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JOSEPH SAMUEL NYE A KONCEPT MOCI V MEDZINÁRODNÝCH VZŤAHOCH: TEORETICKÝ RÁMEC A PRÍKLADY Z PRAXE

JOSEPH SAMUEL NYE AND THE CONCEPT OF POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICAL EXAMPLES

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Koncept moci je ústredným prvkom štúdia medzinárodných vzťahov. Hlavným cieľom príspevku je diskutovať o modernom chápaní moci. Článok mapuje prístup Josepha Nyea ku konceptualizácii moci, ktorý vysvetľuje povahu medzinárodných vzťahov. Dalo by sa tvrdiť, že Joseph Nye vytvoril teoretický rámec, ktorý podnecuje dôslednú pozornosť k moci v jej rôznych formách. Nyeho teoretický koncept moci je doplnený príkladmi z praxe medzinárodných vzťahov. V práci sú použité predovšetkým kvalitatívne metódy, ktoré sú založené na analýze a syntéze, aby poskytli kontextovú a subjektívnu presnosť. Aby sme pochopili, čo je moc v medzinárodných vzťahoch, Nye zdôrazňuje kontextovú inteligenciu, ktorá je kľúčovou zručnosťou i umožňuje politikom a diplomatom byť úspešnými.

Kľúčové slová: medzinárodné vzťahy, moc, prax, teória, Joseph Nye

The concept of power is central to studying of international relations. The main purpose of the paper is to discuss a modern understanding of power. The article surveys Joseph Nye's approach to the conceptualisation of power explaining the nature of international relations. It could be argued that Joseph Nye developed a theoretical framework that encourages rigorous attention to power in its different forms. Nye's theoretical concept of power is accompanied with examples from practice of international relations. Mainly, there are qualitative methods used in the paper, which are based on analysis and synthesis to provide contextual and subjective accuracy. To understand what power in international relations is, Nye underlines contextual intelligence, which is a crucial skill in enabling politicians and diplomats to be successful.

Key words: international relations, power, praxis, theory, Joseph Nye

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1 INTRODUCTION

“Power, like love, is easier to experience than to define or measure” (Nye 1990, p. 25). These words were said by Joseph Samuel Nye (Harvard Kennedy School, 2021). Perhaps, it is quite strange how he could compare something so beautifully fragile like love with something tough, such as power. It is perhaps difficult to understand at the first sign, but after deeper and careful deliberation makes sense. Nye notes that in a friendly relationship or a marriage, power does not necessarily reside with the larger partner, but, in the mysterious chemistry of attraction. However, he underlines that not all relationships are based on affection, attraction and love. Nye takes the example of the playground bully that commands other children and makes them jump at his commands, inducements and threats. Finally, he admits when someone desires to be successful in any relationship, the most important thing he or she has to do is to intelligently combine both types of influence.

If one wants to consider what power is, it is important to note that power is not accurately defined concept. In other words, power is one of the most problematic concepts to study of international relations (Gilpin, 1981). There is no universal definition of what power really is (Nye, 2011). Although, most people have an intuitive notion of what power means (Dahl, 1957). Simply put, “power is the longest-running social phenomenon, which has manifested itself since ancient times – from the first prehistoric inhabitants of the planet who fought for shelter and food – to the present day” (Negut and Neacășu 2012, p. 216). However, scholars have not yet formulated a single universal definition of the concept of power, which is rigorous enough to be used in the systematic study of this social phenomenon in the field of international relations (Dahl, 1957).

Historically, many thinkers considered the meaning of “power”. For example, a power, for Locke (2018, p. 138), is that which allows some entity to change or be changed by another. It means the active power is that which changes. The passive power is that which is changed. The sense of power that Locke explicated is that of a capacity or ability. All that it is to have a power to do something is to be able to do that thing. Locke argued that “nothing can operate, that is not able to operate; and that is not able to operate, that has no power to operate.”

Power is a crucial concept to the School of realism in international relations. Theory of realism perceives world politics as a field of conflict among actors pursuing power. The School of realism was quantitative and behavioural. Edward Hallet Carr, a member of School of realism, studied power and its significance for international politics. In his book *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919–1939. In Introduction to the Study of International Relations* he claimed that power in the international sphere can be divided for the purposes of discussion into three categories: military power, economic

power and the power of ideas. These three categories are closely interdependent. Although, they are theoretically separable, it is impossible to imagine a country having one of these powers and using it separately from the other two components. According to Carr (2011), power is in its essence, an indivisible whole. Another theorist of School of realism, Hans Morgenthau, defined politics as an autonomous sphere based on power interest. He claimed that power is an attribute that characterizes the motivation of actors and whose maximization is one of the main goals of each state (Morgenthau, 1993).

Joseph Nye's attitude towards the study of international relations is unique, and quite distinct from the other prominent approaches such as classical realism, neorealism, liberal international relations theory, constructivism, feminist international relations theory, postcolonial theory, and other critical theories. The reason is that Nye has excelled as much in academia as in public service. In this article, power is defined as “the ability of an individual to influence others to do what they would otherwise not have done (and at a cost acceptable to that individual)” (Nye 2011, p.10). In this sense, power is understood as a control over the results. This relationship is also found in Nye's more precise and frequently quoted definition, where power means “the ability to influence others behaviour to achieve the required results” (Nye 2004, p. 2).

Joseph Samuel Nye (1937) is an American political scientist. He is University Distinguished Service Professor, and former Dean at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the British Academy, and the American Academy of Diplomacy (Harvard Kennedy School, 2021). Professor Nye is the co-founder, along with Robert Keohane, of the international relations theory of neoliberalism.² In 2011, *Foreign Policy* magazine named him to its list of top global thinkers (*Foreign Policy*, 2011). Equally, in 2014, *Foreign Policy* reported that the international relations scholars and policymakers both ranked Nye as one of the most influential scholars (*Foreign Policy*, 2014).

Unusually for a scholar, Professor Nye has excelled as much in public service as in academia. We could argue that his work in the Federal Government of the United States inspired him to focus on the concept of power in academia. From 1977 to 1979, Nye served as Deputy to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology and chaired the National Security Council Group on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This was the era of the Cold War and the bipolar system. International policy was divided between the block of the United States of America and of the Soviet Union. In 1994 and 1995, Nye served as Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs, where he used his political science expertise

² The international relations theory of neoliberalism was developed in their book. See: Nye, J. – Keohane, R. (1977): *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*.

to construct a new institutionalized relationship between the United States and Japan, which helped to defuse the trade conflict of that era (Nye, 2009).

2 POWER AS A CONCEPT EXPLAINING THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

It is very important to note that context is a key aspect in terms of power in the study of international relations. In other words, power always depends on the context in which any relationship exists. Thus, all power in international relations depends on context – who relates to whom under what circumstances. The importance of context for power relations is clear in the following example, as Nye notes: “in the middle of the twentieth century, Josef Stalin scornfully asked how many divisions the Pope had, but in the context of ideas, five decades later, the Papacy was still intact while Stalin's empire had collapsed”(Nye 2013, p. 561). In this sense, Nye underlines the term “contextual intelligence,” (Nye 2013, p. 562) which he defines as a “crucial skill in enabling leaders to convert power resources into successful strategies.” Simply put, he perceives power as “the ability to achieve one's purposes or goals” (Nye 1990, pp. 25-26). In this sense, Nye introduces two definitions of power, that is to say, the behavioural definition and the definition based on the possession of power resources.

The first concept of power is associated with the behavioural definition, which is based on the observation of human's behaviour. Power, in this sense, is the ability to affect the outcomes one wants, and if necessary, to change the behaviour of others to make this happen (Nye, 2002). Power is, thus, the ability to control others and make them behave in a particular way. This behavioural perception of power is derived from Robert Dahl, a leading political scientist and professor at Yale University, who emphasised that power is a relationship between two actors (Dahl, 1961). In this sense, Dahl perceived power like a matter of actor A getting actor B to do what actor A wants, or even of actor A forcing actor B not to do what actor B wants to do. As Dahl noted “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do“ (Dahl 1957, p. 201).

To predict how one will act is very difficult because “when we measure power in terms of the changed behaviour of others, we have to know their preferences” (Nye 1990, p. 26). Furthermore, “knowing in advance how other people or nations would behave in the absence of our efforts is often difficult.” However, sometimes a country can get the outcomes it wants by affecting behaviour without commanding it (Nye, 2004).

The second definition of power is based on the possession of certain power resources that can influence outcomes. Power is the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcome one wants (Nye, 2004). In this perception, power is defined as the possession of relatively large amount of power resources which “include population, territory, natural resources, economic size, military forces, and political stability among others” (Nye 1990, p. 26). When we look on power historically, it

could be argued that the nature of power is ever changing and the resources of power are never static. This explains why, for example, oil was not such impressive power resource before the industrial age and why uranium was not very significant before the nuclear age, or why, power resources, such as advanced science, technology and nuclear weapons had a powerful impact in the twentieth century.

To succeed in the international political scene, political leaders must have an excellent understanding of both definitions, and the ability to apply this understanding, because proof of power lies not only in resources but also in the changed behaviour of nations (Nye 1990, p. 26). However, policy-makers and diplomats often tend to turn only to the definition based on power resources because “it makes power appear more concrete, measurable, predictable than does the behavioural definition” (Nye 1990, p. 27). These political predictions and diplomatic strategies based on power resources alone can be misleading. It is true that possession of power resources provides at least a basic approximation of the possibilities of outcomes, but political leaders can risk a lot in this case. It could be argued, that it is easier to predict that a country that is well endowed with power resources is more likely to affect a weaker country and be less dependent upon an optimal strategy than vice versa. It is understandable that smaller countries may sometimes obtain preferred outcomes because they pick smaller fights or focus selectively on a few issues. “On average, and in direct conflicts, one would not expect Sweden or Georgia to prevail against Russia” (Nye 2013, p. 560). Nye underlines that “in my experience in government, policy-makers do tend to focus on resources”(Nye 2013, p. 572). Despite this practical experience in government, Nye notes that in practice, discussion of power and diplomacy must definitely involve the behavioural definition and also the definition based on power resources. He gives an example of why it is so important to combine both these definitions: when one wants to predicting the successful development of a rising powers, such as the BRICS group of countries, consisted of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. These countries have large population and increasing economic and military resources, but whether the capacity that these resources imply can actually be converted into preferred outcomes will depend upon the contexts and the countries' skills in converting resources into strategies that will produce preferred outcomes (Nye, 2013).

It is interesting that not just policy-makers but also many other people tend to define power as synonymous with the resources that produce it. They sometimes encounter the paradox that those best endowed with power do not always get the outcomes they want. Simply put, having power resources does not guarantee that a country will be successful in achieving its desired outcomes. This fact can be seen in several examples from recent history. For example, the United States was the largest power after the First World War, but it failed to prevent the rise of Germany or Japan, as demonstrated at Pearl Harbour (Nye, 2002). To take another example, in terms of

resources the United States was more powerful than Vietnam, yet the United States lost the Vietnam War (Nye, 2004). For this reason, it is clear that converting power resources into realized power in the sense of obtaining desired outcomes always requires well-designed policy and skilful leadership. This fact is connected with power conversion, which “is the capacity to convert potential power, as measured by resources, to realized power, as measured by the changed behaviour of others” (Nye 1990, p. 27). For example, “NATO's military power reversed Slobodan Milosevic's ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, and the promise of economic aid to Serbia's devastated economy reversed the Serbian government's initial disinclination to hand Milosevic over to the Hague tribunal” (Nye 2002, p. 4). Roughly speaking, NATO possessed sufficient military and economic resources with which they could affect and control the behaviour of the Serbian government in the way it wanted. In other words, NATO was able to convert its power resources into strong influence very effectively. It could be argued that NATO was skilled at power conversion and possessed sufficient power resources.

On the basis of the behavioural definition and the power resources definition, Nye introduces two types of power, that is to say, hard and soft power.³ Hard power can be defined as the ability to achieve one's purposes “by the use of force and payment and some agenda-setting based on them” (Nye 2013, p. 565). In contrast with hard power, soft power can be seen as the ability to affect others to obtain preferred outcomes by the use of “agenda-setting that is regarded as legitimate by the target, positive attraction, and persuasion” (Nye 2013, p. 565). In other words, hard power is push, soft power is pull.

As shown above, to exactly define power we have to be aware of whether we are speaking of the behavioural definition or the definition based of power resources. In behavioural terms, one can obtain preferred outcomes in three main ways such as threat of coercion, payment, or attraction and persuasion. In this sense, Nye writes about command and co-optive methods of exercising power. Command power (Nye 1990, p. 267) is the ability to change what others do. It is the ability to get others to do what one wants. This method can rest on coercion, inducement and threats. Thus, we can talk about the method of “carrots and sticks” (Nye 1990, p. 31). In this sense, a country gets other states to change according to its purposes. On the other hand, co-optive power (Nye 1990, p. 267) is the ability to get others to want what one wants. This method can rest on the attractiveness of one's ideas, culture, ideology or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes actors fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic. Simply put,

³ Nye introduced these definitions of power for the first time in his book *Bound to Lead* issued in 1990.

a country may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics because other countries want to follow it or have agreed to a system that produces this effect.

In terms of power resources, Joseph Nye writes about hard and soft power resources which “are aspects of the ability to achieve one's purposes by controlling the behaviour of others” (Nye 1990, p. 267). The distinction between these two types of power resources “is one of degree, both in the nature of the behaviour and in the tangibility of the resources” (Nye 1990, p. 267). Nye notes that “the types of resources that are associated with hard power include tangible factors like military and economic strength” (Nye 1990, p. 267). He explains that “the resources that are associated with soft power often include intangible factors like ideas, values, culture, institutions and perceived legitimacy of policies” (Nye 1990, p. 267).

During his political and academic career, Nye often focused on the relationship between the United States and Japan.⁴ As an example, he offered a short comparison of the United States with Japan at the end of the twentieth century. His claim was that in terms of command power, Japan's economic strength would be increasing in the future, but assumed that Japan would remain vulnerable in terms of raw materials and relatively weak in terms of military force. Furthermore, in regard to co-optive power, Japan's culture is generally highly insular, which let him to suppose that Japan's culture has yet to develop a major voice in international relations. In comparison with Japan, according to his opinion, the United States had always possessed an universalistic popular culture which also will allowed it a major role in international institutions (Nye, 1990). It could be argued that in today's twenty first century, the United States is recognised for its noticeable strength in command but also in co-optive power. However, Japan's culture still remains insular and relatively isolated while China's culture is more widely spread mainly in countries situated in the Western Hemisphere.

Nye notes that “soft power tends to be associated with co-optive power behaviour, whereas hard power resources are usually associated with command behaviour” (Nye 1990, p. 267). It is very important to note that this relationship is not perfect. Roughly speaking, in political practice, there are many cases when it is not possible to strictly categorise power in this way. In other words, soft power is not associated merely with intangible power resources and co-optive power behaviour, while hard power is not associated only with tangible power resources and command power behaviour. If one remembers the distinction between power resources and power behaviour, one realizes that resources often associated with hard power behaviour can produce soft power behaviour or vice versa, depending on the context and how they are used.

⁴ Joseph Nye offered this comparison in his book *Bound to Lead*.

It is clear that, for example, intangible resources like patriotism, morale, and legitimacy can strongly affect the capacity to fight and win a war. Similarly, threats to use force are intangible, however, they are a dimension of hard power. It is perhaps surprising, but many of the terms that are used daily such as military power and economic power are hybrids that combine both resources and behaviours.

With a deeper understanding of power, it is evident that command power can create resources that can create soft power at a later phase. For instance, the creation of institutions that will provide soft power resources in the future. Similarly, co-optive behaviour can be used to generate hard power resources in the form of military alliance or economic aid. In other words, a tangible hard power resources like a military unit can produce both command behaviour (by winning a battle) and co-optive behaviour (attraction) depending on how it is used. Therefore, since attraction depends upon the minds of the perceiver, the subject's perceptions play a significant role in whether given resources produce hard or soft power behaviour (Nye, 2013). For example, “naval forces can be used to win battles (hard power) or win hearts and minds (soft power) depending on who the target and what the issue is.” (Nye, 2013). Nye takes an example of the American navy's help in providing relief to Indonesia after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami had a strong effect on increasing their attraction towards the United States. “The Navy's 2007 Maritime Strategy refers not only to war-fighting but additionally maritime forces will be employed to build confidence and trust among nations.” (Nye 2013, p. 564). Similarly, as Nye adds, “successful economic performance such as that of the European Union or China can produce both the hard power sanctions and restricted market access as well as the soft power of attraction and emulation of success” (Nye 2013, p. 564).

Hard and soft power are interrelated: They can reinforce each other, but sometimes they can interfere with and undercut each other. Thus, it is very important to have very good “contextual intelligence” which is needed to distinguish how these two types of power can interact in different situations. As Angus Taverne puts it, “the military has to understand that soft power is more challenging to wield in terms of the application of military force—particularly if what the force is doing is not seen as attractive” (Taverne, 2013). Nye adds that “if the other levers of soft power are not pulling in the same direction, then the military cannot create favourable conditions on its own. Except at the tactical level, the military options for the use of soft power have to been [sic] seen in a larger policy context” (Nye, 2013).

As shown above, both hard and soft power reflect the ability to achieve one's purposes by affecting the behaviour of others. For this reason, sometimes the same power resources can affect the entire spectrum of behaviour from coercion to attraction. A country that suffers economic and military decline is likely to lose its hard-power resources but also its ability to shape the international agenda and its attractiveness. In contrast, some countries may be attracted to others with hard power

by the myth of invincibility or inevitability. For example, both Germany and the Soviet Union tried to develop such myths. Hard power can also be used to establish empires and institutions that set the agenda for smaller states—witness Soviet rule over the countries of Eastern Europe (Nye, 2002).

It is very important to note that soft power does not depend on hard power, and, in this sense, soft power is not simply the reflection of hard power. This could be demonstrated by the example of the Vatican and his persistent soft power. In fact, “the Vatican did not lose its soft power when it lost the Papal States in Italy in the nineteenth century” (Nye 2004, p. 9). “Conversely, the Soviet Union lost much of its soft power after it invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia, even though its economic and military resources continued to grow” (Nye 2004, p. 9). Imperial policies that utilized Soviet hard power actually undercut its soft power (Nye 2004, p. 9). In contrast, the Soviet sphere of influence in Finland was reinforced by a degree of soft power. The United States' sphere of influence in Latin America in the 1930s was reinforced when Franklin Roosevelt applied soft power.

As demonstrated above, hard and soft power can sometimes reinforce, but can also sometimes interfere with each other. Roughly speaking, a country that courts popularity may be loath to exercise its hard power when it should. Similarly, a country that throws its weight around without regard to the effects on its soft power may find others placing obstacles in the way of its hard power. It could be argued that no country likes to be manipulated, even by soft power. As a good example of this, Nye takes a decision of President John F. Kennedy in 1961 to go ahead with nuclear testing in spite of negative polls. J. F. Kennedy took this decision because he was worried about global perception of Soviet gains and the Soviets' potential dominance in the arms race. J. F. Kennedy “was willing to sacrifice some of America's soft prestige in return for gains in the harder currency of military prestige” (Nye, 2004). On a lighter note, in 2003, just a few months after massive anti-war protests in London and Milan, fashion shows in those cities used models in US military commando gear exploding balloons. As one designer put it, American symbols “are still the strongest security blanket” (Horny 2003, p. 1).

In political practise, it is thus important to possess the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategies, which is called smart power. Nye introduced the term smart power in 2003 “to counter the misperception that soft power alone can produce effective foreign policy” (Nye 2012, p. 1). The first step towards smart power and effective power conversion strategies is an understanding of the full range of power resources and the problem of combining them effectively in various contexts. Smart power strategies could be compared to the proclamation of US President Theodore Roosevelt in 1901: “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” (Nye 2013, p. 58). Simply put, smart power addresses multilateralism and enhances foreign

policy. To take an example, the end of the Cold War was marked by the collapse of the Berlin Wall, which fell as a result of a combination of hard and soft power. Throughout the Cold War, hard power was used to deter Soviet aggression and soft power was used to erode faith in Communism. As Nye said: "When the Berlin Wall finally collapsed, it was destroyed not by artillery barrage but by hammers and bulldozers wielded by those who had lost faith in communism." (Nye 2013, p. 59). The former American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the diplomacy of the twenty-first century and importance of smart power in the following words: "America cannot solve the most pressing problems on our own, and the world cannot solve them without America. We must use what has been called smart power, the full range of tools at our disposal." (Nye 2013, p. 60). In practice, smart power strategies can be used not only by large states such as the United States, but also by small states. Some countries such as Canada, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian states (Nye, 2004) have political clout that is greater than their military and economic weight, because of the incorporation of attractive causes such as economic aid or peacekeeping into their definitions of national interest. To take an example, Norway, a small state with five million people, has enhanced its attractiveness with legitimising policies in peace-making and development assistance that enhance its soft power (Nye, 2013). Norway has taken a hand in peace talks in the Philippines, the Middle East, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Guatemala and the Balkans (Nye, 2004). Similarly, but other end of the spectrum in terms of population size, China, a rising power in hard economic and military resources, has deliberately decided to invest massively in soft power resources so as to make its hard power look less threatening to its neighbours (Nye, 2013).

When we look at Nye's view on power from historical perspective, it could be argued the nature of power is ever changing. When we survey the distribution of power throughout history, it is clear that the five-century old modern state system⁵ shows that the sources of power are never static and different power resources played critical role in different periods. Nye explains this change gradually from the sixteenth century to the twenty-first century. It is not surprising that in earlier periods, power resources were easier to judge. As demonstrated above, the nature of power has changed and, therefore, we would like to describe four fundamental changes which contributed to the gradual transformation of power resources. In this sense, it is important to note

⁵ The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 inaugurated the modern international state system. This modern system established sovereignty as a right of the state. There are two dimensions of sovereignty, that is to say internal and external sovereignty. Internal sovereignty could be defined as the existence of an absolute authority over all individuals or associations of individuals within the state. External sovereignty could be defined in terms of state equality in international law. Simply put, all states are equal and each state is independent of any compulsion on the part of other states.

which power resources provided the best basis for power behaviour in any particular context.

The first important change related to a country's capability to prove its strength for war (Nye, 2002). Traditionally, the test of a great power was “the test of strength for war” (Teylor 1954, p. 29) and, in this sense, “war⁶ was the ultimate game in which relative power were proven” (Nye 2002, p. 5). In the sixteenth century, Spain was a leading country and managed a huge number of colonies overseas. In society, dynastic ties dominated. Spain, the so-called “the empire on which the sun never sets” had

a prosperous economy benefited mostly from colonial trade and it also possessed strong mercenary armies. Power resources in this period were mainly gold bullion and strong armies (Nye, 1990). In the agrarian economies of the seventeenth century, the Netherland's economy stood out because of its strong navy and flourishing trade overseas. The most important power resources were strong navies and capital markets (Nye, 1990). In the eighteenth-century Europe, population was a critical power resource, which provided a needed base for taxes, manpower in rural industry and public administration, and the recruitment of infantry who were mostly mercenaries. This combination of men and money gave the edge to France. In nineteenth - century Europe, power resources for war continued to change (Nye, 1990). These power resources were represented by the process of industrialisation reflected in the growing importance of industry and technological advance mainly in rail transport. As is well known, growing importance of industry benefited Britain, which ruled with a navy that had no peer (Nye, 2002). In the 1860s, Prussia under Bismarck's command was a pioneer in the use of railways to quickly transport armies where they were needed to quick victories. This Prussian rapid mobilization was in contrast with Russian difficulties to mobilize its army, although, Russia had greater population resources than the rest of Europe (Nye, 1990). Despite these initial difficulties, Russia built a modern rail system in its Western territory at the beginning of the twentieth century.

⁶ However, war is not always the ultimate arbiter in the contemporary age. There is not merely military, but also financial, political, (or diplomatic) and moral rebalancing underway in the world's power structure. Nye notes that none of this is to suggest that military force plays no role in international politics today. According to his opinion, military power remains crucial in certain situations, but it is a mistake to focus too narrowly on the military dimensions of power. The diplomat steps aside and the soldier takes over when the government concludes that the goals being pursued can be achieved through the use of military force - or when the diplomat has bungled. While the threat of use of force, whether explicit or implicit, is still part of the diplomat's arsenal, the actual use of force is required when diplomacy has failed and must be substituted by other instruments of statecraft. See COOPER, A. (2013): *Introduction: The Challenges of 21st Century Diplomacy*. In Cooper, A.: *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*.

This spread of rail systems throughout Continental Europe helped deprive Britain of as advantage, which related on naval power (Nye, 1990). In addition, Nye notes that “there are many situations where any use of force may be inappropriate or too costly. In 1853, for example, Commodore Perry could threaten to bombard Japan if it did not open its ports for supplies and trade, but it is hard to imagine that the United States could effectively threaten force to open Japanese markets today.” (Nye 1990, pp. 27-29). Equally, power resources, such as advanced science, technology and nuclear weapons had a powerful impact in the twentieth century. As we know from the history of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union possessed not only industrial but also nuclear arsenals and intercontinental missiles (Nye, 2002).

The second important change was the rise of nationalism (Nye, 2002), which made it more difficult for empires to rule over “awakened” populations desiring for freedom. It could be argued that European world colonization commenced with military and commercial expansion in 1415 and completed in the nineteenth century. “In the nineteenth century, a few adventurers conquered most of Africa with a handful of soldiers, and Britain ruled India with a colonial force that was a tiny fraction of the indigenous population.” (Nye 2002, p. 5). However, as both Cold War superpowers discovered in the twentieth century in Vietnam and Afghanistan, colonial rule was not only widely condemned but far too costly. The emergence of large swathes of humanity from colonial rule to independence was, perhaps, one of the most important historical phenomena of the last century. The great wave of the retreat of European colonialism, from Asia and Africa in 1950s and 1960s and the South Pacific in 1970s, was followed by the collapse of the largest land-based empire, the USSR, in 1993. This led to a fresh burst of newly independent countries: Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia in 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet empire followed the end of European empires by a matter of decades. To take another remarkable example of nationalism, at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Prussia presented its fellow victors at the Congress of Vienna with a precise plan for its own reconstruction in order to maintain the balance of power. Its plan listed the territories and populations it had lost since 1805. In the prenationalist period, it did not much matter that many of the people in those provinces did not speak German or feel themselves to be German. However, within half a century, nationalist sentiments mattered very much (Nye, 1990). For example, after French defeat “in the Franco-Prussian War, the French government sought to repair the nation's shattered prestige by promoting its language and literature through the Alliance Française,⁷ created in 1883” (Nye 2002, p. 69). Italy, Germany, and others countries soon followed France in its idea to promote culture through diplomacy (Nye, 2002).

⁷ The projection of French culture abroad thus became a significant component of French diplomacy. See JINGJIE, L. (2000): *Pillars of the Sino-Russian Partnership*. p. 530.

The third important cause lies in societal change inside great powers (Nye, 2002). Roughly speaking, “there are three types of countries in the world today: poor, weak preindustrial states, which are often the chaotic remnants of collapsed empires, modernizing industrial states such as India or China, and the post-industrial societies that prevail in Europe, North America, and Japan” (Nye 2002, p. 6). Thus, it could be argued that most of the world does not consist of post-industrial societies. Much of Africa and the Middle East remains locked in preindustrial agricultural societies with weak institutions and authoritarian rulers. Other countries, such as China, India, and Brazil, are industrial economies analogous to parts of the West in the mid-twentieth century. In such a variegated world, all three sources of power—military, economic, and soft—remain relevant, although to different degrees in different relationships. Joseph Nye notes that, for example, “the use of force is common in the first type of country, still accepted in the second, but less tolerated in the third” (Nye 2002, p. 6).

In this sense, Nye argues that no country is better endowed than the United States in all three dimensions – military, economic, and soft power.

To take an example, whereas leaders in authoritarian countries can use coercion and issue commands, politicians in democracies have to rely more on a combination of inducement and attraction. Soft power is a staple of daily democratic politics. Soft power is also likely to be more important when power is dispersed in another country rather than concentrated. A dictator cannot be totally indifferent to the views of the people in his country, but he can often ignore whether another country is popular or not when he calculates whether it is in his interests to be helpful. In democracies where public opinion and parliaments matter, political leaders have less leeway to adopt tactics and strike deals than in autocracies. As Nye takes as a demonstrative example, “it was impossible for the Turkish government to permit the transport of American troops across the country in 2003 because American policies had greatly reduced its popularity in public opinion and in the parliament. In contrast, it was far easier for the United States to obtain the use of bases in authoritarian Uzbekistan for operations in Afghanistan” (Nye 2004, p. 16).

Finally, important changes can be found in the economic strength that states possessed (Nye, 2002). Economic power has become more important than in the past, because of the relative increase in the costliness of force and because economic objectives loom large in the values of post-industrial societies. In a world of economic globalization, all countries are to some extent dependent on market forces beyond their direct control, but markets constrain different countries to different degrees. For example, “Japan has certainly done far better with its strategy as a trading state after 1945 than it did with its military strategy to create a Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere in the 1930s” (Nye 1990, p. 29). Clearly, Japan's role as a trading state after the

Second World War turned out to be more successful and lead it to be one of the largest national economies in the world.

It could be argued that the distribution of power resources in the contemporary age varies greatly on different issues. It is important to determine what power resources are the most important today. In international power today, factors such as technology, education, and economic growth are becoming more important and factors like geography, population, and raw materials are becoming less important. At least five trends have contributed to this diffusion of power: economic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology and changing political issues(Nye, 1990).

3 CONCLUSIONS

When we look at Nye's view on power historically, it is important to note that the nature of power is ever changing: transformation of power is never complete and power is not static. Politics is not a closed system and, thus, the agenda of world politics has become like a three-dimensional chess game in which one can win only by playing vertically and horizontally in an excellent way. On the top board players can find classic interstate military issues. Thus, it makes sense to speak in traditional terms of unipolarity or hegemony and the United States is viewed to be the only superpower with global military reach. However, on the middle board of interstate economic issues, the distribution of power is multipolar. In short, the United States is not able to obtain the outcomes it wants on trade and, therefore, the United States' financial regulation depends on the agreement of the European Union, Japan, China and others. Thus, it makes little sense to call this American hegemony. On the bottom board are placed transnational issues like international crime, climate change, and the spread of infectious diseases. Obviously, power is widely distributed and chaotically organised among state and non-state actors. Thus, it makes no sense at all to call this a unipolar world or an American hegemony. Nye calls this as "a set of issues that is now intruding into the world of grand strategy" (Nye 2004, p. 5).

By summarizing an extensive literature over Nye's understanding of power, we could argue that Nye developed a theoretical framework accompanied with examples from practice of international relations. The conceptual framework shown in this paper encourages rigorous attention to power in international relations. To understand what power in international relations is, Nye underlines the term of contextual intelligence, which is a fundamental skill in enabling politicians and diplomats to convert power resources into effective and successful strategies. Nye suggests that the most effective strategies in foreign policy today require a combination of hard and soft power into smart power strategies.

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