

# **TOPICS IN LINGUISTICS**

Issue 10 – December 2012

Approaches to Text and Discourse Analysis

Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra  
Faculty of Arts

**Názov/Title**

TOPICS IN LINGUISTICS

Approaches to Text and Discourse Analysis

**Vydavateľ/Publisher**

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**Náklad/Copies**

50

**Počet strán/Pages**

69

ISSN: 1337-7590

Registračné číslo Ministerstva kultúry SR: EV 2584/08

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Univerzita Konštantína Filozofa v Nitre

Filozofická fakulta



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## **Príspevky/Papers**



## Pragmatics: From the Micro to the Macro\*

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### Abstract

Defining pragmatics by its general perspective, rather than by its specific object of investigation, entails looking at the analytic scope of pragmatics in terms of micro- and macro-level concepts. These have been traditionally (cf. e.g. Mey 1993) associated with the opposition between the analysis of speech act force at an utterance level and the analysis of global intentionality at the level of a discourse/text. Following this division, as well as its later refinements, the article will, first, review the locutionary / illocutionary / perlocutionary constituents of force of an utterance, relating them to pragmatic concepts which characterize the process of encoding and decoding its message (deixis, presupposition, implicature, etc.). Second, it will demonstrate how individual utterances comprising different sets of constituents and markers of force, including syntactic markers of explicitness and inferable carriers of implicitness, can form sequences to shape the global intentionality of a discourse/text. Invoking such notions as speech event and macro speech act, the article will show which pragmatic concepts utilized in ("micro-") analysis of individual utterances are essentially complementary, i.e. which markers of force denoted by these concepts can collectively generate complex – "macro" – illocutions responsible for accomplishing global discourse/text goals.

### Keywords

Micropragmatics; macropragmatics; deixis; presupposition; implicature; speech act; speech event; macro speech act; intentionality levels

### 1. Preliminaries

If we set ourselves the daunting task of providing a 'critique-proof' definition of pragmatics, we would inevitably lean towards well-known generalizations like "pragmatics is the study of *meaning* by virtue of the use of language", "pragmatics is the study of *meaning* in context" or even "pragmatics is the study of all aspects of human linguistic behavior".<sup>1</sup> The reason these claims are hard to attack is not only that they involve the obvious difficulty to 'identify the enemy' i.e., to make sense of what is precisely meant by such indeterminate concepts as *context*, *use of language* or *meaning* itself. More significantly, they are safeguarded by their ability to fit in with virtually each of the contemporary approaches to pragmatics, and certainly with the two main schools of thought that have emerged – Anglo-American and European Continental.<sup>2</sup> The former takes the *component* view of pragmatics, namely the view that pragmatics should be treated as a core element of a theory of language, on a par with phonetics, phonology, morphology, syntax, and semantics. Thus, on the component view, pragmatics is assigned, similar to the other elements of the theory, a set number of objects of investigation. These usually include deixis, implicature, presupposition and speech acts. The congruence of the component view of pragmatics with the sample definitions of pragmatics offered above lies in the common assumption of a visible relation between what there is to study (for instance, the meaning of a linguistic item) and in what way (for instance, through context analysis of the uses of language involving this item).

The latter school, European Continental, treats pragmatics not so much as a distinctive element of a theory of language, but more as a functional *perspective* on all aspects of our linguistic behavior, studied within any of the disciplines advocated by the component view – syntax, semantics, etc. Again, this approach is not inconsistent with the definitions provided. It only detracts from the apparent one-to-one correspondence between the object of the study and the method, to suggest that the object (for instance, meaning) can be studied across a variety of disciplines, and also, that these disciplines (be them syntax, morphology, etc.) can borrow from the functional, context-based approach, to reinterpret their original findings. In this sense, we can talk of the following order of investigation: first, there is a perspective (functional), then, different objects are approached to see if they lend themselves to analysis from this perspective and whether such an analysis could yield any extra output compared to the output from investigation within their source disciplines.

To get an idea of what is exactly meant by this 'extra output', consider the following example:

(1) A: Never before have I seen such a cute girl working in our departmental library.

A traditional, syntax- and semantics-based approach to this sentence could be as follows.<sup>3</sup> There is a class of time frequency adverbials which is *semantically* distinct from other classes by virtue of its members possessing an explicit marker of negation or being conventionally considered 'negative'. "Never before" belongs to this class, as do "seldom", "hardly ever", etc. *Syntactic* rules allow extraposition of such 'negative adverbials' (with the simultaneous inversion of the subject-predicate order), for extra emphasis on the speaker's commitment to the truth of the predication. Which, in our case, amounts to A's stressing his absolute certainty that a girl that attractive has never worked in

\*Versions of this article have appeared in *Lodz Papers in Pragmatics* 6 (2010) and *Handbooks of Pragmatics* vol. 1: *Foundations of Pragmatics* (2011). See References for detailed information.

1 I am not quoting from a specific book, but giving a general overtone.

2 For a discussion of the two schools, see e.g. Huang (2007).

3 See e.g. Cole (1978), Lyons (1995).

this particular library before. An account of this kind does, basically, three things: (i) it defines the meaning of the proposition (only) as compared to the meaning of the 'unmarked' version (i.e. without the extraposition); (ii) it prescribes what other extrapositions are grammatically possible, given the semantic characterization of the class (of 'negative' time adverbials); (iii) it prescribes the changes to the word order of the sentence (i.e. subject-predicate inversion) that have to follow the extraposition. Thus, in repetitively addressing the relation between the semantic paradigm of lexical choices available for extraposition and the syntactic form of the sentence, the account leads to little more than the observation that the speaker has considered a set of lexical-structural alternatives, choosing one of them to put, for *some* reason, extra emphasis on the proposition expressed. It does not ask what this reason might be and, consequently, how different reasons and intentions could result in different 'meanings' of the sentence.

Of course, an attempt to answer these questions needs concentrating on not merely the structural relations, but mainly on the speaker, the language user who interprets each such relation in terms of the rhetorical choices he or she possesses in his or her interaction with the hearer, to obtain a specific goal (whether involving an action or not), under specific conditions, which go far beyond the linguistic form as such, and are usually referred to as 'context' (which is where our 'sentence' becomes an 'utterance'). Context is notoriously hard to define (or rather, delimit, at least in the sense of saying what context is *not*),<sup>4</sup> but we can attempt the following approximation: it is the back catalogue of situations and utterances and their (physical) consequences, determining the (function of) the current utterance, a combined (or even common) prehistory of the speaker's and the hearer's (linguistic) experience, including a set of expectations the speaker (pre-)possesses with regard to the effect of his or her current utterance. In such a mass of factors, linguistic and extralinguistic, the linguistic factor of 'co-text' (seen as part of context<sup>5</sup>) is not to be ignored – it is important that the current utterance is understood relative to utterances (the speaker's and/or the hearer's) that have preceded it or are expected to follow it, in a given discourse situation.

Thus, if we take a 'pragmatic' inquiry into meaning (of any linguistic unit, but most commonly, sentence-utterance) as necessarily involving context, and if we accept to approach meaning in terms of a paradigm of different, context-dependent intentions/functions giving rise to a paradigm of different effects, then, in the 'pragmatically enriched' analysis of (1) we generate the 'extra output' by looking at the utterance through a number of questions about its possible context. First of all, do A and the hearer know each other well, and in what capacity? Have they ever talked about the library staff and, specifically, the female staff? What is the 'prehistory' of A's (and his hearer's) assessment of physical attractiveness of the female staff who, as is implied, used to work in the library before? How far do A and the hearer agree in their views, in this situation and in general? Do other libraries A and the hearer know tend to employ attractive females? Is there any stereotyping, whether positive or negative, involved: for instance, do A and the hearer believe, even subconsciously, that the concept of a mundane, dull library job and the concept of beauty, freshness and

young vigor (all of which are more or less salient in the description "cute girl") contradict each other? Of course, the answers can form into a number of different configurations, so let us assume just one specific set and see how the 'contextual' meaning evolves. Let us imagine that A and the hearer are both second year students of the department, that they are flat-mates, but there is little more they have in common. A considers studying a sad duty and prefers going to parties and socializing with girls instead; on the contrary, his hearer is studying enthusiast, in fact a bookworm. As a result, living under one roof, they have been arguing a lot and now tend to disagree on virtually every topic that comes up. Obviously enough, A had only occasionally visited the library before. Recently, however, there has been a pile of books growing on his desk and, one day, his mate asks the reason. A replies with (1). Now, what do we make of it? Which of the factors do we relate to, and how extensively, to pinpoint the most likely 'compromise' between the intention (function) of the utterance and its effect, which, altogether, get us close to capturing its *meaning*?

Some of these contextual factors seem more productive to consider than others. For instance, it is of utmost importance that, having reviewed the context, we can presuppose a lasting, firm difference in opinion, or judgment predisposition, between A and the hearer. In other words, we can assume that no matter what kind of proposition comes from A, the hearer may be reluctant to accept it. This leads us to believe that (1) can be more than a simple, direct assertion, or giving a reason (why, all of a sudden, A has taken to 'reading'). One can argue that an extra force is present as well. Since A expects natural antagonism of the hearer, he is apt to use a language form which will, first and foremost, increase his commitment to the truth of the message and, possibly further on (indirectly), turn this increased commitment into a directive/persuasive device (to use the occasion of borrowing books as a pretext for regularly meeting the girl). The caliber of the directive force may vary, from a directive to accept the message as truthful (a "do believe me [my explanation]" kind of force), to an (indirect) directive for the hearer to test the truthfulness for himself (a "just go and see" force). Still, whichever of the A's aspirations is exactly at play here, the language form used (the extraposed "Never before") remains the primary lexical tool for increasing his commitment, same as the disagreement factor remains the primary premise for interpreting the target intention. Altogether then, the way the function of the utterance is eventually determined can be described as a semantically/syntactically-pragmatic enterprise, with each of the domains making its own contribution: either by defining the autonomous lexical meaning (semantics), or by describing the options and the basic functional consequences of different sentence locations of items carrying this meaning (syntax), or else, and not least, by refining the syntax-functional perspective through a complex analysis of the (extralinguistic) context (pragmatics). The latter is exactly what makes up our added value, the 'extra output'.

The other contextual factors pertaining to (1) seem to merely add to, or detract from, the core forces with which the function of the utterance is performed. If A ever mentioned the apparent unattractiveness of the female staff working in the departmental library and his remark met with a flat counter-opinion such as "Actually, I think they're pretty", the rationale for more directive/persuasive force of the current utterance is getting stronger. On the other hand, if negative stereotyping is involved, (1) can be deemed – in

4 See discussions in e.g. Bezuidenhout (1997, 2002); Elugardo & Stainton (2004); Recanatì (1993, 2001, 2004).

5 cf. Mey (1993: 181-4).

addition to its primary status of an 'explanation' – a manifestation of surprise, a Searlian expressive,<sup>6</sup> without much directive impact. Of course, there's plenty of other ways in which reliance on one of the factors, at the expense of others, profiles the core function(s) of the utterance. And, to extend the perspective, there are whole alternative sets of factors, or conditions, which determine inferences of radically different contextual meanings – we have only briefly looked at one such set. The existence of these alterations, however, does not undermine the mechanism of the pragmatic enrichment of analysis as has just been sketched.

It is as late as this point that we can first turn to the concepts of micropragmatics and macropragmatics, which will be dealt with in this article. Micropragmatics can be defined as the study of illocutionary force at an utterance level (a force traditionally assumed to reside in (a) speech act(s) responsible for enacting a specific function of the utterance – but, as will be argued, also traceable elsewhere or determinable in a different way than via investigation of the umbrella concept of the speech act as such). In contrast to micropragmatics, the focus of macropragmatics is not on the utterance, but on series or sequences of utterances which form into discourses, seen as carriers of global intentionality of the speaker (i.e. the intentionality resulting from different speech act configurations, often referred to as *speech events*) and as producers of complex effects (whether on a single hearer or on a class of hearers). In proposing such definitions, I am purposefully assuming a significant overlap between the two domains: there is no micropragmatic analysis that would not provoke a macropragmatic extension of scope; similarly, there is no macropragmatic study that would not question, retrospectively, its micropragmatic components, thus prompting revision or modification of the original analytic track.

The distinction between micro- and macropragmatics seems to be, in a way, a product of three 'infelicities', which have been tackled so far in our discussion. The first has to do with loose definitional boundaries of pragmatics, the second with its rather undefined status as compared to other fields in linguistics, and the third with an apparent lack of formal rules according to which pragmatic analysis enriches e.g. semantic and syntactic considerations. If we take pragmatics to be – recall the first paragraph – the study of *meaning in context*, then context, as has been seen from the analysis of (1), is not limited in formal ways, such as the length of sentence/utterance or the amount of its 'prehistory'. Contextual considerations which are used for determining the function and effect of an utterance may or may not stop within the boundaries of the language form used. Thus, we need a conceptual handle on the interface between smaller and larger functional units of discourse (e.g. speech act versus speech event), coded in smaller or larger forms (e.g. sentence versus text). Secondly, the micro-macro divide reflects the controversy over the component and the perspective view of pragmatics. Better still, it reflects a possible consensus between the two views, which allows them to exist side by side. We can have a 'pragmatic component', understood as the set of whatever pragmatic functions (and methods of their investigation) can be assigned to language, along with a 'pragmatic perspective', that is the way these functions operate within the individual units of the language system and of language use, respectively. This approach, seemingly gaining ground over the past two

decades,<sup>7</sup> entails that we take into account both the macrocosm of all language, and the microcosm of specific manifestations of language, on which manifestations we project methods of investigation selected from the macro catalogue.

Thirdly, there is no way in which to formally characterize or delimit the pragmatic enrichment of semantic and/or syntactic studies – since one simply cannot delimit context, the primary source of such an enrichment. The more access to contextual (including co-textual) embedding of an utterance (recall (1)) or a series of utterances, the better profiled the meaning. Hence a tendency on the part of the analyst to pile up contextual clues and to add to the picture as much of the 'prehistory' of the discourse situation as possible (and feasible). But since access to contextual clues is each time different and invariably limited by a dynamic network of constraints (consider scripts of off-record cues in institutional meetings: in some countries they are eagerly handed over to linguists as co-text data for business discourse studies, in some only parts of them or none are revealed<sup>8</sup>), the analyst can hardly ever claim to have exhausted 'all context' to determine the meaning. In this sense, the micro-macro dichotomy involves a relation between the minimal and the maximal contextual input into analysis, irrespective of its scope, i.e. the length of the language form under scrutiny.

The fact that the micro-macro distinction might be, as has been postulated, result of a number of controversies surrounding the core field of pragmatics, does not detract from its conceptual merits and, mainly, methodological feasibility. I shall repeat what has been said earlier (and what will be documented in the rest of this article), (i), there is no micropragmatic analysis that would not provoke a macropragmatic extension of scope; (ii), there is no macropragmatic study that would not question, retrospectively, its micropragmatic components, thus prompting revision or modification of the original analytic track. Altogether, we arrive at a bottom-top-bottom cycle of 'upgrades' on the explanatory power of both micropragmatic and macropragmatic concepts. By way of illustration, consider a sample analytic procedure whose objective is to account for the pragmatics of speeches of the American cold war presidents (say, Harry S. Truman or Dwight D. Eisenhower). Imagine that a micro-level analysis of utterances making up these speeches points to a large number of deictic, referential and anaphoric markers, embedded in a multitude of direct speech acts. On the contrary, some other units or phenomena explored in such an analysis, for instance implicatures and presuppositions, turn to be underrepresented. The next step the analyst takes is to classify these findings under controlling categories, such as speech events or macro speech acts, to establish the performative denominators and thus postulate about global function(s) of the discourse genre (i.e. the presidential cold war speeches) as a whole. This macro-analytic task needs inviting the extralinguistic context, which informs and complements the linguistic observations. The likely content of the contextual considerations is that the cold war presidents address a world that is ideologically

7 Apparently, this line is followed by most contributors to the Horn and Ward's (2004) seminal handbook. It is also characteristic of the Elsevier's *Journal of Pragmatics*. On the other hand, mission of the International Pragmatics Association and the aims and scope of its quarterly *Pragmatics* express mostly perspectivist views (see also Verschueren (1999)).

8 cf. Ramallo, Lorenzo-Suarez, Rodriguez-Yanez and Cap (2009).

6 cf. Searle (1975, 1979).



divided and respond to a need to clearly define to their audience the essence of this divide, which eventually leads them to construct the well-known 'us and them' opposition. Hence the rhetorical urge for directness and clarity, rationalizing the opulent use of indexicals or anaphoric expressions and banning most forms of implicit communication such as implicatures or presuppositions. Reaching this conclusion means that the analyst was able to use micropragmatic considerations as building blocks of a functional hypothesis, which he or she then tested against contextual factors (including his or her expert knowledge), in order to generate a macro-function of the genre. This is, roughly, how the analytic curiosity about regularities governing the salience of some phenomena observed at an utterance level can provoke the 'macropragmatic extension of scope'. Yet, the 'upgrade cycle' does not stop here, there is still room for a reverse procedure, which has the macropragmatic findings relate to the original component premises. Namely, the analyst may want to return to the bottom level of an utterance to look for more data, to further strengthen the macro conclusion(s). This may mean leaving out some of the now 'useless' forms (e.g. markers of implicitness) and delving deeper into those which have passed the context verification. As a result, further micropragmatic activity can follow, with a view to, either, narrowing down the study of the original parameters, e.g. deixis or direct speech acts, to only those aspects which are in line with the macropragmatic conclusion, or, possibly, identifying more bottom-level forms which are relevant, for instance more cohesive devices, relational propositions, etc. Which is where the first round of the bottom-top-bottom cycle ends, but, apparently, more rounds can still happen, with the micro-macro conclusions refining each other virtually ad infinitum. The existence of such a dialogue is probably among the most significant methodological arguments for having the two concepts, micropragmatics and macropragmatics, in the theoretical framework of the field.

The rest of this article is organized as follows. In 2., I elaborate on the four concepts central to the methodology of pragmatics: deixis, presupposition, implicature and speech acts. I spend most of the space discussing them from an essentially 'micropragmatic' perspective, describing their contribution to the proposition of an utterance, its illocutionary force, and the range and kinds of effects the utterance is able to bring about. At the same time, however, I give a foretaste of the macropragmatic approach, by pointing to three relativities-regularities. The first is the different potential each of the four concepts possesses to contribute to the description of function and effects of an utterance. The second is the fact that, in the process of describing an utterance, some of the concepts 'go together' and form more sophisticated methodological tools, better than others. The third is the different range of utterance contexts each of the concepts is able to account for, which opens up prospects for their hierarchical application in analysis.

In 3., I take these relativities-regularities as prompts for an integrated study of intentionality at the macro level of discourse/text. Addressing such notions as *speech event* and *macro speech act*, I revisit the potential of individual speech acts (considered analytically superordinate to deixis, presupposition, implicature), for combining in large functional units enacting discourse topics. I discuss the conceptual infiniteness pertaining to speech events in terms of their composition and hierarchy, and show the resulting relativity of the concept of the macro speech act.

## 2. A micropragmatic perspective on deixis, presupposition, implicature and speech acts – with some implications for macropragmatics

### 2.1. Deixis

There are at least two reasons why to start this section with deixis. First and foremost, if we accept that pragmatics deals with studying meaning (defined by the function(s) of language form(s) which people apply to obtain real-world goals) in the broadly conceived 'context', then deixis seems the concept that captures the relationship between the language form and the context in the most evident and direct manner. Deixis, derived from the Greek word meaning 'to point to', can be viewed as the main phenomenon whereby features of context of utterance (or speech event, as macropragmatic considerations will show) are encoded in sentences-utterances by primarily lexical (e.g. demonstratives) but also grammatical (e.g. tense) means. This brings us to the second reason, which is that deixis is among the most universal pragmlinguistic concepts. Deictic expressions must be present in all human languages, to serve the pragmatic needs of their users. The accomplishment of these needs always involves setting up a relation between the words people use and the context, hence there must be 'pointers' which indicate *who* utters the words to accomplish *what*, *when* and *where*.

Since such indications clearly bind together the person who makes the utterance, as well as the time and place where the utterance is made, most work on deixis has distinguished between the three categories: person deixis, time deixis, and place deixis.<sup>9</sup> Below I shall give credit to this work, adopting the tripartition and related concepts (e.g. deictic center) as the framework for discussion (except the final, 'extra' account of 'discourse deixis', meant to inspire a later return to deixis from macropragmatic perspective) and summarizing the major points as regards basic utterance functions of the three types. However, on top of it, there will be a critical evaluation of the explanatory power of deixis in (micro-)pragmatic research in general, and a tentative attempt to place the analysis of deixis (so far, within an utterance) at a specific level of pragmatic investigation.

#### 2.1.1. Person deixis

Person deixis serves to identify interlocutors and the roles they play in a situation depicted by an utterance (and later, a speech event). Its grammaticalization occurs, primarily, in personal pronouns (which express the standard features of person, number and gender) and vocatives (encoded in proper names, titles or kinship terms). The two types of grammaticalization of person deixis are illustrated in (2) and (3), respectively:

(2) *You* can leave the room now.

(3) *Mr. Smith*, you are kindly requested to proceed to Gate 9.

Both (2) and (3) allow some extra observations. (2) can be accompanied by the speaker's gesture (specifying which person from among a few, is permitted to leave the room), in which case we speak of a gestural use of deixis. If there is no accompanying gesture, but it is still possible to work out, e.g. from the conversational or monologic co(n)text, which person is referred to, the use of the deictic expression *you* can be described as

9 Among the most useful overviews of research in deixis are Nunberg (1993), Fillmore (1997), and Levinson (2004).

symbolic. The same label applies if the *you* is to refer to the part of or the whole group, but again, there is no physical indication and the referents get worked out from the context (or, possibly, just co-text). There are of course more complex interpretations of *you*, if we reach beyond the example above. Consider an utterance like, (4), "You don't want to live in Bronx", and it becomes clear that the use of *You* is not only non-gestural, but in fact also non-symbolic, since there is hardly a way in which a specific referent could be established from contextual considerations. Thus, (4), having a general, impersonal reference, is an example of a deictic expression used non-deictically. It's quite interesting, though, that while such a use of *you* may render its analysis irrelevant to a standard account of deixis, its functional properties prompt an extremely productive discussion. The *you* in (4) invokes a spectrum of functions possibly larger than can be expected from the same deictic expression used in the 'typical', deictic manner. Depending on context, such functions can involve anything from a counter-advice to a warning or even a threat! Intriguingly, although (micro-)pragmatics cannot afford to leave deixis beyond its scope of investigation, the most interesting functional considerations (possessing significant explanatory value for macropragmatic accounts as well) often rest in borderline or apparently marginal cases. In (3), the vocative deictic expression (whose formal properties are such that it refers to the addressee, but forms no part of the arguments of the predicate) is *Mr. Smith* and, as a call, is utterance-initial. Some other vocatives (especially addresses) can occur later in the utterance, as in (5), "Excuse me, *sir*, we're about to close".

Both (2) and (3) (as well as (5)), exemplify the fact that deixis (not only person deixis but in fact all types) is organized, essentially, in an egocentric way, the central anchorage point being the so-called deictic center defined by the spatio-temporal parameters 'I(speaker)-here-now'.<sup>10</sup> However, a word of caution is necessary here: in some languages (e.g. Japanese or Korean) we encounter the so-called 'deictic projection'. This means that the speaker may choose, usually for politeness reasons, to speak about another person's attributes not from his or her own perspective, but from the perspective projected on the hearer. In such a way, the speaker omits to make an 'uncomfortable' evaluation him- or herself. Needless to say, a comparison of various kinds of deictic projections across world languages offers an extremely fertile ground for studies in pragmatic ways of encoding social distance and prestige.<sup>11</sup>

### 2.1.2. Time and place deixis

Time deixis involves the encoding of points and periods of time relative to the moment at which the speaker produces his or her utterance. The deictic expressions that serve this function are adverbs of time and tense patterns, which two concepts can be illustrated, respectively, by *yesterday* and *is working* (a BE+'ing' structure marking a relatively short time span during which a particular present activity occurs). Of course, as could be expected from the description of person deixis above, temporal projections are possible as well, which pragmatic literature has acknowledged in a variety of terms, such as coding versus receiving time, or proximal and distal adverbs.<sup>12</sup> Instead of going into these typologies, I shall point to the likely subjectivity of messages containing time deixis, a phenomenon often

adding to the speaker's manipulative capacity. If, at 4:01 p.m. on Friday, I send an e-mail to my publisher which says, (6), "I will submit the manuscript on Saturday", I have a good reason to expect the publisher (who works until 4 p.m. and only on weekdays) to read the e-mail no earlier than Monday and, seeing no attachment containing the ms. in the mailbox, to get puzzled – did I mean the Saturday that has just passed or the one to come? Of course, the rhetorical comfort of denying whichever interpretation stays with myself. In fact the 'comfort' starts the moment the Friday e-mail is sent out – I can feel free to submit the manuscript on whichever of the two Saturdays, as I see fit. There is no way I can be blamed for not submitting the ms. on the first of the two Saturdays, as I can always respond I took my addressee's perspective (i.e. receiving time), not mine. All in all, such considerations are obviously close to instances of implicature cancellations, defining interesting ways in which the utterance forces of deixis and implicature can potentially combine.

Ambiguities of this kind are by no means alien to place deixis, which is concerned with specifying entities' location in space relative to the location of the speaker and the hearer. Place deixis is usually expressed by demonstratives (e.g. *this*), adverbs of place (e.g. *here*) and motion verbs (e.g. *go*, as opposed to *come*). Here, vagueness of reference is directly related to the number of deictic expressions a language possesses to indicate the distance between the deictic center and the referent. While English has only a two-member set of such proximal markers (*this/these-that/those*), there are languages (e.g. Malagasy) with over four markers. Needless to say, the English system, albeit counting among the most common ones,<sup>13</sup> has to allow for acts of miscommunication, resulting from the perceptual relativities underlying expressions such as *this* or *that*. Another source of difficulty could be place adverbials (viz. *on the right hand side*), often interpreted differently depending on whose perspective is taken – speaker's or hearer's. In general, however, the contribution of place deixis to the clarification of the positioning of entities which an utterance refers to is rather undisputed. This claim is endorsed, incidentally, not only by pragmaticians, but also by cognitive gestalt theorists, who have plausibly demonstrated that, in studying (especially) place deixis, methodological contact between pragmatics and cognitive linguistics is nothing but natural.<sup>14</sup>

### 2.1.3. Discourse deixis and a brief summary of (micro-)function of deictic expressions

The reason why the phenomenon of discourse deixis is tackled last in this section is that it invites studies at both the utterance and the discourse level, thus leading to macropragmatic considerations. Discourse deixis involves the use of a lexical item within an utterance, to point to the preceding or following utterances in the same discourse situation (speech event). The backward and forward reference can be illustrated by (7) and (8), respectively, where *already* refers to the earlier stretch of discourse and *Here* anticipates the upcoming stretch:

(7) As *already* indicated, all languages possess deictics.

(8) *Here* goes my argument.

Seemingly, there is no rule to how much textual distance should hold between the deictic expression and its referent; while it is reasonable to expect that the

10 cf. Lyons (1977).

11 cf. Marmaridou (2000), Manning (2001).

12 cf. Levinson (1983), Fillmore (1997).

13 cf. Diessel (1999), Levinson (2004).

14 Excellent examples are Lakoff and Johnson (1999) and Marmaridou (2000).

referent of *Here* will be the immediately following utterance(s), the referent of *already* is surely not the closest, preceding utterance, but rather an utterance made much earlier in the unfolding discourse. This brings us to an important (though as yet tentative) conclusion regarding the pragmatics of deixis as a whole. By using a specific number of deictic expressions, the speaker is able to control the overt connectedness of discourse and, in consequence, its comprehension by the hearer. The presence of deictic markers in utterances – which make up a discourse situation where a specific topic is pursued – usually contributes to explicitness and clarity. On the other hand, the speaker may choose to withhold the use of deixis, to purposefully obscure his or her message. Finally, it is also possible to use a deictic expression with intent for ambiguity, as has been shown in (6). These observations pave the way for a possible analysis of the force of deixis compared to and contrasted with the kind of force characteristic of forms of implicit, rather than explicit, communication (viz. presupposition and implicature). Naturally enough, the descriptive potentials will differ, determining, eventually, a specific hierarchy or sequence of the analysis. For instance, the deictic framework of an utterance may be sketched to establish the basic, lexically encoded relations between the referent(s) of the utterance and the 'common ground' of knowledge the utterance assumes to exist between the speaker and the hearer. Yet, a full account of these relations (and of the utterance function(s) the relations contribute to) may need complementation from methodologies which deal with concepts that go beyond lexically encoded relations (e.g. presupposition). Whatever outcome is reached from such an integrated analysis does not, however, affect the general status of deixis as a pragmatic phenomenon worth analyzing at both an utterance and discourse level. The study of deictic expressions provides evidence that language is not a self-contained phenomenon, but that aspects of context are organized into grammatical systems, to support their users in accomplishing real-life goals.

## 2.2. Presupposition

While, indeed, many aspects of context are grammaticalized in utterances, many are not. Let us take this observation as a starting point for discussing presupposition, a phenomenon lying, apparently, at a number of intersections: the encoded and the assumed, the semantic and the pragmatic, (or even) the linguistic and the non-linguistic.

Presupposition can be defined as a mechanism whereby the speaker addresses a body of knowledge and experience, involving both linguistic and non-linguistic contexts, which he or she assumes to be common to him-/herself and the hearer. The assumption of existence of the 'shared' knowledge (usually) makes it the case that the speaker does not assert it overtly in the utterance.

Not long ago, during my consultation hours, I received a phone call from our Rector's secretary, urging me to show up at the Rector's office immediately (it didn't end up quite as bad as it sounded!). The call came about 30 minutes before the end of the consultation time, the remainder of which was supposed to be taken up by my Ph.D. student Anna (who hadn't come by then). Despite the circumstances, I felt rather uncomfortable about having to miss the appointment and, to leave behind an apology, I instructed my office-mate (A):

(9) Please tell Anna the Rector wanted to see me,

thus presupposing, more or less successfully, (at least) that:

- a. A would know there is such a person as Anna.
- b. A would know the Rector exists.
- c. A would know Anna is a Ph.D. student of mine and what she looks like.
- d. A would know Anna is about to come for consultation.
- e. A would pass on the message to Anna.
- f. A would do (e) with an intention of communicating my apology, as efficiently as possible.

Clearly, all these presuppositions have different anchoring in the form of the utterance, and in its linguistic, as well as non-linguistic, context. We will now take a closer look at the particular beliefs that are involved in each case. This will serve to unfold a discussion about, (i), the formal status of presupposition as an apparently semantic but eventually pragmatic phenomenon, (ii), the contribution of presuppositions to force and function of an utterance, and, most importantly, (iii), the descriptive power of investigating presupposition, both in itself and in relation to the other (micro-)pragmatic concepts, especially implicature.

Looking at the list of presuppositions legitimating the utterance of (9), it is easy to observe that only two of them, (a) and (b), are lexically encoded, by means of definite descriptions. The rest draw upon narrower or wider, but all of them potentially non-linguistic, contexts. Defining the contexts as 'narrower' or 'wider' has to do with the different amounts of knowledge and experience that are addressed in each case. To presuppose (c), I may simply recall a previous occasion on which I introduced Anna, as one of my Ph.D. students, to my office-mate. In addition, I may recall a situation in which my office-mate saw Anna enter the room in which I normally run my Ph.D. seminar, at the time when the seminar should begin. Note that these two assumptions involve knowledge which has been obtained through, respectively, linguistic and non-linguistic means – so it looks like our view of presupposition is getting more and more complex. Still, (c) is only a foretaste of intricacies that underlie (f). To presuppose (f), I need to invoke a whole network of beliefs, which not only involve the knowledge carved out from the catalogue of my interlocutor's past experience (whether linguistic or non-linguistic), but also link this knowledge to the proposition asserted explicitly in the form of the utterance. The presupposition (f) consists in a series of expectations: that (A) possesses all the knowledge embedded in (a)-(d), that he wants to and will be cooperative, that he is able to recognize (9) as a request to communicate an apology on my behalf; finally, that he is able to do it as well as I imagine I would. Interestingly, many of these expectations are only legitimate on the assumption (which counts as a presupposition, too!) that (A) relates them to his own experience triggered by the mention of specific lexical items in my utterance. For instance, hearing about "the Rector", (A) may 'replay' his own thoughts and feelings experienced before a similar meeting he attended (for instance a belief that the meeting will be long enough to put paid to other commitments planned) – thus putting himself in my shoes. Which of course is a very useful prerequisite for communicating the function of my utterance exactly as expected.

Traditionally, the more a presupposition was linked with a lexical item or a linguistic construction generating it (viz. (a), (b)), the more it was treated as a semantic phenomenon, the other cases deemed 'pragmatic' and worth less attention precisely because of the absence of fixed language forms responsible for enacting particular presuppositions. This view has produced multiple typologies of presupposition, based on its embedding

in some specific expressions named as 'presupposition triggers'.<sup>15</sup> Examples of presupposition triggers could be *return* (assuming previous presence, in 'iterative presuppositions'), *manage* (assuming an act of (strenuous) trying, in 'implicative presuppositions') or *know* (assuming the existence of a state of affairs predicated, as in 'John knows that Jim is bald', a 'factive presupposition'). A number of properties have been assigned to presuppositions, including cancellability (a possibility of denying a presupposition, usually by adding more content to the utterance where it occurs – just think what would happen if I added in (9) "..., do you remember her?") and constancy under negation (amounting to the fact that negating a lexical item carrying a presupposition does not detach or change it in any way).<sup>16</sup>

Interesting as these explorations may be in their own right, they offer little explanatory power compared to an integrated, global view of presupposition as a concept which should be studied from the perspective of utterance and discourse goals it serves. Such a view must be called 'pragmatic', because, as we have seen from (9), even though there are specific lexical items (in fact, many) associated with specific assumptions (for instance, the assumptions of existence), their descriptive capacity does not expire within the structural boundaries of the linguistic expression. On the contrary, their significance goes much beyond as they are able to combine with primarily experiential premises and thus successfully contribute to a network of contextual, often non-linguistic beliefs making up the entire load of knowledge shared by the speaker and the hearer.

Evidently, one of the most prominent communicative goals served by presupposition (and especially relevant to micropragmatic considerations) is economy of expression. Imagine that in communicating (9) I cannot rely on any shared assumptions and thus have to say:

(10) I am expecting Anna, my Ph.D. student, soon and since I know you know what she looks like and I know that you are willing to pass on an apologetic message that I had to go to the Rector's and thus miss our appointment, please tell her the Rector wanted to see me.

–which still might not suffice to turn explicit all the presupposed information analyzed above! Although economizing on the linguistic form can be seen as an utterance goal in itself, it can also be seen as a contribution to a larger, utterance or discourse goal. This becomes clear in analyses of series of utterances containing consecutive acts of adjustment to shifting discourse expectations. If I am overweight and say "I started jogging after visiting my doctor" and my confession meets with a blatant attack like "So it took you going to the doctor's to work out you should", I can always follow a defense line in continuing "Well, to be honest, I tried to do some jogging a few times before, but now I do it regularly". Since the short form of the initial utterance makes it underdetermined in terms of meaning, the denial of the 'only then and never before' presupposition comes rather easy, contributing to the overall explanation and justification. This case obviously invokes some 'fragmentary' concepts, such as cancellability of presupposition, proving that, despite their apparent limitations in determining the global

functionality of utterances, they could do some work at the very bottom level of description.

Furthermore, I advocate the 'integrated' approach to presupposition as it best inscribes into the very nature of all (micro-)pragmatic considerations, which target at establishing *why* people say things in utterances and why they say them the way they do. The answer to these questions hinges on the complex analysis of how people communicate their knowledge and experience understood in terms of not only what can be verified as true or false on the basis of matching language form with a state of affairs in the world, but also what their expectations, desires, interests, etc., are. It is this variety of aspirations that eventually defines utterance and discourse goals and such goals can only be studied in a conceptual framework which, while fragmented in its internal composition (just as the 'knowledge and experience' is), recognizes a superordinate, controlling tenet. In the case of presupposition this tenet can be described the way I defined the essence of presupposition at the beginning of the current subsection: it consists in assuming a body of S/H-shared knowledge. And it seems that, for the purposes of handling the issue of speaker's *goals* pursued with the help of such an assumption of knowledge, we do not necessarily need to go into the semantic-pragmatic subdivisions.

Finally, note that it is only the concept of presupposition 'as a whole' that allows its apparently fruitful dialogue with the other areas of (micro-)pragmatic investigation. We have seen that presupposition comes in contact with deixis on the plane of its partial anchoring in lexical and structural forms. On the other hand, since many instances of presupposition can only be approached with reference to (non-linguistic) context, presupposition also reaches out in the direction of the implicit, constituting, in a sense, a shared knowledge 'prerequisite' for communicating messages whose final destination is their inference by the hearer. Hence its feasible combination with the apparatus of implicature, a relation which will be addressed in the next subsection.

### 2.3. Implicature

To discuss this relation (as well as its methodological merits), I will first introduce the major concepts associated with the phenomenon of implicature.<sup>17</sup> In so doing, I will refer to the classical work by Paul Grice.<sup>18</sup> Despite several subsequent reformulations and additions (let alone reductionist attempts),<sup>19</sup> Grice's postulates continue to be considered the cornerstone of contemporary thinking in the area of how implicit meaning arises and how it is processed and interpreted. As such, they constitute a sufficient, highly feasible groundwork, for discussing not only the concept of implicature in itself, but also its relevance to all (micro-)pragmatic investigations into the force and function of utterances and their communicative goals.

On Grice's view, implicatures arise from breaches of some of the norms that underlie human communication and determine its efficient and rational character. Grice defines these norms in terms of the 'cooperative principle' (CP) and 'maxims of conversation'. The most common interpretation of the relationship between the two concepts is that the latter is a sort of subdivision of

15 Examples of battles over the status of presupposition are Stalnaker (1973), Soames (1989), while Horn (1996) and Atlas (2004) offer well-balanced overviews.

16 cf. e.g. Beaver (2001).

17 Unless indicated otherwise, my use of the term 'implicature' is synonymous with 'conversational implicature'.

18 cf. Grice (1975, 1978, 1989).

19 See e.g. Horn's (1984) Q-R model or Levinson's (2000) Q-I-M principles.

the former.<sup>20</sup> However, our considerations will show that seeing the maxims as complementing the CP (rather than being merely constitutive of it) makes the account of implicature fuller in its explanatory value. The CP and the maxims are defined as follows:

*The cooperative principle (CP)*

Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

*The maxims of conversation*

a. Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true.

(i) Do not say what you believe to be false.

(ii) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

b. Quantity:

(i) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).

(ii) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

c. Relation: Be relevant.

d. Manner: Be perspicuous.

(i) Avoid obscurity of expression.

(ii) Avoid ambiguity.

(iii) Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).

(iv) Be orderly.

Let us see how speakers may go about observing or breaking these norms in view of the communicative goals they wish to perform. Imagine two students, A and B, both male, discussing their chances of passing an oral examination which is scheduled for the following day. Consider the two options for B's reply to A's question:

(11)

A: So, what do you think, are we going to pass?

B (option 1): No, I don't think so.

B (option 2): Yeah, and the sun will rise in the West tomorrow.

The interpretation of the option 2 reply can go a very long way towards understanding the phenomenon of implicature and all the (contextual) relativities that pertain to it. Eventually, it will also put us in contact with the concept of presupposition. But let us start from the basics.

Let us first assume that B's goal is to communicate that he does not believe they will pass. Then, option 1 does the trick explicitly. Option 2, however, seems inadequate since the reply contains a lexical marker of positive response ("Yeah"). Still, it is quite likely that A will take the response as negative. Such a conclusion is the result of a process of contextual inference, which binds together the concepts of the CP and the maxims of conversation. Though A is aware that "Yeah", standing alone, would mean positive response, he interprets it in conjunction with the proposition that follows, which is clearly negative. Interestingly, A bothers to interpret the proposition, even though it blatantly flouts<sup>21</sup> the Quality maxim. The reason why A

does not disqualify B as a "liar" is – and here is where the CP and the maxims 'complement' each other – that he believes in cooperation, a conversational 'good faith' on the part of B. This amounts to the belief that, while B might appear irrelevant, illogical, uncooperative on the surface of the exchange, he would not have said what he did without some, apparently deeper, goal ('folded in' what we can now call the implicature in B's reply). Thus, A feels an obligation to set out on a road to decipher this goal, which means that he starts to collect (contextual) premises to unfold the implicature. First, he acknowledges that there are, essentially, two ways in which B could reply his question satisfactorily. One is a yes or a yes-like answer that predicates probability of passing the exam. The other is a no or a no-like answer, predicating a lack of such probability. Since the sun does not rise in the West and thus B's proposition is deemed improbable, A uses it as a contribution to the following, negative analogy: it is just as probable for A and B to pass, as is probable for the sun to rise in the West on the exam day. The recognition of this analogy allows the ultimate inference: B implies that they will not pass the examination.

This path of inference certainly suggests that A gets a much more productive prompt for his inference from the proposition B makes about the sun, than from the initial "Yeah", but the function of this marker should not be disregarded, either. First, as has already been mentioned, it contributes to a logical clash with the proposition and thus alerts A to the suspicion that the utterance as a whole might not be explicit. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it 'refines' the goal of B's reply in the eyes of A. Since A eventually recognizes that the proposition about the sun would, alone, suffice to convey the implied negative response, he is likely to assign it some extra function. This function, determined on the basis of a variety of contextual factors (e.g. what consequences failing the exam might have for A and B, how difficult the exam seems, etc.) could be, for instance, to give the negative answer an ironical or sarcastic overtone.

But, to delve deeper, isn't a different interpretation of B's option 2 reply possible? Let us imagine that B's goal is to suggest that, even though the probability of passing the exam is low, it still exists if there is luck or other circumstances that go beyond the 'hard', scholarly rationale. Then, the proposition B makes about the sun could be read, through analogy again, as implying the claim: 'anything can happen tomorrow and thus we might pass, though it is rather improbable'. However, this inference can only be expected if the 'shared knowledge' assumed by B prior to making his reply involves situations less typical than those embedded in presuppositions for the utterance meant as an unequivocally negative response. What needs to be assumed is, for instance, A's past experience with many events, actions, aspirations that *did* happen or *were* accomplished, even though, logically, they were not supposed to. Thus, the presupposition of A's optimism shaped up as a result of such experience is also a factor. Finally, what needs to be presupposed to put the utterance to work in the way of suggesting some, even marginal, probability, is A's intellectual capacity to be able to infer the utterance as intended. Since the interpretation B expects is, essentially, far from 'prototypical', there is obviously some tough inferential job facing A, which requires that A possesses faculties able to handle it.

In this way we have arrived at the highly significant relation that holds between the assumptions (that is,

violations' and acts of 'opting out' of a maxim (cf. e.g. Huang 2007, ch. 2).

20 A representative quote comes from Huang (2007: 25): 'He [Grice] called this overarching dictum the cooperative principle and subdivided it into (...) maxims of conversation (...)'.  
21 Other types of maxim breaches, though hardly conducive to implicatures, are 'unostentatious

presuppositions) made by speakers prior to saying things with some intended effects, and the interpretations (of implicatures) accomplished by hearers through complex inferences. These inferences involve a continual verification of what the hearer is told explicitly, against the underlying context, to determine whether the 'explicit' message is really explicit, or maybe 'implicit', in view of certain 'hints' salient in the speaker's utterance (such as the hint for analogy in (11)), and/or the hearer's own linguistic and non-linguistic experience. The hearer's experience is of course what the speaker tends to assume as part of his or her presupposition before the utterance is made, but we have to remember that it is the hearer who gives the ultimate verdict on whether such an assumption is correct. If, in (11), B expected his option 2 reply to be taken as a partly positive response and it turned out that A took it as an unequivocally negative one, it would mean that at least some of B's assumptions about A were unsubstantiated.

The argument above corroborates a naturally complementary character of the concepts of presupposition and implicature, and the clear methodological feasibility to apply both to the complex analysis of the process of encoding messages by speakers and decoding them by their hearers. This process is essentially a continuum, where making a presupposition serves to pave way for the utterance before it takes on a linguistic form and where, later, the presupposition may or may not be lexically encoded (though it is always 'pragmatically' encoded). From this point, i.e. the point of making the utterance by the speaker, the recovery of the implicature(s) by the hearer may begin – of course, if the hearer senses a prompt to search for it/them. The inference of the implicature(s), whether in accordance with the speaker's expectations or not, finalizes the whole process, thus 'updating' the status of the interaction and, potentially, creating a new basis on which to build presuppositions for further utterances in the exchange.

In discussing the methodological and descriptive contribution implicature makes to (studying) the micropragmatics of utterance(s), let us finally note that, since implicature is rarely encoded in language form,<sup>22</sup> it involves a virtually indeterminable number of more or less complex contextual inferences. As such, it constitutes a valuable rhetorical tool whereby the speaker can control the flow of discourse, adopting his or her consecutive utterances to the current goals. This is due to a central property of implicature, namely cancellability,<sup>23</sup> which makes it possible for the speaker to deny, at any moment of speech situation, any implicature he or she apparently created. We have seen this property as partly relevant to presuppositions, but it is implicature that permits its broadest manifestation. For instance, if B means his option 2 reply to allow positive interpretation, but A's reaction is "So you're suggesting we're going to fail", he can go on to say "No, what I meant is that we actually do have some chance, albeit small". B can also deny A's (whichever) interpretation if, for some reason, he wants to 'play' with A, put a trick on, or simply annoy him. Following on this note, many implicatures get cancelled for ironical or sarcastic effect, which is most visible in humor studies.<sup>24</sup> And, of course, another area where implicatures and their cancellations surface, is public (especially political) discourse. Implicatures contribute to rhetorical safety of public speakers, who, on the one

hand, wish to make statements that are universally acceptable, but on the other, want to retain the possibility of 'refining' or 'fine-tuning' these statements for hearers who hold different expectations of the meanings conveyed in them.<sup>25</sup>

#### 2.4. Speech acts

There is a reason why speech acts are addressed last in this section, thus bridging it with macropragmatic considerations. Discussing deixis, presupposition, and implicature, I have often related them to such concepts as 'force' and 'function' of utterance. I have shown that the conceptual frameworks of deixis, presupposition and implicature make their own (though often overlapping) contributions to understanding how utterance is built, what its referents are and how they are encoded, what assumptions are made before the utterance is produced; finally, what effects can be expected after it has been produced and what inferential processes determine these effects. In other words, I have been preoccupied with tracing the process of enacting *goal(s)* of the utterance, from the speaker's intention to realize its envisaged function via application of specific indicators of force (such as the logical clash in B's second-option reply in (11), eventually triggering sarcasm), to the hearer's successful (or not) recognition of this function and its results. A procedure that complex quite obviously needs a controlling, 'umbrella' parameter of description, one that is able to cover both speaker and hearer related aspects of the utterance function, and, while doing so, draw upon and thus systematize the particular contributions from the frameworks of deixis, presupposition, and implicature. The concept of speech act seems an excellent theoretical candidate to take up this task.

Virtually all theories of speech acts<sup>26</sup> treat utterances and their functions in a rather consequential way; they assume that saying something amounts to (at least partly) doing something, i.e., that words are (part of) deeds. The classical, Austin's and Searle's approaches are especially useful in elucidating the potential of speech act to bind together the speaker and the hearer related aspects of the utterance function. Since they also offer perhaps the most direct evidence of how the concept of speech act can integrate various properties of the other 'micropragmatic' concepts, they will constitute the main thread of our discussion.

The orientation of speech acts to both parties of a verbal exchange, as well as to its linguistic matter, is visible at a glance from the traditional distinction between the locutionary, the illocutionary, and the perlocutionary aspect of a speech act.<sup>27</sup> The locutionary aspect involves the production of a meaningful (in its phonological, syntactic and semantic sense) linguistic expression containing a speech act. The illocutionary aspect has to do with the intention or the purpose the speaker has in performing this act. The perlocutionary aspect involves the effects the performance of the act brings about in the hearer. In sum, then, while the locutionary facet of speech act is the most 'objective' one since it concerns the language form of the utterance wherein the speech act is conveyed, the illocutionary and perlocutionary facets are indicative of a 'subjective' negotiation of meaning between the speaker and the hearer. In saying "It's hot in here" a speaker may be producing an (implicit) illocutionary act

22 We do not deal with 'conventional implicatures' here (cf. e.g. Davis (1998), Bach (1999)).

23 cf. Sadock (1978), Levinson (2000), etc.

24 cf. Attardo (1990, 1993).

25 cf. e.g. Cap (2008).

26 Tsohatzidis (1994) is an excellent, objective overview.

27 See Austin (1962) and a review of Austin's ideas in e.g. Alston (1994).

requesting the hearer to open the window, and the perlocutionary act (effect) might be that the hearer indeed opens it, but it might also be that he or she turns on the air-conditioning instead. Thus, the illocutionary-perlocutionary relation does not only, in a way, mirror the complex process of meaning evolution as sketched at the beginning of this subsection; it also inscribes in the distinction between explicit (direct) and implicit (indirect) ways of communicating a speech act. Consequently, it invokes the notions of deixis, presupposition, and implicature, since they all situate themselves at some specific yet different points of the conceptual axis which links 'what is said' with 'what is effected'.

We cannot really assess the methodological potential of the concept of speech act as a controlling category of description without at least briefly recapitulating its typology. Searle's classical though still most influential typology recognizes five speech act classes: assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declaratives.<sup>28</sup> Assertives (represented by specific cases such as stating, claiming, asserting, reporting, thinking, etc.) express the speaker's belief about some state of affairs in the world, as in "I think she's pretty". Directives (ordering, commanding, requesting, advising, etc.) represent the speaker's attempt to make the hearer do something, as in "Turn the music off". Commissives (promising, offering, refusing, etc., as in "I will help you") express the speaker's *own* intention to do something. Expressives (apologizing, congratulating, thanking, etc.) involve cases in which the speaker gives vent to his or her attitude or psychological state, an example being "Congratulations on passing the test". Finally, declaratives (declaring, nominating, naming, etc.) are acts whereby the speaker exercises his or her authority to perform institutionalized changes in the state of affairs in the world, as in "I find the defendant guilty" or "I baptize you". Of course, each type of speech act may be produced with or without the performative verb;<sup>29</sup> while in our account the assertive includes such a verb ("think"), the directive does not.

The overview provided may be extremely general, but it suffices to illustrate the two apparently major criteria<sup>30</sup> whereby the particular acts are assigned to the five classes. One such criterion is the psychological state expressed; while assertives express a belief, directives arise from a desire that something be done, etc. The other criterion is the type of relationship between the words used to produce a given act, and the reality which these words are supposed to reflect or influence.<sup>31</sup> For instance, commissives influence the reality by predicating a change that will take place in it as a result of a future action performed by the speaker. On the contrary, assertives do not predicate any change, they aspire to mirror the state of affairs 'as is', at the moment the speaker produces his or her utterance. A particularly interesting case is the category of declaratives – these acts possess a uniquely bi-directional orientation, in that they both reflect and influence the reality. Take the example "I find the defendant guilty". The moment a judge utters these words, a new reality is created and part of this reality is, for instance, a sentence that follows. Still, the judge cannot produce the act but for the pre-existence of a number of factors – for instance, the evidence collected,

the setting where the verdict is delivered, etc. In this sense, the judge's act inscribes in or refers to the reality as it has existed, in much the same way in which the speaker of "I think she's pretty" refers to the (pre-existing) reality "she" is part of.

Arguably, the speaker's psychological state and the relationship between 'the words' and 'the world' are two concepts which put us in contact with another tenet of the speech act theory, namely felicity conditions, i.e. the conditions that underlie a successful, logical, 'felicitous' production of a speech act.<sup>32</sup> For example, a speaker cannot make a successful order if he or she does not sincerely want the order to be followed, or if he or she deems the hearer incapable of following it. These two felicity conditions are, furthermore, excellent illustrations of the connection that holds between the concept of speech act and the other 'micropragmatic' concepts – a relation that we have postulated at the very beginning of this subsection. Their awareness by the speaker at the moment of producing the act amounts to no less than making *pragmatic presuppositions* about the contextual aspects of the utterance that contains this act. Then, once the act is made, we 'leave behind' the speaker's presuppositions and concentrate on direct or indirect inferences of the utterance's function. This part of the process is naturally the domain of implicature studies, but, again, we do get some extra insight from the 'cover' framework of the speech act theory and, specifically, from its contribution to research in indirectness.

To receive this insight, we should first acknowledge the studies that attempt to draw a clear distinction between what is direct (speech act) and what is indirect (speech act). Traditionally,<sup>33</sup> directness of a speech act is determined on the basis of the correspondence between the three major sentence types (declarative, interrogative, imperative) and the forces typically associated with them, i.e. asserting, asking, and ordering, respectively. If there is an explicit match between a sentence type and its corresponding force, a speech act is considered direct. If no such explicit match can be established, the act is regarded as indirect.

Ironically, the greatest advantage of this distinction lies in its ability to almost remove one of the two concepts from our scope of investigation. As pointed out in several studies, most speech act usages are indirect<sup>34</sup> – and indeed, even the apparently straightforward act of asking for salt in "Can you pass the salt?" is, formally speaking, indirect. This, however, should not be discouraging. The orientation of the speech act theory to indirect usages is only reflective of the visible emphasis on indirectness that is salient in the other (micro-)pragmatic concepts; after all, our discussion of deixis, presupposition, and implicature has been mostly preoccupied with 'hidden' meanings. Thus, the speech act theory turns nothing but congruent with the other apparatuses. Moreover, it extends over all of their fields of application, from the stage where knowledge is assumed to get encoded in the utterance, to the stage where the utterance is interpreted. Conceivably, a single speech act can be 'realized' through recourse to an x number of presuppositions, an x number of deictic markers in the utterance, which the latter could produce an x number of implicatures. We are thus invoking a certain hierarchy of analysis, with speech act constituting a category superordinate over the other micropragmatic categories. At the same time, however,

28 See Searle (1975).

29 The verb that names the action while performing in it (for instance, *name* in 'I name this ship Queen Elizabeth').

30 Searle's 1975 list includes four basic criteria (also 'illocutionary point' and 'propositional content').

31 The so-called 'direction of fit'.

32 cf. Austin's (1975) account of felicity conditions; see also Searle (1969).

33 See discussion in Levinson (1983).

34 See findings by Bertolet (1994) and Holdcroft (1994).

we are not considering the speech act the top-most variable of description; in order to account for discourses, rather than individual utterances, we are clearly in need of higher-rank concepts.

### 3. Macropragmatics

I rarely start my pragmatics seminar by reading out students' names from the attendance list. Instead, I tend to ask:

(12) Hello, are we all here?

by which, in terms of the findings presented in 2.4, I perform two direct speech acts (greeting and asking), as well as an indirect act of requesting my students to reveal the names of the absentees. The speech acts involve a deictic anchoring (e.g., "here" recognized as classroom), presuppositions (e.g., of some students yet missing), and the indirect act involves a process of inference. This is, with some simplification, where a (micropragmatic) analysis of (12) can get us.

However, being myself the producer of (12), I can enjoy the privilege of stating with absolute certainty that, most of the time, I do *not* open the class with this utterance for the mere sake of greeting, asking, and requesting, as described above. That would be unlikely considering that (12) happens regularly and has thus become (a part of) expectable routine, a pattern that arises, usually, from some kind of a *larger*<sup>35</sup> *intention*. Mark an analogy: If I follow the routine of buying each morning a newspaper (an action which involves micro-actions analogical to the acts defined in (12)), the 'larger intention' can be described as an aspiration to stay updated with the current news. So, it appears, especially when we accept after speech act theorists that 'actions' and (speech) 'acts' are fundamentally interrelated, that there must be a larger intention which underlies (12) as well.

Indeed, the larger intention in (12) is to *begin the seminar*, making sure all things are in place for a productive meeting. This finding does not sound terribly original in itself, but we will take it as a starting point to show, eventually, that the *nature of intentionality* is such that it cannot be a matter of the individual utterance and thus the scope of inquiry must be extended accordingly.

The truth is that, more often than not, I may need to say more than just (12), to successfully begin the seminar. In fact, I may choose from an apparently *infinite* catalogue of other utterances, which are able to serve the same intention, to start the seminar. Some typical cases may be: "It's getting late", "Would you close the doors please?", "Now, Adam, listen up, will you?", "Right, shall we begin?", "And the chalk is missing as usual!", "I can't remember when we last started on time", etc. Apparently a diverse bunch, all these utterances contribute, in one way or the other, to realization of the principal intention. Interestingly, they do so while containing, technically, different speech acts (assertives, directives, expressives) whose force may also be different, direct or indirect. Consequently, each of these acts may accommodate a different input from deixis, presupposition, and implicature.

The routine such as above, involving speaker's performance of individual speech acts (which may in turn involve the other micropragmatic categories) in the service of a larger intention, can be defined as *speech event*.<sup>36</sup> Speech events may contain, as we have seen, a

potentially infinite number of utterances, depending on how many are actually necessary to carry out the intention. If, for instance, my seminar group enters the classroom discussing a just-finished exam in which they participated, I may be in for a longer stretch of talk to 'set up the stage' for my own class. Otherwise, it may take me a few short remarks to cover the technicalities and initiate the topic proper. Whatever happens in actuality is thus dictated, as anything in pragmatics, by context. A speech event can comprise just as many utterances (and speech acts) as needed to match the contextual preconditions. These utterances do not have to come in a monologic pattern. I may keep performing the principal speech event by producing a few utterances in a row, then pausing, then, possibly, reacting to a question that comes in the meantime, then resuming the monologue, etc. Thus, my performance is a genuine 'discourse' performance, which exists in and responds to a social setting, though, of course, some parts of it can mirror 'textual' units and their connectedness patterns.

Intriguingly enough, the concept of *infiniteness* resurfaces once we go on to discuss speech events as 'building blocks' for realization of a yet 'larger' intention. To readdress the case initiated by (12), the speech event which realizes the intention to successfully begin the seminar is not only an umbrella category for a series of individual acts, but may itself be subordinate to a larger discourse goal – be it, for instance, conducting a productive seminar meeting as a whole. This goal entails that an apparently infinite number of speech events are carried out 'on the way', from a speech event of providing a complex, multi-act explanation to a problem that has arisen during the session, to a speech event of assigning homework, which may again involve a number of component speech acts. The latter (event) may include: an expressive (e.g., reprimanding students for not completing the previous assignment), a commissive (e.g., threatening to fail students at the end of the course, if they keep neglecting their assignments), a directive (e.g., telling students to do a particular task for the next meeting), an assertive (e.g., describing a rationale for the task), etc. The variety and diversity of the acts involved is, here, no smaller than in the case of the speech event performed to begin the seminar.

In this clearly bottom-up fashion, we have approached the problem of the 'uppermost' or 'global' category of intentionality enactment, one whose promise would be to encompass all the subordinate intentions realized in speech events and their attendant acts. Such a promise is partly fulfilled by the classical concept of the *macro speech act*, which is, in Van Dijk's words, a global speech act performed by the utterance of a whole discourse, and executed by a sequence of possibly different speech acts.<sup>37</sup> Still, while doing some useful job in the way of systematizing speech events, the macro speech act suffers from a problem of an inherent relativity as regards the range of its own operation. The definition of the macro act only corroborates the problem; we do not get to know how much is 'a whole discourse'. Is it, to return to our example above, the whole body of discourse produced within the duration of the seminar, controlled by the global intention to

37 See mainly Van Dijk's work, from classical contributions to text grammar (cf. Van Dijk 1977, 1980), to recent research in critical discourse analysis (cf. e.g. Van Dijk 2008). See also his joint work with Walter Kintsch (e.g. Van Dijk and Kintsch 1983), which in my view represents the best step ever taken to integrate the concepts of 'discourse' and 'text' in a 'pragmatic' analysis.

35 Despite a temptation to the contrary, I save the term *global* for the discussion of macro acts.

36 cf. e.g. Mey (1993, 2001). Levinson (1983) uses the term 'activity type', Grundy's (1995) proposal is 'genre'.



make it a productive meeting? Then the relationship between the macro speech act and the component speech events (and their individual acts) seems analytically elegant. But, does this account exhaust the potential of the macro speech act to combine with further macro speech acts, to serve a yet-more-global intention? Apparently not. The intention to carry out an academically rewarding seminar can be considered subordinate to the intention to conduct the entire course as planned, which in turn partakes in the intention to perform my (academic) duties properly as a whole, etc., etc., - which, naturally, makes the consecutive macro acts accumulate accordingly. To envisage the highest-rank intention, pursued in the highest-rank speech act, turns, then, a philosophical undertaking.

One of the undisputed methodological values of the search for the clear-cut categories signposting the particular levels of intentionality and its enactment lies, paradoxically, in the recognition of limits to which intentionality *could* be accounted for in larger stretches of discourse. Thus, endeavors like the macro speech act theory should not be carelessly brushed off, as they eventually motivate research, however minimalist, in better demarcated and better empirically equipped areas. A prominent example of such an area is Conversation Analysis (CA), which has been flourishing for the past two decades or so.<sup>38</sup> Conversation analysts have elaborated an impressive arsenal of techniques for the description of speech act deployment, though in necessarily limited contexts, often just co-texts. As a result, the apparatus of macropragmatics has been endowed with a number of relevant concepts, such as 'floor', 'topic', 'turn', 'turn-taking', 'transition relevance place', etc., each of which contributes its share of insight in how people manage their intentions and goals in particularized (conversational) settings.

A related and, in my view, the most important value is that a 'macro' perspective on the pragmatics of discourse makes the analyst approach intentionality as continually re-shaped and updated by extralinguistic context and thus work out methodological tools to handle the variability of enactment of the speaker's intention(s) over an extensive period of time. Let's illustrate this phenomenon by an example from political discourse, a domain rich in speakers' attempts to continue with an enactment of a global intention, though often in consecutively modified patterns, responding to the changing extralinguistic reality. Consider an excerpt from one of G.W. Bush's speeches legitimizing the US involvement in the recent Iraq war:

(13) By advancing freedom in the greater Middle East, we help end a cycle of dictatorship and radicalism that brings millions of people to misery and brings danger to our own people. By struggling for justice in Iraq, Burma, in Sudan, and in Zimbabwe, we give hope to suffering people and improve the chances for stability and progress. [...] Had we failed to act, the dictator's programs for weapons of mass destruction would continue to this day. For all who love freedom and peace, the world without Saddam Hussein's regime is a better and safer place.<sup>39</sup>

This speech comes eight months into the war, which started on the assumption that the Iraqi regime (and its alleged terrorist allies) had developed access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), thus becoming a

world threat and unwilling to disarm unless forced to. In his address, Bush attempts to maintain the aura of legitimization of the US intervention, against the increasingly evident collapse of the original premise – no weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq ever since the US and the coalition troops entered it in March 2003. Since he can no longer employ the single WMD argument to execute his global intention (to keep the legitimization process intact), he deftly switches to a more universal, ideological rationale. Instead of invoking a *direct* threat from a destructive impact of WMD, he concentrates on building up an ideological framework for a *potential* growth of such a threat in the future and presents the US strike as part of the necessary means to ensure that the antagonistic ideologies ("dictatorship", "radicalism", "regime") do not materialize in the form of physical impact. The localization of these ideologies in more countries than Iraq itself (viz. "Burma", "Sudan", "Zimbabwe") is in fact a clever rhetorical ploy. By extending the spectrum of the ideological conflict and, thus, the spectrum of the US foreign involvement, he encourages the construal of the WMD intelligence failure in terms of an isolated incident, fully justifiable given the range of the American mission as a whole. Altogether, Bush keeps up with the global intention to continue with legitimization of the Iraq war, now on ideological grounds, but the pragmatic patterns (and, consequently, lexical choices) responsible for realizing this intention within a macro-temporal reality need to be updated to meet the extralinguistic developments.

I said in the first section, quite emphatically, that macropragmatic analyses (which, as we can see, obviously borrow from broadly contextual considerations) often lead to minor or major redefinitions of the micropragmatic input that has been utilized to build up their tentative versions. They also tend to, retrospectively, review the micropragmatic concepts and point to those whose descriptive potential has not yet been fully exhausted. The analysis of Bush's speech is a good case in point. At its macro-level, we consider the general patterns of adaptation of the political speaker to contextual conditions. This leads us to the more focused question which of the micro-level concepts are able to account for such processes in the possibly richest lexical way, i.e. which of them are most frequently reflected in lexical items and structures that eventually make up the matter of the macroanalysis. The analysis of (13) reveals, for instance, that much explanatory power is yet to be drawn from a careful scrutiny of implicature forms in the text. If we gather from macro-contextual considerations that Bush is forced to switch to a new argumentative strategy, yet, as seems logical, without discrediting the previous argumentation, what better way to accomplish the goal than through implied meanings, which are always subject to cancellation as the speaker sees fit? Recall the phrase "programs for weapons of mass destruction". It is flexible enough to concede that Saddam did not indeed possess WMD understood as a 'product ready for use', at the outset of the war, but it does not completely detract from the original assumption that he did. It is quite likely that a microanalysis of this implicature (as well as of many other bottom-level forms in (13)) could get overlooked but for the prompt from the macropragmatic approach, involving a vast range of contextual factors affecting the entire *discourse* of the Iraq war.

In this way I have returned to the question of the 'micro-macro dialogue', which I defined in the first section of this article as one of 'the most significant methodological arguments for having the [distinction between the] two concepts, micropragmatics and macropragmatics, in the theoretical framework of the

38 In research by such linguists as Emanuel Schegloff, Harvey Sacks, Gail Jefferson, Jonathan Potter, etc. See Ten Have (2007) for an overview.

39 The Whitehall Palace address, November 19, 2003.

field'. In closing, let me say that prompts for such a dialogue needn't come from 'pragmatic' analyses alone; in fact, the dialogic relationship between micropragmatics and macropragmatics is kept alive by insights from approaches which, at least definitionally, go much beyond linguistics-based disciplines or perspectives. An example of such an approach is the rapidly developing critical discourse analysis (CDA), which extends onto the fields traditionally associated with various branches of sociology and social psychology.<sup>40</sup> Rooted in the conception that discourse is just as much reflective of the existing reality as is potentially constitutive of a new reality (a standpoint quite evidently accepted by pragmaticians!), CDA offers a number of useful ways in which to analyze 'the reality' – which pragmatics would rather term (extralinguistic) aspects of context. In so doing, it provides (macro-) pragmatic considerations with socio-cognitive grounding of discourse,<sup>41</sup> thus signposting the 'downward', top-down analytic procedure. Two examples of how such a procedure could operate have been, in this article, the suggested refinements and extensions of the analysis of deixis and direct speech

acts in the language of the cold war presidents, as well as the just-discussed hint for a fully-fledged study of implicature in (13). Of course, CDA has much more to offer, as does any approach or discipline that recognizes the paramount importance of context in human (linguistic) behavior. In whatever kind of acting, including pragmatic acting, we adapt ourselves to a context 'as is', but at the same time we change it with a view to future effects. As Mey writes, all this is done through the intermediate use of language as the tool helping us to select the relevant features of any situation in the total context.<sup>42</sup> Micropragmatics and macropragmatics are two perspectives which, on the one hand, 'statically' account for the different size manifestations of this 'total' context. On the other, they 'dynamically' inform each other (and thus the pragmatic analysis as a whole) of, first, which instances of the utterance-level use of language are worth a broader contextual verification to determine their function, second, which parts of the broader contextual check are applicable as determiners of further analytic activity at the utterance level.


40 cf. e.g. Fairclough (1995), Wodak and Chilton (2005).  
41 cf. Van Dijk (1995, 2002).

42 cf. Mey (1993: 263).

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## Theta Meets Aspect: The Spanish Aspectual “Se” with Consumption Verbs

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### Abstract

This paper sets out to address the Spanish so-called aspectual *se* that appears with consumption verbs like “leer-leerse” (read) as in “Juan se leyó un libro” vs. “Juan leyó un libro”. These verbs have agentive subjects, and select incremental theme objects. Previous analyses build upon the idea that *se* makes an aspectual contribution to the semantics of the predicate. We will argue, however, that the contribution of *se* in consumption predicates is thematic rather than aspectual: *se* is a fully functional pronoun that is interpreted as a participant of the event due to its bearing dative Case and its being theta-marked as experiencer. The presence of this theta-marked experiencer argument triggers the expansion of the predicate by adding a causally related state whose argument is the clitic. It is a lexical operation that licenses *se* with consumption verbs. This operation has previously been described for causativization phenomena in a variety of languages.

### Keywords

consumption verb, causativization, *se*, lexicon-syntax interface, theta, aspect

### Introduction

In Spanish, the clitic *se* appears in a wide variety of syntactic configurations, such as reflexives,

- |     |    |                                                                                                 |
|-----|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|     | b. | “Juan fell off.”<br>Alberto (se) murió.<br>Alberto $CL_{se}$ died.<br>“Alberto died.”           |
| (3) | a. | Juan (se) leyó un libro.<br>Juan $CL_{se}$ read <sub>ref</sub> a book.<br>“Juan read a book.”   |
|     | b. | Alberto (se) comió la pizza.<br>Alberto $CL_{se}$ ate the pizza.<br>“Alberto ate up the pizza.” |

anticausatives, inherent reflexives, impersonals, and middles among others (see Mendikoetxea, 1999b; Mendikoetxea, 1999a; Mendikoetxea, 2012; Teomiro, 2010; Teomiro, 2011).

In a first approach to *se*, we can make a rough distinction between obligatory and optional *se*. On the one hand, obligatory *se* occurs when there is a modification of the predicate as to its participant structure. In reflexive predicates as (1a), the object and the subject are coindexed (Burzio, 1986) or bundled (Reinhart & Siloni, 2005); whereas in anticausative predicates as (1b) the cause argument is deleted altogether (Reinhart, 2002).

- |     |    |                                                                                                                |
|-----|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (1) | a. | Juan *(se) afeita todos los días.<br>Juan $CL_{se}$ shaves all the days.<br>“Juan shaves (himself) every day.” |
|     | b. | La ventana *(se) rompió.<br>The window $CL_{se}$ broke.<br>“The window broke.”                                 |

On the other hand, optional *se* occurs with little (if any) semantic contribution to the predicate as regards its participant structure, as in (2) and (3). It is the aspect of the predicate that seems to be altered, i.e. the presence of the clitic is related to an “aspectual shift” (see De Miguel & Fernandez Lagunilla, 2000; Rigau, 1994; Zagana, 1996). Hence, it has often been referred to as “aspectual *se*” in the literature.

- |     |    |                                             |
|-----|----|---------------------------------------------|
| (2) | a. | Juan (se) cayó.<br>Juan $CL_{se}$ fell off. |
|-----|----|---------------------------------------------|

Despite this first differentiation between obligatory and optional *se*, not all instances of optional *se* can be characterized as “aspectual *se*”. For example, *se* seems to slightly modify the meaning of “cognoscitive” verbs as (4): the clitic in (4a) renders the meaning of the verb “pensar” (think) very similar to “sospechar” (suspect), i.e. “pensarme” in (4a) means “suspect” rather than “think”. In (4b) the presence of the clitic involves that Juan already has walked the way and that he is quite acquainted with it. With appearance/disappearance verbs as in (5), the clitic seems to add a semantic nuance of “spontaneity” or “unexpectedness” to the predicate.

- |     |    |                                                                                                                                                     |
|-----|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (4) | a. | Me pienso que Ana vendrá a la fiesta.<br>$CL_{se}$ think that Ana come <sub>inf</sub> to the party.<br>“I suspect that Ana is coming to the party.” |
|     | b. | Juan se conoce el camino.<br>Juan $CL_{se}$ knows the way.<br>“Juan is very well acquainted with the way.”                                          |
| (5) | a. | Juan (se) marchó a la guerra.<br>Juan $CL_{se}$ went to the war.<br>“Juan left for the war.”                                                        |
|     | b. | Alberto (se) vino a la fiesta.<br>Alberto $CL_{se}$ came to the party.<br>“Alberto came to the party.”                                              |

In this work we will think of “aspectual *se*” as those instances of *se* that (i) occur with no contribution whatsoever with regard to the participant structure of

the predicate, and (ii) are optional. Our definition of “aspectual *se*” rules in (2) and (3), but rules out cases of obligatory *se* (1), cognoscitive verbs (4), and appearance/disappearance verbs (5).

This work centres on the so-called “aspectual *se*” that appears with consumption verbs like (3) (other consumption verbs are “beber(*se*)” [drink up], “tragar(*se*)” [swallow], “tomar(*se*)” [drink], “devorar(*se*)” [devour], and “fumar(*se*)” [smoke]), which have the following characteristics: (i) they optionally allow “*se*”, (ii) they select an object that is the incremental theme of the consumption predicate, (iii) the object may be dropped, (iv) the subject is an agent (rather than a cause), and (v) the subject agrees in person and number  $\phi$ -features when “*se*” is realized.

De Miguel & Fernandez Lagunilla (2000) note that also perception verbs like “ver” (see) allow optional “*se*” when they mean perceptual consumption as in (6a) but not when they mean perception as in (6b). We agree that perception verbs are consumption verbs, when used with the sense of (6a).

- (6) a. Juan (*se*) vió la película.  
Juan  $CL_{3rd}$  saw the movie.  
“Juan watched the movie.”  
b. (\*Me) vi la costa y me dirigí a ella.  
(De Miguel & Fernandez Lagunilla, 2000, p. 24)  
 $CL_{1st}$  saw the coast and  $CL_{1st}$  headed for it.  
“I saw the coast and I headed for it.”

Other verbs that allow optional *se*, such as non-anticausative intransitives in (2), are left aside of this work because they are qualitatively different from consumption (3) and perception verbs (6a) above: verbs in (2) are intransitive and their subjects are not agents (see Teomi, 2012 for an analysis of these verbs).

Previous Analyses: Benefactivity, Perfectivity and Culmination

As Rigau (1994) notes, traditional grammar has insisted on the perfective value of pronominal verbs. Rigau herself argues that pronominal verbs in general, and verbs with aspectual *se* in particular, have an internal argument realized by the clitic, which is responsible of the syntactic-semantic restrictions of the predicate. One of these restrictions is the perfectivity of the predicate, which derives from the benefactive nature of the clitic. We agree with Rigau on the benefactive nature of the clitic, although we disagree on the perfective character of the predicate. Sentences (7) and (8) present evidence against the perfective (and the telic) reading of *se*. Proposals like Sanz (1995), which build upon the telicity of *se*, are falsified by evidence against the perfectivity and telicity contribution of *se* that can be found in (9) and (10): the co-occurrence of *se* with bare plurals (9) and mass nouns (10).

- (7) Juan se leyó el libro un poco.  
Juan  $CL_{3rd}$  read the book a little bit.  
“Juan read a little bit of the book.”  
(8) Juan se leyó el libro a medias.  
Juan  $CL_{3rd}$  read the book a halfway.  
“Juan read the book halfway.”  
(9) Juan se lee novelas en checo.  
Juan  $CL_{3rd}$  reads novels in Czech.  
“Juan reads novels in Czech.”  
(10) Sócrates se tomó veneno. (Romero, 2009)  
Sócrates  $CL_{3rd}$  drank venom.  
“Sócrates drank venom.”

The presence of *se* does not render (9) nor (10) telic. Tests of telicity show that (10) is not a telic event. For example, the logical implications of the progressive aspect in (11) points to the fact that (10) is an activity rather than an accomplishment:

- (11) Sócrates se está tomando veneno *logically implies* Sócrates se ha tomado veneno.

Sócrates  $CL_{3rd}$  is drinking venom *logically implies* Sócrates  $CL_{3rd}$  has drunk venom.

De Miguel & Fernandez Lagunilla (2000) argue that verbs in (2)-(6) convey complex predicates that have two phases: an accomplishment or an achievement plus a change of state. They analyse the clitic *se* as an aspectual operator that focalizes the culmination of the first subevent iff it is followed by a change of state. They follow Pustejovsky (1991) and build on his work to enlarge his typology of events. Verbs that optionally allow *se* are accomplishments (e.g. (3)) or achievements (e.g. (2a)) that may or may not be followed by a change of state. So verbs like ‘morir’ (die) and ‘caer’ (fall) denote just an accomplishment or an achievement, respectively, whereas ‘morirse’ (die) and ‘caerse’ (fall) denote a complex event made up of an accomplishment or an achievement, respectively, plus a resultant state (e.g. ‘be on the floor’ for ‘caerse’ and ‘be dead’ for ‘morirse’). In other words, regardless of whether the lexical entries of ‘caer’ and ‘morir’ encode a complex event, the change of state is ‘visible’ or relevant for syntax iff *se* is realized (De Miguel & Fernandez Lagunilla, 2000, p. 32).

We agree with these authors that *se* correlates with the presence of a state following an accomplishment or achievement in the verbs (2)-(6). However, this analysis raises a number of empirical and theoretical issues when it is applied to other instances of *se*. For example, stative verbs that allow *se* (12) are problematic for this analysis:

- (12) a. (Me) he aprendido la lección.  
(De Miguel & Fernandez Lagunilla, 2000, p. 28)  
 $CL_{1st}$  have  $CL_{1st}$  learnt the lesson.  
‘I have learnt the lesson.’  
b. (Me) estuve callada.  
(De Miguel & Fernandez Lagunilla, 2000, p. 28)  
 $CL_{1st}$  was  $CL_{1st}$  silent.  
‘I remained silent’  
c. (Me) lo creo.  
 $CL_{1st}$   $CL_{ACC}$  believe  $CL_{ACC}$ .  
‘I believe it.’  
d. (Me) pienso que vendrá María.  
 $CL_{1st}$  think  $CL_{1st}$  that will come María.  
‘I think/suspect that María will come’

De Miguel & Fernández Lagunilla argue that (12a,b) do not raise a problem for their analysis because (12a) with *me* implies that the subject has done previous work and as result he knows the lesson now. Likewise, they argue that (12b) with *me* implies that something happened that made the subject become and remain silent. Although we agree with the interpretation of (12a), we do not do so with the interpretation of (12b) with *me*: something could have triggered the change of state (from being talking to become silent) but this is not implied, i.e. the subject could have simply been silent all along (i.e. from the beginning to the end of the situation). Besides, the states in (12c) and (12d) do not necessarily follow any previous eventuality. (12c) denotes a belief irrespective of whether the subject has reflected on it or he has suddenly come up with it. (12d) does not necessarily imply that the subject has thought about María’s coming. What (12c) implies is that the subject does not base his belief on any external evidence but it is rather an intuition. In other words, the verb “pensarse” in (12d) means “suspect” rather than “think”.

From a theoretical point of view, De Miguel & Fernández Lagunilla’s characterization of *se* as an aspectual operator has several shortcomings. First, to say that *se* focalises a phase of the event is to say that two things

happen at once: the presence of *se* and a certain form of complex event. However, it is unclear whether the change of state that follows the eventuality is triggered by the presence of *se*, or the other way around. Moreover, no other such operators exist in Spanish. The authors mention adverbials that function as operators ('*aún*', '*todavía*'). However, *se* does not seem to be an adverbial (as Zagana, 1996 argues) because it has  $\phi$ -features, typical of nominal items, which agree with the subject. Besides, *se* is a clitic with the same distributional pattern as other clitics that clearly are pronouns (*lo*, *la*, *le*, *me*, *te*, *nos*, *os*). Finally, *se* with other kinds of verbs, such as anticausatives, cannot be characterized as an aspectual operator necessary to focalise a change of state that follows another eventuality. The transitive counterpart (13a) of the anticausative verb (13b) disallows *se* despite the fact that it also denotes a complex event (an accomplishment followed by a change of state). It is unclear why *se* is necessary for the state to be relevant for the syntax in (13b) if it is ruled out in (13a).

- (13) a. La tormenta *se* rompió la ventana.  
The storm  $CL_{se}$  broke the window.  
'The storm broke the window.'  
b. La ventana *se* rompió.  
The window  $CL_{se}$  broke.  
'The window broke.'

We agree with De Miguel & Fernández Lagunilla on the claim that the predicates that have an aspectual *se* are in fact complex events. It is De Miguel & Fernández Lagunilla's characterization of *se* as an aspectual operator that we do not agree with. First, because of the aforementioned reasons (presence of  $\phi$ -features, same distributional properties as other clitics that are pronouns). Second, because the function of *se* does not seem to be the same across all the syntactic configurations where *se* appears (cf. (12c), (12d), and (13)). And third, because this characterization of *se* makes it impossible to integrate it in other analyses of *se* occurring with inchoative verbs and anticausative verbs. However, we agree on the intuition behind De Miguel & Fernández Lagunilla's concept of *culmination*. We think that *se* signals (or rather involves, see § 0 below) that one of the sub-events is developed enough so as to affect the argument of the second sub-event (which is identical to the subject of the first sub-event by virtue of binding), i.e. so as to produce a caused or result state on the argument of a second sub-event (bound by the subject of the first sub-event).

Aspect, *se* and event complexity  
Levin & Rappaport-Hovav (2002, pp. 1-2) argue that aspectual properties have been determinant factors in the discussion about argument expression selection. Aspect and event structure are consistently and strongly related to each other in the literature. However, as these authors remark, there are other semantic determinants of argument expression not necessarily related to the aspectual properties of the predicate. Telicity, boundness and incremental themeness are not the only fundamental notions relevant to argument expression, and perhaps not even the major ones, as Levin and Rappaport-Hovav argue.

All the previous analyses of the aspectual *se* reviewed in §0 are based on the aspectual properties of the predicates. We will argue against the aspectual nature of this kind of *se*. We will argue that perfectivity (Rigau, 1994), telicity (Sanz, 1995) and even the notion of *culmination* defended by De Miguel & Fernández Lagunilla (2000) in sentences with aspectual *se*, are just consequences of another property of the predicate that is not related to its aspectual nature but rather to its

event structure, which is derived, in its turn, from its thematic specification (see §0).

It is generally assumed that not only the verb but also the kind of theme that the verb selects are crucial factors to determine the aspect of the event. The kind of theme able to determine the aspect of an event is what Dowty (1979) called *incremental theme*. Only if an incremental theme is quantized (i.e. it denotes a specific quantity of stuff, such that no subpart of that stuff has that quantity) can it render the whole event telic or bound (Dowty, 1979; Krifka, 1989; Krifka, 1992; Krifka, 1998). If the incremental theme is no quantized, the event is atelic. Moreover, in order for a theme to be incremental, there must be a relationship of homomorphism between the event and the object, i.e. a relationship that maintains the part structure: i.e. for every part of the event (e), there is a part of the object (x). If such homomorphism holds, then the duration of the event depends on the material extension of the theme. The themes of verbs of consumption are incremental, as much as paths of motion (Krifka, 1998). The notion of homomorphism implies a temporal dependence between the event and the incremental theme. Hence this kind of theme is crucial to determine the aspect of the event.

Levin & Rappaport-Hovav (2002) argue that event complexity, as defined in (14), is a determinant to argument expression. They state the Argument-Per-Subevent condition (15) for complex events.

- (14) Complex event:  
(Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 2005)  
[CAUSING EVENT]+[RESULT/CAUSED EVENT]  
(15) Argument-Per-Subevent Condition:  
(Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 1999)

There must be at least one argument XP in the syntax per subevent in the event structure.

Yet another condition that a complex event has to meet is the lack of temporal dependence between the subevents, as specified in (16):

- (16) "By lack of temporal dependence between the subevents, we mean that the two subevents need not necessarily unfold together temporally, with the result that a fair amount of flexibility is expected in the temporal relation between them."  
(Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 2002, p. 6)  
Event complexity reflects the internal temporal constitution of the event. Lexical causatives are generally considered complex events ((Dowty, 1979)), but Levin & Rappaport-Hovav provide another kind of construction (17) that also seems to be a complex event (see also (18)):

- (17) The fans screamed themselves hoarse.  
(18) I eat myself sick. (Luzondo Oyón, 2011)

Whereas "The fans screamed" is a simple event (there is just an argument, and the predicate constitutes an activity), the so-called "fake" reflexive turns it into a complex event, and sets up a resultative construction made up of two subevents: an activity with its argument (the fans) and a result state (being or becoming hoarse) with its argument (themselves, which is bound by the fans).

It is quite appealing to think that the reflexive pronoun is what produces this change in the simple event. In fact, we are going to argue in §0 that it is the presence of *se* in consumption predicates that turns the predicate into a complex one.

One could argue that consumption verbs are already complex without the clitic *se* when they are telic. Levin & Rappaport-Hovav (2002) argue against the idea that

every telic event must be a complex event. Whereas an accomplishment is defined by having an endpoint, a complex event is not. A complex event is associated with the semantic property of lack of necessary temporal dependence of subevents and the syntactic property of requiring an argument XP for each subevent (Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 2002, p. 11). Usually, the set of accomplishments and the set of complex events overlap, though this is not a one-to-one relation. In fact, there are atelic complex events as can be seen in (19) (Levin, 2000; Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 1999)<sup>43</sup>:

- (19) a. Robin flew a kite for an hour/ # in an hour.  
b. Pat bounced the ball for ten minutes / # in ten minutes. (From Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 2002)

There are telic simple predicates too, so event complexity and telicity do not go hand in hand with argument structure. We can thus state that the classification of the set of events by their telicity is independent of the classification of the set of events by their complexity, even if the set of complex events partially overlaps the set of telic events. Examples of simple telic events are the sentences in (20) because they do not meet the second condition (lack of temporal dependence) to be complex events.

- (20) a. María comió tres pasteles.  
María ate three cakes.  
"María ate three cakes."  
b. Marta bebió una coca-cola.  
Marta drank a coke.  
"Marta drank a coke."  
c. Carlota leyó un libro.  
Carlota read a book.  
"Carlota read a book."  
d. Julia vio una película.  
Julia saw a movie.  
"Julia watched a movie."

As said before, transitive consumption predicates have an incremental theme and maintain a relation of homomorphism between the event and the incremental theme. This homomorphism, as said before, involves a temporal dependence between the event and the theme, given that the extension of the theme implies the duration of the event. On the other hand, one of the conditions to be a complex event is the temporal independence between the two subevents. Therefore, the conclusion that can be drawn is that transitive predicates of consumption are simple predicates (for further argument see Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 2002, pp. 13-15), even if they denote telic events, as (20).

Let us compare the temporal dependency of transitive predicates of consumption (21), which we argue are simple predicates, with the temporal independence of causative predicates (22), which are complex predicates:

- (21) Ayer por la mañana Óscar comió tres tostadas.  
Yesterday by the morning Óscar ate three toasts.  
"Óscar ate three pieces of toast yesterday morning."

- (22) Ayer por la mañana un ladrón mató a tres rehenes.  
Yesterday by the morning a thief killed to three hostages.  
"A thief killed three hostages yesterday morning."

Suppose the hostages in (22) dead in hospital yesterday at noon rather than yesterday morning; then (22) continues to be true. But if Óscar in (21) started eating

toasts in the morning, and ended up eating the third toast at noon, (21) would not be true. The event denoted by "kill" does not temporally depend on the result event of the action of killing (the death of hostages), whereas the event denoted by "eat" temporally depends on the material extension of the theme that denotes the entity that is eaten (since it is an incremental theme and a relationship of homomorphism holds between the event and the theme).

The conclusion this far is that consumption predicates are simple events, regardless of whether they are telic or atelic. However, this is not always the case in Spanish. If we look at (10) again, repeated below, it is not clear at all that it denotes a simple event. Our proposal states that *se* constitutes an "extra" argument that saturates another subevent (as much as the fake reflexive *themselves* in (17) above). In other words, *se* in (10) is the XP (argument) of a result subevent (23) and, consequently, it denotes an entity that undergoes a change (a result). The clitic *se* ends up referring to Socrates because the subject binds it.

- (9) Sócrates se tomó veneno. (Romero, 2009)  
Sócrates CL<sub>se</sub> drank venom.  
"Sócrates drank venom."

- (23)  $\lambda x \lambda y \lambda z \lambda P \lambda P_2$  P(tomar) & x(Sócrates=agent) & y(venom=theme) & P(resulting state=become affected by the venom) & z(se=experiencer) & se=Sócrates

The event of "tomar" (drink) temporally depends on the material extension of "veneno" (venom), but in this case it is a non-quantized NP, so the simple event denoted by "tomar" is unbound. It is important to insist on the fact that event complexity is independent from notions like boundness or telicity ((10) is a complex event despite the fact that it doesn't denote a telic event, as shown in (23)). The temporal extension of "tomar" is indefinite as the reference of the incremental theme "veneno" is. However, (9) continues to be true even if the effects of the drinking of the venom do not affect Socrates until the day after. Therefore, the two subevents are temporally independent; or rather they are not necessarily temporally dependent. So transitive predicates of consumption with aspectual *se* in Spanish are complex predicates, even if they denote atelic events, as (10).

To sum up this far, we have argued that consumption predicates are simple events (in English and in Spanish when they occur without *se*), whereas consumption predicates with *se* in Spanish are complex events. It is *se* that constitutes the necessary argument of the result or caused state. The presence of the state is what turns the simple event into a complex event. (24a) is a simple telic event (an accomplishment) with two arguments, whereas (24b) is a complex event made up of the accomplishment already present in (24a) plus a caused or result event, whose argument is *se* which is bound by "Juan". The complex event (24b) has three arguments introduced by three  $\lambda$  operators, although two of them are saturated by the same individual (Juan).

- (24) a. Juan leyó el libro.  
Juan read the book.  
"Juan read the book."  
 $\lambda x \lambda y \lambda z \lambda P$  P(read) & x(Juan=agent) & y(the book=theme)  
b. Juan se leyó el libro.  
Juan CL<sub>se</sub> read the book.  
"Juan read the book."  
 $\lambda x \lambda y \lambda z \lambda P \lambda P_2$  P(read) & x(Juan=agent) & y(the book=theme) & P(resulting state=become affected by the reading of the book) & z(se=experiencer) & se=Juan

43 In fact, this is what we will argue for sentences (9) and (10) in §0.

The question that will be addressed in the next section is why only consumption predicates are compatible with the presence of *se* and the conversion into a complex event, unlike other verbs for which the presence of *se* carries out other consequences (reflexivity, inchoativity, etc.).

### Theta meets aspect

The aspectual *se*, as defined in §0, appears with a very restricted set of verbs. In this work we focus on a specific subset: consumption verbs. In §0 we have argued that the appearance of *se* correlates, as De Miguel & Fernández Lagunilla (2000) previously noted, with the fact that the event is complex. De Miguel & Fernández Lagunilla argue that *se* is an aspectual operator whose function is to signal that the first sub-event culminates and that a state follows it, like (25). This explains why *se* is not to be found in the examples in (26): there is no state that follows the first event. However, and as said in §0, it is unexpected that *se* is banned in (27), since a state (be broken) follows the first eventuality.

- (25) a. Juan *se* mareó.  
(De Miguel & Fernández Lagunilla, 2000)  
Juan  $CL_{-3i}$  became dizzy.  
"Juan became dizzy."  
b. Juan *se* cayó  
Juan  $CL_{-3i}$  fell off.  
"Juan fell off"
- (26) a. Juan *\*(se)* besó a María.  
Juan  $CL_{-3i}$  kissed to María.  
"Juan kissed María."  
b. El niño *\*(se)* nació.  
The child  $CL_{-3i}$  was born.  
"The child was born"
- (27) El viento / Martina *\*(se)* rompió la ventana.  
The wind / Martina  $CL_{-3i}$  broke the window.  
"The wind / Martina broke the window."

Moreover, the fact that *se* is an aspectual operator with  $\phi$ -features agreeing with the subject is a unique phenomenon since no such another aspectual operator is found in the grammar of Spanish. De Miguel & Fernández Lagunilla compare *se* with the adverbial operators "aún" (yet) and "todavía" (still), both of which focalize a part of the event. The problem is that "aún" and "todavía" can appear with almost whatever verb as regards their thematic specification, i.e. they do not show the strong lexical constraints that *se* has.

The lexical constraints are so strong that the thematic nature of the subject and the object determine the "interpretation" of *se*:

if the subject is a cause (i.e. it is compatible with natural forces, as well as animate agents) the predicate in which *se* appears is interpreted as anticausative;

if the subject is agentive (i.e. it is compatible only with animate agents but incompatible with natural forces) and the object is compatible with animate arguments (in terms of Dowty, 1991, it is a proto-patient with some characteristics of proto-agents) the predicate with *se* is interpreted as reflexive;

finally, if the subject is agentive and the object is not usually compatible with animate arguments (again in Dowty's terms, it is a proto-patient), *se* is interpreted as signalling a complex event as we argued in §0 (as well as De Miguel & Fernández Lagunilla previously did).

This seems to point out that the interpretation of *se*, in general, and of the aspectual *se* in particular, is thematically restricted, i.e. it is restricted by the thematic composition of both subject and object.

This leads to the possibility of a lexical operation at play in this kind of predicates. Syntax is blind to the content of theta roles (or theta-relations), and it just assigns them so that the semantic system interprets them (Reinhart, 2002). If the distribution of the aspectual *se* is sensitive to the content of the theta-grid of the verb, then it makes sense to think of some pre-syntactic operation able to read the content of the theta-grid of the verb.

In the literature, several lexical operations have been explored. Some operations reduce the valence of the verb: e.g. *external expletivization* and *decausativization* for anticausatives (Horvath & Siloni, 2011; Reinhart, 2002; Reinhart & Siloni, 2005); and *internal expletivization* and *reflexivization* for reflexives (Reinhart, 2002; Reinhart & Siloni, 2005; Teomiro, 2011).

The case of *se* with consumption verbs involves predicate augmentation, i.e. the eventive structure of the event is augmented by adding a state (see §0). One operation to augment predicates has been described in the literature by Reinhart (2002) and Horvath & Siloni (2011). However, this operation, as formalized by Reinhart and Horvath & Siloni, does not add a state to the predicate but an extra argument by expanding the theta-grid of the verb. More concretely, the operation takes as input the basic lexical entry of the verb and it adds an *agent* [+c+m]<sup>44</sup> argument. This operation has been called *agentivization* (Reinhart, 2002) and *causativization* (Horvath & Siloni, 2011), and has been described in a variety of languages. What these authors claim is that some languages resort to a lexical operation to augment the valence of the verb by adding an extra theta-role to the verb's basic theta-grid. This is the case of English, which can augment the valence of certain intransitive verbs like (28) below, as Hungarian does in (29) (examples from Horvath & Siloni, 2011, p. 680).

- (28) a. John walked.  
b. John walked the dog.
- (29) János meg-et-ette Mari-val az almát  
János<sub>ERG</sub> PERF-eat-CAUS-PAST.PRF-DO Mari-INSTR the apple-ACC  
"János made Mari eat the apple."

Based on Reinhart's (2002) theta features (see footnote 44), Horvath & Siloni (2011) define such lexical operation in (30).

- (30) Causativization in the lexicon: (Horvath & Siloni, 2011)

$V < \alpha > \rightarrow \text{CAUS-V } < [+c+m], \alpha' >$ , where  $\alpha$  includes a role specified as external; if this role includes a [+c] feature, the feature is revaluated to [-c] (otherwise  $\alpha$  equals  $\alpha'$ ).

44 These works are within the framework of Reinhart's (2002) Theta System, which describes the thematic relations between arguments and events by means of two thematic features: [-c], which establishes whether the argument is necessary for the change brought about by the event or not, and [ $\pm$ m], which states whether the argument is mentally involved in the change brought about by the event or not. These two theta features combine into eight theta clusters, which roughly correspond to the theta roles described in the literature: [+c] *cause*, [+c+m] *agent*, [-c+m] *experiencer*, [+c-m] *instrument*, [+m] *sentient*, [-c-m] *theme*, [-c] *goal*, and [-m] *subject matter*. It is beyond the scope of this work to give a full description of Reinhart's Theta System. The reader is referred to the works of Reinhart (2002) and Reinhart & Siloni (2005) for a detailed exposition of the system and the rationale behind it.



The operation (30) takes a verb *V* with a theta-grid  $\alpha$  as input. One condition for its application is that the theta-grid  $\alpha$  of the verb *V* contains a theta-role specified as external. In Reinhart's Theta System, the roles specified as external are *agents* ([+c+m]), *causes* ([+c]), and *sentients* ([+m]). Other theta roles (or theta-bundles, in Reinhart's terms) are not marked as external arguments. The output of the operation (30) is the causativized entry of the verb *V*, i.e. CAUS-*V*, which is the result of adding an *agent* theta role ([+c+m]) to the original theta-grid  $\alpha$  of the verb.

It is the second requirement of the operation that is crucial for the issue to be addressed later on (consumption verbs): if the role specified as external includes a [+c] feature (which involves that the argument saturating that theta feature establishes a causal relationship with the event denoted by the verb), this must be revaluated to [-c], i.e. if the original theta-grid  $\alpha$  of the verb *V* contains a *cause* [+c], it is revaluated to a *goal* [-c], and if the original theta-grid  $\alpha$  of the verb *V* contains an *agent* [+c+m], this is revaluated to an *experiencer* [-c+m]. This prevents the presence of two arguments marked as external in the theta-grid, provided that syntax makes only one position available for external arguments.

If we look again at example (28), repeated below as (31), the only argument of "walk" in (31a) is an *agent* [+c+m] that is revaluated in (31b) as an *experiencer* [-c+m] once the new *agent* [+c+m] is introduced by the operation (30). The added role is an *agent* [+c+m], corresponding to an animate argument that triggers the walking event. The internal argument is an *experiencer* [-c+m], which does not bring about the event that executes the actual walking and therefore its mental state is relevant (Horvath & Siloni, 2011, p.608).

- (31) a. John<sub>agent</sub> walked.  
b. John<sub>agent</sub> walked the dog<sub>experiencer</sub>

Even if the operation *causativization* (30) is restricted to verbs that have an external argument specified in their lexical entry, its application seems to be highly idiosyncratic and varies from language to language.

The proposal we want to put forward in this work is that consumption verbs in Spanish are compatible with the application of the operation *causativization* (30). The basic entry of these verbs is specified in (32a) and their eventive structure in (32b) (see §0 for more details on the eventive structure of consumption verbs).

- (32) a.  $V(\text{agent} [+c+m], \text{theme} [-c-m])$   
b.  $\lambda x \lambda y \lambda P. P_1(M) \& x(\text{agent} [+c+m]) \& y(\text{theme} [-c-m])$

If *causativization* (30) applies to (32a), it gives (33) as output.

- (33) CAUS-*V* (*agent* [+c+m], *experiencer* [-c+m], *theme* [-c-m])

The *agent* [+c+m] in (32a) is revaluated as an *experiencer* in (33) since the [-c] feature is rendered as [-c]. The question at stake now is what happens with the eventive structure of the augmented entry (33). We propose that if the entry of a verb contains an *experiencer* [-c+m] theta role, then the eventive structure of the predicate requires the existence of a state that is experienced by the *experiencer*. We formalize this intuition in the *experiencer-state condition* in (34):

- (34) The *experiencer-state condition*:  
If the lexical entry of the verb has an *experiencer* [-c+m] argument, then the eventive structure of the predicate

requires the presence of a state that is experienced by the *experiencer*.

So, the eventive structure of the augmented entry (33) requires a state that is experienced by the *experiencer*, as formalized in (35).

- (35)  $\lambda x \lambda y \lambda z \lambda P. P_1(\text{CAUS-}V) \& x(\text{agent} [+c+m]) \& y(\text{theme} [-c-m]) \& P_2(\text{resulting state} = \text{become affected by the consumption of the theme}) \& z(\text{experiencer} [-c+m])$

The state  $\lambda P_2$  in (35) is the result of the subject's consuming of the object. The *experiencer* can be saturated by a clitic that is not co-referential with the subject as in (36a,b). Nonetheless, it can also be saturated by the clitic *se*, which must be co-referential with the subject as in (36c). In this case, the *experiencer* [-c+m] and the *agent* [+c+m] are the same individual, so the *agent* [+c+m] is the one that becomes affected by his consumption of the *theme* [-c-m] because it binds *se*, and hence it saturates the *experiencer* [-c+m] theta role too.

- (36) a. Juan me leyó el libro.  
Juan<sub>sub</sub> read<sub>pt</sub> the book.  
"Juan read me the book."  
b. Juan le leyó el libro.  
Juan<sub>sub</sub> read<sub>pt</sub> the book.  
"Juan read him the book."  
c. Juan se leyó el libro.  
Juan<sub>sub</sub> read<sub>pt</sub> the book.  
"Juan read the book."

Note furthermore that the affectation of the *experiencer* [-c+m] is of a different nature than the affectation expressed by high applicatives (Pylkkänen, 2008). First, the aspectual *se* can co-appear with a high applicative as in (37) below. Second, the high applicative relates the whole predicate (i.e. the verb and all its arguments, including the external argument) with the argument in the specifier position of the high applicative phrase (the "affected" argument). In the cases of *se* with consumption verbs, the *experiencer* [-c+m] experiences the result of the predicate and the *theme*, but excludes the subject. In other words, in (37b) the mental state of the *experiencer* [-c+m] ("se" = Juan) becomes altered because Juan read himself the book, but no matter if someone else did it, like in (36b), where the *experiencer* [-c+m] "le" (him) undergoes a change in his mental state although he did not read the book himself, but it was Juan who read it to him. However, the argument introduced by the high applicative in (37a) (the speaker) is affected by the fact that the speaker's child and no other does not eat the chick peas (the reference of both the subject and the object are crucial for the affectedness of the argument introduced by the high applicative).

- (37) a. Este niño no se me come los garbanzos.  
This kid not<sub>3s</sub> eat<sub>3s</sub> the chick peas.  
"This kid does not eat the chick peas (which affects me somehow)"  
b. Juan se me lee todos los libros que le traigo.  
Juan<sub>sub</sub> read<sub>3s</sub> all the books that him bring<sub>3s</sub>.  
"Juan reads all the books that I brought to him (which affects me somehow)"

The application of the lexical operation *causativization* accounts for the fact that the presence of the aspectual *se* is sensitive to the thematic specification of the verbal entry. If the entry is specified with a *cause* [+c] external argument, then this entry is compatible with the operation *decausativization* and no other can apply (Reinhart, 2002; Reinhart & Siloni, 2005). If the entry is

specified with an agent then it is compatible in principle with both operations *reflexivization* (Reinhart & Siloni, 2005) and *causativization* (Horvath & Siloni, 2011). We propose that consumption verbs are not compatible with the operation *reflexivization* because their theme argument is less compatible with animate arguments than the theme argument of reflexive verbs like “wash”. This would be something derived from the semantics of the verb and it should be somehow specified in the lexical entry. However, we leave this issue aside for future research since it falls far beyond the scope of this work. Note that the data is compatible with our hypothesis this far. If we look at the sentences in (38), the difference is not aspectual but of a different nature.

- (38) a. Juan se leyó el libro en voz alta.  
 Juan <sub>CL<sub>3</sub></sub> read the book aloud.  
 “Juan read the book aloud.”  
 b. Juan leyó el libro en voz alta.  
 Juan read the book aloud.  
 “Juan read the book aloud.”

Both (38a) and (38b) are telic. We argue that the difference between (38a) and (38b) is the affectedness of the participant denoted by *se* (which is a reflexive pronoun co-referent with “Juan”) rather than the telicity of the predicate. In (38b) Juan may have read the book without involving a change of his mental state, i.e. without having understood any word of it, whereas in (38a) a mental involvement of Juan is expressed so that it is impossible to say something like (39a) (vs. (39b)):

- (39) a. #Juan se leyó el libro en voz alta [sin enterarse de nada].  
 Juan <sub>CL<sub>3</sub></sub> read the book aloud [without understanding of nothing]  
 “Juan read the book aloud without understanding anything.”  
 b. Juan leyó el libro en voz alta [sin enterarse de nada].  
 Juan read the book aloud [without understanding of nothing]  
 “Juan read the book aloud without understanding anything.”

We propose that *se* in the predicate (38a) is a fully functional pronominal that bears dative Case and an *experiencer* [-c+m] theta-role. We further argue that *se* saturates an argument in the predicate (i.e. a  $\lambda$  operator at the semantic level) that has been introduced by the aforementioned lexical operation *causativization*.

- (40) a. Juan se leyó el libro en voz alta.  
 Juan <sub>CL<sub>3</sub></sub> read the book aloud.  
 “Juan read the book aloud.”  
 b. CAUS-V (*agent* [+c+m], *experiencer* [-c+m], *theme* [-c-m])

- c.  $\lambda x \lambda y \lambda z [P_1 P_2 P_3 (CAUS-V) \& x(juan = agent [+c+m]) \& y(el\ libro = theme [-c-m]) \& P_3 (resulting\ state = become\ affected\ by\ the\ reading\ of\ the\ book) \& z(se = experiencer [-c+m]) \& se = Juan]$

- (41) a. Juan leyó el libro en voz alta.  
 Juan read the book aloud.  
 “Juan read the book aloud.”  
 b. V(*agent* [+c+m], *theme* [-c-m])  
 c.  $\lambda x \lambda y \lambda P. P(V) \& x(juan = agent [+c+m]) \& y(el\ libro = theme [-c-m])$

If the pronoun *se* was locally bound by the preceding subject, then the Theta-Criterion would be violated: *se* and the binder subject would be interpreted at the Conceptual-Intentional System as one argument since they form a chain in the syntax and *se* is  $\phi$ -defective since it lacks gender and number (see Reuland, 2001). Volkova (2009) reports on similar cases where an anaphor is locally bound by its antecedent, typically a subject, but without forming syntactic chains so that both the anaphor and the binder subject are interpreted as two independent arguments at LF. This is possible because the anaphor is introduced in the syntactic derivation marked with inherent dative Case, which prevents the chain formation and forces the binding to take place directly at the Conceptual-Intentional System (Reuland, 2011; Reuland, 2001). We propose that *se* is also marked with inherent dative Case and hence, it cannot form a syntactic chain with the subject so that the binding has to take place at the C-I system. This is what Teomiro (2010, p. 237) calls *pseudo-reflexive binding*: the subject, “Juan” in our case, binds the pronoun *se* directly at C-I without resorting to syntactic mechanisms such as chain formation.

#### Conclusions

We conclude that the “aspectual *se*” is not enough to render the predicate telic or perfective. The telicity of the predicate remains the same with or without *se*. The contribution of *se* with consumption verbs consists in defining a caused event (a result state) by virtue of the *experiencer* [-c+m] theta-role that is introduced in the predicate by the lexical (pre-syntactic) operation *causativization*. This operation has been described in other valence augmentation phenomena in a variety of languages (see Horvath & Siloni, 2011). Telicity is not affected by the presence of *se* itself. It is the presence of the state that triggers an aspectual shift since it binds the eventuality, and usually (but not always, see (10) in §0) renders the predicate telic (see Campanini & Schäfer, 2011). Hence we state that the contribution of the so-called “aspectual *se*” is thematic rather than aspectual, although this thematic contribution may have aspectual consequences. The event is rendered complex by adding a caused event whose argument is realized by the clitic *se*, which is bound by the subject by means of pseudo-reflexive binding at the C-I system.

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# Cognitive Approach to the Study of Semantic Change – The Case Study of the Lexical Item Mouth

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## Abstract

The discussion included in this paper continues the academic tradition of the Rzeszów Scholl of Diachronic Semantics (henceforth RSDS), in that it concerns cognitively-couched, diachroic research into the semantics of the lexicon that is close to man. Specifically, the authors aim at evaluating the degree of cognitive salience of mouth and verifying, whether the conceptual patterns distinguished in the historical development of other lexical items linked to the category BODY PARTS (e.g. Więclawska 2010, 2011) also hold true for mouth. Namely, the aim set to the study is to determine the secondary sense-threads of the scrutinised lexical item and determine the kinds of semantic alternation leading to their construal. Also, the authors embark on the task of presenting the phraseological potential of mouth focusing, among other areas, on the issue of the metaphorical implications in the construal of phrase-embedded senses and the degree of cross-linguistic, formal and semantic synergy with regard to its phraseological productivity.

The language data presented in the foregoing covers merely selected historical sense shifts that are classified as well-evidenced in the history of English, as documented by the major lexicographic source relied upon here (the OED), or being especially productive in terms of having entered various syntagmatic relations in present-day English.

## Keywords


Lexical borrowing, loanwords, English vocabulary, theological terminology.

## 1. Cognitive account of the historical senses of *mouth*

The etymological sense **A** of the word is 'the organ of food ingestion in men and animals' and it is first evidenced in the historical texts of the English language at the close of the 9<sup>th</sup> century. The 1000 years time span is richly documented with the *OED* contexts (c 897 Ne forbinde *ge* no *ðæm* *ðerscendum* oxum *ðone* *muð*. > 1875 The cavity of the *mouth* forms the commencement of the alimentary canal. > current in present-day English). Within the cognitive framework adopted here, the historically primary sense may be accounted for by highlighting certain locations within the attributive paths of relevant **CDs**, which largely follows patterns identified in the analysis of other **HEAD**-related body-parts terms. Hence, one is justified in postulating that the sense **A** is founded on the matrix of values located within the attributive paths of **DOMAIN OF BEING** [...] and **DOMAIN OF FUNCTION** [...], whereby the conceptual values (HUMAN BEING) ^ (ANIMAL) and (FOOD INGESTION) are highlighted respectively. The historically primary sense **A** of *mouth* may have provided the semantic base for four secondary senses, as illustrated in *Figure 1*. The senses that are distinguished are as follows:

- sense **B** 'the external orifice of the mouth considered as part of face',
- sense **C** 'the organ of speech production',
- sense **D** 'an object resembling mouth in shape and/or relative position and/or function', and
- sense **E** 'various categories of human being'.

*Figure 1* given below illustrates the possible direction of conceptual processes that led to the generation of the historically evidenced senses of English *mouth*.



**Figure 1. The links in the semantics of mouth.**

The first sense shift that led to the rise of the O.E. sense **B** 'the external orifice of the mouth considered as part of face' may be labelled as a case of narrowing of meaning. This typologising move is based on the stipulation made by *RSDS* scholars who frequently equate sense narrowing with the involvement of a substantial number of **CDs** used for the sense

explication. Here, the construal of sense **B** which is anchored in the conceptual macrocategory **BODY PARTS** may be accounted for by postulating the process of backgrounding of the values (ANIMAL) and (FOOD INGESTION) in the attributive matrix of **DOMAIN OF BEING [...]** and **DOMAIN OF FUNCTION [...]** respectively. However, the attributive path of **DOMAIN OF FUNCTION [...]** remains involved with the newly activated conceptual value (TRANSMISSION) brought to prominence. In order to complement the cognitive profile of sense **B** one needs to add that the process of backgrounding of certain attributive values is coupled with highlighting new elements within the attributive paths of other CDs, that is **DOMAIN OF SHAPE [(OVAL)]** and **DOMAIN OF RELATIVE POSITION [(CENTRAL)]**. The historical time-span of the sense analysed here is evidenced from the 10<sup>th</sup> century in the *OED* contexts (a 900 Swa pæt he for py sare ne meahthe furðon his hond to *muðe* Ʒedon. > 1875 The corners of the *mouth* can be drawn to one side or the other, by the action of various muscles. > current in present-day English). The next historical sense **C** may be said to be based upon the purport of the historically primary sense **A**, that is 'the organ of food ingestion in men and animals', and it may be viewed as a case of widening of meaning, whereby the semantic potential of source sense becomes extended and yields sense **C** 'the organ of speech'. In terms of cognitive model, the value (ANIMAL) may be said to be rendered inactive in the attributive path of **DOMAIN OF BEING [...]**, and the semantic pole of *mouth* becomes highlighted for the value (SPEECH PRODUCTION) located within the attributive path of **DOMAIN OF FUNCTION [...]**. Simultaneously, these operations are coupled with the disappearance of the source value (FOOD INGESTION). The following *OED* quotations illustrate the historical currency of the sense since the 10<sup>th</sup> century (c 1000 Hi habbað dumne *muð* and blinde eazan. > 1864 He cursed that one unctuous *mouth* which lured him, rogue, To buy strange shares in some Peruvian mine. > current in present-day English).

In turn, the construal of sense **D** 'an object resembling mouth in shape and/or relative position and/or function' may be viewed as a case of metaphorical extension of sense **B** 'the external orifice of the mouth considered as part of face'. In line with the methodological framework adopted we postulate that the operations involved here are the substitution of the source value (HUMAN BEING) for the element (INANIMATE OBJECT) specified within the attributive path of **DOMAIN OF BEING [...]**, coupled with the simultaneous activation of the source values within the attributive paths of **DOMAIN OF RELATIVE POSITION [(CENTRAL)]**, **DOMAIN OF SHAPE [(OVAL)]** and **DOMAIN OF FUNCTION [(TRANSMISSION)]**. The analysed sense **D** emerges from the historical texts that date back to the middle 13<sup>th</sup> century (c 1250 ðo breðere seckes hauen he fild And bunden ðe *muðes* ðor bi-foren. > 1875 *Mouth*, the hole in a furnace out of which melted metal flows. > current in present-day English). The historical currency of the sense is documented in various lexicographic works which point to *mouth* being used either with reference to a trap-door opening, opening of a river, opening between the jaws of a vice or the lateral hole of an organ pipe (see *MED* and *CSDD*). The Mid.E. history of *mouth* provides yet another case of metonymic extension. According to the *OED*, at the beginning of the 14<sup>th</sup> century the lexical item started to be used in the sense **E** 'various categories of human being'. Note that here reference is made to a human being viewed generally, but the usage also covers a few more peripheral senses such as, for example, 'a person

viewed as a spokesperson' or a 'food consumer' (see sense **E** in *Figure 1*).<sup>45</sup> As regards the conceptual roots of the sense, this very much peripheral sense may be said to be grounded in the semantic potential of sense **C** 'the organ of speech', while the sense which pictures a man as a food consumer is conjectured to be anchored in the historical sense **A** 'the organ of food ingestion'.

The rise of sense **E** that encompasses conceptually several peripheral senses may be viewed – following the lines of the semantic development of other **HEAD**-related terms analysed in the work – as a case of metonymic extension that fits in the general pattern <PART FOR WHOLE>, and the peripheral senses 'a spokesman' and 'a food consumer' follow the patterns <TOOL TO PERFORM THE ACTIVITY FOR THE PERSON PERFORMING THE ACTIVITY><sup>46</sup> and <FOOD RECEPTACLE FOR THE FOOD CONSUMER> respectively. The *OED* quotations illustrate one of the earliest senses falling within the scope of sense **E**, that is *mouth* used in the sense 'a spokesman' since the 15<sup>th</sup> century (c 1400 We aske þe, lauerd, purg þe *muð* [read *map*] of þe profete. > 1892 You are a little man to be the *mouth* of so big a chief. > current in present-day English). The 19<sup>th</sup> century use of the word in this sense is confirmed by *RHHDAS* which also testifies to the use of *mouth* with reference to criminal defense lawyers.<sup>47</sup> Apart from the five historical well-evidenced senses analysed in the foregoing, *mouth* was also marginally used for a relatively short period of time with the following *OED* attested sense-threads: 'teeth' (1669 She being much troubled with the tooth-ake I staid till a surgeon of hers come, who hath formerly drawn her *mouth*, and he advised her to draw it.), 'an utterance' (a 1400 For I am dampned, I ne dar disparage þi *mouþ*. > 1702 They unanimously barricado'd their Ears against the *Mouth* of the Prophet. > the currency of the sense is confirmed by *MED*), and 'a silly person' (1680 The whole Gang will be ever and anon watching an opportunity to make a *Mouth* of you. > 1823 'I've a *mouth* at the Mint, as brings me out plenty o' gold blanks'. > the present-day currency of the sense is confirmed by *DU*).

Note that in recent times the sense 'an utterance' current in slang register may be said to have become somewhat axiologically-loaded, as the most frequently documented shade of the sense is 'spoken impudence/insolence' (see *DSUE* and *RHHDAS*). Also, let us point out that the first of the historically minor senses, that is 'the teeth' together with the evidenced sense 'the vagina' falls in the category of *intracategorical shifts* identified earlier which involves historical metaphorically-conditioned application of non-taboo body part terms to refer euphemistically to universally tabooed body-part terms. (cf. *eye* used in reference to the anus, *nose* used in reference to the penis).<sup>48</sup>

## 2. Conceptual patterns of the *mouth*-**HEAD** phraseological formations in a diachronic and cross-linguistic perspective

45 Examples borrowed from the *OED*, *DU*, *RHHDAS*, *DSUE*, *MED* and *BI*.

46 The specific metonymic formula was taken from Kopecka (2011).

47 Cf. the evolution of *lip* in Więclawska (2010).

48 Note, that the relevant 18<sup>th</sup> – mid 19<sup>th</sup> colloquial contexts illustrating the sense referring to female sexual organs are *mouth thankless* and *mouth that cannot bite or says no words about it* (see *LdEU* and *DSUE*). The linguistic figures of euphemisms and dysphemisms related to body part terms are studied in more detail by Duda (2011), among others.




Figure 2. A-, B- and C-related idiomatic senses linked to the mouth-based phraseological formations.

## 2.1. Conceptual Category COMMUNICATION

The analysis of the semantic evolution and phraseology of *mouth* provides evidence that the conceptual category **COMMUNICATION** is multifariously linked to the effects of the historical potential of the lexical item *mouth* viewed as a constitutive element of historically evidenced phraseological formations. The relevant *mouth*-based idiomatic senses covered by the analysis may be linked either to the core or to the periphery of the conceptual category in question, referring either to general communicative activities (core senses) or to more specific ways of communication, explicable in terms of a larger number of CDs (peripheral senses). Hence, the idiomatic sense 'to remain silent' expressed by, among others, the phraseological formation *to shut one's MOUTH* or *to put one's hand over one's MOUTH* or the idiomatic sense 'to talk' linked to the phrase *to open one's MOUTH* and the idiom *to be in the MOUTH of somebody* may be postulated to enjoy the status of core-located senses. In contrast to this, the periphery-located idiomatic senses are 'to talk insistently and for a long time' conveyed, among others, by the phraseological formation *to open full MOUTH at somebody*, 'to tell lies' that emerge from the phrase *to flap in the MOUTH*, the sense 'to flatter' expressed, for example, by the idiomatic formation *to give one a MOUTHful of moonshine* and the idiomatic sense 'to talk abusively' that emerges from the phraseological formation *to have a potty MOUTH*.<sup>49</sup>

49 The historical data were taken from, among others, *TEM*, *DSUE*, *DPF*, *BI*, *EAI* and the *OED*. Note that the dictionaries provide us with alternative phraseological formations encoding the above listed senses. Thus, 'to talk unrestrainedly or at length' is alternatively expressed by *to shoot one's MOUTH off*, *to spend one's MOUTH* and *to foam from the MOUTH*, 'to flatter' may be said to be conveyed by *to be honey-MOUTHED*, *to give one a MOUTHful of moonshine* and *to be mealy-*

As shown in Figure 2, most of the idiomatic senses listed here may be assumed to be C-related in that they clearly relate conceptually to actions performed by *mouth* (considered as the organ of speech), in that they generate gesture-based symbolic imagery. For example, opening one's *mouth* customarily stands for speaking (see *to open one's MOUTH* meaning 'to talk'), while closing one's *mouth* translates as becoming silent (see *to shut one's MOUTH* encoding the sense 'to remain silent'). Several of the *mouth*-related idiomatic senses evidently linked to the conceptual category **COMMUNICATION** may be postulated to be A-related since – by virtue of certain associative processes – they may be said to be associated with the cognitive structure of *mouth* employed in the sense A 'the food processing organ', acting as the main organising force in forming the metaphorical imagery in question. For example, the phraseological embodiments of the sense 'to flatter', i.e. *to be honey-MOUTHED*, *to give one a MOUTHful of moonshine* and *to be mealy-MOUTHED* may be conjectured to relate conceptually to various taste sensations experienced during food ingestion. Note that the conceptual motivation that may condition the construal of the discussed senses rests in our symbolically loaded sensory experience. To be more specific, the notion of sweetness and softness which bring in the connotations of complimentary, flattering talk is implied by the presence of such lexical items as *mealy*; that is the constituent of one the idioms listed. Also, the semantics of *light* implied by the constitutive element *moonshine* is linked to the reception of positive stimuli, which metaphorically may be translated into reception of somebody's complimentary talk.

*MOUTHED*, 'to talk abusively' may be assumed to be encoded in *to have MOUTH like the bottom of a crow's nest*, *all shit and twigs* and *to have MOUTH like the bottom of a parrot's/cocky's cage*.

As for chronology, the conceptual category **COMMUNICATION** encompasses the sense of the earliest of the historical idiomatic *mouth*-based formations. These are the Mod.E. sense 'to talk insistently and for a long time', present in its oldest phraseological unit *to open full MOUTH at somebody*, as evidenced by the OED contexts (c 1290 Loude he gradde *with folle MOUTH*: 'Ich am cristine Man.' > 1702 She was *coming full MOUTH* upon me with her Contract.), and the idiomatic sense 'to be silent' encoded in the idiom *to hold one's MOUTH* since the late 13<sup>th</sup> century (c 1290 Beo stille, *hold pinne mouthþ*, ich rede. > current in present-day English).<sup>50</sup> Earlier, it was observed that certain phraseological units HEADED by – *nomen omen* – **HEAD**-related lexical items tend to fall out of English lexicon. The disappearance of the chronologically first idiomatic expression *to open full MOUTH at somebody* used in the sense 'to talk insistently and for a long time' may be assumed to have been at least partially conditioned by the appearance of a number of synonymous or semantically related expressions, for example *to foam from the MOUTH* or *to get diarrhea of the MOUTH*.<sup>51</sup> Moreover, the lexicographic works show that the most significant increase in the number of new phraseological coinages most often covers periphery-located, evaluatively-loaded senses related in various ways to the conceptual category **COMMUNICATION**. Here, the idioms that illustrate the point are *to put a toom [empty] spoon in the MOUTH* that expresses the sense 'to preach without edifying' and the phraseological formation *to have a leaky MOUTH* employed in the sense 'to talk insistently and for a long time' (see DAW).

The *mouth*-based historical data provides research material for cross-linguistic analysis which allows for the phraseological formations to match the distinguished patterns of equivalence. The bulk of the idiomatic formations with *mouth* as a constitutive element forms sets that fit in the category of lexico-syntactic symmetry complemented by the HEAD equivalence of semantically parallel idioms. Compare, for example, those phraseological formations that encode the sense 'to remain silent', namely the Mod.E. expression *to keep one's MOUTH shut*, the Italian *garder la BOUCHE* ('mouth') *cousue*, Italian *cucirsi la BOCCA* ('mouth'), and the German *ein Schloss vor den MUND* ('mouth') *haengen*.<sup>52</sup> Note that formal equivalence here is assumed on the grounds of onomasiological axiom, whereby the elements *closed*, *sewn* and *locked* emerging from the literal wording of the juxtaposed phraseological units, that is French [...] *cousue*, Italian [...] *cucirsi* and German [...] *Schloss* [...] *haengen* are held synonymous.

Also, compare Mod.E. phraseological formation *to put one's hand over one's MOUTH*, the French idiom *mettre la main sur la BOUCHE* ('mouth') and the German phraseological unit *die Hand vor den MUND* ('mouth') *legen*.<sup>53</sup> The set of examples quoted points to certain tendency as regards the patterns that may be discerned

in phraseological lexicalisation of senses across languages. Namely, the number of cross-linguistic parallels is especially significant among those phraseological formations that are somehow gesture-based, in that their abstract potential is based on language-universal understanding of certain body functions and movements. For example, covering one's mouth with a hand is a gesture that universally implies silence.

The analysis of other *mouth*-based idiomatic expressions that fit in the discussed category of cross-linguistic equivalence allows us to say that those English expressions that express core-located senses tend to have more equivalents in other languages that have been taken into consideration. Take, for example, the case of the sense 'to remain silent' linked to the idiom *to shut one's MOUTH* and its French equivalent *fermer la BOUCHE* ('mouth'), Italian *chiudere la BOCCA* ('mouth'), German *den MUND* ('mouth') *zumachen/schliesen/zumachen* that are all parallel as to their syntactic, semantic and lexical structure.<sup>54</sup> Likewise, compare the set of phraseological formations that serve to express another, core-located sense 'to talk', that is Mod.E. *to open one's MOUTH*<sup>55</sup>, French *ouvrir la BOUCHE* ('mouth'), Italian *aprire la BOCCA* ('mouth') and German *den MUND* ('mouth') *aufmachen/offnen* that are all semantically, syntactically and lexically equivalent.<sup>56</sup> When we juxtapose those idioms that encode the sense 'to talk abusively', that is Mod.E. *to have potty/toilet MOUTH* and German *einen losen/lokeren MUND* ('mouth') *haben* we may evidently talk of a pair of phraseological formations that falls in the category of lexico-syntactic hiatus complemented by the HEAD equivalence of semantically parallel phraseological units.<sup>57</sup>

The category of lexico-syntactic hiatus complemented by the HEAD=(*mouth*) ^ (*hand*)/(*head*) ^ (*mouth*)/(*foot*) ^ (*lip*) disparity of semantically parallel phraseological units includes the pair of expressions that convey the sense 'to talk abusively', that is Mod.E. *to shut somebody's MOUTH*, German *schnell bei der HAND*

54 Examples taken from CRUD, PIDF, LGFDDF, DFIIF, DII, GFIF and SdDR. Note that some of the lexicographic sources evidence the corresponding slang variants of these phraseological units HEADED by onomasiologically understood synonyms of *mouth*, that is French *clouer le BEC* ('beak' > 'mouth') *à quelqu'un*. French *fermer la GUEULE* ('muzzle' > 'mouth') *à quelqu'un* and German *den SCHABEL/KLAPPE/RAND/SCHANUTZE/FRESSE* ('beak'/'cover'/'margin'/'muzzle'/'snout' > 'mouth') *halten* and Italian *chiudere il BECCO* ('beak' > 'mouth').

55 Note that the act of opening one's mouth is also a gesture associated with amazement, which will be illustrated in the section devoted to the conceptual category **ATTITUDES**.

56 Examples taken from DIID, GED, Did, CRUD, PIDF, DMFA. Note SdDR, Did and BBID. It needs to be added here that PIDF testifies to the existence of the alternative variants for the Mod.G. formation, where the HEAD of the discussed phrase is occupied by slang synonym of *mouth*, i.e. German *den MAUL/SCHNAUZE/KLAPPE* ('gob'/'muzzle'/'gate' > 'mouth') *aufkriegen/aufzun/aufmachen* and French *ouvrir (tout grand) sa GUEULE* ('muzzle' > 'mouth').

57 The lexicographic data come from DIID, PIDF, LCGE, GFIF and DFIIF among other sources. Note, the colloquial alternative of the German expression *ein grobes/ungewaschenes/grobes/schandbares/gottloses MAUL* ('muzzle' > 'mouth') *haben* employed literally in the sense 'to have coarse/dirty/uncouth/schameless/snout' (see SdDR).

50 Illustrative data taken from DPF.

51 Examples taken from EAI, TEM and BI.

52 Examples taken from SdDR, DFPEAC, DIID, DII, FDDF, DMdPEEL and DAF.

53 Lexicographic material was taken from, PIDF and SdDR among others. Note that SdDR testifies to the existence of alternative variant of the German expression quoted above, that is *den Finger auf dem MUND* ('mouth') *legen*, lit. 'to put a finger on one's mouth' > 'to remain silent'. Note justification for the coexistence of the lexical items *Finger* 'finger' > *Hand* 'hand' lies in the hyponymic, semantic relation holding between these lexical items.

('hand') *mit etwas sein*, lit. 'to be quick at hand with something' (see *DIID* and *PIDF*). Likewise, the idiomatic sense 'to talk insensibly' encoded by the Mod.E. *head*-based phraseological formation *to say the first thing that comes in one's HEAD* may be assumed to correspond to various semantically equivalent, *mouth*-based idioms in French *en avoir plein la BOUCHE* ('mouth'), lit. 'to have full mouth', Italian *parla solo perché ha la BOCCA* ('mouth'), lit. 'to talk because one has mouth' and German *loser MUND* ('mouth') *haben*, lit. 'to have loose mouth'.<sup>58</sup>

Finally, certain *mouth*-based phraseological data may be included within the category of lexico-syntactic symmetry complemented by the *HEAD*=(*mouth*) ^ (*tooth*)/(*mouth*) ^ (*face*) disparity of semantically parallel phraseological units. The case in point is the Mod.E. phraseological formation *to open one's MOUTH* that encodes the sense 'to talk' which corresponds semantically to the French idiom *desserrer les DENTS* ('tooth').<sup>59</sup> Here, one should consider the set of phraseological units that serve to express the sense 'to silence somebody', that is Italian *tappare la BOCCA* ('mouth') *a qualcuno*, German *jemandem eine auf den MUND* ('mouth') *geben* 'to give somebody one in the mouth' against the French *face*-based idiomatic expression *en attraper une sur le coin de la FIGURE* ('shape' > 'face').<sup>60</sup>

## 2.2. Conceptual Category ATTITUDES

The *mouth*-based idiomatic formations related to the conceptual category **ATTITUDES** are 'to be eager', the sense linked to the phrase *the MOUTH waters at/after something*<sup>61</sup>, 'to be discouraged' expressed by the phraseological formation *to leave a bad/nasty taste in the MOUTH*, 'to be sad' encoded in the idiom *to be down in the MOUTH*, 'to be contemptuous' the sense conveyed by the phraseological unit *to make a (wry, ugly, hard) MOUTH/MOUTHS at somebody*, 'to be obedient' the sense of the idiom *somebody's MOUTH was made*, 'to be scared' the sense linked to the phraseological unit *somebody's heart is in his MOUTH*, 'to be surprised' the sense communicated by the idiom *MOUTH scat abroad like a Longships pollack or an 18-penny conger*, and finally the sense 'to be mean' that emerges from the idiomatic saying *so mean he wouldn't spit in your MOUTH if your throat was on fire*.<sup>62</sup> We hope to have provided evidence that certain idiomatic senses may be treated as **A**-related, since they variously relate to the semantics of *mouth* understood as the apparatus for food ingestion. For example, the sense 'to be eager' linked to the idiom *the MOUTH waters at/after something* or the sense 'to be discouraged' encoded by the phraseological formation

*leave a bad/nasty taste in the MOUTH* clearly relate conceptually to the sensory sphere of human experience and provide the metaphorical material by reference to the image of watering mouth and grimace resultant from bitter taste before/after food consumption which connotes enthusiasm or discouragement respectively. To be more precise, the expression used in the sense 'to be eager' based on the experience of mouth watering has its roots in stimulation of the salivary glands by the appetizing sight or smell of food and thus – by all means – this idiomatic sense somehow echoes the sense **A** 'the organ of food ingestion in men and animals'. Likewise, the idiomatic phrase *leave a bad/nasty taste in the MOUTH* relates semantically to the aftermath effects of ill-chosen food consumption; namely having unpleasant flavour in one's mouth translates metaphorically as the general feeling of repulsion.<sup>63</sup>

As shown in *Figure 2*, there are also senses which may be treated as **B**-related in that their semantics is built upon the cognitive foundation of sense **B** of *mouth* 'the external orifice of the mouth considered as a part of face', whereby the act of opening one's mouth, sagging one's mouth, frowning or pouting are extra-linguistic signals that reflect the attitude of surprise, the feeling of sadness or derision respectively. These are reflected in the semantics of relevant phraseological units that encode the senses 'to be surprised' (*to open one's MOUTH*), 'to be contemptuous' (*to make a (wry, ugly, hard) MOUTH/MOUTHS at somebody*), and 'to be sad' (*to be down in the MOUTH*).

Chronologically, the historically earliest sense related to the conceptual category **ATTITUDES** dates back to the mid 16<sup>th</sup> century. This is the idiomatic expression *to make up one's MOUTH* used in the sense 'to be eager', evidenced by the following *OED* contexts from the mid 16<sup>th</sup> century (1546 His wife *to make vp my MOUTHE*, Not only hir husbandes taunting tale auouthe, But therto deuiseth to cast in my teeth, Checks and chokyng oysters. > 1720 Walpole [is] *to make up his MOUTH* by a Bubble, because he did not get enough in South Sea.). The currency of the idiomatic phrase is evidenced by *DAHP* till the close of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

The history of this idiom supports the earlier observed tendency pertaining to the factors that condition the elimination of synonymous phraseological units. Here, one seems justified in postulating that – following the appearance of the 16<sup>th</sup> century formation *the MOUTH waters at/after something* that is synonymous to the chronologically earlier idiom *to make up one's MOUTH*, – the diachronically earlier formation started to head the way to oblivion. The usage of the present-day English *mouth*-based idiomatic expression related to mouth watering is testified by the *OED* from the mid 16<sup>th</sup> century (1555 These craftie foxes [sc. cannibals] espying their enemies a farre of, beganne to swalowe theyr spettle as *their MOUTHES watered* for greedines of theyr pray. > current in present-day English).<sup>64</sup> The alternative scenario is prompted by two other idiomatic senses linked to the conceptual category **ATTITUDES**, that is E.Mod.E. idiomatic sense 'to be sad' linked to the phraseological expression *to be down in the MOUTHS* and the idiomatic sense 'to be contemptuous' encoded by the idiom *to make MOUTHS at somebody/something*

63 This case could be classified as an example of *gustasemy* (taste metaphor), whereby human taste sensations happen to translate metaphorically into our attitudes. For further reading on gustasemic semantic transfers see Osuchowska (2011).

64 Examples taken from *PE*, *BI*, *DPF*, *PE*, *TEM*, *MED* and *DAHP*.

58 Examples taken from *DII*, *DIID*, *DAF*, *SdDR* and *DId* among other sources.

59 Examples borrowed from *CRUD*, *PIDF* and *DMFA*.

60 The lexicographic material quoted after *PIDF*, *DAF* and *DFIIF*.

61 The variant forms are: *to be enough to make his MOUTH water*, *to be MOUTHwatering*.

62 The lexicographic sources consulted here also testify to the existence of the following, alternative phraseological formations expressing the discussed sense linked to the conceptual category **ATTITUDES**, i.e. 'to be eager' *to have one's MOUTH made up*, 'to be discouraged' and *to turn to ashes in one's MOUTH*, 'to be obedient' *to have a good/fine MOUTH*, 'to be surprised' *to be open-MOUTHED*, *to have half cocked MOUTH*, 'to be mean' *to stop two MOUTHS with one morsel*. Note some dictionaries evidence the second sense expressed by the phraseological formation *to have one's mouth made up* i.e. 'to stop speaking'.



which – as testified by the *OED* quotations – have survived until today and are the only idiomatic phrases that embody the relevant senses (1649 The Roman Orator was *downe in the MOUTH*; finding himself thus cheated by the money-changer. > current in present-day English; 1551 And as he was thus saying, he shook his heade, and *made a wrie MOUTH*. > current in present-day English).<sup>65</sup>

Premature as it may seem, one may formulate the tendency that many idiomatic expressions that came into being in the 20<sup>th</sup> century are negatively loaded. More precisely, those idiomatic formations serve to express certain negative attitudes, which seems to confirm the earlier formulated hypothesis of the mutual interdependence between the axiological profile of the *mouth*-phrased senses and their historical currency. The present-day coinages include the sense 'to be scared' that emerges from the idiom *somebody's heart is in his MOUTH*, and the sense 'to be mean' encoded in the phraseological formations *so mean he wouldn't spit in your MOUTH if your throat was on fire* and *to stop two MOUTHS with one morsel*.<sup>66</sup>

Cross-linguistically, we find language material that fits in the established patterns of cross-linguistic equivalence. And so, the set of those phraseological units that serve to convey the sense 'to be eager' may be classed in the category of lexico-syntactic symmetry complemented by the HEAD equivalence of semantically parallel phraseological units. Here, one may quote the Mod.E. phraseological unit *my MOUTH waters*, the French expression *avoir l'eau à la BOUCHE* ('mouth'), and the German idiom *jemandem den MUND* ('mouth') *waessrig machen*.<sup>67</sup> In turn, the juxtaposition of the idioms that serve to express the sense 'to be eager', that is Mod.E. *my MOUTH waters* with the Italian phraseological formation *avere acqua in BOCCA* ('mouth'), used in the sense 'to remain silent' linked semantically the conceptual category **COMMUNICATION**<sup>68</sup> supplies language material that falls in the category of lexico-syntactic symmetry complemented by the HEAD equivalence of semantically unequal phraseological units.

Also, the area of the conceptual category **ATTITUDES** involves certain phraseological data that fit in the category of lexico-syntactic hiatus complemented by the HEAD equivalence of semantically parallel phraseological units. The case in point is the sense 'to be contemptuous' expressed by the E.Mod.E. idiom *to make MOUTH(S) at somebody*, the French phraseological unit *faire la BOUCHE* ('mouth') *en coeur*, lit. 'to make one's mouth in the shape of heart', the Italian idiomatic expression *fare la BOCCA* ('mouth') *a culo di gallina*, lit. 'to make one's mouth in the shape of hen's anal orifice', and the German phraseological formation *ein KarpfenMAEULCHEN* ('mouth') *machen*, lit. 'to make one's mouths in the shape typical for a carp'.<sup>69</sup> Let us point to the fact that the data given here support the observation formulated earlier regarding the productivity of zoosemic context in the generation of the **HEAD**-related phraseological formations.

Another type of equivalence distinguished in our analysis covers those cases of idiomatic expressions that employ different body part items and encode senses related to the conceptual category **ATTITUDES**. Hence, the category of lexico-syntactic symmetry complemented by the HEAD=(*mouth*) ^ (*tongue*)/(*mouth*) ^ (*lip*)/(*mouth*) ^ (*eye*) disparity of semantically parallel phraseological units is represented by the idiomatic embodiments of the senses 'to be discouraged', 'to be contemptuous' and 'to be surprised', that is Mod.E. *to have a bitter taste in one's MOUTH*, = German *einen bitteren Nachgeschmack auf der ZUNGE* ('tongue') *haben*, Mod.E. *to make MOUTHS at somebody*, French *avancer les LÈVRES* ('lip'), and Mod.E. *to stay with one's MOUTH open/to open one's MOUTH* = French *ouvrir de grands YEUX* ('eye') and German *die Augen* ('eye') (*weit*) *aufsperr*en respectively. Also, the phraseological data quoted in the foregoing speak in favour of the observations formulated earlier regarding the principle that governs the contextual co-occurrence of the body-part terms acting as HEADs of idiomatic phrases. Namely, one may speak about the existence of the *mouth* ⇔ *tongue*, *mouth* ⇔ *lips* and *mouth* ⇔ *eyes* cross-linguistic correspondence attributable to the structural contiguity of the lexical items involved here.<sup>70</sup> As regards the phraseological data, there are cases where *mouth* functioning as the HEAD element is missing in English. Here, the examples fit in the category of lexico-syntactic hiatus complemented by the HEAD=(*leg*) ^ (*mouth*)/(*hand*) ^ (*mouth*) ^ (*stomach*) disparity of semantically parallel phraseological units. Compare the following idioms used in the sense 'to be lucky': the Mod.E. imperative expression *Break LEG!*, that is formally close to the German *HALS- und BEINbruch*, lit. 'break your neck and legs', though it differs as to the lexico-syntactic structure, and the HEAD element from the Italian idiom *In BOCCA* ('mouth') *al lupo!*, lit. 'in the wolf's mouth'<sup>71</sup> (see *DIID* and *DII*). Another case is the cross-linguistic set of idioms that serve to convey the sense 'to be disappointed'. The set includes Italian idiom *restare a BOCCA* ('mouth') *asciutta*, lit. 'to stay with one's mouth dry' that semantically corresponds to Mod.E. *to be left empty-HANDED*, and the German idiomatic expression *mit leerem MAGEN* ('stomach') *zurückbleiben*, lit. 'to stay with empty stomach'.<sup>72</sup>

70 The lexical material was taken from *LCGE*, *DAF* and *PIDF*. Note that some lexicographic works evidence alternative variants of the quoted German phraseological formation with the lexical item *mouth* playing the supportive role/being the second body-part item: *MUND* ('mouth') und *NASE* ('nose') *aufsperr*en; *den MUND* ('mouth') *bis zu den OHREN* ('ear') *aufreissen*; *MUND* ('mouth') und *OHREN* ('ear') *aufsperr*en; *MUND* ('mouth') *bis zu*; *den OHREN aufsperr*en; *mit offenen MUND* ('mouth') *dastehen*; *MUND* ('mouth') und *AUGEN* ('eye') *aufsperr*en/*ufreissen*; *MUND* ('mouth') und *AUGEN* ('eye') *ausperr*en/*aufress*en; *mit offenem MUNDE*; *die AUGEN* ('eye') (*weit*) *aufsperr*en; *den MUND* ('mouth') *aufsperr*en (examples taken from *PIDF*, *FDDF*, *DII*, *BBID* and *GED*).

71 Note the idiomatic formation that corresponds to the Italian on syntactic and lexical level differs as to the syntactic structure. Namely the Mod. E. *to be in the wolf's MOUTH* is employed secondarily in the sense 'to be in deadly peril/danger'. Also consider the corresponding **HEAD**-related expression based in the zoosemic context, i.e. *to put oneself in the lion's MOUTH* (examples quoted after *TEM*, *BI*, *DPF* and *DMdPeEL*).

72 Examples taken from *DII*, *DIID* and *DFPEAC*.

65 Language data quoted after *BI*, *DPF*, *DSUE*, *EAI*, *MED*, *LEW*, *DII* and *DII*.

66 Examples taken from *TEM*.

67 Phraseological data taken from *CRUD*, *DFIIF*, *LGFDD*, *PIDF*, *FDDF*, *DAF*, *BBID*, *GED* and *DII*.

68 Examples extracted from *DFIIF*, *DFPEAC*, *BBID*, *DMdPeEL*. Note that the sense 'to be eager' in Italian is conveyed by the idiom *avere l'acquolina in BOCCA* ('mouth'), lit. 'to have saliva in the mouth'.

69 Examples taken from *LGFDDF*, *DFIIF*, *GFIIF* and *DMFA*.

## 2.5. Conceptual Category SUCCESS/FUTILITY

A number of *mouth*-based idioms are linked to the conceptual category **SUCCESS/FUTILITY** and their senses may be said to be A-related, e.g. Mod.E. 'to be at the point of success' encoded by the phraseological formation *to have the spoon at the MOUTH* and the E.Mod.E. sense 'to be unentrepreneurial' encoded by the late 16<sup>th</sup> century proverb *a closed MOUTH catches no flies*. At the same time, one may speak of B-related senses, namely the sense 'to succeed by luck' linked to the expression *to hang by the wicks of the MOUTH*.<sup>73</sup> In general, the senses emerging from idiomatic expressions that echo sense B of *mouth* may be assumed to arise by virtue of the transference of the symbolically loaded imagery of *mouth* used in the secondary sense B, that is 'the external orifice of the mouth considered as part of face'. Here, the figurative image of hanging by the corners of one's mouth is formed, which – in turn – translates metaphorically as a narrow escape. Analogically, the idiomatic senses labelled as A-related may be conjectured to refer to the food-processing function of *mouth* by virtue of the literal wording of the phraseological units that serve to encode them, that is the image of a piece of cutlery in the mouth (i.e. Mod.E. [...] *spoon* [...] *MOUTH*) or the image of food consumer being about to eat a cherry (i.e. Mod.E. [...] *ready MOUTH* [...] *cherry*).

Other language data related to the discussed conceptual category allows us to distinguish certain distinct parallels as regards the lexical and syntactic built-up of the phraseological formations employed in the sense 'to be unentrepreneurial'. Note that the zoosemic, extra-linguistic context seems to be present in all language-specific cases covered by the analysis. The idiomatic expressions that are formally and semantically equivalent may be said to form a set that fits in the category of lexico-syntactic symmetry complemented by the HEAD equivalence of semantically parallel phraseological units. Take, for example, the Mod.E. idiomatic expression *He thinks that larks will fall into his MOUTH ready roasted*<sup>74</sup>, and French phraseological unit *Les alouettes ne vous tombent pas toutes rôties dans le BEC* ('beak' > 'mouth'), and the German idiom *Die gebratene Tauben fliegen einem nicht*

*in den MUND* ('mouth').<sup>75</sup> Note that we speak of formal equivalence here on the grounds of the semantics of the French *bec* 'beak' that may – onomasiologically speaking – be taken to be an informal synonym of Mod.E. *mouth*.

Interestingly enough, the sense 'to be unentrepreneurial' has a number of other phraseological realisations, many of which are related to animal world, and these seem to fit neatly in the second pattern of cross-linguistic equivalence, that is the category of lexico-syntactic hiatus complemented by the HEAD equivalence of semantically parallel phraseological units. The phraseological formations in point are the following ones: Mod.E. *When the fox sleeps no grapes fall in his MOUTH*, German *Schlafendem Wolf laeuft kein Schaf ins MAUL* ('muzzle' > 'mouth'), lit. 'no sheep will run into the muzzle of a sleeping wolf', as well as the Italian idioms *A nessuno piovono le lasagne in BOCCA* ('mouth'), lit. 'Nobody expects pasta in one's mouth', and *Non attendere i maccheroni in BOCCA* ('mouth') *non c'è bene senza bene*, lit. 'Do not expect past in the mouth there is no good without evil'.

## Concluding remarks

The dipole approach to the semantic analysis of *mouth*, i.e. the study of the nominal and phrase-embedded senses, provides findings that may be considered to be a contribution to the multifarious studies of the body-parts related lexicon (e.g. Andersen 1978, Blank, Koch and Gévaudan 1998, Blank and Koch 1999, Brown, 1976, 1979, Krefeld 1999, Norri 1998).<sup>76</sup> Namely, the discussion included in the paper allows the authors to formulate certain conclusions as regards the cognitive profile of *mouth*, the directionality of the semantic shift processes affecting it, conceptual affinity between the assumed source and target, secondary senses and finally – in respect to its phraseological potential – the cognitive processes operative in the phrase-embedded sense construal as well as cross-linguistically universal patterns of formal and semantic equivalence. The diachronic and pan-European *mouth*-related material discussed in the paper fits in the conceptual patterns observed and formulated in earlier analyses of other lexical items linked to the conceptual category **BODY PARTS** (cf. Więclawska 2010, 2011).

73 Examples taken from *TEM*, *AP*, *BI*, *DPF*; *EAI* and *CDoEP*. Note that the lexicographic sources consulted here provide us with more phraseological expressions encoding the sense linked to the conceptual category **MENTAL CAPACITY**.

74 Note the alternative variants of the discussed idiom, that is *Birds fly not into MOUTHS ready roasted*, *You may gape long enough, ere a bird fall into your MOUTH*, *Birds ready cooked do not fly into your MOUTH* (see *CDoEP*).

75 The alternative informal version of the German proverb is *gebratene Tauben fliegen keinem ins MAUL* ('muzzle' > 'mouth') 'roasted doves do not fly in the muzzle'. Also note the variant form of the French proverb *Attendre la chute des alouettes toutes rôties ce n'est pas bénéfice sans cure*, lit. 'Wait for the fall of totally roasted larks there is no profit without an effort' (see *CDoEP*).

76 Some body part terms have been analysed outside the field of semantics. Note, for example, the pragmatically-oriented study of the symbolic potential of *face* in Pikor-Niedzialek (2007).

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## Visual and Context-Induced Verbal Metaphors in National Geographic Headings and Subheadings

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### Abstract

The paper aims to be a contribution to the research in the field of multimodal discourse. Visual and context-induced verbal metaphors in National Geographic (1888-2008) headings and subheadings will be viewed from the perspective of cognitive semantics – conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). The author of the article aims to categorise and analyse the visual metaphors generated by the photographs that complement National Geographic headlines and context-induced verbal metaphors used in the headings and subheadings of this journal.

All the linguistic metaphors analysed in the paper seem to be in some way context-induced. The stylistic analysis also demonstrates that both visual and verbal metaphors and metonymies have some notable functions to fulfil in National Geographic articles and that they bring about quite a few cognitive, pragmatic and stylistic effects. They (1) foreground a pragmatically relevant aspect of the article to grab the reader's attention and arouse the reader's interest, (2) guide pragmatic inferencing in text interpretation (by making reference to the background knowledge, the immediate physical setting and the cultural context), (3) describe the immediate physical setting or the immediate entity of the text, and (4) create referential variety and enhance cohesion and coherence.

### Keywords

Visual metaphor (simile/contextual/integrated); context-induced verbal metaphor; local/global context; metonymy.

### Introduction

The aim of the paper is to classify and analyse the visual and context-induced verbal metaphors used in *National Geographic* headings and subheadings of 70 articles (published from 1888 to 2008), whose topics are related to the two categories of animals: 'bears' and 'whales'. The choice of the articles is motivated by the fact these animals belong to distinct, but representative, categories of animals, which were very often the subject matter of the articles published in this journal. The visual and verbal metaphors and metonymies in *National Geographic* (1888-2008) headings and subheadings will be viewed from the perspective of **conceptual metaphor theory** (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Special attention will be paid to the interrelation between the visual and verbal metaphors, the cognitive effects they bring about, their relation with the context and the pragmatic/stylistic roles they play in this journal.

### 1. Cognitive metaphor theory

Within Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) conceptual metaphor theory (CMT), metaphors, as expressed in language, are not seen as stylistic ornaments, but as evidence for the fact that thinking about, and understanding, the world outside our organisms, as well as the working of our bodies, involves metaphoric processes. A metaphor is fundamentally a kind of mental mapping from which certain patterns of conventional and novel metaphorical language arise. It is an interaction between two concepts (the source domain and the target domain) that enables us to interpret one of them in terms of the other. Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) basic thesis about metaphor is that its function is to enable us to interpret concepts (especially abstract concepts) in terms of familiar, everyday cognitive experiences. The duality of conceptual metaphors as both operating on the cognitive level and being realized in surface level metaphoric expressions leads to inductive reasoning on the part of the researcher, in that the analysis of

metaphoric expressions leads to inferences about the underlying metaphoric models. It needs to be stressed that it is often difficult to determine the underlying metaphorical mappings in the case of novel/creative metaphors and for this reason they will not be discussed in this article.

### 2. Metaphor and metonymy

A distinction needs to be made between a metaphor and a metonymy. In cognitive semantics metonymy has long been considered a conceptual tool that operates within conceptual/semantic structures (domains, scripts, schemas, etc.). In this view the most widespread definition is *metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same idealized cognitive model* (Kövecses 2002). Two broad perspectives for demarcating metonymy have emerged in cognitive semantics: the domain-related approach (Kövecses 2002) and the prototype-related approach (Dirven 2002), along with recent refinements to both approaches: the domain-refined approach (Dirven 2002) and the contiguity-refined approach (Peirsman and Geeraerts 2006). In the domain-related approach metonymy is seen as a shift of meaning within one domain, or background knowledge for representing concepts. One important aspect of domains is that often more than one domain joins together in a given entity, giving rise to the so-called 'domain matrix'. Hence, the definition of metonymy can be rephrased as a metonymic mapping that occurs within a single domain matrix, not across domains (or domain matrices).

Metonymy also seems to involve 'domain highlighting' since it makes primary a domain that is secondary in literal meaning. As to the representation of the conceptual relationship: metaphor is represented as A is B (target is source) whereas metonymy is characterised as A for B (source for target). Yet, in spite of its popularity, the domain approach has been the object of much criticism and this is why different scholars have

focused on contiguity rather than domains or domain matrices (Riemer 2001). Moreover, Taylor (1995) claims that all metaphors may need underlying metonymisations, or, in other words, that they are dependent on at least a prior metonymic conceptualisation. Other linguists (Croft 1993 and Barcelona 2000) view metaphor-metonymy as a continuum with the intermediate notion of metonymy-based metaphors.

### 3. Metaphor and context

Context seems to play a very important role in the understanding of metaphorical language. According to Kövecses (2005), when ordinary people conceptualize an idea metaphorically, they do so under two kinds of pressure called the 'pressure of coherence': 'the pressure of their bodily experiences' and the 'pressure of the context' that surrounds them. In more recent studies Kövecses (2008) suggests that when we speak and think metaphorically, we are influenced by these two factors and that the effect of context on the processing of metaphorical language is just as pervasive, if not more, as that of the body.

For the sake of clarity, Kövecses (2010) distinguishes two basic kinds of context: global and local ones. By **global context** he means the contextual factors that affect all members of a language community when they process metaphors. Global context includes a variety of different contextual factors such as social and cultural ones. By **local context** he means the immediate contextual factors such as physical setting, knowledge of the main entities in the discourse, the immediate cultural context, the immediate social setting, and the immediate linguistic context. Local and global contexts are assumed to form a continuum from the immediate local contexts to the most general global ones.

It has to be stressed that context is especially important in the creation of novel metaphorical expressions. According to Kövecses (2010), we can talk about metaphorical creativity in discourse – creativity induced by the context in which the creation and processing of metaphors takes place. This kind of creativity has not been systematically explored in the cognitive linguistic literature on metaphors. Kövecses (2010) terms the creativity that is based on the context of metaphorical conceptualization **context-induced creativity** and the metaphors that result from the influence of the context on that conceptualization – **context-induced metaphors**.<sup>77</sup> He also distinguishes five contextual factors that commonly produce unconventional and novel metaphors: (1) the immediate physical setting, (2) what we know about the major entities participating in the discourse, (3) the immediate cultural context, (4) the immediate social setting, and (5) the immediate linguistic context itself. Since the speaker and the listener share all of these factors, they facilitate the development and mutual understanding of a given discourse.

### 4. Verbal, visual and multimodal metaphors

It is possible to divide linguistic metaphors into two categories: **conventional metaphors**<sup>78</sup> and **novel metaphors** (Bowdle and Gentner 2005). Conventional metaphors are those that are invoked so frequently that native speakers consider their linguistic expressions to

be institutionalized linguistic units. Novel metaphors in turn involve new or unusual mappings between two conceptual domains. Similarly, some metonymies are conventional while others are novel. It seems that conventionality or novelty of figuration is a matter of degree. Basically, the distinction between conventional and novel metaphors rests upon the amount of cognitive effort required on the part of the interpreter.

Metaphoric expressions have been most exhaustively studied in the verbal mode, i.e., as surface-level linguistic expressions of metaphorically structured mental models. This body of work was followed by research into visual, or pictorial metaphors (Carroll 1994; Forceville 1994). However, most of those studies still addressed mono-modal metaphors, in that both source and target domains were provided in the visual mode and only reinforced, rather than co-constructed, by the verbal co-text. A multimodal metaphor<sup>79</sup>, on the other hand, is constituted by a mapping, or blending, of domains from different modes, e.g., visual and verbal, or visual and acoustic. With a view to some examples presented in this paper, it seems useful to draw on Barthes' (1977: 38–41) concept of anchoring, according to which the verbal elements of a multimodal text serve to cue and thereby restrict possible interpretations of the visual elements.

As far as the classification of **pictorial/visual metaphors** is concerned, Mulken, le Pair, Forceville (2010) distinguish the following types: **similes** (juxtapositions) in which both the source and the target domains are visually presented separately; **hybrid metaphors** (fusions) which combine the target and the source domain into a single impossible 'gestalt', **integrated metaphors** which combine the target and the source domain into a single possible/realistic 'gestalt' and **contextual metaphors** (replacements) in which there is one pictorially present term – the source domain or the target domain – while the other is visually absent, in such a way that the absent domain is evoked by the visual context. They propose to characterize pictorial similes as gentle explicit comparisons inviting rather than forcing the viewer to experience one domain in terms of the other, while they describe hybrid metaphors in terms of violent fusion. They also comment that although the spatial distribution of visual elements may seem a straightforward dimension, it is not uncommon to find **mixed types** or unclassifiable types of visual metaphors that cannot be attributed to one of the above mentioned classes.

### 5. Material analysed

The analysis of visual metaphors that accompany the headings and subheadings of *National Geographic* articles presented here encompasses all the articles (published from 1888 to 2008) whose topics are related to the two categories of animals: 'bears' and 'whales'. The choice of the articles is determined by the fact these animals belong to distinct, but representative, categories of animals, which were very often the subject matter of the articles published in this journal. More specifically, 30 articles devoted to the description of bears and their life and 40 articles that describe the life of whales have been found and analysed. It has to be mentioned that the classification of verbal metaphors into conventional ones and novel ones, used in the

77Pikor-Niedziałek (2012) analyses metaphorical context-induced creativity in *National Geographic* headings and subheadings.

78 Więclawska (2012) analyses the metaphorical potential of the **HEAD-related** phrases in the diachronic and cross-linguistic perspectives.

79 According to Forceville (2006), multimodal metaphors are metaphors whose target and source are each represented exclusively or predominantly in different modes. The qualification 'exclusively or predominantly' is necessary because non-verbal metaphors often have targets and/or sources that are cued in more than one mode simultaneously.

article, is based on the results of a survey conducted by the author among 30 students and lecturers of the University of Minnesota, USA.

### 6.1 Visual and context-induced verbal metaphors in the articles about 'bears'

As has already been mentioned 30 articles whose subject matter is the life of bears were published in *National Geographic* between 1888 - 2008. The author of this paper cannot discuss all the visual metaphors and context-induced verbal metaphors identified in the articles about 'bears'; consequently, only the most interesting examples will be discussed.

It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between a visual metaphor and a picture which only enhances the comprehension of a verbal metaphor. Consider, for example, the heading 'Raccoon: Amiable rogue in a black mask' and its subheading *Tough, curious, and unwanted by man or dog, this bear-faced rascal shows a sense of humour and takes civilization in stride* (*National Geographic*, December 1956). The novel metaphor 'amiable rogue' (where 'rogue' means somebody who behaves in a way that you do not approve of but you still like him) functions as a metonymy (because it stands for a raccoon) and an oxymoron (this figure of speech combines contradictory terms). It is evident that the photo on the first page, which shows the smiling face of a raccoon, does not invite a viewer to construe this verbal metaphor since it does not even imply that a raccoon is a rascal. The picture in question only enhances the comprehension of the verbal metaphor. In the subheading of this article there is another metonymy based on a simile 'bear-faced rascal' that implies that a 'raccoon' is an ill-behaved animal with a bear-like face. It is clear that the above novel verbal metonymies have been induced the context – the background knowledge about this animal and its appearance.

The heading of the article published in *National Geographic*, March 2002 is as follows 'Mother bear man: Ben Kilham nurtures cubs back to nature'. The metaphorical expression 'mother bear man' makes it clear that this article is about a man who is helping/nurturing cubs and then placing them again in their natural habitat. The photo in which this man is kissing the cub on its nose might invite a viewer to construe a visual contextual metaphor in which a man who nurtures cubs back to nature can be compared to a mother (the source domain 'mother', however, is only implied and it not present in the picture). This visual metaphor, even though rather weakly implied, seems to be reflected in the verbal mode in the metaphor 'mother bear man'. It seems that the immediate physical setting (the photograph) induced the use of this particular linguistic/verbal metaphor. Additionally, there is a play on words since the author employed the words 'nurture' and 'nature' to satisfy social/cultural conventions of this discourse type and to draw the readers' attention to the article.

A metonymy is employed in the heading 'White on white' *National Geographic*, February 2004. The first adjective 'white' implies a white object – the polar bear and the second one refers to snow. This expression is complemented by the photograph in which there is a white bear walking on white snow (this picture is white or in different shades of white). One can say that the heading and the photo invite the reader to construe a multimodal metonymy, in which the adjective 'white' refers to both 'a white bear' and 'white snow' displayed in the photograph. In this case the photo does not only generate the verbal metonymy, but it is co-constructing it because this heading can only be comprehended in relation with the picture. It is clear that the two modes (visual and verbal) seem be responsible for the

construction and proper comprehension or processing of this multimodal metonymy.

A similar multimodal metonymy can be identified in the article 'Winter in a Canadian National Park: Refuge in white' *National Geographic*, December 2005. The verbal metonymy 'refuge in white' can only be comprehended in relation with the picture which shows a mother bear sitting on white snow and two cubs under her body – she is cuddling/hugging them. In this creative/novel metonymy the adjective 'white' could stand for white snow, but the picture makes it clear that it stands for the (white) mother polar bear. In other words, both modes, the photo and the verbal metonymy seem to be involved in the comprehension or construction of this multimodal metonymy. It is also hardly possible that the picture and the linguistic expression are processed at the same time. It is more likely that we process the photo first and then modify this information according to the verbal information.

In sum, it seems that only three photos in the headings of the articles about bears invited the journalists to construe visual metaphors (contextual ones) which might in turn be responsible for the use of the verbal context-induced metaphors in the headings/subheadings. There are only two cases, discussed above, in which we can talk about multimodal metonymies, and no cases of multimodal metaphors have been identified.

### 6.2 Visual and context-induced verbal metaphors in the articles about 'whales'

As has already been mentioned earlier, one can find 40 articles whose subject matter is the life of whales. Only some of the visual metaphors implied by the photos found in these articles will be discussed below. In addition, context-induced, generated by the pictures or some other factors, verbal metaphors will also be analysed.

The subheading of the article 'Swimming with Patagonia's right whales' published in *National Geographic*, October 1972 reads Marbled by dancing sunlight, a 45-foot whale surfaces in its winter refuge off South America. The underlined creative metaphor is complex because it comprises two novel metaphors 'dancing sunlight' and 'marbled by ... sunlight' with reference to what a whale looks like. Consequently, the reader is faced with two images; on the one hand, the 'sunlight is dancing' (sunlight is in motion), on the other hand, the whale is dark green and still (not in motion) because it is marbled by the 'dancing sunlight'. To help the reader comprehend this complex metaphor, there is a two-page photograph which displays this complex but beautiful image. The picture seems to invite the reader to construe an integrated visual metaphor in which both domains ('marbled' and 'dancing sunlight') are present and form a unified/integrated 'gestalt'. It is also evident that the photo is responsible for the use of this verbal metaphor in the subheading in question.

Another context-induced verbal metaphor can be found in the subheading of the article 'The last U.S. whale hunters' *National Geographic*, March 1973. The subheading is the following *The bowhead whale, surfaces, parting the black water and scattering a meringue of broken ice....* In this passage one can find one conventional metaphor 'parting the black water' and one novel metaphor 'meringue of broken ice'; both of them describe the action and the immediate physical setting of the whale in a dynamic and vivid way. We will concentrate on the second one because it is accompanied by a photograph. Above this subheading we can see a whale lying on the shore surrounded by small pieces of white broken ice. This image makes it clear that these small pieces of ice can be compared to

a meringue. 'Meringue', being the source domain in this case, is not present in the picture itself; as a result, this visual metaphor seems to be contextual. It can also be said that the choice of the verbal metaphor in the subheading is determined by the immediate physical setting – the photo.

Sometimes metonymies are used as titles of some articles, for example, the heading 'The imperilled giants' *National Geographic*, December 1976 is used with reference to whales. In the subheading of this article in turn one can find quite a few novel metaphors: *Through the twilight sea they come, gliding with infinite grace, a vast and gentle presence in the waters. Ten feet below the surface I watch as the immense shapes – six full-grown humpback whales – turn and swim directly toward me. ...*

The first novel metaphor is complemented by the photo in which there are deep dark blue waters of the ocean; this image justifies the use of the noun 'twilight' by the author of this text. The visual metaphor seems to be a contextual one since the source domain 'twilight' is expressed only in the verbal mode 'twilight sea'. Moreover, all the metaphors underlined produce many cognitive effects and images in the minds of the readers' and they all describe the immediate physical setting – the habitat of whales and their life underwater. The subheading of the article entitled 'New light on the singing whales' *National Geographic*, April 1982 reads *As if in a giant salute, a humpback whale off the Hawaiian island of Maui lifts a massive flipper. ....* The novel linguistic metaphor 'giant salute' is complemented by the picture on the first page of this article which shows a huge flipper of a whale sticking out of the sea. The image the photo displays is compared to a giant salute in the verbal mode. Since the source domain 'salute', only implied in the visual mode, is present in the verbal mode, the metaphor can be categorized as a visual contextual metaphor. In this case the linguistic metaphor describes the immediate physical setting (the position of the whale); the photo in turn seems to be responsible for the use of this particular verbal metaphor.

It has already been mentioned that contextual or cultural references in the headings and subheadings of *National Geographic* articles are not infrequent. For example, in the article 'Narwhal: Unicorn of the Arctic Seas' *National Geographic*, March 1986 narwhal (one species of a whale) is compared to the 'unicorn' – a legendary animal commonly portrayed as a white horse with a goat's beard and a large, pointed, spiral horn projecting from its forehead.<sup>80</sup> This comparison is not surprising because narwhals have distinctive straight spiral single tusks on their heads. In fact, the picture on the first page of this article shows the head of a narwhal with a tusk, which (together with some background knowledge) invited the journalist to use the verbal metaphor 'narwhal is unicorn', making reference to a well-known symbol rooted in our culture. In this visual metaphor the source domain 'unicorn' has been only implied; consequently, the metaphor can be classified as a contextual one.

It has to be mentioned that *National Geographic* headings make quite frequent contextual references to the Bible. Consider, for example, the heading 'Bowhead whales: Leviathans of icy seas' *National Geographic*,

August 1995. In this headline bowhead whales are compared to a Leviathan – a sea monster referred to in the Bible.<sup>81</sup> One can safely say that by convention 'Leviathan' may refer to any large sea monster or creature. Since the heading of this article is accompanied by a photograph which displays three heads of bowhead whales (the heads have bow-like shapes), this visual metaphor seems to be contextual (the source domain 'Leviathan' is expressed only verbally). It seems, however, that this verbal metaphor has been induced by the background cultural knowledge to a greater degree than by the photograph itself.

As has already been mentioned, in some cases the reader has to have some background knowledge to understand what a text is about on the basis of the heading only. Consider the heading 'Arctic ivory: Hunting the narwhal' *National Geographic*, August 2007. To figure out what the novel metaphor 'arctic ivory' refers to, the reader has to know that narwhals (specific species of whales) have tusks on their heads and that people have been hunting these whales for their tusks because they can be used for similar purposes as ivory. The heading is complemented by the picture in which there is a narwhal with a long spiral horn on its head, swimming in the blue waters of the ocean. This visual metaphor is contextual since the source domain 'ivory' in the metaphor 'arctic ivory' is expressed verbally, it is only weakly implied in the visual mode. It also seems that the photo and the background knowledge about this particular species of the whale are responsible for the use of this novel verbal metaphor in the heading.

To sum up, in the headings and subheadings of *National Geographic* articles about whales one can find one visual integrated metaphor and eight visual contextual metaphors. It also needs to be stressed that the pictures that accompany the headings are very often responsible for the use of specific verbal metaphors in the headings or subheadings of this journal.

## 7. Conclusion

Multimodal metaphors (whose source and target domains are expressed in different modes) have not been identified in *National Geographic* articles and multimodal metonymies can be found very rarely (only two have been identified and discussed in section 6.1.). One can, however, observe some (weakly implied) visual contextual metaphors and context-induced verbal metaphors used in the headings that accompany the photographs. The pictures in turn (together with some background knowledge) seem to give the journalists of *National Geographic* subtle hints with reference to the choice and construal of the verbal metaphors in the headings or subheadings.

It is also noteworthy that the journalists of *National Geographic* have displayed a tendency to use photos that invite the construction visual metaphors and context-induced novel verbal metaphors since the middle of the 20th century. It seems to be connected with the changing perception of wildlife and wild animals – in the middle of the 20th century people started thinking about protecting wild animals and stopped perceiving them as objects of hunting. Consequently, the journalists concentrated more on

80 It was first mentioned by the ancient Greeks and it became the most important and imaginary animal of the Middle Ages and Renaissance when it was commonly described as an extremely wild woodland creature, a symbol of purity and grace, which could only be captured by a virgin (see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unicorn>).

81 In Demonology Leviathan is one of the seven princes of Hell and its gatekeeper. The word has become synonymous with any large sea monster or creature. In classical literature (such as the novel *Moby-Dick*) it refers to great whales, and in Modern Hebrew, it means simply a 'whale'. It is described extensively in Job 41 (see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leviathan>).



describing wild animals, their life or habitat, making the readers more ecologically conscious. This tendency is also connected with advances in technology (colourful pictures), different social and cultural expectations of the receivers as well as with the increasing competition in the press market.

Moreover, all the verbal metaphors analysed in this paper seem to be context-induced; when processing them the reader has to make references to the global context – the background cultural knowledge (the Bible, for example) or to the local context – major entities discussed in the articles and to the immediate visual context (the photos). It also seems that visual and novel linguistic metaphors or metonymies bring about quite a

few cognitive, pragmatic and stylistic effects. They (1) foreground a pragmatically relevant aspect of the article to grab the reader's attention and arouse the reader's interest, (2) guide pragmatic inferencing in text interpretation (by making reference to the background knowledge, the immediate physical setting and the cultural context), (3) describe the immediate physical setting or the immediate entity of the text, (4) create referential variety and enhance cohesion and coherence. Finally, the technique of using visual and novel context-induced verbal metaphors suits the cultural conventions of writing journalistic headings, whose main function nowadays is to attract the readers' attention.

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## Social Digital Discourse: New Challenges for Corpus- and Sociolinguistics

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### Abstract

This contribution attempts to link new forms of discourse with old linguistic sub-disciplines, in particular corpus- and sociolinguistics. It shows that social digital discourses can enrich the discussion of linguistic concepts as they pose new challenges for linguistic researchers – but they also offer new opportunities. It focuses on Wikipedia, Facebook and Twitter to show how new technical platforms can help us to expand our database to shed new light on old linguistic questions. This approach can make available data from places in Africa and Asia that are otherwise less accessible to the empirical

English linguist. The study of social digital discourse may also help to attract media-oriented types of students to linguistic analysis when they realise that social media have something to contribute to linguistics just as linguistics has something to contribute to the new media world, which students and colleagues may perceive as outside of our academic world. This contribution aims to prove that they are not ...

### Keywords

Corpus linguistics, empirical methods, Web-as-corpus, discourse analysis, Internet linguistics

### 1. Introduction: the Beauty and the Beast

The internet and its most recent communication forms and platforms such as Facebook and Twitter play an increasingly important role in popular public discourses nowadays. While students show great enthusiasm, many researchers have not yet realised the opportunities to collect new data and to attract students to standard questions in English language and linguistics, for instance. Of course, we must be aware of the Janus-faced nature of the phenomenon: This ambivalence of a fairy and a witch was beautifully captured during the famous Fallas in Valencia in 2011 by a huge *ninot* (Valencian for puppet or paper-mâché artistic monument) presenting the internet as a new version of the beauty and the beast (Photo 1), assembling all the modern stereotypes, - in the end "it's all a pack of lies" (Photo 2).




Photo 1+2 The internet as Beauty&Beast and Twitter "discussion" during the Fallas in Valencia 2011 ("it's all a pack of lies")

This popular discourse has even predicted "wars" between the most successful protagonists in the internet (Fig. 1).

### Social Graph Platform Wars




Fig. 1: Social Graph Platform Wars

Source:

[http://farm3.static.flickr.com/2248/2105757707\\_99dec8729a.jpg](http://farm3.static.flickr.com/2248/2105757707_99dec8729a.jpg)

If we want to take up the academic challenge, we do not have to start from scratch. For more than twenty years "computer-mediated communication" has been analysed in linguistics (e.g. Herring ed. 1996) and for more than ten years "the internet" has been discussed in popular and scientific scholarly contributions (e.g. Crystal 2006 and 2011 and Baron 2003 and 2008). Multimodal and semiotic approaches to digital discourses have been proposed by media specialists and linguists (e.g. Ferencík 2011). Some scholars (e.g. Myers 2010) have even started the analysis of web 2.0 discourse; but many students and colleagues still think that this is not worth their linguistic efforts, although the first handbooks have become available on "different aspects of computer-mediated communication, such as electronic mail, instant message, chat, discussion forum, blog, video conferencing, YouTube, web-based learning and SMS, as well as aspects of behavior typically associated with online discourse like flaming, scamming, trolling, cyberbullying, language mixing, repelling and creativity" (Taiwo in his preface to Taiwo ed. 2010). Some scholars have shown that one can have "fresh perspectives on new media sociolinguistics", the subtitle for the editor's introduction in Thurlow/Mroczek eds. (2011: xix-xliv), a volume with sexy subsections such as "Multimodality: Beyond Language and into the Bedroom" (ibid: xxv) or "the notion of Foucauldian *discourses* – which we dub *F-discourse* as opposed to *L-discourse* ('language in use') ..." (ibid: xxvi). This contribution attempts to demonstrate that mainstream linguistics today, and in particular corpus- and sociolinguistics, can take up the challenge offered by the new social digital discourse.

## 2. Concepts

In the following section, I hope to demonstrate that key concepts from media and linguistic studies can be combined to shed new light on the modern forms of internet communication, particularly social digital discourse. In appropriate cases, I will use definitions from Wikipedia, since this platform will serve as an example later-on, in particular since text quality can be discussed on the basis of the evidence presented in this section.

### 2.1. Media concepts and their linguistic applications

#### 2.1.1. Social networking service

Computer mediated communication, e.g. in email, in forums, etc., is already a well-established concept in applied linguistic research, and digital is almost tautological in modern communication today, while the focus on digital social networks is relatively new. The concept of social digital discourse is not yet defined in current dictionaries, not even the most current Wikipedia entries. But it obviously implies communication between several participants and a certain technology platform. This leads us to a useful Wiki definition under the keyword "social networking service":

A **social networking service** is an online service, platform, or site that focuses on facilitating the building of social networks or social relations among people who, for example, share interests, activities, backgrounds, or real-life connections. A social network service consists of a representation of each user (often a profile), his/her social links, and a variety of additional services. Most social network services are web-based and provide means for users to interact over the Internet, such as e-mail and instant messaging. Online community services are sometimes considered

as a social network service, though in a broader sense, social network service usually means an individual-centered service whereas online community services are group-centered. Social networking sites allow users to share ideas, activities, events, and interests within their individual networks.

[http://newmedia.wikia.com/wiki/Social\\_networking](http://newmedia.wikia.com/wiki/Social_networking) (20/03/11)

Interestingly, the links offered in this description do not lead to entries such as "social media" or "web 2.0", which surface in many internet discussions today, but they demonstrate which Wikipedia entries are considered related concepts, such as "social networks", which can be useful for our linguistics analyses.

#### 2.1.2. Social digital networks

Social networks have been a topic in socio-historical linguistics for a long time. Thus when we search for "social networks", "linguistics" and "English" in Google, we find the Paston letters, a very old social network from the 15th century and a good data base for linguistic research, since letters include more informal language styles, which are difficult to analyse but important for a better understanding of language development. The social networks we are interested in today are part of digital discourse, which today ranges from Skype and texting to micro-blogging and status updates on Facebook. These special languages and styles have are interesting comparative data for linguistics from different perspectives and from different parts of the world. Of course, the famous "digital divide" between the "haves" and the "have-nots", especially in its global version, is clearly visible in all maps demonstrating the internet penetration of the world (Fig. 2). Africa and parts of Asia do not (yet) have the same opportunities and (perhaps) threats as Europe and North America – and it is there where research in "New Englishes" is developing most vigorously (Schneider 2012: 366).




Fig. 2: World Map of Internet Penetration

Source:<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:InternetPenetrationWorldMap.svg>

Of course, the issues of "digital technology" have also been discussed for Africa (e.g. Alzouma 2005), where some parts of the internet are more easily accessible than others. On-line newspapers are well established, and Anchimbe (2010) was able to use *The Post Newspaper Cameroon* ([www.postnewsline.com](http://www.postnewsline.com)) and particularly the interactive features there to analyse how the virtual community constructs its "Diaspora Anglophone Cameroonian identity online", which can be seen as African digital discourse. The more modern social digital networks are less frequently used, as Fig. 3 illustrates.




Fig. 3: Social network preferences by continent (Le Monde 2008)

Source: <http://www.webthreads.de/article-data/uploads/2008/01/socialnetworks.jpg>

In all these comparative considerations, we have to be aware of the fact that China is a special case: even if the international social networking services are available, they face strong "national" competition (as the respective Wikipedia pages summarize):

Baidu can rightly be called the "Chinese Google", since it offers many services, including a Chinese language search engine for websites, audio files, and images. It also offers a special community service, the "Chinese Wikipedia" Baidu Baike, an online collaboratively written encyclopaedia and a searchable keyword-based discussion forum.

QQ is China's most popular IM software, a mixture of sms and email. It is linked with Qzone, a social networking website, which permits users to write blogs, keep diaries, send photos, and listen to music.

Renren is often referred to as the "Chinese Facebook". It also has a variety of functions with its own characteristics and, similar to Google, it changes the web page's design on special days, like Spring Festival or National Day.

These particular circumstances should be taken into consideration when comparing social digital discourse world-wide. Other national organisations (like vkontakte.ru in Russia) may have many users, but are not substantially different from the platforms described here.

### 2.1.3. User profile

From a corpus- and particularly sociolinguistic perspective, the most important feature of modern social media is the user profile, which is included in all three social media discussed below, i.e. Wikipedia, Facebook and Twitter. This is a collection of personal data associated to a specific user, his or her identity; but it is important to remember that it is the user's own

explicit chosen identity. Although social media (esp. Facebook) would like to force their users to reveal as much as possible of their real identity, this publicly visible profile is, of course, rather "the reflection of the shadows on the wall", as in Plato's cave allegory. The following Wikipedia entry does not sound too sceptical about this:

A user profile (userprofile, or simply profile when used in-context) is a collection of personal data associated to a specific user. A profile refers therefore to the explicit digital representation of a person's identity. A user profile can also be considered as the computer representation of a user model.

A profile can be used to store the description of the characteristics of person. This information can be exploited by systems taking into account the persons' characteristics and preferences. For instance profiles can be used by adaptive hypermedia systems that personalise the human computer interaction.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User\\_profile](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_profile) (20/03/11)

For a sociolinguistic categorisation and correlation of language features, it is unclear whether this "subjective" self-description is less valuable than the "objective" socio-biographical data used in traditional sociolinguistics.

## 2.2. Linguistic concepts and their social media application

### 2.2.1. Internet communication networks as discourse communities

The most obvious linguistic concept that links with the media concepts discussed so far is the discourse community, which has been developed by Nystrand, Perelman and particularly Swales in the context of academic discourse (cf. Schmidt fc.).

A discourse community:

1. has a broadly agreed set of common public goals.
2. has mechanisms of intercommunication among its members.
3. uses its participatory mechanisms primarily to provide information and feedback.
4. utilizes and hence possesses one or more genres in the communicative furtherance of its aims.
5. in addition to owning genres, it has acquired some specific lexis.
6. has a threshold level of members with a suitable degree of relevant content and discursive expertise.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discourse\\_community](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discourse_community)  
(25/01/13)

This definition is partly based on the much older concept of a speech community as a group of people who share a set of norms and expectations regarding the use of language. It has been at the heart of the linguistic and sociolinguistic debate on uniform versus diversified norms over the last fifty years since Gumperz, Chomsky and Labov. The application of the concept to internet discourse is unclear and the debate has hardly expanded beyond the well-known netiquette (network etiquette) debate. In some internet discourse, the term blogosphere is used for part of the internet community:

The blogosphere is made up of all blogs and their interconnections. The term implies that blogs exist together as a connected community (or as a collection of connected communities) or as a social network in which everyday authors can publish their opinions. Since the term has been coined, it has been referenced in a number of media and is also used to refer to the Internet.

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blogosphere> (25/01/13)

### 2.2.2. Forum participants as a community of practice

In most recent sociolinguistics, another potentially useful concept has gained attention in academic discussion, i.e. a community of practice, as defined in Wikipedia:

A **community of practice (CoP)** is, according to cognitive anthropologists Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger, a group of people who share a craft and/or a profession. The group can evolve naturally because of the members' common interest in a particular domain or area, or it can be created specifically with the goal of gaining knowledge related to their field. It is through the process of sharing information and experiences with the group that the members learn from each other, and have an opportunity to develop themselves personally and professionally (Lave & Wenger 1991). CoPs can exist online, such as within discussion boards and newsgroups, or in real life, such as in a lunch room at work, in a field setting, on a factory floor, or elsewhere in the environment.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Community\\_of\\_practice](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Community_of_practice)  
(25/01/13)

When we look for such CoPs on the internet, we find them in different formats. In text 1, we see the Welcome page of a forum of Southern Cameroonians established as early as 2003. The "Moderator" evokes Cameroon's late colonial history, claiming that "colonial occupation" continues in "La République du Cameroun". The

contrast to Francophone Cameroon establishes an Anglophone identity, in fact the forum's name SouCam refers to the part of the United Nations Trust Territory that voted to "unite" with the French part in the plebiscite of 1961. Such contrasting identities are typical for political opposition groups and provide a strong bond for communities of practice whose primary aim is obviously independence from (or at least greater autonomy in) Cameroon. The language used in the Welcome text is rather formal and intertextual, as this "declaration" style invokes the American Declaration of Independence.

#### WELCOME MESSAGE

Posted By: [soucam2003](#) Tue Oct 21, 2003 4:12 pm | [Options](#)

"When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. --That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."

We invoke this declaration and its spirit, for the peoples of the former United Nations Trust Territory of the Southern Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, who are today under the colonial occupation of France operating as La République du Cameroun.

Welcome to the Federal Democratic Republic of Southern Cameroons Peoples Forum.

Thank you,  
The Moderator

**Text 1: Welcome page for soucam yahoo forum (25/01/13)**

**Source:**

<http://dir.groups.yahoo.com/group/AmbazoniaPeoples/message/1>

Whereas the function of the soucam forum is typical, its language used in Text 1 is atypical. This becomes clear when we contrast it with Text 2, which is equally political (for "Clean General Elections"), but written in a much more oral style. The web community in this example identifies with Kenya and clearly practices a bilingual "life-style" and the colloquial "Welcome" includes the frequent code-switching between English and Kiswahili: The "Everybody Welcome" is in Kiswahili ("Karibuni wote ...!"), the *habari* ("News") from *nyumbani* ("Home") are obviously essential in order to create a common bond with friends outside of Nairobi and Kenya, and some Kiswahili words are integrated into English such as *nyam(a) chom(a)* ("Grilled Meat" or BBQ; with final vowels dropped) for *rafiki(s)* (with an English plural -s added). Similar phenomena have been found in other multilingual parts of the electronic world (such as Malaysia, cf. Hassan/Hashim 2009 and Norizah Hassan/Azirah Hashim/Phillip 2012).



Activity within 7 days: 1 New Member · 9 New Messages

## Description

Karibuni wote...

I know most of you would like to be at Kengele's or Corni, skiza kidogo ngom z & zippin' some tucker bandi... mbili mbili kama kawaida with some nyam ehom...! But get real, wherever you are soo hii, this might just be the next best thing to nyumbani, so you might as well read the *Standard & Nation*; to catch up on the habari at home, ama upumzike by listening to the beats on Capital FM, & bonga manena with your rafikis hapa na hii online. @ the Kenyan Club



Messages Topics Search:  Search

## Most Recent Messages (View All)

**Our Partnerships is growing**

FriendsKenyaans for a Clean General Election is gaining roots and we want to appreciate the following partners who have come on board. We are sure many more are

Posted - Tue Jan 22, 2013 10:05 am

**Welcome to The Dagoreti Human Peace Caravan- 26th Jan 2013**

Dear Friends, After hosting the successful Mathare Human Peace Caravan on the 19th Jan 2013 at Mathare, we are now focused on hosting The Dagoreti Human Peace

Posted - Mon Jan 21, 2013 11:03 am

**Official Statement from VVM Treasurer**

Friends I am the bonafide founder member and Hon National Treasurer of Vvuvu Mashinani, a movement founded on the ideals of integrity, commitment, respect,

Posted - Mon Jan 21, 2013 5:51 am

**Text 2: Forum pages from Kenyaclub yahoo forum**  
Source: <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/kenyaclub/> (23/01/13)

The great advantage of such internet data for the empirical linguist is that they are easily accessible, handy and even stratified: The data are directly accessible to the researcher, even though they are remote in time (2003) and place (Nairobi). Thus we can avoid the observer's paradox, which occurs when users adapt their styles as they perceive that their linguistic behaviour is observed; and since the texts are made available publicly, analysing them does not seem to be an ethical problem. Internet data are topical, more oral and still written down, so that we do not need any transcription. However, how can we really compile a stratified corpus from different parts of the internet? And how do we deal with the textual variation? Should "digital discourse" be treated as one variable or several variables, or is it a genre? Is there one variety of social digital English?

**2.2.3. Textual variation as genre or text-type?**

Over the last few decades, several attempts have been made to differentiate texts according to their pragmatic functions. Early corpus compilations in the 1960s and 1970s used a classification of descriptive, narrative, expository and argumentative text-types. More recently, linguists have reinterpreted the traditional literary concept of genre as social action from a constructivist perspective. Neither has been applied convincingly in socio- and corpus-linguistic research (and the entries for text-type and genre in Wikipedia are not useful for our analysis of social digital discourse either). This means that we still have to use an ad hoc classification of styles in terms of textual variation as attention to the reader.

Today the extensive options of the internet make a comparison of different texts from the same source possible. Thus, the *Daily News* from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, has an on-line edition that we can read and comment on interactively, a Wikipedia entry with the basic historical and political background, a Facebook account that we can "Like", and (Twitter) tweets that we can "follow" world-wide. This diversity allows us to monitor current events and language in Tanzania presented in different styles by different reporters and columnists. This is a welcome expansion of the

traditional newspaper analysis used in the well-known ICE projects so far (Schmied 2011).

**2.3. Linguistic concepts applied to social digital discourses**

Social digital discourse today is defined by its social functions in the wide sense. In it, the default is a user group. In the following, we will apply our linguistic concepts to three well-known platforms with different types of discourses, i.e. Wikipedia, Facebook and Twitter. Their central idea is multi-nodal (one2many) communication, i.e. we may exchange emails with only one person, but it is not very useful to write a Wikipedia entry for one reader, construct a Facebook profile for one friend, or Twitter with one follower. All three platforms have a similar central "social" communication concept with an interactive, web2.0 component, but also some fuzziness: The central idea of Wikipedia is that this on-line encyclopaedia – ideally – has many active "editors" and many more passive readers. The central idea of Twitter is one active tweet producer and many passive "followers". Facebook has both options depending on the privacy settings: wide open visibility for company status-updates contrast with restricted in-group communication for party invitations.

Apart from these basic defining criteria, the three discourse platforms can also be characterised by different textual variables, like text length, number of texts, text-type and cultural background:

Wikipedia entries are usually long – and they are linked in hypertext format, so their length is not easy to define, potentially the reading is endless. Twitter texts are the shortest, a maximum of 140 characters, but they can also include links to more and longer texts. Facebook is a sort of compromise between a potentially very detailed personal lexicon, including its timeline history, and relatively short personal postings.

Obviously, the number of texts used for linguistic analysis must then be inverse: fewest in the case of Wikipedia, most in the case of Twitter.

The characterisation according to text type is relatively speculative: I would see Wikipedia as informative, as readers do not want to be persuaded; Facebook may be narrative and persuasive; Twitter is mainly narrative and instructive.

Similarly, the different platform discourses have different cultural backgrounds: Wikipedia is outgoing, the intended readership is broad and general; if information is "unsourced" or its "neutrality disputed", an entry is "flagged" and its editors may be "subjected to sanctions" (see below). By contrast, Twitter is "very in-group", since only followers receive the tweets. Facebook can, again, be both: the personal postings are in-group, the company status-updates are as general as possible.

Text functions focus on the product in Wikipedia, the presentation is ideally unbiased. The focus is on affiliation in Twitter, maintaining a thread ("fil") with followers. Facebook with both parts, the School Class Facebook and the Company Facebook, is a hybrid and it is multi-channel: it has Wiki-like functions and it has email functions.

**3. Challenges and new perspectives****3.1. Challenges for sociolinguistics**

Although the new data from social digital discourse may have attractions for sociolinguists, they also present new challenges. The socio-biographical data are a particular problem. Identities are, of course, constructed or "assumed", even multiple identities are possible. Thus they are more a "persona" than a real person; the gender issue (Baron 2004), e.g. male Facebook contributors posing as females, has been widely discussed in the media. So we must ask how real,

how consistent a profile is, or how conscious or unconscious writer identity affects language behaviour and thus studies of language analysis and change. Primarily, such caveats concern the private sphere, but even Facebook has private and public spaces, personal and company profiles. Yet, it is also possible that language usage correlates well with assumed identities. All this emphasizes the constructivist view of language. When we analyse company web-communication, we know that it is a "constructed" profile: we are not interested in the identity of the person who actually wrote the text, we are interested in the "identity" the company wishes to portray. In my view, this is a logical expansion of sociolinguistic research away from studies based on supposedly objective data to studies incorporating more subjective indicators of identities. In any case, the admittedly restricted sociolinguistic data from social media are better than the information we can hope for from many other texts from the internet.

### 3.2. Challenges for corpus-linguistics

The new opportunities for data collection from online discourse have been discussed on a broad social-science and comparative informatics basis (e.g. Goggins/Mascaro 2012).

The advantages of social digital data mentioned above are a great attraction for corpus-linguists. Corpus quality, of course, depends on the textual diversity and social stratification we can achieve. The corpus size necessary depends on the frequency of the phenomenon analysed. Since the text size is restricted in some media (especially Twitter cf. above), specific features and symbols are used, almost like shorthand. So it is easy to investigate abbreviations or contractions on the basis of a Twitter Corpus, but it is difficult to retrieve enough complex tenses, heavy noun phrase modifications – this is not Twitter usage. The most fruitful results can be expected for features that are typical of youth language, like *massive* intensification (cf. Martinez/Pertejo 2012). We have to be aware of these age- or media-specific over- and under-usages as special limitations or opportunities, if we do not want to be discredited as number crunchers. We have to evaluate our data critically before we draw wide-ranging conclusions.

An additional challenge may be retrieving the data effectively – if we do not want to resort to paste-and-copy techniques. How quickly and easily we can compile a corpus of texts from social media also depends on the technical design of these texts. Possible solutions must therefore be specific to the network service and have to be found and changed. Twitter has been tried and found relatively easy to use through its Application Programming Interface (API) in this respect (cf. below). To sum up, although we have to be aware of the challenges and problems involved, the opportunities offered for innovative teaching and research perspectives are considerable, as well be shown below.

### 3.3. Teaching perspectives

The attractions of integrating social media into university teaching are obvious, since we may attract students approaching them as "customers". Integrating their real lives into the academic world also means leaving the "ivory tower". It even allows lectures to learn more from and about their students. We hope to reach students more personally in their digital "reality". Ebner et al. (2010: 99) conducted a study on informal and process-oriented learning in Austria and conclude (in formal German nominal style) that the successful use of microblogging and the increasing value that results for students and teachers from the

use of microblogging is substantial. For the students this can be summarized in the following points:

- Informal learning through informal communication.
- Support of collaboration.
- Feedback on thoughts.
- Suggestions to reflect one's own thoughts.
- Collaboration independent of time and place.
- Direct examination of thoughts and causes of learning.

For teachers the following factors are crucial.

- Current information on the status of learning.
- Possibility to steer the intervention in the learning process of individuals and groups.
- Possibility for immediate, direct feedback.
- Facilitation of student group work.
- Getting an impression of the learning climate.

These arguments were substantiated by my own observations during a recent project, where students organized all their discussions and meetings using Facebook – disregarding the Wiki project page. Maybe the Wiki stage will be used later for documentation, but the fact that students loved to organize themselves and their project work on the basis of new social media is most interesting.

Some English departments have already integrated social media into their staff-student communication channels, as can be seen from their websites. For example, Linguisticsbonn (Fig. 4) has been using Twitter for some time to invite students to Applied English.




Fig. 4: Linguisticsbonn using Twitter

Source: <http://www.linguistics.uni-bonn.de/> (23/03/11)

Whether using social media to distribute news also draws students into a linguistic research project that is based on their own life-experience with social media is another matter. However, a general critical assessment of teaching opportunities using Facebook is surprisingly positive and optimistic (Rambe 2012: 310):

The two [hierarchical and horizontal] discourses mentioned above have fundamental implications for pedagogical practice in higher education:

Academics should induct students into critical engagement, locating and interpreting the philosophy and ideologies behind different discourses they and peers activate. This could unlock student understanding of how disciplinary knowledge is constructed rather than passive reception of educator-generated content. Educators should encourage learner discursive practices involving higher forms of knowledge (theoretical knowledge) as much as they deliberate on procedural issues. Facebook learning communities could be employed as vehicles for deconstructing theoretical propositions and perspectives through text-based interaction. As Salmon's (2000) five stage model of e-



learning posits, it is the higher levels knowledge construction and development that allow for student selfregulation of on-task activities, responsibility for knowledge construction and cognitive growth.

Weak study skills and over-dependence on educators for information are addressed by developing an information sharing culture and valuing the strength of student contributions during collaboration. Through this, students learn to become principal knowledge brokers than information receivers. CDA exposed some hidden assumptions about power and implicit.

### 3.4. Research perspectives

Since data from social media seem to be available in abundance and sampling seems easy, we can use the data thus obtained to re-consider the old problems of style continua and English variation between spoken and written forms or preferences. This research focus is an expansion of up to 20 year old email research (Frehmer 2008). There is a considerable body of research on "lol" and smileys and several of our students are keen to expand early studies on instant messaging and texting. The popular linguist David Crystal has shown that this can provide instant evidence of language change. Others like Tagliamonte, Kerswill and Cheshire have shown the way for more thorough studies, as we can see from the example: "Linguistic Ruin? Lol! Instant messaging and teen language". The fact that it is published in *American Speech* proves that new media language has entered into hard empirical linguistic research, as the following abstract shows:

This article presents an analysis of Instant Messaging (IM), a one-to-one synchronous medium of computer-mediated communication. Innumerable articles in the popular press suggest that increasing use of IM by teens is leading to a breakdown in the English language. The analyses presented here are based on a unique corpus involving 72 teenagers and over a million words of natural, unmonitored IM. In addition, a corpus of speech from the same teenagers is examined for comparison. Targeting well-known IM features and four areas of grammar, we show that IM is firmly rooted in the model of the extant language. It reflects the same structured heterogeneity (variation) and the same dynamic, ongoing processes of linguistic change that are currently under way in contemporary varieties of English. At the same time, IM is a unique new hybrid register, exhibiting a fusion of the full range of variants from the speech community—formal, informal, and highly vernacular.

change that are currently under way in contemporary varieties of English. At the same time, IM is a unique new hybrid register, exhibiting a fusion of the full range of variants from the speech community—formal, informal, and highly vernacular.

**Text 3: Abstract: Linguistic ruin? Lol! Instant messaging and teen language (Tagliamonte/Denis 2008)**

**Source: *American Speech* 83(1): 3-34; DOI:10.1215/00031283-2008-001**

But this is only a beginning. In the following sections, we will look into three types of social digital networks and give examples of how they can be exploited for serious socio- and corpus-linguistic research in order to solve old questions of English language variation.

## 4. Wikipedia

### 4.1. Non-expert driven discourse on reliability

Wikipedia is one of the first (2001) and most prototypical examples of social digital discourse, which is evident from its self-definition:

**Wikipedia** is a free, web-based, collaborative, multilingual encyclopaedia project supported by the non-profit Wikimedia Foundation. Its 18 million articles (over 3.5 million in English) have been written collaboratively by volunteers around the world, and almost all of its articles can be edited by anyone with access to the site.[3] Wikipedia was launched in 2001 by Jimmy Wales and Larry Sanger[4] and has become the largest and most popular general reference work on the Internet.[2][5][6][7] ranking around seventh among all websites on Alexa and having 365 million readers.[8][9] The name Wikipedia was coined by Larry Sanger[10] and is a portmanteau of wiki (a technology for creating collaborative websites, from the Hawaiian word wiki, meaning "quick") and encyclopaedia.

Source: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia> (24/01/13)

Wikipedia's departure from the expert-driven style of the encyclopaedia building mode and the large presence of "unacademic" content have been discussed in several forums, not least in Wikipedia itself (also under "Wikipedia"). Wikipedia even quotes Goethe to prove that their model of swarm intelligence works, that many semi-specialists can produce excellence: "Here as in other human endeavours it is evident that the active attention of many, when concentrated on one point, produces excellence" (The Experiment as Mediator between Subject and Object, Goethe 1772).

Although the policies of Wikipedia strongly emphasize reliability, verifiability and a neutral point of view, critics of Wikipedia accuse it of systemic bias and inconsistencies, especially undue weight given to popular culture, and allege that it favours consensus over credentials in its editorial process. This means in concrete terms: if the students or laypersons agree, they can agree against the professors' or experts' knowledge and enforce their views in the Wikipedia editing - until someone interferes.

Departing from the style of traditional encyclopaedias, Wikipedia employs an open "wiki" editing model. Except for a few particularly vandalism-prone pages, every article may be edited anonymously and with a user account. No article is owned by its creator, or any other editor, nor is it vetted by any recognized authority; rather, the articles are agreed on by consensus. This is not always easy, as the following entries prove:

- While most articles can be edited by anyone, semi-protection is sometimes necessary to prevent vandalism to popular pages.

Sali A. Tagliamonte and Derek Denis University of Toronto

*American Speech* 2008 83(1):3-34; DOI:10.1215/00031283-2008-001

This article presents an analysis of Instant Messaging (IM), a one-to-one synchronous medium of computer-mediated communication. Innumerable articles in the popular press suggest that increasing use of IM by teens is leading to a breakdown in the English language. The analyses presented here are based on a unique corpus involving 72 teenagers and over a million words of natural, unmonitored IM. In addition, a corpus of speech from the same teenagers is examined for comparison. Targeting well-known IM features and four areas of grammar, we show that IM is firmly rooted in the model of the extant language. It reflects the same structured heterogeneity (variation) and the same dynamic, ongoing processes of linguistic

- The reason for protection can be found in the protection log. If there are no relevant entries in the protection log, the page may have been moved after being protected.

This article and its editors are subject to Wikipedia general sanctions. See the description of the sanctions.

#### **To-do list for Wikipedia: WikiProject Environment / Climate change task force:**

The articles linked on this pages [!]

 can be monitored at [Special:RecentChangesLinked/Wikipedia:WikiProject\\_Environment/Climate\\_change/to\\_do](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:WikiProject_Environment/Climate_change/to_do).

- Deletion discussions:
- Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/IPCC chapter 2
- Merge discussion:
- Talk:Climate change in the United Kingdom#Merge
- Discuss climate change articles for specific countries at [Wikipedia:WikiProject Environment/Climate change/Climate change articles by country](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:WikiProject_Environment/Climate_change/Climate_change_articles_by_country)
- Comment on the Climate change discretionary sanctions proposal at [Wikipedia:Administrators' noticeboard/Climate Change](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Administrators%27_noticeboard/Climate_Change)
- Articles
- Climate change - specific weasel words
- Global warming - broken digital object identifier (doi), rewrite discussion
- Temperature record of the past 1000 years - dead ext link(s)
- Cool Earth 50 - stub, orphan
- Mitigation of global warming - unsourced statements
- Climate change and agriculture - unsourced statements
- Climate change denial - neutrality disputed
- Global warming controversy - requested to be merged into Climate change denial
- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change - various fixes needed

...  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:WikiProject\\_Environment/Climate\\_change\\_task\\_force](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:WikiProject_Environment/Climate_change_task_force) (27/01/13)

This article illustrates how particularly controversial pages may be "flagged" and "monitored" by WikiProjects (cf. below). The procedure has been included here in detail since it shows how great the organizational effort is to ensure an ideal "cultured" discourse on this open platform.

#### **4.2. Linguistic evaluation of Wikipedia**

A linguistic evaluation of Wikipedia has to take into account the general editing concept and style, the diversity of styles in the main Article as well as the Talk and the Revision History that belong to them. This favours intellectual discourse, reveals differences of opinion and may help to clarify concepts. However, in user-driven non-specialist academic text production, key persons are the editors, committed lay-persons or specialists who are interested in popularizing topics they are enthusiastic about. Again, this collaborative writing effort emphasises a constructivist approach to texts. Recently, many more editorial comments have been added to categorize Wikipedia articles (according to the 2009 strategic plan), which make it clear that Wikipedia has some implicit or explicit quality standards, which readers can influence by rating articles according to four standard criteria: trustworthy, objective, complete, well-written (and well-organized), which is explained through the following link:

The Article Feedback Tool (AFT) is a Wikimedia survey for article feedback, to engage readers in the assessment of article quality, one of the five priorities defined in the strategic plan.

This tool was created with the following goals:

Quality assessment - Article feedback complements internal quality assessment of Wikipedia articles with a new source of data on quality, highlighting content that is of very high or very low quality, and measuring change over time.

Reader engagement - Article feedback encourages participation from readers, offering a call to action for some assessors to improve the article.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Article\\_Feedback\\_Tool](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Article_Feedback_Tool) (24/01/13)

This quality management is partly based on text-linguistic (text-type) criteria (see 2.2.3 above); in any case, the recent attempts to increase its reliability make it a good starting point for linguistic research - for content and argumentation structures.

#### **4.3. Linguistic applications of Wikipedia**

From a sociolinguistic perspective, it is interesting that "editors" can create profiles with photos, lists of personal interests, contact information, and other personal information. Through this discussion feature, users' modifications to Wikipedia entries can be followed, compared and evaluated, however, the modifications are not as dramatic as one might assume. In a linguistic project on meta-discourse (Schmied fc.), I was hoping to follow the discussion of highly controversial pages like "Global Warming" or "Climate Change" (even the choice of term here suggests some ideological stance). Since the changes to the latest report issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have been debated widely in the media, I thought that comparing hedges (such as *may* and *probably* versus *must* and *usually*) would be a fruitful exercise, as they indicate author stance or even ideological bias. This project endeavour has not been very successful so far, although we found some controversial on-line discussions, indicated in a Wiki:User profile and the corresponding user\_talk:

I'm actively contributing Kenya-related articles. Also, I do watch new articles of all kinds, and if needed, do edit them, mostly categorising uncategorised pages. Yes, I do add speedy and proposed deletion templates quite often, but only when necessary. That is, copyright violation, or subject which obviously fails notability guidelines. (sic!)

My username has nothing to do with my real name.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Julius\\_Sahara](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Julius_Sahara) (25/01/13)

This reference to the name is important here, since in some Kenyan disputes tribal affiliation would determine the stance on such issues. In fact, whereas Julius\_Sahara is still very active in this internal Wiki discussions, his opponent here, Xinunus, is not so easy to follow, for:

This account may be blocked due to abusive use of one or more accounts.

It was predictable that the controversial political discourse was on some leading politician, but the relatively formal and polite style suggests a well-developed discourse culture that Wikipedia can be proud of:

Raila Odinga

I am asking you kindly to stop removing information that is well resourced. The proper way to challenge an entry is to take it up on the discussion page. If you continue to remove information that is resourced by a valid newspaper I will have to get an admin involved. Again stop removing information just because you think it doesn't belong there. You must give more information other than "its not a valid resource" when you delete

other users information. Per wiki rules that is not the correct way to edit a page on here. --Xinunus (talk) 05:24, 1 September 2008 (UTC)

Please stop removing sourced material. You continue to do so without using the discussion page [sic!]. Next time you remove something I am reporting you to an admin. Please follow Wiki rules on challenging material posted. --Xinunus (talk) 02:39, 2 September 2008 (UTC)

The information I added to Raila Odinga was from three reliable sources (a BBC article, a Voice of America article and an Africa Business news article). Judging by your other entries, and previous complaints about your changes to this page, you seem to be a Kikuyu supremacist who is bringing ethnic and tribal animosity to an information page, where it is highly inappropriate. I would be fine with deletion of the whole paragraph, but as people interested in conveying reliable information, we both should find citing Robert Mugabe's propaganda minister for reliable information about Kenya (or anything else) utterly bizarre. Perhaps we could agree on a compromise solution, where we drop the whole paragraph? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 98.209.22.245 (talk) 20:36, 8 October 2008 (UTC)

My policy is to keep this, like any other article, as neutral as possible. I have consistently removed any biased text from this page, whether they have been added pro- or anti-Odinga editors. I agree that the whole paragraph is indeed unnecessary and it has been removed from the current version. Julius Sahara (talk) 14:40, 9 October 2008 (UTC)

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User\\_talk:Julius\\_Sahara](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_talk:Julius_Sahara) (25/01/13)

Although the interruption of a heated debate through sanctions or WikiProjects may be regrettable from a linguistic point of view, it also shows that Wikipedia has been very active to ensure that bias and conflict of interest editing are reported and the respective pages are eliminated, as this entry shows:

In the context of Wikipedia, conflict of interest editing is the editing of Wikipedia articles by people whose background means that their motives are likely to conflict with the encyclopedia's neutrality policy. Conflict of interest editing includes paid editing or paid advocacy, when employees, contractors, or those with financial connection to individuals, products, corporations, organizations, political campaigns or governments edit articles related to those subjects. Although these edits may often involve minor factual corrections and changes, significant media attention has revolved around the editing of articles which removes or downplays negative information and adds or highlights positive information by editors with a conflict of interest.

Wikipedia is free for anyone to edit, but the site maintains a neutral point of view policy. The encyclopedia's official stance on editors who have a conflict of interest strongly discourages them from working in areas where they may be intentionally or unintentionally biased. Wikipedia co-founder Jimmy Wales has argued that editors who have a clear political or financial conflict of interest should never directly edit articles, but instead propose edits to other editors on article talk pages, and seek their feedback.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Conflict\\_of\\_interest\\_editing\\_on\\_Wikipedia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Conflict_of_interest_editing_on_Wikipedia) (25/01/13)

## 5. Facebook

### 5.1. Debates about privacy

Facebook is a social networking service launched in February 2004 by Mark Zuckerberg with fellow students from Harvard University. It is a very wide platform with a user profile, a news feed, messaging, voice and video calls (via Skype), and the famous LIKE button. Facebook

is by far the most successful and linguistically the most stratified social network. But it is also the most criticized social network because of privacy violations, although it claims that safety of its users is top priority and requires users to give their true identity. This debate can be followed on the internet again and again (e.g. Fig. 5, which has been removed since).




Fig. 5: How Social Networking is negatively effecting (!) free discourse (20/03/11)

To allow consensus about privacy, Facebook enables users to choose their own privacy. The (American) media often compare Facebook to Myspace, but one significant difference between the two websites is the level of customization. Perhaps this is the reason why Myspace (the old rival founded in 2003) has lost many followers recently in the US.

### 5.2. Linguistic evaluation of Facebook

Facebook combines different communication channels, different user groups, and different styles. Since its new timeline is good for collective memory, it is a good data base for in-group language change over the past few years. As the name suggests, Facebook includes some good data representing friends' talk in informal casual style, but it also provides good data for company2customers language, i.e. formal persuasive style. From a linguistic perspective, these are two very different styles.

The disadvantage for data collection is that there is too much diversity and the restricted access for users in contrast to the unlimited access for providers - the prototype of the fairy and witch mentioned at the beginning. So we have to find different ways of extracting stratified sociolinguistic language data on the basis of changing Facebook Graph APIs - and that requires specialist knowledge on Facebook technology as well as on cultural backgrounds.

Interestingly, some African cities like Yaoundé in Cameroon have "neighbourhoods" in Facebook, and it takes an insider to assess whether Bastos is more and Cite U Ngoa Ekele and Titi Garage are less privileged, or the other way round. This we can simply compare English usage in these different networks to try a long-distance comparison of sociolinguistic informal language practices.

In most cases, however, Facebook entries show diverging styles. An extreme case is text 4: The entire discourse consisting of the author's initial narrative input and many friends' commentaries clearly comprises two different parts: The first part is written in formal official English, although it is presented as an oral announcement at an airport. The oral part can be seen

from the direct address "Good afternoon" politicians to the final farewell: "Enjoy your flight".



#### Hague Express flight PEV-2007

by Crazy Nairobian on Tuesday, 14 December 2010 at 10:54 · [@](#)

Good afternoon Politicians. We would like to inform you that the Hague Express flight PEV2007 will be ready for take off in 24 hours. All politicians will be boarding through GATE A - Reality Section.

We request that you observe the following basic rules to ensure your flight is both safe and enjoyable.

- 1) Kindly have your luggage checked at the security points without posing any problems to security. Any scare tactics, delaying tactics, bribes or excuses found in your luggage will be confiscated.
- 2) Passengers are not allowed to bring their tribesmen on board as there is no room for demonstrators.
- 3) All politicians taking the flight will have a mandatory bath to ensure the smell of corruption and impunity is NOT transferred to the plane.
- 4) Condoms will not be allowed on board the plane since there is no one for you to screw. If anything, its you who will get screwed by the Hague.
- 5) Any music CDs with the following music tracks will be confiscated and destroyed. Haki Yetu, Solidarity, This is a political scheme to destroy me politically, Money has been poured, Yote yawezekana and Investigations are ongoing. These music tracks are not allowed in Hague.
- 6) There will be free refreshments and supplies on board the flight. All politicians will get free juice and a free brain pack for personal use. Common sense will also be served as an appetizer.
- 7) No hotel bookings are necessary and so any hotel booking receipts will be confiscated. There is special accommodation for all politicians in a five star Jail with solid metal bars to ensure you get all the servings of justice you need without disturbance.

Second helpings of Justice will also be available for anyone who drops the soap in the bathroom.

Once again, thank you for flying Hague Express flight PEV2007. Enjoy your flight.

[Follow me on twitter](#)

#### Text 4 Hague Express flight PEV-2007

Source: <http://www.facebook.com/notes/crazy-nairobian/hague-express-flight-pev-2007/494044029760> (24/01/13)

The text is almost entirely written in formal English, there are only two cases of code-mixing: *Haki yetu* (Kiswahili: "our rights") and *Yote yawezekana* (Kiswahili: "Everything is possible"), Kiswahili expressions that add local colour to the inviting discourse. The text also presupposes some understanding of Kenyan culture and political background, since the flight number PEV2007 immediately recalls for all Kenyans the "post-election violence" from the year 2007, which showed to the entire world the political contrasts in the country. In view of these events, it may be not surprising that the resentment of politicians in Kenya is still great and the "Crazy Nairobian", which is actually the name of a journal, would like to send them all to a five star Jail. The title "Hague Express" also assumes some general world knowledge, i.e. that war criminals are sent to The Hague in the Netherlands for trial. The political culture is also characterized by the "standard luggage" of politicians in Kenya, i.e. "scare tactics, delaying tactics, frights and excuses". The text, however, also demands some good knowledge of English, since the play on the world "screw", with the sexual meaning first and the police meaning second, cannot be taken for granted in a second-language country like Kenya.

The more oral language in the numerous spontaneous commentaries from the same day underneath illustrate not only some pronunciation characteristics of Kenyan English like "*bun*" and "*admista*" in the contribution by Prince Simon Santa but also some internet-specific language like "2hear" by the same contributor. The example of code-switching includes a few Kiswahili inclusions in the English contribution by Prince Simon Santa as opposed to a few English inclusions in the Kiswahili contribution by Florence Kimata. From the different names, the linguistic analyst can also draw two conclusions: a few names, like Steve Maddog Biko look assumed, whereas the vast majority of names appear real since they show the expected tribal forms: *Cheptoo* for Kalenjin, *Wairagu* for Bantu/Kikuyu, for instance.



#### Text 5 Facebook commentaries on Hague Express flight PEV-2007

Source: <http://www.facebook.com/notes/crazy-nairobian/hague-express-flight-pev-2007/494044029760>

#### 5.3. Linguistic applications of Facebook

My own Facebook example (from Beyer 2012) uses specific company webpages, status updates by British and American men's and women's magazines, to be precise. The data was collected between July and August 2011. The linguistic question was unusual for English, since English is typologically not seen as a null-subject or pro-drop language, but in informal and oral contexts subject-less clause have attracted some attention recently. The sociolinguistic research component is based on the assumption that magazine language can be categorized by social class, as Fig. 6 indicates:

| women's magazines  | men's magazines     |
|--------------------|---------------------|
| Vogue UK           | British GQ          |
| Vogue US           | GQ US               |
| Harper's Bazaar UK | Esquire UK          |
| Harper's Bazaar US | Esquire US          |
| Glamour UK         | Details US          |
| Glamour US         | Complex Magazine US |
| Elle UK            | Men's Fitness UK    |
| Elle US            | Shortlist UK        |
| Women's Health US  | Men's Health US     |
| Marie Claire UK    | Men's Health UK     |
| Marie Claire US    | Men's Journal US    |
| Cosmopolitan UK    | FHM UK              |
| Cosmopolitan US    | Maxim US            |
| Grazia UK          | Loaded UK           |




Fig. 6: Classification of magazines according to social class of the readership (Beyer 2012: 29)

On this basis, Beyer (2012: 68) was able to provide evidence that

- lower middle class magazines applied fewer null subjects in their Facebook status messages than upper middle and middle class magazines,
- British and US American men's magazines used fewer null subjects in lower middle class magazines,
- lower middle class women's magazines used more null subjects than upper and upper middle class magazines, and

- the investigation of lower middle class magazines confirmed the findings of the previous group of upper middle and middle class magazines.

This is a convincing result for a small-scale study, since it is in line with the standard sociolinguistic expectations on English variation. It shows that Facebook data can be used for traditional sociolinguistic variation studies.




Fig. 7: Overall occurrences of null subjects per 10,000 words in lower middle class US American and British women's and men's magazines (Beyer 2012: 69)

## 6. Twitter

### 6.1. Discourse with followers by celebrities, companies and service centers

Twitter, also called "the SMS of the Internet", is a web platform that offers a social networking or microblogging service, enabling its users to send and read messages called tweets. Tweets are text-based posts of up to 140 characters displayed on the user's profile page. These tweets are publicly visible by default; however, senders can restrict the delivery to their followers. Although the most popular accounts are celebrities from showbiz and politics, companies also have their own Twitter account today, especially from the US (from CNN to Amazon, but also F.C. Barcelona and Brose Baskets, the German basketball champion). The social and political impact of Twitter became famous during the "Twitter revolutions" in North Africa in 2011. Although there were some security breaches in the past, Twitter is not as controversial as Facebook. Twitter launched a verification program in 2008, allowing celebrities to get their accounts verified. Twitter has expanded in 2011 to an integrated photo sharing service and in 2013 a short video attached makes it more multimodal, revealing more personal identity. Among academics, Twitter gained some reputation as a measurement of popular topics and debates, since its "trending topics" (despite some controversies about fan-group manipulations) indicate what is discussed "in the world" (like Google searches). Although this usually has a strong North American bias or has been restricted to specific areas (e.g. Germany), it reports about the current usages almost immediately and thus helps linguists interested in following the diffusion of new words and word meanings.

Fig. 8 shows a Twitter query "my brother and I" (a linguistic research question pursued in Schmidt 2012 below) in the Dar es Salaam area. Among the results was this nice text with picture of the writer and his brother. Through the geocode (of the registration or the sending location), the writer can be located on the Google map.




Fig. 8: Robert Wanyeki and his tweet from Dar es Salaam retrieved by Twitter Corpus Creation Tool

Fig. 9 is a screenshot from our Twitter Corpus Creation Tool, which uses the Twitter API. It illustrates how the Search String "may" is sent using the default language (English) and the default number of tweets to return (100, the maximum for Twitter's research API). The Geocode (here Latitude: -6.8 / Longitude: 39.283333 for Dar es Salaam and a 500 km radius) is only possible when the user has opted-in to use the Tweeting With Location feature (turned ON). The time for the Tweet collection can be set between two Dates (maximum 1 week ago) and several iterations can be used. Results can be saved in an Output File continuously, whose name can be changed from the default "outfile" (e.g. mybrotherandI\_2013-01-30-00-47-13.txt, with the search string and the time stamp), so that each collection file can be clearly identified. The link to Documentation leads to the related Manual in Wiki.





Fig. 9: Twitter Corpus Creation Tool extracting "may" in tweets from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

### 6.2. Linguistic evaluation of Twitter

These advantages of Twitter data are that they are relatively short, informal, written-like-spoken - and there are many. Although the content of many tweets may be considered "pointless babble" or "social grooming", the language used is very interesting for language researchers since most texts are clearly written in "conversational" style and closer to spoken English than other social media texts.

Since tweets are so frequent and often have a geo-location tag, they have been used for Twialectology studies (e.g. Eisenstein et al. 2010 and Russ 2012), especially in the US. Fig. 9 shows an impressive result that answers a very old and well-known dialectology

question on the distribution of lexical alternatives in US English:



**Fig. 10: Dominant lexical choice of *soda* (blue), *coke* (red) and *pop* (yellow) in US tweets**  
Source: <http://briceruss.com/ADstalk.html>  
However, such API applications always depend on the restrictions imposed by the social media companies, and these can be seen as ambivalent again, balancing individual privacy demands and academic research demands is not easy – and Twitter has recently restricted the research options again.

6.3. Linguistic applications of Twitter

My own Twitter example (from Schmidt 2012) uses data on coordinated personal pronouns (like *he* and *I*) collected with the help of the Twitter API during one week (April 7 to 14, 2011). Although this may not sound like a long collection period, the amount of data collected was overwhelming. Due to the frequency of personal pronouns in Twitter discourse, these archives created Excel files up to 150 megabytes in size, which made them difficult to process. Personal pronouns are a popular research topic in social discourse, e.g. Newman/Teddman (2011) analyse them in online diary writing. It is well-known that the distribution of personal pronouns in informal social discourse is very uneven. This preference for the *me&you* perspective has been called “the personalisation of discourse” (Soffer 2012). Table 5 demonstrates clearly that writer and reader address (*I* and *you*) are by far the most frequent in our Twitter corpus:

| Rank | Frequency | Word       |
|------|-----------|------------|
| 2    | 256,488   | <i>you</i> |
| 3    | 240,532   | <i>I</i>   |
| 4    | 140,977   | <i>me</i>  |
| 10   | 34,825    | <i>her</i> |
| 11   | 33,815    | <i>him</i> |
| 17   | 27,739    | <i>he</i>  |
| 21   | 26,246    | <i>she</i> |

**Table 5: Frequency of relevant singular pronouns in the Twitter corpus (Schmidt 2012: 40)**

Table 6 shows that the traditional English grammar rules (the variants in bold in the following tables) are still adhered to by Twitter users, and yet the alternatives are chosen surprisingly often. For the first time, we can gain an insight into the gradience of the phenomenon in informal English styles. Social digital discourse gives us easy access to “liquid language” (Soffer 2012) that has been very difficult to grasp before. The variables we are used to from traditional sociolinguistic studies based on sociolinguistic interviews and corpus-linguistic analyses also apply to Twitter English usage, but whereas some usages occur very frequently, others can hardly be found even in the vast Twitter database used for this case study, as the normalised figures in tables 6 to 8 clearly show.

|                           | <i>you and I</i> | <i>you and me</i> | <i>I and you</i> | <i>me and you</i> |
|---------------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| subject coordinates       | 6,504<br>37.0%   | 7,572<br>43.2%    | 10<br>0.1%       | 3,458<br>19.7%    |
| per 1M.words              | 1,662            | 1,935             | 2                | 883               |
| prepositional complements | 1,122<br>26.1%   | 1,550<br>36.0%    | 0<br>0%          | 1,630<br>37.9%    |
| per 1M.words              | 287              | 396               | 0                | 417               |

**Table 6: 1sg. + 2sg. as subject coordinates in Twitter and 1sg. + 2sg. as prepositional complements (*for*) in Twitter (Schmidt 2012: 49/table 13 and 63/table 27)**

|                           | <i>he/she and</i> |           | <i>him/her and</i> |            | <i>I and</i>   |                | <i>me and</i>  |                |
|---------------------------|-------------------|-----------|--------------------|------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|                           | <i>I</i>          | <i>me</i> | <i>I</i>           | <i>me</i>  | <i>he/s he</i> | <i>him/her</i> | <i>he/s he</i> | <i>him/her</i> |
| subject coordinates       | 435<br>31.8%      | 3<br>0.2% | 166<br>12.1%       | 15<br>1.1% | 0<br>0%        | 16<br>1.2%     | 9<br>0.7%      | 724<br>52.9%   |
| per 1M.words              | 111               | <1        | 42                 | 4          | 0              | 4              | 2              | 185            |
| prepositional complements | 4<br>1.5%         | 1<br>0.4% | 23<br>8.7%         | 22<br>8.4% | 0<br>0%        | 0<br>0%        | 1<br>0.4%      | 212<br>80.6%   |
| per 1M.words              | 1                 | <1        | 6                  | 6          | 0              | 0              | <1             | 54             |

**Table 7: 1sg. + 3sg. as subject coordinates in Twitter and 1sg. + 3sg. as prepositional complements (*for*) in Twitter (Schmidt 2012: 50/table 15 and 64/table 29)**

|                           | <i>him and</i> |            | <i>he and</i> |             | <i>her and</i> |           | <i>she and</i> |            |
|---------------------------|----------------|------------|---------------|-------------|----------------|-----------|----------------|------------|
|                           | <i>her</i>     | <i>she</i> | <i>her</i>    | <i>she</i>  | <i>him</i>     | <i>he</i> | <i>hi m</i>    | <i>h e</i> |
| subject coordinates       | 24<br>41.4%    | 1<br>1.7%  | 2<br>3.4%     | 23<br>39.7% | 0<br>0%        | 1<br>1.7% | 3<br>5.2%      | 4<br>6.9%  |
| per 1M.words              | 6              | <1         | <1            | 6           | 0              | <1        | <1             | 1          |
| prepositional complements | 21<br>70.0%    | 0<br>0%    | 1<br>3.3%     | 5<br>16.7%  | 1<br>3.3%      | 0<br>0%   | 0<br>0%        | 2<br>6.7%  |
| per 1M.words              | 5              | 0          | <1            | 1           | <1             | 0         | 0              | <1         |

**Table 8: 3sg. + 3sg. as subject coordinates in Twitter and as prepositional complements (*for*) in Twitter (Schmidt 2012: 52/table 17 and 56/table 21)**

Again, the social media data provide convincing results – which in this study correlated with the results of an internet questionnaire survey, and this proves again that traditional sociolinguistic analyses on usage preferences can well be expanded into the new social digital discourses.

## 7. Conclusion: Evaluating social digital media in English Studies

I hope to have demonstrated that social digital media are a good topic in English studies. Of course, new data force us to refine our old concepts. New data also allow us to pursue our old linguistic analyses on a new basis. Maybe we can attract more media-oriented types of students to linguistic analysis when they realise that social media have something to contribute to linguistics just as linguistics has something to contribute to the new media world, and maybe we can also exploit the practical opportunities in teacher – student, student – student discourses.

The most controversial issue in academia are references to Wikipedia in academic writing. Students find it an easy starting point and professors often do not accept Wikipedia as an academic source – and both are correct: Wikipedia must be based on reliable sources, and students have to learn to go back to the original source wherever possible. The Wikipedia controversy only accentuates a problem that may occur in all publications whether in traditional printed books or on-line. This quality issue has two parts, content and presentation style; and this is raised for discussion in the Wikipedia entry in Wikipedia:

The opportunity for vandalism provides a number of unique challenges to Wikipedia. One criticism is that, at any moment, a reader of an article cannot be certain that it has not been compromised by the insertion of false information or the removal of essential information. Former *Encyclopædia Britannica* editor-in-chief Robert McHenry once described the predicament using a simile:

The user who visits Wikipedia to learn about some subject, to confirm some matter of fact, is rather in the position of a visitor to a public restroom. It may be obviously dirty, so that he knows to exercise great care, or it may seem fairly clean, so that he may be lulled into a false sense of security. What he certainly does not know is who has used the facilities before him.

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia> (20/03/11)

It is clear that Wikipedia contributors usually cannot be experts in a wide field, so it is actually amazing that Wikipedia articles have been "surprisingly accurate" in

many respects, even compared to traditional expert writing in encyclopaedias, as Wikipedia praises itself:

Because contributors usually rewrite small portions of an entry rather than making full-length revisions, high- and low-quality content may be intermingled within an entry. Critics sometimes argue that non-expert editing undermines quality. For example, Roy Rosenzweig had several criticisms of its prose and its failure to distinguish the genuinely important from the merely sensational. He said that Wikipedia is "surprisingly accurate in reporting names, dates, and events in U.S. history" (Rosenzweig's own field of study) and that most of the few factual errors that he found "were small and inconsequential" and that some of them "simply repeat widely held but inaccurate beliefs", which are also repeated in *Encarta* and the *Britannica*. However, he made one major criticism.

Good historical writing requires not just factual accuracy but also a command of the scholarly literature, persuasive analysis and interpretations, and clear and engaging prose. By those measures, *American National Biography Online* easily outdistances Wikipedia. ...

A 2005 study by the journal *Nature* compared Wikipedia's science content to that of *Encyclopædia Britannica*, stating that Wikipedia's accuracy was close to that of *Britannica*, but that the structure of Wikipedia's articles was often poor".

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia> (20/03/11) in section "Quality of Writing"

Thus social digital discourse is obviously a challenge and an opportunity for linguists, in teaching and in research. The research perspective seems to be particularly attractive, because social media allow us quick access to new types of language data (even from places where fieldwork may be difficult) that can help to pursue old questions of English variation. Linguistic concepts can be expanded to be profitably used to describe social media discourse. In teaching, this form of English texts brings up a discussion of old scholarly virtues like critical reading and thinking, diligence in empirical work, accuracy in documentation, etc. Thus social media may still be more a Beauty than a Beast for modern linguistics.

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## Epistemic Hedges and Boosters as Stance Markers in Legal Argumentative Discourse

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### Abstract

The main purpose of this work is to describe and analyze the role and function of epistemic hedges and boosters as stance markers in the process of legal argumentative discourse and to discuss their contribution to the evidentiality aspect in this particular kind of discourse. My research is based on empirical linguistic data, extracted from some judgments of the Supreme Court of United Kingdom. The short micro-linguistic analysis shows that hedges and boosters are used as part of the evaluation process of the

context, as items which facilitate interaction between participants and as devices which convey justices' attitude to utterance propositions and express their stances on disputed issues.

### Keywords

hedges, boosters, stance, interaction, evaluation, legal argumentation

### Introduction

There is usually general consensus among discourse analysts that argumentation is by far one of the most important communicative activities of our daily verbal exchanges. For this reason, argumentation has always been an intriguing and growing area of academic investigation and scientific discussion on its nature, structure, effects, applications as well as other particular and complex features.

This study focuses on legal argumentative discourse, as an institutionalized process of interaction, characterized by specific (meta)linguistic aspects throughout. More specifically, it considers legal argumentative discourse in judgments handed down by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and briefly discusses two particular types of linguistic items, hedges (*may, might, could*) and boosters (*certainly, of course, highly etc.*), identified as means for conveying the court's epistemic attitude to discourse in legal argumentation. Moreover, these devices are considered in relation to the court's evaluation of the (meta)linguistic argumentative content, such as provided evidence, background information, regulations and rules, general worldview etc. in response to various relevant factors and with the aim of enabling interaction (either explicitly or implicitly) with the audience. Hedges and boosters at the same time convey the justice's (or court's) standpoints or stances in support to the final decision.

The main purpose of this paper is to describe and analyze the role and function of epistemic hedges and boosters as stance markers in the process of legal argumentative discourse and to discuss their contribution to the evidentiality aspect in this particular kind of discourse. The motivation for conducting this research is the specific argumentative nature of judgments. Judgments could be seen as a product of justice's attempt to resolve legal cases and at the same time reach a final decision. Another motive is the important role and function of hedges and boosters in conveying (to some extent) the court's (or justice's individual) stance in the legal argumentative dimension and in a constantly evaluated context. This context makes up a specific interactional environment, in the absence of the antagonist and in a situation where there is no return to a previous stage (for instance, confrontation stage) or any other concrete or potential argumentative interaction phase.

This article begins with a short general discussion of some important characteristics of argumentative discourse and continues with a section on evaluation, interaction and stance. The second part concentrates on both quantitative and qualitative linguistic analyses of epistemic hedges and boosters. Some final remarks on this empirical research are made at the end of the article.

### 1. Legal argumentative discourse

"Argumentation is a verbal, social, and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint" (van Eemeren - Grotendorst, 2004, p.1). In this regard, argumentation is considered an act of interaction involving real or imaginary, present or absent participants who are committed to resolve divergences of standpoints, stances or worldviews. This model clearly does not take into account the logical approach to argumentation, which is more concerned with formal properties and relations of argumentation.

The discussion in this paper mainly adheres to the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentative discourse, which "acknowledges explicitly that argumentative discourse is part of a communicative activity. That is why the argumentation that is advanced is always analysed in relation to the way in which the verbal interaction between the participants in the communication process proceeds." (van Eemeren - Houtlosser - Henkemans, 2007, p. 3). This is very much in line with the concepts of evaluation taken into consideration by the protagonist to express his or her judgments and interaction, in which participants attempt to be continuously involved in verbal exchanges. More discussion about these concepts follows in the next section.

Legal argumentation is also guided by many of the common principles<sup>82</sup> which apply to argumentation in general, briefly highlighted in the two previous paragraphs. First and foremost, it is a discursive process involving several important factors mainly based on the evaluation of contextual aspects and

<sup>82</sup> Based on the pragma-dialectical argumentative model.

interaction between participants. As Walton (1989, p. 25) states, "legal argumentation is an important type of dialogue where the goal of each counsel is to convince the judge (or jury)".

However, legal argumentative discourse has its own particularities which, undoubtedly, affect to a considerable extent the entire discursive process. As van Eemeren (2010, p. 130) observes, "the domain of legal communication ... fosters some highly formalized conventionalized communicative practices" through which the judge or the jury "determines in favor of one of the parties according to a set of rules" (2010, p. 147). But even more particular is the instance of the argumentative process in judgment discourse, in which "the only outcome that is allowed, and is invariably reached, is a decision by the third party that is in control" (2010, p. 148-149), namely the court.

All the above-mentioned factors directly or indirectly influence both the language and structure of legal argumentative discourse, dominated by formal, unambiguous, relevant etc. linguistic choices throughout. Many works have been published, covering various aspects of legal language, which "range from the use of archaic expressions, definition, and extreme precision, through the use of conversational analysis as evidence, to unusual structures" (Chimombo - Roseberry, 1998, p. 287). In this paper I focus only on some hedges and boosters, frequent devices which convey the protagonist stance in argumentative discourse. But before making a short linguistic analysis of them, let us discuss three important aspects related to hedges and boosters: evaluation, interaction and stance.

## 2. Evaluation, interaction and stance

The interactional aspect of argumentative discourse is particularly important, given the involvement of at least two parties in the argumentative process. However, the way these parties attempt to resolve divergences of viewpoints involves linguistic aspects of verbal exchanges as well as additional extralinguistic aspects, one of which is *evaluation*. Broadly speaking, this term refers to expressed judgments, feelings, and viewpoints about something and performs mainly three main functions: "(1) to express the speaker's or writer's opinion, and in doing so to reflect the value system of that person and their community; (2) to construct and maintain relations between the speaker and the writer and hearer or reader; (3) to organize the discourse" (Hunston - Thompson, 1999, p. 6).

Therefore, as it is seen, evaluation is a considerably important part of interaction, particularly in argumentative discourse, in which parties attempt to be as persuasive as possible and at the same time to recognize 'the value' of different arguments or argumentative interactions. Hylan (2005, p. 176) maintains that these interactions are managed in two main ways. Firstly, "they express a textual 'voice'", which the scholar calls *stance*, including "features which refer to the ways writers present themselves and convey their judgments, opinions, and commitments". And secondly, "writers relate to their readers with respect to the positions advanced in the text," which Hylan calls *engagement*, the main function of which is to involve them in the argumentative process<sup>83</sup>.

Stance is mainly expressed through hedges (e.g. *might*, *perhaps*), boosters (e.g. *clearly*, *obviously*), attitude

markers (*unfortunately*, *hopefully*) and self-mention (e.g. *we*, *us*), while engagement includes reader pronouns (*you*), personal asides (*as I believe*), directives (*it is important to understand*) etc. (for details, see Hylan, 2005, p. 178-186). The abundance of such linguistic devices enables both the (re)construction of argumentative discourse and its interpretation by evaluating it in the interactional process and the convenient possibility of conducting research into argumentation in a systematic and reliable way.

However, the linguistic analysis in this study is somehow restricted because of some first tentative results this paper is expected to present. I will concentrate on the aspect of stance, largely present in argumentative discourse, and analyze only two linguistic devices that commonly express it: hedges and boosters, which, on the other hand, express evidentiality, as one of the main components of stance. Evidentiality refers to the protagonist's conveyed belief in "the reliability of the propositions he or she presents" (Hylan, 2005, p. 178).

The theoretical discussion made so far served to follow a systematic theory for the empirical research in the second part of the paper. The main theoretical framework adopted in this study is the pragma-dialectical model of argumentation supplemented by the notion of evaluation and interaction which assist the protagonist to convey his or her stance through epistemic hedges and boosters.

One of the central functions of hedges and boosters is to express the protagonist's epistemic attitude to propositions in argumentative discourse and explicitly or implicitly reveal his or her partial or full commitment to propositional contents. For instance, in example [1] below *may* includes the protagonist's stance on the reversal of the discriminatory rule, which is not firmly seen as being accepted by everyone. In this case the statement is not presented as a fact but rather as a kind of consideration, based on the evaluation of the context.

[1] *Any reversal of a discriminatory rule or practice that does not treat everyone equally is likely to have an impact on others which, from their point of view, may seem to be to their disadvantage.* (Case ID UKSC 2010/0102, 25 Apr 2012)

On the other hand, *of course* in example [2] 'requires' that the antagonist recognize the assertion made by the protagonist. Interestingly enough, he or she has used *of course* along with the directive *must*, a use which presumably assures the antagonist of the intention of creating a system for the exercise of legislative power by the Scottish Parliament and instruct him or her to recognize the aim of those rules.

[2] *The system that those rules laid down must, of course, be taken to have been intended to create a system for the exercise of legislative power by the Scottish Parliament that was coherent, stable and workable. This is a factor that it is proper to have in mind.* (Case ID UKSC 2012/0066, 12 Dec 2012)

Boosters like *of course* are sometimes called 'force modifying expressions', which signal the protagonist's attempt to assure the antagonist of something but also to help him or her understand the protagonist's aim to assure him or her of something (van Eemeren - Houtlosser - Henkemans, 2007, p. 29).

I believe that it would be interesting to see to what extent evidentiality can contribute to the construction of legal argumentative discourse in judgments, in which case, they are the court's final decisions and there is no

83 In the descriptions of both evaluation and interaction the scholars have included terms such as writer and reader or speaker and hearer, but which in our study could well be applied to participants in argumentation (protagonist and antagonist).

direct antagonist with whom the protagonist (the court) can be involved in the process of argumentation or any challenging counterevidence to follow. This is also an additional reason for narrowing down my research to only two specific linguistic devices.

The next section covers a more detailed linguistic analysis of hedges and boosters.

### 3. A short micro-linguistic analysis

In this section of the paper I will analyze some important hedges and boosters (at the lexical level), which are used by justices in judgments and which account as part of the evidentiality component of stance. For this purpose I have built a mini-corpus<sup>84</sup> of around 26,000 words consisting of four randomly-chosen judgment texts<sup>85</sup>, each of which ranges from 5,000 to 8,000 words. I have used the versatile WordSmith 6.0 software to obtain data for the uses of hedges and boosters in LAC. The qualitative research into these linguistic devices follows the quantitative data, briefly discussed and included at the beginning.

As mentioned earlier, in this paper I analyze only a limited number of lexical items of hedges, in which I have included the epistemic modals *could*, *may* and *might*, and some boosters, mainly adverbs such as *certainly*, *obviously*, *of course* etc.

Quantitatively speaking, there is a striking difference between hedges and boosters used in LAC. The overall number of hedges used is 104 and that of boosters only 16, almost one-tenth of hedges used. However, a more relevant and more important figure to be taken into account is the usage per 1,000 words, which shows that hedges are used almost four times more than boosters (3.91 vs. 1.1) in a 1,000-word text. This difference is not very far from Hylan's research into these linguistic devices in 240 academic articles analyzed (30.9 vs. 5.9) (for details, see Hylan, 2005, p. 186-187).

**Table 1:** Statistical data on hedges and boosters in LAC.

| Item            | LAC Frequency | 26,653 words Percentage | per 1,000 words |
|-----------------|---------------|-------------------------|-----------------|
| <b>Hedges</b>   |               |                         |                 |
| may             | 49            | 0.18                    | 1.84            |
| could           | 33            | 0.12                    | 1.24            |
| might           | 22            | 0.08                    | 0.83            |
| Total           | 104           | 0.38                    | 3.91            |
| <b>Boosters</b> |               |                         |                 |
| of course       | 8             | 0.03                    | 0.30            |
| clearly         | 3             | 0.01                    | 0.26            |
| highly          | 3             | 0.01                    | 0.26            |
| certainly       | 1             | < 0.01                  | 0.14            |
| obviously       | 1             | < 0.01                  | 0.14            |
| Total           | 16            | 0.06                    | 1.1             |

Probably, these statistical differences are owing to the fact that hedges like *could*, *may* and *might* are among the most frequent words in English. In LAC, for instance, *may* was the 56<sup>th</sup> most common word, *could* the 116<sup>th</sup> and *might* the 182<sup>nd</sup> (out of 2789 types of words that LAC has). Another reason for making more frequent use of hedges in judgments is that justices have to frequently support their stances (i.e. their decisions) with premises throughout their legal

argumentative discourse. This process sometimes requires the inclusion of various facts presented as they are, without being modified or presented subjectively.

In both examples below, [3] and [4], the epistemic factor is to be included in the propositions being expressed. In example [3] *might* conveys the *factual possibility* of extending employment for the person in question in specific circumstances. Similarly, in example [4] *may* has been used three times to introduce a series of potential events or actions to take place in the relevant context. In this case, the protagonist attempts to objectively describe the situation.

[3] *By then, he was aged 62. The normal retirement age in the PNLD was 65, although employment might be extended for a year at a time subject to satisfactory medical reports and fulfilling other criteria not expected of people below the age of 65.* (Case ID UKSC 2010/0102, 25 Apr 2012)

[4] *As for any sales that may be entered into in a place where tobacco products are offered for sale, the purpose of section 1 is to discourage transactions in such products by preventing them from being displayed and, by this means, their availability for sale from being advertised. The terms and conditions of any sale that may take place are unaffected, as are any other aspects of the transaction that may need to be regulated to ensure that the consumer is not exposed to a method of trading that is unfair.* (Case ID UKSC 2012/0066, 12 Dec 2012)

I believe that there is not much dialogue involved in these examples if we consider the fact that the antagonist is absent. Consequently, the interactional aspect is not that evident, although some 'nuances' of the justice's stance are still noticed, under careful estimation of the situation. As already mentioned, the protagonist considers extra-linguistic factors before putting forward his or her arguments.

The uses of hedges *may* and *might* above are clearly different from the use of *might* in example [5] below (it follows example [3] in the same text), in which case it has been used to express the justice's attitude to a possible action that can be undertaken in the future in order to resolve the divergences. Interestingly, the context of this example allows us to notice also an affectionate and personal (or maybe professional) attitude (from the justice) to the issue in question.

[5] *This litigation has been pursued in a friendly spirit and it is to be hoped that it might be resolved in similar vein.* (Case ID UKSC 2010/0102, 25 Apr 2012)

The following and last part of the paper investigates some additional examples on the use of both hedges and boosters extracted from LAC and analyses these items in the light of the supporting theoretical framework embraced in this paper: evaluation and interaction in legal argumentative discourse by means of stance markers.

#### 3.1 Epistemic hedges

Epistemic attitude markers such as hedges like *may*, *might* or *could*, which 'tone down' or 'mitigate' the utterance proposition (Fløttum - Dahl, 2012, p. 19), serve in legal argumentative discourse to convey the protagonist's (in our case either the justice's or the court's) stance on a certain argued issue. By using them the protagonist withholds from full commitment to the argued issue. The following three examples help us to illustrate this point better.

In example [6] the protagonist puts forward both his standpoint on the appropriateness of taking a measure

<sup>84</sup> The corpus is called Legal Argumentative Corpus (hereafter LAC).

<sup>85</sup> Downloaded from The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom website (Decided cases).  
<http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/decided-cases/index.html>

in order to achieve the aim<sup>86</sup> and forwards his stance, conveyed by means of *may*, which implicitly expresses his or her attempt to interact with the absent antagonist. This follows the organization of his or her argumentation in a way that fits and is suitable to the already evaluated context.

[6] *A measure **may** be appropriate to achieving the aim but go further than is (reasonably) necessary in order to do so and thus be disproportionate.* (Case ID UKSC 2010/0102, 25 Apr 2012)

*Might* in example [7] also conveys the justice's hesitation to make a firm assertion and at the same time conveys his or her standpoint on the purpose of section 1. Again it is noted the interactional aspect of his discourse in the light of what has been evaluated as potential action in the future, that of rendering tobacco products less visible to consumers.

[7] *The purpose of section 1 is to enable the Scottish Ministers to take steps which **might** render tobacco products less visible to potential consumers, and thereby achieve a reduction in sales.* (Case ID UKSC 2012/0066, 12 Dec 2012)

The combination of extralinguistic factors (evaluation and interaction), highlighted in the two previous examples, becomes more evident if we consider the organization of the overall context and the coherence that several devices establish in it. For instance, in the following example there is silent and implicit verbal interaction with the antagonist but also textual interaction among epistemic attitude markers conveying the justice's stance.

[8] *Action under any of these powers **would result** in a claim for compensation, but not necessarily of the same order. The choice between the options **would no doubt** involve a range of planning and other issues, but it would be curious if comparative cost **could not** be at least one factor in the overall balance.* (Case ID UKSC 2010/0189, 18 Jul 2012)

*Would result* and *would no doubt* are two boosters<sup>87</sup>, which involve the antagonist in the argumentative process and at the same time put forward the justice's stance to be evaluated and accepted or rejected. While these uses 'guarantee' certainty for the expressed propositional contents respectively, the use of the hedge *could not* conveys the possibility that the comparative cost will be the only factor in the overall balance. The use of the hedge comes right after the use of the two boosters and in relation to them. After all, discourse is unified and organized because of the interaction between the devices and between the protagonist and the antagonist.

I also noticed some more specific uses of hedges in LAC, one of which was their frequent use with verbs in passive structures<sup>88</sup>, as shown in examples [9] and [10] below (*may be found* and *could have been solved*). This is not surprising or unexpected, since such uses are common in legal argumentative discourse. However, combinations of hedges and passive structures probably further impersonalize the propositional

contents of the text. In these cases the justice evaluates the context and interacts with the antagonist by adding additional elements to defend his or her stance and to impose in some way this stance to him or her. In example [9] the protagonist observes that it is not certain if the clearest indication of its purpose will be found and in [10] that it was possible to solve the problem, both of which do not mention the agents performing the actions. Such uses could well be object of study for future research.

[9] *As Lord Rodger said in that case at para 75, the clearest indication of its purpose **may be found** in a report that gave rise to the legislation or in a report from one of the committees of the Parliament.* (Case ID UKSC 2012/0066, 12 Dec 2012)

[10] *This problem **could have been solved** by making arrangements for people appointed before the new criterion was introduced.* (Case ID UKSC 2010/0102, 25 Apr 2012)

Another interesting use is still the combination of hedges with other items, and in this case with their own negative forms, such as in the case of *may* and *may not*<sup>89</sup> in the following example. The negative form clearly reinforces the use of *may* and the justice's stance after evaluating the context, namely that it is possible that existing staff might not be motivated by the opportunity of career progression. It seems that such uses, along with others, as it was the case of *may seem* in example [1] above, convey a more 'reinforced' epistemic attitude to the content.

[11] *When it comes to considering proportionality, however, it is necessary to distinguish the aim of recruitment from the aim of retention. It is also necessary to distinguish the aim of retaining newly or recently recruited staff, who stand to benefit from the opportunity of career progression, and the aim of retaining existing staff, who were recruited under a different system, and who **may** or **may not** be motivated to stay by such an incentive.* (Case ID UKSC 2010/0102, 25 Apr 2012)

These were only a few examples extracted from LAC and they were restricted only to three modal verbs (*may*, *might* and *could*). The analysis in this section of the paper helps to better understand the role and function of hedges, as important lexical items in judgments. However, it must be said that LAC is relatively rich with similar hedges, two of which (*we cannot be clear* and *it is possible*) are brought in example [12], but, as it was said, are not intended to be discussed further in this work.

[12] ***We cannot be clear** that if they had asked the right questions they would have reached the same conclusion, although it is possible that they would have done so.* (Case ID UKSC 2010/0102, 25 Apr 2012)

### 3.2 Epistemic boosters

Boosters, as linguistic items which allow discourse participants "to express their certainty in what they say and to mark involvement with the topic and solidarity with their audience" (Hyland, 2005, p. 179), also play an

86 The aim is to make it easier to recruit young people, which is stated in a larger context and not possible to be included here owing to the limited space.

87 Some of those multi-word linguistic devices not dealt with in this paper.

88 Their frequency slightly exceeded the 20 % of the overall used hedges in LAC.

89 Although there were only two instances found for such uses, (both with *may* or *may not*), it is significant the fact that they come from two different text judgments (Case ID UKSC 2010/0189, 18 Jul 2012 and Case ID UKSC 2010/0102, 25 Apr 2012), and thus not necessarily from the same protagonist.

important role in the structure and organization of legal argumentative discourse. Despite their low frequency occurrence in LAC boosters were found to be economical means of marking the justice's standpoint or stance.

The function of *of course* and *clearly* in the following examples is twofold. First, they assist the protagonist to make assertions in relation to previously evaluated issues and as part of his or her stance, and second establish an interactive relationship between the justice and the antagonist.

[13] *I accept of course the ordinary presumption that Parliament is taken as using the same words in the same sense.* (Case ID UKSC 2011/0189, 18 Jul 2012)

[14] *The distinction can clearly be seen from the different view of Judge Dennis, who dissented on this part of the case.* (Case ID UKSC 2011/0247, 17 Aug 2012)

Furthermore, *of course* is combined with the attitude marker *accept* and conveys in a more convincing way the protagonist's stance on the assumption that the Parliament is using the same words in the same sense. *Clearly* is a powerful stance marker as well, and in the present context it allows the justice to firmly express his or her standpoint, namely one's ability<sup>90</sup> (in this case probably his or hers) to reject Judge Dennis' position. Boosters such as the one analyzed here serve also to organize the legal argumentative discourse coherently in an attempt to maintain the interaction between participants still 'open'.

The flexibility of using boosters in some other different positions in discourse and not in a fixed one (such as were the cases with the hedges above) allows the protagonist to include in his or her stance more elements of the estimated situation. For instance *certainly* in example [15] conveys the judgment's assurance of the refusal being rational, namely it applies to a whole utterance rather than parts of it<sup>91</sup>. Therefore, their use in legal argumentative discourse is made on some reasonable basis. The justice evaluates the metalinguistic context and attempts to interact with the antagonist by putting forward not 'empty' utterances but specific stances.

[15] *I do not need to decide whether this is correct since the impact on the interested party coupled with the*

90 Note that *clearly* is used along with *can* and in a passive structure (*can clearly be seen*).

91 Analyzed hedges in this paper have a limited range of operation, mainly for the action or state that the verb expresses.

*completion of three of the four blocks and the reasonable view that the HSE's failure to take immediate action shows that the risk could not be regarded as immediate entirely justifies a refusal to revoke or modify. Certainly, the refusal cannot be regarded as irrational.* (Case ID UKSC 2011/0189, 18 Jul 2012)

As in the case of hedges, boosters do represent one important stance marker in legal argumentative discourse and in this paper I briefly analyzed only some of them. However, there are others to be found in LAC and as important as the adverbials included here, but which have been left out because of the restricted scope of the paper. One in particular, which could well be analyzed in future works is *will*, illustrated in the example [16].

[16] *The purpose of the offences that these sections create, as I have said, is to discourage or eliminate the sale or supply of tobacco products or smoking materials. If this purpose is realised, that will be their effect.* (Case ID UKSC 2012/0066, 12 Dec 2012)

### Final remarks

In this article I attempted to show that epistemic linguistic devices such as hedges and boosters can function as stance markers in judgments. Although the number of these items analyzed here was limited and the discussion rather short, some relevant issues concerning their role in legal argumentative discourse were carefully considered. Hedges and boosters can express the evidentiality component of justice's stances in the argumentative process. This comes as a result of the justice's estimation of (meta)linguistic aspects as well as the present context, but at the same time as a necessity to be involved in an interactional process with the antagonist (although always missing or inexistent in judgments). Thus, hedges, which assist the justice to express partial commitment to what is said, and boosters, which help the justice to assert something, can express epistemic attitude in legal argumentation regarded as an important aspect of the evaluation-interaction-stance process. Furthermore, they function as items which organize and structure judgments, since they establish coherent relations between parts of it, interact with other linguistic items in discourse and transmit metalinguistic features with supplementary value. Hedges and boosters are used by justices in judgments in response to other past, present or future standpoints and stances. Despite these useful preliminary observations, I am certain that this study has been unable to answer many questions, but at the same time I am confident that future works will have more to say about hedges and boosters in legal argumentative discourse. This is, of course, my *stance*!

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## **Vedecké projekty/Research Projects**

# The Current Status and Future Prospects of IT Terminology in Kyrgyzstan

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## Status of IT terminology in Kyrgyzstan

Over the last two decades the Kyrgyz Republic has achieved considerable progress in the developing of information infrastructure and the informatization of state organizations and private companies. The computer's capabilities to understand the world are catching up and surpassing the humanity.

Such an advanced level of technological globalization has necessitated the development of a special language or special terminology that serves this field. The terms of this field are ahead of the special lexicons of other scientific fields in many ways, because they are noticeable in terms of rapidly spreading among different social groups of all ages. The main difficulty of computer terminology research and its description is in the process of innovative changes, especially if the increasing dynamics of technological processes and accompanying language-notion formation are taken into consideration. Computer terminology, since the appearance of the personal computer, is no longer strictly part of a special language, as it is sometimes thought to be. Today, the computer is found in the form of diverse, innovative and technological gadgets that surround us in everyday life. As a result, within the framework of specialist and general languages occur active processes of interchange between commonly used words and terms. Special terms related to computer technologies in the 20th century, which were formed exclusively by professionals, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century have undergone the influence of non-professional masses, representatives of different professions or just common users, which has led to the simplification of language (a global tendency) and nuances in the expressing of new concepts and their notions. For example, "computer", "web", "Internet", "webinar", "tool", "format", "message", etc. Such a situation is being experienced by Kyrgyz terminology too.

## Linguistic and extra-linguistic problems in the translation of specialist vocabulary

We made the first attempts to translate Windows 7 (2010) and Office 2010 (2011) only two years ago in cooperation with the Microsoft Corporation's official representative in Russia, Logrus International. During the work on the translation I faced the following linguistic difficulties:

- A lack of words in our larger and smaller modern dictionaries; the general character of our Kyrgyz-Russian and Russian-Kyrgyz dictionary; and an absence of terminological dictionaries on information science from English into Kyrgyz at all;
- a lack of scientifically based basic principles in the forming of computer terms;
- the ungoverned dissemination of computer terminology into society (a global tendency);
- indistinct definitions of many concepts (in different modern mini-dictionaries, often given different translations & definitions);
- the implementation of English words and constructions without taking into account their regional peculiarities, because of a lack of terms in our native language;
- The main extra-linguistic factors of assimilation of English borrowings into the Kyrgyz language are the following:
  - The rapid growth of Internet resources and their global usage;
  - English language's status as an international language of policy, science & technology;
  - English language as the original language of computer technology and language of creation of most software products and accompanying instructions;
  - dissemination of information through Internet resources;
  - These and other factors influenced the arrival of English borrowings into the Kyrgyz language.

## Lexical Peculiarities and Methods of IT-term translation

The concept "term" is used to denote special objects and notions of particular scientific, technological and other fields and differs from other words in its monosemanticity, brevity, systematicness, simplicity, independence from context, and an absence of synonyms and homonyms. IT jargon is a special language, which is used as written and oral communication of a group of people, united in the sphere of their activity, especially in the sphere of information technology.

The considered terms consist of 338 units, which are frequently used in emailing Windows Live terminology.

**The translation of computer terms** is a lexical process, which can be formed on the basis of existing words, word combinations or sentences of the source and target languages. Some scientific and technical terms are formed via a process of *transliteration* by adapting the phonological structure of the loanword to the sound system of the borrowing language. Transliteration is a way of translation and terms-formation, where the forms and content of translating and translated languages are identical. About 15% of terms were formed by the transliteration method of translation. For ex, microprocessor-микрпроцессор, macroinstruction-макрокоманда, archive-архив, audio-аудио, activation-активация, certificate-сертификат, antivirus-антивирус, port-порт, clip-клип, buffer-буфер, modem-модем and others.

As a result of the abovementioned extra-linguistic factors, most users apply English terms, instead of Kyrgyz translations. For example, computer – компьютер, instead of 'эсептөөчү машина', 'format – форматтоо' instead of 'файлды калыптоо' &etc.



The reasons for the structural identity of meaning of many terms in the English and Kyrgyz languages (Windows Live terminology) is word-formation **calking**. It comprises over 77 % of the considered terms. Most terms-calques, which are created on the basis of Greek-Latin roots, bring monosemanticity, providing integration of a terminological system in the English and Kyrgyz languages and stipulating the international character of computer science. Forming new terms with the help of calking is one of the features reflecting language policy, in order to save Kyrgyz language purity and prevent unnecessary borrowings. Terms-calques are created in order to avoid the direct borrowing of foreign words; for example: start screen-баштоо экраны, people-байланыштар, onboard-платада орнотулган, network-жепе, account -каттоо жазуу and etc.

Descriptive or explicit translation was another method used in the translation of computer terms (8%). This is a process of translation where a lexeme of the translated language is substituted by two or more lexemes or word combinations of the target language in order to give a detailed explanation. We used this way of translation in terms that have no equivalents in the Kyrgyz language; for example, escape- бир коддон экинчисине өтүү, instant message- көз ирмемде жөнөтүлүүчү билдирүү, print screen- экран сүрөтүн басып чыгаруу and etc. Analyzing translation methods, we received the following result:




Figure 1. / Picture 1. / Chart 1.

### Word-formation as an enriching facet of language

There are many types of word formation in the English and Kyrgyz languages.

The Kyrgyz language refers to an agglutinative group of language, and words can generally be created by affixation and non-affixation methods and by the formation of compound words. According to Laurie Bayer: "word-formation can be subdivided into derivation and compounding (or composition). Derivation is concerned with the formation of new lexemes by affixation (prefix and suffix), compounding with the formation of new lexemes from two (or more) potential stems (compounds or composition)."<sup>92</sup> Affixation is peculiar to both languages. "Affixations in the Kyrgyz language not only change the phonological features but also the lexical meaning of the word; that is, they have word-formation features. New lexical meaning forms a new word."<sup>93</sup>

Prefixation is not common in the Kyrgyz language, and that's why it is used only in loanwords borrowed from English, Greek and Latin: auto-, (autocollage - авто комбинациялоо, auto fit - авто батыруу, autoformat - авто форматтоо and etc.); kilo-, (kilo byte - килобайт) macro/micro-, (macromedia - макромедиа, microassembler-микро чогултуучу, microcell - микро элемент, macrocode - макро код); mega-, (megapixel - мега пиксел, megahertz - мега герц, megacomputer - мега компьютер, megabyte - мегабит, megacell - мерасота & etc); meta- (metadata - мета берилмелер); multi- (multimedia - мультимедиа); - super-(supercell - супер элемент, super computer - супер компьютер) and others.

Inflection is another means of word-formation, "which produces from the stem (or stems) of a given lexeme all the word-forms of that lexeme which occur in syntactically determined environments."<sup>94</sup> Inflection affects verb tense (e.g., to run-running/жүргүзүү-жүргүзүүдө, to process-processing/иштетүү-иштетүүдө, to download-downloaded/жүктөө-жүктөлгөн), plurality of noun (e.g., recipient, recipients), comparison of adjectives (e.g., large, larger, largest), and possession (e.g., Microsoft's products).

Derivational suffixes create from one part of speech another part of speech. As we mentioned before, the most productive form of word-formation in the English and Kyrgyz languages is suffixation. In the Windows Live terminology most nouns have a nominative character. In the following examples we can see that the most frequently used parts of speech are nouns, then verbs forming suffixes.

Noun-forming suffixes:

English: -tion, -er, -ion -ty, For ex. to connect -connection, to defend - defender, install-installation, proper-property; Kyrgyz: -лык; -уу, -ла -чы, -кер, -ма, -кыч, -поз, -стан, -тай, -ча, -чык, -стан, -үү, & others. For ex. шайкеш - шайкештиги, туташ - туташуу, аткар - аткаруучу, текшер - текшерүү, көр - көргөзмө, бас-баскыч and etc.

Verb-forming suffixes:

English: mail- to mail, name- to name, pin-to pin, point- to point;

Kyrgyz: -ла, -ар, -лан, -лаш, -сыра, -ык, -ал, -ар, -сы, -сын, -гансы, -гыла, -лык ж.б. сертификат-сертификаттоо, формат-форматтоо, чынжыр -чынжырлоо.

Adjective-forming suffixes:

English: -al, -ed, -ive, ex. function-functional, flag-flagged, interact-interactive;

Kyrgyz: -ган, -лык, -лүү, -ган, -сыз and others, ex. желек-желекче коюлган, интерактив-интерактивдүү, чен-ченелген, үн-үнсүз.

Conversion is one of the word-formation methods used in computer-terminology translation in the Kyrgyz language. Conversions accomplish the change of a word from one part of speech to another without the addition of any

92 Laurie Bayer (1983) English word-formation, Cambridge University Press. p.33

93 Akunova A.R. Chokosheva B. Eshimbekova G (2009) Azyrky Kyrgyz tili. (Modern Kyrgyz language) Morphology. G.J trans. 150 p.

94 Laurie Bauer (1983) English word-formation, Cambridge University Press. p.22

affixes (i.e., prefixes or suffixes).<sup>95</sup> Conversion is frequently called zero-derivation. According to Adams: "The common and interesting functions of the zero-suffixes are to make new verbs from nouns and adjectives, and new nouns from verbs. Verbs are also formed, rarely, from words of other classes in this manner, and there are few zero-derived nouns from particle and verb phrases"<sup>96</sup>. This form of word-formation was also one of the ways of solving terms-formation in our work. But in this work most conversions are made up of nouns from verbs, e.g., to call- a call чалуу-чалуу, to access – an access - мүмкүндүк алуу-мүмкүндүк алуу. To connect –a connection – туташуу-туташуу, to download-a download – жүктөө-жүктөө, to install –an installation –орнотуу-орнотуу, to search- a seach – издөө- издөө and etc.

Compound words, or composition (the process of putting two words together to form a third), are one of the basic methods of computer-term formation, because there are many new concepts which are new for any language. "A compound word may be characterized, unlike a word group, by its inseparability, i.e. it cannot be interrupted by another word; its semantic unity; its unity of morphological and syntactic functioning; and certain phonetical and graphic features."<sup>97</sup> In our terminology there are over 60 compounds. It proves that it is a basic way out of a modern linguistic problem, when languages have no equivalent, adequate translation or variants; for example, handwriting - кол жазма; image stabilization - сүрөттү стабилизациялоо, jump list - ыкчам мүмкүндүк алуу тизмеси, keyboard- баскычтоп, keyword- ачкыч сөз, password-жашыруун сөз, preview –алдын ала карап чыгуу, sign in - катталып кирүү, sign out-каттоодон чыгуу, smartscreen-интеллектуалдык экран, to-do-аткарылуучу иш, on-line –он-лайн, off-line-оф-лайн (автономдуу).

Basically, in computer-terms formation compounds have the following models:

[N+V];[N+N]; [Adj+N];[ Adj+N+V+N] [V+N]; [V+V],[ Particle + N].

From all the models used in English and Kyrgyz, the most frequent are: [N+V],[N+N], [V+V].

### Conclusion

Studying the lexical and semantic peculiarities and methods of IT terms' translation, their linguistic and extra-linguistic aspects and the word-formation methods of computer borrowings on the basis of "Windows live terminology" has enabled us to confirm that computer terminology research in the Kyrgyz language is incomplete and it is at an early stage of formation and development. To solve these linguistic problems, we used various methods of translation and formation of new terms from existing words by affixation, non-affixation and compounding processes.

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95 Dale D. Jonson (2011) Words : the foundation of literacy / Dale D. Johnson, Bonnie Johnson. Westview Press, A Member of the Perseus Books Group. p.53

96 Valerie Adams (1973) Modern English Word-formation. Longman Ltd. New York.p.38

97 Pavol Kvetko (1996) English lexicology. Bratislava, Pedagogicka fakulta university Komenskeho. P.42

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
## **Recenzie/Reviews**

## Colloquial Slovak. The Complete Course for Beginners

(James Naughton: Colloquial Slovak. The Complete Course for Beginners

London and New York: Routledge 2012 (355 p.) ISBN 978-0-415-49634-6)

Review by Gabriela Miššíková, Constantine the Philosopher University n Nitra, Slovakia



James Naughton: Colloquial Slovak. The Complete Course for Beginners  
London and New York: Routledge 2012 (355 p.) ISBN 978-0-415-49634-6

The second edition of Colloquial Slovak by James Naughton, university lecturer in Czech and Slovak at Oxford University, comes over ten years after the first publication of the book. The typesetting of a second edition has given the author an opportunity to carry out efficient updating of items such as the currency (the introduction of the euro), and reflect modern patterns of life (email, mobile phones, computers, etc.). A number of exercises have been added, grammar presentations reviewed and minor errors spotted in the first edition of the book eliminated.

The course is designed both for classroom use and for learners working on their own, without much extra help. The book contains sixteen units divided into several smaller sections, allowing learners to proceed at their own pace. The units aim to take learners up to a level at which they can communicate usefully on a range of everyday topics and begin to read books, magazines and newspapers and follow the media. They combine everyday dialogues and simple narrative texts with explanations of individual language points, aiming to outline the most essential structures. The book is accompanied by a new set of recordings which will be appreciated mainly by the learners working on

their own without any teacher or native speaker to help.

Colloquial Slovak is easy to use and completely up to date. Specifically written by an experienced teacher, the course offers a step-by-step approach to written and spoken Slovak. No prior knowledge of the language is required. The new edition of Colloquial Slovak is a brilliant course book, highly interactive, offering exercises for regular practice, concise grammar notes, useful vocabulary and pronunciation guide as well as a complete answer key and reference section.

This rewarding course will be of great interest equally to professionals traveling on business as well as adventure tourists, taking them from complete beginners to confidentially putting their language skills to use in a wide range of everyday situations.

The book comes with two CDs providing a complete pronunciation guide and recordings of all sixteen units. Recorded by native speakers, the audio material completes the book and will help develop listening and pronunciation skills. Audio materials can be also purchased separately on two CDs or in MP3 format.

Colloquial Slovak is an exciting well-prepared course book, specially written by an experienced teacher to meet the needs of a wide variety of learners with more or less specific goals and motivation for study. It is equally rewarding and efficient – undoubtedly, the best choice in personal language learning.

Gabriela Miššíková



About the author of "Colloquial Slovak: The Complete Course for Beginners"

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