Article

EUROPEAN URBAN AND REGIONAL STUDIES

European Urban and Regional Studies
2019, Vol. 26(2) 134–157

DOI: 10.1177/0969776418756934
journals.sagepub.com/home/eur
SAGE

Exploring cross-border integration in Europe: How do populations cross borders and perceive their neighbours?

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Abstract

Since its creation, the European Union seems to be guided by the idea that an increase in cross-border flows contributes to more European unity. Thus, emphasis has been placed for instance on lowering customs tariffs and encouraging the free movement of goods and people. However, if the opening up of borders creates new opportunities for some residents of border regions, there are others who may not benefit. For this reason, and in a context characterized by the rise of Euroscepticism, it seems crucial to take a more critical look at actual cross-border integration and to unravel its concrete consequences for the people who live in border regions. This paper aims to do so by focusing on two aspects of this process: the functional dimension, through the number of cross-border activities, and the perceptions border residents have of their neighbours, through the level of mutual social trust. The EUROBAROMETER 422 survey is used in order to produce statistical analyses and maps. This enables us to offer a new image of European cross-border integration and to draw the following conclusions. Firstly, cross-border flows are not uniform and vary greatly from one cross-border area to another. Secondly, cross-border regions in which the intensity of flows between neighbouring regions is high do not necessarily show a high level of mutual social trust between borderland populations. Thirdly, there is not always reciprocity with regard to the mutual social trust that people have towards their neighbours within cross-border areas.

Keywords

Border regions, cross-border integration, Eurobarometer, European integration, Euroscepticism

Introduction

European integration and territorial cooperation policies have deeply influenced the way people in border regions live, both in terms of perceptions and actual spatial practices. These inhabitants, who account for one third of the total European population (Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), 2012), have seen and experienced in an intense way the progressive opening of borders to flows of people, goods and capital. European integration policy is driven by a hegemonic discourse that promotes the production of a single, uniform European space in which 'the eradication of barriers is among its central concerns' (Hajer, 2000: 142), even though other scholars nuance this view and show that different storylines coexist within

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this hegemonic discourse (Mejuto, 2017). Economic flows are often presented as drivers of stability, prosperity and territorial unity (Decoville and Durand, 2016: 1825). This so-called 'negative integration', which implies the elimination of barriers that restrict the movement of people, goods and services, is considered easier to put in place than measures for positive integration, which refer to the creation of a common sovereignty through the modification of existing institutions and the creation of new ones (Scharpf, 1997). In order to support the process of cross-border integration and encourage cross-border flows, European politicians have placed emphasis on the lowering of customs tariffs, the free movement of goods and people and the introduction of the single currency. Through the increase of exchanges on both sides of borders, strong relationships have been created between populations, and this has progressively led to the creation of links of interdependency between border territories. In order to accompany this process and to address the new challenges induced by the opening up of borders, cross-border cooperation initiatives have flourished, with the help of new regulatory tools and European funds (Perkmann, 2003). The signing of the Madrid Outline Convention in 1981 allowed a legal framework to be put in place, leading to inter-state agreements for cross-border cooperation initiatives. Since this pioneering measure, considerable progress has been made and concrete operational tools for cross-border governance and cooperation have been set up, such as the European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation (Nelles and Durand, 2014). In parallel, the Interreg Europe programme, launched in the early 1990s, has allowed the co-founding of numerous cross-border projects and the anchoring of policy objectives in a concrete and tangible reality for border populations. European territorial cooperation – the name of the policy in favour of bringing border areas closer together – has become one of the objectives of European regional policy and encompasses cross-border partnerships that have been established between different regional or local authorities in order to find solutions to common problems. However, and despite a substantial increase in economic and political integration within the European Union (EU) over the last 30 years, cross-border cooperation is nowadays called into question in a context characterized both by a multi-faceted crisis concerning economic, financial and refugee issues (Bulmer and Joseph, 2016), and by rising Euroscepticism (Leconte, 2010, 2015; Wassenberg et al., 2010).

Numerous authors have already investigated the reasons why certain populations are more responsive to Eurosceptic trends. These reasons can stem from inside the EU, driven by fears, bitterness, misunderstanding and disillusions, or from 'outside', supported by those who fear the establishment of a strong Europe (Bitsch, 2010). Moreover, they can find their roots in people's actual experiences or, on the other hand, through theoretical or ideological considerations promoted by political parties (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002). Beyond attitudes and perceptions, concrete phenomena indicate a re-bordering process (Rumford, 2006). The willingness expressed by a growing proportion of the population to close borders again, or the tendency towards inward-looking attitudes in the face of international migrations or terrorist threats, are among the most visible signs. Observing what happens in cross-border regions, which are often presented as 'laboratories of European integration' (Kramsch and Hooper, 2004: 3), can allow us to 'take the pulse' of the population and its state of mind with regard to the challenges of European integration.

Today, examining the perceptions of border regions' residents indicates that in spite of several decades of policies in favour of de-bordering within the EU, Eurosceptic behaviour remains very strong in some border regions, as demonstrated by Theresa Kuhn (2011). How can one explain this lack of enthusiasm of the population for the idea of a Europe without borders, despite the astonishing increase in exchanges driven by the new opportunities offered? How can one interpret the fact that territorial cooperation policy in favour of greater cross-border integration, aimed to overcome 'national frontiers in order to heal the scars of history' (Wassenberg et al., 2015: 11), is today facing more reluctance, or even opposition from a significant proportion of the population? Trying to answer these questions requires a critical exploration of the relevance of the European assumption linked to the hegemonic discourse of a 'Europe of Flows' (Hajer, 2000). It requires to question the existence of a causal link between the

intensity of border exchanges and the quality of human relationships, as defended by representatives of the EU, such as in the introduction of the Schengen Agreement signed in 1985 (Official Journal of the European Union, 1990):

> AWARE that the ever closer union of the peoples of the Member States of the European Communities should find its expression in the freedom to cross internal borders for all nationals of the Member States and in the free movement of goods and services,
>
> ANXIOUS to strengthen the solidarity between their peoples by removing the obstacles to free movement at the common borders between the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic.

This clear position in favour of opening up borders has deeply permeated the thoughts of politicians and experts, as shown by the impressive number of reports that capture the cross-border integration issue through indicators of flows (ESPON, 2010; Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development, 2013; Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière (MOT), 2014; OECD, 2009). Indeed, such indicators are frequently used because through simple metrics they can measure phenomena to which we attribute a meaning in terms of cross-border integration, such as cross-border work, residential mobility, shopping and use of medical care. Yet, indicators are tools that always simplify reality and that get their seductive power from their capacity to report on very complex issues in a quick and simple manner, in a context marked by the immediacy of access to information (Decoville, 2018). With respect to border studies, scholars have already demonstrated that numerous and strong interactions between border regions do not necessarily lead to more convergence or similarity (De Boe et al., 1999; ESPON, 2010; Topaloglou et al., 2005). By doing so, they have shown that cross-border integration cannot be assessed through the prism of a unique indicator.

The purpose of this current article is to address the issue of the quality of cross-border integration by taking a critical look at the cross-border integration process and by highlighting the diversity of the phenomenon, both in terms of its extent and its various forms. The main idea is to depict the degree of integration in each cross-border region in Europe, by observing the intensity of cross-border spatial practices and the perceptions of the inhabitants living in border areas. Analysing cross-border integration implies dealing with the exchanges that take place on both sides of borders to have a picture of what is currently happening in terms of functional interactions, but arguably it is equally important to take into account what people think about their neighbours. Our assumption is that if borders persist in the minds of people while disappearing in reality, it is – amongst other reasons – because the interactions and the exchanges that have boomed during the last decades have not all contributed to easing the relationships between border populations. Based on empirical observations, this article aims to highlight the lack of strict correlation between the intensity of cross-border interactions and the perception of neighbours. Of course, correlation tests do not allow us to draw conclusions about the existence of clear causal relationships, but our findings should encourage critically calling into question the European mainstream and normative theories on cross-border integration. With the limitations inherent to the treatment of the survey data used here and the production of simple correlation tests, the ambition of this article is more to raise new questions than to definitively answer any of them. In no way does this article speak in favour of an anti-European current.

In the first part, we aim to provide some elements towards a definition of the concept of cross-border integration and, by means of a review of relevant literature, we show how it has been studied so far and why it requires being approached and considered in a more comprehensive way. In the second part, we present the data and methods that we use to depict the cross-border integration process, both in terms of flows and perceptions. In the third and final part, we will analyse and interpret the results of the survey by comparing the intensity of cross-border activities and the quality of the perceptions that people have of their neighbours living on the other side of the border.

The necessity to disentangle the factors involved in the cross-border integration process

Different approaches to a single concept

Cross-border integration is a complex process that, because of its multi-faceted nature, remains vague in some of its aspects. Nevertheless, scholars have approached it in very different ways, which Van Houtum (2000) has classified under three different trends of research: the flow approach, the cross-border cooperation approach and the people approach.

The first approach derives from economic geography and studies the effects of borders on economic flows and usually provides an unequivocal understanding of the process of cross-border integration. It defines integration using a single metric that could be considered as the porosity of a border to flows. However, since the work of Lösch (1940) – which associates a border with an obstacle equivalent to an additional distance in the exchange process – numerous works have emphasized the assets or resources that borders can comprise (Sohn, 2013; Van Geenhuizen and Ratti, 2001). These assets are the result of differences and differentials between the two sides of the border, in terms of prices, taxation, regulatory constraints, etc. Not all people can take advantage of these opportunities, however, since some specific knowledge and means are required. Therefore, borders can be considered as having an ambivalent role, being at the same time a brake on and booster for exchanges.

The second approach focuses on cross-border cooperation and its institutionalization. Numerous studies have been carried out on the emergence of specific governance forms in cross-border contexts (Blatter, 2004; Dörry and Decoville, 2016), on new institutional spaces such as Euroregions (Evrard, 2016; Svensson and Nordlund, 2015) or on Interreg programmes, their impacts and their evaluations (Knippschild and Vock, 2017). In the European border regions that have benefited from Interreg funding since the origins of the programme, cross-border cooperation initiatives have flourished, but with mixed results that have sometimes given rise to some form of 'cooperation fatigue' (Knippschild, 2011: 631). In some cases they have been routinized, prompting the question of whether the act of cooperating across borders has become an objective in itself rather than a means of solving common problems. For instance, when institutional actors collaborate to produce cross-border territorial strategies, the resulting policy documents are found to have very little concrete impact because they are non-binding (Bufon, 2011) or because they are too strategic and not embedded enough in the right context (Jacobs, 2016). Perkmann describes certain cross-border cooperation structures as 'ceremonial envelopes or administration vehicles for EU programs' (Perkmann, 2007: 862). Similarly, Scott refers to cross-border cooperation as 'an opportunistic strategy for obtaining public subsidies' (Scott, 1999: 613).

The third approach is interested in the spatial practices and behaviour of people involved in cross-border interactions. These works describe how borders affect the individual and collective expressions of the populations who live in border regions. 'Political and social construction, cognition, perception, and identity are key words in these studies' (Van Houtum, 2000: 68). Some studies suggest that the inhabitants of border regions tend to be less Eurosceptic than residents in more central areas (Díez Medrano, 2003; Schmidberger, 1997), although these findings are debated and partially questioned for certain territories (Kuhn, 2011). This greater acceptance of the principle of European integration is interpreted as if crossing borders – and therefore the experience of a borderless Europe – would make the European project more concrete and tangible. According to Kuhn (2011), two types of arguments can explain this greater adhesion to the European integration discourse: the *utilitarian argument* and the *identity argument*. The utilitarian argument states that it results from the benefits that individuals gain from the opening up of borders, which provides opportunities for their quality of life, for instance by giving access to a cross-border labour market or by offering the opportunity for cross-border shopping. The *identity argument* is based on the assumption that interconnections favoured by spatial proximity and the absence of barriers reduce prejudices among border populations and promote mutual understanding and tolerance (Allport, 1954), which

in turn facilitate a more cosmopolitan vision of the world, and even encourage the emergence of collective identities (Kuhn, 2011).

The three approaches to cross-border integration refer to very different fields, which might explain why researchers have often tended to focus only on one aspect of this process. In addition to these three approaches to the concept of cross-border integration, the importance of the notion of convergence between borderland socio-economic and spatial characteristics has also been emphasized, based on the idea that integration cannot be dissociated from the policy concept of territorial cohesion (Decoville and Durand, 2017; Durand and Perrin, 2018). However, it seems important to investigate how these different dimensions (of practices on the one hand and of perceptions and collective identities on the other) interact with each other. The interplay between the flow approach and the institutional approach has already led to interesting findings, such as that 'there is not necessarily a reciprocal link between the intensity of the socio-economic interactions and the extent of the cooperation instigated by the territorial institutions' (Sohn et al., 2009: 936). In this article, we aim to compare the intensity of cross-border spatial practices with the 'people approach', using the revealed trust (or mistrust) that the populations who live in border regions have of their cross-border neighbours.

Cross-border interactions that both bring together and drive a wedge?

Before dealing with these two dimensions, it seems important to highlight the diversity of cross-border flows, their potential impacts and the challenges they raise. Indeed, cross-border flows can be differentiated not only by their nature, but also by the effects that they have on territories and populations. In this article, we question the ambivalence of the impacts of cross-border flows on the behaviour of border populations. Previous works have already distinguished different types of cross-border interactions. Roose identifies on the one hand the goal-oriented interactions motivated by material benefits that can be gained from interacting and, on the other hand, sociable forms of transnational interactions (Roose, 2010: 55). Based on this distinction, Kuhn derives two hypotheses aimed at seeing whether what she calls the 'border effect' is mediated by sociable or by goal-oriented forms of transnational interactions. The results of her model suggest that both forms of interaction have a significant influence on the lowering of Euroscepticism, with sociable forms having a stronger and more robust effect. Inspired by this differentiation of the drivers of cross-border interactions, we argue that certain cross-border flows contribute to strengthening the ties that unite and bring people closer in terms of values, perceptions and ways of life across borders while, by contrast, others do not and are even sometimes perceived as dividing rather than unifying.

Such a distinction between cross-border flows and their supposed impacts on collective expressions stems from their initial driving forces. Firstly, we assume that some cross-border flows involve a better understanding of the neighbouring region, its population and its culture, and this contributes to bringing border populations closer to each other. Cross-border tourism flows could belong to this type of practice, since they derive from an interest in or curiosity about the neighbouring region and its inhabitants. Cross-border flows of student exchanges also contribute in their way to building a European identity. Crossing the border to see family, friends or a lover certainly represents the strongest demonstration of a rapprochement between border populations.

Secondly, other cross-border flows are the result of opportunistic behaviour, driven in particular by differences and differentials between the two sides of the border (Klatt and Herrmann, 2011; Sohn, 2014). These generate diverse opportunities that can be mobilized by those individuals who are able to exploit them (Ratti and Reichman, 1993). Whether it concerns differences in the prices of goods (Spierings and Van der Velde, 2008), wages and unemployment rates (Matha and Wintr, 2009), real estate prices (Carpentier, 2012) or tax regimes (Ohsawa, 1999), some individuals use these differences and border differentials to maximize their interests. The most striking difference for EU citizens is probably the price differential between border regions. Sometimes commercial zones are created near to borders to attract customers from

abroad (Lavik and Nordlund, 2009), often to the detriment of shops located on the other side of the border. Some products in particular drive this type of travel and have already been studied, such as cheaper fuel in Luxembourg (Ohsawa, 1999) than in the neighbouring regions, the difference in prices of alcoholic drinks between Denmark and Sweden (Asplund et al., 2007) and the price variations in tobacco between European countries (Joossens and Raw, 1995). Among the different kinds of opportunistic flows that occur across borders, flows related to cross-border residential mobility resulting from differences in tax or the cost of living should also be mentioned. Research work has already shown that some Dutch have a tendency to settle on the other side of the border, in Germany or Belgium, while maintaining their social ties and job in the Netherlands. They do so in order to take advantage of lower taxes, whether on cars or land, as well as to take advantage of lower real estate prices, this being characterized by adopting 'elastic migration' behaviour (Van Houtum and Gielis, 2006: 195). Cross-border work can be seen as another type of opportunistic cross-border flow, encouraged by better economic conditions in the neighbouring region.

According to neoclassical economic assumptions, people tend to take advantage of the most judicious combination of opportunities offered by each side of a border, but in this game there are not only winners. Those who do not have the knowledge or the means to mobilize the opportunities do not benefit from the cross-border integration process or can even suffer the consequences. These 'victims' may include households that struggle to find affordable housing in their region due to property prices being forced up by cross-border workers and their higher purchasing power (Diop, 2011). Local shopkeepers can also suffer from competition with shops located on the other side of the border that benefit from a more favourable tax environment. The gap in the perceptions between the 'winners' and the 'losers' of the cross-border integration process is far from diminishing over time, since the individuals who exploit the 'differential benefit' (Sohn, 2013: 1705) have a vested interest in making it last longer. It is important not to underestimate the symbolic power of cross-border relationships that can be perceived as asserting an asymmetric balance of power, mostly in economic terms, between border regions. Some of the rationales that drive opportunistic flows therefore somewhat contradict the idea of territorial cohesion advocated by the EU, which is nevertheless central to European spatial planning policy. As shown recently, the persistence of border differentials also runs contra to the policy objective of territorial integration: 'Elevated by the economic crisis, cross-border discontinuities – differences in economic wealth – within the EU have grown since 2008. This suggests decreasing territorial integration within Europe' (Böhme et al., 2015: 23). Indeed, as has already been demonstrated (Decoville et al., 2013), some border cities with high economic performance derive an advantage from their border position compared with less dynamic or attractive regions. This is because they can attract a qualified labour force at a lower cost than the local labour force, yet without bearing all the other costs, for instance of education, infrastructure, social housing and so on. By referring to the 'border paradox', Knotter states:

> The border acts as a bridge, precisely because it is a barrier. People living in the borderlands cross this bridge because they want to profit – economically, socially or culturally – from the trans-border differences. In fact, according to geographers, the 'border paradox' is at the core of the concept of 'borderland' itself: the boundary creates its own distinctive region, making an element of division also the vehicle for regional definition. (Knotter, 2002–2003: 1)

If we make a distinction between cross-border flows depending on whether they exacerbate differences or help in the emergence of a collective feeling of belonging to a cross-border area, it is of course not intended to stigmatize the behaviour of individuals. Further, crossing a border for opportunistic reasons is of course not incompatible with being curious or interested in the region and people located on the other side of the border. In the next part, we show our approach to putting cross-border behaviour into perspective by means of the perceptions of neighbours.

Methodology

In order to explore the links between functional integration – cross-border flows – and the perceptions that residents of border regions have about their cross-border neighbours, we rely on the results of the EUROBAROMETER 422 survey, 'Cross-border cooperation in the EU', commissioned by the European Commission Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, and coordinated by the Directorate-General for Communication. This survey was conducted in all the 123 border regions covered by the 54 different cross-border cooperation programmes, including non-EU border regions in Norway and Switzerland. It was conducted in June 2015 by telephone, and no fewer than 40,619 people responded to it. More information about the investigated territories and the methodology can be found in the relevant report (European Commission, 2015a). This survey is the most extensive source of information collected to date about the representations and practices of individuals living in European border regions. All the data can be downloaded from the official website of the EU.[1] However, the results have previously only been explored in a very descriptive way. We used the results to create indicators and maps at the NUTS 3 level (Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics) with the aim of providing insights into the functional and perceptual dimensions of cross-border integration within the 123 border regions. The analysis of cross-border integration is firstly based on an interpretation of the results of each dimension studied and, secondly, the two dimensions are examined in order to see whether frequent cross-border interactions are associated with a high level of trust in neighbours, as advocated by the European official political discourse.

Firstly, we produce two indicators on the cross-border flows and on the perceptions about cross-border neighbours. The first one is expressed through the number of cross-border activities carried out by the population in all the border regions that were taking part in Interreg A programmes in Europe. We use Question 2 in the survey, which investigates the reasons why people cross borders. The wording is: 'How often do you go to [country from programme] for each of the following reasons?' The reasons stated are: 'to visit family / to visit friends / to use public services / to shop for goods or services / for work or business purposes / for leisure activities including tourist visits'. We then weight the results by the frequency given by each interviewee. For those who responded 'once a month or more often', we give the value of 18 annual activities in the neighbouring region per year. For 'several times a year', we give the value of 6, and for 'once a year or less often', we give the value of 0.5. We then obtain an estimation of the overall number of activities realized in a neighbouring cross-border region per interviewee and per year, by dividing the total score by the total number of respondents in each region.

With regard to the perceptions that people have about their neighbours, we use the results of Question 3, which is described as reflecting the 'mutual social trust among people living in border regions covered by an Interreg cross-border cooperation programme' (European Commission, 2015a: 67). The question wording is: 'Would you personally feel comfortable or uncomfortable about having a citizen from [another country in the Interreg programme in the respondent's region] as (i) your manager, (ii) your work colleague, (iii) your neighbour, (iv) a family member[?]'. We use the aggregated results for each of the four items and produce a percentage that shows, for each NUTS 3 region, the proportion of people who answered that they would feel either 'totally uncomfortable' or 'somewhat uncomfortable' with at least one of the possibilities. These answers offer an interesting first view of cross-border mutual social trust. In a way, this allows us to take at her word Mrs Cretu, the European Commissioner responsible for regional policy, when she says that initially cross-border cooperation initiatives had, as their main objective, 'the establishment of mutual trust for a peaceful and prosperous Europe' (Wassenberg et al., 2015: 1). This indicator only gives a simplistic and partial image of a very complex issue, but to our knowledge it is the first question related to the notion of trust beyond borders ever asked in all the EU border regions.

In the second step, we map the results of these two indices at the NUTS 3 level. To overcome the problem of overlaps due to the fact that some border

areas participate in several Interreg programmes, we calculate average values. In addition, we also collected data for the gross domestic product (GDP) by purchasing power parity per capita at the NUTS 3 level (Eurostat source for 2014), in order to compare the economic differences between border territories and thus complete the analysis. Our hypothesis concerning the use of this variable (which approximates living standards) is that the richer the inhabitants of a territory are, the more likely they will be to cross the border to shop, go as tourists or use the amenities located on the other side of the border. Indeed, all these activities require financial capacities that are very unequally distributed between border regions.

Despite the advantages offered by the EUROBAROMETER 422 survey and its considerable mass of information, a number of reservations should be mentioned in relation to its use. Firstly, the spatial division of this survey corresponds to the programmes that are eligible for Interreg funding, which means that some regions have large geographical perimeters while some others have very small ones. In the case of small NUTS 3 units, where there is a real physical proximity to the border (such as in Germany), the interviewees are more likely to have regular exchanges with the neighbouring territory than in the large NUTS 3 territories, where respondents can actually live several hundred kilometres away from the border (as in the Scandinavian territories, for instance). As shown for the inhabitants of the Lorraine region working in Luxembourg, half of them live within a radius of 40 kilometres from their place of work (Gerber et al., 2012). In the same way, it is obvious that the distance between the place of residence and the border clearly has an importance concerning cross-border practices. Secondly, the sampling of the survey was designed not in relation to the proximity of individuals to the border, but in relation to the urban density within the border regions. This means that the size of the territories under observation and the methodological choices concerning the selection of the people who were interviewed have potentially generated biases in the results of the survey. Further, we have no information on whether those interviewed live in urban or rural regions. Therefore, it is impossible to see whether living in an urban environment tends to be associated with frequent border crossings. Another limitation to be borne in mind is that the EUROBAROMETER 422 survey provides only a snapshot of the situation and does not allow assessment of the evolution over time either of the cross-border practices of individuals or of perceptions. Cross-border integration is a process that could evolve in both these ways (Durand, 2015).

How practices and perceptions reveal the heterogeneity of cross-border integration in Europe

Cross-border activities in European border regions

Since the implementation of the Schengen Agreement, the free movement of people has been permitted between the signatory countries, thus fostering the development of the European integration project. After several decades, what is really happening? Are the borders of Europe extensively crossed by inhabitants of border regions? Have neighbouring border regions been more appropriated by border residents? Figure 1 shows an estimation of the number of cross-border activities realized per person and per year within cross-border regions. It illustrates that border crossing is very different throughout Europe: 53.2 per cent of those interviewed stated that they cross the border at least once a year for one of the above-mentioned activities, and on average – and based on the methodology used to make our estimations – people living in a border region carry out 5.5 activities per year in the neighbouring region abroad. The observation of Figure 1 sheds light on a dark red core of Europe in which the number of cross-border activities is very high. Between the Netherlands, Belgium, the Grand Est region of France, Luxembourg and the Germanic world in general (Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, German-speaking Switzerland and Austria), the number of cross-border activities per person is estimated to be over nine per year; hence, cross-border functional integration appears very strong. The cross-border flows and the number of activities are also significant between Ireland and the Scottish coast. Conversely, in 45 border territories (out of 123),



Figure 1. Intensity of cross-border activities in European border regions. (Colour online only.)

the number of cross-border activities is on average below three per year and in 74 border territories, it is below six per year. Several parameters obviously play a role: the linguistic proximity between some of these territories, the absence of a physical barrier between border regions or, of course, the quality of linked transport networks (road, rail, inland waterway and maritime). In the new member states of the EU, and more generally in the former communist bloc countries, the number of activities realized on the other side of the border is small. This is also true, and understandably so, for the regions participating in the

Interreg programmes that are separated by a sea (Bretagne or Normandy in France, the eastern coast of Italy, Sardinia and the Greek islands). On the other hand, it is interesting to put into perspective these border crossing practices in relation to the level of wealth of the inhabitants, which can be approximated by the GDP (see Figure 4 in the Appendix). Thus, we can observe that, in general, the richer the territories (expressed in GDP per capita by purchasing power parity in 2014), the more their inhabitants are inclined to cross borders ($r^2 = 0.38$ between GDP per capita and the intensity of cross-border activities). A correlation coefficient cannot establish causal links, but it might raise the question of whether populations are actually equal in their ability to cross the border, which depends on multiple factors, including car ownership and greater purchasing power. Moreover, when economic differentials are important between border regions, border crossings are also more numerous. Thus, at the spatial scale of the cross-border spaces of Interreg cooperation programmes, we can observe that without any geographical barrier or long distance to cover, people seem to be more keen on travelling abroad when wealth differentials are important (see the German and Swiss–French borders, the Luxembourg and French–Belgian, German–Belgian borders, etc.). This observation tends to show a complementary aspect of the evidence highlighted by Hudson (2003) that economic integration does not reduce socio-spatial inequalities within the EU even though the interpretation of the EUROBAROMETER 422 results does not scientifically prove any causal relationship, since it is based on simple correlation tests. Indeed, one may wonder if differences and inequalities are not potential driving forces for cross-border interactions or, in other words, if inequalities do not nourish the cross-border integration process. Of course, such an assumption should be confirmed by more detailed analyses based on ad hoc data.

Beyond facilitating the estimation of the number of cross-border activities, the EUROBAROMETER 422 survey also provides interesting information about the reasons why people cross borders (see Table 1 in the Appendix). The first point to note is that individuals who cross the border several times a year do so in general for multiple reasons. This shows that it would be too simplistic to assign to each individual a specific type of cross-border behaviour that would be either opportunistic or based on the willingness to improve an understanding of the neighbours. The survey was not designed to investigate these dimensions and the use that we make of it in this article can only be limited to descriptive statistics.

When taking a broad look at the different reasons why people cross borders, we can first identify those who visit family and friends. This reason is particularly important in territories that were once united and are now separated by a border, or in border regions where there is a sizeable minority of a population originating from the neighbouring country (e.g. Slovakia and the Czech Republic, Ireland and Northern Ireland, the Magyar community of Transylvania in Romania and the German community in Switzerland or Austria). However, these 'social' flows are very rare: just four border areas contain over 40 per cent of the people who answered that they cross the border for this purpose. Tourism and leisure activities can also be included in the category of cross-border flows that are expected to bring border populations closer to each other. This is, moreover, the most often reported reason given by interviewees on average in all European border regions. However, the frequency of these tourist flows is very different from one region to another. The Benelux countries and the border regions of Switzerland constitute areas where populations frequently cross borders for reasons related to tourism.

Alongside the flows that we believe tend to reinforce common European identity, the previously described opportunistic flows can be identified also. Among them, cross-border working flows are probably among the most often mentioned. However, the results of the EUROBAROMETER 422 survey concerning such activities linked to work or business do not appear so significant. This can be explained because the territorial grid that served as a basis for selecting the people for an interview is too wide and the sampling too loose to properly reflect the phenomenon of cross-border work. It is relatively local in scale, especially for the French border regions, which are the largest providers of cross-border workers in Europe (European Commission, 2015b).

Cross-border shopping is another important reason for crossing borders. This is particularly the case for Norwegians travelling to Sweden (78 per cent of the Norwegians interviewed say they go to Sweden at least once a year to buy things), Dutch people travelling to Germany, Czechs visiting Germany or Germans going to Poland. These cross-border flows related to shopping can also generate problems: for example, additional road traffic, and landscape degradation through the building of commercial zones outside city centres in close proximity to borders. This type of cross-border activity clearly does not involve the same relationship with the neighbouring territory and its inhabitants as the ones linked to the existence of social ties or those that result from the desire to discover and to get to know the neighbouring territory better. These flows only contribute weakly to the construction of a mutual cross-border living area and to a shared common knowledge base at the cross-border level, although their economic consequences may be significant.

One final type of opportunistic border crossing can be investigated through this survey: that of access to public services, such as the provision of health care or education. Generally speaking, this reason is seldom mentioned by respondents (10 per cent of people crossing borders have used public services in neighbouring countries). The highest values are found in Ireland, Romania, the UK and Austria. The EU has largely promoted the pooling of cross-border public services in recent decades, notably through the use of Interreg funds. This requires close cooperation between local, regional and sometimes even national public actors. This is why cross-border public services symbolize very well the success of cross-border cooperation, even if the values of the EUROBAROMETER 422 reveal few border crossings for this reason.

The above-mentioned distinction between social or opportunistic activities is an attempt to categorize the variety of cross-border flows. However, crossing the border for opportunistic reasons is far from being incompatible with the desire to get to know the bordering region and its inhabitants better. As mentioned in the EUROBAROMETER 422 report (European Commission, 2015a), in many cases, people who cross the border do so for multiple reasons. People take advantage of a trip abroad to make their journey profitable and to carry out various activities, notably through chain activities (Drevon et al., 2018). For instance, previous work has shown that Dutch residents tend to combine shopping and tourism in the border region (Szytniewski et al., 2017). Consequently, it is important not to differentiate in a simplistic manner between ‘bad’ and ‘good’ practices of border crossings, but instead to think about the consequences of the sum of all the uses that are made of them.

Putting cross-border practices and perceptions into perspective

Observing cross-border practices is the most tangible way of quantitatively assessing the level of cross-border integration. However, does the fact of having numerous activities on the other side of the border correlate with having a better perception of the border residents of this neighbouring country? Figure 2 represents the proportion of people who would feel uncomfortable having an inhabitant of the neighbouring border region as a manager, a work colleague, a neighbour or a family member, expressed as a percentage. As mentioned in the EUROBAROMETER 422 survey, this indicator is used to depict the level of mutual social trust between border residents.

The large majority of people interviewed in border regions in Europe feel comfortable with all the social categories (82 per cent). However, clear differences are apparent between the case studies. Firstly, we can single out a Western and North-western European area that seems to have much more mutual social trust in its neighbours compared with Central and Eastern Europe. The reasons that might contribute to explaining these differences are numerous, and this paper is not the place to go into them since they are specific to cross-border contexts, each with its own history and its specificities. Nevertheless, it seems obvious that the Iron Curtain that separated Western Europe from Eastern Europe for several decades still remains in a lot of people’s minds, both between Eastern and Western Europe and between Eastern European countries. Historical legacies, of course, and the building of nationalism – which relied on the capacity of educational systems, national labour markets and public



Figure 2. Mutual social trust between border neighbours.

institutions to culturally homogenize the national identity (Gellner, 1983) – have greatly influenced the way societies perceive themselves, and consequently the way they perceive others.

Moreover, in the absence of data covering different periods, which would allow one to study the evolution of these perceptions, we cannot conclude anything about the dynamics of possible improvement or

degradation. More modestly, however, based on cross-checking the maps we can shed light on several factual findings on the intensity of cross-border activities and on the trust or mistrust that interviewed people have towards their neighbours. Figure 3 compares the intensity of cross-border activities with the expressed mutual social trust beyond borders, and therefore provides a representation of the differences between the functional and the ideational dimensions of the cross-border integration process. From a methodological perspective, the two dimensions intersect at their respective median values, and consequently four classes of values are obtained according to whether or not a NUTS 3 region has a higher level of border crossing than the median of all the NUTS 3 regions, and whether it has a higher or lower level of mutual trust.

The first finding is that cross-border practices and perceptions are relatively similar for the border regions of each country of residence. That is to say, practices and perceptions seem to be associated, most often, with the national context and the general state of trust or mistrust that exists with respect to the 'outside world' in each country, rather than with 'whom' the neighbours really are, even if a few countries, such as France or Italy, show a variation between their different border regions. Unfortunately, this first observation cannot be further investigated with the limited information provided in the survey. It also prevents us from producing and interpreting correlations between the types of flows that exist between border regions (based on opportunistic reasons or on a willingness to discover and understand the neighbouring region) and the level of trust. Indeed, to avoid the bias associated with national collective representations, correlation tests should be carried out for each country. With our data, however, the very small number of regions studied in each country and the limited number of people interviewed in each region (between 300 and 400) make such tests impossible from a methodological point of view.

The second finding is that there is no strict correlation between the intensity of cross-border activities and the degree of mutual social trust. The correlation coefficient is slightly positive ($r^2 = 0.35$), meaning that, generally speaking, the level of trust is slightly better in the regions where people tend to cross the border frequently. However, substantial differences can be observed and for the same intensity of cross-border practices the degree of mutual social trust radically differs. Interviewed Eastern European people tend to have much less social trust in their neighbours than Scandinavians do, even though they have approximately the same number of cross-border activities. Simple descriptive statistics cannot of course explain the reasons that have led to this situation, and that are certainly related to the political and territorial construct of each state. These results are in line with the work carried out in the EUCROSS project, which states that: 'New Member States (NMS) have lower transnationalism[2] indices compared to Western and Northern countries of the EU, consistently with the existing hierarchy of GDP' (Recchi et al., 2014: 60). It is also striking to note that the border regions of Geneva, Luxembourg and Basel, which are the most open to cross-border flows in Europe (Decoville et al., 2015), show a limited level of mutual social trust, at least lower than we could expect considering the very important intensity of cross-border interactions. These important flows are even sometimes presented as arguments for nationalist or regionalist discourses in the border areas that 'receive' them. For instance, the movement against cross-border workers in the Geneva region – *Mouvement Citoyens Genevois* – blames French cross-border workers for 'stealing' the jobs of nationals, even though the problem of unemployment remains limited (Durand et al., 2017). Although the data used here only provides a snapshot of the situation and therefore does not allow us to draw conclusions about any trends, these strong differences in the perceptions of the neighbours tend to contradict the idea that a high intensity of cross-border activities is associated with converging representations beyond borders.

A third finding can be noted with regard to the asymmetry in the level of mutual social trust between neighbours within single cross-border regions. In most cases where both sides of borders are relatively wealthy territories, the degree of social mutual trust is high, whereas this is not the case when both sides are economically weak or when there is a significant differential between border regions. This observation is in line with the results provided by Question 6 in the EUROBAROMETER 422 survey ('Thinking about the cooperation between [our country] and



Figure 3. Typology of border regions based on the number of cross-border activities and the level of mutual social trust.

[another country from the programme], to what extent is any of the following a problem? …'), which shows that for 46 per cent of the interviewees, social and economic differences constitute a problem that hampers cooperation beyond borders. Indeed, the more people see economic problems as an obstacle

to cross-border cooperation, the more they show mistrust of their cross-border neighbours ($r^2 = 0.51$).

The fourth finding seems to undermine another hypothesis: that there is a relationship between the date of the accession of a country to the EU and greater mutual trust. Our assumption was that the establishment of mutual social trust between inhabitants of border regions is based on concrete individual experiences that can only be acquired over time. If this were the case, we would expect people living in border regions of old EU member countries to have developed more substantial experience of border crossings and therefore to have a more favourable opinion of their neighbours, in accordance with the *identity argument* mentioned above. However, this is not always the case. France, which has been a member since 1953, exhibits a relatively weak level of trust towards its neighbours. This is also the case for Italy (a member since 1973). On the other hand, the inhabitants of Sweden and Finland, both of which joined in 1995, have great trust in their neighbours. As far as these countries are concerned, there are many historical bilateral inter-state agreements that exist outside the strict context of belonging to the EU. Among the latest countries entering the EU, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Baltic States, the Czech Republic and Slovakia all indicate low levels of mutual social trust in their neighbours. The interpretation of these results would most likely be that building relationships of trust takes time, but that time is not a sufficient criterion to achieve an overall high level of trust.

Conclusion

These analyses of data from the EUROBAROMETER 422 survey offer insights into the multi-faceted aspect of the concept of cross-border integration, even though the purely descriptive statistics extracted from this survey and presented in this article would need to be validated by ad hoc and in-depth analyses. Firstly, cross-border flows are not uniform and vary greatly from one cross-border area to another. Secondly, neighbour perceptions differ from one cross-border region to another, and also within the different cross-border regions. These findings allow us to question some of the 'certainties' underpinning the European discourse on territorial cooperation, despite the inherent limitations of the methodology used. For example, it is not in the border regions where border crossings are the most numerous that the notion of trust is the highest. One can legitimately ask whether some of the more opportunistic practices of border crossing in fact generate nuisance levels that negatively influence the perceptions of some people. Another important lesson that can be drawn is that the levels of trust within cross-border areas are not necessarily reciprocal. Indeed, the opening up of borders can potentially reinforce negative perceptions of neighbours, as it highlights the disparities and consequently the feeling of an unequal balance of power – at least at the economic level – between one border area and another.

All these findings show that while the weakening of the restrictive role of borders on flows has been substantial in recent decades, borders remain in some cases relatively present in the minds and attitudes of individuals, despite sometimes intense cross-border practices. In the words of David Newman:

> The globalization impact on borders is as geographically and socially differentiated as most other social phenomena – in some places, it results in the opening of borders and the associated creation of transition zone borderlands, while, in others, the borderland remains a frontier in which mutual suspicions, mistrust of the other and a desire to maintain group or national exclusivity remain in place. (Newman, 2006: 181)

It is therefore an oversimplification to associate the concept of cross-border integration with only one of its dimensions, namely that of cross-border flows. The identification of the absence of direct associations between the two dimensions analysed in this paper (functional and perceptual) is important for two reasons. Firstly, it should help us to better understand the complexity of the European construction process in its border regions from a conceptual point of view. Secondly, it should enable policymakers to relativize the relevance of analytical grids that are only based on the quantitative approach of flows when taking the pulse of cross-border societies and trying to better understand the way populations share (or not) the ideal of a Europe without borders.

If border regions are indeed laboratories of European integration, then we must try to see how the findings of this article can contribute to the broader debate on the challenges linked to the European integration process. It seems to us that the maps in this article show that in spite of the many opportunities created by the opening of borders, many individuals feel left out and tend to express their rejection of the institutions as well as of their European neighbours. Therefore, it is crucial to critically examine the assumptions that underpin European discourse and to re-adapt policies in order to be in greater conformity with the EU paradigms of social and territorial cohesion, seeing that these seem to be partially contradicted in border regions.

Acknowledgements

We thank the Editor and the two anonymous referees for their precious comments and suggestions.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

1. http://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S1565_422_ENG
2. Transnationalism is defined by the authors as 'a web of networks and practices connecting paired societies across borders is a social construction by specific mechanisms related, mainly, to mobility or migration and expressions of social choices or values'(Recchi et al., 2014: 60).

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Appendix



Figure 4. Gross domestic product per capita at purchasing power parity in Europe.

Table 1. Reasons to cross the border per border side in each Interreg cross-border cooperation programme. Expressed in percentage of the interviewed people who answered 'Yes' for each reason evoked for crossing the border.

Case study	Border side	Visiting family	Visiting friends	Buying goods	Using Services	Making tourism	Work reasons
Austria–Hungary	AT	5	13	17	13	44	12
Austria–Hungary	HU	17	24	47	8	66	25
Germany/Brandenburg–Poland	DE	8	16	59	13	44	8
Germany/Brandenburg–Poland	PL	30	35	43	18	51	27
Poland–Slovakia	PL	9	22	18	9	52	12
Poland–Slovakia	SK	9	19	54	10	41	18
Poland–Denmark–Germany–Lithuania–Sweden (South Baltic)	DE	5	9	16	9	29	6
Poland–Denmark–Germany–Lithuania–Sweden (South Baltic)	DK	7	11	21	2	37	11
Poland–Denmark–Germany–Lithuania–Sweden (South Baltic)	LT	6	12	10	4	18	12
Poland–Denmark–Germany–Lithuania–Sweden (South Baltic)	PL	13	18	18	17	27	10
Poland–Denmark–Germany–Lithuania–Sweden (South Baltic)	SE	3	7	28	2	47	9
Poland–Denmark–Germany–Lithuania–Sweden (South Baltic)	EE	7	16	17	2	63	18
Poland–Denmark–Germany–Lithuania–Sweden (South Baltic)	FI	7	14	32	9	50	11
Poland–Denmark–Germany–Lithuania–Sweden (South Baltic)	LV	3	10	10	3	42	14
Poland–Denmark–Germany–Lithuania–Sweden (South Baltic)	SE	2	3	8	1	28	7
Slovakia–Hungary	HU	7	14	16	1	40	5
Slovakia–Hungary	SK	18	23	39	13	49	16
Sweden–Norway	NO	17	28	78	7	64	20
Sweden–Norway	SE	13	17	6	2	48	15
Germany/Saxony–Czech Republic	CZ	15	21	69	7	56	22
Germany/Saxony–Czech Republic	DE	6	13	39	10	62	13
Poland–Germany/Saxony	DE	6	15	48	12	55	16
Poland–Germany/Saxony	PL	39	49	54	12	57	16
Germany (Mecklenburg-West Pomerania/ Brandenburg)–Poland	DE	10	17	50	13	51	14
Germany (Mecklenburg-West Pomerania/ Brandenburg)–Poland	PL	38	42	44	11	59	19
Belgium–Germany–Netherlands	BE	14	14	48	8	56	11
Belgium–Germany–Netherlands	DE	16	25	57	17	69	14
Belgium–Germany–Netherlands	NL	21	27	72	13	81	19
Greece–Italy	GR	15	24	16	13	54	8
Greece–Italy	IT	1	6	2	1	33	6
Romania–Bulgaria	BG	10	9	14	7	37	19
Romania–Bulgaria	RO	20	24	30	18	35	16

(Continued)

Table 1. (Continued)

Case study	Border side	Visiting family	Visiting friends	Buying goods	Using Services	Making tourism	Work reasons
Greece–Bulgaria	BG	12	16	15	3	65	6
Greece–Bulgaria	GR	11	10	17	6	39	8
Germany–The Netherlands	DE	12	21	58	15	69	13
Germany–The Netherlands	NL	19	17	54	9	81	17
Germany–Austria–Switzerland–Liechtenstein	AT	33	45	45	18	75	24
Germany–Austria–Switzerland–Liechtenstein	CH	16	26	41	10	64	14
Germany–Austria–Switzerland–Liechtenstein	DE	15	28	25	12	58	16
Czech Republic–Poland	CZ	3	9	52	4	41	15
Czech Republic–Poland	PL	20	23	32	15	61	11
Sweden–Denmark–Norway (Öresund–Kattegat–Skagerrak)	DK	8	18	11	3	57	12
Sweden–Denmark–Norway (Öresund–Kattegat–Skagerrak)	NO	13	21	51	4	61	24
Sweden–Denmark–Norway (Öresund–Kattegat–Skagerrak)	SE	8	16	25	4	62	13
Latvia–Lithuania	LT	6	10	21	8	64	9
Latvia–Lithuania	LV	8	14	54	15	64	18
Sweden–Finland–Norway (Botnia–Atlantica)	FI	22	22	25	8	49	15
Sweden–Finland–Norway (Botnia–Atlantica)	NO	10	15	33	5	44	9
Sweden–Finland–Norway (Botnia–Atlantica)	SE	8	9	11	1	50	10
Slovenia–Croatia	HR	19	26	45	15	50	18
Slovenia–Croatia	SI	18	29	23	8	77	12
Austria–Czech Republic	AT	4	8	26	6	54	7
Austria–Czech Republic	CZ	4	16	36	6	57	15
Slovakia–Czech Republic	CZ	20	33	17	10	73	22
Slovakia–Czech Republic	SK	48	53	42	20	62	19
Lithuania–Poland	LT	8	11	31	6	39	11
Lithuania–Poland	PL	13	18	16	8	58	17
Sweden–Finland–Norway (Nord)	FI	19	21	43	6	60	13
Sweden–Finland–Norway (Nord)	NO	8	13	33	4	44	13
Sweden–Finland–Norway (Nord)	SE	7	12	10	2	47	11
Italy–France (Maritime)	FR	26	31	51	10	73	16
Italy–France (Maritime)	IT	13	19	15	5	65	13
France–Italy (ALCOTRA)	FR	17	19	39	7	67	9
France–Italy (ALCOTRA)	IT	11	23	13	8	69	11
Italy–Switzerland	CH	20	30	54	8	79	12
Italy–Switzerland	IT	12	25	23	5	52	9
Italy–Slovenia	IT	11	16	38	10	65	10
Italy–Slovenia	SI	14	23	56	5	57	14
Italy–Malta	IT	2	9	7	4	32	6
Italy–Malta	MT	5	10	21	5	73	7
France–Belgium–Netherlands–UK (two seas)	BE	13	22	31	10	63	11
France–Belgium–Netherlands–UK (two seas)	FR	8	14	26	5	44	10
France–Belgium–Netherlands–UK (two seas)	NL	9	15	20	4	59	10
France–Belgium–Netherlands–UK (two seas)	UK	9	12	13	7	36	10

Table 1. (Continued)

Case study	Border side	Visiting family	Visiting friends	Buying goods	Using Services	Making tourism	Work reasons
France–Germany–Switzerland (Rhin supérieur–Oberrhein)	CH	14	34	46	12	70	14
France–Germany–Switzerland (Rhin supérieur–Oberrhein)	DE	18	32	46	15	71	14
France–Germany–Switzerland (Rhin supérieur–Oberrhein)	FR	16	25	49	7	63	19
Slovakia–Austria	AT	5	9	14	4	32	9
Slovakia–Austria	SK	11	22	59	16	61	29
France–UK (Manche – Channel)	FR	6	12	11	7	33	7
France–UK (Manche – Channel)	UK	13	18	17	11	54	14
France–Switzerland	CH	19	30	44	10	72	12
France–Switzerland	FR	21	32	28	13	70	24
Italy–Croatia	HR	10	11	33	10	42	15
Italy–Croatia	IT	2	7	3	2	45	2
Belgium–France (France–Wallonie–Vlaanderen)	BE	32	46	57	12	80	17
Belgium–France (France–Wallonie–Vlaanderen)	FR	23	36	53	10	74	16
France–Belgium–Germany–Luxembourg (Grande Région)	BE	22	29	41	14	52	15
France–Belgium–Germany–Luxembourg (Grande Région)	DE	11	18	30	10	48	10
France–Belgium–Germany–Luxembourg (Grande Région)	FR	15	17	41	9	47	14
France–Belgium–Germany–Luxembourg (Grande Région)	LU	23	40	56	13	72	21
Belgium–The Netherlands (Vlaanderen–Nederland)	BE	15	30	64	13	77	24
Belgium–The Netherlands (Vlaanderen–Nederland)	NL	19	24	47	13	75	20
UK–Ireland (Ireland–North Ireland/Scotland)	IE	59	57	63	23	67	23
UK–Ireland (Ireland–North Ireland/Scotland)	UK	31	40	39	17	62	17
UK–Ireland (Ireland–Wales)	IE	42	52	34	16	59	19
UK–Ireland (Ireland–Wales)	UK	8	14	10	5	37	11
Hungary–Romania	HU	8	22	15	3	51	11
Hungary–Romania	RO	27	24	37	23	51	23
Austria–Germany/Bavaria	AT	35	50	55	20	79	27
Austria–Germany/Bavaria	DE	14	32	41	17	77	19
Estonia–Latvia	EE	6	15	34	4	76	18
Estonia–Latvia	LV	4	14	18	9	66	19
Italy–Austria	AT	14	26	33	7	82	7
Italy–Austria	IT	5	16	21	5	70	7
Slovenia–Hungary	HU	5	10	13	5	39	5
Slovenia–Hungary	SI	6	6	21	5	33	5
Slovenia–Austria	AT	8	11	21	8	56	9
Slovenia–Austria	SI	15	23	50	11	55	17
Greece–Cyprus	CY	44	47	29	17	75	20

(Continued)

Table 1. (Continued)

Case study	Border side	Visiting family	Visiting friends	Buying goods	Using Services	Making tourism	Work reasons
Greece–Cyprus	GR	13	17	14	10	24	8
Ireland–UK (PEACE)	DE	10	15	29	8	67	14
Ireland–UK (PEACE)	DK	8	11	63	5	69	15
Ireland–UK (PEACE)	IE	59	62	62	24	75	25
Ireland–UK (PEACE)	UK	39	51	47	22	86	30
Spain–Portugal (POCTEP)	ES	8	18	43	6	81	13
Spain–Portugal (POCTEP)	PT	11	20	46	15	77	15
Spain–France–Andorra (POCTEFA)	ES	12	17	28	10	57	9
Spain–France–Andorra (POCTEFA)	FR	16	23	38	5	78	10
Hungary–Croatia CB035 Italy–Switzerland	HR	7	10	35	7	38	6
Hungary–Croatia CB035 Italy–Switzerland	HU	7	11	15	6	59	10
Germany/Bavaria–Czech Republic	CZ	17	26	53	5	54	22
Germany/Bavaria–Czech Republic	DE	7	10	36	6	45	9