

New Perspectives

Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations

Benjamin Tallis: The World Is (Not) Heated

Special Section: The Prague Agenda

Michal Smetana, Anastasia Kazteridis, Matthew Kroenig, Sadia Tasleem,
Richard Price, Jeffrey Fields, Jason Enia, Angela Kane, Dieter Fleck

Nicholas Dungey: Writing Kafka's Soul: Disciplinary Power,
Resistance & the Authorship of the Subject

Michael Toomey: History, Nationalism, and Democracy:
Myth and Narrative in Viktor Orbán's 'Illiberal Hungary'

Oľga Gyárfášová: The Fourth Generation: From Anti-Establishment
to Anti-Systém Parties in Slovakia

Laurent Binet: *HHhH*
& The 7th Function of Language

ABOUT NEW PERSPECTIVES

New Perspectives seeks to provide interdisciplinary insight into the politics and international relations of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In encouraging interdisciplinary perspectives on CEE IR and Politics – broadly understood – we seek to widen and deepen interpretive and explanatory frameworks for creating useful knowledge on and in the region and support regional contributions to theoretical, conceptual and methodological development more widely.

Building on the success of its forerunner, *Perspectives* (founded in 1993), the journal has recently been transformed in order to keep pace with developments in international political research and support the development of current and future IR research communities in Central and Eastern Europe and their connectedness to research communities in the wider world.

New Perspectives seeks to encourage and publish original research that is: methodologically systematic, rigorous and reflexive; theoretically innovative and compelling; or empirically groundbreaking. We interpret the borders of ‘Central and Eastern Europe’ broadly and so encourage submissions that reflect this.

New Perspectives seeks to attract submissions which address political aspects of regional affairs and their connections to the wider world from the fields of: International Relations, Political Science, Security Studies and International Political Sociology; International Political Economy; Geography; Sociology; Anthropology; History; Cultural Studies and Legal Studies.

PEER REVIEW PROCESS

New Perspectives operates a rigorous peer-review process facilitated by our world-class editorial board although we reserve the right to reject any manuscript as being unsuitable in its topic, style or form before requesting an external review. Articles that are accepted for refereeing undergo a double-blind peer review, meaning that they are reviewed by at least two external referees.

We aim to complete the peer review process within three months, but please be aware that this can sometimes be delayed. After the peer review process has been completed, you will receive a decision about your article based on the blind-reviews by the referees and drawn together by our editorial team.

This decision will be conveyed in a letter which will notify you that the manuscript has been accepted as it is or rejected as being unsuitable for publication or that we would like you to revise and re-submit the manuscript. As well as informing you of the decision, the letter will explain the key reasons behind it and in the case of the article being classified as ‘revise and resubmit’, it will outline the extent and foci of the revisions that need to be made in order for the article to be reconsidered for publication. Once the necessary revisions have been made, the article should then be re-submitted along with the necessary accompanying explanatory note.

New Perspectives reserves the right to edit and alter all manuscripts, particularly for copy editing, language editing and formatting, but will send proofs to the authors for approval before publication. Upon publication, authors are entitled to one hard copy of the journal and will be sent a PDF (.pdf) version of their article.

New Perspectives

Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations

Vol. 26, No. 1/2018

ÚSTAV
MEZINÁRODNÍCH VZTAHŮ
PRAHA



INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
PRAGUE

Editorial Board

Louis Armand, Charles University, Prague
Pelín Ayan, Anglo-American University, Prague
Mitchell Belfer, Metropolitan University Prague
Roland Bleiker, University of Queensland, Brisbane
Dorothee Bohle, Central European University, Budapest
Antoine Bousquet, Birkbeck, University of London
Mats Braun, Metropolitan University Prague
Christian Bueger, Cardiff University
Juraj Buzalka, Comenius University, Bratislava
Benjamin de Carvalho, The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Vasyl Cherepanyn, National University of Kyiv
Ondřej Císař, Charles University, Prague
Mitchell Dean, Copenhagen Business School
Ondřej Ditrych, Charles University, Prague
Jan Drahokoupil, European Trade Union Institute, Brussels
Alena Drieschova, Cardiff University
Matthias Ebenau, German Metal Workers Union, Beverungen
William Eddleston, Anglo-American University, Prague
Rachel Epstein, University of Denver
Rick Fawn, University of St. Andrews
Andrej Findor, Comenius University, Bratislava
Karolina Follis, Lancaster University
Simone Molin Friis, University of Copenhagen
Dariusz Gafijczuk, Newcastle University
Mark Galeotti, Institute of International Relations, Prague
Sarah Green, University of Helsinki
Béla Greskovits, Central European University, Budapest
Jakub Grygar, Charles University, Prague
Lene Hansen, University of Copenhagen
David Hugill, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver
Julien Jeandesboz, University of Amsterdam
Petr Jehlička, The Open University
Markus Kienscherf, Free University of Berlin
Michal Kořan, Aspen Institute Central Europe, Prague
James Krapfl, McGill University, Toronto

Editorial and Administrative Office

Institute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague 1, Czech Republic
Benjamin Tallis, tallis@iir.cz
Journal: www.newperspectives.iir.cz, Blog: www.ceenewperspectives.iir.cz, Publisher: www.iir.cz

Any opinions expressed are those of the individual authors and thus represent neither the views of the editors nor those of the Institute of International Relations.

Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted or indexed in Scopus, Academic Search Premier (via EBSCO host), ABI/INFORM Global, Academic Research Library (via ProQuest), Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO), the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS), World Affairs Online and the Czech National Bibliography.

ISSN 2336-825X (Print) ISSN 2336-8268 (On-line) ČÍSLO REGISTRACE MK ČR 6554

Petr Kratochvíl, Institute of International Relations, Prague
 Fritz Kratochwil, Central European University, Budapest
 Vendulka Kubálková, University of Miami
 Xymena Kurowska, Central European University, Budapest
 Merje Kuus, University of British Columbia
 George Lawson, London School of Economics and Political Science
 Nicolas Maslowski, Charles University, Prague
 Marek Mikuš, Comenius University, Bratislava
 Can Mutlu, Bilkent University, Ankara
 Martin Myant, European Trade Union Institute, Brussels
 Andrew Neal, University of Edinburgh
 Iver B. Neumann, NOVA, Oslo Metropolitan University
 Zoran Oklopcic, Carleton University, Ottawa
 Polly Pallister-Wilkins, University of Amsterdam
 Hannes Peltonen, University of Tampere
 Jiří Přibáň, Cardiff University
 Ivana Radačić, Ivo Pilar Institute of Social Sciences in Zagreb
 Prem Kumar Rajaram, Central European University, Budapest
 Nikolas Rajkovic, Tilburg University
 Erik Ringmar, Lund University
 Paul Roe, Central European University, Budapest
 Jan Růžička, Aberystwyth University
 Mark Salter, University of Ottawa
 Helene Sjursen, University of Oslo
 Eva Špačková, VSB Technical University of Ostrava
 Ty Solomon, University of Glasgow
 Łukasz Stanek, University of Manchester
 Luděk Sýkora, Charles University, Prague
 Juha Vuori, University of Helsinki
 Johan van der Walt, University of Luxembourg
 Wouter Werner, VU University Amsterdam
 Andrew Wilson, University College London
 Ruben Zaiotti, Dalhousie University
 Kimberley Elman Zarecor, Iowa State University
 Peter Zusi, University College London

Benjamin Tallis
 J. Peter Burgess, Derek Sayer
 Jonathan Austin, Benjamin de Carvalho, Alena Drieschová, Filipe Dos Reis,
 Jairus Grove, Maria Malksoo, Benjamin Herborth, Sofia Stolk

Matyáš Viktora

tallis@iir.cz

Print: €99, p. a., €40, single issues. Electronic: Free Access. Send orders to newperspectives@iir.cz

Jakub Tayari
 Petr Dvořák – Tiskárna, Dobříš

Editor-in-Chief
Senior Editors
Associate Editors

Assistant Editor

Enquiries and
Submissions
Subscriptions

Layout
Printed by

Contents

Editorial

- The World Is (Not) Heated 7
Benjamin Tallis

Special Section: The Prague Agenda 15

*Michal Smetana, Anastasia Kazteridis, Matthew Kroenig,
Sadia Tasleem, Richard Price, Jeffrey Fields, Jason Enia,
Angela Kane, Dieter Fleck*

Research Articles

- Writing Kafka's Soul: Disciplinary Power, Resistance & the
Authorship of the Subject 63
Nicholas Dungey

- History, Nationalism, and Democracy: Myth and Narrative in
Viktor Orbán's 'Illiberal Hungary' 87
Michael Toomey

- The Fourth Generation: From Anti-Establishment to Anti-Systém
Parties in Slovakia 109
Olga Gyárfášová

Cultural Cut

- HHhH & The 7th Function of Language 135
Laurent Binet

- Notes on Contributors 155

Editorial 01/2018

The World Is (Not) Heated

BENJAMIN TALLIS

Editor-in-Chief, *New Perspectives*

To me the Institute is a featherbed, as heavy as it is warm. If I were to crawl out from under it, I would at once risk catching cold; the world is not heated.

Franz Kafka in a letter to his sister, Ottla (1982: 63–64).

The title of this editorial should not be misunderstood. In this issue of *New Perspectives*, I am not writing of either the unusually prolonged and widespread period of hot weather that has swept Europe this summer, or the climate change to which it is most likely linked, important as these issues are (The Guardian, 2018). Rather, I take inspiration from **Nicholas Dungey**'s article in this issue and, particularly, one of the quotes he pulls from Franz Kafka's writings to write something of my own about academia and its relation to politics and international relations – specifically, the relation of the discipline of International Relations and the academics who work in it to politics and international relations more widely.

THE RETURN OF POLITICS TO IR: EWIS 2018

At the recent EISA European Workshops in International Studies (EWIS) event at the University of Groningen, the plenary roundtables sought to explore the 'Return of Politics to International Relations'. As programme chairs of the event, **Benjamin Herborth** and I gathered together a host of leading and cutting-edge IR scholars working in different traditions, in different places and at different career stages, including several who are associated with *New Perspectives*, to do so.

The first roundtable, which featured **Tanja Aalberts**, **Jonathan Austin**, **Xymena Kurowska**, **Swati Parashar**, and **Jaap de Wilde**, examined whether there has been a tendency in IR to forget about politics, even though it has conventionally been viewed as our 'core business' – and if so, how did this happen? It asked whether focusing on 'governance', 'policy', 'practice', or other surrogates amounted to a 'curious disappearance' of politics and how we might thus articulate its return, particularly in the context of the much discussed rise of populism. Finally, it looked at how this very talk of a return of politics might itself be depoliticising, which I will return to later.

The second roundtable brought **Roland Bleiker, Zeynep Gülşah Çapan, Luis Lobo Guerrero** and **Laura Sjöberg** (speaking both for herself and for **Cameron Thies**, who was unable to join us) together to provide additional perspectives on these themes, but with a specific eye to the future. They discussed not only *what is to be done?* but also *how to do it?* This roundtable asked the participants how IR scholars can seize – and shape – the return of politics to the discipline (as well as to the objects of its study). The scholars discussed not only what IR scholars can do within the discipline and how we reflect on it and evaluate it, but also links to other disciplines and other modes of engaging with politics and the international. Dealing with themes close to the heart of *New Perspectives*, they discussed issues of communication, accessibility, experimentation, innovation and normativity as well as scholarly responsibility and related notions of academic freedom: in short the *practices* but also the *politics* of the potential return of politics to IR.

While the consensus seemed to be that politics had never really gone away from IR, many of the participants felt that as a discipline, perhaps we hadn't done enough to engage with different aspects of it. Moreover, it seemed from the discussion that there is indeed much about the present moment that compels us to act more explicitly politically and to find new ways of doing so. There isn't space here to do justice to all of the participants' contributions, or the many probing and classy questions from the audience, so I focus here on just a few.

Tanja Aalberts discussed the de- and re-politicisation of disciplinary boundaries and the political potential of interactions between scholars working within as well as between different fields. Jaap de Wilde urged us to upend the way we teach – he recommended starting with the last chapters in the textbooks and then using them to see if the earlier chapters still make sense. Roland Bleiker focused on how academics can help their colleagues to flourish and how we can better take care of each other and thus take care of the discipline and what it can do politically. Bleiker concentrated particularly on the need to take care of and encourage early career scholars, and the discussion quickly turned to the role of 'critical' scholars in doing so now that many hold senior positions in the discipline.

Swati Parashar urged us to "STOP using lazy categories to understand the complexities of people's lives," while also urging a "return of people to politics and politics to people," and imploring academics to get down from their "hallowed perches," particularly Eurocentric ones that continue to effectively exclude people from the Global South. Luis Lobo Guerrero spoke of those who "find no place in history" and highlighted academics' role in transforming the ever-present politics of such situations into productive, "empirical spaces." Gülşah Çapan echoed this in discussing what we see – and what we don't – and how this is learned through academic practices of research and teaching. Çapan did so, however, by introducing the work of the novelist China Mieville and specifically his book *The City & the City*

(2009). In the same spirit as *New Perspectives'* series of 'Cultural Cuts', Çapan ably demonstrated that political insight is not the sole preserve of those who claim themselves to be political or IR scholars.

Laura Sjöberg, Xymena Kurowska and Jonathan Austin all spoke of the impact that IR scholars can have on and in the world. Sjöberg focused on the inevitability of the violence that scholars do and on our complicity with violence in the world in different forms. This echoed Parashar's injunction against "expertise – I hate that term" and de Wilde's lament for the "tragedy of policy experts." Kurowska, however, looked through the other end of the telescope when speaking of the challenges of being and working as an IR scholar amidst what she characterised as the "neo-authoritarian turn" in Hungary and the "neoliberal turn" in the UK, both of which she has experienced first-hand. She noted that many academics now "feel on our own skin" something of "what it is like to be an object of arbitrary forces."

However, Kurowska was keen to emphasise that rather than being a time of "self-victimisation," this is a productive moment for a return of politics to IR, or a return of IR scholars to politics beyond as well as within the academy: a moment for engagement rather than self-estrangement, for "formulating research questions worthy of the times." She added that rather than 'merely' seeking to "give voice to our research subjects" we should look for other ways to engage. Austin too noted how the concerns of the present impel critical scholars to critically examine their own engagement with and impact on the world – and to ask how they can do more to make a critical impact in the world. He introduced some ways that scholars can participate in quite literally designing different worlds, and disrupting forms of power that we disagree with but he also noted that to do so we need to learn to "build, weld, engineer, code," and to communicate more intelligibly to different audiences, visually as well as verbally and in writing. Not by forgoing style, but quite the opposite: he argued that we should "make IR an aesthetic experience," but one that explicitly seeks to communicate beyond itself and audaciously imagines ways to do so.

The contributions from the roundtable participants as well as the questions and comments from the audience showed there are very different views of the return of politics to IR, or perhaps better stated, the relation of politics, whether domestic or international, to the scholarly discipline of International Relations. I have sympathy for many of these viewpoints. However, it seems imperative now, as much as ever, to embrace and leverage, to take responsibility for rather than disavow our expertise (for if we are not experts then what are we?) (see also Tallis, 2016). But following the line of 'post-critical IR' (Austin, forthcoming), we must do so in critical ways to avoid becoming 'tragic policy experts' and instead find or create new ways to communicate our forms of knowledge to a variety of actors.

The violence of what we do may indeed be inevitable, but if we thought that is all we do, then why do it? Not all of our actions and activities are equally violent, nor

are they only violent. Not only being aware of and reflecting on but also *choosing between* our violences – and their positive corollaries – thus becomes a key aspect of the politics of International Relations, there is clearly more to be done if, as a discipline, we are to stop worrying about “catching cold” and stop using our “institute,” the academy, as a warm, safe blanket to hide under – or given how the outside is heating up, as a refuge from the extreme weather we see through the window. If we are going to effect climate change, we need to get out more.

A MULTIPLICITY OF POLITICS AND IR

Among those seeking to show what IR can do for and in the world, Justin Rosenberg has argued that to do more, the discipline needs to break free of the ‘Prison of Political Science’ and better define what its objects and subjects of analysis are (Rosenberg, 2016). He argues that framing the discipline around understandings of the international as “societal multiplicity” and then exploring the consequences of this multiplicity, would provide one such way of doing so. As well as being the subject of a recent forum (Tallis et al., 2018) this was the subject of a lively and sustained debate in EWIS Workshop K: ‘Beyond Campfire IR: Multiplicity as a New Common Ground for IR Theory’, which was held in Groningen and convened by Rosenberg and Milja Kurki, and in which I was very pleased to participate. However, as this issue of *New Perspectives* shows, there are a multiplicity of other ways of analysing, interpreting and communicating the politics of various aspects of IR.

We are excited to present original research articles from **Nicholas Dungey, Michael Toomey** and **Olga Gyarmasova**, which each showcase different ways of exploring the political and the international. **Dungey** hunts big game: “Writing Kafka’s Soul” looks at the life and work of Franz Kafka through Foucauldian lenses to better understand how we write ourselves and are written as subjects, something which academics will relate to, particularly perhaps when Kafka writes: “I can’t even cope with myself, except when I am writing” (1973: 272). Bearing in mind the discussion above, though, we may also consider how the “uniformity, regularity, comfort and dependence” of our ways of life “keep us unresistingly fixed wherever [we] happen to be” (Kafka, 1965: 262), and think of Jonathan Austin’s injunction to seek to be uncomfortable. Dungey’s piece raises myriad questions that will not only cause academics to reflect on our own ways of being and our aesthetic projects of ourselves, but also provide a new way of looking not for, but at and through one of the 20th Century’s most analysed figures.

Toomey looks at the 20th Century too, or rather looks at the use that is made of aspects of the Hungarian 20th Century by the neo-authoritarian regime of Viktor Orban in the 21st. He illuminates the ways in which the Orban government has narrativised, materialised and deployed particular histories of the Trianon Treaty and the interwar regime of Admiral Mikos Horthy. Toomey shows how these histories have been used in order to construct politically fertile understandings of national trauma and a tragic

national saviour in the past, and how they have been 'parachronistically' pressed into the service of the illiberal Hungarian regime of the present (e.g., Juntunen, 2017).

Gyarfasova looks at the illiberal turn in Slovakia, but rather than looking at it through the lens of the past, she analyses the politics of the parties driving that turn and the preferences of their supporters. Worryingly, she concludes that the emergence of groups such as the extreme right-wing 'People's Party – Our Slovakia' (LSNS)' constitutes a shift from anti-establishment to *anti-system* politics. This 'Fourth Generation' post-communist era party should also be worrying given the tendency in – and beyond – CEE of previously centre-right parties to adopt the positions and ape the tone of the far-right, if not yet fully dressing in their clothes in recent years, as seen in Austria, Bavaria, the UK and elsewhere.

From one hot topic to another, we are also delighted to present a special section on 'The Prague Agenda', the initiative – and the series of conferences held in Prague and co-organised by the Institute of International Relations (which publishes *New Perspectives*) – that followed former US President Barack Obama's speech in the Czech capital in 2009. It was a pleasure to co-edit this special section with **Michal Smetana**, who authors the first contribution in the section, as it was to co-organise the last Prague Agenda conference in 2016. This conference brought together leading scholars and practitioners in the field of nuclear weapons and strategy as well as in that of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. It is an honour for *New Perspectives* to provide a platform for the contributions of the academics **Richard Price**, **Matt Kroenig** and **Anastasia Katzeridis**, **Sadia Tasleem**, **Jeffrey Fields** and **Jason Enia** as well as for the former UN Under Secretary General **Angela Kane** and the former German Ministry of Defence Director **Dieter Fleck**. Briefly browsing the contents will give a flavour of the different geographical and substantial perspectives they bring to this topic – and the value of juxtaposing them.

Intriguingly, Smetana's 'Obituary' for the Prague Agenda, looking back on the initiative and the conferences from the perspective of the Trumpian present, comes with a question mark. Given the nuclear tensions on the Korean peninsula and elsewhere, it is fitting that this hot button issue will make a return to the conference circuit after its brief hiatus. Keep an eye on the web page iir.cz/en/ for details. Finally, and very much in the spirit both of strange obituaries and of finding new and innovative modes of communicating ideas and issues of international and political interest and importance, we are thrilled to present the latest of our Cultural Cuts.

OTHER WAYS TO KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS: LAURENT BINET'S HHHH & THE 7TH FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE

Never content to rest on our laurels, *New Perspectives* again breaks new ground by publishing not one but two Cultural Cuts. And what a way to do so – with extracts from Laurent Binet's globally acclaimed novels *HHhH* and *The 7th Function of Lan-*

guage. These are runaway literary successes, and bestsellers that have been translated into more than 30 languages and reviewed in the Anglosphere by publications including *The Guardian*, *The New York Times*, *The London Review of Books*, *The Washington Post*, and *the FT* ... and now, they are excerpted in *New Perspectives*, so for a moment let us rest instead on our Laurents.

HHhH, Binet's debut novel, which won the Prix Goncourt and a host of other awards, tells a story that's been told many times before. Well, really it tells at least three stories that have been told before:

A story of Reinhard(t) Heydrich, the Reichsprotektor of Bohemia and Moravia, the Hangman of Prague, the Blonde Beast, the architect of the Final Solution, The Man with the Iron Heart (as the film adaptation is called) and the 'name' of Himmler's brain – Himmlers Hirn heißt Heydrich: HHhH.

A tale of the Czechoslovak resistance and Jozef Gabcik and Jan Kubis of the 'Free' Czechoslovak Forces, who parachuted back to the Czech lands from England and who, with considerable difficulty, assistance and betrayal, assassinated Heydrich before being killed themselves, and before Nazi vengeance was unleashed on the village of Lidice outside of Prague.

A selective, panoramic account of the Third Reich that stretches geographically from France to Ukraine, and temporally from the early 20th to the early 21st century, which zooms in to the level of the individual and out to the level of the geopolitical, through memory as well as diplomacy and bureaucracy.

All of this raises questions that are as pertinent for academics as they are for novelists. Binet openly deals with various issues, including: verisimilitude in reconstruction, reflexivity and the place of the author in writing as well as the research that underpins it, and the need to deal with controversies and competing interpretations. He also details habits of procrastination and the painful process of paring down the narrative to only include as much detail as is necessary to tell the story – rather than every snippet that is fascinating to us, but likely less so to our readers. Significantly, Binet tackles head on (and repeatedly) the issues involved with re-constructing and narrativising historical events, rejecting the urge to 'bring the past to life' or 'breathe life into the dead pages of history'. He settles, in myriad ways, for crafting a 'parable' that is "extremely accurate" or "extremely illustrative." Settles isn't fair though; unsettles would be better.

The 7th Function is more satirical and playful than *HHhH*, which fits better with (French) intellectuals than with the perpetrators of the Holocaust. But in its own way it is no less serious. As more than one reviewer notes, Binet likes to have his cake and eat it – he satirises academic and intellectual pretensions and offers a resounding vindication of their importance.

It's a rollercoaster, a page turner that takes in the Paris of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, Philippe Sollers and Julia Kristeva and the gang of gigolos who hang

around the Café de Flore (and other places); Umberto Eco's Bologna; Ithaca and a conference at Cornell attended by, inter alia, John Searle, Camille Paglia, Foucault, Derrida, Kristeva, Noam Chomsky, and a young Judith Butler (and the grad students who try and make sense – and sensuality – of them); and a Venice that belongs, somewhat offhand, to Simon Herzog, the semiotics postgrad and unlikely partner in crime to Superintendent Jacques Bayard. And that's before we head back to Paris and Naples ... all in search of the mysterious '7th Function of Language', a political-semiotic ark of the covenant. You know, how you can really do things with words.

And yes, these books are about Central and Eastern Europe, in different ways, since you ask.

I hope you like the extracts, then read the rest of the books, and enjoy them as much as I did. They're good reading for when it's hot (or cold) outside.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Austin, Jonathan (forthcoming), 'Post-Critical IR?'
- Binet, Laurent (2012), *HHhH*, trans. Sam Taylor, London: Penguin Random House.
- Binet, Laurent (2017), *The 7th Function of Language*, trans. Sam Taylor, London: Penguin Random House.
- The Guardian (2018), 'Extreme Global Weather Is the Face of Climate Change', *The Guardian*, 27/07/2018. Available at www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jul/27/extreme-global-weather-climate-change-michael-mann (Accessed 27/07/2018).
- Juntunen, Tapio (2017), 'Helsinki Syndrome: The Parachronistic Renaissance of Finlandization in International Politics', *New Perspectives*, 25(1).
- Kafka, Franz (1973), *Letters to Felice*, trans. James Stern and Elisabeth Duckworth, New York: Schocken Books.
- Kafka, Franz (1976), *The Diaries of Franz Kafka: 1910–1923*, New York: Schocken Books.
- Kafka, Franz (1982), *Letters to Ottla and Family*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston, New York: Schocken Books.
- Rosenberg, Justin (2016), 'International Relations in the Prison of Political Science', *International Relations*, Vol. 30(2): 127–153.
- Tallis, Benjamin (2016), 'Living in Post-Truth: Power/Knowledge/Responsibility', *New Perspectives*, 24(1): 7–18.
- Tallis, Benjamin, et al. (2018), 'Justin Rosenberg's IR Jail Break: Commentary of the Best Kind', *International Relations*, 32(2): 240–251.

Special Section

The Prague Agenda

15 ► 61

Edited by MICHAL SMETANA and BENJAMIN TALLIS

CONTRIBUTIONS:

The Prague Agenda: An Obituary?

Michal Smetana

Evaluating the Prague Agenda: An American Perspective

Anastasia Kazteridis and Matthew Kroenig

Between the Prague Agenda and the Ban Treaty: Disarmament a Distant Dream in Nuclear South Asia

Sadia Tasleem

Weapons of Mass Destruction, Norms, and International Order: The Chemical Weapons Taboo in Syria

Richard Price

On the Health of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

Jeffrey Fields and Jason Enia

Putting the Prague Agenda in Context: Looking Backward, Looking Forward, Looking Beyond

Angela Kane

Nuclear Disarmament: the Interplay Between Political Commitments and Legal Obligations

Dieter Fleck

THE PRAGUE AGENDA: AN OBITUARY?

MICHAL SMETANA

Charles University, Prague

In October 2009, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the annual Nobel Peace Prize to Barack Obama, highlighting, in particular, his “vision of and work for a world without nuclear weapons” (Nobel Media, 2009). This controversial decision surprised many at the time; after all, the prize was obviously awarded for a *promise* to make the world a better place rather than for an actual achievement in this area. Six years later, the ex-secretary of the Nobel Committee Geir Lundestad expressed his qualms over the award and noted with regret that it did not accomplish what the committee had hoped for (BBC News, 2015). Fittingly, when the television host Stephen Colbert asked Obama what the award was for, Obama jokingly replied: “To be honest, I still don’t know” (NBC News, 2016).

This special section of *New Perspectives* is primarily meant to be an academic reflection of the ‘Prague Agenda’, a term widely used for the Obama administration’s aims in the field of nuclear disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation. From a Central European perspective, however, the term ‘Prague Agenda’ also represents a series of international conferences annually held in Prague between 2011 and 2016. For half a decade, the Prague Agenda conferences were a place for scholars, experts, and policy-makers to take stock of the relevant developments following Obama’s famous 2009 speech at Hradčany Square. The authors featured in this special section jointly participated in the last edition of this conference in December 2016 and agreed to further expand their presentations into short academic articles that would examine the Prague Agenda and issues related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from various angles and perspectives.

In this introductory piece, I proceed as follows. First, I provide a brief critical reflection of Obama’s achievements vis-à-vis the goals listed in his Prague speech. Second, I look back at the series of Prague Agenda conferences and discuss their relevance in the context of Czech public diplomacy. Third, I offer some thoughts on the future of nuclear arms control and disarmament under the new U.S. administration.

OBAMA’S NUCLEAR FOOTPRINT

Obama’s 2009 Prague speech envisioning a world without nuclear weapons cannot be completely divorced from the broader context of the time. It came shortly after the ‘gang of four’ – George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn – launched their famous series of *Wall Street Journal* op-eds suggesting that the idea of nuclear abolition in the 21st century could be embraced in all seriousness by pragmatic Cold War veterans that share a fairly ‘realist’ view of world affairs

(Shultz et al., 2007). However, Obama's appearance also followed the crisis of multilateral diplomacy that started under the George W. Bush administration and, among other things, led to the failed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in 2005 (cf. Müller, 2005; Simpson and Nielsen, 2005; Potter, 2005). Arguably, one of the key objectives of the newly formulated Prague Agenda was to reinvigorate the multilateral cooperation in the field of non-proliferation and nuclear security by demonstrating the renewed U.S. determination to take the NPT disarmament pledge seriously (cf. Müller, 2005; Simpson and Nielsen, 2005; Potter, 2005).

Obama's approach to nuclear issues indeed helped to build a provisional consensus at the 2010 NPT Review Conference and thereby provided a momentum for the renewed cooperation among state parties to the Treaty (Müller, 2010; Johnson 2010; Dhanapala 2010). However, the concrete steps in U.S. nuclear policy eventually turned out to be less than adequate for the new disarmament movement taking place among non-governmental organizations and a number of like-minded non-nuclear weapon states. The so-called Humanitarian Initiative provided a significantly more immediate vision of nuclear abolition, fiercely criticized the U.S. administration for its reluctance to "fill the legal gap" in NPT Article VI, and eventually adopted the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons – obviously without the U.S.'s (or any other nuclear-armed state's, for that matter) participation.¹

At best, Obama's nuclear legacy is today perceived with mixed feelings among both proponents and critics of nuclear arms control and disarmament (a sentiment that is shared also in several articles in this special issue). Whereas Obama did return to Prague a year later to sign a new strategic arms control treaty with the Russian president Dmitry Medvedev,² his promise from Berlin to seek another one-third reduction in the deployed nuclear arsenals of the two countries never materialized (see Pifer, 2015; Smetana and Ditrych, 2015). In spite of plans "to put an end to Cold War thinking [and] reduce the role of nuclear weapons in [the U.S.] national security strategy" (Obama, 2009), the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review report exhibited more patterns of continuity than real changes in U.S. nuclear policy. The 2015 NPT Review Conference once again revealed the depth of discord between the nuclear 'haves' and 'have-nots', and eventually failed to adopt a final document (see Pifer, 2015; Smetana & Ditrych, 2015). When it became obvious that Obama would not be able to secure the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratification in the U.S. Senate,³ he reportedly considered adopting a no-first-use policy in the last year of his presidency; however, the backlash from overseas allies as well as his own aides prevented him from doing so. Despite several impressive achievements – such as the agreement with Iran on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, for example – the supporters of lower salience of nu-

clear weapons in international politics will likely remember Obama's presidency as one of missed opportunity rather than a jump towards the noble goals outlined in Prague.

THE CZECH TAKE ON THE PRAGUE AGENDA

Although the Czech Republic has hardly been a particularly visible actor in the field of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, Obama's 2009 speech and the 2010 New START signature brought Prague into the limelight of debates over the future of nuclear policy. To take advantage of this – rather unexpected – opportunity for Czech diplomacy, the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted a series of annual Prague Agenda conferences between 2011 and 2016, organized in conjunction with the Institute of International Relations, Charles University, and Metropolitan University Prague. Over the years, the Prague Agenda gradually expanded in both size and focus, eventually turning into a two- to three-day event full of panel discussions, expert workshops, roundtables, and side events dealing with various aspects of WMD-related issues.

For some diplomats at the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Prague Agenda was primarily seen as a tool for maintaining the transatlantic link after Obama's administration cancelled Bush's plan for building a third U.S. ballistic missile defense site in the Czech Republic and Poland (a decision that infuriated many Czech diplomats and politicians at the time). For others, the Prague Agenda was simply a clever tool of public diplomacy that was worth keeping alive on an annual basis. The fact is that over the years, the conference managed to attract some of 'the best and the brightest' scholars, experts, and decision-makers in the field, making the Prague Agenda a unique event in the Czech context.

Occasionally, the Prague Agenda served not only as a venue for free (and often heated) discussions, but also as a place for new policy announcements. In 2014, for example, Rose Gottemoeller, the then-U.S. Under-Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, used her presence at the conference to announce a new multilateral initiative: the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), which would engage nuclear and non-nuclear countries as well as NGOs and the private sector in the process of looking for solutions to the problem of nuclear disarmament verification.⁴ Furthermore, scholars participating in the Prague Agenda conferences also worked on a joint project dealing with the issues connected with a hypothetical post-nuclear world, whose findings were eventually published by Routledge in the form of an edited book (Hynek and Smetana, 2015a).

The 2016 edition of the Prague Agenda was the final one, symbolically ending with a letter from Obama himself (which was delivered to the conference by Jessica Cox, the Director for Arms Control on the U.S. National Security Council).

The official reasoning of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs was simple: with Obama leaving office, it was time to say farewell to the U.S. fixation on nuclear disarmament and instead focus on the problem of international security more broadly (hence the Prague Insecurity Conference organized by the Ministry together with the Institute of International Relations in 2017). At the same time, it was evident among Czech diplomatic corps that there was a clear aversion towards giving any further support to the nuclear disarmament idea beyond the general proclamation of a long-term nuclear disarmament goal (that would be understood on a similar level as achieving world peace). If Obama's disarmament agenda was seen as a failed policy, the Humanitarian Initiative was perceived by many as outright dangerous and counter-productive, as it was seen as deepening the divisions in the NPT and calling for unrealistic policies that do not make any sense in the current international security environment. Towards the end of Obama's presidency, the notion of nuclear disarmament had thus become largely discredited in the Central European context.

AN OBITUARY?

At the time of writing this article, the new U.S. administration of Donald J. Trump is still in the process of formulating its own Nuclear Posture Review, which should be published in early 2018.⁵ However, the preliminary reports already suggest Trump's clear departure from some of Obama's pro-disarmament policies, possibly including the development of a new low-yield warhead for U.S. ballistic missiles, the return of the nuclear version of Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles, an increased readiness for the resumption of nuclear testing, and a partial reversal of the U.S. declaratory policy (The Guardian, 2017). Together with the possible collapse of the Iran deal, the new Nuclear Posture Review could mark the symbolic end of Obama's Prague Agenda.

However, there is a case to be made for why completely ending Obama's Prague Agenda would be a mistake. His Prague speech was far from being an idealist embracement of nuclear disarmament. Beyond the long-term goal of nuclear abolition ("not in my lifetime"), Obama's Prague Agenda was comprised of a number of short- to medium-term steps in the area of nuclear arms control, nuclear security, and nuclear non-proliferation that are worth following up on, even by those who do not share Obama's genuine conviction about the desirability of a nuclear weapon-free world. As I argued elsewhere (Hynek and Smetana, 2015b), the logic of nuclear arms control makes sense *particularly* at times of heightened crises and complicated security environments – these should not be seen as mere obstacles, but instead as unique political opportunities that may allow for some new bold proposals that would, in effect, enhance mutual security. In this sense, on the Czech side, we could perhaps also seriously reconsider whether the Prague

Agenda brand, to which we managed to modestly contribute in this decade, is not something worth following up on.

ENDNOTES

¹ On the Humanitarian Initiative, see, for example, Borrie (2014), Sauer and Pretorius (2014), Ware (2015), Smetana (2016), or Bolton and Minor (2016). For some early reflections on the nuclear ban treaty, see Fihn (2017), Williams (2017), Sagan and Valentino (2017), Sauer (2017), or Onderco (2018).

² The New START established new limits for the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two countries as well as a number of verification mechanisms to monitor compliance with the treaty terms. It was meant as a follow up to the expired 1994 START I treaty and a significantly more comprehensive replacement for the 2002 SORT treaty.

³ While the United States was among the first CTBT signatories in 1996, the U.S. Senate failed to ratify the treaty in 1999 due to the Republican opposition to it. Since then, the CTBT belongs among the key issues in U.S. nuclear policy on which the Democrats and the Republicans fiercely disagree. See for, example, Perry et al. (2010: 81-87).

⁴ See NTI (n.d.).

⁵ For two excellent academic appraisals of Trump's approach to nuclear issues, see Michaels and Williams (2017) and Knopf (2017).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- BBC News (2015), 'Nobel Secretary Regrets Obama Peace Prize', 17/09/2015. Available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34277960>.
- Bolton, Matthew and Elizabeth Minor (2016), 'The Humanitarian Initiative on Nuclear Weapons: An Introduction to Global Policy's Special Section', *Global Policy*, 7(3): 380–384.
- Borrie, John (2014), 'Humanitarian Reframing of Nuclear Weapons and the Logic of a Ban', *International Affairs*, 90(3): 625–646.
- Dhanapala, Jayantha (2010), *Evaluating the 2010 NPT Review Conference*, United States Institute of Peace – Special Report. Available at <http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Dhanapala-SR258-Evaluating-the-2010-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>.
- Fihn, Beatrice (2017), 'The Logic of Banning Nuclear Weapons', *Survival*, 59(1): 43–50.
- Harrington de Santana, Anne (2011), 'The Strategy of Non-proliferation: Maintaining the Credibility of an Incredible Pledge to Disarm', *Millennium – Journal of International Studies*, 40(1): 3–19.
- Hynek, Nik and Michal Smetana (eds.) (2015a), *Global Nuclear Disarmament: Strategic, Political, and Regional Perspectives*, London: Routledge.
- Hynek, Nik and Michal Smetana (2015b), 'Nuclear Disarmament: Prague Moments and Analytical Remarks', in Nik Hynek and Michal Smetana (eds.) *Global Nuclear Disarmament: Strategic, Political, and Regional Perspectives*, London: Routledge, pp. 1–11.
- Johnson, Rebecca (2010), 'Assessing the 2010 NPT Review Conference', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 66(4): 1–10.

- Knopf, Jeffrey W. (2017), 'Security Assurances and Proliferation Risks in the Trump Administration', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 38(1): 26–34.
- Michaels, Jeffrey and Heather Williams (2017), 'The Nuclear Education of Donald J. Trump', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 38(1): 54–77.
- Müller, Harald (2005), 'A Treaty in Troubled Waters: Reflections on the Failed NPT Review Conference', *The International Spectator*, 40(3): 33–44.
- Müller, Harald (2010), 'The 2010 NPT Review Conference: Some Breathing Space Gained, but No Breakthrough', *The International Spectator*, 45(3): 5–18.
- Müller, Harald (2017), 'The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in Jeopardy? Internal Divisions and the Impact of World Politics', *The International Spectator*, 52(1): 12–27.
- NBC News (2016), 'Obama's Funniest Moments From "Mock Interview" With Colbert'. Available at <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/obama-s-funniest-moments-mock-interview-colbert-n668261>.
- NTI (n.d.), 'International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification: Engaging a Diverse Group of States to Develop Innovative Monitoring and Verification Solutions', <http://www.nti.org/about/projects/international-partnership-nuclear-disarmament-verification/>.
- Nobel Media (2009), 'The Nobel Peace Prize for 2009 to President Barack Obama' – Press Release. Available at https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/press.html (accessed 06/11/2017).
- Obama, Barack (2009), 'Remarks By President Barack Obama In Prague', The White House. Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered.
- Onderco, Michal (2017), 'Why Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty is Unlikely to Fulfil its Promise', *Global Affairs*.
- Perry, William J. et al. (2009), *America's Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Pifer, Steven (2015), 'Obama's Faltering Nuclear Legacy: the 3 R's', *The Washington Quarterly*, 38(2): 101–118.
- Potter, William C. (2005), 'The NPT Review Conference: 188 States in Search of Consensus', *The International Spectator*, 40(3): 19–31.
- Potter, William C. (2016), 'The Unfulfilled Promise of the 2015 NPT Review Conference', *The Nonproliferation Review*, 58(1): 151–178.
- Sagan, Scott and Benjamin A. Valentino (2017), 'The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty: Opportunities Lost', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Available at <https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty-opportunities-lost10955>.
- Sauer, Tom (2017), 'How Will NATO's Non-nuclear Members Handle the UN's Ban on Nuclear Weapons?', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 73(3): 177–181.
- Sauer, Tom and Joellen Pretorius (2014), 'Nuclear Weapons and the Humanitarian Approach', *Global Change, Peace & Security*, 26(3): 233–250.

- Shultz, George P. et al. (2007), 'A World Free of Nuclear Weapons', *Wall Street Journal*, 04/01/2007. Available at <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB116787515251566636>.
- Simpson, John and Jenny Nielsen (2005), 'The 2005 NPT Review Conference: Mission Impossible?', *The Nonproliferation Review*, 12(2): 271–301.
- Smetana, Michal (2016), 'Stuck on Disarmament: The European Union and the 2015 NPT Review Conference', *International Affairs*, 92(1): 137–152.
- Smetana, Michal and Ondřej Ditrych (2015), 'The More the Merrier: Time for a Multilateral Turn in Nuclear Disarmament', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 71(3): 30–37.
- Ware, Alyn (2015), 'Advocacy Networks and a World Free of Nuclear Weapons', in Nik Hynek and Michal Smetana (eds.) *Global Nuclear Disarmament: Strategic, Political, and Regional Perspectives*, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 122–144.
- Williams, Heather (2017), 'Prohibition and Its Discontents', *Survival*, 59(3): 205–208.

EVALUATING THE PRAGUE AGENDA: AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE¹

ANASTASIA KAZTERIDIS and MATTHEW KROENIG

Georgetown University, Washington DC

In April 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama delivered a speech in Prague, the Czech Republic calling on the international community to take “concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons.” While the foremost goal of the so-called Prague Agenda is to eliminate nuclear weapons worldwide, President Obama cautioned that this objective would not be achieved quickly and perhaps not even in his lifetime. Therefore, he urged the more immediate objective of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons by taking a number of intermediate steps: securing loose nuclear material, safeguarding existing nuclear facilities, preventing countries that so far did not have nuclear weapons from developing or acquiring them, and reducing the sizes of nuclear arsenals in the existing nuclear powers.

In retrospect, we see that the record of accomplishment of Obama’s Prague Agenda is decidedly mixed. Important progress was made on nuclear materials security, although not as much as the Prague Agenda’s architects had initially hoped. But broader geopolitical efforts aimed at preventing a new nuclear proliferation and arms control cooperation among the great powers are already coming under strain because of the underlying political realities. Moving forward, therefore, the heirs of the Prague Agenda must continue to press ahead on the important work of nuclear materials security, but success on the larger issues of nonproliferation and arms control may require a new strategic approach.

GOOD NEWS: POSITIVE OUTCOMES OF THE PRAGUE AGENDA

This essay will begin with the good news. The most significant result of President Obama's speech in Prague was the emergence of the Nuclear Security Summit process. Following the terror attacks of 9/11, security experts became concerned with the prospect of nuclear terrorism. What if Bin Laden had had nuclear weapons? Deterring a nuclear-armed terrorist group from employing nuclear weapons, or even a 'dirty bomb', would be extremely difficult and, therefore, the best means of preventing a nuclear terror attack is almost certainly to stop terror groups from acquiring nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear materials in the first place. Unfortunately, in the wake of 9/11, many countries possessed unsecured nuclear material in military or civilian nuclear programs and the security summit process was designed to build international support for putting this material on lockdown.

The first Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, DC in 2010 when President Obama called for heads of state to convene to discuss international nuclear security. At this and subsequent meetings, leaders from 47 countries and 3 international organizations convened to make commitments to improve security protocols, secure loose nuclear material, and enhance nuclear safeguards to better protect them from theft. At the first Nuclear Security Summit, Ukraine agreed to hand over 90 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to Russia and to replace it with low-enriched uranium (LEU) to fuel its research reactors. Unlike HEU, LEU cannot be used to fuel nuclear weapons. Additionally, the 2010 Summit resulted in the creation of the Washington Work Plan, which calls on participating states to cooperate with international organizations, industries, and other governments in order to share information and coordinate the implementation of the Convention's security measures to reduce the threat of terrorism.

At the Second Summit, hosted by Seoul in 2012, leaders pledged to take action to better safeguard radioactive material and protect it from theft. For example, Russia agreed to move many of its nuclear warheads to more secure storage sites, and other states pledged to improve the protection of nuclear material while it is being transported, taking measures such as hardening road and rail vehicles used to transport the material. Additionally, twelve countries signed the HEU-Free Joint Statement, in which they committed to minimizing and working towards eventually eliminating HEU in their nuclear reactors, while switching to LEU instead to reduce the likelihood of nuclear proliferation. The 2012 Summit also established Centers of Excellence, which host nuclear professionals so that they can receive training in various aspects of nuclear security. Over 15 countries, including China and Japan, have since created their own Centers of Excellence, and multilateral cooperation and coordination amongst the different centers and nations is encouraged.

In 2014, the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague witnessed 35 countries bringing a so-called 'gift basket' in the form of a multilateral commitment on "Strengthen-

ening Nuclear Security Implementation.” The gifts included promises to strengthen indigenous safeguards and improve nuclear security, and set minimum domestic standards, following IAEA guidelines, to be adopted by countries party to the agreement (Pomper, 2016). Japan agreed to give up 500 kg of weapons-grade material (both plutonium and HEU) to the United States, an impressive measure and the largest pledged removal in the history of the nuclear security summit process.

Finally, the 2016 summit concluded with the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material entering into force, which requires countries to meet standards of protection when shipping nuclear material for peaceful purposes and creates a system for international cooperation on the recovery and protection of stolen nuclear material. Additionally, China, India, and Jordan committed to implementing the IAEA nuclear security guidance, which entails both performing self-assessments and seeking peer reviews to ensure that the given country’s nuclear security regime is up to par.

Some critics have questioned whether the pomp and circumstance of the head of state summits was truly necessary, but there is no doubt that the summit process has improved nuclear security. At a minimum, the summits forced governments around the world to seriously consider issues of nuclear security and develop national plans for addressing the problem. In addition, there is less unsecured nuclear material in the world today than in 2010, making it more difficult for terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons.

Broader geopolitical efforts aimed at arms control and nuclear nonproliferation, however, have been less successful. In April 2010, twelve months after delivering his speech in Prague, President Obama signed a comprehensive arms control agreement with Russia. The New START Treaty limits the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads and bombs to 1,550, a nearly 30% reduction from the previous limit set by the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). Additionally, New START limits the number of deployed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) to 700. The treaty was a significant achievement because it brought together the world’s two largest nuclear powers and extended the verification measures between the two states that allow for greater transparency.

BUT...

On the other hand, New START has not prevented a resurgent Russia from relying more, not less, on nuclear weapons. Since 2014, Russia has invaded Ukraine and intervened in Syria, raising the specter of a new Cold War with the West. But what is more pertinent to the present discussion is that Russia has made nuclear weapons a centerpiece of this new, more aggressive national security policy. It has brandished nuclear weapons against NATO and it has tested a new intermediate-range ground-

launched cruise missile in violation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (Schneider, 2016).

Moreover, the logic of the theory animating the arms control portion of the Prague Agenda has been called into question by the empirical evidence (Kroenig, 2016). The hope articulated by supporters of the Prague Agenda was that arms reductions between the United States and Russia would facilitate multilateral arms control negotiations that would eventually bring in China and other nuclear powers to gradually ratchet down nuclear arsenals on a path to global zero. But instead, as Moscow and Washington negotiated reductions, other countries went in the opposite direction. China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea have all expanded and modernized their nuclear arsenals since 2010.

Efforts to prevent other countries from building nuclear weapons have also been only partially successful. In October 2015, President Obama and the P5+1 countries signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known as the Iran Deal, which lifted the sanctions against Iran in exchange for Tehran placing hard ceilings on all aspects of its nuclear program. Though the deal was widely heralded as a success, it includes a 'sunset clause' lifting the limits on Iran's program over time. Among the most important limits, the limit on the deployment of advanced centrifuges will be repealed after year eight, or less than six years from today. This means that the deal at best delays, but will not alone prevent, Iran's nuclear acquisition.

Moreover, the deal never received widespread political support in the United States, the most important state in the negotiations. Bipartisan majorities of the American public and in the U.S. Congress opposed the deal, making it vulnerable to changing political circumstances in the United States.

Finally, a laser focus on the Iran nuclear negotiations over the past five years did not leave sufficient bandwidth to address disturbing nuclear developments in North Korea. At the time the Prague Agenda called for the prevention of nuclear proliferation, Pyongyang produced enough fissile material for up to 20 nuclear weapons and greatly expanded its means of missile delivery.

In short, though progress on nuclear security was made under the Obama administration, there is much work to be done. Beginning with nuclear nonproliferation, it is imperative that the next administration continues to take steps that are necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Current indications suggest that the Trump administration believes that this can be best done by 'renegotiating' the deal. Such an effort could once again make the Iran nuclear negotiations one of the most important international political issues of the coming years.

MUCH TO BE DONE AND CHALLENGES ABOUND

Additionally, it is important that the United States continues to maintain a strong nuclear umbrella over its allies. With growing tensions in East Asia, which include North

Korea testing nuclear missiles and China's assertive posturing in the East and South China Seas, the credibility of U.S. nuclear security guarantees must be maintained in order to dissuade countries like Japan and South Korea from building independent nuclear arsenals.

Beyond maintaining the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the United States must find a way to address the North Korean nuclear challenge. The Trump administration strategy of "maximum pressure and engagement" aims to increase the economic, military, and political pressure on Kim Jong Un to force him to the table to discuss denuclearization in earnest. Such an approach would be an improvement over the 'strategic patience' of the Obama years, but it would be difficult for the U.S. government or the international community to simultaneously confront the nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea.

Future arms control negotiations will require improved relations with Russia, which seem beyond reach at the moment. The Prague Agenda always contained a tension between deterrence and nuclear reductions. As Obama himself stated in the famous Prague speech, "Make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies – including the Czech Republic." Given the renewed Russian threat, the Trump administration will need to lean relatively more toward deterrence.

The Nuclear Security Summits will not survive the Obama administration, but international meetings devoted to nuclear security should continue at the working levels of government. One of the most important areas for future work is military nuclear material. While the Nuclear Security Summits made substantial progress in securing loose nuclear material that can potentially be prone to theft, all of the progress made was in the realm of civilian nuclear material, which only accounts for 17% of the total uranium and plutonium in use, leaving the remaining 83% not subject to safeguards or verifications (Browne et al., 2015).

The lack of international inspections and safeguards for military nuclear material is a cause for concern. Given that the overwhelming majority of nuclear material is military, there is great potential for non-state actors to attempt an infiltration of a military facility to gain access to nuclear material, and a reduced likelihood that any such attempts would be noticed. Because countries are not transparent about how their military material is safeguarded, much of it might very well be vulnerable to theft. It is important, therefore, to establish a framework that would allow for the accounting of military material while also maintaining secrecy for national security purposes.

In 2005, the United States and India signed a nuclear agreement in which Washington lifted its thirty-year moratorium on nuclear trade with India in exchange for India agreeing to separate its military and civilian nuclear material and submit its

civilian nuclear material to IAEA inspections (Bajoria and Pan, 2010). However, the deal only required India to place 14 of its 21 nuclear reactors under international safeguards. Pakistan, on the other hand, has not formally clarified how many of its reactors are used for civilian and military purposes. The United States should encourage India to place more of its reactors under international safeguards and work with China to persuade Pakistan to formally separate its civilian and nuclear reactors and place the civilian reactors under IAEA safeguards.

The above proposal would create momentum for enhancing the security of nuclear reactors, as countries with weaker safeguards remain more vulnerable to sabotage or theft. For example, consider how ISIS militants were found attempting to infiltrate a nuclear power plant in Brussels to acquire radioisotopes for use in a 'dirty bomb' (Malone and Smith, 2016). The international community must ensure that all nuclear facilities are closely supervised to detect possible breaches (Bunn, 2016).

Furthermore, though twenty-two nations agreed to reduce and ultimately eliminate their HEU stockpiles in the 2016 Nuclear Security Communiqué, there is no outlined timetable for this, and many countries still face technical barriers to making the transition. In many countries, research reactors currently operating on HEU fuel would need the high density LEU fuel that is currently available only in South Korea and Europe (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, 2016). Nations worry that using LEU fuel would degrade the performance of their reactors, but it would take approximately twenty years to create new fuels compatible with existing reactors or to convert reactors so that they would be compatible with existing fuels (*ibid.*). Reducing the use of proliferation-prone material cannot wait twenty years; therefore, South Korea and European nations should work with these countries to provide technical know-how so that they would make the transition more rapidly. In cases where technical barriers persist, countries can convert to less-enriched fuel sources containing 40% Uranium-235 until more sustainable measures are taken to shift to LEU (*ibid.*).

Both physical and online security of nuclear material are important and investments should be made in improving cybersecurity at sites containing nuclear material. If a nuclear facility's computer systems were to be compromised, the security of the nuclear materials could be undermined and nuclear command and control systems could be hijacked (Stoutland et al., n.d.). As increasing numbers of foreign governments are subjected to cyberattacks, it would be naive to believe future cyberattacks will not target nuclear facilities. While nuclear cybersecurity presents a serious challenge, a useful first step might be a multilateral agreement among states not to target each other's civilian or military nuclear facilities or nuclear command and control systems with cyberattacks.

In sum, this article examined the legacy of the Prague Agenda and its effectiveness in improving nuclear security. It found that the most important efforts under-

taken in the past eight years in this respect were the four Nuclear Security Summits that brought heads of state together to secure loose nuclear material and reduce the likelihood of nuclear proliferation. Though the summits were successful, broader geopolitical efforts aimed at preventing proliferation and reducing reliance on nuclear weapons among the major powers were at least arguably less so. Continued progress in all of these areas will be necessary to enhance nuclear security in the Trump era.

ENDNOTES

¹ A discussion paper prepared for the Academic Workshop of the 6th Prague Agenda Conference.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bajoria, Jayshree and Esther Pan (2010), 'The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal', Council on Foreign Relations, 05/11/2010. Available at <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/us-india-nuclear-deal>.
- Browne, Des, Richard Lugar, and Sam Nunn (2015), 'Bridging the Military Nuclear Materials Gap', *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, 10/11/2015. Available at https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/NTI_report_2015_e_version.pdf.
- Bunn, Matthew (2016), 'Belgium Highlights the Nuclear Terrorism Threat and Security Measures to Stop It', *Huffington Post*, 29/03/2016. Available at https://www.huffingtonpost.com/matthew-bunn/belgium-nuclear-terrorism_b_9559006.html.
- Kroenig, Matthew (2016), 'US Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation: Is There a Link?', *Journal of Peace Research*, 53(2): 166–179.
- Malone, Patrick and R. Jeffrey Smith (2016), 'The Islamic State's Plot to Build a Radioactive "Dirty Bomb"', *Foreign Policy*, 29/02/2016. Available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/29/the-islamic-states-plot-to-build-a-radioactive-dirty-bomb/>.
- National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2016), *Reducing the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors*, Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
- Pomper, Miles A. (2016), 'The Nuclear Security Summit Will Leave Unfinished Work', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 25/02/2016. Available at <https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-security-summit-will-leave-unfinished-work9186>.
- Samore, Gary (2014), 'A Joint Plan of Action for North Korea?', *Managing the Atom*, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 07/02/2014. Available at <http://www.theasanforum.org/a-joint-plan-of-action-for-north-korea/>.
- Schneider, Mark (2016), 'Russian Violations of the INF and New START Treaties', National Institute for Public Policy, 15/08/2016. Available at <http://www.nipp.org/2016/08/15/schneider-mark-russian-violations-of-the-inf-and-new-start-treaties/>.
- Stoutland, Page, Samantha Pitts-Kiefer, and Alexandra Van Dine (n.d.), 'Addressing Cyber Nuclear Security Threats', *Nuclear Threat Initiative*. Available at <http://www.nti.org/about/projects/addressing-cyber-nuclear-security-threats/>.

BETWEEN THE PRAGUE AGENDA AND THE BAN TREATY: DISARMAMENT A DISTANT DREAM IN NUCLEAR SOUTH ASIA

SADIA TASLEEM

Quaid – i – Azam University, Islamabad

The nuclear-armed South Asian neighbors India and Pakistan continue to pay lip service in support of global nuclear disarmament. Ironically, however, both states are also increasing their fissile material stockpiles, nuclear-capable missiles and counter-force capabilities. These developments point to subtle shifts in their doctrines and postures. What do these trends indicate about the future of nuclear disarmament in South Asia? How have these two South Asian neighbors responded to global disarmament initiatives like the Prague Agenda and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, henceforth called the Ban Treaty? Is there a future for nuclear disarmament in South Asia? If not, why? What are the options for overcoming the existing challenges?

This essay takes the Prague Agenda and the Ban Treaty as two alternative approaches that offer competing tools to achieve global disarmament. It argues that the Prague Agenda was not dismissed outright by India and Pakistan whereas the Ban Treaty has been dismissed by them, yet the chances for the Ban Treaty – with its paradigmatic shift in the nature of the conversations on nuclear weapons – to create a support constituency for disarmament in South Asia in the long-term are higher than the chances for a Prague Agenda type NPT-oriented status quo approach.

THE GLOBAL DISARMAMENT DEBATE

The global disarmament debate – like the nuclear order itself – is at a crossroads. The contemporary global political realities offer reasons for both optimism and skepticism. The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty is gaining momentous support from the non-nuclear weapon states whereas the nuclear weapon states are not only opposing the Ban Treaty but also pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities and modernization programs that make disarmament appear to be a distant dream.

Furthermore, within the discourse supporting disarmament there are sharp divisions on the modus operandi to achieve this objective. The status quo-oriented NPT-centered approach – that recognizes deterrence as a legitimate concept and supports a step-by-step process toward global disarmament – is being challenged by the revisionist wave of the ban the bomb movement, which seeks to delegitimize not only the bomb but also the conceptual arguments that justify the possession of bombs for security reasons.

The Prague Agenda – which has by now receded in its significance – indubitably provided an impetus to the global disarmament debate. Applauded by its propo-

nents and criticized by cynics as a radical approach in favor of nuclear disarmament, the Agenda, which was actually rooted in incrementalism, was at best only an attempt to reinforce the NPT-oriented status quo that was trampled under the weight of the Bush administration's unilateralism. The Agenda prioritized nuclear safety and security, nonproliferation and disarmament – in that order.

Although, the 'Prague Agenda' has lost political capital, the status quo defined from the vantage point of the NPT remains an important pillar of the debates on disarmament. Its biggest 'strength' is its recognition of the consensus of nuclear weapons states as central to any meaningful progress on disarmament. Also its tacit acknowledgement of deterrence as a legitimate concept opens a space for delays and manipulation by nuclear-armed states. Consequently, nuclear-armed states have an interest in preserving this status quo.

Contrarily, the alternative, the rather revisionist Ban Treaty, challenges what some call "the tried-and-failed 'step-by-step' [approach]" (Jaramillo, 2015) that has dashed all hopes of bringing the international community closer to nuclear abolition. Rooted in normative preferences shaped by the humanitarian concerns regarding nuclear weapons it offers a paradigmatic shift by invoking the logic of "mutual assured abstinence" (Pretorious, 2016). The Ban Treaty does not ignore the significance of security; it only looks at security from a broader global perspective, arguing that global security is indivisible and that the possibility of nuclear accidents or nuclear use diminishes security not only for the citizens of states involved in a conflict but also for the world at large. As a result, it seeks to delegitimize the bomb. The Ban Treaty also indicates a deep structural change by shifting the moral leadership to normatively driven non-nuclear weapon states. More importantly the Ban Treaty is a manifestation of the "democratization of disarmament" (Tannenwald, 2017). Its straightforward approach leaves little room for endorsement without action. Consequently, the Ban Treaty has sharpened the binary between states that prioritize deterrence over disarmament and those that delegitimize deterrence and seek the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

The global disarmament debate today is caught up by the tension between the NPT-oriented status quo and the Ban Treaty's revisionism. As stated above, the NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states prefer the status quo; however, identifying and placing the discontented non-NPT nuclear holdouts in this equation presents an intriguing puzzle.

DISCUSSING DISARMAMENT IN NUCLEAR SOUTH ASIA: FROM THE PRAGUE AGENDA TO THE BAN TREATY

Officials from India and Pakistan keep touting their support for global disarmament. Conversely, they also continue to express their long held grievances against

the structure of the NPT-centered nuclear order (Janjua, 2016; see also Varma, 2016). Likewise, when the Prague Agenda was announced, both Islamabad and New Delhi issued statements in support of its broader contours but both sides also added caveats. Pakistan reminded the US and the international community of its responsibility to create an order that would guarantee undiminished security for all by addressing the issue of conventional asymmetries (Akram, 2009). India, on the other hand, emphasized the need for great powers to play a more active and effective role by downsizing their nuclear arsenals and pursuing de-alerting and non-deployment backed by No First Use pledges as part of their nuclear policies (Rao, 2009).

Furthermore, a review of the nuclear policies of India and Pakistan reveals how both sides dismissed the spirit of the Prague Agenda in practice.

India and Pakistan have significantly increased their stockpiles and warheads over the last decade. Both countries have also diversified their launching platforms and the ranges of their nuclear-capable missiles.¹ Moreover, the development of a combination of counter-value and counter-force targeting capabilities by both states indicates that both sides are gradually moving toward war-fighting doctrines (for Pakistan, see Tasleem, 2016; for India, see Raj, 2017).

The stalemate over the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has been a consequence of the same policy preferences. While Islamabad publicly stalled the process, there is little likelihood that India would have participated in the negotiations either. Likewise, India and Pakistan have both declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, but neither side has shown a willingness to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Nuclear weapons have remained central to Pakistan's national security policy throughout the last two decades. Similarly, the trends in India are also increasingly discouraging. While India has traditionally professed a limited role of nuclear weapons in its security policy, the last few years have revealed a gradual shift in its rhetoric about nuclear weapons (Miglani & Chalmers, 2014; see also *The Times of India*, 2016).

Policy aside, even the academic debate on disarmament is almost entirely missing in Pakistan and rapidly disappearing in India. If it appears at all, the conversation on disarmament begins and ends with a lamentation of the poor record of the major powers in fulfilling the disarmament commitment under article six of the NPT.

Unsurprisingly the alternative approach put forth by the non-nuclear weapon states in the form of the Ban Treaty has also failed to receive support from the nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. Both states have refused to take part in the negotiations over the Ban Treaty. A closer look at the official statements issued in Islamabad and New Delhi provide interesting insights about the existing disarma-

ment thinking in both capitals. Below are the salient features of the official positions on both sides.

| India's official position on the Ban Treaty (HT Correspondent, 2017) | Pakistan's official position on the Ban Treaty (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017) |
|--|---|
| <p>"India believes... this treaty in no way constitutes or contributes to the development of any customary international law".</p> <p>"India reiterated its commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world. India believes that this goal can be achieved through a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed global and non-discriminatory multilateral framework. In this regard, India supports the commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention in the Conference on Disarmament, which is the world's single multilateral disarmament negotiation forum working on the basis of consensus..."</p> <p>"India, therefore, cannot be a party to the treaty and so shall not be bound by any of the obligations that may arise from it".</p> | <p>"Pakistan stresses that this Treaty neither forms a part of, nor contributes to the development of customary international law in any manner."</p> <p>"Pakistan is committed to the goal of a nuclear weapons free world through the conclusion of a universal, verifiable and non-discriminatory comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons. The Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD), the world's single multilateral disarmament negotiating body, remains the most ideal forum for concluding such a convention."</p> <p>"Pakistan, therefore, like all the other nuclear armed states, did not take part in its negotiation and cannot become a party to this Treaty. Pakistan does not consider itself bound by any of the obligations enshrined in this Treaty."</p> <p>"It is indispensable for any initiative on nuclear disarmament to take into account the vital security considerations of each and every State."</p> |

Such a convergence in armament policies as well as stated positions on disarmament indicates what one may call 'negative solidarity'. In this case, the 'negative solidarity' is meant to offset the diplomatic pressure coming out of disarmament initiatives like the Ban Treaty.

This is not meant to undermine the distinctive history of India's disarmament discourse, or to downplay the peculiar role-conceptions and worldviews that set India and Pakistan apart. India, for instance, has historically pursued revisionism in the global nuclear context. However, over the last two decades – with the conclusion of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal and the India-specific NSG exemption – India has gradually moved into the orbit of status quo powers (Mohan, 2009).

On the other hand, Pakistan's approach has traditionally been overshadowed by its regional security concerns, resulting in a deeper emphasis on the interlinkages between conventional balance and nuclear disarmament. But more recently, the discontented Pakistan with an obvious contempt for the existing nuclear order that appears discriminatory in the face of the Indo-US nuclear deal, increasingly perceives itself to be at a disadvantage. Consequently, Islamabad has also started seeking a normalization of its nuclear status (Iqbal, 2016; see also Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

It seems that both India and Pakistan will increasingly seek to exploit the space created by the tension between the NPT-oriented status quo and the revisionist Ban Treaty while expanding their stockpiles and modernizing their nuclear forces.

Such sidetracking can only be understood and explained by looking deeper at the imperatives that are shaping the nuclear discourse and thinking in South Asia.

WHITHER DISARMAMENT? THE NATIONAL SECURITY DISCOURSE IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

At the domestic level, the ruling right-wing political leadership and foreign policy experts in India and the military elite – that controls the national security policy – in Pakistan are firmly situated in the traditionalist realism-centric worldview that manifests a clear preference for military power. Both consider disarmament as unreal and impossible. Besides, the military in Pakistan and right-wing forces in India play a significant role in the construction of national narratives that provide them with an exceptional ability to glorify nuclear weapons and feed the ‘nuclear nationalism’ (Abraham, 2009; Nizamani, 2000). This dynamic generates vicious domestic political interests that incentivize the further build-up of nuclear arsenals.

Such narratives are strengthened by the inaction of the major powers toward disarmament. Suspicions about the practicality of disarmament exacerbate each time a major power announces its nuclear weapons modernization plans or tramples non-proliferation goals because of its geopolitical considerations. Under such circumstances, any attempts by the major powers to engage nuclear hold-out states to promote nonproliferation are seen with suspicion and generate perverse incentives to demonstrate nuclear weapon capabilities.

More importantly, however, the national security discourse in India and Pakistan overwhelmingly considers nuclear weapons as a factor of stability, albeit an ‘ugly’ one. The absence of a major war between India and Pakistan after the nuclearization of the region is unduly attributed to the presence of nuclear weapons (see Sumit Ganguly’s arguments in Ganguly and Kapur, 2010; see also MEA – Ministry of External Affairs, 2004).

Pakistan in particular considers nuclear weapons as an equalizer vis-à-vis India’s superior conventional forces. Such assumptions make nuclear deterrence central to Pakistan’s national security policy, thus making disarmament a distant dream. India, on the other hand, also appears to be considering a revision of its nuclear policy, as it is giving a bigger role to nuclear weapons in its defence posture (Fisher, 2017).

Additionally, the high premium on (some indigenous, but mostly Western-sponsored) conversations on deterrence stability has only reinforced the perception that nuclear weapons are inevitable for peace in South Asia. Such conversations have served many purposes, including increasing awareness of and education about the dangers of instability, but they have also inadvertently perpetuated incentives for a fur-

ther nuclear weapons build up. The framework of deterrence stability adds unwarranted pressures on nuclear armed states to keep competing with their key adversaries. The competition between the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union demonstrated the same thing. Now India and Pakistan also appear to be entrapped in the logic of strategic balance, thus dashing all hopes for nonproliferation and disarmament.

Does this mean that disarmament has no future in South Asia? Do NPT-oriented status quo arrangements like the Prague Agenda or the revisionist Ban Treaty provide any remedy to address the challenges? In the near to medium term the prospects for disarmament in South Asia appear bleak. The NPT-oriented status quo manifested in the Prague Agenda did not bring any substantive change. Nor does the Ban Treaty appear to have effectively mobilized any policy change in favor of disarmament in South Asia.

Firstly, the supporters of the status quo demand the mainstreaming of India and Pakistan in the existing global nuclear order (Yusuf and Pandya, 2010; Goldschmidt, 2011). They have been proposing a wide range of formulas for this. Nevertheless, these formulas at best only suggest a way forward toward non-proliferation and arms control. None of the approaches that promote mainstreaming address the issue of disarmament.

Secondly, it is often argued (mainly in the case of Pakistan) that a non-discriminatory approach toward the nuclear hold-out states is essential for any progress on disarmament (Yusuf and Pandya, 2010). It remains unclear how such an approach will create space for disarmament, though.

Thirdly, many analysts believe that the approach of the major powers toward disarmament will be instrumental in shaping the behavior of nuclear hold-out states (Nayyar, 2010; Khan, 2009; Yusuf and Pandya, 2010; see also Basrur, 2009: 18–22). There is no gainsaying the fact that the actions of the major powers will have a tremendous influence in terms of creating diplomatic pressure on the nuclear hold-out states, including India and Pakistan. Yet this does not guarantee the compliance of the weaker states, as their decisions are driven by complex political and security calculations.

In fact, none of these arguments explain how the proposed steps would lead India and Pakistan to pursue disarmament. Moreover, a status-quo-oriented approach would remain mired in all the road blocks that have so far prevented the world from pursuing disarmament. A status-quo-oriented approach is self-constrained in a way. Given its tacit acknowledgement of the deterrent role of nuclear weapons, it has no way forward in terms of persuading weaker states to disarm.

A GLIMMER OF HOPE?

An alternative approach grounded in humanitarian concern may offer a glimmer of hope. Undeniably, the Ban Treaty has been rejected outright by the nuclear-armed

states, including India and Pakistan, and it does not address most of the challenges mentioned above. However, it is relatively better positioned than the NPT, primarily because of two reasons: Firstly, with its normative appeal, it shifts the conversation from the realist paradigm to the one focused on humanitarian concerns. This paradigmatic shift liberates the treaty from the obligation of finding answers to the difficult deterrence-related questions. The NPT recognized, legitimized and therefore normalized nuclear deterrence by granting a special status to the Nuclear Weapon States. Consequently, nuclear deterrence emerged as an essential condition for peace in the dominant discourses in nuclear armed states. But the Ban Treaty has shifted the focus of the conversation from deterrence to humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. This might help change the image and place of nuclear weapons in the popular imagination and public perception. Secondly, the Ban Treaty has another advantage. Unlike the NPT, which is frequently seen with suspicion and often discredited in the postcolonial discourses as an extension of the imperialist agenda aimed at preserving the monopoly of the powerful, the Ban Treaty does not fit in this frame. Given that it is advocated by non-nuclear weapon states along with pro-disarmament activists across the world, it enjoys a moral authority and credibility regarding the sincerity of its intentions. This in itself can become a major force in shaping people's perceptions of it.

If public opinion is effectively mobilized, India, being a state that has traditionally championed the idea of nuclear disarmament, might – under a liberal political regime – be more susceptible to the normative pressures of the globally and locally popular Ban Treaty. As India has a sizeable anti-status quo community and harbors ambitions of global leadership, the Ban Treaty provides India with an avenue to reclaim its lost glory in the disarmament debates.

As for Pakistan, although it projects a myth of consensus regarding nuclear weapons, some of its poets and public intellectuals have flagged their skepticism about the weapons, principally in connection with humanitarian concerns (Naheed, 2004: 110–111; Riaz, 2017: 33–34). Such sentiments can be channelized to sensitize people and create support constituencies. Pakistan, with its indigenously developed support for the Ban Treaty coupled with India joining the disarmament group, may find itself under enormous pressure to pursue disarmament.

Admittedly, there are many reasons for skepticism here that should not be overlooked; the Ban Treaty, however, has at least opened a window of opportunity. It should be noted that a concerted effort is required to make disarmament efforts work in states like India and Pakistan. Extensive outreach programs, social media campaigns and public education can help change people's perceptions of nuclear weapons and the inherent risks in possessing them. Also, campaigns supporting transparency, eradicating censorship, and cultivating a deeper sensitivity and concern for humanity would be vital in this case. The contemporary networked world

with its easy access beyond borders offers a fertile space for such an approach to succeed.

Yes, the current wave of nationalism, anger, and confusion in some parts of the world does paint a dismal picture but the resistance to it carries hope for alternative discourses. The chaos in the contemporary world has created a paradox that presents equal opportunities to both pro-status quo and revisionist forces. A lot will depend upon the effort, energy and resources each side spends in order to prevail.

The challenges are huge but not insurmountable. Even for a status-quo-oriented approach to successfully pursue disarmament, the Ban Treaty or a similar framework has to set the precedent by delegitimizing nuclear deterrence. As long as nuclear deterrence is revered, the likelihood of disarmament will remain very thin.

ENDNOTES

¹ This includes India's testing of the ICBM Agni V, the short range missile Prahaar and interceptor missiles for a BMD system, and Pakistan's testing of the MRBM Shaheen III, the nuclear-capable short-range missile NASR, cruise missiles and, more recently, the MIRV Ababeel. Both states are also working toward a nuclear triad by building sea-based nuclear deterrents.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abraham, Itty, ed. (2009), *South Asian Cultures of the Bomb: Atomic Publics and the State in India and Pakistan*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Akram, Zamir (2009), 'Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, Geneva, in the First Committee', 64th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 12/10/2009. Available at http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com09/statements/12October_Pakistan.pdf.
- Basrur, Rajesh (2009), 'Indian Perspectives on the Global Elimination of Nuclear Weapons', in Barry Blechman (ed.) *Unblocking the Road to Zero: Perspectives of Advanced Nuclear Nations*, Washington, DC: Stimson Center.
- Fisher, Max (2017), 'India, Long at Odds With Pakistan, May Be Rethinking Nuclear First Strikes', *The New York Times*, 31/03/2017. Available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/world/asia/india-long-at-odds-with-pakistan-may-be-rethinking-nuclear-first-strikes.html?mcubz=1>.
- Ganguly, Sumit and S. Paul Kapur (2010), *India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Goldschmidt, Pierre (2011), 'NSG Membership: A Criteria-Based Approach for Non-NPT States', *Proliferation Analysis*, 24/05/2011. Available at <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/05/24/nsg-membership-criteria-based-approach-for-non-npt-states-pub-44147>.
- HT Correspondent (2017), 'Committed to Nuclear Disarmament but Can't Be Party to UN Treaty, Says India', *Hindustan Times*, 18/07/2017. Available at <http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/committed-to-nuclear-disarmament-but-un-prohibition-treaty-does-not-contribute-to-international-law-says-india/story-gD5bfjpBtFfZqBeRf8qAL.html>.

- Iqbal, Anwar (2016), 'Fresh Campaign Launched for NSG Membership', *Dawn*, 29/08/2016. Available at <https://www.dawn.com/news/1280639>.
- Janjua, Tehmina (2016), 'Statement by Ambassador Tehmina Janjua, Permanent Representative of Pakistan, to the United Nations in Geneva and the Conference on Disarmament', General Debate of the First Committee, New York, 10/10/2016. Available at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com16/statements/10Oct_Pakistan.pdf.
- Jaramillo, Cesar (2015), 'The Humanitarian and Political Struggle to Ban the Bomb', 20/03/2015. Available at <http://ploughshares.ca/2015/03/the-humanitarian-and-political-struggle-to-ban-the-bomb/>.
- Khan, Feroz Hassan (2009), 'Pakistan's Perspective on the Global Elimination of Nuclear Weapons', in Barry Blechman (ed.) *Unblocking the Road to Global Zero: Pakistan and Israel*, Washington, DC: Stimson Center.
- MEA – Ministry of External Affairs (2004), 'Joint India – Pakistan Expert – Level Talks on Nuclear CBMs', 20/06/2004. Available at http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/26_ea_india.pdf?_=1316627913.
- Miglani, Sanjeev and John Chalmers (2014), 'BJP Puts "No First Use" Policy in Doubt', *Reuters*, 07/04/2014. Available at <http://in.reuters.com/article/india-election-bjp-manifesto/bjp-puts-no-first-use-nuclear-policy-in-doubt-idINDEEA3605820140407>.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan (2016), 'Press Release on Joint Statement - 8th Round of Pakistan-United States Talks on Security, Strategic Stability, and Nonproliferation Issues', 17/05/2016. Available at <http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?mm=MzcyMw>.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan (2017), 'Press Statement on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty)', 07/08/2017. Available at <http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?mm=NTE5MA>.
- Mohan, C. Raja (2009), 'India's Nuclear Diplomacy and the Global Order', in Arvind Gupta (ed.) *India in a Changing Global Nuclear Order*, New Delhi: IDSA.
- Naheed, Kishwar (2004), 'Talking to a Shepherd in Chaghi', in Asif Farrukhi (ed.) *The Distance of a Shout*, Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Nayyar, A.H. (2008), 'A Pakistani Perspective on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament', *FES Briefing Paper* 9, August. Available at <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/05652.pdf>.
- Nizamani, Haider K. (2000), *The Roots of Rhetoric: Politics of Nuclear Weapons in India and Pakistan*, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
- Pretorious, Joelen (2016), 'The Ban Treaty: An Interim Step, but Politically Profound', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 14/12/2016. Available at <http://thebulletin.org/can-treaty-banning-nuclear-weapons-speed-their-abolition/ban-treaty-interim-step-politically-profound>.
- Raj, Yashwant (2017), 'India Could Strike Pakistan with Nuclear Weapons if Threatened, Says Expert', *Hindustan Times*, 21/03/2017. Available at <http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-could-strike-pakistan-with-nuclear-weapons-if-threatened-says-expert/story-P5N8QuKOldxAJ9UPjboijM.html>.
- Rao, Hamid Ali (2009), 'Statement by Ambassador Hamid Ali Rao, Permanent Representative of India, to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva', General Debate of the First Committee of the 64th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 08/10/2009. Available at <http://www.mea>.

gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/1273_Statement-H-E-Mr-Hamid-Ali-Rao-Ambassador-Permanent-Representative.pdf.

- Riaz, Fehmida (2017), 'Pokhran aur Chaghi', in *Tum Kabir*, Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Tannenwald, Nina (2017), 'The U.N. Just Passed a Treaty Outlawing Nuclear Weapons. That Actually Matters', *The Washington Post*, 17/07/2017. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/17/the-u-n-just-passed-a-treaty-outlawing-nuclear-weapons-that-actually-matters/?utm_term=.f1d36836a989.
- Tasleem, Sadia (2016), 'Pakistan's Nuclear Use Doctrine', *Regional Insight*, 30/06/2016. Available at <http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/pakistan-s-nuclear-use-doctrine-pub-63913>.
- The Times of India (2016), 'Why Bind Ourselves to "No First Use Policy", Says Defence Minister Parrikar on India's Nuclear Doctrine', *The Times of India*, 10/11/2016. Available at <http://timesofindia.india-times.com/india/Having-a-stated-nuclear-policy-means-giving-away-strength-says-Parrikar/articleshow/55357107.cms>.
- Varma, D.B. Venkatesh (2016), 'India Statement – Ambassador D.B. Venkatesh Varma, Permanent Representative of India to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva', First Committee of the 71st Session of the United Nations General Assembly: Thematic Debate on Nuclear Weapons, 14/10/2016. Available at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com16/statements/14Oct_India.pdf.
- Yusuf, Moeed and Ashley Pandya (2010), 'The Quest for Nuclear Disarmament in South Asia: A Reality Check', *Peace Brief*, 46, 06/08/2010. Available at <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/pb43.pdf>.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, NORMS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER: THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS TABOO IN SYRIA

RICHARD PRICE

University of British Columbia, Vancouver

PRE-EMPTIVELY REINFORCING THE THRESHOLD

In this article I offer a brief assessment of the challenge to the chemical weapons (CW) taboo in Syria, using indicators from research on the status of international norms. I also reflect on the significance of reactions to the violations of the taboo for WMD and world order.

The first part of the CW story in Syria involved pro-active norm bolstering by US President Barack Obama, who, in August 2012, declared: "that's a red line for us and [...] there would be enormous consequences if we start[ed] seeing movement on the chemical weapons front or the use of chemical weapons" (The White House,

2012), a warning he repeated on December 3, 2012 in response to warnings from sensors of the movement of the Syrian CW capability.

Contesting the Line: Third Party Responses

After a series of allegations in the spring of 2013, the US released statements that it had assessed that the Syrian regime had used sarin on a small scale, a conclusion also announced by France. It is not difficult to imagine that these public declarations of the Syrian regime's use of sarin without a forceful response could well have been interpreted by Assad as a signal that it was unlikely that the US or other actors would respond with force to further CW use. This may help explain what would otherwise seem impossible to understand: the large scale sarin attack of August 21, 2013, especially since it occurred just days after a UN investigative team arrived in Syria to investigate reports of previous attacks.

Crossing the Line & Norm Enforcement

In a development that is notable for an assessment of norm contestation and robustness in this case, no party to the conflict claimed responsibility for the August attack of about a dozen sarin rockets in the Ghouta suburbs of Damascus, which may have killed as many as 1,400 people (the high-end US estimate). Regarding criteria for assessing norm robustness, this violation of course amounts to a flagrant behavioral act of non-compliance. In terms of indicators of rhetorical challenge, however, this episode lies at the opposite end of the spectrum of norm contestation, leading to weakening, insofar as there was an absence of justifications offered by the violator that would outright reject the norm, justify its violation as an exception, or attempt to redefine what counts as a violation of it. That is, no one challenged the validity of the norm or even how it might be applied, which is quite different from the nature of the challenges in contemporary times to the torture taboo or the ICC.

Assessing the status of the norm depends crucially upon third parties' reactions to the violation of it. Here it is difficult to imagine the taboo having a higher discursive salience than during 2013. In that year, far from downplaying it, Obama stated boldly that he had "decided that the United States should take military action against Syrian regime targets." (Obama, 2013) Interestingly, Obama appealed to the broader potential consequences of a situation in which even this most minimally contested of norms could not be enforced:

Make no mistake – this has implications beyond chemical warfare. If we won't enforce accountability in the face of this heinous act, what does it say about our resolve to stand up to others who flout fundamental international rules? To governments who would choose to build nuclear arms? To terrorist[s] who would spread biological weapons?

However, in the aftermath of Britain's Prime Minister David Cameron deciding not to join in any enforcement action against the Syrian regime, Obama reconsidered and just a day later he decided to seek the approval of Congress before launching the related strikes. US Secretary of State John Kerry indicated that to avoid an attack, Assad could give up Syria's chemical arsenal within a week, and this idea was seized upon by Russia as the basis for the way forward to avoid a military attack. Syria thus accepted the proposal to join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), give up its CW, and submit its facilities to an inspection. In an astonishing chain of events, then, from the perspective of third party responses reinforcing an international norm immediately after its violation, Syria was on its way to becoming a party to the CWC and allowing the OPCW to verify the dismantling of its declared chemical weapons capability.

A more straightforward and indeed unusually powerful case of an attempt by third parties to buttress an international norm in the aftermath of its violation is difficult to imagine. Yet, another phase of behavioral contestation was to come.

IMPLEMENTATION

States may indicate their (dis)approval of international norms, but their strength or weakness depends upon the implementation of their rhetorical and treaty commitments. In 2014, reports began to surface of the use of chlorine bombs in Syria. The CWC does not specifically prohibit Syria from possessing chlorine as such insofar as it is a dual-use material that has commercial applications, though the CWC prohibits the use of chlorine as a weapon.

Surely the threat of a US military strike was the necessary condition for Assad's dramatic decision to bow to the Russian influence, join the CWC and allow inspections to verify the disarmament of the vast majority of his chemical arsenal. Yet, a realist explanation would simply point out that in light of Obama's failure to follow up on his threat to attack, Assad could well have calculated that he could cheat and get away with subsequent attacks without being attacked in response. Indeed, the international responses to the chlorine attacks took a sharp step back from the previous highest levels of norm bolstering and seem likely to have emboldened Assad.

In August of 2015 the UN Security Council established a joint UN-OPCW investigative mechanism (JIM) to determine the culpability for such attacks. The JIM produced a number of reports; it was the third report, which was delivered to the UN Security Council in August of 2016, that for the first time named names, determining that on two occasions there was sufficient evidence to conclude that Syrian regime helicopters dropped devices that released toxic chemicals, and a third such occasion was added to these in its next report (United Nations, 2016).

The chlorine attacks have not garnered nearly as much media coverage and apparent public and political outrage as the sarin attack. In human terms, the Ghouta

violation was many magnitudes worse than the rest of the attacks combined, though in strictly legal terms, the violations since Syria joined the CWC could actually be regarded as an even greater slap in the face of the formal taboo, given that Syria now had a clear formal legal obligation not to engage in chemical warfare. This challenge was escalated significantly in 2017, culminating in a sarin attack by Syria in April of that year that finally provoked a forceful international response, this time from US President Donald Trump, whose ordering of a retaliatory attack of cruise missiles thrust him into the surprising role of the chief CW norm enforcer. There is little doubt that the forceful US response will make any would-be future user of CW much more unlikely to continue the erosion of the CW taboo, though even that did not further deter Assad since Syria eventually resumed chemical attacks, including an apparent chlorine attack a year later that galvanized an even broader commitment to a forceful response from the US, UK and France.

METASTASIZING?

Ultimately, assessing the strength of a norm experiencing violation depends upon whether that violation and the responses to it encourage the spread of further violating behavior. In that regard, there have been numerous allegations and reports throughout the Syrian conflict of the use of CW by non-state armed groups. The JIM determined that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that ISIS had used mustard gas on at least one occasion, while a November 2016 independent report indicated that all told, ISIS may have used chlorine and mustard on as many as fifty-two occasions since 2014 (Schmitt, 2016).

More troubling from the perspective of norm erosion are the reports of use of CW by Sudan in Darfur that were made public by Amnesty International in September of 2016. Whether Sudan's use of CW in violation of its CWC commitments can be verified, and further instances of it unfold, remains to be seen. Still, the criteria of concordance for assessing norm robustness would underscore that with but four states outside the CWC¹ and one of the world's last significantly threatening CW arsenals severely diminished if not destroyed, the potential scope of future state violators of the CWC is severely circumscribed. Against the potential spread of CW to Sudan, the long-time hold out Angola quickly joined the CWC in the aftermath of this episode. The treaty's ratification, of course, does not make violations of it impossible, as we have seen with Syria's cheating on its CWC commitments. Still, the addition of two ratifications points to norm broadening, which is quite a contrast from the direction of other contemporary cases of norm contestation like that of the ICC in 2016.

General Belief and Contestation

Throughout the conflict to date, all the sides in Syria have continued to deny that they have used CW, which reinforces the view that CW use is unacceptable for any-

one wanting to be accepted as a legitimate actor in the international community. Especially in light of the outrages committed, in which ISIS has notoriously gone out of its way to display its violations of humanitarian law norms, it is quite remarkable that even ISIS charged that “[Assad] used illegal chemical weapons against innocent civilians” (Syrian Coalition Political Committee, 2015), which is quite the claim for a group that otherwise explicitly rejects the concept of innocent civilians. Meanwhile, the Government of Sudan categorically repudiated Amnesty International’s accusation of their alleged use of CW.

All told, on the continuum of decreasing degrees of discursive contestation of the norm, where the main categories are a) explicit rejection of the norm, b) special justifications/interpretations, c) denial, and d) affirmation of the norm, the pattern from 2012-present lies at the very robust end of this continuum of the discursive status of the norm, with no public contestation of it in evidence.

WMD, CW and World Order

Some have raised the question of why there is all this fuss about CW, even drawing of red lines for CW, when hundreds of thousands of dead in Syria did not provoke such action. However, I argue that there is a mistaken tendency in some such critiques to believe that norm promotion is somehow a zero sum game (for examples of such critiques, see Carpenter, 2013; Jose, 2013). The argument that promoting the CW taboo has been a bad idea would only carry weight to the extent that its proponents could plausibly establish that enforcing the CW taboo has detracted from the humanitarian achievement that would otherwise have occurred. I have seen no reason or evidence to suggest that this would be the case, however. Still, it is important to acknowledge that the discourse of ‘conventional weapons’ that the CW taboo and larger WMD discourses play off of does serve to somewhat insulate these other means of violence from special sensitivity. Still, while CW are not as destructive as either nuclear or biological weapons, by being the more frequently (even if still infrequently) used weapons of mass destruction, they serve as an important litmus test of humanity’s ability to maintain control in terms of keeping actors from going over the WMD line.

Upholding that line matters. A key reason for why ‘asphyxiating gases’ were banned at Geneva in 1925 was that they were seen then as the first WMD before their time – the threat of catastrophic attacks against cities from the air was a legitimate concern then. While CW have never quite lived up to that catastrophic billing, to some extent this is because of some of the effects of the taboo itself. We saw in Syria their potential for mass civilian death. CW thus serve as something of a canary in the WMD coal mine. If humanity can’t hold the line on this one WMD, then we ought to be very worried indeed in a world with weapons that have the capacity to destroy civilization many times over. So as CW are the ‘not-quite so necessarily cat-

astrophic weapons of mass destruction,' the world's response to them reinforcing the salience of the CW taboo matters in an additional way to that of the sheer awfulness of the register of victims of such weapons.

CONCLUSION

Even though the CW taboo was egregiously violated from 2013–2018, there is not a stampede of other would-be violators just waiting in the wings to follow suit. This has to do with the effects of the institutionalization and politicization of the CW norm. Thanks to the taboo CW arms aren't lying around as part of standard munitions for militaries around the world, and decisions to use them aren't decisions of rank and file soldiers in the field but decisions at the very highest decision making level. While the capability to engage in torture, in comparison, can have far less in the way of start-up costs and can hinge upon the individual volition of many more actors who can undertake the act, most states and non-state armed groups simply do not have an effective lethal chemical weapons capability on hand, which creates a series of vastly higher hurdles to overcome for would-be violators than norms which could be violated more extemporaneously. Overall, the contrast of CW cases with cases of torture or targeted killings in recent years puts the continuing robust status of the chemical weapons taboo into a striking and positive relief. Beyond the use of targeted killings in warfare, however, the targeted killing of the half-brother of North Korea's leader with VX and numerous attempts on the lives of people opposed to Putin's regime in Russia open up another line of erosion of the poison and CW taboos that requires stern responses if the targeted attacks are to be stemmed.

ENDNOTES

¹ Egypt, North Korea, Israel (which signed the CWC but did not ratify it), and the new state of South Sudan, which is expected to join the CWC.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Carpenter, Charli (2013), 'Why Is the International Community Protecting the Wrong Norm in Syria?', Duck of Minerva, 27/09/2013. Available at <http://duckofminerva.com/2013/09/why-is-the-international-community-protecting-the-wrong-norm-in-syria.html>.
- Jose, Betsy (2013), 'Civilians vs. Chemicals: Protecting the Right Norm in Syria', *Foreign Affairs*, 26/09/2013. Available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2013-09-26/civilians-vs-chemicals>.
- Obama, Barack (2013), 'Statement by the President on Syria', 31/08/2013. Available at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/31/statement-president-syria>.
- Schmitt, Eric (2016), 'ISIS Used Chemical Arms at Least 52 Times in Syria and Iraq, Report Says', *The New York Times*, 21/11/2016. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/world/middleeast/isis-chemical-weapons-syria-iraq-mosul.html?_r=0.

- Syrian Coalition Political Committee (2015), 'Joint Statement on the Latest Developments and Implications of the Political Process in Syria', National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, 03/10/2015. Available at <http://en.etilaf.org/press/joint-statement-on-the-latest-developments-and-implications-of-the-political-process-in-syria.html>.
- United Nations (2016), The Third Report of the Joint UN-OPCW Investigative Mechanism, August. Available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/738_30.
- The White House (2012), 'Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps', 20/08/2012. Available at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps>.

ON THE HEALTH OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

JASON ENIA

Sam Houston State University

JEFFREY FIELDS

University of Southern California

Is the nuclear nonproliferation regime failing? Is it in a state of crisis? With each new instance of perceived noncompliance, the questions re-emerge. Over the past decade, a chorus of scholars have come to the conclusion that the answer is yes, that the regime is indeed in trouble.¹ In 2005–2006, several scholars pointed to the revelations of covert nuclear programs in Iran, North Korea and Libya, revelations about the AQ Khan proliferation network, and the perceived failures at the 2005 NPT Review Conference as evidence that the regime was in crisis if not failing (Hanson, 2005; Carranza, 2006; Goldschmidt, 2006; Perkovich, 2006; Krause, 2007; Meyer, 2009; Allison, 2010). Another round of concerns emerged following the 2005 framework outlining the India-United States Civilian Nuclear Deal (Mahbubani, 2005) and then yet another one emerged following the 2010 NPT Review Conference (Grand, 2010).

The assessments run the gamut of pessimism, and the underlying logic is equally diverse. On the less-alarmed side of the scale, several authors point to the North Korea and Iran challenges as eroding the regime's credibility, leading to "doubts about its effectiveness" (Kmentt, 2013). Others argue that the norm of nonproliferation is eroding in a way that places the regime "under severe strain" (Grand, 2010). Many focus on the notion that the regime tensions are the result of the perceived institutional double standard within the NPT (nuclear weapon states versus non-nu-

clear-weapon states) finally coming home to roost (Dhanapala, 1999; Perkovich, 2006; Meyer, 2009). Finally, on the more extreme side are arguments that the NPT in particular is in such a state of disrepair that it should be abandoned and replaced (Wesley, 2005).

We see two problems with these arguments. First, there is a tendency to use the terms 'regime' and 'NPT' interchangeably, and sometimes they are even used together in references to the 'NPT regime'. Often compliance issues associated with the NPT are discussed as 'regime failures'. But is the regime just the NPT or is it something more? After all there are three states that possess nuclear weapons which have never signed the NPT but still adhere to some nonproliferation norms. This is not merely a semantic issue. Definitions of the regime's boundaries have significant implications for attempts to think about its effectiveness. Second, most of the debates on whether the regime is in crisis seem to be based on fears about the impact of future proliferation rather than on an actual attempt to measure the regime's strength or health. We have encountered very few attempts to systematically conceptualize and empirically measure regime health. In 2009, we began a project aimed at correcting these deficiencies (Fields and Enia, 2009; Enia and Fields, 2014) and we are happy to share some of our findings in the context of the Prague Agenda.

WHAT MAKES A REGIME HEALTHY?

We begin by conceptualizing the regime as more than the NPT. Here we follow the lead of scholars of international regimes who argue that multiple aspects of regimes are crucial to understanding the regime as a whole (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 1997; Young and Levy, 1999). In this synthetic perspective, any attempt to analyze the status of international regimes must be multidimensional, encompassing a number of underlying principles that have their roots in a convergence of expectations (Smith, 1987; Müller, 1993), foundational norms which serve to guide behavior toward the achievement of the goals outlined in the principles (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 1997; Rublee, 2009), and various sets of rules and behaviors that provide specific means for achieving the goals of the regime (Tate, 1990; Müller, 1993: 362).

As a starting point for the second issue, we ask, what does it mean for a regime to be healthy? In several decades of regime-related research, scholars have used a number of different concepts to assess aspects of regime quality: effectiveness (Levy, Osherenko, and Young, 1991), robustness (Schimmelfennig, 1994), and attractiveness (Müller, 1995), among others. Obviously, there are important, though sometimes subtle, differences across these terms. Beneath the surface, though, the underlying questions are very similar: Is this regime impacting the problem that led to its formation? What would the state of the problem look like in a coun-

terfactual world in which the regime did not exist? (Stokke, 2012) We approach this topic by casting our net widely, using many of these existing conceptualizations to influence and shape our own. Thus, in our understanding, a healthy regime should:

- show some signs of internal problem-solving effectiveness, specifically an ability to mitigate the challenges inherent to cooperation and coordination in an anarchic international system,
- display robustness or resilience in the face of the challenges to its core norms and values,
- be attracting more members than it is losing,
- be having some effect on the problem that led to its creation.

Putting these pieces together, we build on the existing work on international regimes (Haggard and Simmons, 1987; Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 1997, 2000) and construct a framework that attempts to measure regime health along three dimensions: normative, institutional, and behavioral. Each dimension is structured around several components. For the normative dimension, we recognize different types of norms (Rublee, 2009). We also recognize different levels of strength, and we employ Legro's notions of "specificity," "durability," and "concordance" as measures (1997). For the institutional dimension, we measure issue scope, organizational form, and allocational mode (Haggard and Simmons, 1987). We also employ a more subjective measure of the extent to which the regime's institutions are formal or informal. Finally, on the behavioral dimension, we measure the participatory scope of the regime, the extent to which states constrain themselves domestically, verification, compliance, and enforcement (Puchala and Hopkins, 1983; Haggard and Simmons, 1987).

NONPROLIFERATION: A REGIME IN MIXED HEALTH

When viewed through this lens, the health of the nuclear nonproliferation regime is more varied than is commonly recognized. For example, while the normative foundations of the regime are strong, they are also limited in ways that are challenging. The explicit norm of nonproliferation remains strong. States continue to emphasize the idea that the spread of nuclear weapons should be limited and new nuclear weapon states avoided (Fields and Enia, 2009: 190). These norms have remained relatively robust in the face of regime challenges in Iran and North Korea. However, unlike its sister chemical and biological weapon regimes, the nuclear nonproliferation regime was not explicitly founded on norms of non-use and universal non-possession. This creates tensions around the other norm embedded in the NPT and elsewhere, denuclearization. These tensions have important consequences for how the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states perceive the regime and their respective roles within it (Brzoska, 1992; Fields and Enia, 2009).

Another example reveals similar complexities. The institutional features of the regime appear strong. In terms of scope and organizational form, the regime has near universal membership and covers a wide range of issues pertinent to non-proliferation. The scope has even widened as the regime has expanded to cover nuclear terrorism in conjunction with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. The regime's institutions are designed to mitigate transaction costs that are higher in the anarchic international system. For example, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the NPT Review Conferences (RevCon) are both pieces of the regime that, aside from their explicit functions, provide states information about the preferences and intentions of other actors, helping to mitigate this critical information challenge. However, there are limits to the institutional components of the regime that create challenges on the behavioral side. Instances of non-compliance remain difficult to punish, as the specific rules regarding enforcement are weak. With respect to organizational form, there is no official nonproliferation secretariat with the exclusive purview of maintaining the regime as a whole. The IAEA comes closest to this, but its role within the regime is comparatively limited. In addition, there is no formal dispute-resolution mechanism, and instead the regime relies on the IAEA and its Board of Governors or the UN Security Council for solving disputes (Fields and Enia, 2009: 184). Each of these regime aspects is a tension point that makes the behavioral aspects more challenging.

As is true with many security regimes, the nuclear nonproliferation regime has always been subject to a higher standard than other regimes. When a country violates the global trade regime, for example, the assumption is that complete and unwavering compliance with the regime is very difficult, if not impossible, in the face of competing interests, collective action challenges, and the anarchic nature of the international system. In other words, the violation is understood to be a somewhat standard reflection of the difficulties of international cooperation. However, when a country violates the norms of or fails to comply with the nuclear nonproliferation regime, analysts tend to ignore the fact that the same underlying challenges – competing interests, collective action – exist around nuclear issues. Instead, instances of noncompliance here are often taken as the basis for wondering whether the entire regime is weakening if not failing.

In one light, this analytical inconsistency is not surprising. Because the consequences of a complete failure of the nuclear nonproliferation would be very bad for global security, we desire the nonproliferation regime to operate differently than other regimes. But what we desire of the regime might or might not be true of the way it really operates. It might operate differently than other types of international regimes. It might not. In fact, our analysis suggests the regime is operating in ways that are typical of all international regimes. Regardless, answering questions about the regime's dynamics requires that we dig into the specific aspects so that we can gain a better understanding of how the regime deals with some of the fundamental challenges inherent in the anarchic international system.

ENDNOTES

¹ We recognize that some have been questioning the efficacy and sustainability of the regime from its inception, particularly in the years following the NPT's entry into force. See, for example, Falk (1977).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Allison, Graham (2010), 'Nuclear Disorder: Surveying Atomic Threats', *Foreign Affairs*, 89(1): 74–85.
- Brzoska, Michael (1992), 'Is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation System a Regime? A Comment on Trevor McMorris Tate', *Journal of Peace Research*, 29(2): 215–220.
- Carranza, Mario E. (2006), 'Can the NPT Survive? The Theory and Practice of US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy After September 11', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 27(3): 489–525. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260601060537>.
- Dhanapala, Jayantha (1999), 'The NPT Regime: External and Internal Challenges', in *Seventh Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available at internal-pdf://Address1-3859778304/Address1.PDF.
- Enia, Jason and Jeffrey Fields (2014), 'The Relative Efficacy of the Biological and Chemical Weapon Regimes', *The Nonproliferation Review*, 21(1): 43–64. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2014.880560>.
- Falk, Richard (1977), 'Nuclear Weapons Proliferation as a World Order Problem', *International Security* 1(3): 79–93. Available at <https://doi.org/10.2307/2626658>.
- Fields, Jeffrey and Jason S. Enia (2009), 'The Health of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Returning to a Multidimensional Evaluation', *The Nonproliferation Review*, 16(2): 173–196.
- Goldschmidt, Pierre (2006), 'The Urgent Need to Strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime', *Policy Outlook*, No. 25: 1–8.
- Grand, Camille (2010), 'The Non-Proliferation Treat in an Era of Proliferation Crises', in Jean Pascal Zanders (ed.) *Nuclear Weapons After the 2010 NPT Review Conference*, Chaillot Papers 120, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.
- Haggard, Stephan and Beth A. Simmons (1987), 'Theories of International Regimes', *International Organization*, 41(3): 491–517.
- Hanson, Marianne (2005), 'The Future of the NPT', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 59(3): 301–316. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357710500232998>.
- Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger (1997), *Theories of International Regimes*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger (2000), 'Integrating Theories of International Regimes', *Review of International Studies*, 26(1): 3–33.
- Kmentt, Alexander (2013), 'How Divergent Views on Nuclear Disarmament Threaten the NPT', *Arms Control Today*, 43(10): 8–13.
- Krause, Joachim (2007), 'Nuclear Proliferation and International Order: The Reform of the Non-Proliferation Regime', a paper presented at the international conference Global Security in the 21st Century: Perspectives from China and Europe, 18-19/09/2007, Beijing.
- Legro, Jeffrey W. (1997), 'Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism', *International Organization*, 51(1): 31–63.

- Levy, Marc A., Gail Osherenko, and Oran R. Young (1991), *The Effectiveness of International Regimes: A Design for Large-Scale Collaborative Research*, Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College.
- Mahbubani, Kishore (2005), 'The Impending Demise of the Postwar System', *Survival* 47(4): 7–18. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330500433225>.
- Meyer, Paul (2009), 'Saving the NPT', *The Nonproliferation Review*, 16(3): 463–472. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700903255128>.
- Müller, Harald (1993), 'The Internalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments: The Case of Security Regimes', in Volker Rittberger (ed.) *Regime Theory and International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 361–388.
- Müller, Harald (1995), 'Regime Robustness, Regime Attractivity and Arms Control Regimes in Europe', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 30(3): 287–297.
- Perkovich, George (2006), 'The End of the Nonproliferation Regime?', *Current History*, 105(694): 355–362.
- Puchala, Donald J. and Raymond F. Hopkins (1983), 'International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis', in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.) *International Regimes*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 61–93.
- Rublee, Maria Rost (2009), *Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint*, Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Schimmelfennig, Frank (1994), 'Arms Control Regimes and the Dissolution of the Soviet Union: Realism, Institutionalism and Regime Robustness', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 29(2): 115–148. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836794029002002>.
- Smith, Roger K. (1987), 'Explaining the Non-Proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary International Relations Theory', *International Organization*, 41(2): 253–281.
- Stokke, Olav Schram (2012), *Disaggregating International Regimes: A New Approach to Evaluation and Comparison*, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
- Tate, Trevor McMorris (1990), 'Regime-Building in the Non-Proliferation System', *Journal of Peace Research*, 27(4): 399–414.
- Young, Oran R. and Marc A. Levy (1999), 'The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes', in Oran R. Young (ed.) *The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

PUTTING THE PRAGUE AGENDA IN CONTEXT: LOOKING BACKWARD, LOOKING FORWARD, LOOKING BEYOND¹

ANGELA KANE

The International Institute for Peace, Vienna & The Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Seven years have passed since the US President Barack Obama gave his historic 'Prague speech', in which he spoke about the future of nuclear weapons as the fun-

damental issue for the security of nations and raised the hopes of people around the world that nuclear weapons (NWs) could indeed become weapons of the past (Obama, 2009).

He called the existence of thousands of NWs the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War, he spoke about the moral responsibility of the United States to act in this matter, and he committed to “*seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons*”. Among the goals he cited were the following:

- to reduce the role of NWs in the US’s national security strategy;
- to negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Strategy with the Russians;
- to immediately and aggressively pursue the US ratification of the CTBT;
- to seek a new treaty that would verifiably end the production of fissile material;
- to strengthen the NPT as a basis for cooperation.

On the NPT, he stated: “The basic bargain is sound: countries with nuclear weapons will move toward disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy” (ibid.).

Four years later, President Obama gave a speech in Berlin which was also devoted to nuclear weapons and disarmament and where he stated that “peace with justice means pursuing the security of a world without nuclear weapons – no matter how distant that dream may be.” He also noted that he “reduced the number and role of America’s nuclear weapons. Because of the New START Treaty, we are on track to cut US and Russian deployed nuclear warheads to their lowest levels since the 1950s” (Obama, 2013). In the same speech, he further outlined some specific NW-related goals:

- to reduce the US’s deployed strategic NWs by up to one-third;
- to seek negotiated cuts with Russia in order to move beyond Cold War nuclear postures;
- to work with NATO allies in order to seek bold reductions in US and Russian tactical weapons in Europe;
- to forge a new international framework for peaceful nuclear power;
- to call on all nations to begin negotiations on a treaty that would end the production of fissile materials.

Two more statements on this issue followed in 2016. On 30 March, President Obama published an opinion piece in the *Washington Post* titled “How We Can Make Our Vision of a World Without Nuclear Weapons a Reality” (Obama, 2016).

The positions Obama outlined were the following:

- Obama referred to the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington as advancing “*a central pillar of our Prague Agenda: preventing terrorists from obtaining and using a nuclear weapon*” (ibid.).

- The US will continue strengthening the international treaties and institutions that underpin nuclear security.
- The US is taking concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons. The US and Russia remain on track to meet their New START Treaty obligations.
- Obama reduced the number and role of NWs in the US national security strategy.
- Obama ruled out developing new nuclear warheads and narrowed down the category of contingencies under which the US could use or threaten to use a(n) NW.
- The US strengthened the global regime – including the NPT – that prevents the spread of NWs.
- The US is pursuing a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation.
- A world without NWs will not happen quickly, perhaps not even in Obama's lifetime. But the US and its allies have begun the process of moving towards it. The US has the moral obligation to lead the way in eliminating them.
- People must never resign themselves to the fatalistic idea that the spread of NWs is inevitable.

Then in May 2016, during a historic visit to Hiroshima, as the first US President to visit it after World War II, Obama said: "among those nations that hold nuclear stockpiles, we must have the courage to escape the logic of fear and pursue a world without them. We may not realize this goal in my lifetime, but persistent effort can roll back the possibility of catastrophe. We can chart a course that leads to the destruction of these stockpiles. We can stop the spread to new nations and secure deadly materials from fanatics" (Obama and Abe, 2016).

WORDS AND ACTIONS

Those were the speeches and that was the rhetoric. Now comes the hard part – what were the actions that were taken to follow up on the speeches?

- The New START Treaty, which entered into force in 2011, was indeed achieved, and it reduced the number of deployed nuclear warheads and their delivery units, but omitted other classes of nuclear weapons. Yet President Obama's promise to seek to include all NW-States in this endeavor, which he had made in the Prague speech, did not materialize.
- The four Nuclear Security Summits did secure nuclear materials and thus helped prevent nuclear terrorism, yet it must be pointed out that only civilian materials were included in the measures – which made up some 15% of the total amount of nuclear materials.
- The new framework for civil nuclear cooperation (i.e. an international fuel bank) – which was NOT in the Prague Agenda – is now being built in Kazakhstan.

I tried hard to come up with more positives but can only state what yet remains to be implemented and highlight the disappointing gap between Obama's rhetoric and action:

- The CTBT remains unratified.
- The NPT was not strengthened – quite the contrary, as I will outline below.
- The arms race has not decreased – quite the contrary. The US and Russia are acting with increasing belligerence toward each other.
- The US plans to spend \$1 trillion over 30 years on an entire new generation of nuclear bombs, bombers, missiles and submarines. President Obama was modernizing existing bombs to be used by fighters and long-range bombers, as well as warheads for submarine-launched missiles. In addition, he has authorized the rebuilding of the nuclear infrastructure, such as the facilities that produce and maintain the materials and components used in NWs.
- President Obama has ordered 200 new nuclear bombs to be deployed in Europe.
- He has not kept his (qualitative) 2010 Nuclear Posture Review promise to reduce the role of NWs in the US security strategy.

To set out why the President's record on nuclear disarmament falls short, Barry M. Blechman of the Stimson Center in Washington wrote an article in April 2016 titled "Obama Should Return His Nobel Peace Prize" (Blechman, 2016). In it, he referred to five missed opportunities which could have advanced the Prague Agenda:

- 1 Without a strategic analysis (bilateral or multilateral negotiation with Russia), the bureaucracy took the default path: continued bilateral talks with Russia.
- 2 A September 2009 meeting of the UN Security Council – convened by President Obama and attended by the presidents of all the member states – adopted a resolution committing the states to working toward "the peace and security of a world without NWs" – but there was no tangible follow-up to it. Such a follow up could have been a request to, for example, convene a working group which could meet to elaborate plans, milestones, or deadlines.
- 3 Washington's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) did not go as far as had been intended or hoped, as the policy still permits first use of NWs in certain circumstances.
- 4 The NPR follow-on implementation study did not call for changes in the so-called 'requirements' for a prompt response, which is a key factor for determining how many NWs must be kept on alert and how many must be in the arsenal. Nor did it reduce the number of warheads kept in reserve.
- 5 In 2010, many members of NATO called for the removal of the 180 US nuclear bombs still kept in Europe, yet the US sided with the so-called 'nuclear hawks' and reaffirmed the role played by NWs as part of NATO's overall strategy.

Blechman's article thus concludes with the following statement: "No, Mr. President, your nuclear record has not been impressive. Decency demands that you should return your Nobel Peace Prize" (ibid.)

Let me now turn to other developments that negatively influenced the debate and atmosphere around nuclear weapons and disarmament.

THE CONFERENCES ON HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES AND THE 2015 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

As High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, I witnessed the steadily deteriorating climate between the NW States and the non-NW States. An ambitious Action Plan was adopted at the NPT 2010 Review Conference in the optimistic phase after the Prague speech and the New START negotiations, yet by 2015 its nuclear disarmament part remained unimplemented.

The three conferences on the humanitarian consequences of a nuclear explosion – based on the 2010 Final Document – were not attended by the P-5, with the exception of the US and the UK participating in the last one, which was held in Vienna in December 2014.

The Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on nuclear disarmament convened in Geneva in 2013.² It was to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. But it was also not attended by the P-5 – and "boycott" was the term often used by civil society in connection with their absence.

The 2015 NPT Review Conference closed without adopting a Final Document. The failure resulted from the participants' inability to reach an agreement on holding a conference on a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East; this happened despite the fact that the commitment to hold the conference dated back to 1995 and the plan was later re-committed to by the UK, the US and Russia with the firm expectation that the conference would take place in 2012.

This also meant that the results of the OEWG could not be carried forward in the NPT process, and the issue was thus moved ahead in the First Committee of the United Nations, which decided in the fall of 2015 to hold a second OEWG to address "concrete effective legal measures, legal provisions, and norms that will need to be concluded to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons" (United Nations, 2015; 2016). It was yet another instance of an event of this sort that took place without the participation of the P-5.

The work of the OEWG resulted in resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, *Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations*, which was first voted on in the First Committee on 27 October 2016, with 123 votes in favor of it, 38 against it, and 16 abstentions. The resolution – which had 57 co-sponsors, a remarkable number – calls for the related negotiations to be open to all Member States, and to start in 2017. On 23 December, the final vote in the General Assembly was 113 in favor, 35 against, and 13

abstentions, but the sponsorship of the resolution by a large majority of Member States remained. It is not surprising that the US, the UK, France, Russia and Israel voted against it, together with most of NATO, Australia and Japan. China, India and Pakistan abstained from the vote, and interestingly, the DPRK voted in favor of it.

In a leaked document distributed to all NATO members ahead of the First Committee decision, the United States urged its allies to vote against the resolution and to boycott the negotiations, which were due to start in 2017. Participation in the negotiations, it argued, would erode the perception that nuclear weapons are legitimate in the context of certain actions, and it would make it more difficult for NATO to engage in nuclear planning.

A final US intervention at the General Assembly revolved around the question of the budget, as the US objected to a request for funding for four weeks of treaty negotiations at the UN in New York, but under tremendous pressure from supporters of the resolution, the US objection was withdrawn.

So negotiations on the **nuclear ban treaty**, as it is now referred to, will start soon. It is clear that a legal ban treaty cannot deliver disarmament by itself, but it is an important milestone. It is a practical expression of Article VI of the NPT: to “*pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament*”. It has revived the flagging momentum in the disarmament community and re-energized efforts to move from a ban to a total elimination of nuclear stockpiles and a dismantling of the nuclear weapons infrastructure.

BACK TO THE PRAGUE AGENDA?

Let me, however, come back to President Obama’s Prague speech.

US Ambassador Robert Wood, when speaking about the L.41 resolution in the First Committee, said: “How can a state that relies on nuclear weapons for its security possibly join a negotiation meant to stigmatize and eliminate them?” (Wood, 2016).

That, of course, begs the following question: what did President Obama claim to want when he advocated “the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons”?

And Acting Under Secretary Tom Countryman, at the EU Non-Proliferation Conference in early November, asked: “What should we expect of a negotiation among 100 countries and 200 NGOs conducted in a public setting? They will agree on the first day on the number – zero – and, in 1,000 days, they will not be able to agree either on a meaningful verification mechanism or on a realistic path to get to the declared goal” (Countryman, 2016).

He also stated, “my job, and *President Obama’s agenda*, requires me to do all I can to sustain global security at an ever-lower level of nuclear armament. We do not believe that the proposed convention offers a practical path to that goal” (my emphasis) (ibid.).

It is clear that the Prague Agenda has lost urgency and power; the momentum behind it has been lost, and the expectations of progress have dwindled. A new US Administration will take over in two months and we are moving into uncharted and unpredictable territory.

Next year will see the first preparatory session of the 2020 NPT Review Conference around the same time that the Ban Treaty negotiations will begin. It is not difficult to imagine the scenario: a hardening of positions, acrimonious discussions, accusations and counter-accusations, and a further weakening of the NPT?

What we need is to engage with the US and other key governments to promote practical and creative disarmament solutions – solutions that will support and fulfil the promise of Article VI in the NPT.

It can no longer be overlooked by the nuclear powers that there is a growing frustration with their failure to implement their pledges to reduce the role, the numbers, and also the risks of nuclear weapons. It is also clear that the dialogue in the US has shifted from a promise to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether to a dialogue where the Obama Administration prioritized agenda items that would reduce nuclear danger through non-proliferation and arms control rather than the much harder ones which would effectively lead to nuclear disarmament. In fact, Ambassador Wood explained the situation as follows: “the challenges to disarmament are a result of the political and security realities we presently face. [...] A ban treaty will do nothing to address these underlying challenges. [...] The world’s nuclear weapons arsenals did not appear overnight and they will not be drawn down overnight. We cannot lose sight of the fact that while we may disagree on process, we all agree on the goal: the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons” (Wood, 2016).

This statement communicates an image of progress: we affirm the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, while at the same time explaining that disarmament is not yet realistic. It in fact restores the power of nuclear weapons by placing them at the center of maintaining global diplomatic stability – yet thinking of nuclear disarmament as a goal alone will not make it happen. What is needed is a strategy, a practice in which the international community must be actively engaged.

The frustration of the non-nuclear states has found its expression in the conferences on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear war and in resolution L.41 – and regardless of whether the possible outcome is dismissed as an empty shell by those who oppose it, the power of the conviction that nuclear weapons must be outlawed has increased and will not be vanquished.

ENDNOTES

¹ This text is an edited version of the remarks delivered by Angela Kane at the Prague Agenda Conference in December 2016.

² It was established by resolution A/RES/67/56 of 3 December 2012; the results were noted in resolution A/RES/68/46 of 5 December 2013.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Blechman, Barry M. (2016). 'Obama Should Return His Nobel Peace Prize', *The National Interest*, 06/04/2016: Available at www.nationalinterest.org/feature/obama-should-return-his-nobel-peace-prize-15691.
- Countryman, Thomas (2016), 'Disarmament and Deterrence – Bridging the Divide', EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference 2016 First Plenary Session, IISS, 03/11/2016. Available at www.iiss.org/en/events/eu-conference/sections/eu-conference-2016-c74a/plenary-1-70fe/thomas-countryman-d263.
- Obama, Barack (2009), Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague, 05/04/2009. Available at www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered.
- Obama, Barack (2013), Remarks by President Obama at the Brandenburg Gate, Berlin, 19/06/2013. Available at www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/remarks-president-obama-brandenburg-gate.
- Obama, Barack (2016), 'How We Can Make Our Vision of a World Without Nuclear Weapons a Reality', *Washington Post*, 30/03/2016. Available at www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obama-how-we-can-make-our-vision-of-a-world-without-nuclear-weapons-a-reality/2016/03/30.
- Obama, Barack & Shinzo Abe (2016), Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe of Japan at Hiroshima Peace Memorial, 27/05/2016. Available at www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/27/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abe-japan-hiroshima-peace.
- United Nations (2015), Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations, Resolution A/RES/70/33, 07/12/2015.
- United Nations (2016), Report of Open-Ended Working Group, Resolution A/71/371, 19/08/2016.
- Wood, Robert (2016), 'Ambassador Wood: Remarks at U.N. General Assembly First Committee Thematic Discussion on Nuclear Weapons', 18/10/2016. Available at <https://geneva.usmission.gov/2016/10/18/ambassador-wood-remarks-at-u-n-general-assembly-first-committee-thematic-discussion-on-nuclear-weapons/>.

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND LEGAL OBLIGATIONS¹

DIETER FLECK

ILA Committee

To meet the challenge of nuclear armament effectively, it is important to consider it in the context of a larger spectrum of problems. Indeed, President Obama, when

leaving an impressive footprint at Hradčanské náměstí eight years ago, referred to a global economy in crisis; a changing climate; persistent dangers of old conflicts; new threats; and the spread of catastrophic weapons (Obama, 2009). He also realistically added that none of these challenges can be solved quickly or easily.

While the world has moved very fast in these recent years, only a few modest steps towards nuclear disarmaments were made by states in this period.² Civil societies, supported by elder statesmen and a growing number of governments, have convincingly addressed the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons (Kissinger et al., 2008; see also Policinski, 2016). The UN General Assembly has adopted a Resolution on 'Taking Forward Multilateral nuclear Disarmament Negotiations' (see United Nations, 2016a, b, c) and the new Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, adopted on 7 July 2017 with a vote of 122-1-1, in which no nuclear-weapon State participated (United Nations, 2017), has opened a new agenda of activities partly overlapping with those of other *fora*. This may affect the implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (United Nations, 1968), the work of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Organization (United Nations, 1996, 2017; see also Bauer and O'Reilly, 2015), and nuclear disarmament verification.

Critical evaluations of this new situation notwithstanding, there is a stronger conviction today than ever before that reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence is "increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective" (Kissinger et al., 2008). At the same time it must be realized that, as emphasized by President Obama in his Prague speech, "the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up" (Obama, 2009): some States other than the nuclear-weapon States accepted under the NPT have acquired nuclear weapons and there is a continuing black market trade in nuclear secrets and materials. The legal dimension of the problem is thus embedded in global aspects of international security and the survival of mankind.

BEST PRACTICES?

I am presenting my thoughts as part of a major research project conducted under the auspices of the International Law Association (ILA) to explore best practices of States and international organizations for complying with, and ensuring compliance with, nuclear non-proliferation obligations (ILA Committee, 2014). At the last ILA Conference (Johannesburg, 2016) the participants realized that there was still a long way to go before the envisioned outcome, an ILA *Declaration on Legal Issues on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Weapons*, could be reached. But there was a consensus that all three pillars of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (United Nations, 1968) – i.e. non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; the right to develop research, production and the use of nuclear energy

for peaceful purposes; and nuclear disarmament – need to be addressed in context. We have actively promoted this comprehensive approach in our book series (Black-Branch and Fleck, 2014, 2015, 2016), and the next ILA Conference (Sydney, 2018) will carry this work further based on a report addressing controversial issues of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including nuclear security and safety, radioactive waste management, damage prevention and reparation.

There is an important interplay between political commitments and legal obligations in this respect. While political commitments are not legally binding, firm legal obligations are generally too *status quo*-oriented to convincingly embrace dynamic changes. Yet the two categories should not be seen as limiting, but as mutually reinforcing each other in the striving towards nuclear disarmament under a strict and effective international control. It is not only extensive networking, but also cooperation between States that remains necessary to fulfil the obligations under the NPT and fully address the relevant rights and obligations under the customary international law. Such cooperation is more important and may be more effective than simply relying on enforcement measures. Indeed, a new diplomatic approach will be required to improve international cooperation and seriously review defence doctrines and structures that may be no longer effective for securing international peace and security (Gates, 2010).³

The obligations related to legal aspects of nuclear disarmament set up in Article VI of the NPT are legal binding obligations (ILA Committee, 2014). As the ICJ had underlined in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, these obligations include “an obligation to negotiate in good faith a nuclear disarmament” that would go beyond “a mere obligation of conduct” (*pactum de negotiando, pactum de contrahendo*) (ICJ, 1996: para. 105 F), and include “an obligation to achieve a precise result” (ibid.: para. 99; see also Owada, 2012). The objectives are clearly listed in Article VI of the Treaty as “cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date”, “nuclear disarmament”, and “general and complete disarmament”. Each of these objectives requires negotiations that should be pursued in good faith and implementation measures under a strict and effective international control. Article VI is thus far from conditioning nuclear disarmament on the achievement of a general and complete disarmament. Rather, it requires States to take effective steps to end the nuclear arms race and to enhance international security at lower levels of armament. It would not be correct to argue that the obligations under Article VI are dependent on future events or that factual developments after the conclusion of the NPT had changed the situation envisioned by the parties and thus affected the obligations they had entered into in 1968. On the contrary, the events during and after the Cold War and the indefinite prolongation of the Treaty in 1995 have underlined the need for a cessation of the nuclear arms race. They have reinforced the need for nuclear disarmament and confirmed that a gen-

eral and complete disarmament is not just an aspiration, but an obligation of States to be pursued under the UN Charter.

Furthermore, nuclear-weapon States are under a legal obligation to revise and strictly limit their relevant strategies (see, e.g., Thakur, 2015; Evans, 2014) to ensure that nuclear weapons are only a means of last resort in an extreme circumstance of self-defence in which the very survival of the State is at stake. They are likewise under an obligation to act in accordance with existing obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law. It should be noted that the grave humanitarian consequences of a nuclear weapon detonation are beyond dispute, but security and humanitarian principles co-exist, so realistic progress towards disarmament can only be achieved if both types of principles are given due consideration.

States modernizing their nuclear arsenals should exercise transparency as to the modernization's purpose and effects for nuclear safety and consequences for nuclear deterrence in accordance with existing obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law. As these obligations are owed to the international community as a whole, all States have a *droit de regard* to follow the global state of compliance with these obligations and appropriately react in case of their breaches, irrespective of whether they are directly injured. Any such reaction requires a will to cooperate. Countermeasures in cases of such breaches must only be the last resort. They must be reviewed and stopped as soon as cooperative solutions become possible.

BEST PRACTICE, CONFIDENCE AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The aforementioned legal obligations are valid *erga omnes*, as they affect the international community as a whole rather than a particular State or group of States. They are not limited to States party to the NPT, as they are part of customary international law or at least an evolving custom. States Parties to the NPT must cooperate with one another as well as with non-Parties to the NPT to implement these obligations. Responsible cooperation and a certain amount of transparency towards third States are, indeed, required to ensure compliance with nuclear non-proliferation obligations. This includes confidence-building measures on military, technological and other security-related issues and has consequences for military doctrines, force structures and alert levels; a comprehensive nuclear test ban; the termination of the production of fissile material for weapons; cooperative approaches to anti-ballistic missile defence; and further limitations to military uses of outer space.

For fully meeting the challenge of nuclear terrorism States must co-operate under the auspices of the Security Council (United Nations, 2004) and, in appropriate partnerships, implement their obligations to ensure nuclear non-proliferation, law enforcement and the punishment of crimes. This cooperation cannot be reduced to

criminal prosecution of terrorist attacks. It must include prevention and security, human welfare and the protection of the environment.

While the tasks addressed here are complex and difficult, I do not accept that it is impossible to fulfil them. Nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes in that reliable non-proliferation measures may facilitate arms control and disarmament measures. The interrelationship between these two important tasks is not only valid for the NPT, in which they form two essential pillars; it also applies to States not party to the Treaty. It is in this sense that political commitments are as important as legal obligations, since they serve to achieve progress on nuclear disarmament in times of increasing security challenges.

ENDNOTES

¹ Based on the author's remarks delivered in Prague on 1 December 2016, which were revised in July 2017.

² For example, there was the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the New START Treaty) and Protocol (8 April 2010); see Phillips (2010). Approximately 15,395 tactical and strategic nuclear warheads still exist today, of which about 4,120 are deployed with operational forces and roughly 1,800 are kept in a state of high operational alert; see Kile and Kristensen (2017: 611).

³ For more on the U.S. 2017 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) currently underway, see Rühle and Rühle (2017).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bauer, Sabine and Cormac O'Reilly (2015), 'The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO): Current and Future Role in the Verification Regime of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty', in Jonathan L. Black-Branch and Dieter Fleck (eds.) *Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law, Vol. II: Verification and Compliance*, Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer/Asser Press.
- Black-Branch, Jonathan L. and Dieter Fleck (eds.) (2014), *Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law, Vol. I*, Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer/Asser Press.
- Black-Branch, Jonathan L. & Dieter Fleck (eds.) (2015), *Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law, Vol. II: Verification and Compliance*, Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer/Asser Press.
- Black-Branch, Jonathan L. and Dieter Fleck (eds.) (2016), *Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law, Vol. III: Legal Aspects of the Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes*, Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer/Asser Press.
- Evans, Gareth (2014), 'Nuclear Deterrence in Asia and the Pacific', *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies* 1(1): 91–111.
- Gates, Robert M. Gates (2010), *Nuclear Posture Review Report*, April. Available at <http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/9469671-nuclear-posture-review-report>.
- ICJ (1996), *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, Advisory Opinion of 08/07/1996 (General Assembly Opinion), *ICJ Reports*, 226, 35 ILM, 809.

- ILA Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and Contemporary International Law (2014), Second Report: Legal Aspects of Nuclear Disarmament, Washington, D.C. Available at <http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1025>.
- Kile, Shannon N. and Hans M. Kristensen (2017), 'World Nuclear Forces', in *SIPRI Yearbook 2017*, OUP, pp. 609–667.
- Kissinger, Henry A., George P. Schultz, William J. Perry, and Sam Nunn (2008), 'Toward a Nuclear-Free World', *The Wall Street Journal*, 15/01/2008. Available at http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB120036422673589947.html.
- Obama, Barack (2009), Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, 05/04/2009. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered.
- Owada, Hisashi (2012), 'Pactum de Contrahendo, Pactum de Negotiando', in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.) *Max-Planck-Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, OU. Online edition: www.mpepil.com MPEPIL, paras. 3, 5, 7.
- Phillips, Macon (2010), 'The New START Treaty and Protocol', 08/04/2010. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/04/08/new-start-treaty-and-protocol>.
- Policinski, Ellen (2016), 'Majority of Governments Vote for Negotiations to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons', 29/08/2016. Available at http://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2016/08/29/negotiations-nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty/?mc_cid=7d9fcee5cf&mc_eid=2ffb948f41.
- Rühle, Hans and Michael Rühle (2017), 'Contours of a Third Nuclear Age', National Institute for Public Policy, 421 *Information Series*, 17/07/2017.
- Thakur, Ramesh (2015), 'The Problem of Nuclear Weapons and What to Do About It', in Ramesh Thakur, *Nuclear Weapons and International Security. Collected Essays*, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 216–233.
- United Nations (1968), Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (01/07/1968) 729 UNTS 161.
- United Nations (1996), Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), adopted by General Assembly Resolution 50/245 (10/09/1996), 35 ILM 1439.
- United Nations (2004), SC Res 1540.
- United Nations (2016a), Report of the Open-Ended Working Group Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations, A/71/371 (01/09/2016).
- United Nations (2016b), First Committee document A/C.1/71/L.41 (14/10/2016).
- United Nations (2016c), UNGA Res 71/258 (23/12/2016).
- United Nations (2017), Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, adopted on 07/07/2017, UN Doc A/CONF.229/2017/L.3/Rev.1 (06/07/2017). Available at <https://www.un.org/disarmament/ptnw/>.

Writing Kafka's Soul: Disciplinary Power, Resistance & the Authorship of the Subject

NICHOLAS DUNGEY

Institute of International Relations, Prague
& California State University, Northridge

Abstract: Who is the *real* Kafka? What do his writings *really* mean? These are the questions that have dominated Kafka scholarship, which has predominantly focused on issues of the author's identity and the meaning of his writings. As the heirs of a modern metaphysics that posits the existence of an objectively rational and free subject, we – including many Kafka scholars – have generally assumed that there is a true self, that reason enables access to universally verifiable knowledge, and that this subject presupposes and authorizes the works of knowledge, art, and cultural productions that bears the subject's name. It is time to ask, however, whether the metaphysical approach to Kafka and his writings obscured more than it has illuminated? What if, instead, we abandon the metaphysical search for the true Kafka? There is now an emerging postmodern account of Kafka's subjectivity and the dynamic, discursive relationship between the construction of his subjectivity and the production of his writings. Utilizing Foucault's interrogation of metaphysical subjectivity, I investigate Kafka's voluminous letters and diaries as the effects of disciplinary power and the vehicles through which resistance to this power is pressed into the service of aesthetic self-creation.

Keywords: Kafka, Foucault, Author Function, Subjectivity, Writing, Disciplinary Power, Literature.

The metaphysical urge is only the urge toward death.

Franz Kafka (1965: 200).

Who is the real author?

What has he revealed of his most profound self in his language?

Michel Foucault (1977a: 118).

INTRODUCTION: ABANDONING KAFKA

As the heirs of a modern metaphysics that posits the existence of an objectively rational and free subject, we generally take for granted the assumption that the self

is essentially a real thing, that reason enables access to universally verifiable knowledge, and that this subject presupposes and creates the works of knowledge, art, and cultural productions that bear the subject's name. Modernity not only discovered the freedom, dignity, and rights of the individual, but also more importantly, gave rise to a particularly powerful, essentialist version of the relationship between the subject and the authorship of modes of intellectual and creative production.

In the last one hundred years, however, this material, intellectual, and cultural inheritance has come under increasing interrogation. As Jean-Francois Lyotard famously asserted, there is now emerging a deep "incredulity toward metanarratives" (1984: XXIV). Franz Kafka and Michel Foucault are two figures intimately defined by and entangled in this discourse, and they are each, in their own ways, engaged in the critique of metaphysics and the transformation of the modern project. While Kafka's writings often problematize the stability of the rational subject and the socio-political space, the standard interpretations of Kafka and the relationship between Kafka and his literature have remained grounded in metaphysical theories about the subject and the production of literature. Central to the vast majority of secondary literature on Kafka and his writings is the assumption that there is an objectively true Kafka, and that his writings gesture toward the discovery or revelation of some truth about religion, power, identity and existential nihilism.

For example, in *Kafka: Judaism, Politics, and Literature*, Ritchie Robertson locates the source and meaning of Kafka's literature in the complex constellation of Jewish, ethnic, and political dynamics that shaped Kafka's early and middle life (1985: 1–2). Ursula Mahlendorf's version of Freudian metaphysics is relevant here as well. In *The Wellsprings of Literary Creation*, Mahlendorf writes, "in fiction about artists, writers tend to use the hero to portray aspects of their own creative struggle. Each work reveals crucial facts about the writer's own psyche" (1985: xv). In writing a story about the conflicts and triumphs of an artist, Kafka discovers his true self, which is a process Mahlendorf calls self-cohesion through struggle. Meanwhile, James Hawes observes that for too long many have thought that "the way to find out who Kafka really was and . . . why he wrote what he wrote [...] is to try to get closer to him [...] until we will find the Truth about his writings" (2010: 76). Nonetheless, despite the *production* of over ten thousand secondary academic writings on Kafka (Gooden, 1977: 2), there is no consensus on *who* the real Kafka is or what his literature really *means*.

Contrary to the metaphysical account of Kafka's identity and the meaning of his writings, there is now emerging what could loosely be called a post-metaphysical account of Kafka's subjectivity and the dynamic, discursive relationship between the fabrication of his subjectivity and the production of his writings. Nearly fifty years after Kafka's death, Foucault's terse declaration that "man is a recent inven-

tion, and one nearing its end" (1970: 387) both serves as a postmodern epitaph for metaphysics and prepares the way for an alternative approach to Kafka and the relationship between Kafka and his writings. Describing Kafka and the group of literary friends who were part of the Prague Circle, Scott Spector writes, "the constructedness of selves was not intuited, but experienced in a literal sense" (2000: X). By the phrase "constructedness of selves," Spector refers to the discursive set of material, intellectual, and ethnic forces that fabricated Kafka's identity. Spector is not merely suggesting that these forces influenced, shaped, or guided the discovery of a metaphysical subject that lies prior to and presupposes cultural and intellectual inscription. Spector argues that the narrative of Kafka's identity was written on and in Kafka in an immanent, physical, and conceptual manner. My goal is to situate Spector's observation in a more comprehensive, Foucaultian analytic schema. Interpreting Kafka's subjectivity and writings from a discursive point of view requires that we forego an essentialist interpretation of Kafka's subjectivity; abandon the metaphysical account of reason and language as mediums to an objective knowledge about God, humanity, or politics; and to let go of the idea that some mode of writing, in this case Kafka's letters and diaries, points toward a uniform teleology of life.

Utilizing Foucault's interrogation of metaphysical subjectivity and his account of the formation of the subject who is both revealed by and constituted in writing, I investigate Kafka's letters and diaries as both disciplinary effects and specific technologies engaged in the production of what Foucault calls the "author-function." In "What Is an Author," Foucault identifies the historico-discursive conceptual and material practices that operate to signify an individual as an "author." Challenging the claim that there is a metaphysical subject that presupposes the works of intellectual or artistic production that bear his/her name, Foucault suggests "we should suspend the typical questions: how does a free subject penetrate the density of things and endow them with meaning?" (1977a: 137). This analysis, however, is not intended to deny the facticity of the subject, but rather to situate the subject and the cultural designation 'author' in the field of relations of power that make them possible. "[T]he subject should not be entirely abandoned. It should be reconsidered, not to restore the theme of the originating subject, but to seize its functions, its interventions in discourse, and its systems of dependencies" (ibid.). Arguing that the subject is an effect and a vehicle of power, Foucault illuminates the ideas and practices that enable the subject to "appear in the order of discourse" as something recognized as an 'author' (ibid.: 138). The subject and the way a subject comes to be designated as an author must be analyzed as complex and variable effects and functions of discourse (ibid.).

By applying Foucault's account of disciplinary power and his analysis of the 'author-function' to Kafka and his *production* of tens of thousands of diary entries and

letters, I wish to do three things. First, I identify the way in which letters and diaries enact micro versions of the main strategies of disciplinary power – the control of space and time, the opening of a state of infinite self-examination, and the creation of a perpetual space of self-surveillance. Second, I trace the way one modality of Kafka’s subjectivity, as an ‘author-function,’ is facilitated through the confessional practice of writing his letters and diaries. The goal is to document the way the disciplinary and confessional aspects of Kafka’s letters and diaries turned Kafka into a self-confessing writing machine/author that represents a unique example of Foucault’s account of the ‘author-function.’¹ Third, I finish the essay with an examination of the ways in which Kafka redirects the more coercive and disciplinary dimensions of the ‘author-function’ by becoming an ‘initiator of a discourse’ through mobilizing Foucault’s account of resistance to power, and finally by conceiving his subjectivity as a work of art. Ultimately, I argue, Kafka enacts Foucault’s normative account of the ‘author-function’ through living his life as literature.

POWER, ENLIGHTENMENT DISCOURSE, AND SUBJECTIVITY²

According to Foucault, power is not a thing, but rather an always-already existing condition of meaning, modes of resistance, and sites of possible transformation.³ Power does not originate in, nor is it authorized by a metaphysical source. It does not derive from the intellectual autonomy or physical freedom of the individual, and it can’t ever be fully consolidated in or mastered by a single individual or set of institutions. Significantly for the argument advanced here, power is simultaneous with the expression of language and the material strategies, techniques, and arrangements that coordinate and organize the temporal and spatial dimension of meaning and physical reality. As such, the examination of power’s concrete modalities is always simultaneous with a specific analytical and conceptual framework that Foucault calls discourse. “We have to know,” Foucault argues, “the historical conditions that motivate our conceptualization. We need a historical awareness of our present circumstances” (2003: 127). He writes,

[I]n a society such as ours [...] there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterize and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse. There can be no exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth (1980: 93).

Discourse refers to *both* an historical network – philosophical, theological, moral, political, and scientific – of concepts, *and* a set of material and physical strategies that help implement these ideas. Moreover, the material and physical strategies that

emerge along with the network of concepts are designed to fabricate subjectivity, target the human body, and shape the material and physical environment. Discourse signifies the conceptual and material way the enabling power of human thought/language, action, and transformation is rendered meaningful and established as a regime of truth.

Performing a genealogical examination of *our* discourse, Foucault returns to Kant's essay on (the) Enlightenment: "When [...] Kant asked 'What is Enlightenment?' he meant, 'what is going on just now?' What's happening to us? What is this World, this period, this precise moment we are living?" (2007: 110). Applying a Nietzschean analysis to the philosophical, scientific, and political ideals of the Enlightenment, Foucault identifies three techniques and strategies that he calls disciplinary power: the extensive regulation of space and time; the creation and deployment of scientifically sanctioned examinations to measure and diagnose one's aptitude and normalcy; and the creation of a permanent and internalized system of surveillance. Disciplinary power is Foucault's term for a genealogical analysis of the presence, operation, and effects of the primary ideas and strategies of the Enlightenment discourse. The purpose of disciplinary power is to construct a form of subjectivity through the objectification and normalization of the individual. By objectification, Foucault means the way disciplinary power holds the subject in a field of scientific examination and observation. By normalization, Foucault means the narrowing and homogenization of the subject's possibilities. From the point of view of disciplinary power, the question becomes: *How* did the Enlightenment fashion us into the subjects we are?

Foucault's account of power and discourse is ecstatic to his view of the formation of subjectivity. "We should try to discover," Foucault writes, "how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies [...] desires [...] [and] thoughts" (1980: 97). If subjectivity is not metaphysically or biologically given, what does Foucault mean by the term? There are two meanings of the word "subject": subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to one's own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. According to Foucault, the Enlightenment discourse represents a unique way in which individuals come to view themselves as subject to a set of metaphysical ideas and institutions (and subject to the individuals who possess this knowledge), and in the process develop a form of self-consciousness that deepens and reaffirms its subordination. The Enlightenment discourse and the disciplinary power it gives rise to "[categorize] the individual, [mark] him by his own individuality, [attach] him to his own identity, [and impose] a law of truth on him that he must recognize and others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power that makes individuals subjects" (Foucault, 2003: 130). I will now turn to the way disciplinary power, through the confessional practice of writing diaries and let-

ters, operates as a technology that fabricates subjects and turns them into 'author-functions.'

WRITING, DISCIPLINARY POWER, AND CONFESSION

Throughout his life, Kafka was obsessed with the *discipline of writing* and with the cultivation of the self-discipline necessary for what he considered a literary life. The optimal environmental conditions necessary to write were, for Kafka, extremely important and were highly ritualized. Malcolm Pasley notes that "[e]arly in his life Kafka conceived of writing more as self-discipline than as self-expression" (1989: 203). The dynamics of the disciplinary formation of subjectivity, and the use of confessional writings – especially diaries and letters – as techniques and strategies that turn subjects into self-writing machines are particularly relevant to Kafka. Julian Preece writes, "most of Kafka's daily writings [...] are letters, which, in sheer volume, are approximately twice as long as his collected fictions – his novels, stories, fragments, and aphorisms – and three times as long as his diaries" (2002: 117). In addition to the sheer volume of letters and diary entries, letter writing was Kafka's primary and preferred way of communicating with others (Preece, 2002: 113).

From the modern, metaphysical perspective, diary entries and, to a lesser degree, letters are generally thought to be autobiographical accounts of personal events, observations, feelings and thoughts. In the ostensibly private, material, and reflective space of the diary, the subject conveys, struggles with, and confesses his or her deepest thoughts, feeling, and observations. In letters these same autobiographical or descriptive accounts are shared between friends and intimates. Diary entries and letters are generally seen to be registers of fact and archaeological excavations of Truth, and are therefore believed to be grounded in or expressive of (at least) two levels of Truth. The first level of Truth pertains to the descriptive accuracy and facticity of the thoughts, feelings, or descriptions conveyed. In this exercise, the subject seeks to identify, understand, and ideally discover something True about his or her *real* thoughts, feelings, and identity. The second level is that in discovering and writing this Truth, another, deeper Truth about the relationship between the individual and the moral, social, political community may be identified or pursued. Both of these levels of speaking/writing the Truth assume that the Truth is something that lies prior to power and is often spoken/written in opposition to coercive power. However, seen from a Foucaultian gaze, diaries and letters are not simply private, power-free, and non-socio-political expressions of an autonomous and free individual seeking to excavate the Truth, but rather a particularly effective technology of confession that turns subjects into 'author-functions.'

According to Foucault, the emergence of the normative social and medical sciences, their obsession with examination, and their belief that all things and people

must and should be examined, increased the visibility of individuals. As a micro-form of disciplinary power, the confessional technology of diaries and letters has made the modern subject *visible* to him or herself, and *visible* to the normative social, medical, and therapeutic apparatuses by making the subject an *object* of examination and endless documentation. He writes,

The confession has spread its effects far and wide. It plays a part in justice, medicine, education, family relationships and love relationships, in the most ordinary affairs of everyday life, and in the most solemn rites; one confesses one's crimes, one's sins, one's thoughts and desires, one's illness and troubles... One admits to oneself, in pleasure and in pain, things it would be impossible to tell anyone else... Western man has become a confessing animal (Foucault, 1990: 59).

This increase of visibility is motivated by the desire to induce in the confessing subject a form of power that seeks to train, shape, control, and normalize the individual. Disciplinary power forms subjects by turning them into confessing/writing machines.

This territory and activity of confession is enacted through the spoken and written word. One speaks one's confessions – sins, crimes, sickness, obsessions or desires – to the agent of God, the medical doctor, the psychiatrist, or the judge. But in the diary, one *writes* to one's self one's deepest confessions. From a genealogical perspective, letters and diary entries may be seen as the material and discursive space where the normative social and medical sciences' obsession with confession take place. In writing one's confession to one's self, the subject performs a sort of auto-inscription and documentation of the primary ideas and strategies of disciplinary power; one writes oneself into and as a sort of machinery of narrative construction and re-enforcement of social, medical, and therapeutic norms. As Foucault has observed more generally about the operation of disciplinary power and subjectivity, in the material and narrative space of the diary, the subject becomes its own hyper-concentrated object and vehicle of power.

As mentioned above, diaries are generally thought to be private, autonomous, and power-free exercises in the discovery of Truth. However, if we acknowledge the postmodern claim that truth is never separate from power, that truth is in fact produced in relations of power, then we must acknowledge that letters and diaries do not escape power and do not objectively liberate individuals, but are themselves the effects of power, and the truth they 'seek' has already been produced in the very discursive and power relations that authorize them. As Foucault writes:

Letters and diaries have become specific modalities in the development of new forms of literature ordered according to the infinite task of extracting

from oneself, in between the words, a truth which the very form of the confession holds out like a shimmering mirage [...] The obligation to confess is now relayed through so many different points, is so deeply ingrained in us, that we no longer perceive it as the effect of a power that constrains us (Foucault, 1990: 60).

Rather than liberating individuals in and through the pursuit of truth through relentless regulation, self-examination, and normalizing observation, the letters and diaries re-inscribe the individual in disciplinary practices and reaffirm the power these practices exert over the individual. Indeed, the *more one writes* in search of the Truth, the more one deepens the grip disciplinary power has over him or her.

The increased visibility opened in and through the confession problematizes the Liberal, philosophical account of the existence of a 'private' self and the relationship between a 'private' self and the Truth. This tension is beautifully illuminated in the case of Kafka and his diaries and letters. On the one hand, as Preece notes, Kafka was deeply concerned to keep some of his correspondence private, to take precautions to keep it from being observed and judged (2002: 113). When seen from a genealogical point of view, however, the disciplinary and confessional functions of letters and diaries illuminate the way letters and diaries facilitate a unique modality of the author-function through making the self visible to the self and others. The activity of confessional self-writing – the 'author function' – actually dissolves the very notion of privacy it seeks to protect.

Indeed, as Foucault notes, the subject's desire to acquire some Truth about oneself and one's relation to the socio-political space operates as a closed circuit of disciplinary re-inscription. Given the constructive ambiguity within the disciplinary technology of confession – it is a ritual of privacy and it also incites a type of sharing and visibility – Kafka himself often effaced the private/public dimension of his letters and diaries by reading passages from his diaries aloud and also by giving his diary to Milena Jesenská. Problematizing the dissolution of the private/public distinction further, the strategic, intellectual/academic, and market-based decisions to treat the collected letters and diaries of certain individuals as 'works of literature' and to publish them only reinforce the circular power of the 'author-function.' In the modern academic and literary context, Kafka's confessions – his oeuvre of letters and diaries – are essential to research/acquisition of cultural and aesthetic knowledge, and big business.

Seen in light of Foucault's account of the 'author-function,' the preoccupation with confession and the use of letters and diaries as the primary technologies of self-confession have extended the influence of disciplinary strategies of the 'author-function' directly to the mass public. Letters and diaries democratize the 'author function.' Indeed, the use of letters and diaries as spaces and discourses of thera-

peutic confession and the search for the Truth has succeeded in making the 'author-function' nearly universal.⁴

WRITING KAFKA'S SOUL

Kafka's letters and diaries document a lifelong confessional project. In and through his letters and diaries, Kafka enacts Foucault's claim that a critical technology of the construction of modern subjectivity as the 'author-function' is the development of the confessing subject. As vehicles for the creation of a specific mode of subjectivity and the 'author-function,' letters and diaries combine the three techniques and strategies of disciplinary power—they exert a powerful, structural control over the space and time of one's thoughts and feelings, they function as loci of relentless self-examination, and they produce in the soul of the individual a perpetual gaze of auto-surveillance. Operating as micro-forms of disciplinary power, Kafka's diary entries and letters then serve to reaffirm and deepen these relations of power.

I. LETTERS AND DIARIES AS DISCIPLINARY AND CONFESSIONAL TECHNIQUES

Disciplinary power has its origin in the organization of space and time. The early modern creation of military barracks, modern prisons, hospitals, and boarding schools symbolizes the first attempts to strategically enclose and define space according to domains of activity. The purpose of these enclosures is to organize and regulate as efficiently as possible the activity of a group of people – soldiers, factory workers, or school children. Simultaneously with the organization of space, time also becomes more rigorously controlled. During the eighteenth century, military units, factories, and schools adopted and perfected the monastic obsession with timetables: "Its [the monastery's] three great methods – establish rhythms, impose particular occupations, regulate the cycles of repetition – were soon to be found in schools, workshops and hospitals" (Foucault, 1979: 149). Moreover, in such systems, every subdivision of time has a specific activity assigned to it, and every activity has its allotted time in which it must be performed. Time penetrates the body and administers the subject's thoughts and actions.

Simultaneous with the organization of space and time is the emergence of architectural and psychological systems of surveillance. During the Enlightenment buildings were architecturally designed and built with the specific purpose of maximizing the observation of those within them and inducing in those being observed the psychological awareness that they are always being watched. Architecture is pressed into the service of power by permitting "an internal, articulated and detailed control – to render visible who are inside it; in more general terms, [it is] an architecture that would operate to transform individuals: to act on those it shelters, to provide a

hold on their conduct, to carry the effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them" (Foucault, 1979: 172). As a mode of disciplinary power, the ideal architectural design would make it possible for a single gaze to see everything constantly (Foucault, 1979: 171–173).

As forms of disciplinary, confessional technologies, letters and diary entries function as micro examples of the organization of space and time, self-examination, and auto-surveillance. As forms of strategic enclosure, the diary entry and letter represent a specific attempt to control and regulate space and time as each letter or diary entry marks off a structured, enclosed space and a temporal moment. Each letter or diary entry opens and structures the space and time for the development and expression of Kafka's ideas, emotional experiences, and relationships. For example, in an early letter written to Oskar Pollack (1903), Kafka writes, "Letter-writing is like being looped together by a rope; when we stop, the rope is broken, even if it was no more than a thread" (1977: 12). Seven years later, in a letter to Max Brod, Kafka complains, "You've forgotten me completely. You don't write me –" (1977: 63). Kafka is famous for the anxiety of space and time he experienced when waiting for a letter to arrive from Felice Bauer, or when, due to work or family obligations, he could not get to his desk to write. The organization, regulation, and experience of space and time were for Kafka deeply influenced by the discursive facticity that his life and subjectivity were enacted through the writing of his letters and diary entries.

Recording in his diary the conceptual, spatio-temporal structure and experience of a normal day, Kafka writes, "recently, when I got out of the elevator at my usual hour, it occurred to me that my life, whose days more and more repeat themselves down to the smallest details, resembles that punishment in which each pupil must according to his offense write down the same meaningless [...] sentence ten times, a hundred times or even oftener; except that in my case the punishment is given me with only this limitation: 'as many times as you can stand it'" (1965: 254). Kafka's personal and professional life was the repetition of details brought about by the rigorous control of space and time, ever present examinations and a judgmental glare. Kafka has written and rewritten the lesson of his life over and over again on the chalkboard of his body and consciousness – the lesson is who he is.

During a particularly unstable and fluid time in his life, Kafka writes, "it has become very necessary to keep a diary again. The uncertainty of my thoughts, F., the ruin in the office, the physical impossibility of writing and the inner need for it" (1965: 219). Like in the case of the hapless Officer in Kafka's "In the Penal Colony," a disciplinary "Apparatus" wrote Kafka's subjectivity and life as his soul. And he recorded these details and self-discipline in the micro-apparatus of power – his diary.

The strategies of disciplinary power, the confession, and the 'author-function' are not only recorded in Kafka's own letters and diaries, but Kafka imposed these

same dynamics on his friends and lovers. This can be seen operating through Kafka's insistence that his lovers and friends keep journals and engage in a vigilant epistle correspondence. For example, in a letter to Felice Bauer (written very early in their courtship), Kafka implores her to "just keep a little diary for me... You must record, for instance, at what time you get to the office, what you had for breakfast, what you see from your office window, what kind of work you do there, the names of your male and female friends, why you get presents, who tries to undermine your health by giving you sweets, and the thousand things of whose existence and possibilities I know nothing" (1973: 7). In another example, this time in a letter to his friend Max Brod and his wife (while they were on their honeymoon), Kafka implores them to keep a diary: "Are the two of you at least keeping a journal? If you have not yet done so, you must begin today. Sit down somewhere along the shore and together draw up an account of your trip so far, even if it takes you from morning to night. I warn you there will be war between us unless you do this" (1977: 94).

These examples clinically express and (politely and humorously) demand Kafka's desire for the total documentation of Felice, Max, and his wife's time and space. In addition, Kafka's requests and the style in which they are expressed serve as modes of observation and incipient examination, and they have the consequence of turning his friends into 'author-functions.'

II. KAFKA'S BODY, HIS FATHER, THIS SEXUALITY

As a particular discursive modality, disciplinary power is adopted by and expressed through several 'specialized' institutions throughout society, especially the family. As Foucault writes, "one day we should show how intra-familial relations, essentially in the parents-children cell, have become 'disciplined,' absorbing since the classical age external schemata, educational [...] then medical, psychiatric, psychological, which have made the family the privileged locus of emergence for the disciplinary question of the normal and the abnormal" (1979: 215-216). Foucault's quote accurately frames Kafka's now famous descriptions of his relationship with his father and the effects of this dynamic on the physical and social discursive figuration of Kafka's body and personality. Kafka's "Letter to Father" is an excellent example of the way letters are micro examples of disciplinary strategies and techniques, but also of the way Kafka's letters document the disciplinary formation of his subjectivity. In "The Letter to Father," we see a fine example of Foucault's oft-noted claim that power should be analyzed from the "bottom up" in order to see its "infinitesimal mechanisms" and identify their local and hidden force relations (1980: 99).

"I was," Kafka writes in the letter, "weighed down by your mere physical presence [...] There was I, skinny, weakly, slight; you strong, tall, broad" (1989: 120-

121). Kafka records that his father's physical domination made him fearful, shy, and physically underdeveloped. Kafka continues, "There was, for instance, the worry about my health; it began imperceptibly enough, with now and then a little anxiety about digestion, hair falling out, a spinal curvature, and so on, intensifying in innumerable gradations, it finally ended with a real illness" (1989: 152). Astonishingly, Kafka refers to a respiratory disease that he knew was psychosomatic – a respiratory disease that would later become tuberculosis. Kafka narrates the way his hypochondria became a real illness: "until finally under the strain of the superhuman effort of wanting to marry [...] blood came from the lung" (1989: 152). In this example, we see Kafka document/confess the effects of the disciplinary formation of his subjectivity through a letter, itself a micro-expression of disciplinary strategies.

Kafka's observations about his physical and mental health document the normalizing and violent inscription of his subjectivity. Following Nietzsche, Foucault observes that "[t]he body manifests the stigmata of past experience and also gives rise to desires, failings, and errors [...] The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas) [...] [power] attaches itself to the body. It inscribes itself in the nervous system, in temperament, in the digestive apparatus; it appears in faulty respiration, in improper diets, in the debilitated and prostrate body of those whose ancestors committed errors" (1977b: 147). Seen from the disciplinary perspective, Elias Canetti's observation about Kafka's sensitivity to his body takes on a deeper, more visceral meaning. Canetti writes:

He had found, in his body, an object of observation that never escaped him, which he could not slip away from. What he saw of it, and felt, was always close to him: the one could not be dissociated from the other. With his thinness as a starting point, he became unshakably convinced of his frailty... For the one certain thing was a feeling [...] of being threatened... The pains warn of dangers, they are the heralds from the adversary (1974: 42).

Kafka's body and soul became the violently marked, inscribed surface of profound conflict. By internalizing the disciplinary and normalizing expectations of masculinity conveyed through his father, Kafka becomes the object/subject/author – the 'author-function' – of his own debilitating narrative.

In addition to documenting in the "Letter" the way disciplinary power structured his relationship with his father, and the effect this had on his perception of his physical and material being, Kafka's "Letter" also documents the effect this had on the formation of his sexuality. Following the emergence of the normative social and medical sciences, and the way these institutions identify/create sexuality as an object of examination and a subject for relentless confessional documentation, it is no

coincidence that a primary theme in Kafka's diaries and letters is the question of his own sexuality.

As Foucault notes, it is in and through the development of sexuality as a "regulated and polymorphous incitement to discourse" that the modern subject is developed. Sex became something that "was administered [...] it called for management procedures, it had to be taken charge of by analytic discourses [...] sex became a police matter" (1990: 34, 24). Kafka's letters and diaries operate as a discursive and material vehicle through which Kafka tries to administer and assert control over his own body, desires, and sexuality. In the confessional space of the letters and diaries, Kafka narrates and polices the formation of his sexuality and erotic desires. We can see this dynamic play itself out in Kafka's own awareness of the weakness and limits of his physical body and sexuality, as well as his awareness that his sexuality and desires are objects of moral and social observation.

On the physical, sexual level, Kafka was aware that his physique, physical strength, and masculinity were inferior in light of the emerging, normative and scientific accounts of the healthy, strong, and virile man. Kafka believed that his body was weak, thin, emaciated – not suitable for the normal sexual expectations of life. Reflecting on the physical strength required for writing and sexual activity, Kafka writes, "Nothing can be accomplished with such a body" (1965: 124). The fact that Kafka sees a certain type of physical strength as necessary to both writing and sexual performance is not coincidental. Indeed, for Kafka, they are the same. Kafka often did not feel physically strong enough to write, and writing was for Kafka a form of sexual activity.

This critical self-examination of the physical and virile limits of his body led to Kafka's famous 'performance anxiety.' In a letter to Felice, Kafka confesses: "My real fear – surely nothing worse could be said or listened to – is that I will never be able to possess you [...] I would sit next to you and, as has happened, feel the breath and life of your body at my side, yet really be farther from you than I am now in my own room" (1973: 214). Nearing the end of his life (1922) and looking back in retrospect, Kafka writes in his diary, "What have you done with your gift of sex? It was a failure, in the end that is all that they will say" (1965: 399). By Kafka's time, the institutional-discursive sex complex became interested in tracing examples of a "sexual instinct capable of presenting constitutive anomalies, acquired deviations, infirmities or pathological processes" (Foucault, 1990: 117). As Dreyfus and Rabinow point out, sexuality "concerns hidden private pleasures, dangerous excesses of [and] for the body, secret fantasies; it came to be seen as the very essence of the individual human being and the core of personal desire" (1983: 171). In the letters and diaries we witness – in terms of observation and judgment – Kafka's self-reflexive institutionalization of his sexual fantasies, fears, and failures.

Kafka imposes upon himself a relentless self-examination conveyed through writing, which only further reinforces the practices that would shape his becoming an author. By making himself, through his letters and diaries, an object of physical, sexual, and psychological investigation and examination, Kafka *inscribes* his subjectivity in an infinite field of documentation. "The examination," Foucault writes, "introduces the individual into the field of documentation... The examination that places individuals in a field of surveillance also situates them in a network of writing, it engages them in a whole mass of documents that capture and fix them" (1979: 189). Foucault calls the "turning of real lives into writing" a new mode of descriptibility that not only produces subjects but holds them in a field of conceptual and material domination.

III. DISCIPLINARY POWER AND KAFKA'S PROFESSIONAL LIFE

One of the primary, positive functions of disciplinary power is the creation of aptitude and the production of knowledge. In his letters and diaries, Kafka documents/confesses the way disciplinary power fabricated his professional life and acknowledges both the positive and the coercive effects of disciplinary power. His education and career exhibit the same strategic duality that defined the other dimensions of his subjectivity and life – disciplinary power positively celebrates and rewards the internalization of efficiency, aptitude, and the acquisition of ever-greater 'knowledge,' while it coercively controls the body and mind by producing a 'soul' that knows it is regulated, examined, and judged.

Kafka was quite 'knowledgeable'⁵ about many things, and he was especially knowledgeable about his duties and the expectations of the Insurance Company.⁶ He was exceptionally efficient and a very valuable employee, and he even took a great deal of silent pride in being good at what he did and being respected for it. And yet, throughout his letters and diary entries there is constant scorn for the emerging bureaucracies of modern European life, and an especially vitriolic scorn for the way his position at the insurance agency steals his time and destroys his ability to write.

In an early diary entry about the insurance agency, Kafka writes, "[I]f I did not have to go there, I could live calmly for my own work and should not have to waste these six hours a day which have tormented me... In the final analysis, I know this is all just talk, the fault is mine and the office has every right to make the most definite and just demands on me. But for me in particular it is a horrible double life from which there is probably no escape but insanity" (1965: 38). Nonetheless, Kafka never doubted his constructed dependence on the office and the way it gave meaning and structure to his life. The office, Kafka writes, is "not just any old stupid institution [...] but it has been my life up to now, I cannot tear myself away from it... I can treat

it shabbily, work less than anyone else (which I do), botch the work (which I do), can in spite of it make myself important (which I do), can calmly accept as due to me the most considerate treatment imaginable in an office" (1954: 127–128).

Despite his persistent complaints about the office, "he knew that it had also helped him by giving him a hold on day-to-day life, and by according his existence some shape. However confused and inchoate his inner life, outwardly he was the punctilious, well-liked and competent senior official – he always called himself a civil servant rather than a lawyer – who went each day to the office, neatly dressed in his long coat and hat" (Murray, 2004: 341). Expressing perfectly the presence and operation of disciplinary power as it structured his soul, Kafka writes, "The uniformity, regularity, comfort and dependence of my way of life keeps me unresistingly fixed wherever I happen to be" (1965: 262). Kafka was keenly aware of the positive elements of the structure, normality, predictability, and security that disciplinary power had produced as him and for him. He simultaneously felt connected to, comforted in, and rewarded by the social and professional relations opened by disciplinary power. In a moment of confessional exaggeration, Kafka writes to his sister, Ottla, "To me the Institute is a featherbed, as heavy as it is warm. If I were to crawl out from under it, I would at once risk catching cold; the world is not heated" (1982: 63–64).

Like the disciplinary relationship between Kafka and his family, Kafka had an inescapable, collusionary relationship to the Insurance Company. In a letter to Brod written in 1921, Kafka notes that his "debt to the Institute is so enormous, so unpayable, that it can only go on increasing – there can be no other development" (1977: 287). Kafka's acknowledgement of his dependency on the Insurance Agency is suffused with a suffocating awareness that the Institution would never let him go, that it would continue to utilize and exploit his skills and expertise until his death. From 1921 until his death in 1924, despite his frequently growing absences, his worsening sickness, and his stated desire to retire early, the Institute promoted Kafka. As a highly disciplined and competent civil servant, Kafka was too valuable to the Institute. They would not let him go.

Kafka's queerly fatalistic awareness that the Insurance Institute would never let him retire because he was too useful to them, even as he was dying from tuberculosis, is a good, if extreme, example of Foucault's account of biopower:

[A] power whose task is to take charge of life needs continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms. It is no longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty, but of distributing the living in the domain of value and utility. Such a power has to qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize, rather than display itself in its murderous splendor; it does not have to draw the line that separates the enemies of the sovereign from his obedient subjects; it

effects distributions around the norm [...] what was demanded and what served as an objective was life, understood as the basic needs, man's concrete essence, the realization of his potential, a plentitude of the possible (1990: 144–145).

Even after the Insurance Institute knew of Kafka's terminal disease, it would not grant him his request to retire. Indeed, the manager of the Institute gave him a glowing review and promoted him. Kafka died a few years after his 'promotion.'

IV. RESISTING AND TRANSGRESSING THE 'AUTHOR-FUNCTION'

Foucault replaced the metaphysical subject with the effects of functions of discourse. As I have argued, several of these disciplinary, discursive functions turned Kafka into a docile, self-confessing writing machine that exhibits one modality of Foucault's account of the 'author-function.' However, given Foucault's account in which no discourse of power is ever complete, and in which all writing gives rise to the possibilities of resisting and transgressing its own boundaries, I now turn to a discussion of the way Kafka resists and re-directs the disciplinary effects of the 'author-function.' Foucault concludes his essay "What Is an Author" with a brief description of the way some authors transcend their own 'author-function' by becoming what he calls "initiators of discursive practices" (1977a: 132). I will finish the section by gesturing toward the way Foucault's early account of "initiators of discursive practice" foreshadows and gives rise to his later account of writing as resistance to power and his fully developed account of the aesthetics of existence and the art of self-creation. I will, once again, turn to Kafka's letters and diaries to illuminate Foucault's account of resistance and the aesthetics of existence – thereby documenting the way Kafka opens new styles of discourse and aesthetic subjectivity.

Foucault argues that certain authors are able to transgress and modify their subjectivity by becoming aware of their embeddedness in relations of power and writing in such a way as to re-imagine and alter the normalizing practices of the 'author-function.' "Writing," Foucault argues, "unfolds like a game that inevitably moves beyond its own rules and finally leaves them behind [...]. The essential basis of the writing is not [...] the insertion of a subject into language. Rather, it is primarily concerned with creating an opening where the writing subject endlessly disappears" (1977a: 116). In transgressing the language games and relations of power that first constituted Kafka's 'author-function', Kafka opens a new territory for a type of writing that initiates a discursive space and makes way for new expressions of the writing subject. In and through his letters and diaries, Kafka sought the erasure and disappearance of his 'disciplinary' self in the hopes of allowing something entirely new to emerge.

"I will write in spite of everything, absolutely; it is my struggle for self-preservation" (Kafka, 1965: 300). As this sentence was written in July, 1914, during what was, perhaps, the most personally difficult and creatively productive time of his life, Kafka bears witness to the presence of power and heroically declares that writing is an act of resistance. Kafka's account of writing as an act of resistance anticipates Foucault's view of the relationship between disciplinary power and resistance:

There are no relations of power without resistances; the latter are all the more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised; resistance to power does not have to come from elsewhere to be real (1980: 142).

Highlighting the role that diaries and letters can play in acts of resistance, Foucault writes, "It seems to me, that the so-called literature of the self – private diaries, narratives of the self, and so on – cannot be understood unless it is put into the general and very rich framework of these practices of the self" (2003: 122).

Kafka's consciousness of resistance began forming early in his life. In July, 1910, Kafka records in his diary that "my education has done me great harm in some respects [...] I can prove at any time that my education tried to make another person out of me than the one I became" (1965: 15, 17). The great harm his education inflicted on him is connected with the 'other' person that his disciplinary education tried to construct, the normalized son, husband, bureaucrat, and citizen. As an act of resistance, Kafka writes, "It is for the harm [...] that my educators could have done me in accordance with their intentions that I reproach them; I demand from their hands the person I now am, and since they cannot give him to me, I make of my reproach and laughter a drumbeat sounding into the world beyond" (1965: 17–18).

Despite the presence and operation of disciplinary power and education, Kafka was becoming something different. Due to the strategic space writing opens, he knows that resistance is possible because his "education had [not] penetrated into [him] as deeply as it wanted to" (1965: 19). Moreover, since his teachers are subjects who are also caught up in a dense webbing of power, Kafka knows he can't reproach them personally and he must therefore *stylize* his reproach as an act of resistance. Channeling Nietzsche, Kafka proclaims he will reproach his teachers with a laugh and a drumbeat that sounds through the familial, moral, and social relations of power. For Kafka and Foucault words are weapons. Philosophy, critique, and art are agonistic discourses pressed into the service of resistance to power.

From acts of resistance to the art of self-creation, through his letters and diaries, Kafka becomes a fully conscious 'author-function.' In "On the Genealogy of Ethics," Foucault writes, "from the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art" (1994:

110). Anticipating Foucault's provocative observation by eighty years, Kafka writes in his diary in 1913 "I am nothing but literature and can and want to be nothing else" (1965: 230). For Foucault, living life as a work of art entails three primary elements – recognizing the self/subjectivity as an aesthetic project (what Foucault calls our ethical substance), the conscious cultivation of the *techniques* and *discipline* of writing as tools and practices in the creation of one's life as art, and the teleologico-poetic view that one writes into one's death.

From the very beginning, Kafka sees himself as a writer, but not because something metaphysical is speaking to him or calling him. His desire to write should not be interpreted as emanating from the wellsprings of some deep, true self. Kafka sees himself as a writer because, like Nietzsche, he sees himself and the domain of meaning as an aesthetic experience. In a letter to Felice Bauer, Kafka writes, "If only I could write... I am consumed with the desire to do so [...] Writing is the only thing that makes my inner existence possible" (1973: 245). Later he writes to Felice again, telling her, "I can't even cope with myself, except when I am writing" (1973: 272). Writing creates and makes possible a re-imagined inner existence, and this new interiority is the alternative subjective space upon which Kafka will re-imagine his subjectivity and relation to the world. In a diary entry of August 21, 1913, he writes, "Everything that is not literature bores me and I hate it, for it disturbs me or delays me" (1965: 231).

Having briefly identified Kafka's recognition that his subjectivity must be forged in writing, I now turn to what Foucault calls the *techniques of the self*. These techniques and practices represent the specific actions Kafka took and the strategies he deployed in order to enact his aesthetic transformation. Foucault writes, "No technique, no professional skill can be acquired without exercise; neither can one learn the art of living" without cultivating the discipline necessary to enact one's care for the self (2003: 119). Kafka anticipates Foucault's observation that the Ancient Greeks and Romans developed a set of disciplines and practices that were essential to the creation of the self as a work of art. In a letter to Oskar Pollak in January, 1904, Kafka writes,

I am putting Marcus Aurelius aside, putting him reluctantly aside. I think I could not live without him now, for reading two or three maxims in Marcus Aurelius makes me more composed and more disciplined, although the book as a whole only shows a man who with prudent speech and a hard hammer and sweeping view would like to make himself into a controlled, steely, upright person... It's fine if we can use words to cover up ourselves from ourselves, but even better if we can adorn and drape ourselves with words until we have become the kind of person [that] in our hearts we wish to be (1977: 14).

In pursuit of his own self-creation and literature, Kafka turns to Marcus Aurelius for guidance. Emulating the discipline of Aurelius, and therefore learning to appreciate

the way discipline shapes and develops the techniques necessary for the art of self-creation, makes the young Kafka more composed, steady, and confident. Aurelius demonstrates to Kafka that a certain level of self-discipline is necessary to master the techniques and practices of writing and to live one's art of life.

Kafka's cultivation of the *techniques* and *discipline* of writing as practices of self-formation is an excellent example of Foucault's claim about the reversibility of disciplinary power and technologies. Through his letters and diaries, Kafka reverses the strategies of disciplinary power and redirects them toward the practice of self-creation. Kafka would come to approach his diaries and letters in the same way he did his literature. Nicholas Murray writes, "It is characteristic of Kafka that a volume of diaries should wield the axe as much as a fictional work. [...] [T]here is a strong case for treating his own volumes of letters and diaries as works written with the creative energy and imaginative wholeness of works of art" (2004: 52). Kafka's epistolary correspondences and diaries constitute the principal *technique* he used to cultivate his discipline as a writer and move in the direction of his own aesthetic subjectivity. Reiner Stach notes:

The letter had become expression in the emphatic sense, a means of developing subjectivity and expressing it to the outside world...

The letter can be an expression of beleaguered, uncertain subjectivity, but the act of expression makes it less certain. The diffuse self struggling to understand itself... Diary entries, like letters, play a determining role for the writer; they are a means of self-direction and self-formation... Kafka is a perfect example of why the wavering, insecure subject who requires great effort to define himself and can explain himself only at an enormous psychological cost places great hope in the self-healing power of the letter and keeps talking to himself about it (2005: 152–153).

Writing daily journal entries and letters allowed Kafka to come to grips with what Foucault calls the decentered, aesthetic self. Writing these multiple selves into his letters and diary entries allows Kafka to recreate and assert some power over the diffuse nature of his self and begin the process of directing them in pursuit of self-creation. In a moment of intense, self-reflexive awareness of the role his diary plays in the *creation and living* of his life, Kafka writes, "I won't give up the diary again. I must hold on here, for it is only here that I can" (1965: 26). Nicholas Murray claims that Kafka consciously pursues the project of inventing himself through language (2004: 57). Nietzsche calls the process of forging the multiple selves into a coherent, creative personality *style*. In forging a unique *style* through writing, Kafka becomes what Foucault calls an initiator of discourse, and Kafka's *style* makes possible the opening of numerous 'transdiscursive' possibilities (1977a: 131).

I now turn to what Foucault calls the *telos* of the aesthetics of existence and how it finds expression in Kafka's self-creation as an 'author-function.' When one's *telos* is the creation of the self as a work of art, one must write into one's death. Because the creation of the self as an artistic experiment is always underway, often fragmentary, and never complete, one is always behind oneself. Kafka recognized that the project of living one's life as an aesthetic experience could never be completed, just written and rewritten until death: "In the Great Account of my life, it is still reckoned as if I were first beginning tomorrow, and in the meantime it is all over with me" (1965: 413–414). The *telos* of life as an aesthetic experience unfolds in an ecstatic space of self-creation and nothingness.

Writing to Max Brod in 1922, Kafka identifies the fear of death associated with his life as literature:

[The writer] has a terrible fear of dying because he has not yet lived... What is essential in life is only to forgo complacency, to move into the house instead of admiring it and hanging garlands around it... To make oneself finer and more savory?

What I have play acted is really going to happen. I have not bought myself off by my writing. I died my whole life long and now I will really die... Of course the writer in me will die right away, since such a figure has no base, no substance, is less than dust. He is only barely possible in the broil of earthly life, is only a construct of sensuality (1977: 334).

Kafka always felt that he had never adequately expressed what was in his heart and mind. This made him fear that he had not quite lived enough. On one hand, this is true, and must be true given the exigencies of life as literature. One always dies with something else to say. And yet, on the other hand, it can be said that Kafka must have transcended this fear about writing and dying because few other modern writers have so completely 'moved into their own house.' Kafka wrote his way home and into death. In living his life as literature and writing his way into death, Kafka has become immortal.

CONCLUSION: SACRIFICIAL WRITING, LITERARY LIFE

In an early letter to Brod (1902), Kafka writes, "Prague doesn't let go. Either of us. This old crone has claws. One has to yield, or else" (1977: 5). Toward the end of his life, in a letter to Milena, Kafka bears witness to the darker implications of disciplinary power: "I don't know its inner laws," Kafka writes, "I know only its hand at my throat, and this is really *the most terrible thing I've ever experienced or could experience*" (1954: 106). What Kafka is describing is the always-already moving network of conceptual and material force relations, the webbing of disciplinary power in and through

which he has been constituted. He does not "know its inner laws" because the existence-as-effect-of-power he is experiencing and *re-writing* as a form of confessional technology is not a metaphysical idea or possession. Seen from a genealogical perspective, Kafka's letters and diaries not only represent an Enlightenment mode of confession that seeks the Truth, but they also simultaneously reveal how our commitment to these modes of self-examination, observation, and surveillance only further deepens our entanglement in the themes and strategies of disciplinary power.

In addition, in so far that the practice of confession seeks a Truth that must forever be deferred, it gives rise to an endless process of writing and re-writing. It creates a vast, unending incitation to write, to contribute to the discursive and disciplinary description and documentation of our lives. It becomes a self-perpetuating machine of self-writing. It turns all of us into *authors*. Moreover, the fact that Kafka's letters and diaries are public not only reinforces the historico-discursive aspect of the 'author-function,' but it also made Kafka the object of perhaps the most extraordinary form of psychological, physico-sexual, and moral observation and judgment in human history. Throughout his life Kafka wished to be invisible, but he knows that such invisibility is impossible. As a product of disciplinary power and a self-confessing writing machine, Kafka makes himself visible to himself and us. In doing so, he enacts one modality of Foucault's account of the 'author-function.'

However, Kafka also exhibits Foucault's account of a writer with an 'author-function' that becomes aware of his own entanglement in the webbing of power relations and consciously writes his self as an aesthetic creation. Foucault observes that "writing is now linked to sacrifice and to the sacrifice of life itself; it is a voluntary obliteration of the self that does not require representation in books because it takes place in the everyday existence of the writer. Where a work had the duty of creating immortality, it now attains the right to kill, to become the murderer of its author. Flaubert, Proust, and Kafka are obvious examples of this reversal" (1977a: 117). In a letter to Felice Bauer in 1913, Kafka writes, "The novel is me, my stories are me" (1973: 138). Kafka wrote and lived his life as literature.

ENDNOTES

¹ In "What Is an Author," Foucault does not identify the confessional practices of writing diaries and letters as a specific technology that contributes to the constitution of subjects and turns subjects into self-writing 'author-functions.' This may be due to the fact that the essay was written prior to Foucault's analysis of the emergence of confession and its broader normative social and political functions that he develops in *The History of Sexuality*.

² Readers familiar with Foucault's account of disciplinary power, discourse, and the formation of subjectivity may move directly to Section III.

³ Throughout his career, Foucault deftly avoided articulating a 'theory' of power. The goal, Foucault writes, "is to move less toward a 'theory' of power than towards an 'analytics' of power: that is, toward a defi-

dition of the specific domain formed by relations of power, and toward a determination of the instruments that will make possible its analysis" (1990: 82).

⁴ When Foucault wrote "What Is an Author," he had not yet developed the analysis that would make the 'author-function' universal. In the essay, he claims, "the 'author-function' is not universal or constant in all discourses" (1977a: 125). The universalization of the 'author-function' would come with the analysis, the deployment, and the ubiquity of confession in *The History of Sexuality*.

⁵ For a comprehensive discussion of Kafka's academic and intellectual background and training, see Heidsieck (2005).

⁶ For an account of the expertise Kafka developed as an official at the Insurance Institute, see Robertson (1985: 41).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Canetti, Elias (1974), *Kafka's Other Trial*, trans. Christopher Middleton, London: Penguin Classics.
- Dreyfus, H.L and Paul Rabinow (1983), *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Foucault, Michel (1970), *The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences*, trans. Alan Sheridan, New York: Random House.
- Foucault, Michel (1977a), 'What Is an Author?', in Donald F. Bouchard (ed.) *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Foucault, Michel (1977b), 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', in Donald F. Bouchard (ed.) *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Foucault, Michel (1979), *Discipline and Punish*, trans. Alan Sheridan, New York: Vintage Books.
- Foucault, Michel (1980), 'Power and Strategies', in Colin Gordon (ed.) *Power/Knowledge*, New York: Pantheon.
- Foucault, Michel (1990), *History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Volume 1*, trans. Robert Hurley, New York: Vintage Books.
- Foucault, Michel (2003), 'The Subject and Power', in Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose (eds.) *The Essential Foucault*, New York: The New Press.
- Foucault, Michel (2007), 'What Is Enlightenment?' (trans. Catherine Porter), in Sylvere Lotringer (ed.) *The Politics of Truth*, Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).
- Gooden, C. (1977), 'Points of Departure', in Angel Flores (ed.) *The Kafka Debate*, New York: Gordian Press.
- Hawes, James (2010), *Excavating Kafka*, London: Quercus.
- Heidsieck, Arnold (2005), *The Intellectual Contexts of Kafka's Fiction: Philosophy, Law, Religion*, Columbia: Camden House, Inc.
- Kafka, Franz (1954), *Letters to Milena*, trans. Tania and James Stern, New York, Schocken Books.
- Kafka, Franz (1965), *The Diaries of Franz Kafka: 1910-1923*, New York: Schocken Books.
- Kafka, Franz. (1973), *Letters to Felice*, trans. James Stern and Elisabeth Duckworth, New York: Schocken Books.
- Kafka, Franz (1977), *Letters to Friends, Family, and Editors*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston, New York: Schocken Books.

- Kafka, Franz (1982), *Letters to Ottila and Family*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston, New York: Schocken Books.
- Kafka, Franz (1989), 'Letter to Father', in *Franz Kafka: The Sons*, New York: Schocken Books.
- Lyotard, Jean-Francois (1984), *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press.
- Murray, Nicholas (2004), *Kafka: A Biography*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Pasley, Malcolm (1989), 'The Act of Writing and the Genesis of the Text', in Mark Anderson (ed.) *Reading Kafka: Prague, Politics, and the Fin de Siecle*, New York: Schocken Books.
- Preece, Julian (2002), 'The Letters and Diaries', in *The Cambridge Companion to Kafka*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Robertson, Ritchie (1985), *Kafka: Judaism, Politics, and Literature*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Spector, Scott (2000), *Prague Territories: National Conflict and Cultural Innovation in Franz Kafka's Fin De Siecle*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Stach, Reiner (2005), *Kafka: The Decisive Years*, New York: Harcourt.

History, Nationalism and Democracy: Myth and Narrative in Viktor Orbán's 'Illiberal Hungary'

MICHAEL TOOMEY

University of Limerick, Ireland

Abstract: This article studies the relationship between nationalistic discourse and Hungary's 'illiberal turn' from the election of Viktor Orbán's Fidesz party in the 2010 Hungarian elections up until 2015. It begins by examining the arguments of authors such as Jeffrey Alexander, Quentin Skinner, and Tapio Juntunen in order to establish a theoretical framework for how political actors construct and manipulate historical myths for their own political purposes. It then goes on to examine how Orbán specifically uses and constructs narratives surrounding the Treaty of Trianon and Miklós Horthy, the interwar leader of Hungary. This article argues that in addition to allowing Orbán to build a defensive shield against criticism from international and domestic actors, these interpretations of Hungarian history restore to prominence the interwar-era 'populist-urbanist' cleavage, and allow Orbán to create an exclusionary image of Hungarian nationalism. Thus, this serves to legitimize Orbán and Fidesz, while denying opposition parties from both the right and the left the opportunity to stake claims to being true representatives of the Hungarian people.

Keywords: Fidesz, Hungary, nationalism, Trianon, Horthy, Orban

HISTORICAL AND NATIONALIST NARRATIVES IN POST-2010 HUNGARY

Since the victory of Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party in the 2010 Parliamentary elections, much academic attention has been focused on Hungary's 'illiberal turn' and its consequences for democracy in the country. The increasingly authoritarian tendencies there have been accompanied by a notable intensification of nationalistic sentiment on the part of Orbán and many of his fellow party members, and facilitated by politicized retellings of Hungary's past (particularly as they relate to the country's experiences during the interwar period and the years prior to the country's occupation by Nazi Germany in March 1944). This surge has manifested itself in a number of policy initiatives, but most visibly in the cases of the creation of the Hungarian Citizenship Law in 2011 (which extended the possibility of citizenship to any Hungarian-speaking descendant of Hungarian citizens who lived within the coun-

try's pre-1920 borders) and the construction of a controversial statue in Budapest's Szabadság Tér (Freedom Square) commemorating "all the victims" of the "German occupation" of Hungary during the Second World War (e.g. Euractiv, 2014).

In some ways, this may be seen as nothing new, as politicized historicist narratives and symbolic politics have long been associated with Hungarian politics. Throughout the 20th Century, periods of regime change in the country were marked by the creation of new political identities and historical 'truths' which were always in line with the respective new government's ideological perspective, a dynamic that continued following the country's transition to democracy in the early 1990s (Greskovits, 2012: 751). In this vein, for many years, Orbán and his party have at least partially relied upon their elaboration and dissemination of particular historical understandings and narratives as a political tool. An example of this could be witnessed in their construction of metaphorical associations between the 2006 anti-government protests that occurred in Budapest and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution (Oltay, 2013: 165). In addition, they adopted a 'victim discourse' in the late 2000s and early 2010s which sought to explain Hungarian history as being a series of (externally imposed) disasters. This then allowed for the framing of the introduction of a new constitution for the country in 2012 as part of a more comprehensive and conclusive reckoning with the legacy of Soviet communism than the one that had initially taken place after the democratization in the early 1990s (Kovács and Mindler-Steiner, 2015: 54; Oltay, 2013: 14).

Between 2010 and 2015, however, Hungary's historical politicization has tended to revolve around Miklós Horthy (Hungary's interwar – and wartime – leader) and the Treaty of Trianon, the peace settlement Hungary signed with the Allies following its defeat (as part of Austria-Hungary) in World War I. This is most visibly, but not only, represented in initiatives such as the aforementioned Citizenship Law and the Szabadság Tér statue, and it is part of a 'reconnection' on the part of Orbán with Hungary's pre-communist past (Rupnik, 2012: 135–136).¹ This approach recalls and reconstructs the country's 'urbanist-populist' cleavage, a crucial dynamic in the interwar years which separated the country into two camps: one, based in Budapest, which was composed of liberal, socialist, and Jewish elites, and the other, which was made up of the 'true' Hungarians of the countryside and the peasantry (Gerner, 2006: 101).

What is unique about this contemporary approach is its 'parachronistic' character: it retrospectively makes the assumption that the entire Hungarian 'nation' suffered (and continues to suffer) a collective cultural trauma as a result of the Trianon settlement, and it also involves a construction of Horthy as a 'predecessor' to Orbán in his status as a leader who sought to redress this trauma. This served several purposes for Orbán. It has allowed him to outflank political opponents (such as the Movement for a Better Hungary, also known as Jobbik) that were previously per-

ceived to be further to the right on the political spectrum (although perhaps this perception is no longer the case) (Schultheis, 2018; Toth, 2018). It delegitimizes any internal or external opposition to himself and his party's rule, since the opposition is then perceived as being treacherous to the Hungarian nation. Most importantly, it allows Orbán to construct an exclusivist understanding of the Hungarian nation, which renders him and his party the sole representatives of 'true' Hungarians, and his political opponents as treacherous usurpers. In exploring these issues, this article addresses the following research questions:

- *How are narratives and discourses surrounding the Treaty of Trianon and Miklos Horthy constructed in modern Hungary?*
- *How do these narratives and discourses inform and shape the political strategies and successes of Viktor Orbán and Fidesz?*

The article begins by establishing the analytical and methodological framework through which these questions are explored in it. This framework is substantially based on Jeffrey Alexander's (2004; 2012) theories surrounding the construction and elaboration of 'cultural traumas', but also integrates literature on the politics of history and the application of parachronistic and anachronistic viewpoints in the establishment of historical myths, narratives, metaphors, and analogies. Moving on from this, the article will then discuss the specificities and uniqueness of the roles played by the 'Horthy' and 'Trianon' discourses in contemporary Hungarian politics, the reasons for their particular prominence following the 2010 parliamentary elections, and their relationship with previous myths and narratives promulgated by Orbán. Finally, it will conclude by discussing the implications these particular constructions of history have for Hungary's 'illiberal turn', and how they function to facilitate Orbán's continued dominance over the country's political scene.

'TRAUMA', NARRATIVE, AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY AND HISTORICITY

One of the primary objectives of this paper is to unpack and explain the ways in which national 'traumas' can potentially contribute to the construction of politically useful myths and narratives. A trauma can be defined as being an occurrence whereby a social group believes that they have been the victim of a traumatic event which has left deep, significant impacts upon the collective psyche of the group, which last into perpetuity (Alexander, 2004: 1). According to Sztompka, for a cultural trauma to develop amongst a given society, it must necessarily have experienced a social change which contains four key characteristics: that the change occurred rapidly and suddenly, that it was substantive and had a broad scope affecting a swathe of members of the affected community, that it was caused exogenously and not (or at least not knowingly) by the community itself, and that it was experienced as being unexpected, unpleasant, repulsive, and/or shocking (Sztompka, 2000a: 452). Sz-

tompka describes a bottom-up process through which a societal or cultural trauma is elaborated and realized. According to this approach, cultural traumas...

[...] appear only when people start to be aware of [their] common plight, perceive the similarity of their situation with that of others, [and] define it as shared. They start to talk about it, exchange observations and experiences, gossips and rumors, formulate diagnoses and myths, identify causes or villains, seek for conspiracies, decide to do something about it, envisage coping methods. They debate, even quarrel and fight among themselves about all this. Those debates reach the public arena, are taken by the media, expressed in literature, art, movies [...] (Sztompka, 2000b: 279–280).

The existence of a trauma within any society, however, is never an indisputable or self-evident historical or social fact, and a particular event cannot simply be assumed to be traumatic. According to Alexander, when one considers social systems, “[...] societies can experience massive disruptions that do not become traumatic [...] for traumas to emerge at the level of the collectivity, social crises must become cultural crises” (Alexander, 2012: 15). According to Alexander, collective cultural traumas are not connected directly to ‘traumatic’ events, as events in and of themselves are not necessarily traumatic: instead, they are socially constructed based on the perceptions of the affected society before, during, and/or after the event, and may indeed be entirely imagined (Alexander, 2004: 8). Additionally, he argues that these ‘traumas’ are constructed and given meaning by “carrier groups”,² who articulate the nature and significance of national traumas in pursuit of their own ideals and material interests (Ibid.: 11–12).

In order for the idea that the community in question has been traumatized to be accepted by its constituent members, the carrier groups need to effectively engage in the construction of complex (and potentially divisive and polarizing) symbolic narratives and stories (Alexander, 2012: 17). As such, ‘trauma’ is as much a function of particular constructions of a society’s history as it is a function of any particular material historical fact, and in contrast to Sztompka’s understanding of how cultural traumas emerge, its realization may be elite-driven as much as it may be grassroots-driven. In this sense, the existence of a cultural trauma may just as easily reflect the perspectives, experiences, and priorities of the carrier or elite group in question, as it does the broader society from which the carrier group is drawn. As this process is inherently subject to interpretation, it thus becomes necessary to consider the mechanisms through which history may be constructed and historical narratives given meaning.

Even at their most banal level, the manner in which historical myths and narratives are constructed and interpreted, and the lessons, meanings, and understandings de-

rived from them, are crucial to the ways in which the politics of a given state or organization may be shaped. This is because these depictions not only shape the way in which the members of a given community may understand and perceive the present, but they can also subsequently shape the identities and inform the future behaviours of these actors and alter perceptions of what actions and relations are considered acceptable and unacceptable (Browning, 2002: 48). Bliesemann de Guevara agrees with this, arguing that "...myths are one of the structuring elements of broader discourses which construct political problems and legitimate policy solutions" (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2016: 19). She goes on to state that there are four major types of socio-political functions of historical myths: determining functions, meaning the use of myths to distort language and knowledge in the service of maintaining or imposing a given hierarchical order; enabling functions, meaning the coping strategies used by organizations for dealing with societal influences or dilemmas; naturalizing functions, which are the ways in which certain myths structure knowledge in such a way that the myth is 'naturalized', and that subsequently can allow for the crystallization of certain hierarchical structures; and constituting functions, meaning the construction of significance and meaning through narratives and paradigms which themselves drive the construction of what people consider 'knowledge' (ibid.: 32–36).

There is no one 'correct' or 'true' way for historical research to be carried out, and different modes of analysis serve various purposes and functions, with no necessary inherent hierarchy of appropriateness amongst them (Hobson and Lawson, 2008: 416–417). If this is the case, then it is also possible to state that there is no one necessary way in which to elaborate and explain the findings and stories. However, it is crucial to understand at the same time that historical research is often fraught with inaccuracies, flawed assumptions, and incorrect, anachronistic, or parachronistic readings of a given actor's intentions or objectives. Skinner, for instance, highlights the fact that historical and historicist research is filled with muddled logic and factual errors, and that attempts to overcome these problems by, for instance, divorcing events and pieces of literature from their specific social context can lead to anachronistic mistakes whereby historians apply their own expectations and values to those of the actors they are interpreting (Skinner, 1969: 4–5, 12). As such, he argues that "perennial problems" do not exist in philosophy (or elsewhere), and that "...there are only individual answers to individual questions... there is in consequence simply no hope of seeking the point of studying the history of ideas in the attempt to learn directly from the classic authors by focusing on their attempted answers to supposedly timeless questions" (ibid.: 50).

Joseph Femia, while broadly agreeing with Skinner's arguments surrounding the potential pitfalls of historical and historicist research, disagrees with his broader points about the temporal specificity of historical events. He argues that while historicism should aim to ensure that past events are not completely ripped away from

the social context in which they transpired, this does not mean that historical ideas need to be straitjacketed in the past, with no application or relevance to modern events (Femia, 1981: 126–127). He goes on to note that political ideas are crucially dependent on given historical and/or philosophical traditions for their genesis and development, and are rarely results of completely original thought (*ibid.*: 134). While this may indeed be the case, Skinner’s arguments about the need to properly contextualize historical events and historical research still hold. As Tapio Juntunen points out, historical myths function through their replacement of historical narratives that may or may not be deeply contextual and specific to a specific period in time with overgeneralized universal meta-narratives (Juntunen, 2017: 62–63). Subsequently, this can result in observers seeing “the world as more unchanging than it is,” and can lead to the lessons drawn from these overgeneralized narratives being applied to cases and events that are only superficially, or that are not at all, similar (*ibid.*). Specifically, this can lead to ‘parachronistic’ errors, which simplify the intricacies of past events and discard important elements of these events in order to shoehorn them into palatable frameworks that can easily serve the interests and perspectives of the present, regardless of whether or not they have anything in common with the current situation (*ibid.*: 71).

An analysis of the literature on this subject indicates that many of the authors seem focused on the issue of honest mistakes made in the process of applying historical metaphors or analogies to present-day problems. However, we must also be careful to note that the construction of some political ideas may indeed be knowingly based on inaccurate or even false readings of historical traditions. In such cases, these ‘mistakes’ may be intentionally made in the construction of politically favourable myths and narratives. Even where they are not being made intentionally, and where the elaborator of the flawed narrative may genuinely be seeking to render an ‘honest’ account of history, having a vested interest in a narrative being interpreted in a certain way can lead to errors being ignored or glossed over. Political concerns and imperatives often exist in tension with the examination and discussion of historical subjects (Lazaroms and Gioielli, 2012: 656). When we combine this with our previous discussion of the way in which cultural and social traumas are constructed through the elaboration of historical narratives (as opposed to existing as a matter of fact), it highlights the importance of understanding the manner through which these discussions and discourses are established, and of understanding the political imperatives informing their establishment.

CONSTRUCTING TRAUMA, TRAGEDY AND (A) SAVIOUR(S): THE TRIANON AND HORTHY DISCOURSES IN ORBÁN’S HUNGARY

At this point, this paper moves on to discussing the ways in which Fidesz (and their leader, Viktor Orbán) constructed and employed historical myths and narratives in

the period between 2010 and 2015, and the political purposes these myths and narratives served. During this time, Fidesz's use of historical myths and analogies was primarily centred on events that occurred in the country during the interwar period, and specifically on the Treaty of Trianon and the subsequent rule of Miklós Horthy. It should not be a controversial statement to say that the Treaty of Trianon was one of the most important events, and Horthy (symbolically, at least) one of the most important figures, in Hungarian history: the Trianon settlement led to the creation of the modern territorial borders of the Hungarian state, while Horthy was the head of state for almost the entirety of one of the most tumultuous periods in the country's history.

However, the broader significance of each arguably lay in what they symbolized. Trianon, for many Hungarians (both then and now), represented the humiliation of their nation, marked the definitive end of the Kingdom of Hungary, and created an enduring perception amongst nationalist circles that Hungary had been uniquely hard done by the post-WWI settlement, and by the foreign powers that imposed it (Traub, 2015). Meanwhile, although Horthy was Hungary's head of state from 1920 until 1944, he was not the only figure of power in the country; oftentimes, actors such as his Prime Ministers, István Bethlen, Gyula Gömbös, and Pál Teleki, would take more decisive roles in decision-making processes (Molnár, 2001: 287). However, an intense propaganda campaign built around him during this time allowed for the construction of an image of him as the heroic military saviour of the nation, who would seek to bring about a restitution of the 'injustices' wrought upon the country at Trianon, and thus restore the nation's honour and glory. This interpretation would eventually become dominant in the country from the early 1920s until 1940, and served an important role in legitimating the interwar regime (Romsics, 2009: 98–99; Turbucz, 2014: 11).

Official statements relating to a possible re-visitation of the Trianon settlement have been a common theme of Viktor Orbán's career, at least since his first rise to the Prime Minister's office in 1998. Throughout the period between the 1998 and 2006 elections, Orbán repeatedly irked neighbouring countries (while receiving acclaim from nationalist groups amongst the Hungarian diaspora) for his advocacy of a 'cultural and social reunification' with ethnic Hungarian communities in neighbouring countries, and his references to Transylvania being "part of Hungary's living space in the Carpathian Basin" (The Economist, 2002; British Broadcasting Corporation, 2000; The American Hungarian Federation, 2004). On the other hand, positive references to Horthy are a relatively new development, and as late as 2013, Horthy was largely being publicly commemorated only by those on the extreme right of the country's political spectrum, and particularly by supporters of the Jobbik party.³ Since then, however, Orbán's approach towards Horthy subtly became more positive. This was initially marked by his adoption of a non-committal and even

conciliatory attitude towards the erection of statues of Horthy in the towns of Kereki and Csokako in 2012, and the unveiling of a Horthy commemorative plaque in the city of Debrecen in the same year (Dempsey, 2012; Verseck, 2012; Schleifer, 2014). This was followed by his more active approach to the re-visitation of Horthy's legacy with the 2014 installation of the 'Memorial to the Victims of German Occupation' in Szabadság Tér in Budapest, and his even more favourable attitude toward the interwar Regent in the subsequent year.⁴

Trianon: Parachronistically Constructing a Collective Trauma

Following Hungary's defeat in World War I, the country's political establishment underwent a dramatic upheaval which subsequently led to the emergence of its first democratic political system under the premiership of Mihály Károlyi (Romsics, 1999: 90). This new government sought to allay the various ethnic divisions within the country which had been reinforced by the war through the creation of constitutional guarantees of political representation and autonomy and, in so doing, to at least somewhat protect the territorial integrity of the Hungarian state. The Károlyi administration's capacity to implement these reforms (along with other pressing social reforms) soon began to creak under the weight of an impending economic collapse, and the territorial demands of the neighbouring regimes in Serbia, Czechoslovakia and Romania (*ibid.*: 91–95). Indeed, according to Kontler, as early as January 1919, the democratic Hungary had already effectively lost control of some 50% of its pre-WWI territory and population (Kontler, 2002: 330).

The subsequent agreement of the Treaty of Trianon one year later saw these losses confirmed and even expanded. In total, almost three-quarters of the territory of pre-war Hungary and two-thirds of its population were ceded to the newly independent states of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and also to Romania. These territories, whilst predominantly populated by the respective majority ethnic groups of the states they were awarded to, also contained large Hungarian populations, who found themselves as minorities in the new states. This perceived loss of territory and population is widely thought to have contributed to the undermining of progressive and liberal democratic elements in the interwar Hungarian society, and a consequent growth in support for revanchist and radical populist platforms (on both the right and the left) in the following months and years (Kontler, 2002: 332; Ormos, 2007: 20, 23). This subsequently led to the emergence of a brief left-wing regime in the country led by Béla Kun, which fought a war against Czechoslovakia and Romania in order to recoup Hungary's territorial losses. The emergence of this Soviet republic in Central Europe alarmed the attendees of the Paris Peace Conference, who in turn provided support to the Romanian and Czechoslovak armies to turn back the Hungarian advance, and so consolidated the new borders (Romsics, 1999: 106).

In the ensuing years, the reasons for why Trianon occurred started to be of particular relevance to Hungarians, with the subsequent interpretation of the events being that they were not just a punishment for Hungary's defeat in WWI, but also a result of the emergence of Kun's short-lived socialist republic. Thus, during the interwar years, Jews, socialists, and liberal or progressive democratic politicians (who were all associated with the various governments during the period of the Trianon negotiations) often received blame for the excoriating terms of the treaty (Gerner, 2006: 98). Deriving from this, a cleavage emerged in Hungarian society between the so-called 'urbanists' and 'populists'. The 'urbanists' were considered to be made up of a cohort of liberal, socialist, and Jewish elites, primarily based in Budapest and other large population centres, while the 'populists' were composed of the 'true' Hungarians of the smaller towns and villages, and the rural countryside, and of the peasantry (ibid.: 101). In addition, the 'urbanists' were perceived as having a Western European identity, while the 'populists' (at least according to several key intellectuals and public figures associated with this group) had a more 'Magyar', Asiatic and Turanian identity or, at the very least, an identity that was neither fully 'western' nor 'eastern' (Esbenshade, 2014: 179–180).

It is certainly true that Hungarian society has been, and continues to be, deeply affected by Trianon. Both Kristian Gerner and Jan-Werner Mueller, for instance, have argued that the country has an abiding "obsession" with, and a sense of resentment resulting from, this period in its history (Gerner, 2006: 98; Mueller, 2011: 7). The terms of the Trianon settlement are commonly believed by Hungarian nationalists to be a unique injustice suffered by the nation.⁵ However, the extent to which Trianon is a trauma 'carried' by the grassroots of Hungarian society is debated. Krisztián Ungváry argues that the legacy of Trianon remains crucial as it led to a situation whereby Hungarians who lived outside of the state's new borders were forcibly assimilated into the majority cultures of their new states, and that it is this, along with the subsequent inequality suffered by these Hungarians, that perpetuates the 'trauma' of Trianon; on the other hand, Éva Kovacs contests the idea that Hungarians are necessarily traumatized by the legacy of Trianon, arguing that the matter is no longer truly relevant to the lives of Hungarians, and that it exists purely in the country's cultural memory (Laczó, 2011). Likewise, Gabor Egry opposes Ungváry's position by arguing that Hungarians that found themselves living outside of Hungary's borders after 1920 were neither universally victimized by the authorities in their new countries nor universally accepted by nationals of the 'new' Hungary, and that the extent of the trauma of Trianon was thus unclear, even in the immediate aftermath of the settlement (Egry, 2012). Thus, while the sheer presence of a debate on the issue shows that Trianon retains an influence on Hungarian discourses surrounding nationality and democracy in the modern era, the degree to which the elaboration of the cultural trauma associated with it continues to be a bottom-up

process (in the manner described by Sztompka [2000b]) in the modern era is limited, and it is dependent upon the actions of elite 'carriers' for much of its development.

It is with this in mind, then, that the significance of Viktor Orbán and Fidesz as the carriers of the Trianon trauma becomes even greater. Throughout much of his political career, Orbán's messages have been based on the concept of a 'national unification' project which would seek to somehow redress the Trianon Treaty (Bozóki, 2011: 649). Upon returning to power in 2010, Orbán has been able to deliver tangible results in this regard through his introduction of legislation such as the previously-mentioned Citizenship Law, and the creation of a 'National Unity Day'⁶ commemorating the country's perceived territorial losses in 1920. Throughout this time, he and his fellow party members have been at pains to stress the linkages between the law, the Unity Day and Trianon. For instance, the proponents of the bill that eventually led to the creation of the National Unity Day stated the following as justification for the legislation:

The Treaty of Trianon signed on June 4, 1920 left an indelible, yet to this day unresolved mark on the consciousness of the peoples of Central Europe, for generations influencing directly or indirectly political and historical events in the region... while for some countries Trianon meant the realization of their aspiration to a national identity and as such was a progressive event, for Hungarians it was the greatest tragedy of the 20th century. The national remembrance and the interest of promoting a common future for the peoples of the Carpathian Basin vindicating European values, gives us the task of understanding and resolving the issues brought up by the decisions taken at Trianon. At the same time, it gives us the opportunity to prove that, despite a historic tragedy, the Hungarian nation, nurtured by her culture and language, is capable of national renewal and the solution of her historic tasks (Kövér and Semjén, 2010).

The introduction of the Citizenship Law and the creation of the National Unity Day serve an important purpose. They either imply the *existence* of a national trauma surrounding Trianon, or attempt to retroactively construct such a trauma (almost as if the argument was that if a 'solution' was found, then surely there must have been a problem that existed which necessitated this solution in the first place). Fidesz and Orbán thus act through these policies and discourses as clear examples of Alexander's (2012) 'carrier groups' for the elaboration and articulation of the Hungarian cultural 'trauma' surrounding Trianon.

This elaboration and articulation of trauma serves immediate political goals for them, as they lend credence to Fidesz's nationalistic credentials (without the implementation of which, the party's adoption of nationalistic discourse would seem hol-

low and lack credibility). In addition, it allows Fidesz (and Orbán specifically) to be presented as the 'saviours' of the Hungarian nation who are bringing restitution to the country for its losses suffered during the 20th Century, and as its defenders against any attempt to inflict a 'second Trianon' upon the populace. Indeed, references by Fidesz representatives and other right-wing figures to the need to defend Hungary against a recurrence of this 'disaster' began to emerge following the onset of the European migration crisis towards the end of 2015, and have increased in frequency in the ensuing years.⁷ The Orbán regime has made repeated connections to this topic through issues relating to control of borders, self-determination and an unwillingness to bow to the demands of outsiders ('Brussels' and 'liberal' Western Europeans) in this regard.

The Orbán regime's construction and use of the trauma of Trianon has not been confined to the Citizenship Law and the National Unity Day. Following the annexation of Crimea by Russia in early 2014 and the outbreak of the separatist conflict in Eastern Ukraine, and coming immediately in the wake of his victory in the 2014 Hungarian parliamentary elections, Orbán gave a speech wherein he demanded that ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine be given autonomy, and that they be allowed to avail themselves of a dual citizenship (Gardner, 2014; Zalan, 2014). Elaborating on this point, he argued that "...the Hungarian issue has been unresolved since the Second World War", and stated that his government would henceforth be pursuing these concessions for Hungarians throughout the Carpathian Basin (a region that encompasses parts of Slovakia, Ukraine, Serbia, and Croatia, along with Hungary) (Zalan, 2014). These demands were swiftly rejected by the Ukrainian government, and did not receive much consideration from other governments in the region either. Given the curt treatment of these comments, and the lack of any subsequent escalation of actions by the Hungarian government, it is likely that these comments were not made with the intention of being taken fully seriously outside of Hungary. Instead, their intended audience was more likely a domestic one.⁸ Comments such as these bolster the idea of a Hungarian cultural trauma, and of the urgent necessity of resolving this trauma, and contribute to the creation of an image amongst the Hungarian population of Viktor Orbán as a 'tragic' national saviour who is engaged in an earnest, but possibly futile, effort to redress the 'injustices' inflicted upon the nation at Trianon.

This approach is historically careless and presumptuous, as it asserts that revising or otherwise rectifying Trianon is an issue which is of pressing concern for Hungarian people in the 21st Century. It is parachronistic, as it uses a simplified understanding of Hungarian history, as past events are ripped from their context (the idea that the Hungarian 'nation' was necessarily 'traumatized' by the Trianon treaty) to serve the interests of present day actors and activities. However, it is also an effective and successful strategy, as it restores to modern day relevance the 'populist-ur-

banist' cleavage, and situates Fidesz firmly on the side of the populists. As such, any domestic opposition to their rule can be dismissed as being made up of the modern descendants of the feckless and corrupt urbanists, whose incompetence was responsible for the infliction of the trauma of Trianon on the pure, uncorrupt populists. Thus, when the party attacks particular civil society organizations as being agents of 'meddling foreigners' and tries to threaten their access to funding (Dunai and Koranyi, 2014; Novak, 2014), or when Orbán describes Brussels as "the new Moscow" and alleges that the EU is trying to colonize Hungary (Deutsche Welle, 2013), such statements carry greater weight amongst nationalistic circles in the country. Likewise, the manner in which the trauma is constructed allows for anyone who might seek to contest the Trianon narrative to be similarly dismissed as the allegedly self-interested urbanists, who are supposedly seeking to deny the suffering of the Hungarian people so as to deflect attention from their own culpability.

Orbán's role as the 'carrier' of the Trianon trauma is highlighted by the previously discussed debate over the trauma's existence and relevance in modern Hungary. However, it should not be taken to mean that because the Trianon trauma is largely an elite-driven one, the general population is a passive actor in this process. As Jacques Ranciere argues, "...every spectator is an actor in her story; every actor, every man of action, is the spectator of the same story" (Ranciere, 2009: 17). In this sense, then, while Orbán's narratives surrounding Trianon are misleading and partial, they are also successful precisely because a receptive audience actively chooses to accept them and internalize them. This then permits Orbán to shape and direct the modern day construction of the Trianon trauma in such a way that it allows him to extract the maximum possible value from it.

Horthy: Mythically Constructing a Tragic National Saviour

In contrast to Trianon, the popular legacy and memory of Miklos Horthy is even more contested. Following Béla Kun's brief interlude as the leader of Hungary, Horthy was installed as the Regent of Hungary (in effect, its Head of State) after a military coup had toppled Kun's regime.⁹ This coup was supported by Britain and France, and was followed up in the country with a period known as the 'White Terror', when army units loyal to Horthy carried out a series of retributive attacks on the remaining Socialists, and on societal elements (including Jewish people and liberals) that were seen as having been loyal to Kun's regime (Ormos, 2007: 66–69). Horthy's domination of Hungary's political scene in the subsequent years leading up to 1944 was so complete that, in the words of Ignác Romsics, "...it is entirely fitting that it should be referred to as the Horthy era" (Romsics, 1999: 129).

Hungary subsequently lurched towards right-wing extremism and authoritarianism (albeit without becoming a totalitarian state) in the late 1920s and 1930s, sign-

ing alliances with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany in 1927 and 1939, respectively (Hoensch, 1996: 136–141; Romsics, 1999: 190–191). Horthy was also able to deliver some partial revisions to the Trianon settlement. These included a significant rearmament program, the achievement between 1938 and 1939 of significant territorial concessions from Czechoslovakia in the regions of Slovakia and Ruthenia, and the addition in 1940 and 1941 of lands that had previously been ceded to Romania and Yugoslavia (respectively), which set off a wave of national celebration and jubilation (*ibid.*: 199–201).

However, these developments would also eventually lead Hungary to disaster, as the country found itself on the losing side of yet another major international conflict. With the tide of war seemingly turning against the Axis powers in WWII, by 1943 Horthy had already started to send out peace overtures to the Allies. Having found out about this, Hitler ordered the occupation of Hungary in March 1944, and in October 1944 he appointed the leader of the extremist Arrow Cross Party (Ferenc Szálasi) in place of Horthy as the puppet ruler of the state. Szálasi then accelerated the campaign of extermination against the Hungarian Jewish population, which had already begun under Horthy's tenure¹⁰ (Lendvai, 1999: 423–424). This sealed the fate of the country, as it was occupied by the Soviet Union in February 1945, which left it firmly in the hands of the Communists for the duration of the Cold War.

As a result, Horthy's legacy to Hungary could reasonably be argued to be one of defeat and occupation, without even mentioning his (at least partial) culpability for the fate of the Hungarian Jewish community. Regardless of this, after 2010 Fidesz and Orbán began a subtle, but noteworthy, rehabilitation of Horthy. This is most apparent in their wording of the preamble to the 2011 constitution, which at one point states:

We date the restoration of our country's self-determination, lost on the nineteenth day of March 1944, from the second day of May 1990, when the first freely elected body of popular representation was formed. We shall consider this date to be the beginning of our country's new democracy and constitutional order. We hold that after the decades of the twentieth century which led to a state of moral decay, we have an abiding need for spiritual and intellectual renewal... Our Fundamental Law shall be the basis of our legal order, it shall be an alliance among Hungarians of the past, present and future. It is a living framework which expresses the nation's will and the form in which we want to live (Constitute Project, 2013).

According to this formulation, the periods of Nazi and Communist rule over Hungary are explicitly delegitimized and excised from the history of Hungary as a self-determining country (Bozoki, 2011: 659–660). By contrast, Horthy's period of rule

is dislocated from its connection to Hungary's experiences during WWII and the period of German occupation that largely resulted from his decisions. As such, Horthy's regency is normalized and included in the avowed period of the country's history of self-determination, which establishes a linkage between his regime and the rule of the Orbán government.¹¹ Subsequently to this, in 2014 Fidesz decided to erect another monument in Szabadság Tér (it is separate to the bust of Horthy which sits in the same square, and which is referenced in endnote ix) which sought to commemorate the "Victims of the German Occupation".¹² The monument depicts a giant eagle attacking a statue of the Angel Gabriel (used here as a symbol of Hungary, albeit a somewhat unusual and obscure one); the message of this is quite clear: Hungary and, virtually by extension, Horthy are reconstituted as victims of Germanic aggression, and the suffering of the country as a whole is equated with that of its Jewish population.

It is important to note that during his first period as Prime Minister between 1998 and 2002, Orbán had also taken steps to minimize the role of Horthy and his administration in the Holocaust, and to shy away from criticizing him (Dempsey, 2012; Verseck, 2012). For instance, the high-profile and internationally recognized¹³ House of Terror Museum in Budapest, established by Fidesz in 2002, minimized Horthy's role in the atrocities suffered by the Hungarian population before and during WWII, whilst largely putting the blame on Szálasi's Arrow Cross party, and presented the crimes committed during the communist era as being equal to, if not greater than, the crimes committed during the Holocaust (Gerner, 2006: 102–104).

However, after 2010, Orbán's approach shifted from a mere minimization of Horthy's offences (which still implied some blame) towards a sanitization and a rehabilitation of Horthy. The Szabadság Tér statue cannot be decoupled from the sentiments expressed in the preamble to the constitution, as both contribute to the creation of a revisionist understanding of history. It constructs the Hungarian nation as not being truly responsible for the crimes committed on its soil during WWII, and thus allows Horthy to be conceived of as being an honourable and courageous nationalist leader who defied Hitler's demands and defended both Hungary and its Jewish population for as long as he could (Jenne, 2016: 11–12).

In the manner that Juntunen and Skinner both describe, and similarly to Fidesz and Orbán's discourses surrounding Trianon, this approach is parachronistic, ignoring the specificities of the context within which Horthy's regime is historically located so as to serve the interests of the present-day Hungarian government. Again, this is related to the government's efforts to recreate the 'populist-urbanist' cleavage for their 21st-century audience. During the interwar years, Horthy functioned as an 'antidote' to the urbanists,¹⁴ having achieved some measure of restitution for the country following the chaos experienced during the immediate aftermath of the conclusion of WWI. During his period of regency, regime stability was restored, and

a partial restoration of the country's pre-WWI borders was achieved through his alliances with Hitler and Mussolini. Thus, from the perspective of Fidesz, Horthy serves as a useful analogy (or even a predecessor) for the travails and accomplishments of the current government.

Orbán is likewise presented as an 'antidote' to what they characterize as the weak and incompetent 'urbanist' administration of Ferenc Gyurcsány¹⁵ – and the Budapest liberal elite more widely – who is constantly striving for a solution to the 'Trianon' issue that will allow for the restoration of the Hungarian pride and honour. As was noted earlier, the suggested restoration of the territories previously controlled by the Kingdom of Hungary is geopolitically impossible, and has already been flatly rejected by those countries that would be affected by it. However, the ingenuity of Orbán's approaches lies precisely in the fact that 'Trianon' cannot ever be resolved; his intended audience is not external, but internal. As such, by engaging in a perpetual battle to restore the country's lost honour, he continues to reconstruct the Trianon trauma, while also consolidating his image as the tragic national saviour (in a similar manner to the way in which the previously mentioned interwar 'Horthy-cult' continued to be used to burnish and legitimate Horthy's position as the heroic military saviour striving to resolve Trianon).

CONCLUSION: THE USES OF 'TRIANON' AND 'HORTHY'

The analysis presented above showed that Viktor Orbán has sought to tap into various streams of Hungarian nationalist history through manipulating and historicizing understandings of the country's experience during the interwar years, and then using these interpretations as implicit and explicit analogies and as lessons for the contemporary actions of his government. Through these approaches, Trianon becomes constructed as an uncontestably traumatic event, one which has fundamentally and detrimentally affected the 'true', non-urbanist Hungarian nation as a whole, and which demands restitution (even one hundred years after the fact). Meanwhile, Horthy is reconstructed as a courageous defender of the true Hungarian nation and Hungarian national interests, who sought to provide this restitution and to restore stability to the country, but was tragically undone by the country's occupation by Germany in 1944. In this manner, he becomes the spiritual predecessor of Orbán, who likewise delivered Hungary from the abyss of the economic and political instability wrought on the country, and who has also struggled against overwhelming odds and foreign adversaries to achieve a sustainable solution to the Trianon trauma. Thus, Orbán's rule is afforded a façade of nobility as the actions of the mythic saviour of the nation, who is selflessly seeking to restore the Hungarian dignity and pride.

There are a number of purposes for the use of these discursive strategies. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, Fidesz and Orbán function as carriers for the development and elaboration of the cultural trauma associated with Trianon. This allows them to

cast themselves as the guardians of the broader Hungarian *nation's* interests (as opposed to merely being the leaders of the Hungarian state). As such, Fidesz and Orbán become analogous with Hungary itself – the ‘true’ Hungary, that is. Their more nationalistic policies (such as the Citizenship Law or the National Unity Day) become inherent, indisputable parts of the Hungarian culture and nationality. Using this construction, they can claim to have taken decisive steps towards healing the country’s ‘trauma’ (which they themselves are largely responsible for elaborating). Additionally, this allows them to deflect any criticisms from international actors such as the EU or from the indigenous civil society of other aspects of their ‘illiberal turn’ by saying that these are attacks on Hungary itself (rather than just attacks on the country’s government) by foreign powers and their domestic proxies (Jenne and Mudde, 2012: 153; Hodonyi and Trüpel, 2013; Saltman and Herman, 2013). As a result of this, opposition movements find themselves delegitimized and deprived of resources, while the regime’s critics from the European Commission and the European Parliament find their critiques inadvertently fulfilling Fidesz’s narratives, and thus reinforcing the party’s grip on Hungarian society.

However, this is just one aspect of these narrative strategies, and it represents only one function of Fidesz and Orbán’s approach. A much more important point to consider is who the intended audiences for these narratives are, and what the message that is being communicated is. In truth, these messages are likely not being created for the purposes of communicating Hungary to the outside world, and are not intended to majorly expand Fidesz’s voting base or counteract left-wing criticism. Nor are they likely to be focused to any great extent on changing people’s minds about the historical legacy of Horthy. Instead, these narratives are targeted more towards right-wing nationalists in the country, many of whom would already view Horthy as being a courageous and tragic figure. Thus, by seeking to reconstruct Horthy’s interwar image as the virtuous military hero who sought to guide the nation through a particularly turbulent time in its history, Orbán legitimizes the admiration such people hold for Horthy. In so doing, this creates affinities between Orbán and the nationalist right in the country, and removes a potential obstacle to their absorption into his broader coalition of voters.

By seeking to rehabilitate the image of Horthy (at least from an official state government standpoint rather than from an academic standpoint) and to resolve the ongoing trauma associated with the Trianon treaty, Orbán firmly aligns himself with the ‘populist’ segment of Hungarian society. This then serves to create an image of the Hungarian nation that is exclusionary of both people on the left and political groupings on the right of the political spectrum. The ‘true’ Hungarians find their sole representation in Fidesz and Orbán. Meanwhile, the left-wing opposition parties and civil society activists become the modern incarnation of the urbanist cleavage, and are more easily castigated as being agents of the perversion of the general will

of the nation, who might prevent the resolution of the Trianon trauma if they could. On the other side, the Jobbik party (specifically) are equally excluded. By appropriating the legacy of Horthy for himself, Orbán is able to pre-empt Jobbik, and force them to either accept the mantle of being the heirs to Szálasi's Arrow Cross fascists or (as has transpired) move towards the political centre and away from the right. So while Orbán's spiritual predecessor is reconstructed as a brave and honorable leader and defender of the nation, Jobbik (unwillingly) either become the successors of a group that eventually betrayed Hungary and collaborated with its enemies, or, effectively, urbanists. This assists in the consolidation of Fidesz's electoral base, and prevents their support from being eroded by anyone from further to the right of them on the political spectrum.

Through this, it is possible to see how Fidesz and Orbán use partial and parochistic approaches to Hungarian history as a discursive tool for legitimizing and consolidating their rule over Hungary. By constructing a 'cultural trauma' that has been suffered by the Hungarian people as a result of the Treaty of Trianon, they can subsequently claim credit for having attempted to resolve it through steps such as the Citizenship Law and the National Unity Day; this can be constantly recycled, as by its sheer nature Trianon can never realistically be fully resolved. As such, policies related to the redress of the trauma can be continually introduced and claimed domestically as steps towards the ultimate redemption of Hungary's national honour without ever truly removing the spectre of Trianon from Hungarian life. By reclaiming the legacy of Horthy, Orbán can ensure that he alone reaps the electoral rewards from these strategies whilst bolstering his image as the strong and determined leader tragically beset by domestic and foreign adversaries intent on thwarting him. Broadly speaking, then, the strategy revolves around resuscitating the 'populist-urbanist' cleavage of the interwar years in the 2010s, and ensuring that Fidesz, and only Fidesz, can lay claim to being the 'true' representatives of and heirs to the populist tradition. In this way, the approaches of Fidesz and Orbán outlined in this paper seem to have been broadly successful thus far, and have been an important part of Hungary's post-2010 'illiberal turn'.

ENDNOTES

¹ According to Rupnik, this reconnection is most notable in the way in which it reflects Horthy's own twin obsessions: his strident opposition to 'Bolshevism', and his irredentist desire to reverse the territorial losses resulting from the Treaty of Trianon (Rupnik, 2012: 135).

² According to Alexander, there is not necessarily any specific characteristic to these carrier groups, who may be "...prestigious religious leaders or groups whom the majority has designated as spiritual patriarchs...[they may] be generational...national...[or] institutional..." (Alexander, 2004: 11).

³ Indeed, at the unveiling of a monument to Horthy in Szabadság Tér in Budapest, Jobbik politicians had effusively praised Horthy's role in "...[rebuilding] the country after the deadly Bolshevik rampage fol-

lowing the First World War and the catastrophe of Trianon, which was the darkest time in the history of [the] country" (Jobbik, 2013).

⁴ Indeed, in more recent months Orbán has gone on to adopt even more nakedly pro-Horthy stances, going so far as to describe him as being an "exceptional statesman" in a speech given in Budapest in 2017 (Balogh, 2017a). While this statement falls outside of the chronological focus of this paper, it is useful to note that Orbán's veneration of Horthy has not died down in the subsequent years, but instead, it has become ever more brazen.

⁵ References to the unjustness of the terms of the Treaty of Trianon are frequently made at rallies by the Jobbik party, and the revanchist 'Greater Hungary' map is often adopted and displayed by members of nationalist and 'patriotic' groups. One example of this rhetoric appeared during an anti-EU protest in Budapest in 2012 when protestors chanted "Down with Trianon" (Jobbik, 2012).

⁶ The idea for the creation of a national commemoration of Trianon was originally proposed by the Jobbik party, and was part of their platform during the 2010 elections. It was not until after the elections that Fidesz adopted this policy (Biro Nagy et al., 2013: 245–247).

⁷ Although they lie somewhat outside the chronological scope of this article, it is important to highlight some specific cases here. As early as December 29th 2015, the *Budapest Beacon* reported that János Lázár, a senior figure in the Hungarian government, opposed the settlement of refugees in Hungary on the grounds that it could lead to Hungarians becoming a minority in their own land, which was a supposed precondition for the Trianon settlement (Novak, 2015); likewise, in a speech in March 2017 commemorating the 1848 revolution, Viktor Orbán thematically (albeit not explicitly) linked the government's opposition to the refugee quotas with its restoration of the 'unity' of the Hungarian nation (Orbán, 2017). In contrast, Balogh reports on the far more explicit linkages made by several pro-government historians and public figures between the refugee crisis and the potential for a 'new Trianon' (Balogh, 2017b).

⁸ Although it lies outside of the scope of this article, it is interesting to note that similar tactics to those described here have previously been used by Orbán and Fidesz. A case in point would be the 2015 anti-refugee billboard campaign, in which billboards were erected throughout the country containing messages such as "If you come to Hungary, you should not take Hungarians' jobs"; the messages were written in Hungarian, a language very few refugees to the country spoke (Nolan, 2015).

⁹ Horthy's appointment as Regent essentially meant that Hungary became an autocratic government with him as the leader. This was because Hungary, although legally a kingdom, did not have a king; when the rightful claimant to the throne, King Charles, attempted to ascend it in October 1921, Horthy (with the backing of the Allies) had him taken prisoner and exiled (Lendvai, 1999: 381).

¹⁰ It is important to note that prior to the appointment of Szálasi, deportations of Hungarian Jews had already begun between April and July 1944, but then they were halted by Horthy in the face of an international outcry; however, these initial deportations did not include the Jewish population of Budapest. Following Szálasi's installation as ruler of the country, the deportations and massacres were restarted, and this time they included the Budapest Jews.

¹¹ Given that Horthy was an avowed conservative, and was supported throughout his tenure by right-wing and far-right political groupings, his regime could be more easily seen as a spiritual predecessor of Orbán's government than as a predecessor of Ferenc Gyurcsány's government (for instance).

- ¹² An inscription above the statue states in Hungarian: "The Memorial for the Victims of the German Occupation".
- ¹³ Amongst its other distinctions, the House of Terror Museum is recognized as a member of the EU's Platform of European Memory and Conscience (Platform of European Memory and Conscience, 2018).
- ¹⁴ According to Balogh (2011), Horthy was actually criticized in his time by intellectuals from the 'populist' camp, who were largely left-wing; however, she also notes that in the modern era, the heirs of the 'populist' mantle are predominantly right-wing, and that Fidesz are very much part of this group.
- ¹⁵ Orbán's accession to the position of Prime Minister in the 2010 elections came in the wake of the culmination of eight years of rule by the Hungarian Socialist Party. These years were marked by economic turmoil, with the country experiencing ballooning budgetary deficits between 2002 and 2006, which were subsequently followed by one of the most severe recessions in the EU in 2008. In addition to this, massive, sustained street protests were experienced in several major cities in 2006 after the leaking of then Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány's 'Balaton speech' to the press, in which he admitted that the Socialist government had been lying to the Hungarian people about the troubles facing the country's economy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alexander, Jeffrey C. (2004), 'Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma', in Jeffrey C. Alexander, Ron Eyerman, Bernard Giesen, Neil J. Smelser, and Piotr Sztompka (eds.) *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity*, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 1–30.
- Alexander, Jeffrey C. (2012), *Trauma: A Social Theory*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- The American Hungarian Federation (2004), 'Former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán Visits Cleveland to Help Commemorate the 1956 Hungarian Revolution'. Available at http://www.americanhungarian-federation.org/news_orban.htm (accessed 11/09/2017).
- Balogh, Eva S. (2011), 'Today's "Right" and Its Antecedents'. Available at <http://hungarianspectrum.org/2011/11/06/todays-right-and-its-antecedents/> (accessed 14/11/2017).
- Balogh, Eva S. (2017a), 'In Orbán's Opinion, Miklos Horthy Was an Exceptional Statesman'. Available at <http://hungarianspectrum.org/2017/06/21/in-orbans-opinion-miklos-horthy-was-an-exceptional-statesman/> (accessed 15/9/2017).
- Balogh, Eva S. (2017b), 'A New Declaration of War: Justice for Hungary!'. Available at <http://hungarianspectrum.org/2017/06/04/a-new-declaration-of-war-justice-for-hungary/> (accessed 09/10/2017).
- Bíró Nagy, András, Tamás Boros, and Zoltán Vasali (2013), 'More Radical Than the Radicals: The Jobbik Party in International Comparison', in Ralf Melzer and Sebastian Serafin (eds.) *Right-Wing Extremism in Europe: Country Analyses, Counter-Strategies and Labor-Market Oriented Exit Strategies*, Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, pp. 229–253.
- Bliesemann de Guevara, Berit (2016), 'Myth in International Politics: Ideological Delusion and Necessary Fiction', in Berit Bliesemann de Guevara (ed.) *Myth and Narrative in International Politics: Interpretive Approaches to the Study of IR*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bozóki, András (2011), 'Occupy the State: The Orbán Regime in Hungary', *Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, 19(3): 649–663.

- British Broadcasting Corporation (2000), 'Bitter Hungarians Recall Trianon'. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/777320.stm (accessed 11/09/2017).
- Browning, Christopher S. (2002), 'Coming Home or Moving Home? "Westernizing" Narratives in Finnish Foreign Policy and the Reinterpretation of Past Identities', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 37(1): 47–72.
- Constitute Project (2013), 'Hungary's Constitution of 2011 with Amendments Through 2013'. Available at https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Hungary_2013.pdf?lang=en (accessed 14/10/2017).
- Dempsey, Judy (2012), 'Orban Has Gone Too Far'. Available at <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=48892> (accessed 26/04/2018).
- Deutsche Welle (2013), 'Moving Right in Hungary'. Available at <http://www.dw.de/moving-right-in-hungary/a-16563266> (accessed 02/05/2018).
- Dunai, Marton and Balazs Koranyi (2014), 'Hungary Raids NGOs, Accuses Norway of Political Meddling'. Available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-norway-funding-ngo/hungary-raids-ngos-accuses-norway-of-political-meddling-idUSKBN0ED1QW20140602?feedType=RSS> (accessed 26/04/2018).
- The Economist (2002), 'Viktor Orban, an Assertive Hungarian', 28/02/2002. Available at <http://www.economist.com/node/1011129> (accessed 11/09/2017).
- Egry, Gábor (2012), 'Towards a Social History of Trianon and Its Aftermath'. Available at http://www.imre-kertesz-kolleg.uni-jena.de/fileadmin/imre-kertesz-kolleg/Portal/Egry_Gabor_Towards_a_Social_History_of_Trianon_and_its_Aftermath.pdf (accessed 26/04/2018).
- Esbenshade, Richard S. (2014), 'Symbolic Geographies and the Politics of Hungarian Identity in the "Populist-Urbanist Debate", 1925–44', *Hungarian Cultural Studies*, Vol. 7: 177–197.
- Euractiv (2014), 'Controversial Monument Divides Hungarians, Angers Jewish Community'. Available at <http://www.euractiv.com/sections/central-europe/controversial-monument-divides-hungarians-angers-jewish-community-303656> (accessed 26/04/2018).
- Femia, Joseph V. (1981), 'An Historicist Critique of "Revisionist" Methods for Studying the History of Ideas', *History and Theory*, 20(2): 113–134.
- Gardner, Andrew (2014), 'Orbán to Ukraine: Give Hungarians Autonomy'. Available at <https://www.politico.eu/article/orban-to-ukraine-give-hungarians-autonomy/> (accessed 03/12/2017).
- Gerner, Kristian (2006), 'Between the Holocaust and Trianon: Historical Culture in Hungary', in Martin L. Davies and Claus-Christian W. Szejnmann (eds.) *How the Holocaust Looks Now: International Perspectives*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 97–106.
- Greskovits, George (2012), 'Re-presenting Moral Ambivalences: Narratives of Political Monologue Regarding András Hegedűs and Pál Teleki', *European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'histoire*, 19(5): 749–766.
- Hobson, John M. and George Lawson (2008), 'What Is History in International Relations?', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 37(2): 415–435.
- Hodonyi, Robert and Helga Trüpel (2013), 'Together Against Orban: Hungary's New Opposition'. Available at <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2013-03-22-hodonyi-en.html> (accessed 26/04/2018).
- Hoensch, Jorg K. (1996), *A History of Modern Hungary, 1867–1994*, London: Longman Group.

- Jenne, Erin K. (2016), 'How Populist Governments Rewrite Sovereignty and Why'. Available at <https://www.ceu.edu/sites/default/files/attachment/event/15587/erinjennepolberg-consec-2016.pdf> (Accessed 23/10/2017).
- Jenne, Erin K. and Cas Mudde (2012), 'Hungary's Illiberal Turn: Can Outsiders Help?', *Journal of Democracy*, 23(3): 147–155.
- Jobbik (2012), 'Gabor Vona Re-elected as the President of the Jobbik Party'. Available at http://www.jobbik.com/gabor_vona_re-elected_president_jobbik_party (accessed 26/04/2018).
- Jobbik (2013), 'Horthy's Statue Was Unveiled in Budapest City Center'. Available at http://www.jobbik.com/horthys_statue_was_unveiled_budapest_city_center (accessed 26/04/2018).
- Juntunen, Tapio (2017), 'Helsinki Syndrome: The Parachronistic Renaissance of Finlandization in International Politics', *New Perspectives*, 25(1).
- Kontler, László (2002), *A History of Hungary: Millennium in Central Europe*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kovács, Henriett and Ursula K. Mindler-Steiner (2015), 'Hungary and the Distortion of Holocaust History: The Hungarian Holocaust Memorial Year 2014', *Politics in Central Europe*, 11(2): 49–72.
- Kövér, László and Zsolt Semjén (2010), 'Of the Testimony to National Unity'. Available at http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/hungary/2082_Trianon_Law_060410_EN1.pdf (accessed 02/10/2017).
- Laczó, Ferenc (2011), 'The "Trianon" – Debate in the Hungarian Left-Liberal Weekly Élet és Irodalom'. Available at <http://www.imre-kertesz-kolleg.uni-jena.de/index.php?id=414> (accessed 26/04/2018).
- Lazaroms, Ilse Josepha and Emily R. Gioielli (2012), 'The Politics of Contested Narratives: Biographical Approaches to Modern European History', *European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'histoire*, 19(5): 653–658.
- Lendvai, Paul (1999), *The Hungarians: 1,000 Years of Victory in Defeat*, London: Hurst and Company.
- Molnár, Miklós (2001), *A Concise History of Hungary*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mueller, Jan-Werner (2011), 'The Hungarian Tragedy', *Dissent*, 58(2): 5–10.
- Nolan, Daniel (2015), 'Hungary Government Condemned over Anti-immigration Drive'. Available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/02/hungary-government-condemned-over-anti-immigration-drive> (accessed 01/05/2018).
- Novák, Benjamin (2014), 'Janos Lazar Accuses Norway of Interfering in Hungary's Domestic Affairs'. Available at <http://budapestbeacon.com/featured-articles/janos-lazar-accuses-norway-of-interfering-in-hungarys-domestic-affairs/> (accessed 26/04/2018).
- Novák, Benjamin (2015), 'Hungary Fears Immigration May Lead to Another Trianon'. Available at <https://budapestbeacon.com/hungary-fears-immigration-may-lead-to-another-trianon/> (accessed 09/10/2017).
- Oltay, Edith (2013), *Fidesz and the Reinvention of the Hungarian Center-Right*, Budapest: Szazadveg Kiado.
- Orbán, Viktor (2017), 'Viktor Orbán's Speech on the Anniversary of the 1848 Revolution'. Available at <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/viktor-orban-s-speech-on-the-anniversary-of-the-1848-revolution> (accessed 09/10/2017).

- Ormos, Mária (2007), *Hungary in the Age of the Two World Wars*, New Jersey: Atlantic Research and Publications Ltd.
- Platform of European Memory and Conscience (2018), 'Members'. Available at <https://www.memoryandconscience.eu/members2017/> (accessed 29/04/2017).
- Ranciere, Jacques (2009), *The Emancipated Spectator*, London: Verso Books.
- Romsics, Ignác (1999), *Hungary in the Twentieth Century*, Budapest: Corvina Books.
- Romsics, Ignác (2009), 'Changing Images of Miklós Horthy', in Anssi Halmesvirta (ed.) *Cultic Revelations: Studies in Modern Historical Cult Personalities and Phenomena*, University of Jyväskylä, pp. 93–115. Available at https://jyx.jyu.fi/dspace/bitstream/handle/123456789/23081/spectrum_hun_4.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 01/05/2018).
- Rupnik, Jacques (2012), 'How Things Went Wrong', *Journal of Democracy*, 23(3): 132–137.
- Saltman, Erin Marie and Lisa Herman (2013), 'Hungary versus Europe'. Available at http://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=4436&title=Hungary-versus-Europe (accessed 14/11/2017).
- Schleifer, Yigal (2014), 'Hungary at the Turning Point: How Prime Minister Viktor Orban and His Populist-Right Party Is Slowly Destroying His Country's Democracy'. Available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/moment/2014/10/viktor_orban_s_authoritarian_rule_the_hungarian_prime_minister_is_destroying.html (accessed 18/09/2017).
- Schultheis, Emily (2018), 'How Hungary's Far-Right Extremists Became Warm and Fuzzy'. Available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/06/how-hungarys-far-right-extremists-became-warm-and-fuzzy/> (accessed 27/04/2018).
- Skinner, Quentin (1969), 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', *History and Theory*, 8(1): 3–53.
- Sztompka, Piotr (2000a), 'Cultural Trauma: The Other Face of Social Change', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 3(4): 449–466.
- Sztompka, Piotr (2000b), 'The Ambivalence of Social Change: Triumph or Trauma?', *Polish Sociological Review*, Vol. 131.
- Toth, Csaba Tibor (2018), 'Hungarian Far Right Pushes Moderate Image – and Wins'. Available at <http://www.dw.com/en/hungarian-far-right-pushes-moderate-image-and-wins/a-18378981> (accessed 02/05/2018).
- Traub, James (2015), 'Hungary's 500-Year-Old Victim Complex'. Available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/28/hungarys-500-year-old-victim-complex-nazis-habsburgs/> (accessed 02/05/2018).
- Turbucz, David (2014), 'The Horthy-Cult, 1919-1944'. Available at <http://eklektika.ektf.hu/dsr/access/6b3a1042-6616-427f-b633-3c324dda2440> (accessed 01/05/2018).
- Verseck, Keno (2012), '"Creeping Cult": Hungary Rehabilitates Far-Right Figures'. Available at <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/right-wing-extremists-cultivate-horthy-cult-in-hungary-a-836526.html> (accessed on 02/05/2018).
- Zalan, Eszter (2014), 'Orban Upsets Neighbours by Call for Hungarian Minority Self-Rule'. Available at <https://euobserver.com/foreign/124145> (accessed 03/12/2017).

The Fourth Generation: From Anti-Establishment to Anti-System Parties in Slovakia¹

OLGA GYÁRFÁŠOVÁ

Comenius University, Bratislava

Abstract: The party systems in many democracies are in flux due to the emergence and electoral successes of new, alternative political parties. This phenomenon has a particular dynamic and, drawing on a case study from Slovakia, it is argued that compared to their predecessors the most recent political newcomers may have a more radical, even anti-system character. The paper deals with theories of new political parties and the conceptual definitions of anti-system parties in general while the empirical part focuses on the developments, characteristics and profiles of two political parties in Slovakia, namely the anti-establishment group Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO) and the extreme right-wing People's Party – Our Slovakia (ĽSNS), which represents an anti-system party. Based on empirical data from several surveys the study points to variance in the profiles of anti-establishment and anti-system voters. It is argued that the voters of the anti-system party (ĽSNS) show an ideological distance from other political parties, as well as a strong identification with the party of their electoral choice as opposed to the voters of OĽaNO. The concluding discussion displays the differences between anti-establishment and anti-system parties in general, and in this specific perspective the Slovak case fits into the much broader debate about illiberal tendencies in Central and Eastern Europe. Anti-system political parties – the next generation of the new alternative parties – could be a real threat to liberal democracy in the region.

Keywords: Slovakia, political parties, anti-establishment and anti-system parties

INTRODUCTION

New political parties have been attracting increasing attention in recent years. Regardless of what we call them – new, alternative, non-traditional, non-standard, unorthodox, populist, extremist or protest parties – they are changing the political landscape and challenge traditional party-voter alignments. But it's not just about this. Radicalized new political parties could challenge the principles and values of liberal democracy.

Even a fleeting glimpse at the political map of established western democracies reveals that it has undergone fundamental changes during the past two decades,

and over the last two or three years the speed of change has been increasing. Mass parties, which were systematically analysed by M. Duverger in the 1950s as parties with a large membership, distinct ideological profiles, and intra-party democracy (Duverger, 1954), started to lose significance in the late 1960s. Later on the importance of catch-all parties (Kirchheimer, 1966) also declined substantially. According to Kirchheimer a catch-all 'people's' party attempts to transgress the socio-economic and cultural cleavages among the electorate in order to attract a broader 'audience' (ibid.: 184). Furthermore, the decline of party membership in contemporary western democracies is very well empirically documented in several studies (cf. van Biezen et al., 2012). These phenomena are closely related not only to shrinking partisanship (as in Dalton's famous 1998 term 'parties without partisans') but also to the loosening of traditional ties between political parties and their voters, which tests the classic party representation model. We observe that "[t]he decline of traditional party affiliation and the fiercer competition resulting from this for the political parties have, in the meantime, become standard diagnoses in Western European party studies" (Plasser & Ulram, 2000: 6).

In Western democracies, party alignments, as identified and examined by Stein Rokkan and Seymour M. Lipset in their fundamental publication (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), were formed after World War II and reflected how parties and political representation were anchored within a society's social structure. However, the societal configuration of developed democracies underwent fundamental changes during the 1970s and the 1980s as the importance of differences in value orientation increased. The loosening of traditional ties (de-alignment) and the establishing of ties with other political parties (re-alignment), or failing to establish new ties altogether, creates favourable conditions for voters to make noncommittal, *ad hoc* choices. As a result, voters without any partisan ties become more 'mobile' and tend to change their preferences from one election to the next without being re-aligned (cf. Dalton, 1998; Schmitt & Holmberg, 1995; Mair, 1997; Plasser & Ulram, 2000, and many other sources).

This greater voter volatility is further reinforced by the media and, in recent years, above all by social media and networks, which have proved extremely effective in generating quick and emotional but often short-lived mobilizations of voters. Fritz Plasser and Peter Ulram illustrate it empirically on the case of Austrian voters: "Floating voters who did not decide which party to vote for until the final phase of the election (late deciders), reported exceptionally frequently that they were strongly influenced in their personal decision by the mass media's political coverage of the campaign" (Plasser & Ulram, 2000: 14). Hand in hand with the de-alignment process and the loss of loyal electorates which they could rely on, traditional political parties have been faced with the problem of voter disenchantment. As a consequence of

all these processes, the stable party system came to an end and the resulting unstable system opened up to new actors.

In newer, less established democracies the alignment between political parties and their electorates does not have the sort of historical roots that exist in more mature democracies. The ties to parties in the newer democracies have only been built up during some two decades of political pluralism so it is rather difficult to talk of de-alignment in such cases since no proper alignments have been established in the first place. We are witnessing a form of quasi-de-alignment in such cases since any alignments that had previously existed there were not strong and socially embedded. Further catalysts for the fluctuation of party support are the organizational instability of political parties (cf. Deegan-Krause & Haughton, 2015), voters' dissatisfaction with traditional, established political parties, and crises of political trust. These lead to lower electoral engagement, marginal numbers of partisan voters and an increasing proportion of independent voters. Even though new, alternative parties are not just a phenomenon typical for the post-communist world, new democracies are more severely affected by this phenomenon because of several reasons related to post-communist development, and this situation has been analysed in numerous studies (cf. Sikk, 2011; Rovny, 2015; van Biezen, 2005). It is argued that whereas in Western democracies parties usually emerged as strong movements of society, in new democracies they are formed as 'agents of the state' (van Biezen, 2005). In other words in new democracies parties are often created on the basis of 'politicized attitudinal divisions' and not on the basis of 'politicized social stratification' (ibid.: 154). The shallow rooting of the political parties in the given society (social structure) is among the factors which make political parties (and the entire party systems) in new democracies more fragile and unstable than their counterparts in established democracies.

In Slovakia, which is the focus of this study, we can observe several waves of newcomers to the national political arena. The most significant breakthrough came in the 2002 parliamentary election, which was also marked by the highest percentage of aggregated volatility within the relatively short history of democratic elections in Slovakia: 40% (Haughton et al., 2016). This was mainly caused by the electoral success of parties which mobilized voters from both of the extremely polarized political camps at the time, thereby placing themselves in the political centre or beyond the existing political conflict. Based on the way they appealed to voters and how they positioned themselves strategically, they have been described as a case of centrist populism (Učeň et al., 2005).

Later on, a new generation of new parties emerged (in 2010 and 2012), and these can be characterized mostly by their anti-establishment, anti-elite appeals from different ideological positions (for example, the party Freedom and Solidarity using a neo-liberal background); they claim to be alternatives to mainstream parties. Not

only by their profiles and their ways of addressing voters but also by their organizational structures, they want to demonstrate their 'alternativeness'; they intentionally do not aim at mass membership, they avoid calling themselves a 'party' and they have not built organizational networks, as they are centred around their respective leaders. However, with the next wave of newcomers, which came in the 2016 general election, we see a shift from anti-establishment to anti-system parties, which indicates a clear, observable radicalization of the new alternatives.

In the case of Slovakia it was manifested by the electoral success of the extreme right-wing nationalist People's Party-Our Slovakia (ĽSNS), and partially also by another successful new project called We Are a Family (Sme rodina). Both entered the national parliament in the 2016 parliamentary elections. The radical right-wing alternative – ĽSNS – is not just a newer new party; it shows features of 'anti-systemness'. As for Sme rodina, it is still an insufficiently profiled case – in some aspects it shows a neoliberal face in regard to economic and social issues, but on the other hand it has made radical statements on the refugee issue; moreover, their ultra-traditional position on cultural values is combined with some liberal tendencies. Nevertheless, its impact on political processes and political discourse is relatively limited, and it is definitely not comparable with that of ĽSNS.

This paper explores the several generations of successful new political parties in Slovakia. The main objective of the study is to document the radicalization of the successful new alternatives and the partial move from anti-establishment, anti-elitist positions towards anti-system parties, which represent a different kind of challenge to liberal democracies.

The key objective of this study is to more accurately characterize the new alternative parties in Slovakia. The following objective is to demonstrate the process of their radicalization and the emergence of anti-system parties. We focus on two cases in the context of the political parties' development in Slovakia since 2002. Two Slovak political parties that recently achieved representation in the national parliament have been selected as cases of empirical evidence for our arguments: 1. Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO) as a typical anti-establishment party/anti-elite movement; and 2. the People's Party-Our Slovakia (ĽSNS), which represents a radical, anti-system alternative. We explore both parties from two major perspectives: firstly, that of their ideological stances and agenda as well as their organizational structures and, secondly, the perspective in which we explore the differences between the voters of anti-establishment alternatives and those of the radical, anti-system alternatives in terms of their attitudinal profiles and partisan loyalties, as well their relationships to or views of other political parties.

The paper is structured as follows: The first section deals with theoretical concepts of new political parties, and the conceptual definitions of anti-system parties. The second section describes the context of the successful entries of the newcomers in

both Slovakia and other states. It identifies the forms, faces and stages of the emerging alternatives in Slovakia with a focus on the most illustrative cases of a Slovak anti-establishment party (OLaNO) and a Slovak radical anti-system party (LSNS). Both cases are examined in the context of the party political dynamics in Slovakia. The third part offers empirical data comparing the electorates of the two new parties, which can be classified into the categories of anti-establishment challengers and radicalized alternatives. The final section then discusses the results of the study and their implications for Slovakia as well as what they mean when they are placed against the background of recent political developments in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

WHAT'S SO NEW ABOUT THE 'NEW' POLITICAL PARTIES?

Clearly, new political parties are not really a new phenomenon. However, within the last two or three decades their emergence and electoral successes have accelerated massively. The corresponding theoretical literature can be traced back to Paul Lucardie's prominent study (2000), which is primarily focused on the structural pre-conditions (the political opportunity structure) of the appearances and electoral successes of new parties. He identified four ideal types of new political parties based on the kind of political project they pursue (Lucardie, 2000):

- 1) 'Prophetic' parties, which articulate new ideologies, and are successful if they are able to link these ideologies to latent or 'subterranean' traditions and mobilize sufficient resources;
- 2) 'Purifiers' or challengers, whose ambition is to 'cleanse' the political system of the corruption that benefits the establishment and traditional parties;
- 3) 'Prolocutors', which represent interests neglected by the established parties, and depend mainly on the political opportunity structure and specifically on the established parties' positions on salient cleavages and issues, as well as on the electoral system; and, finally,
- 4) Personal vehicles (or idiosyncratic parties).

In many later analyses the reason for the emergence of a new party is identified with new issues or new cleavages. As Simon Hug put it, the emergence of new parties is "a sign that the old parties have failed to incorporate new issues or assimilate new cleavages" (Hug, 2001, in Sikk, 2011: 466). However, some authors, such as Lucardie (2000) and Krouwel and Lucardie (2008), explicitly considered the possibility that new parties may not actually be based on a new issue, but they may still enter the party political landscape on a territory occupied by established parties (Sikk, 2011: 466). For both of these explanations, a disappointment with existing political parties (be it the incumbent, or the possible alternatives in the opposition) on the part of citizens has to be identified. This can be seen as an important but definitely not a suffi-

cient condition, however. Offering another explanation, Allan Sikk (2011) develops the idea of an attractive newness on the part of new parties which appeals to voters: a kind of *carte blanche* which has not disappointed expectations – yet. In other words, ‘newness’ is a winning formula, a quality in its own right. Based on his analyses of four empirical cases (two parties from Latvia and two from Estonia) Sikk empirically proves that newness itself without any ideological position or opposition is appealing for voters who are disappointed by the parties they chose previously (Sikk, 2011).

The Fourth Generation

Many studies focus specifically on the explosion of new political projects in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (Haughton & Deegan-Krause, 2015; Rovny, 2015; Pop-Eleches, 2010). In order to better frame these “undefined emerging objects” Pop-Eleches introduced the term “unorthodox political parties” (UOPs) and conceptualized them through what these parties are not: “they are not orthodox or mainstream political parties” since “a political party is classified as mainstream if its electoral appeal is based on a recognizable and moderate ideological platform rather than on the personality of its leader and/or extremist rhetoric” (Pop-Eleches, 2010: 225). In spite of a certain vagueness in this definition, in his more detailed description of UOPs he developed a typology of them, and in particular, through his listing and categorizing of these types of parties in the CEE countries covered by his research, the image of what UOPs are and what they are not is made clearer.

Pop-Eleches connects the concept of UOPs with the “third-generation elections of [the] post-communist era” and according to him this “wave” is characterized by the return of the anti-party and by the “protest vote (or anti-vote) – an electoral option driven less by the positive appeal of the chosen party’s ideological/policy platform than by the rejection of other possible political choices” (Pop-Eleches, 2010: 236). He argues that “[p]rotest voting is the practice of voting for a party not because of the actual content of its electoral message but in order to ‘punish’ other parties” (ibid.: 223). In this conceptualization we can see that UOPs are a good choice for someone wishing to cast a protest vote.

The concept of three generations of elections in post-communist countries became an inspiration for this study. According to it the first generation is represented by the founding elections, which were usually won by broad anti-communist coalitions; the second generation of elections brought an alternation of power among the mainstream political parties and were characterized as ‘normal years’; and in the third generation elections both of the main camps already have well-established and usually not entirely positive track records and so the protest vote mechanism disrupts the established political elites and seemingly consolidated party systems, and gives a chance to new alternatives. All in all, in the third generation of elections many voters are likely to opt for alternative, unorthodox parties (Pop-Eleches, 2010: 233–237).

Following Pop-Eleches' arguments, in the Slovak case we could say that the phase of third generation elections opened with the entrance of centrist populist parties in 2002 and continued with new anti-establishment alternatives in 2010 and 2012. However, Pop-Eleches' concept could be further developed (his cross-country comparative analysis covers only the period until the mid-2000s) and extended by a fourth generation. Undoubtedly, elections coming later repeat to a certain extent the 'third generation' pattern, which means that in each electoral competition newer new alternatives are emerging and are successful. Nevertheless, the character of these alternatives is changing, and in Slovakia we can observe their radicalization.

Protest parties are also broadly characterized by the Polish author Bartolomiej Michalak (2011), who summarizes their distinct characteristics in four points: (1) Protest parties are relatively young, weakly institutionalized and frequently not deep-rooted within their party systems, (2) their genesis is related to the deep structural and mental transformations which began in Western Europe in the second half of the 20th century (including the silent revolution in values), (3) the emergence and later electoral success of protest parties were the consequence of the crises of democratic representation, including the shift of political competition from centrifugal to centripetal competition (centripetal party competition is traditionally associated with the need to capture the median voter in a two-party system, whereas the existence of center parties is associated with centrifugal party competition; in other words once the protest parties step into the political competition its logic is modified) and (4) protest parties exceed (in some measures) the traditional model of inter-party competition, which is closed within the left-right dimension (Michalak, 2011: 112–113).

Whereas Michalak argues that protest parties are conceptually identical to anti-system parties, we challenge this argument. We argue instead that while perhaps they are a part of the broad category of protest parties, anti-system parties are specific and distinct from other types of protest parties. This definitional argument will be supported by demonstrating the differences between two generations of new alternative parties.

Going back to Lucardie's typology, most of the new alternatives in CEE countries fit very well into the categories of purifiers and prolocutors, and some of them also provide an ideological platform which fills an existing niche. However, many of them, including those in the Slovak case, belong to the category which Sikk described as parties based purely on newness and without ideological motivation: "Such parties based on the project of newness do not attempt to salvage an ideology..." (2011: 467). Lucardie's conceptualization, and in more general terms the literature on protest/unorthodox/anti-elite parties, is about non-radical alternatives, which often emerge as centrist populists and/or as any of Lucardie's types. They belong in the anti-establishment rather than the anti-system category. The radicalized alternative ĽSNS, which gained a surprising electoral success by entering the national parliament with 8% of the votes in the 2016 Slovak election, would not fit into any of those

types. That's why we decided that the radicalized new alternatives should be explored not 'just' as anti-establishment but as anti-system parties. Summing up, most of the new parties which emerged within the third generation of elections could be categorized as anti-establishment, but relatively few are anti-system. ĽSNS, however, belong in the latter category.

Conceptualizing 'Anti-Systemness'

In order to understand and conceptualize the distinction between anti-establishment parties and their more radical versions I resolved to explore the older concept of anti-systemness, which was not necessarily originally related to new emerging parties; among anti-system parties typical for Western democracies are extreme right and fascist parties but also 'old' communist parties, secessionists and those close to anti-system groups or even terrorist groups such as the IRA and ETA (Capoccia, 2002). However, with the spiral of new and newer parties we can observe a radicalization of new alternatives – there are new challengers not just for the establishment (traditional/mainstream political parties and elites) but also for liberal democracy as such. It does not mean that the radical alternative would replace or become a successor of an earlier anti-establishment party, since its rise and electoral success normally follow specific political and discursive opportunity structures. For example, ĽSNS took an opportunity to fill a specific niche when the Slovak National Party (SNS), which previously had a monopoly on nationalist issues (cf. Gyárfášová & Mesežnikov, 2015), smoothed its nationalistic appeals. However, this context does not explain the key argument of this study.

The anti-system party is a key element of Giovanni Sartori's theory of party systems, specifically in polarized pluralism (Sartori, 1976 [2005]). Sartori offers two definitions of an anti-system party: the broad and the narrow definition. The broad definition is conceived as encompassing all possible variations in time and space of the attitudes of such parties and their electorates, ranging from alienation to protest, but "these variations and varieties find their minimal denominator in a common *delegitimizing impact*. [...] Accordingly, a party can be defined as being anti-system whenever it *undermines the legitimacy* of the regime it opposes" (ibid.: 117–118).² The narrow definition focuses on the ideological characteristics of the party and the fact that "an anti-system party would not change – if it could – the government but the very system of government. Its opposition is not an 'opposition on issues' (so little that it can afford to bargain on issues) but 'an opposition of principle'" (ibid.: 118). And Sartori follows up on this by adding the ideological aspect: "...anti-system parties represent an *extraneous ideology* – thereby indicating a polity confronted with a maximal ideological distance" (ibid.).

In the context of Sartori's theory, Giovanni Capoccia argues that the definitional attribute of anti-systemness is relational, being given by the ideological difference be-

tween one or more parties and the other parties in the system (Capoccia, 2002: 10) and he later states that “Sartori’s concept is ‘relational’ in a two senses [sic]: first it involves the ideological distance of a party from the others along the political (left-right) space of electoral competition and, second, it refers to the delegitimizing impact of the party’s actions and propaganda on the regime in which it operates” (Capoccia, 2002: 14). The attributes of relational anti-systemness and their systematic consequences are summarized in the following table:

Table 1: Attributes of relational anti-systemness and their consequences for the party system mechanism

| Attribute of a party’s relational anti-systemness | Systemic consequences |
|---|--|
| A distant spatial location of its electorate from those of the neighbouring parties | Unequal spacing between parties (or space disjunction) |
| Low coalition potential | Multi-polarity |
| Outbidding propaganda tactics/delegitimizing messages | Centrifugalization and an increase in polarization (process) |

Source: Capoccia, 2002: 15.

As we will demonstrate in more detail later, LSENS displays all three of the attributes postulated by Capoccia, and their consequences for the party system and political competition listed in the table above can be demonstrated in its case too.

Combining the two dimensions of anti-systemness – the ideological and relational dimensions – Capoccia identified five types of anti-systemness, whereas “the assessment of relational anti-systemness is based on a general evaluation of a party’s coalition and propaganda strategies, rather than on its location on the ideological space – although all examples share the common property of being located at one extreme of the competitive space” (Capoccia, 2002: 24–25). The five types are listed and mapped out in the table below.

Table 2: The typology of political parties according to their anti-systemness

| Relational Anti-systemness (‘isolationist’ strategies, a separate ‘pole’ of the system) | | | |
|---|-----|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Ideological Anti-systemness (outbidding propaganda tactics, refusal of basic joint values) | | Yes | No |
| | Yes | Typical anti-system parties | Irrelevant ASPs Accommodating ASPs |
| | No | Polarizing parties | Typical pro-system parties |

Source: Capoccia, 2002: 24, additional explanations by the author.

As indicated in the table a party which demonstrates relational and ideological anti-systemness (yes on both dimensions) adopts 'isolationist' strategies, tends to build a separate pole of the system and refuses to enter coalitions, and resorts to out-bidding propaganda tactics and systematically opposes and discredits founding values of the regime, on which all other parties agree, which is the most significant characteristic of such a party (cf. Capoccia, 2002: 25). A party which meets the conditions of relational and ideological anti-systemness is classified as a typical anti-system party. The other parties which belong to the 'no' types are either irrelevant or accommodating, or if they are characterized by a "no" on both dimensions, they are typical pro-system parties.

In the Slovak case, ĽSNS would be placed in the top left-hand cell ("yes" on both dimensions) of this typology since it adopts isolationist strategies and is isolated by the other parties (all the other parties declared that they would not build a coalition with it), and at the same time it systematically opposes some founding values of the regime on which the other parties agree. On the other hand the anti-establishment alternative – OĽaNO – does not fit into the category of ideological anti-systemness. It demonstrates a rather fuzzy but not extreme or anti-system profile; moreover, as we will show later, as for its spatial location there is a relatively small distance between its electorate and those of the neighbouring parties. As for the relational dimension, in its 'earlier life', as a part of its mother party Freedom and Solidarity, it was a part of a center-right government coalition (2010–2012). However, for the electoral cycles 2012–2016 and 2016–2020, it would fit into the category of 'polarizing parties' since its coalition potential is low and its relations to other parties are problematical.

Recently, in the literature there has been a revival of anti-systemness. The established Sartorian perspectives on anti-system parties (celebrated their 50th anniversary in 2016) are now challenged and revisited (Zulianello, 2017). Mattia Zulianello is developing a revised concept of anti-systemness and "a novel typology by focusing on two salient dimensions for any political actor: its core ideological concepts and its visible interactions at the systematic level" (ibid.: 24). This two-dimensional typology enables one to make a major distinction between populist parties as well as to follow the development of individual cases in time. However, for the purposes of this paper's objectives – to identify the distinction line between the anti-establishment and anti-system cases – the classic Sartorian approach applied also by Capoccia is more productive.

FORMS, FACES, AND STAGES OF THE NEW ALTERNATIVES IN SLOVAKIA

In previous sections of this paper I have explained Pop-Eleches' concepts of the protest vote and the generations of post-communist elections and connected them

to a theoretical analysis of the anti-system parties and their distinct positions in the party systems. The following empirical part focuses on the developments, characteristics and profiles of the two examined Slovak political parties, namely the anti-establishment group Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO) and the extreme right-wing People's Party – Our Slovakia (ĽSNS), which represents an anti-system party. The Slovak case is a case of a specific country; however, it has many similarities with the cases of other countries in the Central European region.

An Anti-Elitist Appeal to 'Ordinary People'

The new political parties which got the label 'centrist-populists' (Učeň et al., 2005) entered Slovakia's political system in the 2002 general election. As has already been stated, this election perfectly matches Pop-Eleches' concept of a third generation election. The next poll, in 2006, was the only one since 1990 in which no new party emerged at national level. The 2010 election then concluded a four-year period during which the country was governed by a nationalist-populist coalition of Direction-Social Democracy (Smer-SD), led by Prime Minister Robert Fico, the Slovak National Party (SNS) and the People's Party-Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (ĽS-HZDS), which was then still led by the semi-authoritarian former Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar. The new alternative parties which successfully participated in this election were the Hungarian-Slovak party Bridge (Most-Híd) and Freedom and Solidarity (SaS).

Whereas the former cannot be seen as a complete newcomer, since it was established in a split from the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK) with the aim of building a bridge between the Hungarian ethnic minority, which made up ten per cent of the population of Slovakia, and the majority population, the latter was entirely a 'greenfield' project. However, SaS does not fully fit into the category of unorthodox challengers without a clear profile. The party had a clear ideology and filled a niche on the political scene, namely the liberal one: on economic issues the party was neoliberal and on cultural issues, it was liberal and in clear opposition to the conservative Christian Democrats. The program and the stances of the party were unambiguous and the profile of its voters and adherents was also clear-cut and coherent (cf. Bútorová & Gyárfášová, 2011). Its novelty and liberal attitudes together with an up-to-date communication strategy via social media made the party very popular among young voters: in 2010 first-time voters made up almost a quarter of its electorate. According to Lucardie's categories SaS would belong among the 'prophets' because it occupied a niche which was not fully taken by any of the established parties. However, SaS, like other Slovak new parties, challenges Lucardie's thesis that new parties need to recruit members in order to win voters (Lucardie, 2000: 178). SaS did not recruit members, and even later it only did so in a very limited way.

After the election SaS joined a centre-right coalition which lasted less than two years as it lost a vote of confidence, and thus an early parliamentary election was held in March 2012 and ended with a landslide victory for Smer-SD. Before the early election the demand for new alternatives was enormous. It was mostly due to the huge disappointment of the voters with the traditional parties as a consequence of the 'Gorilla scandal'.³ Twenty-six parties were running in this election (in 2010 there were 'only' 18) and alongside the traditional established parties there were a great number of new, recycled, re-branded or otherwise rehashed subjects that responded to the provoked demand for new parties and faces. However, the only one which got over the five per cent threshold was Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OLaNO), which had previously stood together with SaS but this time ran as an independent party (cf. Bútorová et al., 2012).

OLaNO represents an anti-establishment, anti-elite alternative *par excellence*. Even its name sends a clear signal about its potential electorate: it is a typical protest party that attracted voters who had become disillusioned with established political parties. The concept of a party that in fact refuses to become one responded effectively to the anti-party sentiment shared by many voters and gave them the chance to express their disapproval of the established party system's representatives. Moreover, OLaNO has striven to be perceived not just as an anti-party or quasi-party but as an antipode to a political party. Based on this concept, OLaNO consistently refuses to evolve into a political party and also refuses to build its own organizational structures or membership base (again, its electoral success was achieved without party members).

During the mobilization phase it portrayed itself as a new actor that came from outside the established political elite. It lacks not only the organizational structure typical for standard political parties but also a clear ideological profile. Its representatives like to describe their entity as a 'party of common sense'. However, when addressing certain issues, the movement betrays a significant inconsistency that at times verges on syncretism. This may be a direct result of the movement's organizational amorphousness and the non-existence of an internal structure that would consider adopting joint positions as a way of advertising the subject's profile. They do not strive for party discipline, and their elected deputies vote according to their consciences. OLaNO insists on being the only party with issue ownership when it comes to fighting corruption. In their manifesto they declared:

However, there is one big problem which we finally want to solve. As long as there is corruption in politics, clientelism and theft of public finances and public property, there will be not enough money for such basic services as health care, education, and support for families, senior citizens or the handicapped (Obyčajní ľudia, 2012: 1, author's translation).

And they argue that this can only be done by new politicians:

Therefore our main objective is to bring new blood into politics, to hold a mirror to the old generation of politicians and to give the citizens the chance to select representatives who will really advocate their interests, and not the interests of the party headquarters and lobby groups (ibid., author's translation).

OLaNO clearly distances itself from the "old generation" of politicians, claiming "we are new and clean; we did not commit the sin of political corruption" (ibid.).

With regard to ideological profiling, OLaNO is a rather fuzzy case. It denies any explicit position on the left-right continuum, preferring the adjective "good,"⁴ but implicitly it presents itself as a 'centrist' force that is rather compatible with centre-right parties, yet it mixes pro-liberal proposals in the socio-economic area with clearly statist, leftist ideas. Its positions are similarly varied and non-unified when it comes to cultural issues: some of its representatives declare themselves as liberals who are tolerant towards minorities, whereas others are strictly conservative in this respect.⁵

The same applies to their electorate. OLaNO voters constitute a quite heterogeneous and incoherent group from the viewpoint of ideological preferences and professed values. On the economic left-right axis,⁶ OLaNO supporters are closer to the average for all voters than those of any other party. This justifies the conclusion that self-positioning on the left-right continuum is considered important by neither the party nor its voters. OLaNO voters do not show a strong profile on the liberal-conservative axis either.⁷ To paraphrase Sikk we could say that "fuzziness is the winning formula", since the party offers choices *à la carte*, not coherent programmatic stances; each of its voters can pick their own 'cherries'.

OLaNO fits two out of the three main categories of newly-emerging political parties that were identified by Lucardie. This quasi-party acts and is perceived as a 'purifier' that has embarked on combating widespread corruption and party political clientelism. Moreover, OLaNO presents itself as a 'prolocutor' that represents the interests of voters neglected by established parties (that is, ordinary citizens) and focuses on a single issue neglected by traditional parties. It does not act as an 'ideological prophet' as it prefers to stand on non-ideological platforms, which it perceives as a comparative advantage over parties that have a clear ideological profile. Thus OLaNO is a clear anti-establishment party.

Right-Wing Radicals Enter the Parliament

The 2016 Slovak parliamentary election followed the pattern regarding newcomers and brought several new parties into the parliament: the centrist programmatic alternative Network (Sieť), the newly established Sme rodina and the

extreme right-wing party ĽSNS. Sieť was a very short-lived project and disintegrated shortly after the election. Sme rodina was founded by the controversial businessman Boris Kollár, who ‘purchased’ and renamed a small regional party shortly before the election, thereby circumventing the time-consuming process of collecting supporters’ signatures and applying to become legally registered by the Interior Ministry. The party represents the phenomenon of ‘non-political politics’: it has a very unclear ideological profile, but uses radical anti-migration rhetoric, and is Eurosceptic, and its key issue in the campaign was offering an amnesty for insolvents, a measure which, according to legal experts, cannot be implemented, but which sounds very attractive – to some at least. The question to what extent this party will become anti-system is open: so far it is anti-establishment rather than anti-system.

ĽSNS, on the other hand, is a radical, extreme right-wing party which bears clear signs of representing an anti-system alternative: the party has a spatial location that is distant from all other political parties in the parliament. Above all, in regard to questions of Slovakia’s core geopolitical orientation, ĽSNS demands Slovakia’s exit from the EU and NATO, and initiated a petition for holding a referendum on this topic. The party also opposes basic principles of human rights: it rejects minority rights, and makes anti-Semitic invectives and dehumanizing proclamations about the Roma minority, promising to protect people from “gypsy extremists” and calling the Roma “parasites” (Kotleba, 2016: 1–2; Kotleba, 2015). Furthermore, the party denies the democratic historical tradition of the Slovak Republic represented by the Slovak National Uprising against the Slovak state in 1944 and praises the fascist state that existed in wartime Slovakia. In their eyes, the Slovak National Uprising against the fascist regime and its ally Nazi Germany was a “national tragedy” and a “communist coup” (Vražda, 2016).

The ten-point election manifesto of ĽSNS includes its promise to fight against corruption, but also anti-migrant rhetoric (including statements like “Slovakia is not Africa”, “We will never give in to foreigners” and “We will not take in a single migrant”), anti-Roma declarations and the anti-EU and anti-NATO positions that were already mentioned. In addition to that it presents itself as conservative: the values of the traditional family are put into the centre field, together with a “fair social policy” that includes very generous social benefits, lowering the pension age and a hundred per cent increase in maternity benefits (Kotleba, 2016). The fight against the “system” is also explicitly written into the motto of the party: “With courage against the system.”

The party also meets the criterion of low coalition potential: when ĽSNS entered the national parliament in 2016, it received 14 out of the 150 seats, but all of the seven other parliamentary political parties formed a *cordon sanitaire* around it, so the party has zero coalition potential. Nevertheless, in accordance

with what Sartori said about anti-system parties, ĽSNS is ready to bargain on single issues, and it has been approached by other parties, both coalition and opposition, to bargain on issues such as the vote on increasing the number of members required for the registration of minority religions (then the ĽSNS deputies voted with the government) or the investigation of allegations of corruption at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in that case they voted with the opposition).

If we compare the attributes of relational anti-systemness (Table 1) with the attributes of ĽSNS at the level of party positions and actions, we see its congruence with all three attributes, and as for the typology combining ideological and relational anti-systemness (Table 2), we can classify ĽSNS as a typical anti-system party as it is positive on both dimensions. More specifically, we would categorize ĽSNS as a typical anti-system party due to its isolationist strategies and its systematic opposition to Slovakia's founding values: minority rights, its geopolitical position and the democratic traditions in its history. It also recognizes and promotes extreme (fascist, neo-Nazi) ideologies which are contradictory to elementary human rights and are in conflict with the constitution of the Slovak Republic.

In May 2017 the anti-systemness of the party and its threat to Slovakia's democratic regime were recognized by the Prosecutor General of the Slovak Republic when he asked the Supreme Court to ban the party as an extremist group whose activities violate the country's constitution. The court hearing is pending at the time of writing.⁸

CHARACTERISTICS OF SLOVAK ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT AND ANTI-SYSTEM PARTIES' ELECTORATES

Finally, we would like to compare the two examined anti-establishment and anti-system parties in terms of the perspectives of their electorates. We stated that an ideological spatial distance from other parties at the level of the party system is one of the constitutive characteristics of anti-system parties. A similar pattern can be seen at the level of voters. The electorates of seven parliamentary parties evaluated how much they liked individual parties on an 11-point scale, and their answers have been translated into indices ranging from -100 to +100 in the following table.

Table 3: Views of parties' voters about their own and other parties (indices – 100 to +100)

“What do you think about the following political parties? Please rate them on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly dislike that party and 10 means you strongly like that party.”

| Party voted for | Party evaluated | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|
| | ĽSNS | MOST-HID | OĽaNO | SaS | SNS | Sme rodina | Smer-SD |
| ĽSNS | 71 | -37 | -37 | -33 | -48 | -28 | -71 |
| Most-Hid | -51 | 75 | 5 | 3 | -37 | -22 | -29 |
| OĽaNO | -34 | -30 | 47 | 8 | -20 | -30 | -54 |
| SaS | -42 | -29 | 3 | 57 | -33 | -22 | -57 |
| SNS | -45 | -10 | -54 | 3 | 60 | -33 | 5 |
| Sme rodina | -32 | -14 | 8 | 4 | -4 | 25 | -44 |
| Smer-SD | -53 | -4 | -62 | -48 | 25 | -56 | 65 |
| Average for SK population | -40 | -9 | -31 | -19 | 5 | -38 | 3 |

Note: Average indices on the following scale: +100 (most favourable) to –100 (most unfavourable). The numbers in bold represent the evaluations of the voters of the party of their choice.

Source: CSES/ISSP Slovakia, 2016.

The findings of the party/electorate ‘sociogram’ represent a kind of ‘mental map’, the ‘chemistry’ of voters’ perceptions. But here we will focus primarily on our two cases: ĽSNS is the least favoured party among the Slovak public (its average value in the table is –40; it does not receive a positive rating from any electorate except its own, and its negative ratings range from –53 to –32). The positions of ĽSNS voters towards other parties are symmetrical: its extremist voters dislike all the other parties, be they in government or in opposition. As for OĽaNO, it is perceived slightly more positively (with an average rating of –31) (Table 3).

The party/electorate map reveals one more significant finding about ĽSNS and its voters: a very strong identification of the electorate with its party. ĽSNS voters give their party a higher score than any of the other electorates (+71), with the exception of Most-Hid’s electorate, as its ethnically Hungarian voters may feel a particularly strong link to ‘their’ party. The anti-establishment alternative OĽaNO scored only +47 among its voters, which was the lowest score on this variable for all the parties with the exception of Sme rodina (+25), where the lack of party identification could be partially explained by the novelty of this party. However, when we compare it with ĽSNS, for which strong electoral ties are typical, it shows that Sme rodina is closer to the anti-establishment alternatives – perhaps it is even a sort of OĽaNO for a new generation.

The strong inclination of ĽSNS voters for their party can also be demonstrated by other findings from the post-election survey. Specifically, when asked the question

“Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular party?” 68% of ĽSNS voters answered positively, whereas significantly fewer OĽaNO voters – only 48% – did so. Moreover, when the survey asked, “Do you feel very close, somewhat close, or not very close to this party?” 44% of ĽSNS voters but only 16% of OĽaNO voters said they felt “very close” to the party they had voted for. To complete the picture of their high level of identification, the loyalty of the ĽSNS voters can also be demonstrated by the fact that 90% of the party’s voters in the 2016 election said they would repeat their choice 6 months after the election, which was the highest percentage of core loyal voters among all the parliamentary parties (CSES/ISSP Slovakia, 2016).

The electorates of the anti-establishment and anti-system alternative parties are also different in terms of the profiles of their voters. As we already argued, the anti-establishment parties are characterized by an unclear profile and a relatively weak identification with the party on the part of its voters. On the other hand the voters of the anti-system alternative ĽSNS have a very clear profile above all on issues which are constitutive for the party’s program: their views on immigrants are the most hostile out of all the groups of voters, although it has to be pointed out that views on immigration are fairly negative among practically all the parties’ electorates. ĽSNS voters are also extremely negative towards EU integration, and other survey data shows their strong resentment towards minorities and also towards democracy.

Table 4: Views on refugees and EU integration

| Voters of | Refugees: a benefit or a threat for EU countries? (0 = benefit, 10 = threat) | St. Deviations | European integration: has it gone too far or should it be continued? (0 = gone too far, 10 = should be continued and deepened) | St. Deviations |
|---------------------------|---|----------------|--|----------------|
| ĽSNS | 9.37 | 1.028 | 3.17 | 3.054 |
| SNS | 8.59 | 1.545 | 3.63 | 2.602 |
| Most-Híd | 8.53 | 1.650 | 3.91 | 2.785 |
| Smer-SD | 8.51 | 1.775 | 4.03 | 2.844 |
| Average for SK population | 8.41 | 1.837 | 3.90 | 2.786 |
| OĽaNO | 8.14 | 2.079 | 4.42 | 3.192 |
| SaS | 7.87 | 2.099 | 3.79 | 2.316 |
| Sme rodina | 7.65 | 2.230 | 4.11 | 3.315 |

Source: CSES/ISSP, 2016.

The same pattern of the electorates' views can be documented also in connection with other topics and statements. For example, it can be demonstrated by the data from the survey focused on cultural values (including positions on national sovereignty; intolerance towards others in terms of religion, ethnicity, and/or sexual orientation; positions on European integration, etc.). The ĽSNS voters are clear outliers whereas the OĽaNO voters are close to the country mean (Table 5). The same pattern emerges when it comes to evaluations of some key historical events, and social distance from or support for Slovakia's NATO membership (Bútorová and Mesežnikov, 2017).

Table 5: Cultural Closedness vs. Openness (averages on a scale from 1, which means the values are perceived extremely unfavourably by the given party, to 7, which means the values are perceived extremely favourably by the given party)⁹

| | Cultural closedness, protection of national sovereignty | Multiculturalism, cultural openness, deeper integration |
|---------------------------|---|---|
| SaS | 4.91 | 4.25 |
| Most-Híd | 5.00 | 4.53 |
| Average for SK population | 5.08 | 3.92 |
| Sme rodina | 5.10 | 4.04 |
| OĽaNO | 5.25 | 4.13 |
| SNS | 5.30 | 3.92 |
| Smer-SD | 5.32 | 3.85 |
| KDH | 5.50 | 4.10 |
| ĽSNS | 5.60 | 3.00 |

Source: Bútorová & Mesežnikov, 2017: 24.

Summing up the aforementioned empirical findings, we can also see significant differences at the level of electorates between the anti-establishment protest parties and the anti-system alternatives. Whereas the protest voters who voted for anti-establishment choices are only very loosely identified with their selected parties, and such a choice could be a short-term option, the voters of the anti-system party are strongly identified with their party, the electorate is much more homogeneous in terms of their opinions and they are clearly ideologically distant from any other voter groups. So, the voters of an extreme anti-system party are strongly identified with 'their' party: they feel a high proximity to its views and values, and are certain that they will vote for it again. Such intense party loyalty is clearly demonstrated in the case of ĽSNS but not in the case of OĽaNO or even Sme rodina. Thus, we conclude that ĽSNS can be categorized as an anti-system party in a way that other parties in Slovakia cannot.

CONCLUSION: PUTTING THE FOURTH GENERATION IN (REGIONAL) CONTEXT

This article has examined the radicalization of new alternatives among the Central European political parties. As we have illustrated, the emergence and electoral success of new parties is a complex, multidimensional phenomenon. The key objective of this article was to identify the distinction line between anti-establishment and anti-system parties, and to exhibit the growing radicalization of new alternatives in the case of Slovakia. Using a single country case study with a focus on two political actors – the typical anti-establishment party OĽaNO and the emblematic radical anti-system party ĽSNS – we demonstrated that the process of emerging new alternatives continues with each new election in the post-communist countries. However, with its continuation we also see a radicalization of the new alternatives – namely, a shift from anti-establishment to anti-system parties. While the future of anti-system parties in Slovakia is far from certain, looking at the data presented above, particularly in relation to voter loyalty, would suggest that the radicalization is unlikely to be a short-lived phenomenon.

This is relevant to a much broader recent debate about the illiberal turn and the illiberal consolidation, deconsolidation, hollowing and backsliding of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (for example, see Krastev, 2007; Greskovits, 2015; Dawson & Hanley, 2016) as well as to the discussion of the rise of populism, Euroscepticism and extremism across even more advanced democracies. Compared to Orbán's Hungary and Kaczyński's Poland, Slovakia represents a less prominent case of such tendencies and is not very often mentioned in the 'backsliding literature'. This has two reasons: Firstly, the extreme and anti-system ĽSNS has only recently entered the national parliament and is still rather too marginal to have a crucial impact on the party system and change the broader political profile of the country. Secondly, the ruling party Smer-SD – unlike FIDESZ in Hungary or Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland – is not taking major steps to undermine democratic mechanisms or initiate a populist mobilization (to give some examples of such steps in other countries, Hungary made some constitutional amendments aimed at concentrating power and held an anti-EU plebiscite in autumn 2016, and the new government in Poland established overt state control over public broadcasting and allowed governmental interference with the Polish constitutional court).

But what are the factors that prevent an illiberal turn in Slovakia? Szomolányi and Gál (2016) identified four: the pragmatic-opportunistic two-faced politics of the Slovak political elite; the proportional electoral system which is conducive to coalition governments; Slovakia's strong EU integration, including its integration in the euro-zone; and, last but not least, the structure of the Slovak economy, which is export-oriented and very much dependent on the EU single market (Szomolányi & Gál, 2016: 80).¹⁰ Nevertheless, the electoral success of ĽSNS was a signal that under cer-

tain circumstances even an anti-system party can get enough votes to be represented at parliamentary level, not to mention the fact that a large portion of these votes came from young voters and voters who did not vote until they finally found a tempting choice in 2016 (Gyárfášová et al., 2017).

This latest development shows that radicalization of newly emerging alternatives is a more general phenomenon than previously thought – and that Slovakia is not immune to this issue. To mention a similar case, a further radicalization of the already radical right-wing part of the political spectrum is to be observed in Hungary; the main opposition party, Jobbik, has been moving away from its far-right roots and is staking out a more centrist position while being replaced by a newly established movement called “Force and Determination”, which uses openly racist language to oppose liberalism and immigration. This shows that the process of radicalization of new alternatives is ongoing in the region (for more details, see *The Guardian*, 2017).

When looking at the general social climate in Slovakia we can see a broad spectrum of contextual indicators which could be the background for the recent radicalization, ranging from the consequences of the radical rhetoric used by mainstream politicians on the issue of migration to the growing political corruption and an inefficient judiciary, and the spill-over effect of a radical populist ‘Zeitgeist’ which is currently circulating in the democratic world. It is very difficult to quantify this precisely, or to sufficiently demonstrate the causal effects. However, comparing some indicators from 2010 and 2016 we can see that the general satisfaction with democracy declined, as did trust in the meaningfulness of the democratic electoral process, meaningful voting and effective vote choices, all of which are indicators of institutional efficiency.¹¹

The survey data also show an increasing tolerance for radical statements. In international comparisons, Slovakia used to be a country with an above-average resistance to radical views and activities. Nowadays, however, it is a country where tolerance of such views and activities is above average (Bahna & Zagrapan, 2017). The poll conducted in fall 2016 (CSES/ISSP, 2016) showed that there is a connection between attitudes to corruption and the growing tolerance of radical views in Slovakia. Namely, those who believe that politicians are corrupt are more tolerant of radical activities. Eight to ten years ago this connection did not exist (ibid.). So, we can assume that negative changes in the social and political climate might indirectly contribute to the increased popularity of anti-system parties or at least to a continuation of their presence on the political scenes in post-communist countries.

This paper also revealed how the voters of anti-system parties differ from other constituencies: the Slovak case shows that their voters are highly identified with their chosen party, meaning that they would hardly listen to cognitive arguments about the party’s dangerous ideology or the very low policy competence of extremist politicians. To vote for an ideologically extreme anti-system party is very much an act

of an affective nature. This leads us to assume that the stability of such parties' votes could be higher than that of some short-lived anti-establishment parties which emerged in the earlier stages of the third generation post-communist elections.

Consequently, although it has been common in Slovakia and other CEE states for new parties to come and go, the dangers posed to liberal democracy in Slovakia – and to the country's participation in the EU and NATO – by a far right party such as ĽSNS may be greater than they at first seem. As has been shown, this anti-system party differs in many respects from anti-establishment parties, and some of these features may make it likely to be re-elected at the national level, or its anti-system-ness may be taken up by other actors. Given the regional context of democratic backsliding and increasingly openly expressed anti-EU and anti-NATO sentiments, this is an issue for Slovakia's neighbours, partners and allies to also pay attention to.

ENDNOTES

¹ This work has been conducted within the project 'Between East and West, Value Integration or Divergence? Slovak Society in the International Comparative Surveys', which was supported by the Slovak Research and Development Agency (APVV-14-0527). The author would like to thank Prof. Soňa Szomolányi, Dr. Karen Henderson and the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful advice on earlier versions of this paper as well as the Editor and proofreader of *New Perspectives* for their work in improving the piece.

² The pagination is according to the edition published by ECPR in 2005. See the Bibliography.

³ The 'Gorilla scandal' was the biggest political corruption scandal in Slovakia since the 2000s (after the end of the Mečiar governments). Information about politicians, officials and business executives discussing 'businesses' and privatization contracts was leaked from the secret service in December 2011. The Gorilla scandal resulted in a wave of nationwide political protests across the country shortly before the 2012 general election.

⁴ In its program for the 2016 election OĽaNO declares, "good politics; a good state; a good life and a good job" (Obyčajní ľudia, 2016b).

⁵ In the 2016 election some long-term Christian Democrat voters argued that they switched to OĽaNO because their representatives are allegedly more authentic in terms of upholding traditional Christian values.

⁶ The left-right economic axis comprises two indicators: paternalism vs. individual responsibility, and for vs. against social redistribution.

⁷ The liberal vs. conservative axis comprises three indicators: pro-life vs. pro-choice, pro- vs. anti-same sex marriage, and the role of the church in society (its strengthening vs. its weakening).

⁸ It is worth noting that the ĽSNS predecessor Slovenská pospolitosť – Národná strana (Slovak Solidarity – National Party) was banned in 2006 (the first party to be prohibited after 1989). The Supreme Court ordered the dissolution of the ultra-nationalist party because of its extremist ideology.

⁹ Respondents gave their evaluations of nine different values and political positions. Based on a factor analysis a summary index for two dimensions has been constructed. For more details see Bútorová and Mesežnikov (2017: 24–25).

¹⁰ Let us specify the differences between Slovakia and the other V4 states: Slovakia is the only Visegrad country which already adopted the euro currency (in January 2009). Unlike Slovakia Hungary has a mixed electoral system, since in accordance with the latest amendments introduced by Orbán, in the most recent Hungarian election (April 2018) more than half of the seats were won on a majority 'first-past-the-post' basis in individual constituencies, and the second round was eliminated, which led to even greater advantages for Fidesz. Also, out of all the V4 countries Slovakia has the highest share of intra-EU exports of goods, and Poland the lowest (Eurostat, 2018).

¹¹ The indicators show a quite consistent trend: within six years, the overall satisfaction with democracy decreased by 9 percentage points, the belief that it does make a difference who is in power decreased by 12 percentage points and fewer people think that the elections offer meaningful choices – a decrease by 13 percentage points. The changes over time are statistically significant and illustrate that public trust in democracy has declined (CSES/ISSP, 2016). Also, the widespread complaint that all politicians are the same is more common than it was six years ago.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bahna, Miloslav and Jozef Zagrapan (2017), 'Tolerancia radikálnych názorov narástla a súvisí s vnímaním skorpumpovanosti politikov' [The Tolerance of Radical Views Increased and It Is Related to the Perception of the Corruption of Politicians]. Available at http://www.sociologia.sav.sk/cms/uploaded/2543_attach_Bahna_Zagrapan_radikali.pdf (accessed 21/05/2017).
- Biezen, Ingrid van (2005), 'On the Theory and Practice of Party Formation and Adaptation in New Democracies', *European Journal of Political Research*, 44(1): 147–174.
- Biezen, Ingrid van, Peter Mair & Thomas Poguntke (2012), 'Going, Going, ... Gone? The Decline of Party Membership in Contemporary Europe', *European Journal of Political Research*, 51(1): 24–56.
- Bútorová, Zora & Olga Gyárfášová (2011), 'Trendy vo verejnej mienke a voľičskom správaní [Trends in Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior]', in Zora Bútorová (ed.) *Slovenské voľby 2010. Šanca na zmenu [Chance for Change]*, Bratislava: Inštitút pre verejné otázky, pp. 143–180.
- Bútorová, Zora, Olga Gyárfášová and Martin Slosiarik (2012), 'Verejná mienka a voľičské správanie [Public Opinion and Behaviour]', in Vladimír Krivý (ed.) *Slovenské voľby '12. Čo im predchádzalo, postoj a výsledky [What preceded them, attitudes and results]*, Bratislava: SAV, pp. 137–202.
- Bútorová, Zora & Grigorij Mesežnikov (2017), *Zaostrené na extrémizmus [Focused on Extremism]*, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs.
- Capoccia, Giovanni (2002), 'Anti-System Parties: A Conceptual Reassessment', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 14(9): 9–35.
- CSES/ISSP Slovakia (2016), 'Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems/International Social Survey Programme', empirical data set from a representative survey. Available at http://sasd.sav.sk/sk/data_katalog_abs.php?id=sasd_2016002.
- Dalton, Russel J. (1988), *Citizen Politics in Western Democracies: Public Opinion and Political Parties in the United State, Great Britain, West Germany, and France*, Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers.
- Dalton, Russel J. (1998), *Parties Without Partisans: The Decline of Party Identifications Among Democratic Publics*, Berkeley: Center for German and European Studies, University of California, Berkeley.

- Dawson, James & Sean Hanley (2016), 'East Central Europe: The Fading Mirage of the Liberal Consensus', *Journal of Democracy*, 27(1): 20–34.
- Duverger, Maurice (1954), *Political Parties. Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, London, Methuen, New York: Wiley.
- Eurostat (2018), 'Intra EU Exports of Goods Compared with Extra EU Exports of Goods by Member State, 2016'. Available at [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Intra_EU_exports_of_goods_compared_with_Extra_EU_exports_of_goods_by_Member_State,_2016_\(%25\).png](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Intra_EU_exports_of_goods_compared_with_Extra_EU_exports_of_goods_by_Member_State,_2016_(%25).png).
- Greskovits, Bela (2015), 'The Hollowing and Backsliding of Democracy in East Central Europe', *Global Policy*, 6(S1): 28–37.
- The Guardian (2017), 'Hungarian Far Right Launches New Political Party', 08/07/2017. Available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/08/hungarian-far-right-launches-new-political-party>.
- Gyárfášová, Oľga & Grigorij Mesežnikov (2015), 'Actors, Agenda, and Appeals of Radical Nationalist Right in Slovakia', in Michael Minkenberg (ed.) *Transforming the Transformation? The East European Radical Right in the Political Process*, Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 224–248.
- Haughton, Tim & Kevin Deegan-Krause (2015), 'Hurricane Season: Systems of Instability in Central and Eastern European Party Politics', *East European Politics and Societies and Culture*, 29(1): 61–80.
- Haughton, Tim, Darina Malova and Kevin Deegan-Krause (2016), 'Slovakia's Newly Elected Parliament Is Dramatically Different and Pretty Much the Same. Here's How', *The Washington Post*, 09/03/2016. Available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/09/slovakias-newly-elected-parliament-is-dramatically-different-and-pretty-much-the-same-heres-how/> (accessed 30/11/2016).
- Hug, Simon (2001), *Altering Party Systems. Strategic Behavior and the Emergence of New Political Parties in Western Democracies*, Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.
- Kirchheimer, Otto (1966), 'The Transformation of Western European Party Systems', in Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner (eds.) *Political Parties and Political Development*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 177–200.
- Kotleba – Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko (2015), 'Antisemitizmus alebo odvádzanie pozornosti od podstaty verejného dlhu?' [Anti-Semitism or Drawing Attention Away from the Essence of the Public Debt?]. Available at <http://www.naseslovensko.net/nasa-praca/antisemitizmus-alebo-odvadzanie-pozornosti-od-podstaty-verejneho-dlhu/>.
- Kotleba – Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko (2016), '10 bodov za naše Slovensko! Volebný program politickej strany' [10 Points for Our Slovakia! Election Manifesto of the Political Party Kotleba – People's Party Our Slovakia]. Available at <http://www.naseslovensko.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Volebn%C3%BD-program-2016.pdf> (accessed 12/06/2017).
- Krastev, Ivan (2007), 'The Strange Death of the Liberal Consensus', *Journal of Democracy*, 18(4): 56–63.
- Krouwel, Andre & Paul Lucardie (2008), 'Waiting in the Wings: New Parties in the Netherlands', *Acta Politica*, 43(2): 278–307.
- Lipset, Seymour M. and Stein Rokkan (1967), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, New York: The Free Press.
- Lucardie, Paul (2000), 'Prophets, Purifiers and Prolocutors: Towards a Theory on the Emergence of New Parties', *Party Politics*, 6(2): 175–185.

- Mair, Peter (1997), *Party System Change. Approaches and Interpretations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Michalak, Bartolomiej (2011), 'The Anti-Systemness of the Protest Parties', *Polish Political Science*, Vol. 40: 110–121.
- Obyčajní ľudia (2012), 'Volebný program hnutia Obyčajní ľudia a nezávislé osobnosti pre voľby do NR SR v roku 2012' [Party Manifesto of the Movement Ordinary People and Independent Personalities for the General Election in 2012]. Available at <http://obycajniludia.sk/volebny-program-hnutia/> (accessed 10/10/2016).
- Obyčajní ľudia (2014), 'Volebný program hnutia Obyčajní ľudia a nezávislé osobnosti pre voľby do EP v roku 2014. Máme radi Slovensko' [Party Manifesto of the Movement Ordinary People and Independent Personalities for the EP Elections in 2014. We Love Slovakia]. Available at <http://www.eurokandidatka.sk/program/> (accessed 10/10/2016).
- Obyčajní ľudia (2016a), 'Náš program pre Slovensko. Program za ľudské a rozumné Slovensko' [Our Program for Slovakia. A Program for a Humane and Reasonable Slovakia]. Party manifesto of the movement Ordinary People and Independent Personalities – NOVA for the 2016 general election. Available at http://www.obycajniludia.sk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/PROGRAM_OLANO_bez_orezek_B.pdf (accessed 10/10/2017).
- Obyčajní ľudia (2016b), 'Ciele a vízia hnutia' [The Movement's Goals and Visions]. Available at <http://www.obycajniludia.sk/ciele-avizia-hnutia>.
- Plasser, Fritz and Peter A. Ulram (2000), 'The Changing Austrian Voter', Vienna: Center for Applied Political Research. Available at <http://www.demokratiezentrum.org/fileadmin/media/pdf/austrian-voter.pdf>.
- Pop-Eleches, Grigore (2010), 'Throwing Out the Bums: Protest Voting and Unorthodox Parties after Communism', *World Politics*, 62(2): 221–260.
- Rovny, Jan (2015), 'Party Competition Structure in Eastern Europe: Aggregate Uniformity Versus Idiosyncratic Diversity?', *East European Politics & Societies*, 29(1): 40–60.
- Sartori, Giovanni (1976 [2005]), *Parties and Party Systems*, 2005 edition, ECPR Press Classics.
- Schmitt, Hermann & Soren Holmberg (1995), 'Political Parties in Decline?', in Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs (eds.) *Citizens and the State*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 95–133.
- Sikk, Allan (2011), 'Newness as a Winning Formula for New Political Parties', *Party Politics*, 18(4): 465–486. Available at http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?hl=en&publication_year=1995&pages=95-133&author=H+Schmitt&author=S+Holmberg&title=Political+parties+in+decline%3F&.
- Szomolányi, Soňa & Zsolt Gál (2016), 'Slovakia's Elite: Between Populism and Compliance with EU Elites', in Jan Pakulski (ed.) *The Visegrad Countries in Crisis*, Warsaw. Collegium Civitas, pp. 67–86. Available at https://www.civitas.edu.pl/collegium/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/The-Visegrad-Countries-in-Crisis-%E2%80%93-ed.-J.-Pakulski-2016_final_final.pdf (accessed 18/07/2017).
- Učeň, Peter, Olga Gyárfášová & Vladimír Krivý (2005), 'Centrist Populism in Slovakia from the Perspective of Voters and Supporters', *Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs*, 6(1): 28–46.
- Vražda, Daniel (2016), 'Cesta Mariana Kotlebu z bystrického sídliska až do parlamentu' [Marian Kotleba's Path from a Bystrice Housing Estate to the Parliament], *Denník N*, 07/03/2016. Available at

<https://dennikn.sk/396106/cesta-mariana-kotlebu-bystrickeho-sidliska-az-do-parlamentu/> (accessed 12/06/2017).

- Zulianello, Mattia (2017), 'Anti-System Parties Revisited: Concept Formation and Guidelines for Empirical Research', *Government and Opposition*, May 2017: 1–29.

Cultural Cut

HHhH (2012)

&

The 7th Function of Language (2017)

LAURENT BINET

EDITOR'S NOTE

HAVING & EATING; DEAD & ALIVE

BENJAMIN TALLIS

Editor-in-Chief, *New Perspectives*

Never content to rest on our laurels, *New Perspectives* again breaks new ground by publishing not *one* but *two* cultural cuts. And what a way to do so – with extracts from Laurent Binet's globally acclaimed novels *HHhH* and *The 7th Function of Language*. Runaway literary successes, bestsellers translated into more than 30 languages and reviewed in the Anglosphere by publications including *The Guardian*, *The New York Times*, *The London Review of Books*, *The Washington Post*, *the FT* ... and now, excerpted in *New Perspectives*, so for a moment let us rest on our Laurents.

HHhH, Binet's debut novel, which won the Prix Goncourt and a host of other awards, tells a story that's been told many times before. Well, really it tells at least three stories that have been told before.

1

A story of Reinhard(t) Heydrich, the Reichsprotektor of Bohemia and Moravia, the Hangman of Prague, the Blonde Beast, the architect of the Final Solution, The Man with the Iron Heart (as the film adaptation is called) and the 'name' of Himmler's brain – *Himmlers Hirn heißt Heydrich: HHhH*.

2

A tale of the Czechoslovak resistance and Jozef Gabčík and Jan Kubiš of the 'Free' Czechoslovak forces, parachuted back to the Czech lands from England and who, with considerable difficulty, assistance and betrayal, assassinated Heydrich before being killed themselves, and before Nazi vengeance was unleashed on the village of Lidice outside of Prague.

3

A selective, panoramic account of the Third Reich that stretches geographically from France to Ukraine; temporally from the early 20th to the early 21st century; and which zooms in to the level of the individual and out to the level of the geopolitical, through memory as well as diplomacy.

All of this raises questions that are as pertinent for academics as they are for novelists. Binet openly deals with various issues, including: verisimilitude in reconstruction, reflexivity and the place of the author in writing as well as the research that underpins it, and the need to deal with controversies and competing interpretations. He also details habits of procrastination and the painful process of paring down the narrative to only include as much detail as is necessary to tell the story – rather than every snippet that is fascinating to us, but likely less so to our readers.

Significantly, Binet tackles head on (and repeatedly) the issues involved with reconstructing and narrativizing historical events, rejecting the urge to ‘bring the past to life’ or ‘breathe life into the dead pages of history’. As you will see in the extract, he warns of the dangers of ‘hypotyposis’ and the curious relation of seeing and blindness and how it may or may not be convincing as ‘actual’, ‘real’ detail rather than imaginative inventions. He settles, in myriad ways, for crafting a ‘parable’ that is “extremely accurate” or “extremely illustrative.” Settles isn’t fair though; unsettles would be better.

4

The parallels to academic work here should be clear, most obviously in the historical and narrative work to which international relations has turned in recent years, but also for anyone who conducts fieldwork or interviews with people – what value do we place on the words of our interlocutors; how do we shape them into a narrative that aims for accuracy or illustration? How do we make sense of what we are told – and how do we then tell our stories; and to what purpose?

How do we relate all that to the many other ways in which these stories have been told and which will influence (more or less) how our own stories are received – or whether they are received at all?

Do we also see a tendency to fetishise our subject matter and the dangers of exoticism or pedestalsation, intermingled with sympathy, empathy as well as the normative drive of our work and how our various strengths and shortcomings enable us to do justice to it?

And yes, these books are about Central and Eastern Europe, in different ways, since you ask.

5

The 7th Function is more satirical and playful than *HHhH*, which fits better with (French) intellectuals than perpetrators of the holocaust. But in its own way it is no less serious. As more than one reviewer notes, Binet likes to have his cake and eat it – he satirises academic and intellectual pretensions and offers a resounding vindication of their importance.

The having and eating is clear in the narrative opening that questions the relationship between fiction and reality, in which Binet purports to “want to tell you what actually happened” mere pages after the epigraph, taken from Jacques Derrida, has encouraged us to remember that:

there are interpreters everywhere. Each speaking his own language, even if he has some knowledge of the language of the other. The interpreter’s ruses have an open field and he does not forget his own interests.

And interpret Binet does. He frames too. The establishing shot gets hit with a jump cut that brings in semiotic theory, its consolations and its disappointments. In our extract I add a jump cut of my own. No need to wait for Godard. You’ll see.

6

The 7th Function is a rollercoaster, a page turner that takes in the Paris of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, Philippe Sollers and Julia Kristeva and the gang of gigolos who hang around the Café de Flore (and other places); Umberto Eco’s Bologna; Ithaca and a conference at Cornell attended by, *inter alia*, John Searle, Camille Paglia, Foucault, Derrida, Kristeva, Noam Chomsky, and a young Judith Butler (and the grad students who try and make sense – and sensuality – of them); and a Venice that belongs, somewhat offhand, to Simon Herzog, the semiotics postgrad and unlikely partner in crime to Superintendent Jacques Bayard. And that’s before we head back to Paris and Naples ... all in search of the mysterious ‘7th Function of Language’, a political-semiotic ark of the covenant. You know, how you can really do things with words.

7

The trouble is that the books’ ‘chapters’ – my god how many of them are there? – are so small but so uneven in length that they don’t start neatly on new pages, which makes extracting difficult (as we faithfully reproduce excerpts page by page, font by font) ... even if it is a super way to write a book. Or anything, come to think of it.

There are 99 in the *7th Function* and 257 in *HHhH*, by the way.

So, I could have chosen that magnetic scene in which Deleuze, Lacan, Foucault, Hamed (a gigolo), Sollers and Kristeva, not to mention President Valéry Giscard

D'Estaing, are all watching the same TV programme, on which an important announcement about Roland Barthes is made (and many eyes are rolled).

Or the dinner party with much of the same crowd – but add Althusser, some North Americans and Bernard Henri Levy (and his white shirt) and discard Giscard. The invented dialogue sparkles and shocks illustratively and mingles, jostles sometimes, with accurate descriptions of events.

8

Still, the extracts came free and in a charming way from the publishers so I shouldn't complain about that. And I won't because it's really an honour to have a world-renowned fiction writer appearing here in our journal. And it was all arranged through Twitter, which is pretty short and uneven itself, truth be told, but through which Laurent was terribly kind.

So, I chose 4 pages from *The 7th Function*'s beginning and a fifth from later in the book, which might seem a little incongruous and cuts in a somewhat jarring manner, but I wanted to use our full allocation after all, and it contains some important clues, keys perhaps. There was so much to choose from, but this will have to do. And it will do well.

9

The extracts begin, though, with those from *HHhH* and they start in Halle, not far from where I am sitting now, writing this editorial. I'm in Leipzig and the cities share an airport (now that we know it is indeed Halle [Saale]) at least – and I'm late in writing this. It's been bothering me, partly because of the constraints set by the publishers – only 5 pages (haggled up from “2–3”) per book. How to do justice to such works with such a paltry (although very generous) amount?

It's impossible, so instead I just chose parts where I found something particularly accurate or illustrative, funny or significant and which introduce a facet of Laurent Binet's style and some of the ways in which he treats and makes substance – or a flavour of that substance at least.

10

It's amazing really that Laurent agreed. And that Penguin were on board too. So here we are with a world famous novelist in *New Perspectives* and the editor's note is late. Yes, because of the chapters and choosing between them. But it's also late because I couldn't decide whether to try and echo Binet's style in my note, and procrastinated while I mulled it over. Adéla suggested it and I dismissed it. But then I thought again and wondered if it wouldn't be best after all. She's probably right. But there's no time for that now though, not to do it well at least. Well, maybe I'll try. A bit. Let's see where that gets us...

While Laurent Binet may not want to “invent” Nazism, nor to bring these ‘dead pages’ (of history or philosophy) to ‘life’, he succeeds in making the subject matter of both books relevant in a new way, fresh to a perhaps jaded audience, and makes them stand out amid the noise, the commentary – as if saying for the first time what has nonetheless been said, inventively repeating what was never told as Foucault may have put it.

But really, there was so much to choose from, so much I wanted to share – I loved reading these books. Raced through them and went back to the start again.

I hope you’ll like the extracts.

And then read the rest.

With gratitude to Laurent Binet for his responsiveness and generosity – and for writing the novels – as well as thanks to Stuart Williams and Madeleine Hartley of Penguin Random House for making this happen.

HHhH

Laurent Binet



TRANSLATED FROM
THE FRENCH BY SAM TAYLOR

HARVILL SECKER LONDON

Published by Harvill Secker 2012

2 4 6 8 10 9 7 5 3 1

Copyright © Éditions Grasset et Fasquelle 2009

English translation copyright © Sam Taylor 2012

Published by arrangement with Farrar, Straus and Giroux LLC,
18 West 18th Street, New York NY 10011, USA. All rights reserved

Laurent Binet has asserted his right under the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988 to be identified as the author of this work

Grateful thanks to Milan Kundera and to Faber and Faber for permission to
reprint material from *Encounter*, translated by Linda Asher

This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not,
by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, resold, hired out, or otherwise
circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form of
binding or cover other than that in which it is published
and without a similar condition including this condition
being imposed on the subsequent purchaser

First published with the title *HHhH* in 2009
by Éditions Grasset et Fasquelle, France

First published in Great Britain in 2012 by

HARVILL SECKER

Random House

20 Vauxhall Bridge Road

SW1V 2SA

www.randomhouse.co.uk

Addresses for companies within The Random House Group Limited can be found at:
www.randomhouse.co.uk/offices.htm

The Random House Group Limited Reg. No. 954009

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 9781846554797 (hardback)

ISBN 9781846554803 (trade paperback)


The Random House Group Limited supports The Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC®), the leading international forest certification organisation.

Our books carrying the FSC label are printed on FSC® certified paper.

FSC is the only forest certification scheme endorsed by the leading
environmental organisations, including Greenpeace.

Our paper procurement policy can be found at:

www.randomhouse.co.uk/environment



Printed and bound in Great Britain by Clays Ltd, St Ives PLC

13

Of course I could, perhaps I should – to be like Victor Hugo, for example – describe at length, by way of introduction, over ten pages or so, the town of Halle, where Heydrich was born in 1904. I would talk of the streets, the shops, the statues, of all the local curiosities, of the municipal government, the town's infrastructure, of the culinary specialities, of the inhabitants and the way they think, their political tendencies, their tastes, of what they do in their spare time. Then I would zoom in on the Heydrichs' house: the colour of its shutters and its curtains, the layout of the rooms, the wood from which the living-room table is made. Following this would be a minutely detailed description of the piano, accompanied by a long disquisition on German music at the beginning of the century, its role in society, its composers and how their works were received, the importance of Wagner . . . and there, only at that point, would my actual story begin. I remember one interminable digression in *The Hunchback of Notre Dame* on the workings of judicial institutions in the Middle Ages. I thought that was very clever. But I skipped the passage.

So I've decided not to overstylize my story. That suits me fine because, even if for later episodes I'll have to resist the temptation to flaunt my knowledge by writing too many details for this or that scene that I've researched too much, I must admit that in this case – regarding Heydrich's birthplace – my knowledge is a bit sketchy. There are two towns in Germany called Halle, and I don't even know which one I'm talking about. For the time being, I think it's not important. We'll see.

14

The teacher calls the pupils one by one: 'Reinhardt Heydrich!' Reinhardt steps forward, but another child raises a hand: 'Sir! Why don't you call him by his real name?' A shiver of pleasure spreads through the class. 'His name is Süß, everyone knows that!' The class explodes, the pupils roar. Reinhardt says nothing: he clenches his fists. He never says anything. He has the best marks in the class. Later that day, he will be the best at P.E. And he's not a Jew. At least he hopes not. His grandmother remarried a Jew, apparently, but that's got nothing to do with his family. This, at least, is what he's understood from the public rumours and his father's indignant denials. But in all honesty he's not really sure. In the meantime, he's going to shut them all up in P.E. And this evening, when he gets home, before his father gives him his violin lesson, he'll be able to boast that he was top of the class again. And his father will be proud, and congratulate him.

But this evening the violin lesson won't happen and Reinhardt won't even be able to tell his father about school. When he gets home, he will learn that the country is at war.

'Why is there a war, Father?'

'Because France and England are jealous of Germany, my son.'

'Why are they jealous?'

'Because the Germans are stronger than they are.'

15

There is nothing more artificial in a historical narrative than this kind of dialogue – reconstructed from more or less firsthand accounts with the idea of breathing life into the dead pages of history. In stylistic terms, this process has certain similarities with hypotyposis, which means making a scene so lifelike that it gives the reader the impression he can see it with his own eyes. When a writer tries to bring a conversation back to life in this way, the result is often contrived and the effect the opposite of that desired: you see too clearly the strings controlling the puppets, you hear too distinctly the author's voice in the mouths of these historical figures.

There are only three ways you can faithfully reconstruct a dialogue: from an audio recording, from a video recording, or from shorthand notes. And even with this last method, there is no absolute guarantee that the contents of the conversation will be recorded exactly, down to the last comma. Indeed, the stenographer will often condense, summarize, reformulate, synthesize. But let's assume that the spirit and tone are reconstructed in a generally satisfactory manner.

If my dialogues can't be based on precise, faithful, word-perfect sources, they will be invented. However, if that's the case, they will function not as a hypotyposis but as a parable. They will be either extremely accurate or extremely illustrative. And just so there's no confusion, all the dialogues I invent (there won't be many) will be written like scenes from a play. A stylistic drop in an ocean of reality.

40

Fabrice comes to visit, and talks to me about the book I'm writing. He's an old university friend who, like me, is passionate about history. This summer evening we eat on the terrace and he talks about my book's opening with an enthusiasm that is encouraging. He fixes on the construction of the chapter about the Night of the Long Knives: this series of telephone calls, according to him, evokes both the bureaucratic nature and the mass production of what will be the hallmark of Nazism – murder. I'm flattered but also suspicious, and I decide to make him clarify what he means: 'But you know that each telephone call corresponds to an actual case? I could get almost all the names for you, if I wanted to.' He is surprised, and responds ingenuously that he'd thought I'd invented this. Vaguely disturbed, I ask him: 'What about Strasser?' Heydrich going there in person, giving the order to let him suffer a slow death in his cell: that, too, he thought I'd invented. I am mortified, and I shout: 'But no, it's all true!' And I think: 'Damn, I'm not there yet . . .'

That same evening, I watch a TV documentary on an old Hollywood film about General Patton. The film is soberly entitled *Patton*. The documentary consists essentially of showing extracts from the film, then interviewing witnesses who explain, 'In fact, it wasn't really like that . . .'

He didn't take on two Messerschmitts that were machine-gunning the base, armed only with his Colt (but no doubt he would have done, according to the witness, if the Messerschmitts had given him time). He didn't make such-and-such a speech before the whole army but in private, and besides, he didn't actually say that. He didn't learn at the last moment that he was going to be sent to France, but had in fact been informed several weeks in advance. He didn't disobey orders in taking

Palermo, but did so with the backing of the Allied High Command and his own direct superior. He certainly didn't tell a Russian general to go fuck himself, even if he didn't much like the Russians. And so on. So, basically, the film is about a fictional character whose life is strongly inspired by Patton's, but who clearly isn't him. And yet the film is called *Patton*. And that doesn't shock anybody. Everyone finds it normal, fudging reality to make a screenplay more dramatic, or adding coherence to the narrative of a character whose real path probably included too many random ups and downs, insufficiently loaded with significance. It's because of people like that, forever messing with historical truth just to sell their stories, that an old friend, familiar with all these fictional genres and therefore fatally accustomed to these processes of glib falsification, can say to me in innocent surprise: 'Oh, really, it's not invented?'

No, it's not invented! What would be the point of 'inventing' Nazism?



41

You'll have gathered by now that I am fascinated by this story. But at the same time I think it's getting to me.

One night, I had a dream. I was a German soldier, dressed in the grey-green uniform of the Wehrmacht, and I was on guard duty in an unidentified landscape, covered with snow and bordered by barbed wire. This background was clearly inspired by the numerous Second World War video games to which I've occasionally been weak enough to become addicted: Call of Duty, Medal of Honour, Red Orchestra . . .

Suddenly, during my patrol, Heydrich himself arrived to perform an inspection. I stood to attention and held my breath while he circled me with an inquisitorial air. I was terrorized by the idea

The 7th
of FUNCTION
LANGUAGE

LAURENT BINET

TRANSLATED FROM
THE FRENCH BY SAM TAYLOR



Harvill Secker
L O N D O N

1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

Harvill Secker, an imprint of Vintage,
20 Vauxhall Bridge Road,
London SW1V 2SA

Harvill Secker is part of the Penguin Random House group of companies
whose addresses can be found at global.penguinrandomhouse.com



Penguin
Random House
UK

Copyright © Éditions Grasset & Fasquelle 2015
English translation copyright © Sam Taylor 2017

Laurent Binet has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this Work in
accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988

First published by Harvill Secker in 2017

First published with the title *La Septième fonction du langage* in
France by Éditions Grasset & Fasquelle in 2015

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library


penguin.co.uk/vintage

ISBN 9781910701584 (hardback)
ISBN 9781910701591 (trade paperback)

Typeset in 11.5/14.5 pt Adobe Garamond Pro by Jouve (UK), Milton Keynes
Printed and bound in Great Britain by Clays Ltd, St Ives PLC

Excerpts from *The Outsider* © Albert Camus 1942,
English translation © Sandra Smith 2012

Penguin Random House is committed to a sustainable future
for our business, our readers and our planet. This book is made
from Forest Stewardship Council® certified paper.



1

Life is not a novel. Or at least you would like to believe so. Roland Barthes walks up Rue de Bièvre. The greatest literary critic of the twentieth century has every reason to feel anxious and upset. His mother, with whom he had a highly Proustian relationship, is dead. And his course on 'The Preparation of the Novel' at the Collège de France is such a conspicuous failure it can no longer be ignored: all year, he has talked to his students about Japanese haikus, photography, the signifier and the signified, Pascalian diversions, café waiters, dressing gowns, and lecture-hall seating – about everything but the novel. And this has been going on for three years. He knows, without a doubt, that the course is simply a delaying tactic designed to push back the moment when he must start a truly literary work, one worthy of the hypersensitive writer lying dormant within him and who, in everyone's opinion, began to bud in his *A Lover's Discourse: Fragments*, which has become a bible for the under-twenty-fives. From Sainte-Beuve to Proust, it is time to step up and take the place that awaits him in the literary pantheon. Maman is dead: he has come full circle since *Writing Degree Zero*. The time has come.

Politics? Yeah, yeah, we'll see about that. He can't really claim to be very Maoist since his trip to China. Then again, no one expects him to be.

Chateaubriand, La Rochefoucauld, Brecht, Racine, Robbe-Grillet, Michelet, Maman. A boy's love.

I wonder if the area was already full of 'Vieux Campeur' shops back then.

In a quarter of an hour, he will be dead.

I'm sure he ate well, on Rue des Blancs-Manteaux. I imagine people like that serve pretty good food. In *Mythologies*, Roland Barthes decodes the contemporary myths erected by the middle classes to their own glory. And it was this book that made him truly famous. So, in a way, he owes his fortune to the bourgeoisie. But that was the petite bourgeoisie. The ruling classes who serve the people are a very particular case that merit analysis; he should write an article. Tonight? Why not right away? But no, first he has to organise his slides.

Roland Barthes ups his pace without paying attention to the world around him, despite being a born observer, a man whose job consists of observing and analysing, who has spent his entire life scrutinising signs of every kind. He really doesn't see the trees or the pavements or the shop windows or the cars on Boulevard Saint-Germain, which he knows like the back of his hand. He is not in Japan any more. He doesn't feel the bite of the cold. He barely even hears the sounds of the street. It's a bit like Plato's allegory of the cave in reverse: the world of ideas in which he shuts himself away obscures his awareness of the world of the senses. Around him, he sees only shadows.

These reasons I mention to explain Roland Barthes' anxiety are all well known. But I want to tell you what actually happened. If his mind is elsewhere that day, it's not only because of his dead mother or his inability to write a novel or even his increasing and, he thinks, irreversible loss of appetite for boys. I'm not saying that he's not thinking about these things; I have no doubts about the quality of his obsessive neuroses. But, today, there is something else. In the absent gaze of a man lost in his thoughts, the attentive passer-by would have recognised that state which Barthes thought he was destined never to feel again:

4

excitement. There is more to him than his mother and boys and his phantom novel. There is the *libido sciendi*, the lust for learning, and, awoken by it, the flattering prospect of revolutionising human knowledge and, perhaps, changing the world. Does Barthes feel like Einstein, thinking about his theory as he crosses Rue des Ecoles? What is certain is that he's not really looking where he's going. He is less than a hundred feet from his office when he is hit by a van. His body makes the familiar, sickening, dull thudding sound of flesh meeting metal, and it rolls over the tarmac like a rag doll. Passers-by flinch. This afternoon – 25 February 1980 – they cannot know what has just happened in front of their eyes. For the very good reason that, until today, no one understands anything about it.

2

Semiology is a very strange thing. It was Ferdinand de Saussure, the founding father of linguistics, who first dreamed it up. In his *Course in General Linguistics*, he proposes imagining 'a science that studies the life of signs within society'. Yep, that's all. For those who wish to tackle this, he adds a few guidelines: 'It would form a part of social psychology and, consequently, of general psychology; I shall call it *semiology* (from the Greek *semeion*, "sign"). It would show what constitutes signs, what laws govern them. Since it does not exist yet, no one can say what it will be; but it has a right to existence, a place staked out in advance. Linguistics is only a part of this general science; the laws discovered by semiology will be applicable to linguistics, and the latter will circumscribe a well-defined area within the mass of anthropological facts.' I wish Anthony Hopkins would reread this passage for us, enunciating

each word as he does so well, so that the whole world could at least grasp all its beauty if not its meaning. A century later, this brilliant intuition, which was almost incomprehensible to his contemporaries when the course was given in 1906, has lost none of its power or its obscurity. Since then, numerous semiologists have attempted to provide clearer and more detailed definitions, but they have contradicted each other (sometimes without realising it themselves), got everything muddled up, and ultimately succeeded only in lengthening (and even then, not by much) the list of systems of signs beyond language: the highway code, the international maritime code, bus and hotel numbers have been added to military ranks and the sign-language alphabet . . . and that's about it.

Rather meagre in comparison with the original ambition.

Seen this way, far from being an extension of the domain of linguistics, semiology seems to have been reduced to the study of crude proto-languages which are much less complex and therefore much more limited than any real language.

But in fact, that's not the case.

It's no accident that Umberto Eco, the wise man of Bologna, one of the last great semiologists, referred so often to the key, decisive inventions in the history of humanity: the wheel, the spoon, the book . . . perfect tools, he said, unimproveable in their effectiveness. And indeed, everything suggests that in reality semiology is one of the most important inventions in the history of humanity and one of the most powerful tools ever forged by man. But as with fire or the atom, people don't know what the point of it is to begin with, or how to use it.

too. Borg: stays on the baseline, returns the ball, well above the net, thanks to his topspin. Any prole can understand that. Borg is inventing a tennis for the proletariat. McEnroe and Connors, obviously, play like princes.'

Bayard sits down on the sofa. He has a feeling he's going to have to listen to a lot of crap.

Simon objects: 'But Connors is the archetype of the people, isn't he? He's the bad boy, the brat, the hooligan; he cheats, he argues, he whines; he's a bad sport, a scrapper, a fighter, he never gives up—'

Deleuze interrupts impatiently: 'Oh yes? Hmm, that's an interesting point of view.'

Bayard asks: 'It's possible that someone wanted to steal something from Monsieur Barthes. A document. Would you know anything about that, Monsieur Deleuze?'

Deleuze turns towards Simon: 'It is likely that the question *what?* isn't the right kind of question. It's possible that questions like *who? how much? how? where? when?* would be better.'

Bayard lights a cigarette and asks in a patient, almost resigned voice: 'What do you mean?'

'Well, it's obvious that if you have come to find me, more than a week after the event, to question me about a moronic philosopher's half-baked insinuations, it's because Roland's accident was probably not an accident at all. So you are searching for a culprit. Or, in other words, a motive. But you are a long way from *why*, aren't you? I suppose that the line of inquiry relating to the driver didn't get you anywhere? I heard that Roland had woken up. And he didn't want to say anything? So you change the *why*.'

They hear Connors grunting each time he hits the ball. Simon glances out the window. He notices a blue Fuego parked down below.

Notes on Contributors

LAURENT BINET lives and works in France. His first novel, *HHhH*, was an international bestseller which won the prestigious Prix Goncourt du premier roman, among other prizes, and was first published in English in 2012. His second novel *The 7th Function of Language* was published in 2017. Both novels were translated into English by Sam Taylor and published by Harvill Secker, an imprint of Vintage, which is part of the Penguin Random House Group. A film adaptation of *HHhH – The Man with the Iron Heart* – directed by Cedric Jiminez was released in 2017. In 2012 he published *Rien ne se passe comme prévu (Nothing Goes as Planned)*, an account of the successful French presidential campaign of Francois Hollande, which he witnessed while embedded with Hollande's staff. He tweets @LaurentBinetH.

correspondence through: tallis@iir.cz

DR NICHOLAS DUNGEY is Professor of Political Philosophy in the Department of Political Science at California State University, Northridge and associate researcher at the IIR Prague. He has taught at the University of California in Davis and Santa Barbara and a recent book on Kafka and Foucault with Lexington Press. Previous works include 'Thomas Hobbes's Materialism, Language, and the Possibility of Politics' (*The Review of Politics*, 2008); 'The Ethics and Politics of Dwelling' (*Polity*, 2007); and, '(Re)Turning Derrida to Heidegger: Being-With-Others as Primordial Politics' (*Polity*, 2001). He runs and produces the popular political philosophy (video) podcasts 'Dungey State University'.

Correspondence email: nicholas.dungey@csun.edu

JASON ENIA is an Associate Professor of Political Science and the Director of the Center for the Study of Disasters & Emergency Management (CDEM) at Sam Houston State University. His research explores the political economies of both nuclear nonproliferation and natural disasters, focusing on the ways in which institutions incentivize behaviour.

Correspondence email: jason.enia@shsu.edu

JEFFREY FIELDS is an Associate Professor of the Practice of International Relations and the Director of the Dornsife Washington DC Program at the University of Southern California. His research focuses on international security, diplomacy, and U.S. foreign policy.

Correspondence email: jrfields@usc.edu

DIETER FLECK is a former Director of International Agreements & Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence of Germany; a Member of the Advisory Board of the Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL); a Rapporteur of the ILA Committee on

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and Contemporary International Law; and an Honorary President of the International Society for Military Law and the Law of War.

Correspondence email: dieterfleck@t-online.de

OLGA GYÁRFÁŠOVÁ is associate professor and senior researcher at the Institute of European Studies and International Relations, Comenius University in Bratislava. She studied sociology and holds a PhD in comparative political science. In her research she focuses on electoral studies, political culture, analyses of populism and right-wing extremism. She is the national coordinator of the European Election Studies (EES) and the Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems (CSES). Recently, she co-authored a chapter on the radical nationalist right in Slovakia (Gyárfášová and Mesežnikov, 2015) and published a paper on electoral behavior in European Parliament elections (with Karen Henderson in *East European Politics*).

Correspondence email: olga.gyarfasova@fses.uniba.sk

ANGELA KANE is the Vice President of the International Institute for Peace, Vienna, a Senior Fellow at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, and a former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Correspondence email: akane@vcdnp.org

ANASTASIA KAZTERIDIS graduated *magna cum laude* from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, where she studied International Politics with a concentration in Security Studies. Her primary areas of interest are international relations and national security, including nuclear security and conflict resolution.

correspondence through: matthew.kroenig@georgetown.edu

MATTHEW KROENIG is an Associate Professor at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council. Dr. Kroenig is the author or editor of six books, including the latest, *The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Oxford University Press, 2018). His dozens of articles have appeared in leading peer-reviewed academic journals, foreign policy journals, and major newspapers, including: *American Political Science Review*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, *International Organization*, *The Wall Street Journal*, and *The Washington Post*. He was a senior national security adviser on the 2016 Marco Rubio presidential campaign and a foreign policy adviser on the 2012 Mitt Romney campaign. He has served in several positions in the U.S. Department of Defense and the intelligence community, has testified before Congressional committees, and regularly consults with U.S. government entities.

Correspondence email: matthew.kroenig@georgetown.edu

RICHARD PRICE (Ph.D., Cornell) specializes in international relations. His research interests focus on the role of norms in world politics, particularly norms limiting warfare; constructivist international relations theory; normative international relations theory; the politics of international law, and ethics in world politics. His publications include the co-authored *Special Responsibilities: Global Problems and American Power* (Cambridge University Press, 2012), *Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2008), *The United Nations and Global Security* (with Mark Zacher, co-editor, 2004), *The Chemical Weapons Taboo* (Cornell University Press, 1997), and numerous articles in *International Organization*, *World Politics*, *International Security*, *European Journal of International Relations*, and the *Review of International Studies* among others. His teaching interests include courses on world politics, the politics of international law, ethics in world politics, and international relations theory.

Correspondence email: rprice@mail.ubc.ca

MICHAL SMETANA is a post-doctoral researcher at the Center for Security Policy and the Peace Research Center Prague at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University. He worked as one of the main organizers of the Prague Agenda conference between 2012 and 2016. He would like to express his gratitude to the editors of *New Perspectives* for publishing this special section and to all the friends and colleagues that contributed to the success of the Prague Agenda conferences in the last couple of years. Moreover, he would also like to acknowledge the funding by the Charles University Research Centre program UNCE/HUM/028 (Peace Research Center Prague/Faculty of Social Sciences) and by the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic in the context of the grant project VI20152019011.

Correspondence email: smetana@fsv.cuni.cz

SADIA TASLEEM is a lecturer at Quaid-i-Azam University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies in Islamabad, Pakistan. As a Robin Copeland Memorial Fellow for Nonproliferation from 2014 to 2015, she investigated the prospects of "Creating a Constituency for Unilateral Nuclear Arms Restraint in Pakistan." She regularly delivers lectures on issues relating to strategic stability and nuclear deterrence at the Pakistan Air Force and Pakistan Navy Headquarters in Islamabad as well as the Pakistan Naval War College, Lahore. She is an active participant in various Track II dialogues promoting strategic stability in South Asia. She is also a member of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

Correspondence email: sadia.tasleem@gmail.com

MICHAEL TOOMEY received his doctorate from Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey in 2015. He is currently employed as a Teaching Fellow at the Univer-

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

sity of Limerick, Ireland. His research interests include the normative power and foreign policy of the European Union, the role of external actors in democratization processes, democracy and democratization processes in Central Europe, and the science of pedagogy. He has previously held a faculty appointment at Wenzhou-Kean University in Wenzhou, China, and a teaching appointment at Rutgers University. He has also previously been a visiting scholar at the Institute of International Relations in Prague, and the Central European University in Budapest.

Correspondence email: michaeltoomey2005@gmail.com

GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORS

GEOGRAPHIC, THEMATIC AND INTERDISCIPLINARY SCOPE

We interpret the borders of 'Central and Eastern Europe' broadly and plurally. We therefore encourage submissions that their authors consider as falling roughly within or being related to this region, while retaining the right to reject manuscripts that we feel fall outside of our scope.

New Perspectives seeks to attract submissions which address *political aspects of regional affairs and/or their connections to the wider world* from the fields of: International Relations, Political Science, Security Studies and International Political Sociology; International Political Economy; Geography; Sociology; Anthropology; History; Cultural Studies and Legal Studies.

TYPES OF ARTICLES

New Perspectives publishes three types of articles:

- **Research Articles** are full-length papers that make an original contribution to research and are the main type of article that we seek. *New Perspectives* particularly seeks research articles that are methodologically systematic and reflexive; theoretically innovative and compelling; or empirically ground-breaking. Research Articles are normally between 8,000 and 10,000 words, including footnotes and references, although the maximum length, including all notes and references, is 12,000 words.
- **Discussions/Analytical Essays** integrate, synthesise or juxtapose scholarship, delineate or develop scholarly debates, or identify new directions in interdisciplinary research on the politics and international relations of Central and Eastern Europe. We encourage discussion papers that are between 10,000 and 12,000 words, although the maximum length, including all notes and references, is 15,000 words.
- **Review Essays**, which *New Perspectives* publishes fewer of, contextualise several recently published or re-published volumes (3–5 titles per Review Essay) in relation to each other as well as in relation to wider academic scholarship and public political debate and discussion by identifying and critically engaging key themes and strands of thought. Review essays should be between 3,500 and 4,500 words, with a maximum length of 5,000 words, including all notes and references.
- **Interventions** are shorter, and somewhat polemical or provocative pieces that intervene into contemporary or historical debates in order to move them forward. Interventions are intended to provoke responses and productive discussion. They should be a maximum of 7,000 words, including all notes and references.

Submit your manuscripts to tallis@iir.cz

For further guidelines please consult our webpage

<http://www.newperspectives.iir.cz>

The postal address of the journal is:

New Perspectives, Institute of International Relations, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Prague, Czech Republic

