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In search for greater v4 engagement in international crisis management

Samuel Goda, ed.



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Preface

Practice as well as general and applied research indicate that international relations and international security are subject to great dynamism, making the field more interesting and appealing not only to professionals but the general public as well. Nonetheless, such rapid development means that international and security affairs can be harder to read or predict, and sometimes understand in sufficient depth. Combined with various other factors, this can and, indeed does, lead to conflicts and crisis situations.

Inter and intra-national conflicts are still a feature of and occur frequently in contemporary world affairs. Several milestones can be identified in the general worsening of or change in the regional or global security situation – the fall of the Berlin Wall, the war in former Yugoslavia, September 11, the terrorist attacks in Madrid, war in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Arab Spring or Maidan in Ukraine, for instance. What is more important in regards to the outcome is how individual states react to the crisis situation. Unfortunately, in most cases a reaction is triggered because prevention has failed for countless reasons and combinations thereof (although, conflict prevention can be considered as part of crisis management, in this publication we understand it to be a separate, but interconnected, earlier stage in crisis management). Countries may react separately, alone, and in other cases, may make use of international crisis management – a term encompassing the efforts of international actors in crisis situations, including military and civilian intervention. This can be executed in various ways and one is to coordinate actions under (an) international organization(s).

The main aim of this study is to offer an updated analysis of and insights into the engagement of V4 countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – in international crisis management. In the broader Euro-Atlantic space there are three key institutions – NATO, the EU and the OSCE – that are capable of executing and leading crisis management missions. As this study shows, all V4 countries are committed to and have experience of international crisis management missions. Therefore, we have decided to fuse these two aspects and place the V4 countries together with these three international organizations in order to show how Central European countries operate through NATO, the EU and the OSCE in particular conflicts, and identify their main contributions and, where possible, point out the comparative advantage(s).

When selecting our case studies, we sought a balanced mix of ongoing and previous crisis management missions. We also wanted, in part, to highlight the state of affairs in mutual, inter-organizational relations among NATO, the EU and the OSCE on crisis management missions – this is the subject of the last chapter.

Hence we have chosen Kosovo, Afghanistan and Ukraine as our case studies. Kosovo was one of the most comprehensive crisis management missions to be performed on the inter-organizational level ever, and involved all three organizations of particular interest to us – NATO, the EU and the OSCE, and provided all the V4 countries with an opportunity to engage. However, as the chapters show, V4 countries differed in their level of engagement, due in part to the different stages they were at in the NATO and EU integration processes.

The largest and logistically most complicated mission was the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Here the leading role was given to NATO, leaving the EU and OSCE on the sidelines. Nonetheless, this mission was considered to be one of the most important tests of V4 countries' ability to contribute to NATO operations.

Last but not least is the case of Ukraine. The conflict in Ukraine, in Donbass, is a very important security issue for the V4 countries as Ukraine is either a neighbor or country of priority interest. Future developments in this conflict will have direct consequences for the security environment of the whole region. Here, unlike in Afghanistan, the OSCE and EU play a major role. This case study also indicates that the countries hold rather diverse attitudes to and perceptions of the conflict situations and consequently responses vary.

This publication should provide new stimulation to the ongoing debates on V4 countries' engagement in international crisis management missions. The publication offers a qualitative analysis and is rich in statistical data as well. This should encourage further research on the topic, especially on the shared competences among countries, rationalizing material resources and human capital, positions on the main institutional actors in crisis management, etc. In addition, we aim to stimulate ideas on Central European perceptions of NATO, the EU and the OSCE in crisis management missions and on European security architecture in general.

Development of Czech crisis management tools

Karel Klinovský

CRT in the Czech Republic

While Western European countries have continually developed their CMT tools throughout the second half of the twentieth century until now, the Czech Republic has had to adjust its CMT tools to the needs of modern society in a much shorter period of time. Just as in other post-communist countries, the race to become an equal member of the international community has consisted of two phases. Not surprisingly, the first phase was to gain membership of NATO and the EU. Only membership of these organizations can guarantee the Czech Republic a firm position in the Western world and the opportunity to assert its own international agenda efficiently. Consequently, transatlantic ties and European integration are the cornerstones of Czech security policy.

The second phase was to build and use CMT tools effectively, both on a tactical or operational level and on a strategic one. The CMT tools were often created ad hoc with no deeper analysis or understanding of the issues. Therefore the history of Czech CMT development is a jungle of various documents and strategic plans which were often quite short-sighted. The last act of strategic thinking among Czech politicians was Vaclav Havel's push for Czech membership of NATO and the EU.

Founded on democratic values and on promoting human rights, Czechoslovakia, and later the Czech Republic, quickly joined various international peacekeeping missions. However, Czechoslovakia had already started participating in peacekeeping missions shortly before the Velvet Revolution, particularly the UNAVEM mission in Angola and the UNTAG mission in Namibia in January and March 1989. The new democratic Czechoslovakia first deployed military personnel on operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Saudi Arabia and Iraq in 1991. Subsequently, the Czech Republic deployed units to the UNPROFOR mission in the former Yugoslavia, and more specifically, Croatia. By May 1995, when the first strategic document, "The White Book of the Defense of the Czech Republic,"¹ was published,

¹ "The White book of the defense of the Czech Republic," Ministry of Defence & Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, 1995. Available online: <http://www.mocr.army.cz/images/Bilakniha/CSD/1995%20Bila%20kniha%20o%20obrane%20CR.pdf> (accessed on September 21, 2015).

almost 4,000 Czechoslovak, and later Czech troops, had participated in OSCE and UN missions. The document primarily emphasized the role of the defense forces in the territorial defense of the country. This conception of the military later changed and the Czech armed forces more or less became an expeditionary force. A country of 10 million people could not sustain an army of 120,000 men and women.

Unlike most of its Western allies, the Czech Republic's response to the major security shift following 9/11 was not very flexible. Evidence of this is found in the fact that the Czech Republic first considered the post 9/11 situation in its Security Strategy of December 2003, more than two years after the event. In 2005, the Czech Republic ended the practice of conscription and built a fully professional army of 30,000 troops (although once the administrative and intelligence staff are excluded, the army consists of only 21,000 troops). The current Security Strategy was approved in February 2015² and it fully reflects the security challenges confronting Europe today. Most notably, it lists the main security threat as being the weakening of the cooperative security mechanisms and political and legal obligations in the security sphere.

Previous developments had led to the creation of small, highly specialized civilian and military CMT units. The advantage of such an approach is the high degree of interoperability and relatively fast deployment. By contrast, the Czech Republic ceased guaranteeing its own security, since its armed forces are expeditionary forces. Also, the legal framework of CMT is still imperfect since it overestimates the ability of Czech CMT bodies to act independently with no support provided from outside the country. Furthermore, the Czech Republic has a tendency to undermine the cornerstones of its security – NATO and EU membership. This is despite recent European security challenges having led to a significant change in the traditionally unpredictable Czech attitude to NATO and the EU. The Czech Republic promised to start slowly moving towards compliance with its obligation to meet the NATO defense spending target of 2 per cent of GDP.

More detailed analyses of the Czech application of CMT will be conducted using the examples of Kosovo, Afghanistan and Ukraine. The Czech Republic has constructively cooperated with the EU, NATO and the OSCE on achieving mission objectives and has therefore complied with its international obligations.

² “The Security Strategy of the Czech Republic 2015,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, February, 2015. Available online: http://www.mocr.army.cz/images/id_40001_50000/46088/Bezpecnostni_strategie_2015.pdf (accessed on September 21, 2015).

Kosovo

The Czech Republic joined NATO only 12 days before the run-up to the Kosovo campaign, called Operation Allied Force. Thus the Czech forces did not directly participate in the aerial operations in Yugoslavia. However, there was rare consent between Czech political representatives on the necessity of the operation. Then president Vaclav Havel and prime minister Miloš Zeman both publicly stated that NATO involvement in solving the Kosovo crisis was unavoidable. For that reason the Czech army 6th Reconnaissance Unit (which later became the 601st Special Forces Brigade) entered Kosovo as part of the first wave on June 12, 1999. It was, of course, the first Czech engagement in Crisis Management as a full NATO member and the goal was to prove that the Czech Republic was a trustworthy partner able to comply with its obligations. The unit fulfilled its tasks under British command as a part of a Multinational Brigade (together with the armed forces of the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden and Ireland). The unit began immediately participating in the main goal of the operation – to maintain a secure environment that would allow for a future peace process. A group for military-civilian cooperation (CIMIC) was created for this purpose. This was a crucial decision because most of the actions required careful liaison between two highly hostile ethnic groups. The task was extremely difficult because many refugees and internally displaced people were returning back to their homes, which further escalated the tension. The Czech army presence was gradually increased to 400 military personnel in May 2001.

Since the territory that the Multinational Brigade Centre (MNB-C) was to cover had been enlarged, the number of Czech military personnel was supposed to grow. This clearly meant a significant increase in the cost of the whole mission. Therefore it was necessary to find a more budget-friendly solution. Back then, Slovakia was a NATO candidate country and had a long common history with the Czech Republic (only nine years previously, the two countries, and hence their armies, had separated) and so the idea of a Joint Czechoslovak Battalion was mooted. The two countries conducted military exercises in the Czech military area of Boletice and on February 27, 2002 were prepared to participate in fulfilling UN Resolution 1244 on Kosovo. All in all, there were six Joint Czechoslovak Battalions from February 2002 until July 2005. Their main objective was not only to continue ensuring a secure environment but also to support the UN mission in Kosovo – UMIK. Naturally, the Joint Battalion laid common ground for the future deployment of more Czechoslovak units and also raised the possibility of purchasing military equipment together. Unfortunately, neither the Czech Republic nor Slovakia continued to develop joint CMT capacities and the purchase of 3D radio locators was abandoned. Nonetheless, cooperation continues on the national level and it is not out of the question that both countries may later recommence the deployment of Joint Units.

The Czech Republic became the leading nation in MNB-C in August 2005. The Task Force of the Czech Republic completed its involvement in Operation Joint Guardian in November 2011. Undoubtedly, its biggest success was participating in the training of the Kosovo Security Forces which achieved full operational capability in 2013. There are currently three Czech military personnel serving in the Deployable Communication Module.

Another way in which the Czech Republic significantly contributed to stabilizing Kosovo was through the EULEX mission. This Common Security and Defense policy mission is a continuation of UNMIK and was established in 2008. The Czech Police are involved in the Supplementary Police Unit (SPU), a part of the EULEX Executive division which has an executive mandate comparable to local institutions. SPU tasks include guarding important Kosovar institutions and prisoner escorts. The most exposed area in which SPU operates is Mitrovica, an ethnically divided city. It is worth noting that the escalation of violence amid the 2014 general elections in Kosovo led to the evacuation of all OSCE personal. The SPU was entrusted with providing security for OSCE staff and all convoys involved in organizing the repeat elections. A member of the Czech Police Force is an advisor with Border Police Monitoring for dealing with Kosovar citizens being deported back to Kosovo from other countries. This aspect of the EULEX mission is even more important now during the migrant crisis. Equally important is the EULEX Rule of Law mission in which prosecutors and judges from the Czech Republic were involved in creating a working judicial system in Kosovo. Since January 30, 2012 the Chief EULEX Prosecutor is Jaroslava Novotná from the Czech Republic.

Czech involvement in Kosovo via the OSCE dates back to the very beginning of the conflict when it provided three observers to the Kosovo Verification Mission. In fact, Czech diplomacy was working on involving the international community more in peacefully resolving the conflict. Within the OSCE, the Czech Republic concentrated on capacity building projects and offered its Kosovar partners expertise based on its own experience transitioning from a totalitarian state to a modern liberal democracy. The Czech Republic was also one of many countries that helped to renovate the crime scene investigation room to be used for training the newly established Kosovo Crime Scene Investigation Unit. Subsequently, the Czech Republic sent a large group of observers to monitor the first general election in the country.

Afghanistan

Since the Czech army is responsible for the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense multinational battalion in NATO, it deployed 612 military personnel to Kuwait to provide support for the initial phase of Operation

Enduring freedom. The ISAF mission to Afghanistan was a direct response to the 9/11 attacks and was the first time in history that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty had been implemented. Evidently, nobody expected that the deployment in Afghanistan would turn out to be the determining conflict at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The Taliban had learned years ago during the Soviet invasion that it was impossible to resist the invading forces in symmetrical warfare and so they employed their well-known insurgency tactic. It took the NATO forces five years to adopt the counter-insurgency tools to defend against it. The main rationale behind the counter-insurgency is to provide the civilian population with a positive alternative to the Taliban, in the case of Afghanistan. Therefore, military personnel are involved in capacity and state building instead of conventional warfare. The goal is, to use that well-known phrase rather unfortunately uttered during the Vietnam War, to win the “hearts and minds” of the people. However, there are those that argue this approach goes against the purpose of the military.

The only unit able to participate in implementing the counter-insurgency doctrine was the elite Czech 601st Special Forces Group. It was the first combat operation the Czech army had conducted since the end of World War II. Not surprisingly, the details of their deployment are confidential and the details and area of operation are not publicly known.

Subsequently, the Czech Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) was established in Logar on March 19, 2008. The PRT was a combination of seven civilian engineering experts and 192 military personnel (this number was later increased to 292 troops and 12 civilians). It would become the longest lasting Czech military project in Afghanistan until the PRT was officially disbanded in February 2013. The case of the Czech PRT in Logar province is interesting because, unlike that of other countries, the Czech approach was NGO based. The ministries of foreign affairs and defense created joint civil-military teams. The main idea behind the Czech PRT was to allow Afghans to participate in all the projects from the very beginning. Therefore each of the 248 projects not only led to real outcomes but were also part of capacity building. Projects were designed to tackle the main issues in the province (and Afghanistan in general): poverty, good governance together with security and education and health care. Instead of building Western-style infrastructure which might not have been appreciated by the local population, the Czech PRT always used needs assessments to establish the real needs of the local population. This included attending local councils (shuras) and maintaining close contact with important figures in the local tribes and government. Another important aspect was the sustainability of the projects. There were cases in the Afghan provinces where the newly created Afghan National Police or Army did not value newly built barracks and used them as stables instead. One problem with the NGO based approach was the Czech Republic’s role as state actor in Afghanistan was not as visible as it could have been. In the past,

Czechoslovak motorbikes and weapons had been well known in Afghanistan. Also, many people had studied in the Czech Republic and better PR could have restored positive ties between the two countries. Instead, practically no Czech private sector actors participated in the PRT's activities.

Two Military Advisory Teams (MAT) were deployed in March and April 2013 to strengthen Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan. One numbering 64 troops operated within the PRT in Logar and another 59 troops operated in Wardak province. Their main mission was to provide advisory and operational support for the ANA. Each MAT worked with the ANA *kandak* (battalion) in their area of deployment and trained them to perform their duties independently, without the support of the Allied Forces. MATs made use of the experience gained by the Operational Mentoring and Liaison team that had served in Wardak province from November 2012 until March 2013 and which concentrated on developing ANA operational capabilities. The Czech army created a Task Force to oversee all Czech training operations in Afghanistan and it also deployed a 4th SR to Bagram Airport for patrol duties (150 troops in total).

Within the EU, the Czech Republic supported the creation of the EUPOL mission in Afghanistan but waited passively until there was general consent on the mission objective and mandate in the EU. Unfortunately, the creation of the EUPOL mission was delayed because Afghanistan is the most dangerous environment the EU has ever conducted development efforts and member states were reluctant to take action. Once the Germans took over the EU presidency in 2007³ the mission was finally approved and replaced the bilateral missions of some EU countries. The Czech Republic provided five police officers and was also involved in the ANP reforms as part of Security Sector Reforms. In comparison with other EU nations, the Czech contribution to the EUPOL mission in Afghanistan has not been significant.

The OSCE has had a hard time defining its purpose in Afghanistan. In fact, the OSCE has been attempting to create a secure area within Central Asia but has had difficulty finding the resources to support its goals. Thus the most significant contribution made by the OSCE was the deployment of Election Support Teams during the Afghan elections, especially during the presidential elections in 2004, 2009 and 2014. Czech monitors were involved in all these electoral missions. To sum up, involvement in Afghanistan plays an important role in Czech foreign policy. This is emphasized by the fact that Afghanistan is the second biggest recipient of Czech humanitarian aid.

³ Germany was responsible for the reform of ANP.

Ukraine

Unlike Poland and the Baltic states, the Czech approach towards the Ukrainian conflict is ambiguous. While the Czech Republic realizes that the conflict is one of the greatest security challenges facing NATO today its politicians have been unable to unite themselves on this issue. Some MPs and senators have adopted a very open pro-Russian stance and even the president of the Czech Republic, Miloš Zeman, takes their side. The country therefore sends very mixed signals to its international partners.

Its relationship with Ukraine plays a pivotal role in Czech foreign policy not only as a part of the Eastern Partnership (one of the dimensions of the EU Neighborhood Policy) but also because the Czech Republic has its own agenda in the country. Ties between the two countries date back to 1918 when Subcarpathian Rus was part of Czechoslovakia. The Ukrainian minority is one of the most populous minorities in the Czech Republic and Ukraine is home to a significant Czech community (around 6,000 people, the Volhynia Czechs in Zhytomyr Province). As a matter of fact, the Czech Republic repatriated 40 Volhynia Czech families (approximately 250 people) to the Czech Republic in 2015 and is ready to accept more. In addition, the Czech Republic has many ongoing projects in Ukraine promoting Czech traditions and culture. Earlier, the former Ukrainian economy minister Danylyshyn and Yulia Tymoshenko's husband Oleksander Tymoshenko had been granted asylum on the basis that their prosecution was politically motivated by then prime minister Viktor Yanukovich. And lastly, Ukraine is a recipient of Czech humanitarian aid. Almost one million EUR (21.5 CZK) is to be spent on the democratic transformation of the educational system in Ukraine. Also, Ukrainian companies are being encouraged to use advanced manufacturing techniques so as to be able to compete on the EU market. Two million CZK was spent on Ukrainian Crisis Response Capacities in eastern and south eastern Ukraine to develop Mobile Medical Posts for the Ukrainian Red Cross. The project includes the purchase of suitably equipped vehicles and inflatable rescue tents. Moreover, a humanitarian convoy was launched on February 16, 2015 in collaboration with the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Czech Red Cross, the State Material Reserve Authority and People in Need. This is an example of the way in which the Czech NGO sector has been working alongside the state in providing assistance as part of Crisis Management.

Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine clearly prompted concern in NATO about Russia's further intentions. Ironically, the Ukraine Crisis may have helped NATO to determine its purpose once more, since Russia can no longer be considered a reliable partner. In response, NATO established a series of projects to reform the Ukrainian armed forces into a modern and effective army. The Czech Republic is the Lead Nation in the NATO-Ukraine Logistics and Standardization Trust Fund. The main objective of the trust fund is to

help reform Ukraine's logistics system and increase its interoperability with NATO, notably through the adoption of NATO standards for the tracking and management of national military equipment and supplies.⁴ In addition, the Czech Republic is also involved in the Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP) Ukraine under Polish leadership. The main goal is to build, develop and reform the educational institutions within the security, defense and military domains. Its two main tracks of assistance are: faculty (how to teach) and curriculum (what to teach) development for eight key Ukrainian institutions in Kyiv, Lviv, Kharkiv, Odessa and Zhytomir.

In response to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and other action in eastern Ukraine, the EU has imposed sanctions⁵ targeting diverse sectors of the Russian economy and political elite. Although the Czech Republic supported the sanctions, the political debate on this issue is still ongoing and a growing number of politicians do not support further sanctions against Russia for pragmatic reasons. Not surprisingly, the ongoing debate influenced Czech ratification of the EU–Ukraine Accession Agreement.⁶

Since the OSCE is the only functioning forum in which Western countries can seek to resolve the Ukrainian conflict alongside the Russian Federation, it has an exceptionally importance role in solving the Ukrainian crisis. Moreover, the OSCE is the only international body with the capacity to monitor the situation in eastern Ukraine. Unquestionably, the Czech contribution to the OSCE monitoring mission in Ukraine is more than sufficient even when compared to that of bigger states. Of the 591 monitors present in Ukraine in January 2015, fourteen were from the Czech Republic. One of the main goals the Czech permanent mission in Vienna sought to achieve was to extend the mandate of the OSCE special monitoring mission until March 31, 2016.

Conclusion

Instead of Fukuyama's End of History thesis, the Czech Republic and the Western world, in general, increasingly faces security challenges. The Czech Republic therefore has to keep improving its CMT. One way would be to share the burden of Central European security together with the Visegrad 4

⁴ "NATO's practical support to Ukraine," NATO Fact Sheet, February, 2015. Available online: http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_05/20150508_1505Factsheet_PracticalSupportUkraine_en.pdf (accessed on September 2015).

⁵ "Council regulation (EU) No 1351/2014," Official Journal of the European Union, December 18, 2014. Available online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.365.01.0046.01.ENG (accessed on September 28, 2015).

⁶ Passed by the Czech Parliament's lower chamber on September 17, 2015. See: "Czech Chamber passes EU-Ukraine Association Agreement," *České noviny*, September 18, 2015. Available online: <http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/czech-chamber-passes-eu-ukraine-association-agreement/1259773> (accessed on September 21, 2015).

countries. For example, V4 countries could create Joint Task forces to deal quickly and effectively with crises in their immediate neighborhoods. Although being a member of supranational organizations can bring a certain amount of frustration over the need to give up part of state sovereignty, Czech politicians should not forget that NATO and the EU are the cornerstones of Czech security. The Czech Republic has to maintain its level of involvement in crisis management around the world so it can secure its integrity and survival in today's world.

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Development of Hungarian crisis management tools

Péter Wagner

In the 1990s two considerations defined the thinking of the Hungarian elite on crisis management activities. On the one hand decisions were demand driven, so Hungary participated in all the missions it was requested to join by the international community and had at least the minimum qualifications needed. For instance when Hungary was requested to join the UN mission in Cambodia, the Hungarian police sent a contingent despite it having only three officers with adequate language skills.⁷

On the other hand there was clear and almost unanimous acceptance of the strategic goal to become a member of NATO and the EU. Given its strategic location Hungary willingly offered its airspace to NATO aircraft to monitor the civil war in Yugoslavia. This was a serious gamble on the part of Hungary, as NATO could not give any kind of security guarantee against a potential Yugoslav military retaliation or against a punitive action targeting the Hungarian minority in the Vojvodina. Following the Dayton Peace Accord, Tászár airbase was used as the main entry point for US peacekeeping forces to Bosnia–Herzegovina. This was the first time after the Cold War that NATO soldiers had set up a base in a former communist country.⁸ The airbase was used during the Kosovo war as well, and Hungary actively participated in the Partnership for Peace program, considered to be the first step towards full NATO membership.

Despite the fact that Hungary was quite clear as to its new foreign and security policy priorities after 1990, the National Security Strategy was not adopted until 2002. Before that, two documents had laid down the principles of Hungarian security policy. The first was adopted by parliament in 1993 and underlined Hungary's commitment to joining NATO, emphasizing the need for regional security cooperation, and stressing the destabilizing effect of widespread nationalism against ethnic minorities.

In 1998, a new document, the Resolution on Security and Defense Policy Principles, was adopted by parliament following NATO approval of the ac-

⁷ J. Boda, "A magyar rendvédelmi békefenntartás humán története," *Rendvédelem-történelmi Füzetek (Acta Historiae Praesidii Ordinis)* Vol. XVIII, No. 21, 2010, p. 15.

⁸ J. McDonnell, "Lessons learned from the Taszar staging base," *Army Logistician* Vol. 34, No. 2, 2002, p. 20. Available online: <http://www.alu.army.mil/alog/issues/MarApr02/MS754.htm> (accessed on September 18, 2015).

cessions of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic the previous year. It was more of an update of the 1993 document than a new concept reflecting the new circumstances. It failed to provide a profound re-evaluation of the potential new threats and challenges or provide for the future role of the armed forces. The Resolution on Security and Defense Policy Principles had already implied the need for a security and military strategy, but accession to NATO did not bring about the expected changes/developments.

It was more than a decade after the end of the Cold War that the first National Security Strategy was adopted, in 2002, the last year of the conservative Orbán government. A mere two years later, in 2004, in relation to EU accession and the War on Terror, a new National Security Strategy was approved. The strategy established the fight against terrorism as the main priority, followed by WMD proliferation; failed states; illegal migration and economic instability as the major global challenges. Although terrorism in general played a minor role in Hungary, the terrorist attacks of September 2001, and the threat perception of the European Security Strategy published in 2003 clearly influenced the Hungarian document. The document said nothing about what Hungary intended to achieve through its NATO and EU membership but instead listed its national security interests concerning the two institutions.

The first Hungarian military strategy was adopted in 2009. It was more of a description of Hungary's security environment than a vision of how Hungary sought to contribute to the security of Europe and the wider world. The strategy was vague about the direction of the military's future capability development, emphasizing only the need to shift modernization efforts from the air force to ground forces and to be able to execute "expeditionary – like" operations. The government stated in the document that it sought to increase the military's budget by 0.2 per cent between 2009 and 2013 seemed unfeasible as Hungary's GDP was decreasing in the midst of the global economic crisis.

The most recent National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy (NMS) were adopted in February and December 2012 respectively. There is continuity in the political statements between the 2009 and 2012 NMSs. Both documents emphasize the fundamental roles of NATO and the EU in Hungary's security, and state that the two pillars of national defense are the nation's military strength and cooperation between alliance members. The new NMS reaffirms the previous assessment stating that "the current level of the threat of a conventional attack against Hungary and its Allies is marginal" while admitting that "conflicts of the past decades" should not be neglected.⁹

⁹ "Magyarország Nemzeti Katonai Stratégiája," [Hungary's National Military Strategy] Government of Hungary, January, 2012. p. 8. Available online: http://www.kormany.hu/download/a/40/00000/nemzeti_katonai_strategia.pdf (accessed on September 18, 2015).

The two National Military Strategies handled some of the threats differently, but there is no substantial difference with the exception of military capabilities. The military strategy of 2009 enunciates that the “Republic of Hungary – according to NATO’s integrated defense planning – has no intention of forming the full spectrum of military capabilities.”¹⁰ However, the new 2012 military strategy aims to retain or reactivate the capabilities the previous NMS deemed redundant. Unfortunately, the 2012 NMS uses the same framework as the old NMS, and so only the goals seem to be clear, while the priorities and benchmarks remain undisclosed.

Hungarian CRM in practice

The Cold War hadn’t even ended when Hungary began participating in various UN mandated crisis management and observer operations. First among these was the United Nations Iran – Iraq Military Observer Group between 1988 and 1991, followed by other missions in Asia and around the globe. In the 1990s Hungary deployed military and police officers on seven different UN missions in Africa. From the Hungarian perspective, this was an important period of gaining the necessary skills and experience in smaller crisis management operations before embarking on more complex and demanding missions. For example, at that time having the necessary language skills was a serious challenge for the Hungarian police and military forces. Usually only a few officers (and the intelligence community) had the appropriate language training, hence in the early years Hungarian contingents were boosted with diplomats as well.¹¹

In 1995 Hungary began deploying its first armed peacekeepers in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the Sinai Peninsula (Multinational Forces Observers) and the Balkans. Instead of small groups of individuals, company or battalion level units were sent on these missions. In the UNFICYP, a 100-strong Hungarian unit patrolled and maintained the buffer zone, while in the MFO an 80-strong joint military/police unit took up Military Police duties.

In 1994 Hungary joined the UN mandated peacekeeping missions of IFOR and SFOR in pursuit of its clear political aim to improve its chances of joining NATO. Moreover, stability in the Balkans has consistently been an issue for all Hungarian governments; therefore huge resources were mobilized for the SFOR/IFOR mission. The Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) deployed a battalion sized military engineers unit from 1996 until the end of the mission in

¹⁰ “A Magyar Köztársaság Nemzeti Katonai Stratégiája,” [Hungary’s National Military Strategy] Government of Hungary, January, 2009, p. 10. Available online: http://www.honvedelem.hu/files/9/13818/nemzeti_katonai_strategia_feher_konyv.pdf (accessed on September 18, 2015).

¹¹ J. Boda, *op. cit.*

2002. This was the biggest single military unit in terms of military hardware and the troop numbers deployed and maintained by the HDF.

From an American and NATO perspective, of greater importance was probably the support provided by Hungary to the hundreds of thousands of NATO troops transported to the military theater through major Hungarian military bases between 1995 and 2002. According to former Chief of Staff General Zoltán Szenes, this “successful Hungarian contribution to Bosnian peacekeeping operations provided significant weight to the invitation issued by NATO for Hungarian membership” in 1997.¹²

While the Hungarian Defense Forces decreased in size between 1989 and 2010, the average number of troops sent on peacekeeping and crisis management missions remained at around 900–1,200. Since joining NATO in 1999, around 70 per cent of the Hungarian soldiers deployed have served in NATO-led missions.¹³ The HDF have kept only a symbolic presence in the UN missions (ten personnel in MINURSO and four in UNIFIL). Hungary provided a modest contribution to almost all of the EU CSDP missions (EUFOR ALTHEA, EUJUST LEX Kosovo, EUPOL Afghanistan, EUTM Mali, EUTM Somalia etc.).

In recent decades Hungary’s crisis response tools have been focused on Afghanistan. Kabul received most of the Hungarian development assistance, overtaking traditional priority regions like the Balkans. More than 50 per cent of HDF troops (around 550 personnel) deployed to crisis management missions have participated in various NATO missions in Afghanistan, thus Hungary has provided more forces to Afghanistan in proportion to the size of its economy than most other allies.

Kosovo

The Western Balkans region has traditionally been of great importance to Hungary. Its shared history and shared borders with former Yugoslav countries along with the existence of Hungarian minorities in neighboring states have all contributed to the region being permanently in the focus of Hungarian foreign and security policy. For these reasons crisis management missions in Kosovo stand out from other international crisis management operations in Hungarian security policy. In fact, this is the only region in which Hungary aims to become a credible security provider and thus its actions and contributions are not driven by the interests or the pressure of the Alliance.

¹² Z. Szenes, “Peacekeeping in the Hungarian armed forces,” *AARMS* Vol 6, No. 4, 2007, p. 122.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

Given its geographic location, Hungary played a crucial role in the first stage of the NATO war against Yugoslavia, mostly by providing free access through its national airspace to NATO operations. Many of the fighter jets attacking Yugoslav targets departed from the Taszár airbase, which had previously been an important transport hub for the NATO peacekeeping mission in Bosnia beginning in late 1995.

In 1999 Hungary contributed a light infantry battalion (around 300 troops) to KFOR, tasked with guarding KFOR bases and installations in and around Pristina. The force remained there for ten years. Although KFOR troop numbers shrank almost continually from the original 45,000, Hungary retained a battalion size presence until 2011 (although the battalion was transformed into a maneuver infantry battalion and moved to Peć/Peja in 2009).¹⁴

As the security environment improved in 2010, the North Atlantic Council authorized KFOR to further reduce the number of troops to approximately 5,000. In 2011 the Hungarian maneuver battalion was withdrawn and a company level unit was added to KFOR. This unit was part of the KFOR Commander's Tactical Reserve Maneuver Battalion and was trained intensively in combat riot control techniques. In the last couple of years it has been deployed several times in the most violent parts of northern Kosovo where the majority of the Serb community lives.

Balancing the withdrawal of Hungarian troops from Afghanistan, Hungary actively sought an opportunity to increase its presence within KFOR. From 2014 another maneuver infantry company was added to the Hungarian contingent as part of Multinational Battle Group East bringing overall troop numbers to around 350. The increase in the number of Hungarian troops at a time when overall KFOR was decreasing in size (around 4,600 troops) also shows the primacy of the Kosovo mission for Hungary.¹⁵

Hungary also participated in various non-military missions from the beginning. The European Union's rule of law mission (EULEX Kosovo) saw a major Hungarian contribution. The 50-strong (mainly) civilian contingent was the biggest Hungarian non-military participation in an international crisis management operation ever. Although the numbers have decreased since 2008 (currently 15 police officers are deployed to EULEX Kosovo), the Hungarian contribution to EULEX has grown proportionally as the mission has downsized. Members of the Hungarian police force have played a cru-

¹⁴ W. Gozicki, P. Hlaváček, J. Ušiak, P. Wagner, *Security policies of the Visegrad Group countries*, Lublin: Instytut Sadecko Lubelski, 2014, p. 62.

¹⁵ "Hungary KFOR contingent fully ready for peacekeeping, says ministry," *Politics.hu*, August 24, 2014. Available online: <http://www.politics.hu/20140824/hungary-kfor-contingent-fully-ready-for-peacekeeping-says-ministry/> (accessed on September 18, 2015).

cial role in the capability building of the local police, while Hungarian law enforcement personnel fulfill a wide range of responsibilities.

With regards to international development assistance, Kosovo has been one of the so-called project based partners. In 2008, at the first major donor conference after the declaration of independence, Hungary offered around 2 million USD in aid. The Hungarian contribution focused on two areas. One of them was helping establish Kosovo's new system of personal documents, providing blank secondary personnel documents to high security standards. The other was a capacity building and training project for local governments and state administration including the National Assembly of Kosovo, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo and the Ministry of Local Government Administration of Kosovo.¹⁶

Afghanistan

Hungarian participation in the state building of Afghanistan had a transformative impact on the country's crisis management mechanism. This was the first time Budapest had used all of its available tools (armed forces, police, diplomatic staff and development aid) in a coordinated manner.

Hungary's involvement started in 2002 when it sent humanitarian aid and Hungarian police officers to the German Police Project Office. With NATO taking over the ISAF mission in 2003, the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) deployed their first units to Afghanistan. Between 2003 and 2006 Hungary sent a medical unit and a reinforced maneuver company to Kabul. Concentrating all of its forces in one location, Hungary took over the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Baghlan province, northern Afghanistan, from the Netherlands. Hungary was the first V4 country to operate its "own" PRT.

Operating a PRT was the most complex Hungarian crisis management mission ever. The HDF had to make use of all the experience it had gained on previous international peacekeeping missions, while simultaneously preparing for new types of challenges especially after 2009 when the Taliban-led insurgency spread to districts in the provinces. Although the 200–240-strong Hungarian PRT was criticized several times for actively engaging insurgents, it did not have the political support from Budapest nor the necessary training and military hardware for counterinsurgency operations.¹⁷

This was the first time on crisis management missions that Hungarian diplomats and police officers (later, from 2007 part of EUPOL Afghanistan)

¹⁶ "Inspired by experience: Hungarian development cooperation," Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, p. 19. Available online: <http://www.mfa.gov.hu/NR/rdonlyres/09524B2E-76D7-4DCC-ADF6-67D3E1A14FA7/0/InspiredByExperience.pdf> (accessed on September 18, 2015).

¹⁷ W. Gozicki, P. Hlaváček, J. Ušiak, P. Wagner, op. cit., pp. 62–3.

had been co-deployed with the military. Hungarian NGOs outside the wire implemented humanitarian and international development projects funded by the Hungarian state and other donors (Japan and Greece). The total amount of development aid channeled through Hungarian NGOs and PRT in Baghlan was approximately 5 million EUR.¹⁸

As training the Afghan National Security Forces has become NATO's top priority, Hungary has also increased its involvement as well. From 2009 on a 60-strong Hungarian–US Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) was deployed in Baghlan province. Based at a different military base, the OMLT have mentored a newly deployed Afghan infantry battalion in the province until 2013. Also from 2009 on a Special Forces A team (12 person) was deployed to East Afghanistan under US command (periodically this unit was doubled in size and augmented with a command element). This contingent is the only one to operate without national caveats.

Under the Afghanistan NATO Training Mission, Hungary provided a few skilled trainers. Together with Czech and US mentors, Hungarian pilots were part of Mi-8/17 transport and Mi-24 attack helicopter mentor teams and a detachment was also deployed to the Combat Service Support (CSS) School in Kabul. Hungary also contributed to the operation of Kabul International Airport in 2010 as the lead nation, and in 2012 as a provider of a force protection battalion.

Hungary's contribution to the ISAF mission was significant. As mentioned earlier, Hungary aims to have 1,000 troops that can be deployed in crisis management missions at any given time. Between 2011 and 2012 around 550 soldiers were deployed to Afghanistan, which proves how important NATO priorities were for Hungary. Another telling figure is that of the 28 members of NATO, Hungary – and the other V4 countries – were among the top ten countries in terms of GDP/deployed soldier ratio in Afghanistan.¹⁹

Until the closure of the PRT in 2013, the reconstruction team was Hungary's flagship project. In preparation for the post-ISAF, post-2014 period, at the Chicago NATO summit, Hungary committed 1.5 million USD from 2015 to 2017 to financially sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). There are around 150 Hungarian troops deployed in staff, advisor, force protection and special forces roles in the Resolute Support mission.

¹⁸ P. Wagner, Z. Venczel, "Hungary's international development assistance in Afghanistan," *Demnet Research papers*, 2012, p. 5. Available online: http://www.demnet.hu/images/stories/B_kiadvanyok/nemzetkozi_afganisztan/tanulmany02_eng2.pdf (accessed on September 18, 2015).

¹⁹ T.A. Nagy, P. Wagner, "NATO and Afghanistan: What role for Visegrád countries?" *CEPI Policy brief*, February 5, 2013. Available online: <http://www.cepolicy.org/publications/nato-and-afghanistan-what-role-visegrad-countries> (accessed on September 18).

Ukraine

CIS countries have always played a minor role in Hungarian foreign policy compared to the Western Balkans. There are historical reasons for this and this did not change substantially after 1989. The only exceptions were Ukraine and Moldova.

Hungarian foreign policy towards Ukraine – and other neighboring countries – has been dominated by interest in the status of the Hungarian minority (around 150,000 Hungarians live in the Zakarapattya region in Transcarpathia), and support for the rights of the minorities. Kiev was also given special consideration as Budapest was strongly dependent on Ukrainian gas transit. In 2013 approximately 80 per cent of Hungary's gas consumption was imported from Russia, and Russia has also been a key player in supplying Hungary's nuclear power plant in Paks.²⁰

Since the revolution in Ukraine, two main messages have been emphasized by the Hungarian government. Firstly, Hungary explicitly supports Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and sees a strong, economically and politically stable Ukraine as being in its interests. Secondly, the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia enjoys overall priority and the Ukrainian government must respect minority rights.²¹

The nature of the conflict in Ukraine has meant that the main emphasis has been on providing international development assistance as an available crisis response tool. In recent years, Hungary has supported Ukraine both on a bilateral and multilateral basis, but it was only after 2014 when the first International Development Cooperation Strategy was adopted that Kiev became a priority for Hungary. Total aid provided to Ukraine amounts to 7.8 million USD, however 90 per cent of this is targeted at Hungarian minorities living across the border. The remainder of Ukraine received approximately 750,000 USD in development assistance²². The 330,000 EUR humanitarian aid provided for Ukraine in 2014 was intended to help deal with the Maidan crisis and ease the tension resulting from intensified fighting in eastern Ukraine.

The financial support provided for Zakarapattya Oblast has mainly been to help preserve the cultural and linguistic identity of Hungarian communities. The largest project is the 486 million HUF subsidy for nursery and school

²⁰ A. Racz, "From pragmatism to bear hug: Hungary's Russia policy on the eve of the Ukraine crisis," *Visegrad Revue*, December 29, 2014. Available online: <http://visegradrevue.eu/from-pragmatism-to-bear-hug-hungarys-russia-policy-on-the-eve-of-the-ukraine-crisis/> (accessed on September 18, 2015).

²¹ The Hungarian government emphasizes these messages regularly, see for example: "Szijjártó meets Transcarpathia Hungarian organization, local leaders in Ukraine," *Politics.hu*, January 23, 2015.

²² Information provided to the author by the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

teachers, which affects 2,000 teachers in this area. Approximately 116 million HUF was earmarked for meal allowances in schools and pre-schools. Hungary also provides substantial support for the renovation of educational institutions, having contributed to the rebuilding of several pre-schools, schools, the University of Uzhhorod and the university library.²³ The underlying motive behind such projects is to encourage Hungarian parents to send their children to Hungarian schools, and thus halt the process of assimilation.

The assistance granted to Kiev was to support the reform of the public administration. In relation to this Hungary provides help with harmonization procedures and training civil servants.

Hungary is also active in supporting Ukraine in multilateral forums through international organizations. The 900-strong OSCE/ODIHR observer mission tasked with overseeing the presidential elections of May 25, 2014, included 15 Hungarian delegates. Hungary is currently preparing its contribution to the OSCE/ODIHR observer mission for the municipal elections to be held on October 25, 2015.

Astrid Thors, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities launched a one-year long project starting in April 2014 to ensure her office has a continuous presence in the country and to monitor developments affecting national minorities. Hungary provided 20,000 EUR for the implementation of this project.

Hungary provided 10,000 EUR in 2013–2014 and 14,000 EUR for 2015–2017 for the Council of Europe Action Plan for Ukraine to support the enhancement of democratic institutions, the consolidation of the rule of law and the protection of human rights. In order to finance the youth projects under the same initiative, the Hungarian Ministry of Human Capacities provided an additional 10,000 EUR.²⁴

In response to a request issued by the NATO–Ukraine Committee in May 2014 to improve Ukrainian defense capabilities, Hungary is contributing, for instance, a 100,000 EUR injection to the fund created to advance NATO cyber security capacities.

Also following the Committee's request, Hungary committed to providing English language courses for 20 Ukrainian officers in 2014–2015, as well as treatment for 20 wounded Ukrainian soldiers in Hungary and also training sessions for bomb disposal experts. Providing assistance in the field of energy security is another unique but crucial component of support for Ukraine. Hungary provided reverse gas flow for Ukraine in 2014.

²³ "Szijjártó meets Transcarpathia Hungarian organization, local leaders in Ukraine," *op. cit.*

²⁴ Information concerning Hungary's contributions to the OSCE missions and the Action Plan for Ukraine was provided to the author by the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Hungary abruptly suspended this in September 2014 claiming it needed to fill its storage capacities before the winter and reverse flow was restarted only in January 2015. The suspension coincided with Alexei Miller's visit to Budapest making the Hungarian action the target of strong domestic and international criticism.²⁵

Hungary supported the various crisis management missions from the initial phases and participated according to its capabilities. Hungary seconded 25 experts to the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) set up by the OSCE in March 2014. There were 10 regional teams and Hungarian diplomat István Venczel led the Ivano-Frankivs mission. Between March 2014 and March 2015 the SMM was mainly financed by voluntary contributions, and in 2014, Hungary also contributed 100,000 euros.²⁶

Hungary has delegated two experts to the EU's Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine). The Head of Mission of the EUAM Ukraine is Kálmán Mizsei, who previously held the position of EU's Special Representative (EUSR) for the Republic of Moldova.

Conclusion

Twenty-five years after the fall of communism, Hungary's military, civilian and humanitarian engagement in crisis management missions underwent a significant change. In the 1990s the priority was military operations, mainly for two reasons. Firstly, Hungary was the only V4 country that shared a border with former Yugoslavia, and hence its security was affected by the ongoing conflict there. Hungary considered HDF involvement in the various crisis management missions to be a primary interest. Secondly, Hungary used one of its crisis management tools to enhance its prospects for future NATO accession by offering Hungarian airspace to the AWACS surveillance mission, and later providing a staging base for US forces, and finally committing substantial military forces to IFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Accession to the EU led to other crisis management assets, like development aid and the police force becoming more important. After 2004 Hungary had to design and implement its own international development programs. Although its financial resources remain limited, Hungary has developed significant know-how in the last few years through development assistance engagements. Hungary's EU accession increased its policing capacity as well. While before 2004 only a handful of experts were deployed to the various

²⁵ "Hungary restarts gas supplies to Ukraine," *The Daily Observer*, January 13, 2015. Available online: <http://www.observerbd.com/2015/01/13/66179.php> (accessed on September 2015).

²⁶ This information was provided to the author by the Ministry of Interior.

UN and MFO missions, Hungary is now permanently involved in the EU-led crisis management missions.

In the last couple of years the security landscape in Europe and the Middle East has undergone dynamic change. Although crisis management will remain one of NATO's three core tasks, it is expected that in the future more resources will be allocated to collective defense. Hungary will have to increase its international development assistance and allocate more resources to the least developed countries. Furthermore, it will have to shift its assistance to areas that are less connected to its traditional foreign policy priorities of the Balkans or Eastern Neighborhood countries. This will not mean that assistance to Kosovo or the Ukraine for example will be stopped, but it will have to be channeled through different frameworks.

Development of Polish crisis management tools

Wojciech Lorenz

Poland has a long history of contributing to international missions. Since 1953 Polish military staff have participated in international commissions and observer teams monitoring the armistice on the Korean Peninsula and in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Nigeria. In 1973, during the détente in relations between the West and the Soviet bloc, Poland became the first member of the Warsaw Pact to be invited to serve on the UN mission (UNEF II) in the Middle East. But it was only after the democratic changes in 1989 that crisis management missions gained new significance and became an important foreign policy tool used to advance Polish reintegration with the West. Today, Poland, a country of 38 million people, is an important member of NATO and is the seventh biggest economy in the European Union. It seems quite natural that it should have a growing interest in maintaining the broader stability of the transatlantic area through active and effective CR activities.

Evolution of CRM doctrine

Despite slight shifts in priorities from government to government over the last quarter of a century, Poland's major strategic aims have remained unchanged; its major pillars of multilateral security architecture have been NATO and EU integration and bolstering the two organizations following accession, and strengthening the OSCE and UN as well. With the security environment in Europe undergoing significant changes, Poland has been developing different tools to achieve its strategic goals, with crisis management capability receiving regular attention in national security strategies. In 1992 Poland published its first security strategy reflecting the major geopolitical changes in Europe brought about by the collapse of the USSR, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the reunification of Germany.²⁷ The document signaled that the main threat to Poland could emanate from the lack of stability in the former USSR with the major risks taking the form

²⁷ S. Koziej, "Współczesne problemy bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego i narodowego, Annex 8," [Contemporary issues of international and national security] Założenia polskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa oraz polityka bezpieczeństwa i strategia obronna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, [Foundations of Polish security policy and security policy and defense strategy of Poland] Warszawa, 2003, pp. 227–39.

of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and mass migration. Although Russian troops were still stationed on Polish territory, the new doctrine claimed that Poland's strategic aim was to gain membership of NATO and the Western European Union. The importance of the US for NATO and European security was also stressed. Poland had already declared it would militarily contribute to the UN peace operations and other sorts of missions organized by the UN, the CSCE (renamed the OSCE in 1995), NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Council (NACC) and the Western European Union.

After joining NATO in 1999 Poland stressed, in its new National Security Strategy (2000), that the biggest threat to international and Polish stability were not state adversaries but external crises, which might be political–military or non-military in character.²⁸ Poland declared that to maintain stability it was ready to share its transformative experience with other states, especially in the Eurasian area. It also confirmed support for UN, OSCE and NATO peace operations and crisis management activities and for developing European CRM capabilities. Interestingly, it also acknowledged the importance of a civilian component, including the police, in the new type of peace operation and indicated that it would adjust its capabilities accordingly.

A further boost to the development of the Polish crisis management doctrine came after the September 11 terrorist attacks against the US in 2001. The National Security Strategy published in 2003 pointed out that it was crucial for Polish security to support the NATO adaptation to make the Alliance more responsive to global threats such as terrorism, but without it losing its primary collective defense function.²⁹ Poland emphasized the significance of CSDP and declared its support for developing military and civilian European capabilities which could be used in EU peace operations. At the same time it was ready to support UN missions by making a civilian, military and police contribution. In line with these priorities, the Polish armed forces were to be transformed from static to more mobile, highly trained units able to liaise with civilians and deal with military and non-military threats inside and outside the country. For the first time the strategy advocated the creation of a comprehensive approach to internal and external threats. Although there was mention of the OSCE as an important stability mechanism, this was not placed in the context of crisis management.

²⁸ Ibid, Annex 9, pp. 241–56.

²⁹ “Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej,” [National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland] Transcript of the meeting of the National Security Council, September 8, 2003. Available online: <http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwalne-aktualnosci/rok-2003/art,493,posiedzenie-rady-bezpieczenstwa-narodowego.html> (accessed on September 28, 2015).

In 2007, three years after EU accession, Poland published a national strategy which was harmonized with the EU Security Strategy (2003) and the NATO Strategic Concept (1999).³⁰ It indicated that Polish troops should develop the necessary operational capabilities to provide extensive support for NATO and EU missions, but also to participate in operations under the UN flag and coalitions of the willing. It underlined the importance of further NATO adjustment to combating non-traditional, asymmetric threats and supported the selective engagement of the Alliance out of area providing it did not diminish the ability to fulfill collective defense tasks. Poland announced it would contribute to the development of EU rapid reaction units, including through the development of EU Battle Groups, and pledged to enhance its contribution to EU development aid, which was described as an important instrument for neutralizing numerous threats. The strategy further supported the development of a comprehensive approach to CRM with the broader use of civilian security assets, such as police and fire fighting units.³¹

In 2009 the growing significance of crisis management for Polish security was underlined by the adoption of the first ever comprehensive Strategy for the Use of the Armed Forces in International Operations.³² The strategy provides a very detailed picture of the Polish crisis management priorities which could be managed using military capabilities. According to the strategy, Poland should be able to deploy between 3,200 and 3,800 troops to international missions. The strategy offers flexibility both in cooperation and geographical scope. Poland is ready to contribute to NATO, EU, UN, OSCE missions and ad hoc coalitions, where the first two organizations are perceived as being the most important frameworks of cooperation. Although it is suggested that the missions should have a UN mandate, Security Council approval is not a precondition for Polish participation. There are also no geographical boundaries of Polish engagement in international operations.

Poland updated its national strategy again in 2014³³ following the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the eruption of conflict in eastern Ukraine,

³⁰ "Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej," [National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland] Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 13, 2007. Available online: <http://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/7d18e04d-8f23-4128-84b9-4f426346a112> (accessed on September 28, 2015).

³¹ Firefighting units have specialized capabilities which can be used during search and rescue and humanitarian operations.

³² "Strategia Udziału Sił Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Operacjach Międzynarodowych," [Polish strategy for the participation in international operations] Bureau of National Security, 2009. Available online: https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/01/strategia_udzialu_szrp_w_operacjach_miedzynarodowych.pdf (accessed on September 28, 2015).

³³ "Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej," [National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland] Bureau of National Security, November 5, 2014. Available online: <https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/SBN%20RP.pdf> (accessed on September 28, 2015).

which was widely interpreted as a sign Russia was ready to use force to achieve its foreign policy goals in what it perceived to be an area of privileged interests. Hence, Polish priorities shifted towards national defense, NATO collective defense, the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and bilateral strategic partnerships with selective participation in crisis management operations. Although Polish president Bronisław Komorowski signaled a shift in priorities from crisis management to territorial defense³⁴, the national strategy stresses the importance of participating in external missions but advocates that military activities should be strengthened by civilian engagement, including development aid. The strategy also underlines the importance of bolstering the UN and OSCE; however, it assesses that the effectiveness of the latter will be undermined by ever deepening divisions in Europe.

CRM in practice

The priorities embodied in the strategies, with NATO and the EU replacing the UN and the CSCE/OSCE as the major pillars of Polish security architecture, translated into the development of Polish crisis response and management capabilities as important elements of foreign policy. Since Poland had limited financial resources and significant armed forces inherited from the Warsaw Pact era, the military became the primary platform for CRM activities. In the 1990s Polish decision-makers decided to support the development of an effective expeditionary force to be placed under UN command. In 1999 Poland, together with Ukraine, activated a battalion (POLUKRBAT) of 700 troops to be used in international operations. It also became one of the six founding countries of the Multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG) and contributed a mechanized battalion to the brigade size force (4,000–5,000 troops ready to be deployed within 15–30 days of approval) which became operational in 2000. When in 2002 NATO leaders agreed in Prague to form a NATO Response Force (NRF) to improve the Alliance's expeditionary capabilities Poland decided to take the role of the leading nation in the Multinational Military Police Battalion (NATO MNMPBAT) and began contributing troops to each rotation of the multinational rapid reaction force.³⁵ It also supported the development of EU

³⁴ "Komorowski: koniec łatwego wysyłania żołnierzy na antypody," [Komorowski: the end of easy sending troops to antipodes]" *Polskie Radio*, August 15, 2013. Available online: <http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/910630,Komorowski-koniec-latwego-wysylania-zolnierzy-na-antypody> (accessed on September 28, 2015).

³⁵ "Participation of Poland in transformative initiatives of NATO," Ministry of National Defense Republic of Poland, 2011. Available online: http://archiwalny.mon.gov.pl/pliki/File/UDZIAL_POLSKI_W_INICJATYWACH_TRANSFORMACYJNYCH_NATO_2011.pdf (accessed on September 28, 2015).

capabilities by taking political and organizational leadership of the formation of the Battle Groups in 2010 (Poland, Germany, Lithuania, Slovakia, Latvia), 2013 (Weimar BG – Poland, France, Germany) and in 2016 (V4 BG – Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia).

On the operational level the opportunity to support Polish strategic goals through crisis management operations came with the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s, which became the biggest security crisis in Europe after the collapse of the USSR. Initially Poland supported the main UN peace keeping operations of UNPROFOR (1992–1995) and UNCRO (1995–1996) with a contingent of 893 soldiers based on the mechanized battalion (the force grew to 1,245 in 1995)³⁶. But with the growing inability of the UN to respond to the challenges, as reflected by the 1995 massacre of Muslims in Srebrenica, and with the steady growth in NATO's role in the region, Poland began to shift its resources to missions led by the military Alliance it was determined to join.

In 1995 Poland deployed a mechanized battalion (POLBAT) of 660 troops in support of the NATO-led IFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995–1996). This was the first time Polish troops had served under NATO command – a decision some politicians perceived to be a turning point in Polish expeditionary operations.³⁷ Once the IFOR mandate had expired and been replaced with the NATO mission in Bosnia (SFOR), Poland deployed a mechanized battalion of 500 troops and in 1999 again contributed to the NATO-led AFOR mission in Albania with a maneuver company of 140 soldiers.

NATO accession in 1999 and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the US influenced the motives behind the Polish contribution to operations and crisis management activities. To demonstrate solidarity and strengthen relations with the US – the biggest NATO member crucial to European security – Poland joined the US-led operation to topple the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (2002) by providing a small contingent of logisticians, sappers and special forces and participated in the US-led operation to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq (2003), contributing 2,500 troops at later stages and taking over responsibility for one of the provinces. However, with the Iraq war turning into a political and military liability, Poland gradu-

³⁶ J. Kajetanowicz, "The Polish Army in the international security operations 1973-2008," *Akademia Obrony Narodowej*. [Academy of National Security] Available online: http://www.dsw.edu.pl/fileadmin/user_upload/wydawnictwo/RBM/RBM_artykuly/2010_11.pdf (accessed on September 28, 2015).

³⁷ "Transcript of the session of the Foreign Affairs and National Defence Committee of the Polish Sejm. Biuletyn 599/4," Sejm of the Republic of Poland, May 21, 2002. Available online: <http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Biuletyn.nsf/0/4F057E2FE05DF508C1256BE500356F25?OpenDocument> (accessed on September 28, 2015).

ally withdrew its forces and invested significant resources in the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan.

Concurrently Polish governments chose to promote strategic goals and strengthen international stability by contributing to EU missions. In 2003, a year before EU accession, Poland designated forces to join operation EUFOR Concordia in Macedonia (17 troops out of 320). After the accession major operations included EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004 (190 troops out of 4,500), EUFOR RD Congo in 2006 (130 military police out of 1,400) and EUFOR Chad/ Central African Republic in 2007 (400 troops out of 3,700 – the second biggest contingent after France). Poland provided military and civilian experts to a number of smaller missions including: EUBAM (Moldova, Ukraine), EUJUST LEX Iraq, EUPOL Afghanistan, EUMM Georgia, EUTM Mali and most recently EUAM Ukraine. The shift in priorities from UN missions to NATO and EU operations was sealed in 2009 by the decision to withdraw Polish troops completely from UNDOF at Golan Heights and UNIFIL in Lebanon where Polish soldiers had served for 35 and 17 years respectively. Polish participation in the mission in Chad, which was taken over by the UN, was also terminated.

Of all the major missions, it is worth providing more detail on those in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Ukraine. On the operational level they serve as perfect examples of Polish attitudes to CRM and the ability to use the different tools required for achieving both broader foreign policy goals, as well as the aims of the missions.

Kosovo

Poland's accession to NATO in 1999 coincided with the operation in Kosovo (KFOR) – the first out of area mission in the history of the Alliance. Hence, as a new member state trying to enhance its credibility as a security provider but also hoping to speed up the modernization of its armed forces through operational cooperation with the Allies, Poland decided to contribute substantial resources to the operation.

A significant amount of Polish diplomatic activity aimed at stabilizing Kosovo was channeled through the OSCE, in which Poland has gained influence over its decades of membership. In response to the deteriorating security situation in Kosovo, Poland, which had been chair of the OSCE in 1998, helped to establish a 1,500-strong Kosovo Verification Mission (OSCE-KVM, October–June 1999), which, with 20 Polish observers, was the biggest OSCE operation ever. Being aware of the decision-making limitations of the OSCE which at that time comprised 55 states, Polish diplomats advocated closer cooperation and coordination between the OSCE and the more homogeneous and able to act organizations of NATO

and the EU³⁸. These efforts resulted in the Alliance setting up a special task force to evacuate OSCE observers in case there should be a sudden deterioration in security. OSCE and NATO cooperation also facilitated the development of an early warning mechanism based on the exchange of information gathered by the monitoring mission and NATO, which established an aerial surveillance mission over Kosovo.

The Polish experience of democratic reforms meant it considered it important that the OSCE establish an Ombudsman post in Kosovo as an important element in the human rights protection system. Following the efforts of the Polish foreign ministry, a dedicated human rights lawyer from Poland, Prof. Marek Antoni Nowicki was chosen as the first candidate for the post³⁹. Support for the Ombudsman institution was continued through the Visegrad Group–Western Balkans Expert Network, established in 2013 during the Polish presidency of V4.

Given the deteriorating situation in Kosovo, Poland was ready to provide extensive support with operational police and military contingents. Warsaw supported the UNMIK mission which was formed in 1999 and replaced in 2008 by EULEX – the biggest EU mission within the Common Security and Defense Policy. From the very beginning Poland delegated a substantial police contingent to Kosovo to support the mission. It was one of only a few countries to contribute 115 policemen from a special police unit – a force of choice to be used in high risk operations (protecting convoys, witnesses and minorities, crowd control during riots). The contingent was also augmented by up to 20 experts from the police, customs services, and prison wardens (CIVPOL) who had supported local operational activities and had participated in security sector reform activities. Altogether the Polish contribution to policing in Kosovo is the biggest contingent in Polish police history.

The military contribution was even more significant, although only a fraction of the overall 50,000-strong force. At the beginning of the NATO KFOR mission in 1999 Poland deployed an 800-strong mechanized battalion, but on the request of the Alliance it also agreed to send another battalion for a short period of time, and the Polish contribution reached almost 1,350 soldiers in 2000 when Poland maintained the seventh biggest

³⁸ “Transcript of the session of Foreign Affairs Committee of the Polish Sejm. Biuletyn 1248/III,” Sejm of the Republic of Poland, January 19, 1999. Available online: <http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Biuletyn.nsf/0/1A5369B959450939C1256B73003641C9?OpenDocument> (accessed on September 28, 2015).

³⁹ “Response of the Minister of Foreign Affairs about Polish participation in OSCE mission in Kosovo,” Sejm of the Republic of Poland, October 24, 2000. Available online: <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/IZ3.nsf/main/16656830> (accessed on September 28, 2015).

contingent among NATO members.⁴⁰ After only a couple of months into the operation the main Polish battalion was replaced by the Polish–Ukrainian POLUKRBAT unit (Polish 550, Ukrainian 320) supported by a company of Lithuanian soldiers. The area of responsibility and the size of the contingent changed over the years to contain 230 soldiers and civilians in 2015, but as the mission decreased overall to 4,600 troops, Poland became the eight biggest contributor out of 31 countries. Following the withdrawal of operational troops from Afghanistan, the Kosovo mission became the biggest Polish out of area military operation. It seems however, that not all the lessons from Afghanistan have been implemented and used to the benefit of the Kosovo mission, especially in areas of tactical capabilities. Sometimes the Liaison Mentoring Teams (LMT) responsible for maintaining good relations with the local population did not include a single female member, crucial for making contact with local women.⁴¹

Poland has contributed significant financial resources to support the crisis management activities in Kosovo, with the cost of the police and military presence exceeding on 10 million USD a year in 2012. However, the picture of bilateral and multilateral channel financial support, an important part of crisis management, is rather mixed due to the low level of Polish Official Development Aid (ODA). In 1999 at the beginning of its civilian military engagement in Kosovo, ODA amounted to 0.01 per cent of GDP (approx. 50 million USD) and reached 0.08 per cent of GDP (approx. 400 million USD) in 2014. The majority of the ODA was channeled through multilateral organizations, with the EU becoming the most important. Since Kosovo was not on the ODA priority list and most of the resources were consumed by the mission in Afghanistan, Polish bilateral support was rather symbolic. Nevertheless, it was balanced by the significant engagement of a number of Polish NGOs in Kosovo. In 1999 Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH) established a permanent office in the province, and a year later was able to send humanitarian help worth 250 million USD, with some projects being coordinated and financed by the foreign ministry.

Afghanistan

For Poland, the mission in Afghanistan was a major demonstration of solidarity with the US following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and it also became a crisis management operation crucial to the credibility

⁴⁰ “Transcript of the session of the Foreign Affairs and National defense Committee of the Polish Sejm. Biuletyn 2846/III,” Sejm of the Republic of Poland, May 25, 2000. Available online: <http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Biuletyn.nsf/0/724DD8E45CB2A0A5C1256B73003C042B?OpenDocument> (accessed on September 28, 2015).

⁴¹ R. Zieliński, “Bałkańskie reminiscencje,” [Balkan Reminiscences] *Przegląd Sił Zbrojnych*, No. 2, 2014, pp. 68–71.

of NATO. Poland participated almost from the very beginning in the US Enduring Freedom operation providing 200 special forces troops, sappers, logisticians, and a multi-task logistical ship (the *ORP Xawery Czernicki*), but it then decided to support the US in another priority mission in Iraq. Only after 2007, with the growing size and mandate of the ISAF mission and the gradual withdrawal of Polish troops from Iraq, did the size and scope of the Polish contribution in Afghanistan increase significantly. Poland put its troops under ISAF command, established Task Force White Eagle (TF WE), and took over responsibility for Ghazni province. From 2010 to 2011, Poland had the seventh biggest contingent in Afghanistan with up to 2,600 troops and civilians on the ground. The Afghan mission became the biggest ever Polish stability operation with 28,000 soldiers and civilians participating in the US-led Enduring Freedom operation and the XIV operational rotations under ISAF command.

With no limitations (caveats) on the missions performed by the military, the security contingents were mainly involved in stabilization tasks (including kinetic missions) and training the ANSF. With Polish operational units troops gathered in Ghazni, they could carry out training for ANSF local units using a more coordinated approach and on a relatively big scale. Polish soldiers provided mentoring and supported the operations of the 3rd Brigade 203th Corps, numbering approximately 4,600 soldiers. The Polish military police who ran the Police Training Centre on the outskirts of Ghazni city also trained more than 9,000 Afghan police officers, including women. Additionally, Polish Special Forces trained an elite anti-terrorist unit of the Provincial Response Company (PRC), and personnel belonging to Afghanistan's intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security (NDS). Polish soldiers were also on duty 24/7 at the Operations Coordination Centre at the provincial level, facilitating information sharing between the ANA, the ANP, the NDS and international troops and providing a common picture of operations and enhancing ANSF command and control ability.

In line with NATO's comprehensive approach doctrine, Poland also demonstrated a commitment to developing civilian security in the heavily militarized environment. The Polish military deployed two specialists to the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission, which was intended to facilitate civilian efforts in developing the judiciary. The TF WE helped establish the first ever firefighting unit in Ghazni, which required not only providing Afghan police with specialized training and equipment but also coordination with Polish administration, which provided some training in Poland. From 2008 Poland was also involved in the EU police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL), but since it was contributing significantly to ISAF, it decided to deploy only three officers.

At the same time Poland attempted to maximize the impact of its stability activities by adopting the concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams

(PRT), which became a major support mechanism for security sector reform, reconstruction and development. In 2008, Poland joined the US-led PRT in Ghazni. Within five years a largely independent unit of 20 to 30 military and civilian personnel had completed more than 190 projects worth 22 million USD. One of the landmark security projects was the establishment of the Crisis Management Center in Ghazni, which was to coordinate the responses of the different administrative bodies to major accidents and catastrophes.

The funding for the projects were provided and overseen by the Polish foreign ministry and at a later stage by the defense ministry. Additionally Poland provided development through the Polish embassy in Kabul and via NGOs. Moreover, Poland provided assistance to Afghanistan through voluntary contributions to international institutions and organizations such as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund and the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which pays for the costs of the ANP. Since 2008, Poland has invested 35 million USD in development and civilian projects including security sector reform.

Ukraine

Poland's strategic priority is to help Ukraine develop into a stable, democratic and predictable state that has good relations with its neighbors. Poland, which consequently supported the pro-western aspirations of Ukrainians, was one of the most vocal advocates of international support for Ukraine when the country began to slide into internal conflict following then president Victor Yanukovich's decision to postpone the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU and the use of force against the protesters. From the very beginning Poland tried to manage the developing crisis through the EU and OSCE using the experience and political clout amassed by Jan Tombinski (the head of the EU Delegation to Ukraine) Adam Kobieracki (the OSCE's Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre) and Donald Tusk (President of the EU Council since December 2014).

Already in December 2013 when the Ukrainian security services used brutal force against peaceful demonstrations, Polish MEPs supported the European Parliament's call for the immediate launch of an EU mediation mission at the highest political level to secure a peaceful outcome to the crisis. One of the channels of communication considered was the European Parliament Monitoring Mission led by former president of the European parliament Pat Cox and former president of Poland Aleksander Kwaśniewski, who had earlier traveled to Ukraine to monitor the fate of imprisoned former Ukrainian prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko. But in February 2014, with the security situation deteriorating and dozens of people killed during protests, the foreign ministers of Germany (Frank Walter Steinmeier), France (Laurent

Fabius) and Poland (Radosław Sikorski) went to Kiev to negotiate a truce between the government and opposition. Poland also actively and effectively lobbied in the EU for the imposition of sanctions against the Ukrainian officials responsible for the bloodshed.

At the same time Poland advocated establishing an OSCE monitoring mission in Ukraine as attempts to send observer teams were being blocked by Russia. To circumvent the Russian veto 40 unarmed military observers from 21 OSCE countries, including two Polish experts, were sent to Crimea on an ad hoc visit. This visit was made possible by the invitation of the Ukrainian government under Chapter III of Vienna Document 2011, which allows for the “voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about unusual military activities.” However, Russia argued that the delegation, consisting only of representatives of NATO countries, was not objective and so the observers were not allowed access to the peninsula. Nevertheless, the initiative offered some valuable situational awareness and probably helped exert pressure on the OSCE to agree to deploy a civilian mission a couple of weeks later.

A civilian Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) agreed by consensus could only begin on March 21, 2014, three days after the formal annexation of Crimea sealed by the treaty signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and the pro-Russian authorities of the peninsula. Poland delegated 14 specialists to a 466-strong mission (at the end of 2014) and took leadership of the SMM group operating in Lviv. By the end of 2014 the Polish financial contribution for the mission amounted 170,000 EUR.

On July 22, 2014, after the intensive efforts of the former Polish government to build consensus in the EU in support of Ukraine, member state foreign ministers approved the decision to send a police mission to Ukraine. A two-year EUAM mission was a part of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy, and was supposed to facilitate the reform of the security sector at interior ministry level. Poland declared it would send ten policemen to the mission, which initially contained 70 international experts and had the potential to be expanded to 100 people. The cost of the Polish participation was estimated to be 200,000 EUR a year.

Although NATO is mainly perceived by Poland to be a pillar of collective defense, Polish politicians and diplomats used the available channels of cooperation to generate the political will necessary for the Alliance to use its political clout and where possible military support for the conflict resolution in Ukraine. Witnessing the developments in Crimea where Russian special forces were taking control of military installations, Poland invoked Art. 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which allows a country feeling threatened to call for consultations and discussion on potential developments. This was only the fourth such case in its history – the three previous emergency meetings had been called by Turkey.

At the initiative of the Polish delegation of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (PA), Poland hosted the 87th Rose Roth Conference in October 2014, devoted to the situation in Ukraine and the consequences of the crisis for Central and Eastern Europe. Polish parliamentarians at NATO PA (with Witold Waszczykowski as the NATO PA rapporteur) promoted the resolution, which urged NATO member states to support the peaceful resolution of the Russia-backed armed conflict in eastern Ukraine and prevent it from becoming another “frozen conflict.” The document, approved in November 2014, also called for additional political, financial, economic, material and technical support for Ukraine following the NATO decision two months earlier to set up four trust funds to help Ukraine develop the necessary capacity in command, control and communications; logistics and standardization; cyber defense; and facilitate military career transition. Once the resolution had been adopted, NATO agreed to set up a fifth trust fund on medical rehabilitation in December 2014.

Conclusions

During the 25 year period after it regained sovereignty, Poland developed crisis management capabilities to advance a wide spectrum of its foreign policy and security goals. Initially the aims were limited mainly to strengthening Polish political and military potential so it could anchor itself within the Euro-Atlantic community following more than four decades of Soviet domination. Although the process is ongoing, the major strategic aims have been achieved with accession to NATO and the EU, and Poland is better positioned to advance its interests by exerting a real influence on solving crises and implementing sustainable solutions. This is of crucial importance at a time when the security environment in Europe and its vicinity is worsening, exerting immense pressure on the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. It can be expected that Polish military capabilities will still be extensively used in future with the civilian aspect of the missions growing in significance. Poland’s growing political influence will translate into more effective activities through international institutions. Poland will also contribute significant financial resources to promoting stability. Although it spends less than one per cent of GDP on Official Development Aid, expenditure will be almost 0.5 billion USD in 2015. Having significant potential at its disposal and gaining new experience with every mission, Poland will have to make sure that it makes the best use of its capabilities in the future. This will require a systemic approach to civil-military engagement in international operations, which will involve structured cooperation among the major actors: the president, government (the ministries of foreign affairs, defense, the interior, finance and justice), the military and NGOs at different levels of decision making and mission execution. It is also crucial that regular assessment of mission

outcomes (both internal and independent) is performed and that the lessons learned are implemented. Only with such solutions in place will Poland be able to achieve maximum efficiency in CRM capabilities as a major tool for ensuring Polish sovereignty and prosperity in a changing geopolitical environment.

Slovakia and international crisis management

Samuel Goda

Like all the Visegrad 4 countries, Slovakia has its own approach to international crisis management derived from its previous experiences from the “Czechoslovak era” of the Warsaw Pact and particularly from the post-1993 transition. From the outset Slovakia declared its willingness to adopt a European and Euro-Atlantic direction. Nonetheless, in 1994 the government briefly opted for an unclear, unpredictable and opaque foreign and security policy, which led to Slovakia being the only V4 country not to be invited to join the first round of NATO enlargement at the Madrid Summit in 1997. Meanwhile, however, Slovak engagement with the OSCE followed a different narrative. Slovakia joined the CSCE/OSCE on January 1, 1993, immediately after gaining independence, because the OSCE opted for a more inclusive approach. From 1994 to 1998 Slovak diplomat Ján Kubiš served as director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center, the most important institution within the OSCE. After that, between 1999 and 2005, he served as OSCE secretary general. However, in general Slovakia’s international fame, despite its engagement in several UN, OSCE and NATO-led missions, was an unhappy one.

In general, Slovakia uses conventional instruments when dealing with international crisis management situations – civil and military operations and missions, reconstruction and stabilization activities and development and humanitarian aid. It contributes particular specialized capacities to multinational and international missions which when combined with those others provide should lead to greater synergy. From the regional point of view Slovakia is interested in and willing to participate in a wide range of missions, but places particular emphasis on the Balkans, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, in areas such as improving the security situation, preventing conflict, promoting confidence building measures, reconstructing and developing the economy as well as building civil society and the rule of law. As mentioned, regional preferences play a secondary role when it comes to urgent needs such as those that can be seen in Afghanistan or eastern Africa. Slovakia’s most important forms of contribution are the Slovak armed forces, civil experts including diplomats, police and customs forces and last but not least Slovak Official Development Aid programs. Which particular form of engagement is used of course depends on the needs on the ground; however, when combined all these instruments together provide the framework of Slovakia’s assets.

On the institutional level, Slovakia actively promotes Security Sector Reform. Within the UN, as chair of the informal UN member states group, it has been involved in and organized numerous events devoted to this topic. Security Sector Reform is also seen to contribute to the effective functioning of executive structures and the OSCE missions as well. As initiator and Chairman of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform/G in the OSCE, Slovakia also promoted this topic in Hofburg. Slovakia backs the creation of a handbook of the practical experience of the democratic control of armed forces and a guide to the executive structures of the OSCE.

Overview of Slovak approach to crisis management

The need to address the new security environment was reflected in a number of national security and defense documents. The first conceptual document dealing with security and defense issues was the 1994 Defense Doctrine of the Slovak Republic (Obranná doktrína SR). Of particular importance was the declared aim to transform individual defense into collective defense through participation in the Partnership for Peace program. Despite the emphasis on addressing threats to national security and sovereignty, the defense doctrine declared Slovakia's willingness to participate in international crisis management activities. This was also true of The Fundamental Aims and Principles of the National Security of the Slovak Republic (1996). The fourth principle stated that Slovakia was willing to participate in international organizations to prevent conflict and in peaceful conflict resolution missions and that it was ready to extend its participation in international peace missions.

The 1998 change of government signaled a significant shift in Slovak foreign and security policy. Slovakia not only declared its commitment to joining NATO and EU but also took several steps towards achieving it. The Security Strategy as well as the Defense Strategy and Military Strategy of 2001 reflected both this and the desire to approximate the EU and NATO approach to security thinking. The most fundamental document is the Security Strategy and the Defense and Military Strategies build upon it. The Security Strategy declared once more that Slovakia was committed to the work of the UN and OSCE, including international missions. It also states that the aim is to build a comprehensive national crisis management strategy capable of operating with UN international crisis management. The Defense and Military Strategies also indicate Slovakia's willingness, following in-depth consideration, to participate in international crisis management missions under the command of a coalition of nations, if the EU or NATO should decide not to establish and lead the mission.

In this period, from 1993 to 2003, two important highpoints can be identified in Slovak engagement in international crisis management missions. In March 1999 Slovakia opened up its airspace to NATO as required for airstrikes

in Kosovo, at that time part of Yugoslavia. This step was considered to be a sign of commitment to future NATO membership and to follow in the heels of neighboring countries – already NATO member states. The second turning point is considered to be the crisis in Iraq in 2003 and the NATO Prague Summit in the autumn of the previous year. The Prague Summit was important not only because Slovakia was invited to become a full NATO member, but also because it presented Slovakia with the opportunity to choose which areas the Slovak armed forces would specialize in and offer expertise, ultimately sapper activities, protection against WMD, special units and the military police.

The next chapter of the Slovak approach to national and international security came after NATO and EU accession in 2004 when Slovakia adopted a new and updated Security Strategy and an associated Defense Strategy in 2005. Both documents basically reiterate the main ideas of the European Security Strategy, NATO Strategy Concept and post-September 11 developments. Here Slovakia reaffirms it is willing to participate in missions outside national territory under UN, OSCE, NATO or EU mandate and that it will modernize the capacities of the Slovak armed forces to ensure interoperability with NATO and EU. The conceptual aims of modernizing the armed forces and developing defense capacities, including the then current (2006) and future challenges are reflected in Model 2015⁴², an updated version of Model 2010. In the context of international crisis management missions Model 2015 suggests that the armed forces should be prepared to participate in at least two simultaneous international crisis management operations; retain a permanent land force of up to 8 per cent for international crisis management operations and that 40 per cent of the forces must have the capacity to be deployed in these operations; ensure the rotation of troops deployed in international crisis management operations after 2010 at the level of battalion, battalion group or an equivalent up to the size of a battalion.⁴³ The 2013 White Paper on Slovak Defense states, among other things, that the future deployment of the armed forces abroad will involve hybrid methods of war, including conventional and non-conventional methods. Since 2013 the European security environment has changed significantly and this assumption can now be viewed as correct.

In July 2005 the Slovak government approved a very important document – the Concept for the Participation of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic in International Crisis Management Missions (Konceptcia účasti

⁴² “Model 2015: Dlhodobý plán rozvoja Ministerstva obrany s výhľadom do roku 2015,” [Model 2015: Long – term development plan of the Ministry of Defense with an overview to 2015] Press Department of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, 2006. Available online: <http://www.mosr.sk/data/files/834.pdf> (accessed on September 19, 2015).

⁴³ Ibid

ozbrojených síl Slovenskej republiky v operáciách medzinárodného krízového manažmentu). The aim of which is to propose a systematic approach to the military international crisis management. It also tackles the most important financial, operational and managerial issues in crisis management from the national point of view. Hence, it proposes the following procedure for deciding whether to deploy the armed forces in international crisis management missions: early warning; comprehensive expert (political, military, resource, legislative) analysis of the impact of the crisis on Slovakia's interests and obligations and the possibility of engaging the armed forces in crisis resolution; preparing and adopting the Slovak government position in decisions on further crisis solution seeking; presenting the potential engagement of the armed forces in operations to relevant international organizations via the Slovak representatives of these institutions and participation in the decision making processes within these organizations; approval of armed forces participation in line with national legislation and once an international organization has made the decision, to execute the operation and hold a planning conference; operational planning.

The Slovak defense ministry in cooperation with the foreign and finance ministries will submit to the Slovak Security Council and parliament a proposal to authorize the participation of the armed forces in a specific international crisis management operation. Other state administration bodies will also be involved in the drafting process if deemed necessary. The Slovak government and parliament will decide whether to approve participation in accordance with the legislation and on the basis of expert analysis. Moreover, the Concept proposes that a clear crisis management framework should be established so qualified decision making can be undertaken on the operational planning and deployment of the Slovak armed forces in missions abroad.

Since 2012, the Slovak foreign ministry has been mandated to provide a comprehensive annual report on Slovak engagement in complex civil and military activities related to international crisis management so Slovak engagement in missions of this nature can be assessed and analyzed. Currently, three such reports have been produced – from 2012, 2013 and 2014.

Slovak armed forces' experience in international crisis management

Since gaining independence in 1993, the Slovak Republic has undergone a unique journey towards becoming a reliable partner within the key security stakeholder organizations on the European continent – NATO, EU and OSCE. Twenty years later, Slovakia is still more of a security consumer than a provider in general terms; nonetheless, it is working progressively to improve its own capacities in defense and crisis management capabilities. In the following section we will briefly discuss Slovak engagement in inter-

national crisis management missions on different continents attempting to follow a chronological order.

The history of Slovak engagement in civil and military international crisis management and stabilization mission is relatively rich. Slovakia has participated in and completed 24 missions with up to personnel of 10,000 under the mandates of the UN, NATO, the EU and the OSCE, and is currently taking part in another five missions. In May 1993 the Slovak armed forces, particularly its sappers, took part in the UNPROFOR mission in the Croatian towns of Lipik and Daruvar. The Slovak peace force engineers battalion involved 606 troops and more than 400 pieces of equipment. The main responsibilities included sweeping, repairing roads, constructing and renovating bridges, constructing camps and checkpoints, maintaining roads in winter and, last but not least, helping local people reconstruct war-damaged infrastructure. Once the UNPROFOR mandate came to an end in January 1996, the battalion joined the UNTAES (1996–1998) mission in Eastern Slavonia, mainly performing the same tasks as in the previous mission. Slovak personnel on the UNGCI (1991–2003) mission helped protect humanitarian aid workers, Kurds and Shia Muslims. The Slovak armed forces involved in UNOMIL (1993–1997) monitored elections, investigated crimes against humanitarian law, supervised disarmament and agreements between adversaries. During the UNOMUR mission (1993–1994) members of the Slovak armed forces monitored the ceasefire on the border between Uganda and Rwanda. They continued performing these tasks in Rwanda as part of the UNAMIR mission (1993–1996), and helped provide humanitarian assistance related to the return of displaced persons. There were three stages of the UNAVEM mission in Angola (I, II, III; 1993–1997), which later became the MONUA mission (1997–1999). On this mission a total of 36 members of the Slovak armed forces gained a wealth of experience working with humanitarian and other international organizations and on disarmament programs of former enemies. As part of the UNDOF mission (1974–) between 1998 and 2008 Slovak armed forces participated in monitoring activities at several checkpoints. The armed forces were also engaged in the Balkans during the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (1998–2001) where six members were stationed. In 1999 and 2005 two Slovak monitors on the UNAMSIL mission were engaged in collecting, processing and assessing information in the field, and also in the full assessment of military threats and collecting data on the diamond business. In June 1999 the Slovak engineers battalion was stationed at the Casablanca base as part of the NATO AFOR mission, later the KFOR mission (1999–2002), where members helped reconstruct transport infrastructure and were involved in demining and constructing several local civilian buildings. This was the first ever mission in which the Slovak armed forces were an organic part of a peacekeeping mission under NATO command. After the Bosnian War, NATO established a peacekeeping

mission called SFOR (1996–2004) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The deployment of a Slovak armed forces helicopter unit to this mission strengthened Slovakia's position among the countries concerned and enhanced relations with NATO member countries. With the anticipated development of sustainable peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, participation in the SFOR operation was broadened so Slovakia had an equal position in the consultations and in preparing decisions on the international community's future engagement in the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This also created an opportunity for Slovakia to help apply strategies to reinforce the influence of European countries in solving the continent's security problems.

The Slovak army also made an important contribution to the SFOR operation in that this was the first time Slovak Air Force units had been deployed in a peacekeeping operation and the Slovak Air Force as a whole gained valuable experience in operational planning and deploying their troops in a peacekeeping operation. Slovakia deployed its engineers battalion and was therefore also involved in the UNMEE mission (2000–2004) from January 2001. In July 2001 Slovak armed forces deployed a military field hospital under the mandate of the UNMISSET mission (2001–2003). In Afghanistan Slovakia took part in Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF, which are the subject of the next section. In 2003 the Slovak parliament decided to deploy the Slovak armed forces in three missions – Enduring Freedom Kuwait (2003), Iraqi Freedom (2003–2007) and the first ever EU–CONCORDIA military operation in Macedonia (2003). In Kuwait, the Slovak armed forces operated within the First Czechoslovak chemical, radiological and biological protection battalion. The role of Slovak unit in Iraq was to perform demining and pyrotechnical work and carry out weapons and ammunition disposal on Iraqi territory. Three armed forces members were also deployed in monitoring tasks as part of the AMIS II mission (2004).

These missions are all ones in which the Slovak armed forces have already concluded their mandate or the missions have come to an end. However, they are still active in a number of missions, namely Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan (since 2015), the EUFOR Althea mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (since 2004), UNFICYP (since 2001), UNTSO (since 1998), and EUMM (since 2009). Moreover, Slovakia also has a mandate to deploy a monitor within the OSCE Mission in Moldova⁴⁴ and the OSCE Mission in Georgia. However, the mandate has yet to be fulfilled.

⁴⁴ Slovak armed forces personnel took part in the OSCE mission to Moldova between 1998 and 2002. It still has a mandate to send one expert. Slovakia also has a mandate to send two experts as part of the OSCE mission to Georgia.

Kosovo

As mentioned already, the Balkan region is one of Slovakia's long-term foreign and security priorities. It is no secret that Kosovo is still considered to be an area of instability with the mass engagement of international actors, including UN, NATO, the EU and the OSCE. One such operation was participation in the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo following a decision by the Slovak parliament made on December 16, 1998. However, the number of personnel involved was somewhat symbolic – four members of the Slovak armed forces in 1999 and two in 2000. These experts then continued to work in the transformed OMIK mission until 2001.

Despite the fact that Slovakia was not a NATO member state, it participated in an operation under NATO command – KFOR⁴⁵. On September 7, 1999, a Slovak engineers battalion numbering 40 persons became part of the Austrian AUSCON/KFOR. In September 2000 two armed forces members were stationed at mission HQ. At the beginning of 2000, twenty non-member states contributed 7,700 soldiers to the KFOR mission. In February 2002 Slovakia increased its number of soldiers to 100 on the basis of an agreement between the Czech and Slovak ministries of defense and the Slovak army. The Slovak armed forces sent a mechanized platoon to a joint Czech–Slovak mechanized battalion. The joint Czech–Slovak unit operated within Central MNB under the operational command of the United Kingdom. Funding for this came from the Ministry of Defense budget totaling around 8,766,679 million EUR in 2002. Members of the Slovak unit were in charge of patrolling and monitoring local objects, securing local infrastructure, ensuring the continued and safe return of Kosovar Serbs following the 2004 clashes. They provided protection to the Serbian minority, assistance to humanitarian organizations carrying out work in the Kosovo area and attempted to create a peaceful environment for the coexistence of Serbs and Albanians in the area they were allocated to. In 2006 another 35 members of the armed forces joined the unit, primarily to ensure logistical support for the unit. The overall cost of the mission reached 6,944,878 million EUR in 2006. Between 2007 and 2009 Slovak armed forces members in KFOR were boosted to include five experts who joined the HQ for 12 months and the armed forces also sent two Mi-17 helicopters together with a 39 member helicopter unit. Deploying the helicopters and helicopter unit members for two three-month rotations cost around 1,826 million EUR. Hence, there was a total of 140 Slovak armed forces members for the duration of Slovak participation within the mission, which ended on December 31, 2010.⁴⁶ Six members of the Slovak police force

⁴⁵ And, of course, KFOR is an integral part of UNMIK.

⁴⁶ More information can be found here: <http://www.rokovania.sk/Rokovanie.aspx/Vyhľadavanie?page=1> (accessed on September 19, 2015).

are currently working for the EULEX mission in Kosovo. Their main tasks included monitoring and advising local police on management systems and developing professional standards at regional police HQs. Some members are in charge of executive tasks relating to special police units. Their core task was to prepare and implement EU projects on the reorganization and restructuring of police forces in Kosovo.

Afghanistan

From the military point of view, the ISAF operation created on December 20, 2001 under NATO command was the largest and most important in terms of the Slovak armed forces capacities. This operation was not only about the Slovak contribution to the Allied Forces, the Slovak armed forces also benefited considerably in terms of lessons learned and capacity building. We have already mentioned Enduring Freedom which was the “predecessor” to ISAF. On December 14, 2005, the Slovak parliament decided to relocate the Slovak engineers unit from Enduring Freedom to ISAF. The unit, together with the other sapper and demining unit, was integrated into the engineers company of the multifunctional Kabul International Brigade. The specialized capacities undertaken by the Slovak armed forces were eliminating unexploded explosives, radiological, chemical and biological protection and special forces. The Slovak armed forces participated in ISAF as part of: the combat engineering unit, guard unit, field hospital, Provincial Reconstruction Team, the Train, Advise and Assist Team, National Support Element; Special Forces Unit; Communication and Information Systems; Explosive Ordnance Device; national police training center ; Very High Readiness Joint Task Force; ISAF Headquarters and the military advisory team. In September 2008 a patrol unit was sent to Afghanistan tasked with protecting Camp Holland in Tarin Kowte, Uruzgan province. In December 2008 another such unit was located in Kandahar province to protect the air base in Kandahar. Both units comprised 50 members. In March 2009 another 50-member patrol unit was sent to camp Deh Rawood in Uruzgan province. In June 2013 the mandate was increased to 179 guard unit members when the ISAF operation was extended until December 31, 2014. One of the great achievements of the Slovak armed forces was the 236 successful interventions made by the Slovak Explosive Ordnance Disposal unit from 2010 to 2013. The armed forces participated in the work of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in May 2007 – an officer for the development of civilian-military cooperation (CIMIC) was posted to the Hungarian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Pol-e-Khor in the province of Baghlan, and in August an additional officer was sent to operations management. Slovak army officers were also involved in the Dutch PRT in Tarin Kowt. The Slovak mission of officers in the PRT was completed in July 2013. The main task of the PRT

was to build confidence among the local population, the institutions and the ISAF forces. It also promoted and coordinated projects to help in the reconstruction and reform of the security sector and government interest in PRT. Members of the Slovak armed forces assigned to PRTs carried out instructions given by the provincial reconstruction command team. Their involvement in the activities of the PRTs operating in NATO operations is essential to the development of CIMIC.

In 2008, Slovakia decided to send three armed forces members to build a module of Deployable Communications and Information Systems to be used to provide support for the communication and information systems (CIS) used in operations and also in other NATO activities. Slovakia was able to provide a rare but crucial NATO capability. Slovak members helped provide support services to CIS as part of the united command of the ISAF headquarters in Kabul and supported radio systems within the Special Forces Command in Kabul. The Slovak armed forces thus proved their CIS expertise and acquired new skills and knowledge which can be used in complying with NATO commitments in the future.

A total of 15,375,090 EUR (and an extra 117,202 EUR for DCIS) was spent ensuring the Slovak armed forces fulfilled their role in the ISAF operation in 2014. In addition to military assistance, in the last three years the Slovak Republic has sent material aid of around 400,000 EUR. Operation ISAF ended on December 31, 2014, by which time Slovakia had contributed more than 3,600 armed forces members. On the basis of the NATO North Atlantic Council decision of November 28, 2014 and existing agreements on the status of forces (SOFA) Operation Resolute Support was begun by January 1, 2015. Unlike the ISAF military operation, this operation is non-military in nature. Almost 12,000 soldiers are providing training, advice and assistance to the Afghan components. On the basis of National Council resolution no. 1327/2014, Slovakia is sending 66 professional soldiers in support of this non-military operation.⁴⁷

It is worth noting a very important achievement for Slovak diplomacy that testifies to the personal and professional qualities of Ambassador Ján Kubiš. Ján Kubiš was appointed Ambassador by UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon and served as his Special Representative and Head of UNAMA (the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) mission in Afghanistan from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2014. Ambassador Kubiš now serves as the UNSG Special Representative for Iraq and the Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).

⁴⁷ L. Tomášeková, "Ozbrojené sily Slovenskej republiky a vojenská operácia ISAF" [Armed Forces of the Slovak republic and the military operation ISAF] *Vojenské rozhledy* Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 131–7.

Ukraine

Slovakia, along with the other V4 and Eastern European countries, supported Ukrainian attempts to develop closer relations with the EU through the Association Agreement including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. The Slovak government and civil society also stood firm from the beginning of the Maidan movement. However, the situation became less clear and it became difficult to interpret the mixed messages issued by the prime minister representing the Slovak government and the foreign ministry.

On the bilateral level, Slovakia continued to support the much needed reforms in Ukraine and contributed various forms of humanitarian assistance. The sharing of know-how and experience on energy, taxes and security sector reform are the key areas in which Slovakia could apply its best practices. P. Poroshenko took the initiative to approach former Slovak prime minister M. Dzurinda and former finance minister I. Mikloš to invite them to become members of a group of international advisors working with the Ukrainian government (I. Mikloš is assisting the ministry of finance on tax reform, decentralization and the reorganization of public finances).

Slovak humanitarian aid (through the foreign, defense, interior and health ministries) reached the sum of around 800,000 EUR for Ukraine in 2014 and this year the figure is around 700,000 EUR. This aid was provided for the needs of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

In addition a total of 100 persons who fought in the ATO (Anti-Terrorist Operation) mission will be located to institutions providing military health services in eastern Slovakia, in the region of Zemplín, as part of their rehabilitation program. Furthermore, so far 126 children evacuated from the occupied areas of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions have stayed in Slovakia for a few weeks for rehabilitation purposes. An extra 70 scholarships, bringing the total to 100, will be provided for Ukrainian students in the 2015/2016 academic year.

Ukraine is also a country of special interest in Slovakia's Official Development Assistance program. In 2014 the Slovak Agency for International Development Cooperation (SAIDC, a state-funded foreign affairs ministry organization, responsible for managing bilateral and trilateral development projects) had an overall budget of 5,984,864 EUR of which 2,894,394.93 EUR was earmarked for the ODA grants scheme. Two projects to be implemented in Ukraine were awarded funding of a total of 182,861 EUR. In addition, the Slovak foreign ministry's Centre for Experience Transfer in Integration and Reforms implemented four projects with Ukraine. Micro grants of 15,197.87 EUR were provided to Ukraine under the aegis of the Slovak Embassy in Kiev and the Consulate in Uzhhorod. SAIDC also helped provide humanitarian aid to Ukraine totaling 90,000 EUR. Of this, 30,000 EUR was donated to NATO-Ukraine trust funds, especially the NATO-Ukraine Medical Reha-

bilitation Trust Fund and the Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP) Ukraine. Additionally, 20,000 EUR worth of humanitarian aid was donated to train Ukrainian experts in demining.

However, bilaterally, probably the main and most important area of mutual cooperation, not directly a humanitarian aid tool, but very important for Ukraine, was the launch of a mutual project – the reverse gas flow from EU to Ukraine through Slovak territory on September 2, 2014. The Vojany–Uzhhorod pipeline has a capacity of 27 million m³/day.⁴⁸

Slovakia's efforts to support Ukraine at the multilateral level are also important. Slovakia, holding the presidency of the International Visegrad Fund in 2014, put a lot of effort into enhancing cooperation with Ukraine, especially at the V4+Ukraine meeting attended by P. Poroshenko. This regional initiative specifically emphasized Ukrainian energy security.

Nonetheless, the main instrument through which current international crisis management efforts in Ukraine are channeled is the OSCE. OSCE participating states maintain a presence in Ukraine via their Project Coordinator in Ukraine, the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine and Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints of Gukovo and Donetsk. Furthermore, the OSCE works through the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG). Slovakia firmly supported the establishment of the SMM through the Permanent Representation. However, in practical terms, the support is rather humble compared to that of other countries: it has only seven observers, one of whom works at the checkpoints and the other six in the SMM. At the institutional level Ambassador Marcel Peško performed some very useful managerial and negotiational work when serving as Director of the Office of the Secretary General. In September 2015 he was appointed Director of the Conflict Prevention Center, underlining his excellent professional and diplomatic qualities. In financial terms, in 2014–2015 Slovakia provided the SMM with 10,000 EUR in extra budgetary contributions, 31,791 EUR in assessed contributions and in 2015–2016, 102,093 EUR in assessed contributions.

Conclusion

It is evident that Slovakia is willing to contribute its specific expertise of comparative advantage to assist international organizations with their crisis management activities. However, there are limits to this engagement due to the limited financial and personal sources. Also, blame can equally, if not

⁴⁸ “Vďaka reverznému toku plynu zo Slovenska prežila Ukrajina uplynulú zimu,” [Thanks to the reverse gas flow from Slovakia, Ukraine survived the last winter] Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic, September 10, 2015. Available online: <http://www.vlada.gov.sk/vdaka-reverznemu-toku-plynu-zo-slovenska-prezila-ukrajina-uplynulu-zimu/> (accessed on September 19, 2015).

more so, be levelled at several stakeholders for the lack of strategic thinking and management on the national level, most visible in the military engagement. Nonetheless, members of the Slovak armed forces (such as the sapper or demining units and battalions) are considered to be committed and respected contributors to military crisis management activities in various regions. There has been significant improvement in civilian expertise; however, this should be further developed especially within the EU and OSCE. In our opinion, Slovakia has great potential and high quality personnel that can be deployed in civilian missions.

Lessons learned for the Visegrad Group?

Karel Klinovský, Samuel Goda

Is there a V4?

The Visegrad Group (V4) consists of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. It is an alliance of four states which allows them to coordinate their actions within the EU and NATO. Theoretically, all V4 states share certain characteristics which naturally lead them to cooperate. They are all post-communist countries with a troublesome past with the Soviet Union, they are all new democracies and they all hope to become highly developed countries soon. In addition, all V4 countries undoubtedly have very similar cultural and value systems. As a result, the V4 countries deal with security issues in similar ways. For example their governments have responded demonstratively to the recent “migrant crisis.” Indeed, their recent actions prove that the V4 is able to put across their common interests despite international actors of greater importance attempting to make them act differently. Unfortunately, this is a very rare example of unity among the V4. Usually, the alliance is often no more than a formalized conference. There is still a prevailing opinion that the V4 is only a theoretical alliance. In the end of the day, all the V4 countries tend to seek the solution that most suits them without considering the common interests of the V4.

Although the V4 has gained official recognition from some world leaders who have attended V4 summits (most recently French President François Holland), it is still searching for the true purpose of its existence. Regional security may be one solution (as the recent “migrant crisis” proves). Regional cooperation on issues of economic development is not effective because the V4 countries are EU member states and so most of their economic policies have their origins in this international organization. However, most of the current security issues cannot be tackled independently. None of the V4 countries has the capacity to solve the conflicts in the European neighborhood on their own. But, as an alliance, the V4 could play an important role in solving regional crises, such as the conflict in Ukraine or the Balkan refugee route. There are at least three main issues preventing the V4 from becoming an effective international actor.

Firstly, there is the inability of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia to accept Poland’s obvious leading role in the V4. Poland is generally more than happy to accept a leading role in the international arena as was the case

with the successful 2011 EU presidency or the 2012/2013 V4 presidency. The other three countries cannot keep up with Polish international enthusiasm and, as I will demonstrate further in this chapter, they (or at least some of them) often go against Polish efforts. Also, Poland has, given its historical experience, developed one of NATO's most operational and independent security toolboxes and it does not need the other V4 countries for it to enforce its interests.

Secondly, the V4 do not share the same view on the importance of the transatlantic relationship. Poland and the Czech Republic have traditionally seen membership of the EU and NATO as the cornerstone of their foreign policies and do not seek out other options. By contrast, Slovakia and Hungary are sometimes less than enthusiastic about making compromises for the sake of these international organizations. This was demonstrated particularly during the economic crisis that hit the EU at the beginning of the 2010s.

The last reason is that the V4 is not an answer to the question "Who can we call in Central Europe?" In fact, the V4 is a young entity whose purpose is still to be clarified. V4 member states are not perceived as a firm alliance and therefore they are not addressed as a whole. The V4 is a platform for sharing information, but not for making decisions.

The following chapter attempts to find the common ground for the V4 countries in their involvement in Kosovo, Afghanistan and the recent Ukraine crisis. It attempts to identify the lessons learned, or indeed not learned. It seems there is an absence of deeper cooperation or coordination among countries in the international crisis management. The goal is to determine the common ground which might help the V4 to develop a more coordinated policy for future or ongoing international crises. Because if the V4 wants to be more than just a formalized conference it needs to develop the mechanisms that will provide for a timely and effective response to the security challenges of today's world.

The Kosovo crisis was the first true test of the abilities of the V4 countries to act as established democracies participating in state building. The precedence of Kosovo independence remains a troublesome issue among the V4 countries, as Slovakia still does not recognize the independence of Kosovo. One of the V4's most significant achievements was the Joint Czechoslovak Battalion. Both the Czech Republic and Slovakia perceived the Joint Battalion as an act of continuity with the Czechoslovak Armed Forces. Therefore when NATO member states (and Slovakia, then a NATO candidate state) were asked to provide more military personnel, the Joint Battalion was an elegant solution. Evidently, neither the Czech Republic nor Slovakia alone was able to carry the burden of providing more personnel. As a result, both countries agreed to share the costs of engagement. This was possible due to the close geographic location and the beginning of a new direction in Slovak foreign policy. Equally important was the fact that both countries speak very

similar languages. Since it was only nine years ago that two countries had split, they could easily communicate when on deployment even in specific situations. The mission was part of NATO's Joint Guardian operation (later renamed Joint Enterprise) from February 2002 until July 2005. Both countries demonstrated that they could provide greater engagement through mutual cooperation.

The outcome of the mission was highly positive because both countries learned they could cooperate on similar terms in the future. The benefits of having future Joint Battalions would not only be cost sharing but also better coordination between the two armies. In addition, the Czech Republic and Slovakia could create much closer links outside regular liaison or NATO structures. This would enable them to respond faster and more effectively to issues of border security or to unexpected requests for greater involvement abroad.

Obviously, this raises the question of whether it might be possible to create a V4 Joint Battalion. There are many valuable arguments in support of the Joint V4 approach to the Kosovo crises. The V4 has demonstrated on many occasions that it prioritizes its role in the Eastern Partnership. Furthermore, all the V4 countries support EU enlargement in the Balkans. When Croatia became an EU member on July 1, 2013 the European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy was a Czech – Štefan Füle. In addition, to some extent, the V4 countries share a similar cultural and language background with the Balkan states. They could serve as a mediator between the pro-Russian elements in the Balkans and the EU and NATO. The Joint Battalion would also help make it possible to deploy the armed forces in the region at less cost. As a result, the Joint Battalion would not just be used ad hoc but would build common ground for future deployments. Together the armies of the V4 countries could purchase expensive military aircraft such as the Lockheed C-130 Hercules (now owned only by Poland) instead of buying inferior aircraft, such as the CASA C-295. Since NATO forces serve mostly as an expeditionary force, this would surely help V4 countries to uphold their Alliance obligations.

A chapter that covers Kosovo would not be complete without a short evaluation of the Kosovo crisis. The V4 should not only focus on deeper involvement and better capacity and state building, as outlined above but should also tackle the issue relating directly to the poor state of Kosovo's administration – the number of Kosovar asylum seekers. One possible solution would be to support the German motion to declare Kosovo (and Albania) safe countries of origin and help other EU countries process asylum requests. At the beginning of September 2015 the Czech prime minister offered Serbia limited funding to help with the flow of asylum seekers. If the V4 had made this offer together and used its joint influence, it would have made more of an impact.

Afghanistan – state-building 101

The ISAF mission to Afghanistan was a direct response to the 9/11 attacks and, what is more, it was the first time in history that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty had been implemented. Evidently, nobody had expected that the deployment in Afghanistan would turn out to be the most determining conflict of the beginning of the twenty-first century. The Taliban learned years ago during the Soviet invasion that it is impossible to resist invading forces using symmetrical warfare and so they employed their well-known insurgency tactic. It took the NATO forces five years to adopt the counter-insurgency tools to deal with it. The main rationale behind the counter-insurgency is to provide the civilian population with a positive alternative to, in Afghanistan's case – the Taliban. Therefore, instead of using conventional warfare, military personnel are involved in capacity and state building. The goal is, to use that well-known phrase, rather unfortunately uttered during the Vietnam War, to win the “hearts and minds” of the people. However, there are some who argue that this approach goes against the purpose of the military. The loudest critic of the counter-insurgency doctrine in Afghanistan was Bing West who called this approach “teaching war like sociology.” Part of the counter-insurgency toolbox was the creation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). The V4 countries were among the states that played an important part in the campaign.

Given the conditions, the PRT activities can be seen as a success. However, it was a missed opportunity in terms of helping to rebuild the country via partnership and not just by mentoring. As in the previous case of Kosovo, joint deployment by V4 countries could be an answer. Not only would they would provide more “boots on the ground” which would certainly improve the general security climate in the province, but they could also share the costs of PRT. The joint presence of the Czech and Slovak forces might prove a reminder of the positive role of Czechoslovakia in the history of Afghanistan. And, most importantly, all the countries would avoid the “Afghanization” of their armies. The term Afghanization refers to a situation in which most of the NATO forces have adjusted their capacities, equipment and training to fight insurgency under Middle Eastern conditions. Following the conclusion of the main military operations in 2015, many armies are struggling to redefine their new role. Together the V4 countries could purchase equipment specifically for the conditions in Afghanistan and, strategically speaking, save their tax payers millions of euros. Obviously, V4 involvement in Afghanistan is not possible because Polish military capacity exceeds that of all the other countries and one cannot imagine the Polish carrying most of the expense while sharing out the profits. Not surprisingly, Poland would rather invest its resources in strengthening its transatlantic ties. In fact, the Czech Republic and Hungary share the same attitudes to Afghanistan as Poland does.

The peculiar case of Ukraine

No other recent security challenge has brought more antagonism and mistrust to the V4 alliance than Ukraine. To support this claim, we have to examine the responses of the member states to the crisis. There is no doubt that the fiercest response came from Warsaw. In early 2014 then minister of foreign affairs, Radosław Sikorski, and his German and French counterparts, were directly involved in the efforts to safeguard the peaceful transition of power in Ukraine. Ever since the failure of these attempts Poland has been Europe's greatest critic of Russian involvement in eastern Ukraine. Poland provides the Kyiv government with political support and also seeks ways to provide Ukrainians with material support. Poland has even considered, together with the United Kingdom, training the Ukrainian armed forces. Poland was involved in a "morale boosting exercise" conducted in Lviv in July 2015. From the very beginning, Poland was involved in the OSCE mission to Ukraine and President Petro Poroshenko has even asked for more Polish monitors to be part of the OSCE mission. Since the OSCE is the only international body effectively involved in monitoring and solving the Ukrainian crisis, this request proves that the Polish role is vital. As in the EU, Poland is also the main supporter of a tough stance on the issue. From the Polish point of view, the sanctions are the only tool the EU can use to counter the Russian actions in eastern Ukraine. Poland has also criticized EU member states for acting reluctantly in relation to the sanctions against Russia. In particular, Poland has voiced its disappointment at the positions of Czech President Miloš Zeman and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico. The two of whom are loud critics of sanctions against Russia. The Polish response to the Ukrainian crisis is equally strong within NATO. In June 2015 the NATO conducted a military exercise called Baltops in direct response to a similar Russian exercise. Poland will also most probably station a NATO deterrent force on its territory.

The response from Budapest to the Ukrainian crisis was completely the opposite. Not only did Hungary sign a deal with Russia on expanding the Paks nuclear power plant amid the general efforts to weaken European energy dependence on Russia, but Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán also pronounced that Hungary should become the kind of illiberal state the Russian regime represented. Such actions make Hungary a suspicious actor in the eyes of its V4 allies. Hungary also condemned the implementation of EU sanctions on Russia. The general estimation is that Hungary prefers not to risk its economic relations with Russia over the crisis in Ukraine. However, this position may prove to be short-sighted since Russia may not truly care about having a mutually beneficial relationship with Hungary but is probably more interested in weakening the EU.

The Czech and Slovak positions seem to be very similar in certain aspects. Mention has already been made of the fact that leading politicians from the

two countries have condemned sanctions against Russia. Slovakia also had almost the same energy diversification difficulties as Hungary. The owner of the Slovak nuclear power plant at Jaslovské Bohunice, Italian energy giant Enel, considered selling the power plant to the Russian state owned company Rosatom. The whole transaction was canceled following strong pressure from the EU. This example may seem to be completely unrelated to the Ukrainian crisis but in fact the opposite is true. It perfectly demonstrates the Slovak attitude to the whole crisis. The EU position contradicts Slovakia's economic interests and Slovakia upholds the common policy toward Ukraine through clenched teeth.

The Czech Republic was involved in the OSCE monitoring mission from the very beginning of the conflict. There was even the case of a Czech officer who was monitoring the conflict being kidnapped at the beginning of 2014. He was released a few days later (together with his Polish, Danish and Swedish colleagues). The OSCE mission to Ukraine was prolonged until March 31, 2016 and the Czech Republic continues to participate in the mission. As has been mentioned before, Czech actions within the EU and NATO are very cautious in relation to Russian involvement in Ukraine. Different positions are held by the Czech president and the government on the issue. The cornerstone of Czech actions is ambiguity. On one hand the Czechs support the sanctions against Russia but on the other they clearly do not want to strengthen the sanctions.

Summing up, the V4 countries need to decide whether they are going to honor their own interests or their international responsibilities. Poland has decided to stand strongly with the pro-Western part of Ukrainian society and is using its transatlantic ties to pursue this goal. On the other hand, Hungary has decided to play a destructive role in the EU's common policy on the Ukraine crisis and is effectively resisting any attempts to change its attitude. Slovakia and the Czech Republic seem to have ambiguous positions; although Slovakia seems more disturbed by the EU policy on Ukraine. The V4 countries should support each other in order to increase the number of their monitors in the OSCE mission to Ukraine. The reason being that it is only by carefully recording hostile action on the front and later publicizing these hostilities that pressure can be brought to bear on the two actors in the conflict. The V4 countries could serve as mediator between Russia and Ukraine within the OSCE since they are extensively involved in monitoring the conflict. On the EU, unfortunately, the V4 do not seem able to find common ground. Poland and Hungary have fundamentally different approaches to Russia and to involvement in Ukraine. In this case, it is also unrealistic to hope that their antagonistic position might lead to a wise and moderate compromise. The V4 should consider a common request to place NATO deterrent forces on its territory. The presence of NATO forces on its territory would not be a real military threat to Russia but its political value

would be priceless. The V4 countries would be able to demonstrate their affiliation to the Western world. Since the Visegrad declaration promotes EU and NATO membership for the V4 countries this would be in compliance with the goals of the V4.

Lessons learned

To conclude, the V4 has a unique opportunity to become more than a formalized conference of four states sharing the same values and a similar history. Europe is now facing one of the most challenging crises in its modern history and only a cooperative approach can bring about a positive resolution. Therefore the leaders should opt for a strategic vision and not just focus on short-term profits. To be able to do this, the V4 has to take the following steps.

Most importantly, the V4 needs to clearly define its role. This of course means that the Visegrad Declaration requires further specification and that the V4 should redefine its role instead of making vague proclamations. The main focus should be on the Eastern Partnership. While Afghanistan presents no vital interest to the V4 countries, the situation in the Balkans and Ukraine clearly affects their internal security. The V4 should more actively enter into negotiations concerning these regions and offer a mediation service. In addition, the V4 should be the main platform for discussing Central European security together with Germany and Austria. Emphasis has to be put on energy security. The member states should guard their strategic energetic resources and should try to decrease their dependence on Russia through diversification.

The next step is to create the mechanisms that would enable V4 countries to respond rapidly and effectively to security challenges in the Central European and Eastern neighborhood. In the future, V4 countries might consider deploying joint forces when requested, so as to increase their role in conflict resolution. Consequently, they would be able to share the costs of deployment and would not have to purchase the necessary equipment by themselves. This also means that the V4 has to create a hotspot where they can be contacted as a united entity. We will then be able to answer the question of “Who can we call in Central Europe?”

The last important lesson learned is that the V4 countries should keep emphasizing the importance of transatlantic and European ties. In spite of the many painful compromises they have to make for the sake of these ties, a simple cost benefit analysis proves that if they do not maintain them they will be unable to survive as independent democratic states.

Institutional form of European security – status quo, challenges and future limits

Samuel Goda

European security policy is a term often used in academia and in journalism. Despite the different interpretations of this concept, the vast majority of authors tend to believe, that besides being based on values, ideas and political declarations, European security policy is primarily the institutional security architecture in the Euro-Atlantic area.⁴⁹ The main institutions involved are NATO, the OSCE and of course the UN. All these institutions have a common denominator – Euro-Atlantic security.⁵⁰

After the fall of the Iron Curtain these institutions realized that the security environment was changing, and that the emerging security challenges and threats were no longer perceived in classical military terms but had shifted to other sectors. The countries also saw that the new reality did not (and still does not) allow them to fully and effectively respond to the security challenges and threats on an individual and isolated level. Therefore delegating certain security powers to supranational institutions was a logical step. Equally institutions were adapted, or reformed, to take account of the new situation. It would be naive to regard this institutional reform as having been completed because international relations is a complex, dynamic and fast evolving area. That does not prevent us from dealing with the issue of reforms; on the contrary, it encourages us to engage in a debate on the future orientation of these institutions and Slovakia's direct participation within each of them.

The complexity and the dynamics of international relations and regional security, including internal developments within NATO, the EU, the OSCE and the UN should lead these institutions to increase cooperation over regional security because of the many ways in which the agendas of all the institution are intertwined. The need for cooperation is especially magnified in the conflicts in the Balkans, the military mission in Afghanistan, but also

⁴⁹ G. Aybet, *European security architecture after the Cold War: questions of legitimacy*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, p. 336.

⁵⁰ It is possible to accentuate the pan-European or Eurasian dimension of the OSCE, which is, to some extent, of course, correct.

in a wide range of transnational threats – from human and drug trafficking, through environmental security, to the fight against various forms of terrorism.

In the following part we will describe the inter-institutional (inter-organizational) cooperation in Euro-Atlantic security between the North Atlantic Alliance and other institutional actors – the EU, OSCE and UN.⁵¹ Based on this information, we will identify the current state of affairs, determine the baseline of the interrelations between these institutions, point out the limits of cooperation and attempt to formulate recommendations for the future. We emphasize that we are clearly not able to give an exhaustive view of this issue, because of the limited time and space. The aim of this chapter is to provide information on the issues and contribute to the professional debate through our final findings. The information has been drawn from studies on the subject, available on the internet and also from the official documents of the various institutions.

NATO and the UN

At present, the United Nations is the most important intergovernmental, international organization, which, among other things, reflects above all the post-war power arrangements in global international relations. The UN's most important element and instrument are the resolutions of the Security Council. NATO member states are aware of the legally binding nature of the Security Council resolutions, especially in regard to operations not covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, and in relation to the political legitimacy of these operations. This legal basis and political legitimacy help NATO cooperate with other international intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to carry out tasks relating to, e.g. stabilization, reconstruction and promoting sustainable security.

Despite the efforts and political declarations of both NATO and the UN, the coordination between them is not optimal, as evidenced by their activities in the Balkans in the early 1990s. Arrangements known as the “dual key” concerning the NATO bombing of former Yugoslavia demonstrated a lack of trust between NATO and the UN. This also extended to the level of the military commanders and UNPROFOR (NATO and UN Protection Force), who were vulnerable to domestic military attacks, primarily because of the response to NATO activities. Opinions that the NATO air forces could protect localities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, designated as safe by the UN Security Council, proved to be erroneous and inappropriate.

⁵¹ For more information about the involvement of the Council of Europe see: U. Caruso, *Interplay between the Council of Europe, OSCE, EU and NATO*, European Academy, 2007, p. 200.

ate. The most famous failure in protecting “safe areas” was Srebrenica. This dysfunctional system has forced NATO to return to the negotiations with the UN within the UN Security Council in order to secure a future UN Security Council resolution on operations, where the emphasis is on competency of command. A subsequent initiative was the “UN–NATO framework agreement” intended to clarify and specify the form of future cooperation, not only during crisis situations, but also more generally. However, this initiative was not accepted within the UN. This is not surprising given the current composition of the UN Security Council, particularly its permanent members. Internally, the view held by the UN and many of its members on NATO is not very positive and NATO is often seen as a relic of the Cold War and a foreign policy tool. This may have several causes, e.g. the different historical development of the organizations, the varied inter-institutional cultures, but also a mutual ignorance of and disinterest in regular communication.

Despite the fact that the UN is the only intergovernmental international organization with global reach, in the form of the UN Security Council resolutions, its impact on Euro-Atlantic security is relatively limited. NATO, the EU and the OSCE are seen as organizations that have more pronounced “know-how” in this field. Of course, the UN missions on the European continent have played an important role, with the UN Security Council consisting of countries in these regions. On the other hand, UN attention cannot be limited only to Euro-Atlantic security, and thus its global dimension could be a “double-edged” sword.

NATO has long sought to create a sustainable platform for cooperation with the UN, instead of ad hoc cooperation in crisis management. For this purpose, it would be possible, for example, to create a framework for dialogue on the senior administrative level between both institutions. The nomination of highly respected experts should mean that trust can be established, thus ending the distrust currently evident on both sides. Of course, this communication should not be limited only to cooperation in crisis management, but would be extended to the issues to which both institutions attach great importance, e.g. small arms and light weapons disarmament or interventions in humanitarian and natural disasters. An interesting idea for NATO would be for it to become an observer at the UN Security Council, as at other institutions e.g. the EU, OSCE, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).⁵² Another option would be to establish permanent NATO representations at UN headquarters and vice versa.⁵³ Although both organizations complement one another,

⁵² The latter two gain this status without the need for UN elections.

⁵³ This idea is not new. From 1992 to 2000 NATO had temporary representatives at the UN headquarters in New York. The same applies vice versa between 1999 and 2006.

the issue of the use of force and its legitimacy will probably continue to divide the member states of both institutions, and affect the relationship between NATO and the UN. Last but not least, the long-term interests of the Russian Federation and China are not consistent with the interests of the Alliance and this is probably the main obstacle in convergence between NATO and the UN.

NATO and the EU

The meeting of the European Council in Cologne in June 1999 saw the beginning of the implementation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). For the EU this was a truly significant milestone, especially in the sense that the EU had decided to play an active role and to take on certain aspects of security and defense. Of course, there are deficiencies in this process, whether in the focal areas of the EU missions, the future of the European defense industry, member states' approaches to the "common defense" or the future direction of the security agenda at the level of EU member states, especially given the absence of consensus on strategic issues.

In March 2003 the development of the "Berlin-plus"⁵⁴ package was announced, which contains provisions enabling NATO to support EU-led missions in cases where NATO is not engaged as a whole. The EU and NATO declaration on ESDP states that the relationship between NATO and the EU will be conducted on the basis of agreed principles.

The Berlin Plus mechanism thus enabled the first EU-led peacekeeping mission – Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which ran from March to December 2003. NATO provided different capabilities for this EU operation, including a professional standard. The commander of the operation was the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR). Continuing in this regard, at the NATO summit in Istanbul in 2004, the Allies decided to terminate the SFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the end of 2004 and to work with the EU under the Berlin Plus platform to transform SFOR into the EU-led Althea operation launched in December 2004 and active to this day. The Commander of the European Force (EUFOR), who is responsible for the Althea operation, is also DSACEUR of NATO. Having a command organization of this nature ensures NATO–EU coordination, while giving the EU access to various NATO benefits and capabilities.

⁵⁴ More on "Berlin Plus" available online: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf> (accessed September 8, 2014).

On the other hand, there is also a “participation problem” between NATO and the EU. This eloquent abbreviation expresses the conflict of principles that emerged following the EU enlargement in 2004, which limits effective cooperation between the member states of the EU and NATO. The problem lies in the fact that the EU member states take the position that all EU countries can participate in NATO–EU meetings. By contrast, there are NATO members who emphasize that the Alliance must ensure the security agreement between NATO and the EU.⁵⁵ This agreement contains the rule that classified information may be conferred only to EU member countries which are also members of the NATO Partnership for Peace (NATO PfP) and have accepted the aforementioned agreement within the framework of the NATO PfP. In other words, the EU will not lead formal meetings with NATO outside the framework of Berlin Plus and NATO will not lead meetings using the NATO–EU format with countries that have not signed the security agreement within the NATO PfP. Turkey is not an EU member, while Malta and Cyprus are not members of the NATO PfP and have therefore not signed that security agreement. Althea can be considered to be an operation that is conducted under Berlin Plus and also using the NATO–EU format. Therefore, Althea is the only agreed operation which could have been negotiated without the participation of Cyprus and Malta. So far, only ad hoc solutions, such as informal ministerial meetings, have been used to include those countries and allow for the continuation of the high level dialogue between all NATO and EU member states.

Besides the participation problem there is also the “scope problem.” This largely lies in the opposition of several EU member states, also NATO members, to expanding the scope of cooperation between the EU and NATO beyond discussions of developing capabilities and operations under the Berlin Plus format. These EU member states have an interest in restricting the dimension of cooperation between NATO and the EU to certain activities in order to create future room for maneuver for the EU to transfer wider activities to itself. The logic behind this step can be observed in the US foreign policy shift toward the Asian–Pacific area. On the other hand, the current conflict in Ukraine and the perceived threat from the Russian Federation may cause a change in foreign policy direction, not only for the USA, but also for the EU and NATO members interested in taking on more of the EU CSDP competencies.

Mutual administrative and expert relations rely on military representatives or liaisons. The EU has representatives at NATO SHAPE, and vice versa, NATO has a team at the EU Military Staff. Nevertheless, some experts

⁵⁵ See here:<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/73803%20-%20Solana%20-%20Permanent%20arrangements%20+%20NATO%20declaration.pdf> (accessed September 8, 2014).

consider this configuration to be asymmetrical and at the expense of NATO's limited access in its relationship with the EU. This could, therefore, be improved by significant "pooling and sharing" of information and documentation. Another interesting fact is the lack of a common view and coordination between EU member states in NATO, as can be seen in the OSCE, where EU member states have their own meetings separately before almost every Permanent Council meeting. But the extent to which this move could be considered counterproductive is questionable.

Recommendations on how to improve mutual relations also come from the non-governmental sector. Monthly joint meetings could be held, for example, between the EU High Representative for Foreign Policy and the NATO Secretary General, where they could discuss issues of common interest and consequently present their ideas at meetings of ambassadors, which could contribute to better mutual coordination. They could also share attitudes on potential missions⁵⁶ prior to their commencement, exchange mutual information and compare various capabilities (and thus prevent the situation that arose out of the intervention in Libya).⁵⁷

As can be seen, the EU is as yet the only organization whose cooperation with NATO has a formal structure. However, it is also evident that states which are members of both institutions are faced with the dilemma of duplicating efforts. In terms of efficiency, member states would be happy if they could avoid both the duplication of activities and thus also the financial expenditures. On the other hand, this type of process cannot start without the premeditated, agreed strategic intentions of the individual states nor without political coordination. However, all member states realize that the military forces of NATO and the EU member states are constrained (insufficient) and limited.

NATO and the OSCE

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is one of the basic institutional and political pillars of Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security. During the Cold War, the OSCE served as a bridge between the two blocs, which decided to negotiate together within the then Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe over the "final" confirmation of spheres of influence (among other things). Following the collapse of the

⁵⁶ More about missions see Leo Michel, "NATO-EU cooperation in operations" *Research Paper* No. 3, 2007, p. 3. Available online: <http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Leo%20Michel%20on%20NATO-EU%20at%20NATO%20College.pdf> (accessed on September 8, 2014).

⁵⁷ D. Keohane, *Unlocking EU-NATO cooperation*, 2006. Available online: <http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/bulletin-article/2006/unlocking-eu-nato-co-operation> (accessed on September 8, 2014).

bipolar system, the initial euphoria and bold ideas on the future of the CSCE/OSCE and the entire region's security encountered the harsh reality of national interests, which are still palpable within the institution.

NATO has never directly supported OSCE operations; however, it has provided security, logistics, planning, information or communication support for OSCE activities in areas, where NATO forces had been sent previously. The first real example of cooperation worth mentioning was the cooperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the mid-1990s. From October 1998 to March 1999 NATO led Eagle Eye, an air operation to support the ground operation and accompanied by an OSCE presence in Kosovo. During the same period, NATO organized an "Extraction Force" that was ready to evacuate OSCE staff in an emergency or period of distress. Photos of the OSCE mission members who had to leave the country immediately are relatively well-known.

The next ad hoc act of cooperation between NATO and the OSCE, helped by the EU, was also relatively successful. In January 2001 the OSCE established a mission in the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, focusing on the problems in southern Serbia where there was an ethnic Albanian uprising against central government. The OSCE mission coordinated its activities with international partners, not only NATO but particularly with NATO's active members – the USA and the UK, which had their own interests in the area. The mission attempted to stabilize the situation and apply CBMs (confidence-building measures).

Apart from the joint NATO and OSCE activities in the Balkans, in recent years inter-institutional cooperation, as has already been mentioned, includes other areas – border security and management; security and management of small arms, light weapons, armaments and rocket-propelled weapons; the fight against terrorism, including the initiative against MANPADS (man-portable air-defense systems); the fight against human trafficking, as well as regional cooperation, especially in the South Caucasus, south east Europe and Central Asia.

The OSCE concentrates on democratization, the rule of law, respect for human rights, reconciliation, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, including peace-building. Furthermore, participating states are concerned with political–military talks relating to confidence and security-building measures, through setting standards and the transparent management of political–military affairs, to the collection and creation of best practice manuals to be used in post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation.

Introducing the above-mentioned areas of activity into the work of the OSCE was intended to clarify the differences between the work of NATO and the OSCE. In comparison to NATO and EU activities, the work of NATO and the OSCE does not overlap to such an extent. However, this does not

mean that joint activities are conducted in a spirit of understanding and cooperation.

Summary and recommendations

Despite the fact that the UN is the only global organization among the above-mentioned institutions, NATO, the EU and, to some extent, the OSCE to have gained a “more global” functional and territorial agenda, as evidenced by many of the missions performed beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, the relationship between these organizations is characterized by a high level of complexity and a low level of coordination.

It still follows that the only organization with which NATO has a formalized framework for cooperation is the EU; despite it being far from the desired state. The issues of “participation” and “competence” clearly stem from the pursuit of national interests. So the question is: will NATO and EU member states be interested in changing this situation? For the Slovak Republic, the key institutions are the EU and NATO. As regards, for example, the financial burden, the UN and the OSCE do not exert similar pressures. Of course, this does not mean that the ongoing processes within them are not of interest to the Slovak Republic; on the contrary, this is evident in the fact that the OSCE is playing an important role in resolving the conflict in the current situation in Ukraine, for instance. Compared with the NATO–EU relationship, the NATO–OSCE relationship is not characterized by such a high level of competition. On the other hand, the OSCE is very sensitive to any action by NATO. It should also be said that critical voices often emanate from the OSCE especially regarding NATO activities in post-conflict reconstruction, where NATO has been beset by relatively large shortcomings, and also failures. In the NATO–UN relationship there is a surprising lack of formalization in such relations, for example, on a contractual basis. As has already been mentioned, in the medium term we do not see any room for improvement in this situation nor for the creation of such a platform.

Each of these organizations has its own internal system for the way it functions, accumulates resources, documents and processes information. The coordination between them then is not a simple matter precisely because of the practical side of handling relations, dealing with confidential and non-public information, maintaining or increasing institutional autonomy, hierarchy⁵⁸ and primacy. In our opinion, the greatest obstacles to closer cooperation are the national interests of the member states. This is not only true in relation to e.g. countries that are not member states of NATO – such

⁵⁸ The mere concept of the regional and global level is controversial. It has been used here descriptively, with no intended undertone.

as China and Russia – the OSCE or the UN. Noticeable disagreement is also shared among the allies themselves within the organizations. Thus it is unclear what actions member states are willing to perform in order to increase the level of inter-institutional cooperation. In our opinion, it would be possible to carry out soft approaches, such as organizing joint workshops with the participation of think-tanks and academics on issues of common interest; establishing educational and training programs; and, organizing temporary exchanges or “professional mobility” for senior officials. Another interesting idea would be to create a platform for the institutions’ permanent civil experts. However, on this latter we can expect member states to adopt a more reserved approach. On the other hand, we think that other ideas, based on a careful, more general approach, would have the potential for success.

Of course, the role *sine qua non* for NATO, before even considering the possibilities of enhancing the practical side of cooperation, is that of ensuring a broader strategy for inter-institutional cooperation. The creation of such a strategy should be at the organizational level and include the participation of professionals. However, any such initiative, at an earlier or later stage, will once again come up against the national policies of member states, especially those of the leading countries in these organizations. In the current geopolitical situation such a change cannot be expected in the short term, but the dynamics of international relations do not exclude it in the medium and long term. The current security status quo is called into question from different sides and there will probably be some modification. However, questions remain over how the so-called system states, or powers, will deal with this – will the situation be solved at the institutional level? In his very valuable work on this subject, D. Yost⁵⁹ has noticed fundamental changes at the national and NATO levels, which were the result of various crises and ad hoc adaptation to these crises, and not the result of agreed strategies.⁶⁰ To some extent, this resembles improvisation more than strategic planning. But that does not mean that there is no need to establish a strategy. The role of strategy is to create alternative scenarios of development, based on expert analysis. In the end, we can say that in the short and medium term, inter-institutional cooperation will consist of reacting to international events rather than anticipating them. This will continue to weigh on the budgets of countries; imperfection or rather the absence of the division of labor, may, for example in the case of conflict missions, first and foremost adversely affect the quality of life of the local population and thus be counterproductive. It seems that NATO and other organizations

⁵⁹ Yost, D.S, *NATO and international organizations*. Rome: NATO Defence College, 2007, p. 190.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 182.

have yet to feel so threatened by threats and challenges as to set clear rules for cooperation and instead lead the fight for prestige and competition. However, in the future this luxury may adversely affect the lives of citizens in the member states of NATO, EU and the OSCE.

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