing the society in terms of social structure, one can point to certain social groups that have the greatest difficulty in achieving their own sense of social security. And so, in terms of occupational and social position, the most vulnerable people are people who have lost their job or are not able to undertake it. It should be remembered that unemployment has a negative impact not only on the unemployed themselves and their families, but also on entire local communities; people working in enterprises threatened with liquidation; people living in former PGRs or living on small farms that have no chance of employment in other areas of the economy. Another criterion refers to socio-demographic issues that may affect vulnerability to social threats and include: large families and incomplete families; people with mental and physical disabilities; children and adolescents growing up in pathological families; people living below the subsistence level, including low-income seniors. Should also be remembered that social threats are also vulnerable to people or communities that live in specific regions, such as the economically most deprived regions, regions with the highest unemployment or those affected by natural disasters.

State tasks in the field of social security

The state, in order to ensure favorable conditions for the development and functioning of individuals, groups and communities that will give a sense of development opportunity and lack of threats, conducts a specific social policy. It is the activity of legislative, executive and control entities of the state, as well as local governments and non-governmental organizations, aiming at shaping appropriate working and living conditions, desirable social structures in which it will be possible to meet society's needs. (Auleytner, 2002, s. 47) Thus, social policy aims to protect people against their needs, from the most elementary ones to the needs related to development and full participation in social life. The state's activities in the sphere of social policy are primarily aimed at improving the living situation of socially and economically vulnerable groups; mitigating social inequalities and poverty; minimizing social risk; organizing social progress. (Auleytner, 2002, s. 53) Thus understood social policy can be identified with the aspirations of the state to ensure social security perceived as creating conditions for citizens to last and develop. On the other hand, the motive for state activity is on the one hand certain problems and threats, and on the other, the pursuit of economic and social development, which will prevent the emergence of social issues and problems both on the national and regional and local levels. Hence, in the area of social security, three sectors can be

distinguished, which undertake various activities for the broader understood social good. Belong to them:

- public sector, within which activities are undertaken by government and local government institutions;
- the private sector, which complements the public sector and a certain alternative;
- the non-governmental sector, which is based on the idea of civil society, uses initiatives of local communities as well as volunteering or social economy. (Rysz-Kowalczyk, 2002, s. 141)

In democratic countries in which stable socio-economic and economic systems function, economic operators also play an important role in shaping social security. They undertake various activities in the social and living areas, which turn out to be important for the employee, and concern, inter alia, the creation of better working conditions, professional development which allows to retain deficit staff. In the field of social policy, there are also non-governmental entities whose task is to supplement the state's activities for individuals and social groups, not only those who are the weakest in social terms. On the one hand, these organizations deal with satisfying specific social needs by articulating the interests and needs of various social groups, but also participate in the decision-making process in the field of social policy, among others through the process of social consultations.

The entities of social policy of realizing their basic tasks are guided by certain, clearly defined norms, principles and directives. In social policy, the most articulated and implemented principles are:

- precautionary principle, which means that man himself must take responsibility for his and his loved ones' lives. Therefore, he must manage his possessions in such a way as not only to meet current needs, but also to ensure a safe future. This principle also indicates that the state can not be the only institution providing security in the unitary dimension;
- the principle of self-help, which manifests itself in the existence and development of mutual help of people who are struggling with similar life problems and help stronger for the weaker. This principle is most often implemented in small informal groups;
- the principle of social solidarity is sometimes identified with social solidarity. This principle is perceived as transferring the consequences and social risks from the individual to society. It also means the superiority of common interests of all members of society over the interests of specific social or professional groups;
- the principle of subsidiarity and subsidiarity. This principle means adopting an order so that the individual can expect help and support from social institutions that are at different levels of the social structure. It is about building such an approach that the first level of support would be the immediate environment, followed by the local community and organizations operating in

its area, and finally state support. Some idea of this principle is to stimulate the activity of people who find themselves in a difficult situation;

- the principle of participation is also called the principle of participation. It indicates that every member of society has the right to participate fully in social life, to belong to communities, social groups and active in them. So that everyone can realize their social roles. This principle also addresses equality issues in social life;

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- the principle of self-government implements such values as human freedom and subjectivity. This principle is implemented through such organization of social life that both individuals and social groups can actively participate in existing social institutions, and also create new ones that will more effectively implement and meet social needs and interests;

- the principle of common good manifests itself in actions of public authorities that take into account the benefits and needs and interests of all citizens and rely on seeking compromises when these needs and interests are at odds;

- the multi-sectoral principle consists in the simultaneous functioning in the public space of public entities of social policy together with non-governmental organizations and market institutions. All these sectors should provide the public with resources and services aimed at meeting social needs. (Rysz-Kowalczyk, 2002, s. 141)

The indicated principles of social policy are universal principles, while individual models of social policy adapt specific sets of rules to their needs.

The indicated social dangers of the 21st century, due to their range, intensity and longevity, become global threats. Therefore, in the implementation of tasks, the state must be supported by the entire potential of its society. This is primarily about human capital, social capital and social values. It is therefore necessary and necessary to take measures to improve social and social security. It is also important to include all entities acting for security in the actions undertaken. This applies to both governmental, local government and non-governmental entities.

Instead of ending

In the era of globalization, internal security and external security are closely interrelated. Threats from the outside can easily turn into internal threats. This applies above all to such areas as terrorism, international crime, the use of energy supplies for political purposes, natural and man-made natural disasters.

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Poland is exposed to many of them, and many of them affect the country to a greater or lesser extent.

Political and economic events taking place in one country influence events in others. Cataclysms resulting from the polluted environment, which led to the greenhouse effect, belong to those related to human activity and are responsible for specific countries or enterprises.

Therefore, the immediate effect of globalization is the need to cooperate in security with both institutions and organizations established on their own territory, as well as with international organizations. This cooperation includes broadly understood activities related to counteracting and solving various issues and problems. In the field of internal security, the state, while planning its activities, must be aware of these conditions and create appropriate conditions, and on their basis, appropriate institutions, and then try to improve and adapt to current situations. (Zięba, 1999, s. 78)

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BELT ROAD INITIATIVE SECURITY ASPECTS

Jozef Žigray[1] - Pavel Nečas[2]

ABSTRACT
The Belt Road Initiative, or the One Belt One Road Initiative, is specific for its obvious and incomparable economic scope, which is often highlighted. Another, less researched but not less specific feature of the Chinese initiative is its close linking with security issues. The aim of the article is to highlight the security dimension of the Chinese Belt Road Initiative.

Key words: *Belt Road Initiative, international security aspects, China military diplomacy*

Introduction

After the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR, the USA took the position of hegemon in international relations. Currently this status is increasingly questioned and the attention focuses on emerging China as a potential challenger to the United States. Rising China comes with new visions. In 2002, former President **Jiang Z.** believed that *the first two decades of the 21st century are a period of important strategic opportunities*, which China should seize (Jiang, 2002). In 2003, under the leadership of his successor **Hu J.**, China articulated a concept of *China's peaceful rise*. Later, in 2004, President Hu softened this term and China started to speak about *China's peaceful development*. In 2012, current President **Xi J.** announced his vision for the achievement of *great renewal or rejuvenation of Chinese nation* which would reflect a national aspiration for a *Chinese Dream* about making the country stronger through development (Rajan, 2013).

1 Political and economic aspects of BRI

At the end of 2013, during his official visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia, President **Xi** announced the visions of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. Both initiatives were later called as the One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR), The Belt and Road (B&R) or The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the term which we use for the purposes of this article. In 2014, *"Beijing identified BRI as a top national priority, created specific financial*

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institutions to fund it, and promised to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on infrastructure projects across Eurasia" (Rolland, 2017a, p. 1). In 2015, the concept was formalized into the *BRI Action Plan* by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and adopted as a structured mechanism with established priorities and principles (NDRC, 2015). BRI has become the *grand strategy* of the 5th generation of Chinese leaders headed by President **Xi.** BRI is the central element of the PRC's economic strategy and foreign policy strategy. BRI has also become an essential factor in the implementation of state security strategy and the strategy for development of its Armed Forces. **Chen G.** notes that BRI modified China's long-standing principle of keeping a low profile and reflects China's newly discovered ambition to seek global great power status and its long-term plan of reshaping the global economic order (Chen, 2017). *"In other words, BRI is a grand strategy, coordinating and giving direction to a large array of national resources to achieve a political objective, which Xi Jinping has defined as the China Dream of the great rejuvenation of the nation: the achievement of China's unimpeded rise" (Rolland, 2017b, p.5).* The idea of the *New Silk Road,* linking the Eurasia region is not entirely new. Some older Chinese projects have been included in BRI framework, such as a scheduled freight train linking Chongqing with Duisburg, Germany. The project was agreed in 2011 and is operational from April 2017 (CASS, 2017). In Asia, it is the *Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor*, implemented since 1999 as the *Kunming Initiative* (Iyer, 2017). Since 1992, the European Union has launched several projects under the *Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia initiative* (Fedorenko, 2013). In 2011, the US announced the *New Silk Road Initiative*, which aims to increase Afghanistan's integration into Central and South Asian economies through energy and transport development (US Department of State, 2017). In 2013, Japan initiated *revitalization strategy*, while in the same year South Korea announced the *Eurasia Initiative* focused on regional economic connectivity (Rolland, 2017c). Currently BRI, supported by Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), is intensively studied by Chinese and foreign scholars, analysts and politicians. BRI is also considered from its geopolitical point of view. The vast majority of states, including the EU countries or Russia, welcome the initiative, while the USA, Japan and India are rather cautious or skeptical. Initiative seems to be a geopolitical project in the first place and it has nothing to do with the Marshall Plan. (Larin, 2017). **M. Glosny** rises a question whether China's growing wealth and economic capacity is, or is not, leading to similar levels of regional or global diplomatic, military, or overall strategic influence (Glosny, 2016). Interest in BRI does not automatically guarantee objective results and consistent views regarding its benefits. Political, geopolitical and security factors play a significant role in connection with the individual interests of the powers. *"So far, the combined economic and geostrategic impacts of new Chinese led initiatives like the Belt and Road in South and Central Asia remain more often the subject of*

speculation than of careful research and analysis" (Ferchen, 2016a, p. 11). Inaccurate evaluations are the result of a narrow and often unilateral view on dynamic economics, geopolitics and security developments in China which complicates the search for appropriate solutions and creation of constructive relationships. The scope and focus of the article does not allow us to deal more in detail with BRI economic significance. But we consider it appropriate to highlight some of the facts. BRI is an inter connected network of East West and North South trans-regional corridors that go parallel to or link the *belt* and the *road*. The corridors differ in their scope and are at various stages of implementation (Grieger, 2016). China and countries along the China proposed the construction of six economic corridors (namely Eurasia Land Bridge, China-Mongolia-Russia, China-Central Asia-West Asia, China-Indo-China Peninsula, China-Pakistan, and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar) within BRI (China Daily, 2015). China estimates that BRI can potentially involve 65 countries and 4.4 billion people in a geographical area which generates roughly 55% of global GNP, represents about 70% of global population and has an estimated 75% of known energy reserves. BRI projects will take 30 to 35 years. China believes to achieve an annual trade worth US$ 2.5 trillion between the countries along BRI within ten years (Grieger, 2016). These figures are still not final and vary depending on the new countries' entry The BRI initiative has a foreign political, economic, strategic and security potential. BRI is a symbol of the current ambitious and expanding policy of President Xi, which is generally welcomed in the world. Such a huge project, with a significant impact on virtually the whole of Eurasia, logically brings concerns and uncertainties in dimensions of security.

2 Security aspect of BRI

2.1 Development and security

Several authors note the BRI's dependency with international security as well as the interconnection of China's economic development and its security. Although BRI is by officials mainly referred to economic terms, it does follow the long-standing conceptual vision of China's official views about the economic basis of regional and global security (Ghiasy, Zhou, 2017). China understands economic development as mutually beneficial to its actors, and likewise sees common security as mutually beneficial. **M. Swaine** asserts, that BRI can be seen as part of an overall Chinese attempt to use its growing economic power and influence along the periphery in order to strengthen and expand cooperative interactions, create an integrated network of mutually beneficial economic and political ties, as well as ultimately lower level of distrust and enhance a sense of common security (Swaine, 2017). We believe that BRI requires new approaches to security issues for at least six reasons. *The first* reason is the Chinese vision of security, which does not fully respect the

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Western understanding, especially in terms of its exceptional complexity. In 2014, President **Xi** in his speech at the first meeting of Central National Security Commission of the Communist Party of China identified eleven security areas forming China's comprehensive national security system: political, homeland, military, economic, cultural, social, science and technology, information, ecological, resources, and nuclear security. **Shen G.** asserts that among these eleven national security areas, only military security can be considered within the scope of traditional security, other areas are nontraditional. Understanding of China's national security is incrementally comprehensive because China is rising to a great power statute, but on the other hand, it is more vulnerable than before because of its complicated environment (Shen, 2014). The evolution of BRI *"is forcing China's traditional diplomacy based on economic and commercial calculations to embrace a broader political and security engagement with the countries involved by the initiative"* (Arduino, 2016, p. 4). *The second* reason is a Chinese different understanding of the relationship between economic development, security and geopolitics. Many Western scholars believe, there is no direct interdependence between the economic development of the state and its impact on security. **A. Tooze** assess, that on the international scene, the USA remained in many ways unwilling or unable to productively form global affairs in a way corresponding in its economic status after World War II (Tooze, 2014). But the Chinese view is different. Chinese leaders naturally and explicitly link development and security concepts. President **Xi** described development as the highest form of security and he denoted development as a foundation of security, and security as a condition of development (Tiezzi, 2014). At the 17th Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO, President **Xi J.** confirmed the thesis of a conditional relationship between development and security. **Xi** stated: *"Without security, there will be no development to speak of"* (Xi, 2017).

"Thus, one of the most underappreciated aspects of the Chinese leadership's continued commitment to the Peaceful Development strategy is the dogged faith and confidence in the almost magical power of development" (Fretchen, 2016b).

The third reason is China´s ambition to become the main guarantor and provider of BRI´s security. Other states will participate in the security of BRI according to their capabilities of involvement in projects and on the basis of agreements made with China. The security of BRI projects abroad can be guaranteed by: 1. Chinese armed forces, in particular PLA; 2. local armed forces and private security companies of the countries in which the projects are implemented; e.g. **Ivančík and Nečas** draw attention to the possibilities of using private military companies in the absence of other alternatives *"when countries do not have their own sufficient financial, material and / or human resources available to conduct military operations or carry out other necessary military activities by their own power"* (Ivančík - Nečas, 2017). 3. external security providers, e.g. Russia in certain Central Asia states (Gabulev, 2015); 4. Chinese private security companies (Zi, 2016). President **Xi J.**, when introducing the *New Asian Security*

Concept For New Progress in Security Cooperation, declared that development is *the greatest form of security* and *the master key to regional security issues.* China aims to become a major, and most likely the main regional security provider (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). *The fourth* reason is the assumption that China will review its previous approaches to the application of its *Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence*, which govern its foreign and security policy. This applies in particular to the principle of non-interference. In order to safeguard its investments in BRI projects, to protect its state and private companies and citizens operating abroad, China will be forced to more proactively engage in issues of regional and global security. **Duchâtel et al.,** warn that BRI will become an impetus for China's new security thinking and activities (Duchâtel – Brauner - Hang, 2014). *The fifth* reason is the belief that BRI differs from the Marshall Plan, among other things, by not being inspired by an ideology. The Marshall Plan was conceived and executed in the very specific political context of the US's ideological and geopolitical competition with the former USSR in post-war Europe (Shivshankar, 2017). We agree with this assessment, but we note that the security of BRI is provided by instruments such as the PLA and military diplomacy of China. And the functioning of these tools is clearly based on ideology through the CPC. *The sixth* reason is the possibility that BRI will create the conditions for the emergence of new forms and mechanisms of regional security for Eurasia. In relation to the BRI, Chinese scholars propose some new paradigms of security interaction with other countries, including new global security early warning and prevention mechanisms, as well as international security intelligence cooperation on non-traditional security issues (Zhao et al, 2015). President **Xi J**. in his speech at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) confirmed China´s proposal to create mechanisms for regular exchange and cooperation to jointly combat terrorism, separatism, and extremism, China´s readiness to discuss with regional countries the creation of Asian forum for security cooperation in law enforcement, and Asian security emergency response center to deepen security cooperation and better respond to major security emergencies by coordinating national efforts in the region (Xi, 2014). Some of mechanisms already exist, like *Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure* (RATS) within the SCO or *Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism* established between the armed forces of China, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan in 2016 (China Military Online, 2016).

2.2 Concepts, strategies, policies

Despite the significant economic impact, the BRI concept is well in line with conceptual documents on national security such as China White Papers 2013, 2015, 2017, National Security Law of the PRC (2015) or New Asian Security Concept For New Progress in Security Cooperation (2014). An

example for the claim is White Paper 2017 *China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation*, defining China's security policies for peace and stability as follows:1. to promote common development and lay a solid economic foundation; 2. to promote the building of partnerships and strengthen the political foundation; 3. to improve the existing regional multilateral mechanisms and strengthen the framework; 4. to promote the rule-setting and improve the institutional safeguards; 5. to intensify military exchanges and cooperation to offer more guarantees; 6. to properly resolve regional differences and disputes, and maintain a sound environment of peace and stability (State Council, 2017).

2.3 Threats and challenges

Chinese sources almost unanimously point to the negative, and even deteriorating environment in which the BRI is developing. Some foreign analysts assess that the security risks are too great to consider large-scale infrastructure development and Chinese companies should avoid operating in some countries or subregions (Wuthnow, 2017). Implementation of BRI projects faces many security challenges and threats. As the most significant we consider: terrorism, extremism, separatism, radicalism in Xinjiang, Tibet, Central Asian countries and elsewhere, efforts to Taiwan independence, escalation of territorial disputes, lack of energy and resources, insecurity of strategic lines of communication, defections of political elites in fragile states, natural disasters and humanitarian catastrophes, conflicts inside or between the states of BRI projects, international crime, environmental risks and cyber security issues.

2.4 Responsibilities, obligations, leadership

In order to eliminate threats, to anticipate and address crisis situations threatening BRI projects, China and its armed forces will focus particularly on: active participation in UN Security Council and other international organizations and formats dealing with security issues, UN and SCO peace operations, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, supporting the creation of mechanisms of emergency notification, military risk precaution, crisis management and conflict control, protection of transport routes and their infrastructure, fostering common resources exploitation, establishing mechanisms for settling territorial disputes, promoting international exchange of intelligence, and anti terrorism cooperation. BRI will require from China to take more responsibilities, obligations, and later even a leadership role in regional or global security issues. These missions will require especially PLA (People's Liberation Army) investment in power projection capabilities and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) related technologies. President Xi, during his recent inspection of PLA, has ordered the creation of an elite combat force through real combat training and digitalization (Xinhuanet,

2018). We assess, China will not be able to meet the objectives of foreign and security policy just by using its *hard power*. Chinese s*oft power* will play an important role in BRI. Military diplomacy will also be significantly involved.

2.5 Military diplomacy

In 2015, President **Xi J.** introduced the vision of *the new military diplomacy of superpower with Chinese characteristics* and confirmed its increasing importance for the overall strategy of foreign and security policy (Tiezzi, 2015). The current position of Chinese military diplomacy confirms the President's statement. Military diplomacy, in addition to assisting in the implementation of the aforementioned strategies, policies, responsibilities and obligations, actively participates in shaping regional security cooperation mechanisms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Xiangshan Forum, China-ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Ministerial Dialogue on Law Enforcement and Security Cooperation, Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), ASEAN Security Dialogues and Mechanisms, China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Cooperation, East Asia Summit, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and shaping new security standards of relevant BRI. **N. Rolland** notes that the implementation of BRI projects is reshaping China's diplomatic conduct and China goes from *rule taker* to *rule maker (Rolland,2017b. p.6). "This diplomatic transformation marks the opening of a new era with a more proactive China, which has put forward a series of positions on international relations and global governance" (Li, 2017).*

Conclusion

Chinese BRI offers to Eurasian states a significant perspective of the economic development and it is generally welcomed in Europe. Successfully implemented economic projects have also the potential to strengthen regional stability and security. On the other hand, the persistent regional security threats considerably limit the success of the BRI. In addition to the ongoing strategic power competition, the security factor is the reason for cautious and hesitant access of some major powers to BRI. Nevertheless, China will develop BRI and continue economic cooperation with the USA, India and Japan. The powers can also strive for cooperation in the field of regional security in areas of common interest. We expect China will successfully cope with the economic and financial challenges of BRI. The security aspect of the initiative will stay more complex. The reason are not only persistent security threats, but also underdeveloped conditions and mechanisms for their solutions. The security of BRI will require adequate attention of state, armed forces, military diplomacy, and intensive international security cooperation.

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