Logophoricity in discourse

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Abstract

This paper deals with the notion of logophoricity as a phenomenon pertaining to discourse, not grammar. An examination of the discourse role configurations (discourse environments) proposed by Peter Sells has shown that particular configurations are either overloaded by role-multiplication or non-specific. Instead of discourse environments, a general pragmatic matrix (a non-overt abstract sentence) is suggested, anchoring any utterance event to the current speaker's perspective, including his/her communicative activity and temporal and spatial location. The role of the pragmatic matrix shows that all utterance events can be considered logophoric. At the same time, the pragmatic matrix underlines specific properties of explicit performative formulae.

Key words

1. Introduction

1.1 This paper[1] explores the notion of logophoricity as a discourse phenomenon occurring not only in languages of a certain type but as a feature pertaining to verbal communication as such. First, the original concept of logophoricity is presented in brief, followed by its relations to other linguistic issues. Afterwards, an overview of the discourse environments proposed by Sells (1987) is provided. As its result, I propose a re-assessment of logophoricity in terms of linguistic pragmatics, considering it (also) as a pragmalinguistic phenomenon reflecting the properties of utterance events (discourse as language use, cf. Mey, 2009; Huang, 2000), marking a difference between performative vs non-performative utterances.

1.2 The notion of logophoricity was first introduced as a typological feature of certain African languages, differentiating regular pronouns from pronouns with special distribution (Hagège, 1974). Originally, logophoricity described the difference between a group of (African and Asian) languages where such a pronoun, a logophoric marker, is available, and a group of languages where it is not. The so-called logophoric marker is typically a specific pronoun (subject of a complement clause) occurring in clauses embedded under matrix clauses with predicates that convey information. It refers anaphorically to a co-referential subject (its logophoric antecedent) of a matrix clause (1). In embedded clauses where the subject is not co-referential with the subject of the matrix clause, a regular pronoun occurs (2). Most frequently, this kind of marking concerns subjects/pronouns in the third person, e.g. in the African language Mupun:

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(1) *Wa sat n ʒ ta de dee n-jos*
   She say COMP stop LOG stay PREP-Jos
   'She[i] said that she[i] stopped over at Jos.'

(2) *Wa sat n ʒ wa ta dee n-jos*
   She say COMP she stay PREP-Jos
   'She[i] said that she[j] stopped over at Jos.'

In other languages (e.g., Tuburi), the logophoric antecedent can also be another, non-subject argument:

(3) *P ɔl laa jág   Ja ŋ   gá s ʒ l ʒ´ɛ*
   Paul heard from John that LOG fell
   'Paul[i] heard from John[j] that he[j] fell.'

(Examples (1) – (3) are from Siewierska, 2004, pp. 201-204.)

In (1), the subjects of both the matrix and complement clauses are co-referential; therefore, in the complement clause, the logophoric pronoun (marker) is used. In (2), the subject of the complement clause is different from that of the matrix clause, and there is no co-reference; therefore, an unmarked pronoun occurs. In (3), the logophoric expression marks the co-reference of the subject of the complement clause and the indirect object of the matrix clause. (As for the concept of co-reference, cf., e.g. Chomsky 1982; Hajičová et al., 1985-87; Levinson 2000; Huang, 1994-2007, 2013; Panevová et al., 2014). Logophoric markers function as anaphoric substitutes for their logophoric antecedents in discourses reporting speech, thoughts or perceptions. Originally, only logophoric pronouns in the third person were observed (morphologically distinct from non-logophoric ones), with a distribution limited to the type of constellations shown in (1) and (3). Further studies (Huang, 2000, 2000, 2013) have shown that in some African and East and South Asian languages, logophoric markers can refer to the addressee also, and they occur in the form of verbal affixes or clitics. For a detailed overview, see Huang (2013, pp. 219-220). Logophoric markers typically appear in complement clauses following matrix clauses containing verbs that convey information or verbs that deal with information mentally. These verbs are called logophoric predicates; their complements represent what is termed the logophoric domain. According to Stirling (1993, p. 259), logophoric markers (in languages that use/allow them) most frequently follow logophoric predicates in the following hierarchy:

(4) verbs of communication > verbs of thought > verbs of mental processes > verbs of perception.

Logophoric markers, then, occur in propositional complements of matrix clauses with verbs such as

(5) *S/he says / thinks / is afraid / feels / has heard that* (p).

Huang (2007, p. 185) calls such verbs "logocentric triggers."

1.3 Obviously, the semantics of the groups of verbs in question relate logophoricity both to the attitudinal predicates, especially to epistemic ones (*know, think, assume*), and through them to another (pragma)linguistic phenomenon: evidentiality (in languages expressing the means by which the speaker has acquired the information s/he is conveying not by evidential morphemes but lexically). Evidentiality and logophoricity appear to be interconnected mainly in the areas of hearsay (*he said, I have heard from …*) and evidentials based on perception (*he can see, he has heard*); cf. Speas, 2004; Huang, 2013. Additionally, the argument co-reference and/or switch reference relates logophoric markers to the investigation of anaphora (cf. Stirling, 1993; Huang, 2007). The issues of evidentiality and anaphoric reference will not be dealt with in this paper, nor will I tackle the problems concerning variations of discourse definitions.

1.4 Even though the use of logophoric markers (if they are pronominals) can be analysed purely in terms of syntax (Koopman & Sportiche, 1989), it has also been noted (Culy, 2002) that in some languages

their use is not obligatory; on the contrary, it may depend on the speaker's intention to disambiguate the potential argument (co)-reference. Viewed from this angle, logophoricity appears to be not just a specific grammatical feature related to the anaphoric function of some expressions but an instance of the borderline between grammar and pragmatics: logophoric markers can reflect extra-linguistic differences and, moreover, their use can depend on the speaker's decision, i.e. on his/her communicative goal.

1.5 Most European languages do not exhibit specific means of expression classifiable as logophoric markers, with some exceptions. In Latin, what may be termed the "logophoric use" of reflexive pronouns ("indirect reflexivization") has been observed; e.g. *Cicero dixit eum sibi maledixisse* = 'Cicero$_i$ said that he$_j$ (*eum*) insulted him$_i$ (*sibi*)', cf. Clements 1975, p. 142. A similar role of reflexives correlated with subjunctive mood in embedded clauses following the matrix sentences with nonfactive verbs of saying or propositional attitude has been described in Icelandic; e.g. *Jón upplýsti hver hefði barið sig* = 'Jón$_i$ revealed who had hit him$_i$ (refl)', cf. Thráinsson 1976, Mailing 1984, p. 212. In Bulgarian (and in Macedonian) the so-called "vid na izkazvaneto" (mode of re-renarration) occurs, a verbal form used in reproducing other speakers' utterances, i.e. conveying an additional epistemic meaning; e.g. 3rd person singular (*toj*) *piše* = '(he) writes' (indicative) × (*toj*) *pišel* = '(he) is said to write' (re-narration). In older grammars, this form is considered a mood, cf. Scatton, 1984, pp. 331-338; in newer grammar writings, it is presented as a parallel verbal form of all tenses, cf. Kucarov, 2007, pp. 304-322. In sentential complements of matrix clauses with the above-mentioned verbs, European languages use regular pronouns (consequently, the referential value of anaphoric expressions in analogical clauses is potentially ambiguous). Nevertheless, the pragmalinguistic phenomenon of conveying another person's words/perspective exists in any language. Utterances expressing such content thus become logophoric ("logo-phoric" in a pragmalinguistic sense, see 3.3 below), as do the pronouns referring to agents, holders or experiencers of the information that is transferred, even though their form is identical to pronouns in other surroundings. (In what are termed *pro-drop* languages, the logophoric marker in embedded clauses can occur as a *pro*.)

2. Logophoricity and the interaction of discourse roles

2.1 In his 1987 study, Sells proposed that "there is no unified notion of logophoricity" (1987, pp. 445). Instead, he related logophoricity to predicates of propositional attitudes and suggested that it should be accounted for as a result of an interaction of primitive discourse roles/properties: a SOURCE – one who is the intentional agent of the communication; a SELF – one whose mental state or attitude the content of the proposition describes; and a PIVOT – one with respect to whose (space-time) location the content of the proposition is evaluated. (Sells stresses that presenting a being as a PIVOT is not a matter of empathy; in his paper, no detailed specification of the space-time location is given, however.) Logophoric pronouns are always linked to a noun expression (NP) by virtue of the fact that the NP is associated with a particular role. The interaction of the three roles creates four basic types of discourse environments with respect to whether each role is predicated on a sentence-internal referent or on an external speaker. The core logophoricity is seen in a role constellation when the speaker identifies with the communicating being of the internal protagonist. That, according to Sells, means that the SOURCE becomes internal; following this, the SELF and the PIVOT must be internal, too. Such a concept of discourse environments is broader than the traditional notion of "reported speech" because it also covers information that need not be explicitly uttered (Sells, 1987, pp. 456-457).

2.2 The combinations of role specifications together with some other features create the distinctive discourse environments shown in (6):

(6) Table of discourse environments (cf. Sells, ibid., p. 456):

	Direct speech	3rd person point of view (3POV)	Psych-verb	"Logophoric" verb
SOURCE	external	external	external	internal
SELF	external	external	internal	internal
PIVOT	external	internal	internal	internal

The term "psych-verb" denotes verbs of mental processes in general (including epistemic predicates and verbs denoting emotional experience and perception); "logophoric verbs" are verbs of communication.

Sells's article does not present a detailed interpretation of particular environments based on exemplification of particular role combinations; therefore, certain facts have to be extrapolated from the text of his article. The easiest way to go through the table (6) is to start with the typical logophoric verb *say*. In the sentence

(7) *Max_i said that Louise loved him_i*

the external speaker reports what *Max* said, i.e. *Max* is the internal SOURCE, the SELF, and the PIVOT of the matrix sentence, as well as the PIVOT of the complement clause.

The discourse environment created by psych-verbs is illustrated by construction (8) (Sells's example (41)):

(8) *That Louise ignored him_i, distressed Max_i.*

Here the SOURCE is the external speaker; *Max* performs the roles of the SELF and PIVOT. Neither in (7) nor in (8) is *Louise* assigned a discourse role.

As for the 3POV configuration, Sells's description on p. 258 is rather vague; a plausible example is provided on p. 463 as (48). The main feature of 3POV, differentiating it from other constellations, is that the dependent/embedded clause is often supposed to be adverbial. Below, I repeat Sells's example (only its English translation) as (9):

(9) *Taroo_i got wet because that fool Yosiko spilled water on him_i.*

The external speaker is the SOURCE and the SELF of the whole sentential unit, while the internal protagonist of both the matrix and of the adverbial clause *Taroo* is the PIVOT. (For further discussion concerning the evaluation of *that fool* ascribed to *Yosiko*, see 3.3.1.) Similarly, my variation of (8), shown here as (10), exhibits the same characteristics:

(10) *Max_i was distressed because Louise ignored him_i.*

2.3 In Sells's article, no description or example of the environment "direct speech" is given. I nonetheless dare to assume that it need not be a clause distinguished by quotation marks preceded or followed by a reporting sentence (in grammars, direct speech is usually presented as a verbatim quotation of a person's speech in contrast with indirect speech, e.g., cf. Leech and Svartvik, 1975, pp. 149-152; e.g. *"Here is our taxi," she said* vs. *She said that our taxi was here*). As a specific discourse role constellation (if I follow Sells's terminology here), direct speech should be just any utterance in which the speaker talks about him/herself or on his/her own behalf. The external speaker functions not only as the SOURCE and the SELF but also as the PIVOT, i.e. these discourse roles coincide:

(11) *I am leaving tomorrow;*

or

(12) *I did like the movie.*

(As for constellations such as, e.g. *He said that I would be leaving tomorrow,* where multiplying of roles occurs, see par. 3.3 below.)

In constellations like (13), where another person is spoken about, this participant should be considered the PIVOT, i.e., (13) should be listed as a 3POV. But, since the content is related to the external speaker by an overt expression (first person possessive pronoun), the constellation suggests that the role distribution is not identical to (14) and (15), typical 3POVs, where no element expressing the relation to the external speaker occurs:

(13) *Mary did not come to my party;*
(14) *Max is leaving tomorrow;*
(15) *Mary did not come to the party.*

As for (13), the type of discourse environment being represented is uncertain. The expressed relation to the external speaker (the presence of 1st person possessive pronoun *my*) suggests that his/her role (perspective) is more prominent than in (14) and (15). The speaker of (14) and (15) is external. *Max* and *Mary* can be considered internal PIVOTS, because both examples talk about them, and at least their temporal location (very general in [15]) is mentioned, but which entity can be considered a SELF? In 3POV environments, a SELF is supposed to be external, but neither (14) nor (15) describe a mental state or attitude of a speaking individual except for the fact that they communicate information held by their external speaker. Can the difference between (13) on the one hand, and (14) and (15) on the other, suggest that there can be more types of discourse environments? Other suggestions concerning the network of discourse environments will be discussed in Section 3.

3. Further discussion

3.1 Sells's outline of the four environments does not seem to provide an exhaustive repertoire of distinctive properties enabling the characteristics of sentences used to convey information to be covered and such properties to be accounted for. In the first place, the linguistic form of the particular environments is not dealt with so, e.g. no specific distinction is drawn between one-clause sentences and complex ones. What is even more striking is that the role of the addressee is not mentioned at all, despite the fact that any utterance/discourse is addressee-oriented. Since these two factors are not taken into account, it is unclear how to classify sentences containing either just a single clause or a complex sentence with a matrix clause in the form of the second person or an expression referring to the addressee, respectively. In some cases, such a constellation appears transparent and easily classifiable:

(16) *You know that you are not obliged to come.*

In (16), the speaker is the external SOURCE, but the roles of the SELF and of the PIVOT are internal. *Know* being a psych-verb (an epistemic predicate), the SELF (the one who *knows*) is supposed to be internal, as is the PIVOT; also, the SELF and the PIVOT are co-referential here. In (16), the addressee fits into the psych-verb discourse environment design. In (17), the roles also follow the psych-verb design:

(17) *You know that Peter/he is not coming.*

The difference between (16) and (17) is the disjoint reference of the SELF and the PIVOT in (17), even though they are both internal. Another constellation occurs with a sub-class of psych-verbs, verbs of perception:

(18) *I saw / noticed you in front of the building.*

In sentences with verbs of perception, if the predicate is in the form of first person singular, the speaker is most probably not only the external SOURCE but the internal SELF, too. The addressee

is in the position of an internal PIVOT. If the addressee is not explicitly mentioned, e.g. if s/he is referred to only by a possessive pronoun (e.g. [18a] *I saw / noticed your car in front of the building*), the PIVOT role is suppressed. Nevertheless, the relation towards the addressee and their role in the discourse is still present in the sentence/utterance – using (18a) in a conversation includes the meaning "if your car was there, I assume you must have been around" (a particularized conversational implicature, cf. Grice, 1975, p. 56).

A distinct constellation, though, emerges in (19):

(19) *You know that I will not be coming.*

The SOURCE is external again; the SELF *you* and the PIVOT *I* (not co-referential with SELF) are internal. However, in (19), the PIVOT is clearly co-referential with the external speaker / SOURCE. Can it simply be listed in the same environment as (16) and (17), or should we consider another variation closer to direct speech? (cf. example [13] above.) Another example:

(20) *You were expected at the party;*

is a single-clause sentence in which the SOURCE is the external speaker, but the SELF and the PIVOT (both the addressee *you*) are not embedded into any overt higher-level predicate. But (20) obviously cannot be a 3POV; at the same time, there is a question whether it might be listed as a direct speech environment because it includes no overt element referring to an external speaker. Nevertheless, regarding the issue of perspectives that are conveyed, the proposition in (20) is presented from the perspective of the external speaker, not from the PIVOT's perspective. As for discourse environment meanings, (20) implies that the speaker is reminding the addressee of information s/he was presumptively told earlier (an invitation to a party), i.e. (20) is information secondarily pointing to a message previously conveyed. The following example also represents a different constellation, with neither an embedded clause nor an overt PIVOT:

(21) *Your order is being processed.*

The SOURCE in (21) is the external speaker, while the other roles are unclear (sentence [21] is a typical line that occurs regularly in communication between an e-shop and a customer). The expressed relation to the addressee's previous speech act (*your order*) implies that (21) is a response to a preceding communication in which the addressee was the SOURCE.

3.2 As mentioned, Sells's article does not provide an explanation as to how the PIVOT's space-time location works, so I will endeavour to elicit it from the cited examples. In sentence (9), repeated here as (22),

(22) *Taroo$_i$ got wet because that fool Yosiko spilled water on him$_i$.*

the space location of the event "spilled water on him" is not mentioned, and without knowledge of the wider context of the utterance it cannot even be guessed at, so it will not be considered here. As for the temporal location, the extra-linguistic experience (together with the causal conjunction) suggests that, in the course of events, "spilling the water" happened before, i.e. its temporal location t preceded the incident of "getting wet": $(t_{spilled + n}) = t_{wet}$; while at the same time being its cause. Both these events precede the temporal location $t_{u(tterance)}$ of the actual 3POV utterance performed by an external speaker. Or, in Reichenbachian (1948) notation (point of event E, point of speech S, reference point R):

$$E_{1=spilled} \qquad E_{2=wet} = R \qquad S_u$$

In verbal description, on the time axis, Event$_1$ caused, i.e. temporally preceded, Event$_2$, which is the reference point R for the point of speech S_u (= the moment when (22) is uttered). The analysis of (22) suggests that from the broader "logo-phoric" point of view, the temporal relations of sentence

propositions expressed in utterances "spoken about" are always related to the temporal position of the external speaker (by the utterance "spoken about" I mean the presence of the evaluation *that fool* – someone obviously had described Yosiko this way before [22] was uttered). I will deal with this in 4.2, ex. (29).

3.3 The role of the external speaker seems more prominent than Sells's article claims. In three of the four discourse environments, the external speaker's presence is posited as obvious; it is only in environments with verbs of speaking (the true logophoric ones) that the role of the person actually uttering the message is suppressed in favour of the agent of the reported speech. The description of the internal SOURCE role (the speaker identifies him/herself with the communicating being of the internal protagonist; see above) cannot mean, though, that the external speaker has ceased to exist. Additionally, it is unclear why the same "identification" cannot be seen in sentences with verbs of mental processes (psych-verbs), where the SOURCE is supposed to be an external speaker:

(23) *Mary is afraid that Peter is not coming.*
(24) *Paul assumes that Mary will be happy if Peter comes.*

If the external speaker can identify him/herself with something another person has said, then there is no reason why his/her report of somebody's feelings or thoughts cannot be considered a result of an analogical identification, since such a report (the ascription of a mental state or an attitude) is most probably based on verbal communication. Consequently, only three discourse environments would be sufficient – constellations with psych-verbs and with logophoric verbs could be unified into a single "internalist" environment. Or, more importantly, a reversed view is possible: if sentences with psych-verbs in their matrix clause are ascribed to an external speaker as the SOURCE of the information, why can it not be the case with verbs of speaking? Semantic differences among the verbs *say, tell, repeat* and *fear, assume, know* undoubtedly exist, but if I say that "*Mary says/said* p," it is the same external speaker "I" who utters the sentence as it is with "*Paul assumes/assumed* p." There is a semantic difference between the sentences

(25) *Peter is sure to come;* (3POV)
(26) *Mary believes that Peter is sure to come;* (Psych-verb environment)
(27) *Mary says that Peter is sure to come.* (Logophoric environment)

But in real communication, there is always an external speaker uttering any of (25) – (27). As for the properties of the SOURCE, the difference between (25) and the other two is pragmatic: in (25), it is the external speaker who is committed to the truth value of the propositional content (s/he can be made responsible for it); in (26) and (27), s/he is committed only to the truthfulness of the matrix clause. Nevertheless, the external speaker is always present, and it is s/he who sets the perspective of the utterance in question, his/her own information or his/her understanding/interpretation of the previous communication being the basis for the way in which the conveyed information is presented. In other words, the speaker's own thinking (the conceived proposition) or his/her interpretation/assessment of the previous communication serves as a foundation of his/her point of view concerning the information which is then, in his/her sentence, "logo-phored"[2] (*logophoric* can be seen as an analogy to *anaphoric* since the Greek *pherein* = "to bear" occurs in both terms). Therefore, (26) and (27) also could appear as

(26a) *Mary does not believe that Peter is sure to come;*
(27a) *Mary lies that Peter is sure to come;*

i.e., conveying a different speaker's assessment.

Examples (26) and (27) show another important property interconnected with logophoricity if we think of it in the framework of discourse environments: in sentences like these, a layering of discourse roles can be observed. In (25), there is only one SOURCE of the information, the external speaker *I*, while in (26) and (27) there is SOURCE$_1$ (I = the external speaker = the current agent of the utterance)

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[2] Phatic communication (mostly lacking propositional content) is different and should be assessed separately.

and SOURCE$_2$, *Mary,* the individual whose speech or mental processes are conveyed. In sentences like (28), roles multiply:

(28) *I assume that Mary will be happy if Peter comes.*

Here, the external speaker is SOURCE$_1$ and SELF$_1$, *Mary* is PIVOT$_1$ (regarding the relation to the external speaker); at the same time, *Mary* is SOURCE$_2$ and SELF$_2$, while *Peter* is PIVOT$_2$.

3.3.1 If the role of the external speaker is adopted and taken into account, Sells's role constellations/environments get rather complicated. The main point is that, for most sentences/utterances, the discourse environment is multi-layered. Variations of discourse roles are hinted at in Sells's article (p. 462). When assessing his example (45) (repeated here as (29); only its English translation):

(29) *Takasi$_i$ told Taroo$_j$ that that fool Yosiko was following him$_{i/j/k}$;*

in a language lacking logophoric markers (like English), the actual anaphorical referential value of *him* in this position (from the syntactic point of view, it can be both *Takasi* and *Taroo*) must be decided in the context of the (29) discourse (as a discourse anaphor, it can be *k*), e.g., by heuristics, based on the neo-Gricean theory of meaning, cf. Levinson, 2000; Huang, 2007. Sells tries to decide who ascribes to *Yosiko* the evaluation *that fool.* His conclusion is that it can be either the inner SOURCE *Takasi,* which corresponds to the logophoric discourse environment, or it can be the external speaker – which, however, is not an independent role in Sells's design and is not allowed for in the respective environment (the reading according to which *him* can have an antecedent in the broader preceding context, i.e., *k,* is not mentioned). Further on in his article, Sells admits that the role of a PIVOT can be doubled, too (cf. pp. 466-467). The potential multiplication of discourse roles, as well as the unclear role of the PIVOT, overloads the whole picture of discourse environments, with latent borderline cases.

3.4 So far, the overview of the previously described approach suggests that no matter how inspiring Sells's account of the phenomenon of logophoricity is, further investigation of the issue can make use of other impulses. They mainly concern the role of the external speaker and the complexity of the event of conveying a message/utterance. I will discuss them in Section 4.

4. Centre of deixis

4.1 In the previous section, it became apparent that in real communication, any sentence is uttered by an external speaker and that the temporal meanings of the utterance content gain their values in relation to the actual moment at which the speech/utterance event occurs, which represents the absolute temporal meaning. Additionally, an indisputable participant in an utterance event is its addressee. These elements, put together and completed with a relation to the location of the utterance, offer a pragmalinguistic picture of an uttered sentence: it is an individual utterance event (Jakobson, 1971, p. 134) – an event executed/communicated by a speaker, "I", to an addressee, "you", at a certain place, "here", at a moment, "now". These semantic-pragmatic concepts are represented by what are known as sheer indices and create a deictic centre of each speech event. Furthermore, uttering a sentence conveys a message, a central constituent of which is a proposition "p" (which can be single or complex). The notion of the deictic centre was mentioned many decades ago, in Karl Bühler's classic *Sprachtheorie* (1934/1999) as a *Koordinatenausgangspunkt,* called *Origo,* too, consisting of the basic deictic coordinates *I, here* and *now* (p. 102). Bühler's Origo was conceived of as a launching point for an interpretation of deixis, not necessarily with an orientation towards communication. Therefore, an addressee was not included, nor was any concept of a "communicative activity," the element transmitting the message (utterance content), even though it is obvious that these elements must be present in order to give rise to communication. If we admit that an abstract notion of communicating/conveying a message is an integral part of an utterance event (the presence of an external speaker makes no sense if the speaker does not convey a message), the very notion of logophoricity can be seen in a new light. It is the external speaker employing the other elements of the utterance event who sets the primary perspective (cf. Safir, 2004) of any utterance and, at the same time, it is the external

speaker who reflects the event "I communicate p to you here and now." This claim is not meant as a resuscitation of Ross's (1970) performative hypothesis/analysis (an assumption of the presence of a performative element in the deep structure of a sentence) – the pragmatic setting of any utterance is an abstract unit representing and reflecting the very act of communication, not the precise illocutionary force of a particular utterance. Whether the element p is communicated as an assertion/statement, a promise, a warning etc., is a matter of the speaker's intention and his/her choice of the predicate verb and its form (see 4.2.3.1). This means that the concept of a pragmatic setting/matrix can be related to utterances of all forms, not only assertions/statements (indicatives). Another supporting impulse for the concept of such an abstract pragmatic unit can be seen in Bianchi's (2003) proposal to anchor a sentence/utterance to an external Logophoric Centre, corresponding to the speech event. Bianchi's Logophoric Centre is conceived as a source of the temporal specification (temporal meaning), as well as the person feature encoded in a finite verb form. (Non-finite clauses, specifically control clauses, are anchored to an internal Logophoric Centre, a contextually introduced speech or mental event distinct from the speech event; cf. Bianchi 2003, pp. 3, 12, 26ff.)

4.2 The idea of a pragmatic matrix has a strong analogy in contemporary syntactic theory. The cartography of syntactic structures as suggested by Rizzi's (1997) and Cinque's (1999) treatises (cf. also Cinque and Rizzi 2008, 2015, 2016) counts on the existence of a functional domain. The cartographic approach synthesizes pragmatic and syntactic factors in sentence analysis and interpretation, introducing functional categories into sentence derivation. In the pre-subject position, i.e., in the functional domain, a complementizer position is postulated that projects a sequence of what are termed "silent" (non-overt) heads in the hierarchy of Force, Intention, Finiteness, Mood, Tempus, etc. (Cinque presents many more of them as examples, but the Force head always decides only about the formally encoded illocution, i.e. the sentence type, the most frequent of which are indicatives/declaratives, imperatives, and interrogatives.) Analogically, the present study proposes the existence of a pragmatic parallel to the functional domain, a non-overt pragmatic matrix (matrix sentence) anchoring the elementary features pertaining to any uttering of a sentence. Every utterance event can be viewed as a complement of a non-overt (phonetically empty) communicative unit (an abstract sentence). This abstract matrix sentence consists of an abstract predicate representing a concept of a message conveying activity, of a subject / agent "I", an object / patient "you", and a complement represented by a message content "p", i.e. the audible / visible utterance itself. As previously mentioned, this abstract sentence does not influence the illocutionary value of the message. That is a matter of the agent's / speaker's intention, together with his/her choice of predicates and their formal means of expression. Performing an act of communication (uttering a sentence of a certain form) and (at the same time) performing an illocutionary act are simultaneously executed aspects of an individual utterance but, with respect to the linguistic form of an utterance, they need not be identical. (Cf. the *locution* and *illocution* distinction [Austin, 1962]; see also the distinctions concerning the intended, the coded, and the interpreted illocution in Dik, 1997/1, pp. 229-232; Allen, 1998.) Specifically, the abstract matrix sentence introduces coordinates of time and place (the indices *now* and *here*), thus imposing the speaker's perspective on the phonetically realized utterance. The non-overt pragmatic matrix sentence S_i represents the interface of the utterance in question and the current context/communicative situation. It reflects the fact that from the pragmatic point of view, the speaker always intuitively reflects his/her communicative activity in progress (the overt, ongoing utterance), and the very fact of performing it, i.e., the fact that the nature of communication is logophoric. S_i is a pragmatic entity, not a syntactic unit occupying the left periphery of the overt (audible/visible) sentence/utterance S_j. S_j, i.e. the message/complement itself, is set into an inherent pragmatic (logophoric) frame, which can be analysed from the perspective set by S_i. S_i (the pragmatic matrix sentence) can be symbolized/depicted as

S_i (I_i here$_i$ now$_i$ COMM you$_i$ p (S_j))

4.2.1 S_i is posited as an abstract structure, the inherent indexical constituents of which can project into S_j openly or stay hidden (inferential). S_i is not a source of what are termed the unarticulated constituents (cf. Perry 1998; Rècanati 2002; Stanley 2007; for discussion on the topic, see Cappelen and Lepore 2005; Bach, 2007; Martí, 2006). Neither is S_i an equivalent of an attitudinal predicate – the COMM

element is a reflection of the fact of uttering/conveying a message, not an expression of an attitude. The indexical constituents of the proposition(s) expressed in S_j, which refer to its speaker, addressee or its spatio-temporal location (i.e., S_i constituents), are semantic parts of the S_j proposition. If S_j does not contain any overt element of that kind, the projection of its speaker, addressee, and the spatio-temporal location (including movements towards the speech event location or away from it) can be considered a result of a bridging inference (cf. Carston, 1999). In this view, utterance (30) can be interpreted as follows:

(30) *John mounted my bike and (he) rode away.*
S_i (S_{j1} and S_{j2})
(I_i here$_i$ now$_i$ COMM you$_i$ (*John*$_{j1}$ *mounted* in $tj1 = (ti - n)$ *my*$_i$ *bike and* (John$_{j2 = j1}$) *rode* in $tj2 = ((tj1+n) = ti - n)$ *away* from the place$_i$ using bike$_i$)

In the pragmatically embedded sentence S_{j2}, if *John* is the subject of the predicate *rode,* the subject pronoun referring to him is preferably omitted (cf. the Avoid Pronoun Principle; Chomsky, 1982, p. 65; Horn, 1984, p. 23; Levinson, 2000, pp. 161, 281; Huang, 2007, p. 120). Using an overt pronoun may suggest a disjoint reference (*he* may refer to *John* but does not have to), which would have to be accounted for with an input of wider context data. On the other hand, the interpretation of (31) shows that, in a language lacking logophoric markers, further contextual (discourse) information may be necessary:

(31) *John mounted his bike and (he) rode away.*
(I_i here$_i$ now$_i$ COMM you$_i$ (*John*$_{j1}$ *mounted* in $t_{j1} = (t_{i - n})$ *his*$_{j/k}$ *bike and* (John$_{j2 = j1}$) *rode* in $tj2 = ((tj1+n) = ti - n)$ *away* from the place$_i$ using bike$_{j/k}$))

In (31), the antecedent determining the reference value of the possessive pronoun *his* (which cannot be omitted) can be either *John* (syntactic anaphora, cf. Reinhart, 1983, pp. 150-174) or a different antecedent (corresponding with *his* as for the categories of number and gender) present in the preceding discourse (discourse anaphora, cf. Huang, 2000; 2007, pp. 172-177; Blackwell, 2003, pp. 43-49). The particular interpretation must process a greater amount of data rooted in the preceding context.

4.2.2 The agent of the utterance (the primary/external current speaker) is always present in the context; s/he can communicate the message content from his/her own perspective or take into account the perspective of another perspective holder(s) / (speaker(s). In the following examples (32) and (33) the switch of the perspectives (in B's utterances) is explicit:

(32) (A: *I am kind of reinventing myself anyway so it doesn't matter.*)
B: *So you say you are reinventing yourself. What's the new perspective? What are you thinking?*

(33) B: *Just a moment! Let me understand!* (Turning to L., another participant in a discussion.)
So you say we can also trust what the old lady says? (L. *Of course*.)

(The source of both (32) and (33) is the Corpus of Contemporary American English, https://www.english-corpora.org/coca/, query "so you say*").

In other situations, the switch of the perspective either does not occur or need not be marked openly. In (13), repeated here as (34)

(34) *Mary did not come to my party*

both the utterance event and the message content are set in the perspective of the actual speaker and presented from it; its pragmatic arrangement related to S_i is the following:

S_i (S_j (Mary did not come$_{ti-n}$ to my$_i$ party))

S_i can show how the current speaker indicates that s/he communicates the message with respect to the perspective of another speaker (his/her actually performed or presumed previous utterance indexed $_{pu}$). In the model examples below the switch is implicit (in various arrangements). The utterer of the previous utterance can be the addressee of S_i:

(35) *So you have already been here?*
    S_i (S_j $t_j = t_{i - n}$ (*So* (you$_i$ say$_{pu}$ that) *you$_i$ have already been* $_{tk = ti - n}$ *here$_i$?*))

The $_{pu}$-temporal perspective can be made visible with more precision:

(36) *So you were here yesterday?*
    S_i (S_j $t_j = t_f$ (*So* (you$_i$ say$_{pu}$ that) *you$_i$ were* $_{tk = ti - 1}$ *here$_i$ yesterday* $_{tj = ti - 1}$?))

Reflecting the other speaker's perspective through S_i always includes the $S_i - S_j$ temporal relations, but it can also cover the changes in the reference value of the indices *I* and *you*, specifically if the first and the second person expressions function as bound variables substituting for each other. The $_{pu}$ marks "previous utterance."

(37) (you say that) *I do not understand a thing but you want to cooperate with me?*
    S_i (S_j $t_j = t_{i - n}$ (you$_i$ say$_{pu}$ that) $I_j = I_i$ = you$_{pu}$ *do not understand a thing but you$_j$* = you$_i$ = I_{pu} *want to cooperate* $_{t pu = ti + n}$ *with me$_i$* = you $_{pu}$))

Turning the indices *I* and *you* into bound variables means that their reference value is not given by the context of a current speech event but is enforced by the layering of distinct speakers' perspectives. In such cases, they can no longer be considered demonstratives (they have undergone the process of de-demonstrativization); the logical semantics speaks here about monsters (Kaplan, 1989; Schlenker, 2003; Karlík, 2014).

The following example (36) shows that even a non-present speaker's utterance (k), representing one more perspective = layer of the speech event (presented earlier by the addressee of S_i), can be taken into account:

(38) *So he says that you don't understand a thing but he wants to cooperate with you?*
    S_i (S_j you$_i$ have said in $t_j = t_{i - n}$ (S_k *he$_k$ says$_k$* in $t_k = t_{i - n}$ *that you$_i$* = you$_k$ *don't understand* in $t_k = t_j = t_i$ *a thing but he$_k$ wants to cooperate* in $t = t_{i + n}$ *with you$_i$* = I_j = you$_k$))

4.2.3 The concept of S_i allows for a fine-grained analysis of temporal relations as well as the shifts of the index reference occurring in an individual utterance event towards the situation in which it is uttered. Using the Reichenbachian temporal elements notation (see [22]) makes visible the fact that the temporal reference of S_i (= t_i) always overlaps with $S_{u/i}$ (the temporal location of the point of speech S of the utterance in question is identical to the temporal location of the utterance in question $t_{u/i}$), i.e. the current point of speech S_i is identical to the time at which the utterance took place (as for the notation, S always marks S_i or S_j, and S means the Reichenbachian "point of speech"). Additionally, the Reichenbachian "point of event E" and the COMM element in S_i can be considered as S_i's event E_i. As for the temporal relation of S_j towards S_i, t_j can be identical to t_i (*It is raining* – here, t_j covers/embraces t_i), it can precede it ($t_j = t_{i - n}$) - see (35) – (37), or it can follow it, e.g., *I will make us some coffee* ($t_j = t_{i + n}$). (The Reichenbachian temporal system was further developed into more configurations by Vikner, 1985, but the basic elements were preserved.) When the current speaker describes some non-verbal activities in the form of the present tense or the present perfect, i.e. activities happening in the "non-past time zone" (Leech, 1987, p. 4) or having "current relevance" (ibid: 152), the S_j time overlaps with S_i, but the S_j event (E_j) precedes E_i – if someone says that *s/he reads a book* or *has been painting the wall*, the activity in question must have started before $S_{u/i}$ (which is identical to S_i). With sentences using one of the past tenses, the $S_i - S_j$ temporal relations are obvious: the S_j (and E_j) temporal locations precede those of S_i (and R_j coincides with E_j). If S_j concerns verbal (speech) activities, its relation to S_i is the same as with non-verbal activities in the past or future: *Paul called me last night; I will call him right away.* A substantial difference, though, emerges in speech events

producing sentences/utterances where S_j includes an illocutionary verb in the form of first person singular indicative, present tense imperfective (in languages distinguishing imperfective vs perfective aspect) used performatively. In those so-called Explicit Performative Formulae (EPF), the indices *I, you, here* and *now* in S_i and in S_j are of identical referential value; the temporal location of the COMM element (E_i) and the temporal location of the illocutionary verb used performatively (E_j) are identical, too. The speaker's communicative activity is therefore executed by the S_j finite verb. At the same time, the points of reference R_i and R_j are identical:

(39) *I* (hereby) *ask you to leave.*
      S_i (I_i here$_i$ now$_i$ COMM you$_i$ p (S_j I_i *ask$_i$* in t$_i$ *you$_i$ to* PRO you$_i$ *leave* $_{ti+n}$))
      point of speech $S_i = S_j$ = point of event $E_i = E_j$ = point of reference $R_i = R_j$

This means that, in the case of EPF (when the sentence form is used performatively), S_j is fully identical to S_i. Since performative utterances represent the temporal identity (coincidence) of "saying" (locution) and "doing" (performing a speech act, illocution), the S_i – S_j identity suggests that performative utterances, unlike other utterances, lack the logophoric detachment occurring elsewhere: the pragmatic interface represented by the logophoric matrix **S_i** fuses with **S_j**. Nevertheless, **S_i** is present.

4.2.3.1 The essential prerequisite making the utterance suitable for performative use, i.e. for the coincidence of locution and illocution, is deemed to lie in its temporal qualities, specifically in the overlapping of the point of speech, point of event, and point of reference. The core of "performativity" is a semantic property of certain *verba dicendi* giving them the potential to coincide locution (to utter a sentence with a specific form) and illocution (to perform an act denoted by the verb; therefore, the illocutionary force resides in the propositional content of the sentence). Our concept of coincidence conceived of as a temporal quality uses Koschmieder's (1934, p. 109) notion of "coincidential imperfectiveness" in the framework of his aspect theory. For performativity, the temporal meaning of the actual present is central, and the actual present can only be expressed by an imperfective verb. The notion of coincidence itself has not been treated uniformly, though. In studies based on cognitive linguistics (Dickey, 2000), a tendency to define coincidence in terms of the relation of a speech/utterance event and an extra-linguistic situation can be observed, specifically as a configuration in which a situation that is referred to coincides with the utterance event (Dickey, 2000, p. 175). The major difficulty of the concept is that a real coincidence is relatively rare "because a speaker usually cannot identify a situation as a totality quickly enough to express it verbally simultaneous to its occurrence" (cf. Dickey, 2000, p. 177). In a similar way, certain cases of the use of the simple present were interpreted by Leech and Svartvik (1975, p. 64: "In most contexts, one rarely has the occasion to refer to an event begun and ended at the very moment of speech."). If coincidence is understood in such a "material" way, different degrees of it are assumed, including the fact that even perfective verbs can be coincidental, albeit to a lower degree than imperfectives (Dickey 2000, pp. 178-179). Such an approach makes the notion of coincidence (and performativity) fuzzy and descriptively weak. The definition of coincidence as a temporal property, as a unification of the locution (temporal meaning of the illocutionary verb) and illocution (semantics of the illocutionary verb) of an utterance, relies on facts of language.

4.2.4 In sentences containing illocutionary verbs in other forms (including sentence forms identical to EPF not used performatively, i.e. those where locution and illocution do not coincide), the reference value of the indices, especially of *now*, may shift despite the fact that the form of the sentence/utterance does not change. If a sentence like (39) is repeated, e.g. used as an answer to the question *What have you just said?*, it is not used performatively any more. It does not perform a request but is an indirect performance of an act of assertion/statement about a request made previously:

(40) S_i (I_i here$_i$ now$_i$ COMM you$_i$ p (S_j I_i *ask$_j$* in t$_{j=ti+n}$ *you$_i$ to* PRO you$_i$ *leave* $_{ti+n}$)).

What happens in the repeated (39), i.e. in (40), is a temporal shift resulting from the disconnection of the temporal reference point R_i, the moment of speech S_i, and those elements in S_j. Additionally, the S_i event E_i represented by COMM is not identical to the E_j *ask*. Through the repetition, the fusion of S_i and

S_j (and the identity of their Ss, Es, and Rs) is cancelled, and its direct performativity is suspended by the mentioned temporal shift; therefore, (40) joins the majority of other non-performative utterances.

4.2.5 It should be noted that the concept of logophoricity presented here is applicable primarily to spoken face-to-face communication during which the interlocutors react to each other (or to one another) and the speakers' perspectives shift continuously. As for other constellations (perception and interpretation of written messages or technologically mediated conversations, like posting on a social network, e-mail exchanges, video conferences, etc.), their spatio-temporal coordinate relations as well as participants' perspective shifts will be different. This, of course, opens an area for a future research.

5. Conclusion

5.1 In this paper, I have examined the broader notion of logophoricity suggested in Peter Sells's 1987 article. If logophoricity is viewed as a property of an utterance resulting from the interaction of three primitive discourse roles (SOURCE – SELF – PIVOT), it appears to be a phenomenon present not only in communications explicitly conveying other persons' words or thoughts (mental states). Sells's distribution of the role constellations created four types of discourse environments; nevertheless, a closer look at them has shown that: a) the delimitation of particular types of environments is too general; b) individual discourse roles often combine (multiply); c) the space-time location pertaining to the PIVOT role is mostly unclear and, d) the role of the external speaker is underestimated (and the role of the addressee of an utterance is not mentioned at all). Since an external speaker is present in any utterance as an utterance event agent, his/her role and his/her relations to other elements of the utterance event seem to be essential for any interpretation of an utterance. It is the external speaker who sets the primary perspective of any utterance and who, at the same time, reflects on the event (the act of communication itself). This reflection is represented by a non-overt abstract matrix sentence consisting of an abstract predicate COMM representing the concept of a message conveying activity, of a subject/agent, "I", an object/patient, "you", and of a complement represented by the message content, "p", i.e., the audible/visible utterance itself. This abstract sentence does not influence the illocutionary value of the message. Performing an act of communication and performing a specific illocutionary act occur simultaneously but they are (unmarkedly) not identical. As a result of such a non-overt pragmatic matrix being posited (a pragmatic parallel to a functional domain, see 4.2), different discourse environments can be seen as being condensed into a single generalized one (S_i) which, in individual utterance events, projects its components individually into the audible/visible message S_j. This non-overt pragmatic matrix sentence S_i represents the interface of the utterance in question with the current context/communicative situation; it is a semantic-pragmatic entity, not a syntactic unit occupying the left periphery of the overt (audible/visible) sentence/utterance S_j. S_j, i.e. the message/complement can be analysed from the perspective set by S_i; this means that from the pragmalinguistic point of view all utterances are logophoric. The only exception is represented by EPF used performatively. In them, because of their temporal properties, the S_js are fully identical to their S_is.

5.2 As a result, I wish to suggest that the notion of logophoricity can be reassessed (or rather extended). While in linguistic typology, logophoricity is treated as a property of grammar, the exponents of which are logophoric markers referring to specific antecedents, in linguistic pragmatics, logophoricity appears to be the most prominent pragmatic property of a sentence when seen as an utterance, i.e. in communication. This means that for every utterance/utterance event, the role of the external (current) speaker is essential because it sets the primary perspective of the utterance and acts as its pragmatic anchorage. Semantic constituents, especially indexical elements in an uttered sentence, obtain their referential value towards their pragmatic matrix S_i, i.e., as "spoken about," referred to in speech, i.e., logophoric. S_i, the logophoric matrix, then works as a general meta-pragmatic analyser reflecting the fact that each utterance is a token, and centring on an event makes it possible to capture the elements of the utterances' individuality.

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